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diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45fb9a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex @@ -0,0 +1,1210 @@ +\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)} +\subsection*{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)} + +This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be +an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are +tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. +Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by +their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as +corresponding to non-tautologous propositions. + +Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or +supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is +also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the +notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the +natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in +philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is +continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which +philosophers have dealt with it. + +All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are +normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be heipful to +examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here +beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this +monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain +approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold +beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. + +it is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that +they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on +their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, +quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some +non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has +to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. +Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy +non-cognitive needs. + +To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I +could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is +true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which +we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level +of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit +and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing +subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to +recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of +beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical +validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in +the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are +alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have +not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions +being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. + +A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for +non-cognitive reasons follows. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it." + +\item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. + +\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons. + +\item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. + +\item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one +who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the +inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. +Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of +the archetypal activity in this category. + +When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are +instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive +motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific +method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he +believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a +common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who +discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a +commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he +must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. +The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry +begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows +that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a +demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then +their interest in science cannot be cognitive. + +The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the +non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the +non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not +be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed +area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two +contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be +satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test +or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other +hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a +single alternative is welcome. + +\item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested +in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To +academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had +made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians +circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as +scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. + +\item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is +provided by the person who holds a fearful belief which is widely considered +to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the +motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would +welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect +that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a +demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no +comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it +seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. +\end{enumerate} + +This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, +limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or +self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The +examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge +whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to +our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this +monograph. + +\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used +unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without +change.)} + +\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems} +\subsection*{Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts} + +In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of +philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing +language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might +tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, +formulations of them (for example, \formulation{Other persons have minds} as +representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem +will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be +driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or +false). + +To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right +into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next +chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and +simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain +concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution +they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has +to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly +philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which +doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the +truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the +others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. + +The first concept is a new one, that of "explication". Explication of a +familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding +a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is +wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing +philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their +"meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to +use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which +the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as +replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, +which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses +are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be +replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to +the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be +concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the +uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the +expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of +acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of +which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents +(and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. +Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents +in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, +especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. +(I will not say here just how I use "connotation". What the connotations of +an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a +supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are +supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) +supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, +for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the +expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to +be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". +Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is +inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the +same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. + +I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of +Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very +problematic "definition". For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher +of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, +suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of +"work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, +clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. + +Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an +expression is suggested, as an explication for "thing having a mind" (if +supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the +things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other +"overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this +expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for "thing +having a mind", since "thing having a mind" presumably has the connotations +for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, +higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt +behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by +the thing having it", and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: +the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the +proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causual +connection between having a mind and the other things, because the +expression 'thing having a mind' itself, and not the supposed effects of +having a mind, is what is under discussion. + +As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating +expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are +for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be +slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be +otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of +finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical +problems. + +Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed +name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the +connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases +when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with +philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly +be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the +explications for "thing having a mind" mentioned above. + +The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be +discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two +chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a +good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify +the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for "true statement". +(Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the +explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) + +Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be +"statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language +you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What +does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just +about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their +arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that +when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy +ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important +connotations of "true statement", and, more generally, of "statement", as +traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion +which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content", as it is sometimes +said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbal" part of a statement is +supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at +least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a +statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do +with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is +related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and +mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus +irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are +interested in.) Thus, if "true statement" is to be explicated, "assertion having +truth value" and "is true" (and "has content" in a misleading use) have to be +explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication +for "true statement" deserves the connotations which were suggested with +"assertion having truth value" and "is true". One important conclusion from +these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or +bodes of marks such as "The man talks") are often said to be "statements", +would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate "statement" by simply +identifying it with "sentence" (in my sense); something must be said about +such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same +reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify "statement" +with "sentence", the latter being explicated in terms of the ("formal") rules +for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no +reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. + +In explicating "true statement" I will use the most elegant approach, one +relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having +truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way +to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to +make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" \term{table} to +the thing. It is supposed that \term{table} has been "interpreted", that is, that it is +"determinate" to which, of all things, applications of \term{table} are (to be said +to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is +"determinate" which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word +"table", are expressions "equivalent to" "table".) The word "determinate" is +the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit +myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one +can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and +"then" the thing. 'point out' is restricted to refer to "ostension", pointing +out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to "directing +attention to things not in one's presence" as well. The assertion is 'true', of +course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things +to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) +"true", otherwise "false". It should be clear that such a pointing out of a +"first" thing and a "second", the first being an interpreted expression, is an +assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further +suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to +this explication, the things to which equivalent names ("occurances of a +name") may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, +other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the +concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple +assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is +how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation +between name and referents is an "objective, metaphysical entity", which +would be getting into philosophy proper. + +The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that +what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the +context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" +kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first +let us say that the "complex name" gotten by replacing a sentence's "main +verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the +sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is +'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate +clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main +verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: \said{The +table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one +man while the other man talked}; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been +pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, +but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be +invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to +make a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this +"asserted name" being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one +doesn't assert names; names just have referents---it is statements that one +makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate +this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple +kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. In other +words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a +statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and +puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying +'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in +Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the +application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. + +Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader +for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is +replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). +Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to +describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a +statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even +more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of +interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to +speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of +course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from +simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus +referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which +they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex +names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex +names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such +words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context +of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be +clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these +relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything +about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents (and +non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension +unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for +my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells +the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is +true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly +philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous +word 'determinate', because I haven't said anything about how names get +referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how +one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards +explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with +formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if +language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in +some form must have the central role in it.) + +"Statements", then, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind +which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have +described. I could thus explicate 'true statement' as referring to those true +"simple" assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this +would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of 'true +statement' having to do with the method of apptying the first member to the +second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to +do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more +elegant to explicate 'true statement' as referring to all true assertions of the +"simple" kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of +the two explications the reader prefers. + +So much for the preliminaries. + +\subsection*{Chapter 3 : "Experience"} + +I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step +in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical +language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This +terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing +my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on +precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I +think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern +philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are +relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. + +First, consider the term 'non-experience'. Although the concept of a +non-experience is intrinsically far more "difficult" than the concept of +"experience" which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, +presupposed in all "natural languages" and throughout philosophy, is so +taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should +have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are +perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of +it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the +future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects +from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily +understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and +their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the +second chapter); unperceivable "things" (microscopic objects (of course, +viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), +essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, +normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To +simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am +speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing +the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.) +Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that +there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one +can not know whether there are any---this is not a non-belief but a complex +belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the +mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is +presumably a connotation of 'other minds' for the reader, as explained in the +second chapter. + +In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. +Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about +non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or +experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that +one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some +of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes +(assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by +having a "visual-table-experience". The theory goes on to say that these +perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in +one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now +there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, +saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they +are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a +table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". +The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to +the second source of confusion. Does the English word 'table', as ordinarily +used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity +external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's +perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between +the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to +the reader, then he probably uses 'table', 'perceived table', and +'table-experience' as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, +is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not +perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this +confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being +used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the +perceptions. + +Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are +experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term +'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a +start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy +knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are +experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional +philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not +know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective +table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, +has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences +not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one +unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there +is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like. +One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would +be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, "thinking" that one doesn't have +one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be +shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest +idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the +reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably +known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some +philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say +cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some +philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In +speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a +lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by +appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy +which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One +does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective +tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other +persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's +table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as +will be shown). + +I have explained the current use of the term 'experience'. Now I want +to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, +will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing +'non-experience' I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of +the term, in the case of 'experience' I am going to suggest a new use for the +term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of +experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the +former. What I am interested in, however, is not 'experience' as it implies. +'perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind', but as it refers to that +which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not +something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it +already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that +experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same +referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use +'experience' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to +non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally +used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a +leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy +between 'experience' as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences +or in particular the realm where they could be, and 'experience' without +these connotations. + +Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be +obvious that although my term 'experience' was introduced last, it is +intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the +terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I +discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I +have used the perspective of the Western philsophical tradition to explain my +term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, +especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader's +conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and +especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he +ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term +'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. + +I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. +As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it +by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including +the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based +on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, +in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for +different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes +(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as "The table is +black" implies the formulation \formulation{Material objects are real} (to the materialist), +or \formulation{So-called objects are ideas in the mind} (to the idealist), or \formulation{Substances +and attributes are real}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to +explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, +ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I +use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of +\term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example +when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be +dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is +not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied +philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, +to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or +other natural language, but by having referents. + +As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my +\term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything +about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that +there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the +most important in this book. The fact that although it is the "simplest" and +least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain +using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the +philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my +\term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as +an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this +isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be +no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this +realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the +book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from +the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is +past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may +already realize what I'm going to say. + +\subsection*{Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution} + +Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the +book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the +problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the +language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present +the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my +work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, +and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a +philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will +not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to +explore all its implications; that will come later. + +However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this +chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous +version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight" behind the main +argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is +true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified +from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without +appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot +know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a +contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be +right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if +they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but +inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively +understandable way. + +To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that +one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to +that other that \name{black table} has to \name{table}: a referent of the former is +necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names +mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any +statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity depends on +'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For +example, \name{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the +formulation \formulation{Other persons have minds}, certainly depends on +\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-experience} will be true of the +associated name of any formulation of a belief. + +In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of +non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of +\term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions +\term{non-experience} and \term{experience} (traditional). What I did not go on to +show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, +one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What +follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the +reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's +experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there +be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was +awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to +non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of +non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in +the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) +justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it +without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were +just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience +(traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience +(traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have +them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into +experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience +which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there +is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience +(traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in +one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness +which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as +they are supposed to be understood. And for "understanding" +\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its +referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an +experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and +non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an experience +(traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands +'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and \triquote{non-experience}; but here +one is, using "non-experience" and \triquote{non-experience} to say so (which +certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible +for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the +concept of non-experience, it collapses. + +(A final point for the expert. This +tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does +not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot +name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences +about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that +one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say +so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) + +My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now +what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about +experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken +as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' +(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have +said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is +a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' +(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" +the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent +desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no +explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the +expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, +remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are +completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to +experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a +formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is +not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is +an important point about method which should be brought out. If all +"non-experiential language", "belief language", is inconsistent, how can I +show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer +is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into +contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I +want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we +have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of +beliefs are false'. + +Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about +belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is +right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since +the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a +belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable +explication which was true; in short, the belief would have a true +formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a +formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point +answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of +belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not +to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one +who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that +it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an +expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some +way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. +The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one +can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. +The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of +the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. +(Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the +way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like +being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to +be a "table"".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how +a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its +referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this +belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be +discussed here. + +The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes, +but...' thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their +formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of +linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if +embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how +well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said +about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in +them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its +formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose +rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be +impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these +matters. + + +\clearpage + + +2/22/1963 + + +Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate +against Lincoln Center, February 22, + + +1963 +(photo by Jack Smith) + +\clearpage + + +\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems} + + +\subsection*{Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts} + + +In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by +discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be +talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of +the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will +not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify +"common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally +relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I +discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. + +I should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed +to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of +non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. +This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one +does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having +beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for "belief" in the +use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of +the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an +experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of +consciously having a belief", of what is "in one's head" when one says that +one "believes a certain thing". Further, I will, for convenience in +distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief "that others have minds", for example, +or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation +marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be +"about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely +about experiences; I will not be trying to talk "about the realm of +non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already +fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has +any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his +"beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously +believing', although I will need to make a few comments about that too. +What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, +use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, +rather than rejecting the word altogether. + +There is a further point about terminology. The reader should +remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that +perceptions are in the mind", one can make a distinction between mental +and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with +one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am +going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For +example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an +"imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by +"imagined" I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I +use "imagined" because saying 'mental-table-experience" is too much like +saying "table in the mind" and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way +of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of +an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is +a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental +experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of +a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining +like a (non-mental) table-experience). In other words, an +imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it +is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a +(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an +imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this +terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the +conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by +saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". + +I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, +not perceived by oneself, behind one now", or anything else. Well, in the +first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an +imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization +of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed +statement, such as \lexpression{There is a table behind me}. This is not all one does, +however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said +to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The +additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" +toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe +that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief +about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in +other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental +action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not +be, at all like the claim "that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to +correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The +question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise +here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, +the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is +"consciously, deliberately" self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I +don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what +is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the +attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good +explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". + +I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one +is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as +mentioned above. The attitude is "peripheral", is a matter of the way one is +atttentive. Saying that the attitude is "conscious, deliberate", is a little +strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am +trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception +such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This +is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the +inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; +with respect to English the attitude is a "vague, elusive" thing, very difficult +to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by +saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think +I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the +attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the +self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a +(non-mental) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief "that there is +a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic +expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an +imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself +(to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving +attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back +to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is +a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly +an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not +inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that +one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked +the question, one stops believing "that there is a table behind one" and starts +believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a +non-experience", a different matter (different belief). + +lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression +(which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), +the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a +referent". With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's +attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \expression{There is a table +behind me}, pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and +one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent". +Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of +beliefs. + +\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse +the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the +version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving +language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an +imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in +the version involving language, the attention is on something which is +"regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). +For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove", and +correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs +doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, +referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make +believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in +the version of the belief not involving language, has something which +functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language +one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one +has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the +version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the +thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving +"language" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a +referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, +which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does +so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the +belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires +with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the +way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for +awareness of the referent to be part of one's experience corresponds to the +attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it +not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's +experience corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. +Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which +it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving +language consists of being attentive to an imagined-experience and having the +attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief. + +Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather +unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of +"attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be +something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it +to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive", so that I am +calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to +speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the +experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is +"self-deceiving", is a "(conscious) self-deception experience", because when +aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just +about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere +taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to +be a "belief". The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be +"self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of +the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be +to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which +would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is +to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more +than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving". + +In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention +some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, +one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the +one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and +believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing +table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so +believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in +believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence +for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation +shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic +expression 'x', one may give attention to a referent of +'imagined-x(-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to +imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be +"analogous to the referent of 'x'". In the latter case the y-experiences will be +mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be +to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is +visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of +'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-y-experiences +(such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be +"analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with +beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as +Being". + +Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", +"arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate +the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong +with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would +show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language +and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested +before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the +justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive +justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be +evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical +assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them +inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has +four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that") any other table has four +legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it +superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, +argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can +show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, +weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to +believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, +then one already had the belief "implicitly" (it was a conjunct of a belief +one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. + +I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions +my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, +I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my +position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, +and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it +is ironic that 'disbeliever', without qualification, has been used by believers +as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some +belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the +existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to +speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental +experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, +is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either +be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are +inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere +"decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies +"the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical +of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", +has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. + +What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of +beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In +the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions +dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect them +to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting +the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have +described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the +self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. +To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right +philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief +one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). + +\subsection*{Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs} + +In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any +given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter +I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just +what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the +entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at +least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, +psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, +phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, +comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each +with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, +associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not +hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential +language", and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not +always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and +belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter +of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an +anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are +difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has +to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind +what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are +incomplete and confused. + +What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a +few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of "knowledge"; +have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are +thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so +"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as +too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if +they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. +The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have +these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's +experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea +of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and +of not having it. + +Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered", beliefs +formulated in "natural laws", beliefs "about substance", and the like. +Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived +world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting +beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is +("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The +non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is associated with beliefs +"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the +world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's +"perceived world" is not part of what is "essential" in these beliefs. + +Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. +After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from +oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict +sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a +formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave +one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are spatially +distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a +visual---"moving"---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal +beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. + +Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring" may +seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", +doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that +things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the +slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should +observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs +"about the objectivity of referring", but they are not "objective referring"; +and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. + +Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself +have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other +humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in +rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived +other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is +associated with the belief "that others have minds", but it is not "other +humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not +part of what is essential in believing "that others have minds", points I +anticipated in the second chapter. + +Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of +temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form "If \x, then \y\ +will follow in the future", especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is +something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the +switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear +"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge". They say, +for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, +and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the +light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated +with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does +not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not +part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the +light will come on". As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about +the necessity of such knowledge for survival", it is just more beliefs of the +same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt +dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows +how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. +Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" +beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. + +By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their +formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most +suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with +non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the +beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in +defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he +continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the +experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do +so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to +deny that he has the experiences. Now I am not denying that he has the +experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the +reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the +self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary +of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs +after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It +sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief +language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language +to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's +usually because one has beliefs. + +The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences +is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all +English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a +result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use +English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly +associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often +among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have +always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to +so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being +the introduction of my use of "experience" in the third chapter. Thus, some +of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't +for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the +book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third +chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to +experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and +which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by +announcing when the language is used for that purpose. + +It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I +was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be +understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented +my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This +does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They +are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, +which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think +of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not +be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually +get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by +suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than +beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English +in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to +learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having +unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. + +\subsection*{Chapter 7 : Summary} + +The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I +am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore +beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he +will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to +construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a +formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or +the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of +them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is +supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This +statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in +connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that +my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible +argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain +unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to "doubt, question" it, or +to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not +believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief +to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the +position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is +objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to +reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less +credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a +belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to +decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or +the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to +understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it +is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be +wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the +matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my +position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. + +Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without +beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for +example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. +Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to +be "true or false", to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you +to believe something, for example, to believe "that there is a table behind +you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to +continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing +yourself with your back to a table"), you are going to have to have the +attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, +deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going +to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. + +As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, +intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to +realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The +important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true +statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the +expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences +associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when +you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my +language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to +do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the +complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to +be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language"); if you +don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just +ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said +about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not +therefore valueless. + +So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having +beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete +transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter +position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, +"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic +proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical +problems (for example, "Could an omnipotent god do the literally +impossible?", "Are statements about what I did in the past while alone +capable of intersubjective verification?") arising from them? And again, one +begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is +wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be "Why +bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving +myself". Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. +And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one +"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so +(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, +since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts +which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. + |