cleaning aling

1 files changed, 492 insertions, 796 deletions

diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex
index ef48678..49cfd11 100644
--- a/blueprint.tex
+++ b/blueprint.tex
@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@
 \newcommand{\essaytitle}[1]{
 	\emph{#1}}
 
+\newcommand{\gap}{\plainbreak{2}}
+
+% --- typesetting aids for some subtle syntax of flynt
+\newcommand{\formulation}[1]{'\textit{#1}'}
+
+\newcommand{\triquote}[1]{'''#1'''}
+
 \begin{document}
 
 \graphicspath{{img/}}
@@ -388,7 +395,7 @@ refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond
 experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic 
 expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark 
 parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to 
-nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word 'table' is supposed to denote an 
+nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word "table" is supposed to denote an 
 object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. 
 Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as 
 follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that 
@@ -398,10 +405,10 @@ words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of
 all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is 
 true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is 
 whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more 
-immediately than in the case of 'nonexperience,' that this question is 
+immediately than in the case of "nonexperience," that this question is 
 caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is 
 there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and 
-nonexperiences? Is there an expression, 'Empire State Building,' which is 
+nonexperiences? Is there an expression, "Empire State Building," which is 
 related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and 
 which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire 
 State Building or not? ) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask 
@@ -412,7 +419,7 @@ natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of
 the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this 
 container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There 
 is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned 
-before, the aphorism that 'saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an 
+before, the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an 
 example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
 
 in summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, 
@@ -481,7 +488,7 @@ that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street,
 shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? 
 Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of 
 having to accept the dare that "you have to do it to prove you don't believe 
-it's dangerous'? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? 
+it's dangerous"? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? 
 The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief 
 should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. 
 
@@ -519,7 +526,7 @@ blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I
 structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. 
 
 The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I 
-have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that 'if I try to walk 
+have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that "if I try to walk 
 through the wall I wil! fail and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am 
 sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. 
 But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a 
@@ -632,7 +639,6 @@ phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this
 way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical 
 anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. 
 
-
 \item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" 
 of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
 Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I 
@@ -668,10 +674,10 @@ emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these
 temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) 
 
 How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if 
-my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily--- the 
+my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily---the 
 object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. 
 
-\plainbreak{2}
+\gap
 
 \item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
 take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other 
@@ -692,7 +698,7 @@ hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is
 simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he 
 apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction 
 between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only 
-way of confirming a model, but to construct a mode! of the relation between 
+way of confirming a model, but to construct a model of the relation between 
 the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. 
 
 \item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative 
@@ -736,7 +742,7 @@ walking through a wail or not.
 At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my 
 genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of 
 non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a 
-hair's-breadth of difference between the state ! propose and mental 
+hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental 
 incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
 this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. 
 
@@ -752,7 +758,7 @@ over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes.
 Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking 
 suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an 
 objective relation between words and things.) The !anguage we "see" is a 
-shell whose 'transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. 
+shell whose "transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. 
 
 \item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in 
 \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical 
@@ -761,11 +767,12 @@ motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of
 contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline 
 case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which 
 violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to 
-classify.) The contradiction in "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs" has to do first 
+classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first 
 with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to 
 do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as 
 if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter 
 sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. 
+\end{enumerate}
 
 
 {
@@ -797,341 +804,48 @@ Comments from the audience
 
 \chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality}
 
+\begin{enumerate}
 
-1. STOP ALL "GROSS BELIEVING," SUCH AS BELIEF IN OTHER 
-MINDS, CAUSALITY, AND THE PHANTOM ENTITIES OF SCIENCE 
-(ATOMS, ELECTRONS, ETC.). 
-
-
-2. STOP THINKING IN PROPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE. 
-
-
-3. STOP ALL SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESIZING. DO NOT CONSIDER 
-YOUR "SIGHTINGS" OF THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING AS 
-CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS THERE WHEN YOU ARE NOT LOOKING 
-AT !T-OR FOR THAT MATTER, AS CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS 
-THERE WHEN YOU ARE LOOKING AT IT. 
-
-
-4. STOP ORGANIZING VISUAL EXPERIENCES AND TACTILE 
-EXPERIENCES INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. STOP ORGANIZING 
-SO-CALLED "DIFFERENT SPATIAL ORIENTATIONS OR DIFFERENT 
-TOUCHED SURFACES OF OBJECTS" INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. THAT 
-IS, STOP HAVING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTS. 
-
-
-5. STOP BELIEVING IN PAST AND FUTURE TIME. THAT 15, LIVE 
-OUT OF TIME. STOP FEELING LONGING, DREAD, OR REGRET. 
-
-
-6. STOP BELIEVING THAT YOU CAN MOVE YOUR BODY. 
+\item \textsc{ Stop all \enquote{gross believing,} such as belief in other minds, causality, and the phantom entities of science (atoms, electrons, \etc).}
 
+\item \textsc{Stop thinking in propositional language.}
 
-7. STOP BELIEVING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY 
-OBJECTIVE MEANING. 
+\item \textsc{Stop all scientific hypothesizing. Do not consider your "sightings" of the empire state building as confirmations that it is there when you are not looking at it --- or for that matter, as confirmations that it is there when you \emph{are} looking at it.}
 
+\item \textsc{Stop organizing visual experiences and tactile experiences into object-gestalts. Stop organizing so-called "different spatial orientations or different touched surfaces of objects" into object-gestalts. That is, stop having perceptions of objects.}
 
-8. YOU ARE NOW FREE TO WALK THROUGH WALLS (IF YOU CAN 
-FIND THEM). 
+\item \textsc{Stop believing in past and future time. That is, live out of time. Stop feeling longing, dread, or regret.}
 
+\item \textsc{Stop believing that you can move your body.}
 
-25 
+\item \textsc{Stop believing that these instructions have any objective meaning.}
 
+\item \textsc{You are now free to walk through walls (if you can find them).}
 
-6. Some Objections to My Philosophy 
+\chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
 
 
-A. The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in 
-euucated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the 
+\textbf{A.} The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in 
+educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the 
 philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The 
 Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply 
 that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that 
 other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a 
 philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See 
-Philosophical Investigations, $420.) Statements which imply that other 
+Philosophical Investigations, \S 420.) Statements which imply that other 
 people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were 
 intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because 
-they subject the statements to criticism by logical! standards which are 
-irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (§ § 402, 412, 119, 116.) 
+they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are 
+irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.) 
 
 For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, 
 and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things 
 which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real 
-case.' (§303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's 
+case." (\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's 
 memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in 
 God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. 
 
 
-Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs 
-
-
-In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
-given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
-I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just 
-what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the 
-entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
-least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, 
-psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, 
-phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, 
-comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each 
-with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, 
-associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not 
-
-
-26 
-
-
-ee eR eT A ee OE eT Ee a 
-
-
-hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential 
-language', and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
-always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and 
-belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter 
-of fact is unquestionably does involve betiefs, is not for example an 
-anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of- knowledge are 
-difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has 
-to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind 
-what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are 
-incomplete and confused. 
-
-What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a 
-few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of 'knowledge'; 
-have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are 
-thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so 
-"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity} that they are either just assumed, as 
-too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if 
-they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
-The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
-these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's 
-experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
-of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
-of not having it. 
-
-Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered', beliefs 
-formulated in 'natural laws", beliefs "about substance', and the like. 
-Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived 
-world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
-beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is 
-("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
-non-strange character of one's 'perceived world" is associated with beliefs 
-"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the 
-world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
-"perceived world" is not part of what is 'essential' in these beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
-After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from 
-oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict 
-sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
-formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave 
-one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply 'that there are spatially 
-distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a 
-visual - "moving" - hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
-beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
-
-
-27 
-
-
-Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring' may 
-seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", 
-doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
-things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
-slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should 
-observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs 
-"about the objectivity of referring', but they are not "objective referring'; 
-and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
-have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other 
-humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
-rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived 
-other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
-associated with the belief 'that others have minds', but it is not "other 
-humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
-part of what is essentia! in believing "that others have minds", points I 
-anticipated in the second chapter. 
-
-Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of 
-temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form 'If x, then y 
-will follow in the future', especially if y is something one wants, and x is 
-something one can do. {After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the 
-switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear 
-"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge'. They say, 
-for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
-and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the 
-light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
-with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
-not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not 
-part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the 
-light will come on'. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about 
-the necessity of such knowledge for survivai", it is just more beliefs of the 
-same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt 
-dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows 
-how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. 
-Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" 
-beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
-
-By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their 
-formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most 
-suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with 
-non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the 
-beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in 
-
-
-28 
-
-
-ee ee ee eR 
-
-
-defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he 
-continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the 
-experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do 
-so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to 
-deny that he has the experiences. Now {I am not denying that he has the 
-experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the 
-reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the 
-self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary 
-of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs 
-after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It 
-sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief 
-language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language 
-to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's 
-usually because one has beliefs. 
-
-The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences 
-is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all 
-English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a 
-result, those who want to talk about experiences {my use) and still use 
-English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
-associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
-among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
-always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to 
-so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
-the introduction of my use of 'experience' in the third chapter. Thus, some 
-of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
-for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
-book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
-chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to 
-experiences, languag2 with which they are very strongly associated and 
-which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
-announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
-
-It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I 
-was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be 
-understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented 
-my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This 
-does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They 
-are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, 
-which is not having beliefs {and realizing, for any belief one happens to think 
-of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not 
-be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope f will eventually 
-get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by 
-
-
-29 
-
-
-suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than 
-beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English 
-in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to 
-learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
-unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
-
-
-Chapter 7 : Summary 
-
-
-The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
-am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
-beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he 
-will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to 
-construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a 
-formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or 
-the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of 
-them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is 
-supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This 
-statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in 
-connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that 
-my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible 
-argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain 
-unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to 'doubt, question" it, or 
-to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not 
-believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief 
-to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the 
-position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is 
-objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
-reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less 
-credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a 
-belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to 
-decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or 
-the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well! take one a long time to 
-understand my position, but if one is taking a jong time to decide whether it 
-is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be 
-wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the 
-matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my 
-position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. 
-
-Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without 
-beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for 
-
-
-30 
-
-
-example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. 
-Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to 
-be "true or false', to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
-to believe something, for example, to believe 'that there is a table behind 
-you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
-continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing 
-yourself with your back to a table'), you are going to have to have the 
-attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, 
-deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you do do? ) You are going 
-to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
-
-As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, 
-intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to 
-realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The 
-important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true 
-statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the 
-expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences 
-associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when 
-you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my 
-language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to 
-do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the 
-complete realization of what the right position is on you {it doesn't have to 
-be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language'); if you 
-don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just 
-ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
-about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not 
-therefore valueless. 
-
-So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having 
-beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete 
-transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter 
-position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, 
-"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
-proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical 
-problems (for example, 'Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
-impossible? ', 'Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
-capable of intersubjective verification? ') arising from them? And again, one 
-begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is 
-wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be 'Why 
-bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving 
-myself'. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
-And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one 
-"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
-
-
-31 
-
-
-(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, 
-since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts 
-which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. 
-
 In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason 
 why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read 
 that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they 
@@ -1141,8 +855,8 @@ Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet
 Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the 
 latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as 
 inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have 
-today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay "The 
-Flaws Underlying Beliefs" shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that 
+today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay \essaytitle{The 
+Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that 
 the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief 
 that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no 
 different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It Is 
@@ -1151,8 +865,8 @@ totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also
 possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be 
 absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per 
 cent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we 
-need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. "The Flaws Underlying 
-Beliefs" shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural 
+need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying 
+Beliefs} shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural 
 sciences, involve outright self-deception. 
 
 These discoveries have consequences far more important than the 
@@ -1162,8 +876,8 @@ the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human
 cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In 
 analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring 
 the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to 
-doubt in a real case, as in my essay "Philosophical Aspects of Walking 
-Through Walls." I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of 
+doubt in a real case, as in my essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking 
+Through Walls.} I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of 
 intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these 
 consequences. 
 
@@ -1172,11 +886,6 @@ can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical
 maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not 
 necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical 
 connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in 
-
-
-32 
-
-
 the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural 
 language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive 
 linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic 
@@ -1196,8 +905,8 @@ Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to
 see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as 
 inadmissible. 
 
-Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the Empire 
-State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The 
+Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the \textsc{Empire 
+State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The 
 Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic 
 because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no 
 behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to 
@@ -1216,27 +925,23 @@ to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious
 inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish 
 intellectual dishonesty. 
 
+\gap
 
-B. In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which 
+\textbf{B.} In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which 
 cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality 
 are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if 
-
-
-33 
-
-
 there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there 
 are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus 
 there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which 
 leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the 
-middle of the argument by a play on the words "subject" and "object." 
+middle of the argument by a play on the words \enquote{subject} and \enquote{object.} 
 
 When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the 
 attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within 
 experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it 
 would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be 
 "proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, 
-etc. from immediate experience, then ail these phenomena would be 
+etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be 
 trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be 
 my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its 
 otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it 
@@ -1254,12 +959,9 @@ describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly,
 there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective 
 basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is 
 controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with 
-
-
 crossed fingers.) 
-Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are 
-
 
+Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are 
 addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have 
 conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step 
 such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of 
@@ -1273,27 +975,17 @@ transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring
 the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, 
 transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the 
 empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing 
-
-
-34 
-
-
 fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many 
 transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific 
 psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes 
 as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental 
 arguments are supposed to prove. 
 
-
-35 
-
-
-7. Philosophy Proper ("Version 3," 1961) 
-Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973) 
-
+\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
+\subsection*{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be 
-an inquiry as to which beliefs are 'true,' or right. The right beliefs are 
+an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are 
 tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. 
 Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by 
 their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as 
@@ -1325,14 +1017,9 @@ to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare.
 Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy 
 non-cognitive needs. 
 
-To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "! 
+To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I
 could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is 
 true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which 
-
-
-36 
-
-
 we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level 
 of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit 
 and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing 
@@ -1340,31 +1027,27 @@ subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to
 recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of 
 beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical 
 validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in 
-the denial! of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are 
+the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are 
 alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have 
-not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self- deceptions 
+not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions 
 being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. 
 
 A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for 
 non-cognitive reasons follows. 
 
-1. Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to 
-live if 1 didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to 
-know it." 
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it." 
 
-2. One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews 
-to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
+\item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
 
-3. The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in 
-Catholicism for esthetic reasons. 
+\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons. 
 
-4, Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their 
-efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
+\item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
 
-5. A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one 
+\item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one 
 who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the 
 inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. 
-Such a circumscribed inquiry wil! be called 'theologizing," in recognition of 
+Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of 
 the archetypal activity in this category. 
 
 When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are 
@@ -1382,10 +1065,6 @@ that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a
 demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then 
 their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
 
-
-37 
-
-
 The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the 
 non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the 
 non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not 
@@ -1397,14 +1076,14 @@ or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other
 hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a 
 single alternative is welcome. 
 
-6. Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested 
+\item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested 
 in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To 
 academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had 
-made vatid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians 
+made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians 
 circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as 
 scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. 
 
-7. The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is 
+\item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is 
 provided by the person who holds a fearful! belief which is widely considered 
 to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the 
 motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would 
@@ -1413,33 +1092,28 @@ that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a
 demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no 
 comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it 
 seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. 
+\end{enumerate}
 
 This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, 
-limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self- deception, or 
+limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or 
 self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The 
 examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge 
 whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to 
 our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this 
 monograph. 
 
-
-(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
+\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
 unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without 
-change.) 
-
-
-38 
-
-
-Part I : The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems 
-Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts 
+change.)}
 
+\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
+\subsection*{Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of 
 philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing 
 language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might 
 tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, 
-formulations of them (for example, 'Other persons have minds' as 
+formulations of them (for example, \formulation{Other persons have minds} as 
 representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem 
 will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be 
 driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or 
@@ -1457,10 +1131,10 @@ doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the
 truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the 
 others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. 
 
-The first concept is a new one, that of 'explication'. Explication of a 
+The first concept is a new one, that of "explication". Explication of a 
 familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding 
 a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is 
-wanted that the expression 'mean'. To explain: I will be discussing 
+wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing 
 philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their 
 "meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
 use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which 
@@ -1469,48 +1143,43 @@ replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is,
 which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses 
 are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be 
 replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to 
-the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that ! will be 
+the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be 
 concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the 
 uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the 
 expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of 
-acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions {expressions of 
-
-
-39 
-
-
+acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of 
 which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents 
 (and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. 
 Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents 
 in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, 
 especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. 
-(1 will not say here just how I use 'connotation'. What the connotations of 
+(I will not say here just how I use "connotation". What the connotations of 
 an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a 
 supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are 
-supposed to be like.) 'Finding', or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
+supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
 supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, 
 for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the 
 expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced wil! be said to 
-be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the 'explication'. 
+be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". 
 Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is 
 inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the 
 same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. 
 
 I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of 
 Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very 
-problematic 'definition'. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
+problematic "definition". For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
 of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, 
 suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of 
 "work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
 clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. 
 
 Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an 
-expression is suggested, as an explication for 'thing having a mind' (if 
+expression is suggested, as an explication for "thing having a mind" (if 
 supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the 
 things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other 
 "overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
-expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for 'thing 
-having a mind', since 'thing having a mind' presumably has the connotations 
+expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for "thing 
+having a mind", since "thing having a mind" presumably has the connotations 
 for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
 higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt 
 behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by 
@@ -1523,11 +1192,6 @@ having a mind, is what is under discussion.
 
 As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating 
 expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are 
-
-
-40 
-
-
 for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be 
 slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be 
 otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of 
@@ -1540,13 +1204,13 @@ connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases
 when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with 
 philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly 
 be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the 
-explications for 'thing having a mind' mentioned above. 
+explications for "thing having a mind" mentioned above. 
 
 The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be 
 discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
 chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a 
 good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify 
-the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for 'true statement'. 
+the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for "true statement". 
 (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the 
 explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
 
@@ -1558,47 +1222,42 @@ about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their
 arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that 
 when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy 
 ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important 
-connotations of 'true statement', and, more generally, of 'statement', as 
+connotations of "true statement", and, more generally, of "statement", as 
 traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion 
-which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content', as it is sometimes 
-said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbai" part of a statement is 
+which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content", as it is sometimes 
+said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbal" part of a statement is 
 supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at 
 least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a 
 statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do 
 with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is 
-related. {The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and 
+related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and 
 mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus 
 irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are 
-interested in.) Thus, if 'true statement' is to be explicated, 'assertion having 
-truth value' and 'is true' (and 'has content' in a misleading use) have to be 
+interested in.) Thus, if "true statement" is to be explicated, "assertion having 
+truth value" and "is true" (and "has content" in a misleading use) have to be 
 explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication 
-
-
-41 
-
-
-for 'true statement' deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
-'assertion having truth value' and 'is true'. One important conclusion from 
+for "true statement" deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
+"assertion having truth value" and "is true". One important conclusion from 
 these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or 
-bodes of marks such as 'The man talks') are often said to be "statements", 
-would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate 'statement' by simply 
-identifying it with 'sentence' (in my sense); something must be said about 
+bodes of marks such as "The man talks") are often said to be "statements", 
+would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate "statement" by simply 
+identifying it with "sentence" (in my sense); something must be said about 
 such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same 
-reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify 'statement' 
-with 'sentence', the latter being explicated in terms of the ('formal') rules 
+reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify "statement" 
+with "sentence", the latter being explicated in terms of the ("formal") rules 
 for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no 
 reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. 
 
-In explicating 'true statement' I wil! use the most elegant approach, one 
+In explicating "true statement" I will use the most elegant approach, one 
 relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having 
 truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way 
 to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to 
-make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" 'table' to 
-the thing. It is supposed that 'table' has been "interpreted", that is, that it is 
-"determinate" to which, of ail things, applications of 'table' are (to be said 
+make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" \term{table} to 
+the thing. It is supposed that \term{table} has been "interpreted", that is, that it is 
+"determinate" to which, of all things, applications of \term{table} are (to be said 
 to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
-'determinate' which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word 
-'table", are expressions "equivalent to" 'table'.) The word 'determinate' is 
+"determinate" which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word 
+"table", are expressions "equivalent to" "table".) The word "determinate" is 
 the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit 
 myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one 
 can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and 
@@ -1617,13 +1276,9 @@ other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the
 concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple 
 assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is 
 how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
-between name and referents is an 'objective, metaphysical entity", which 
+between name and referents is an "objective, metaphysical entity", which 
 would be getting into philosophy proper. 
 
-
-42 
-
-
 The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that 
 what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the 
 context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" 
@@ -1633,20 +1288,18 @@ verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the
 sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is 
 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
 clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main 
-verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: 'The 
+verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: \said{The 
 table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one 
-man while the other man talked'; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been 
+man while the other man talked}; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been 
 pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
 but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be 
 invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to 
-make <a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this 
-"asserted name' being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
-doesn't assert names; names just have referents—-it is statements that one 
-
-
+make a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this 
+"asserted name" being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
+doesn't assert names; names just have referents---it is statements that one 
 makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate 
 this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
-kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. tn other 
+kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. In other 
 words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a 
 statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and 
 puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying 
@@ -1657,7 +1310,7 @@ application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'.
 Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader 
 for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is 
 replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). 
-Well, all 1 can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to 
+Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to 
 describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a 
 statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even 
 more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of 
@@ -1668,18 +1321,13 @@ simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus
 referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which 
 they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex 
 names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex 
-
-
-43 
-
-
 names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such 
 words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
 of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be 
 clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these 
 relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything 
-about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents {and 
-non-referents), of a name is. {I might say that a thing can't have an intension 
+about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents (and 
+non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension 
 unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for 
 my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells 
 the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is 
@@ -1707,20 +1355,13 @@ the two explications the reader prefers.
 
 So much for the preliminaries. 
 
+\subsection*{Chapter 3 : "Experience"}
 
-Chapter 3 : "Experience" 
-
-
-1 will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step 
+I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step 
 in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical 
 language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This 
 terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing 
 my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on 
-
-
-44 
-
-
 precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I 
 think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern 
 philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are 
@@ -1734,7 +1375,7 @@ taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should
 have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are 
 perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of 
 it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the 
-future (future events); the past; space {or better, the distantness of objects 
+future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects 
 from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily 
 understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and 
 their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the 
@@ -1760,15 +1401,10 @@ experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that
 one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
 of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes 
 (assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by 
-having a "visual-table-experience'. The theory goes on to say that these 
+having a "visual-table-experience". The theory goes on to say that these 
 perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in 
 one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now 
-there are two sources of confusion in ail this for the naive reader. First, 
-
-
-45 
-
-
+there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, 
 saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they 
 are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a 
 table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". 
@@ -1791,7 +1427,7 @@ experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term
 'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
 start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy 
 knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are 
-experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A_ traditional 
+experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional 
 philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not 
 know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective 
 table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, 
@@ -1805,17 +1441,12 @@ one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be
 shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest 
 idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the 
 reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably 
-known {I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some 
+known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some 
 philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say 
 cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some 
 philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In 
 speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a 
 lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by 
-
-
-46 
-
-
 appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy 
 which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One 
 does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences {nor are the objective 
@@ -1838,7 +1469,7 @@ something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it
 already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that 
 experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same 
 referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use 
-'experiei.ce' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
+'experience' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
 non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally 
 used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a 
 leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy 
@@ -1860,41 +1491,36 @@ ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term
 'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. 
 
 I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. 
-
-
-47 
-
-
 As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it 
 by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including 
 the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based 
 on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, 
 in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for 
 different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes 
-(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as 'The table is 
-black' implies the formulation 'Material objects are real' (to the materialist), 
-or 'So-called objects are ideas in the mind' (to the idealist), or 'Substances 
-and attributes are real', and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
+(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as "The table is 
+black" implies the formulation \formulation{Material objects are real} (to the materialist), 
+or \formulation{So-called objects are ideas in the mind} (to the idealist), or \formulation{Substances 
+and attributes are real}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
 explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, 
 ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I 
 use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of 
-'experience', about its referents, there is about my English, for example 
+\term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example 
 when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be 
-dropped from 'experience'. There can be this new term, the philosopher is 
+dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is 
 not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied 
 philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, 
 to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or 
 other natural language, but by having referents. 
 
 As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my 
-'experience' because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything 
+\term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything 
 about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that 
 there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
-most important in this book. The fact that although it is the 'simplest' and 
+most important in this book. The fact that although it is the "simplest" and 
 least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain 
 using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the 
 philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my 
-'experience' he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as 
+\term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as 
 an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this 
 isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be 
 no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this 
@@ -1904,12 +1530,7 @@ the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is
 past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may 
 already realize what I'm going to say. 
 
-
-48 
-
-
-Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution 
-
+\subsection*{Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution}
 
 Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the 
 book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the 
@@ -1924,7 +1545,7 @@ explore all its implications; that will come later.
 
 However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this 
 chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous 
-version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight' behind the main 
+version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight" behind the main 
 argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is 
 true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified 
 from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without 
@@ -1934,29 +1555,24 @@ contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be
 right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if 
 they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but 
 inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively 
-understandable way. : 
+understandable way. 
 
 To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that 
 one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
-that other that 'black table' has to 'table': a referent of the former is 
+that other that \name{black table} has to \name{table}: a referent of the former is 
 necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names 
 mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any 
-statement, or formulation, of a _ belief of necessity depends on 
+statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity depends on 
 'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
-example, 'Other persons having minds', the associated name of the 
-formulation 'Other persons have minds', certainly depends on 
-'non-experience'. Thus, anything true of 'non-experience' will be true of the 
+example, \name{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the 
+formulation \formulation{Other persons have minds}, certainly depends on 
+\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-experience} will be true of the 
 associated name of any formulation of a belief. 
 
 In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of 
 non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
-'non-experience'), showed the connotations of the expressions 
-'non-experience' and 'experience' (traditional). What ! did not go on to 
-
-
-49 
-
-
+\term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions 
+\term{non-experience} and \term{experience} (traditional). What I did not go on to 
 show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, 
 one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What 
 follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the 
@@ -1979,30 +1595,28 @@ is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience
 (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in 
 one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
 which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as 
-they are supposed to be understood. And for 'understanding' 
-'non-experience' {and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its 
+they are supposed to be understood. And for "understanding"
+\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its 
 referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an 
 experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and 
-non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an_ experience 
-{traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 
-'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and "non-experience"; but here 
-one is, using "non-experience" and "non-experience" to say so (which 
+non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an experience 
+(traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 
+'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and \triquote{non-experience}; but here 
+one is, using "non-experience" and \triquote{non-experience} to say so (which 
 certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible 
 for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the 
-concept of non-experience, it collapses. (A final point for the expert. This 
+concept of non-experience, it collapses. 
+
+(A final point for the expert. This 
 tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does 
 not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot 
 name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences 
 about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that 
 one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say 
-so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) : 
-My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
-what is important is that it has done so precisely because ! have talked about 
-
-
-50 
-
+so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) 
 
+My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
+what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about 
 experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken 
 as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' 
 (traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
@@ -2019,11 +1633,11 @@ experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a
 formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is 
 not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is 
 an important point about method which should be brought out. If all 
-"non-experiential language', 'belief language", is inconsistent, how can I 
+"non-experiential language", "belief language", is inconsistent, how can I 
 show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer 
-is that 1 don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into 
+is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into 
 contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I 
-want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as 1 said we would, we 
+want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we 
 have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of 
 beliefs are false'. 
 
@@ -2045,18 +1659,11 @@ way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made.
 The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one 
 can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
 The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of 
-
-
-51 
-
-
 the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. 
 (Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the 
 way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like 
 being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to 
-
-
-be a "table".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
+be a "table"".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
 a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its 
 referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this 
 belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be 
@@ -2066,7 +1673,7 @@ The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes,
 but...' thoughts. !f he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
 formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of 
 linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if 
-embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but 1 am concerned with how 
+embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how 
 well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said 
 about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in 
 them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its 
@@ -2076,30 +1683,26 @@ impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these
 matters. 
 
 
-52 
+\clearpage
 
 
 2/22/1963 
 
 
 Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate 
+against Lincoln Center, February 22, 
 
 
 1963 
-(photo by Jack Smith} 
-
-
-53 
+(photo by Jack Smith)
 
-
-against Lincoln Center, February 22, 
+\clearpage
 
 
-Part 11 : Completion of the Treatment of 
-Properly Philosophical Problems 
+\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}
 
 
-Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts 
+\subsection*{Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts}
 
 
 In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by 
@@ -2109,70 +1712,64 @@ the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will
 not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
 "common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
 relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I 
-discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. ; 
+discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
 
-i should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed 
+I should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed 
 to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
 non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
 This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one 
 does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having 
-beliefs, that beliefs {in my sense) will not do as referents for 'belief' in the 
+beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for "belief" in the 
 use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of 
 the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an 
 experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of 
-consciously having a belief', of what is "in one's head" when one says that 
-one "believes a certain thing'. Further, I will, for convenience in 
-distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief 'that others have minds', for example, 
+consciously having a belief", of what is "in one's head" when one says that 
+one "believes a certain thing". Further, I will, for convenience in 
+distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief "that others have minds", for example, 
 or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation 
 marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be 
 "about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
-about experiences; I! will not be trying to talk "about the realm of 
+about experiences; I will not be trying to talk "about the realm of 
 non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already 
 fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has 
 any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his 
 "beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously 
-believing', although {I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
+believing', although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
 What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, 
 use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
 rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
 
 There is a further point about terminology. The reader should 
 remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that 
-perceptions are in the mind', one can make a distinction between mental 
+perceptions are in the mind", one can make a distinction between mental 
 and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
-
-
-54 
-
-
-one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now ! am 
+one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
 going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For 
-example, a _ visualization of a table will be said to be an 
+example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an 
 "imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by 
-'imagined' I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I 
-use 'imagined' because saying 'mental-table-experience' is too much like 
-saying 'table in the mind' and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way 
+"imagined" I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I 
+use "imagined" because saying 'mental-table-experience" is too much like 
+saying "table in the mind" and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way 
 of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
 an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
 a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
 experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of 
 a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
-like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). in other words, an 
+like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). In other words, an 
 imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it 
 is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
-(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined- 
-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
+(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
 imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this 
 terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the 
 conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by 
 saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". 
 
 I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, 
-not perceived by oneself, behind one now', or anything else. Well, in the 
+not perceived by oneself, behind one now", or anything else. Well, in the 
 first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an 
 imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization 
 of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed 
-statement, such as 'There is a table behind me'. This is not all one does, 
+statement, such as \lexpression{There is a table behind me}. This is not all one does, 
 however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said 
 to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The 
 additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" 
@@ -2181,75 +1778,65 @@ that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief
 about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
 other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental 
 action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not 
-be, at all like the claim 'that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
+be, at all like the claim "that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
 correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The 
 question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise 
 here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, 
 the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is 
-"consciously, deliberately' self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I 
-
-
-55 
-
-
+"consciously, deliberately" self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I 
 don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
 is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the 
-attitude and the reader is aware of it, he wil! presumably find it a good 
+attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good 
 explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". 
 
 I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one 
 is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as 
-mentioned above. The attitude is 'peripheral', is a matter of the way one is 
-atttentive. Saying that the attitude is 'conscious, deliberate', is a little 
-strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brain washing; what I am 
+mentioned above. The attitude is "peripheral", is a matter of the way one is 
+atttentive. Saying that the attitude is "conscious, deliberate", is a little 
+strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am 
 trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception 
 such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This 
 is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the 
 inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; 
-with respect to English the attitude is a 'vague, elusive" thing, very difficult 
+with respect to English the attitude is a "vague, elusive" thing, very difficult 
 to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by 
 saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think 
 I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the 
 attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the 
 self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a 
-(non-menta!) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief 'that there is 
+(non-mental) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief "that there is 
 a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
-expression, it will be on an _ imagined-experience such as an 
+expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an 
 imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself 
 (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving 
 attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
 to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
-a (non-menta!) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
+a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
 an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not 
 inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that 
 one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked 
-the question, one stops believing 'that there is a table behind one" and starts 
+the question, one stops believing "that there is a table behind one" and starts 
 believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
 non-experience", a different matter (different belief). 
 
 lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression 
 (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), 
 the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a 
-referent'. With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's 
-attention in believing would be primarily on the expression 'There is a table 
-behind me', pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and 
-one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent'. 
+referent". With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's 
+attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \expression{There is a table 
+behind me}, pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and 
+one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent". 
 Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of 
-
-
-56 
-
-
 beliefs. 
 
-(This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse 
-the reader it can be skipped.) I will now describe the relation between the 
+\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse 
+the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the 
 version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving 
 language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an 
 imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in 
 the version involving language, the attention is on something which is 
 "regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). 
-For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove', and 
+For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove", and 
 correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs 
 doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
 referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make 
@@ -2260,7 +1847,7 @@ one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one
 has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the 
 version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the 
 thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving 
-"Yanguage" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a 
+"language" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a 
 referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, 
 which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does 
 so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the 
@@ -2280,20 +1867,15 @@ Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather
 unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of 
 "attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
 something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it 
-to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive', so that I am 
+to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive", so that I am 
 calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to 
 speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the 
-
-
-57 
-
-
 experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
-"self-deceiving', is a "(conscious) self-deception experience', because when 
+"self-deceiving", is a "(conscious) self-deception experience", because when 
 aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just 
 about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere 
 taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to 
-be a 'belief'. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
+be a "belief". The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
 "self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of 
 the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be 
 to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which 
@@ -2311,10 +1893,10 @@ believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in
 believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence 
 for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation 
 shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic 
-expression 'x', one may give attention to a_ referent of 
-'imagined-x{-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to 
+expression 'x', one may give attention to a referent of 
+'imagined-x(-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to 
 imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
-"analogous to the referent of 'x". In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
+"analogous to the referent of 'x'". In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
 mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be 
 to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is 
 visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 
@@ -2322,7 +1904,7 @@ visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of
 (such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
 "analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
 beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
-Being'. 
+Being". 
 
 Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", 
 "arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate 
@@ -2331,35 +1913,22 @@ with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would
 show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language 
 and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested 
 before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the 
-
-
-58 
-
-
-t 
-i 
-$ 
-} 
-} 
-ig 
-
-
 justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive 
 justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be 
 evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical 
 assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them 
 inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has 
-four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that') any other table has four 
+four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that") any other table has four 
 legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it 
 superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, 
 argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can 
 show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, 
 weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to 
 believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, 
-then one already had the belief 'implicitly' (it was a conjunct of a belief 
+then one already had the belief "implicitly" (it was a conjunct of a belief 
 one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. 
 
-f will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions 
+I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions 
 my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, 
 I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my 
 position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, 
@@ -2376,7 +1945,7 @@ inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere
 "decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies 
 "the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
 of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", 
-has some of the very beliefs 1 am concerned to discredit. 
+has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. 
 
 What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of 
 beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In 
@@ -2387,44 +1956,253 @@ the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have
 described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the 
 self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. 
 To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right 
+philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief 
+one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
 
+\subsection*{Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
 
-59 
+In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
+given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
+I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just 
+what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the 
+entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
+least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, 
+psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, 
+phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, 
+comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each 
+with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, 
+associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not 
+hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential 
+language", and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
+always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and 
+belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter 
+of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an 
+anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are 
+difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has 
+to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind 
+what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are 
+incomplete and confused. 
 
+What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a 
+few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of "knowledge"; 
+have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are 
+thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so 
+"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as 
+too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if 
+they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
+The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
+these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's 
+experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
+of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
+of not having it. 
 
-d realizing, for any belief 
-sn't involve having 
+Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered", beliefs 
+formulated in "natural laws", beliefs "about substance", and the like. 
+Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived 
+world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
+beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is 
+("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
+non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is associated with beliefs 
+"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the 
+world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
+"perceived world" is not part of what is "essential" in these beliefs. 
 
+Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
+After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from 
+oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict 
+sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
+formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave 
+one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are spatially 
+distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a 
+visual---"moving"---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
+beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
-it is not having beliefs (an 
+Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring" may 
+seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", 
+doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
+things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
+slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should 
+observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs 
+"about the objectivity of referring", but they are not "objective referring"; 
+and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
+Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
+have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other 
+humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
+rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived 
+other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
+associated with the belief "that others have minds", but it is not "other 
+humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
+part of what is essential in believing "that others have minds", points I 
+anticipated in the second chapter. 
 
-philosophical position is: 
-it is wrong (which doe 
+Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of 
+temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form "If \x, then y 
+will follow in the future", especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is 
+something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the 
+switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear 
+"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge". They say, 
+for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
+and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the 
+light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
+with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
+not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not 
+part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the 
+light will come on". As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about 
+the necessity of such knowledge for survival", it is just more beliefs of the 
+same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt 
+dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows 
+how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. 
+Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" 
+beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
 
+By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their 
+formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most 
+suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with 
+non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the 
+beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in 
+defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he 
+continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the 
+experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do 
+so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to 
+deny that he has the experiences. Now I am not denying that he has the 
+experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the 
+reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the 
+self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary 
+of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs 
+after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It 
+sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief 
+language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language 
+to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's 
+usually because one has beliefs. 
 
-one happens to think of, that 
-beliefs)). 
+The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences 
+is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all 
+English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a 
+result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use 
+English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
+associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
+among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
+always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to 
+so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
+the introduction of my use of "experience" in the third chapter. Thus, some 
+of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
+for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
+book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
+chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to 
+experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and 
+which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
+announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
 
+It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I 
+was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be 
+understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented 
+my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This 
+does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They 
+are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, 
+which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think 
+of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not 
+be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually 
+get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by 
+suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than 
+beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English 
+in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to 
+learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
+unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
-60 
+\subsection*{Chapter 7 : Summary}
 
+The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
+am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
+beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he 
+will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to 
+construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a 
+formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or 
+the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of 
+them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is 
+supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This 
+statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in 
+connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that 
+my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible 
+argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain 
+unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to "doubt, question" it, or 
+to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not 
+believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief 
+to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the 
+position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is 
+objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
+reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less 
+credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a 
+belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to 
+decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or 
+the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to 
+understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it 
+is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be 
+wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the 
+matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my 
+position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. 
 
-ESTHETICS 
+Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without 
+beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for 
+example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. 
+Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to 
+be "true or false", to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
+to believe something, for example, to believe "that there is a table behind 
+you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
+continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing 
+yourself with your back to a table"), you are going to have to have the 
+attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, 
+deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going 
+to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
 
+As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, 
+intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to 
+realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The 
+important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true 
+statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the 
+expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences 
+associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when 
+you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my 
+language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to 
+do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the 
+complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to 
+be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language"); if you 
+don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just 
+ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
+about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not 
+therefore valueless. 
 
-8. Down With Art 
+So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having 
+beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete 
+transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter 
+position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, 
+"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
+proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical 
+problems (for example, "Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
+impossible?", "Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
+capable of intersubjective verification?") arising from them? And again, one 
+begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is 
+wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be "Why 
+bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving 
+myself". Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
+And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one 
+"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
+(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, 
+since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts 
+which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. 
 
+\part{Esthetics}
 
-1; 
-ART or BREND? by Henry Flynt 
+\chapter{Down With Art}
 
+\section{\textsc{Art} or \textsc{Brend}?}
 
-1. Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession 
-is to say that it is somehow scientific. L7-Monte Young, Milton Babbitt, and 
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession 
+is to say that it is somehow scientific. LaMonte Young, Milton Babbitt, and 
 Stockhausen are exponents of this sort of justification. 
 
-The flaw which reiates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value 
+The law which relates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value 
 and is an outstanding scientific law. Is the work of art such a law? The 
 experiment which shows that the speed of light is independent of the motion 
 of its source is a measurement of a phenomenon crucial to the confirmation of 
@@ -2437,9 +2215,9 @@ analysis?
 
 The motives behind the "scientific" justification of art are utterly sinister. 
 Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an 
-academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a_ pedantic 
-pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music', intends 
-nothing less than the suppression of the culture of 'lower classes" and 
+academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a pedantic 
+pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music", intends 
+nothing less than the suppression of the culture of "lower classes" and 
 "ower races." 
 
 It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to 
@@ -2448,24 +2226,19 @@ artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters
 all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the 
 audience than all the works that "obey" the laws. 
 
-2. The artist o: entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other 
+\item The artist or entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other 
 people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to 
 win public acceptance for it, to advertise and promote it, to sell it, to force it 
 on people. If the public doesn't accept it at first, he is disappointed. He 
 doesn't drop it, but repeatedly urges the product on them. 
 
 People have every reason, then, to ask the artist: Is your product good for 
-
-
-63 
-
-
 me even if I don't like or enjoy it? This question really lays art open. One of 
 the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to 
 defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of 
 art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but 
 they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one 
-artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is 'Do 
+artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is "Do 
 you like it?" Once the "scientific" justification of art is discredited, the 
 artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no 
 reason why you should "consume" it. 
@@ -2476,7 +2249,7 @@ transcended. Even so, subjectivity of value remains a feature which
 distinguishes art and entertainment from other activities. Thus art is 
 historically a leisure activity. 
 
-3. But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which 
+\item But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which 
 one person produces for the liking, the enjoyment of another. The value of 
 the object is supposed to be that you just like it. It supposedly has a value 
 which is entirely subjective and entirely within you, is a part of you. Yet---the 
@@ -2496,21 +2269,17 @@ connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find
 their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would 
 have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as 
 your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's 
-product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to "be oneself' for 
+product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to "be oneself" for 
 other people, to "express oneself" for them. 
-4. There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and 
-entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of t 
+
+\item There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and 
+entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of 
 these experiences, by comparing and contrasting them with art. I have 
-coined the term "brend" for these experiences. 
+coined the term \term{brend} for these experiences. 
 
 Consider all of your doings, what you already do. Exclude the gratifying of 
 physiological needs, physically harmful activities, and competitive activites. 
 Concentrate on spontaneous self-amusement or play. That is, concentrate on 
-
-
-64 
-
-
 everything you do just because you like it, because you just like it as you do 
 it. 
 
@@ -2526,7 +2295,7 @@ notice that things are not produced by you. The essence of a just-liking is
 that in it, you are not aware that the object you value is less personal to you 
 than your very valuing. 
 
-These just-likings are your "brend." Some of your dreams are brend; and 
+These just-likings are your \term{brend.} Some of your dreams are brend; and 
 some children's play is brend (but formal children's games aren't). In a sense, 
 though, the attempt to give interpersonal examples of brend is futile, 
 because the end result is neutral things or actions, cut off from the valuing 
@@ -2540,7 +2309,7 @@ necessarily solitary. The definition simply recognizes that valuing is an act of
 individuals; that to counterpose the likes of the community to the likes of 
 the individuals who make it up is an ideological deception. 
 
-5. It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are 
+\item It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are 
 pseudo-brend; that your brend is the total originality beyond art; that your 
 brend is the absolute self-expression and the absolute enjoyment beyond art. 
 Can brend, then, replace art, can it expand to fill the space now occupied by 
@@ -2552,17 +2321,12 @@ beyond art already occurs in his life---but is totally suppressed by the general
 repressiveness of society. 
 
 
-Note: The avant-garde artist may 'raise a final question. Can't art or 
+Note: The avant-garde artist may raise a final question. Can't art or 
 entertainment compensate for its impersonality by having sheer newness as a 
-
-
-65 
-
-
 value? Can't the very foreignness of the impersonal object be entertaining? 
 Doesn't this happen with Mock Risk Games, for example? The answer is 
 that entertainmenta! newness is also subjective. What is entertainingly 
-strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, oF irrelevant to 
+strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, or irrelevant to 
 another. The only difference between foreignness and other entertainment 
 values is that brend does not have more foreignness than conventional 
 entertainment does. 
@@ -2571,29 +2335,24 @@ As for objective newness, or the objective value of Mock Risk Games, these
 issues are so difficult that I have been unable to reach final conclusions 
 about them. 
 
+\clearpage
 
-66 
-
-
-2. 
-
-
-Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, 
-Mass., dated 11/8/62 
-
+\section{Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, 
+Mass., dated 11/8/62}
 
 One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and 
 decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others 
 were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and 
 "radical new theory" of "pure recreation" for their enjoyment but before he 
-let them in for this highly secret and "revolutionary theory' they should 
+let them in for this highly secret and "revolutionary theory" they should 
 follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclasm. From those 
 that balked he removed the label "avant-garde" and attached the label 
-traditionalist' or if they were already labeled "traditionalist" he added one 
+"traditionalist" or if they were already labeled "traditionalist" he added one 
 more star. If they accepted they got a "hip" rating with gold cluster and if 
 they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their 
 own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose 
 designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf. 
+
 Now about this hip radical new theory of pure recreation.---Well---alor! its 
 simply what people do anyway but don't realize it but it seems that what 
 people "do anyway and don't realize it" will not be fully appreciated until 
@@ -2609,38 +2368,23 @@ inspiration or any other natural phenomenon that reminds us of the ugly
 scourge art that has preoccupied and plagued man since he can remember 
 then yes then at last Henry Flynt, sorry! 
 
-sites tere tase 
-
-
-> Henry Flynt 
-
-
-v 
-er 
-
-
-. 
-TaySs 
-
+\img{terry_flynt_name}
 
 will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee 
-[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved] 
-
-
-67 
-
-
-3. 
 
+\signoffnote{[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved]}
 
-letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62 
+\clearpage
 
+\section{letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62}
 
 Dear Henry, 
 
+\gap
+
 perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not 
 important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most 
-admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage & 
+admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage \& 
 Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding "new" ideas has 
 not shown too much more than that it has become established as a 
 traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be 
@@ -2649,9 +2393,9 @@ react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of
 when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can 
 somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty 
 with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have 
-only had a few good ones. {I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't 
+only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't 
 seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand 
-way---but what I mean by "new ideas" is not only what you might call! 
+way---but what I mean by "new ideas" is not only what you might call
 "Concept Art" but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms 
 more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt 
 these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants 
@@ -2666,29 +2410,17 @@ since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is
 now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with 
 "just liked" things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art 
 (some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or 
-memory or however}. As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and 
+memory or however). As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and 
 when avoiding "given" structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and 
-decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. {f I need concentration, 
+decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. If I need concentration, 
 which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. 
 
 One accepts language, one accepts logic. 
 
-Best regards, 
-
-Bob Morris 
-
-
-68 
-
-
-> 
-i 
-fe 
-Ff 
-
-
-4, 
+\signoff{Best regards,}
+\signoff{Bob Morris}
 
+\section{}
 
 FROM "CULTURE" TO VERAMUSEMENT 
 Boston-New York 
@@ -3866,7 +3598,7 @@ of the M*-Memory, indirect implication is not only thinkable but
 mechanical. It is not superfluous because cross-method contact of mental 
 states is not necessarily transitive. The outside observer can decide whether a 
 sentence is a theorem by the following mechanical procedure. Check 
-whether the sentence's M*-assertion has acually been thought; if so, check ail 
+whether the sentence's M*-assertion has acually been thought; if so, check all 
 sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; if not, check all the 
 sentences which imply the sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; 
 etc. The number of possible methods is given as finite, so the procedure is 
@@ -3929,7 +3661,7 @@ the three are adjacent {and can be written Sit: S;, Si-1 ), and are such
 that 6 5 = xj44-Xj raat Sy is the implicand. (The function of Sj+4 is to 
 give the duration 6,= +1 -%; of Sj. Sj states that event;, the first 
 dae' of s? "4, ended ata aitence: Zj inte the past, where zj is smaller 
-than s $s own vduretian The diagram indicates the relations.) 
+than s \$s own vduretian The diagram indicates the relations.) 
 
 
 G2: evenby obi: event 3 
@@ -4446,7 +4178,7 @@ contact between states.
 
 Conclusion 3.3. For an M*-Memory, to remember is to choose the 
 mental state in which the remembering is required to occur (by the 
-memory). After ail, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the 
+memory). After all, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the 
 
 
 A,.-required things you are doing while you remember. 
@@ -4659,7 +4391,7 @@ Consider the consecutive thinking of each D-sentence precisely once, in
 minimum time, while the number of sentences remains constant. Such a 
 "D-paragraph" is a permutation of the D-sentences. Let H™ be a 
 D-paragraph when the number of sentances equals the integer m. There are 
-m! SA" s. When f(t) = m = 3, one of the sixH" sis sais}, thought in 
+m! SA" s. When f(t) = m = 3, one of the sixH" sis sais\}, thought in 
 minimum time. Assume that the duration A of a D-paragraph depends only 
 on the number of D-sentences and the bi. We can write 
 
@@ -4679,7 +4411,7 @@ i
 
 translation, and does not appear in the ®*- Memory. 
 
-Conclusion 7. Given a $*-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not 
+Conclusion 7. Given a \$*-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not 
 only will there be a gap in the awareness of when what events occurred; it 
 will be forgotten which method has actually been used. 
 
@@ -5202,7 +4934,7 @@ throughout. The organism has available different (single) methods, has
 different methods it could try. The different sequences, of all units, are 
 assigned to the different (single) methods available to the organism to signify 
 them; are symbols for them. (Thus, the number of available methods 
-increases as units are added to the memory.) /Now ail this only approximates 
+increases as units are added to the memory.) /Now all this only approximates 
 what is the case, because contrary to what I may have implied, which 
 method is used is not a matter of "fact" as are the temporal intervals and 
 amounts of progress. As I have said, having all units in any succession 
@@ -5223,7 +4955,7 @@ total memory, total recall ("factually"), although different sequences signify
 different methods used./ #As an indicator of the method used, the whole 
 memory is a multiplex symbol. Names for each of the methods are combined 
 in a single symbol, the totality of units. In remembering, the organism 
-separates any single name by going through ail the units in succession, and 
+separates any single name by going through all the units in succession, and 
 that name is the complete reading of the multiplex symbol, the complete 
 information about the method used. I will not be concerned to "explain" 
 the matter of the increasing number of available methods; or the matter of 
@@ -5250,7 +4982,7 @@ indefinite variety of contents, as humans have particular imagings, in its
 conscious states of mind. I will outline the principal contents. There are 
 "visualized" fluid regions of color (like colored liquids), first-order contents. 
 There are 'visualized' radient surfaces, and non-radient surfaces or regions 
-("holes"}, the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are 
+("holes"), the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are 
 "projective" constructs of imaged geometric surfaces, "covers," "lattices," 
 and "shells." Fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. They can occur in 
 certain series, "channels"; and in certain arrays, "reservoirs." A channel can 
@@ -5317,7 +5049,7 @@ Speaking as accurately as possible in English, in each reservoir there is
 precisely one point of "maximum mixture' of the primary colors. (The rest 
 of the reservoirs are not significant: the primary colors are mentally mixed in 
 any way to get the right amount of mixture, as pigments are mixed on a 
-palette.) X_ For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a 
+palette.) X\_ For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a 
 scale of amounts of color mixture. For the second memory, the points are 
 two points on a scale of vertical distances from the imaginary horizontal! line 
 which bisects the rectangular surface, divides it into lower and upper halves. 
@@ -5518,23 +5250,21 @@ edges of the surface and intersecting the four points in the ashes nearest the
 four edges of the surface) must exactly cover the film); develop film-- s. 3 is 
 the negative 
 
-$.2 and s.3 imply s.4: melt s.3 and cool in mold to form plastic doubly 
+\$.2 and s.3 imply s.4: melt s.3 and cool in mold to form plastic doubly 
 convex lens with small curvature; take color photograph of ashes' rectangle 
 in yellow light using this lens; develop film-- s. 4 is color negative 
 
-$.2 and s.4 imply s.5: repeat last step with s.4 (instead of 3), using red 
+\$.2 and s.4 imply s.5: repeat last step with s.4 (instead of 3), using red 
 light-- s. 5 is second color negative 
 
 S.2 and s.5 imply s.6: repeat last step with s.5, using blue light-- s. 6 is third 
 color negative 
 
-$.2 and s.6 imply s.7: make lens from s.6 mixed with the ashes which have 
+\$.2 and s.6 imply s.7: make lens from s.6 mixed with the ashes which have 
 been being photographed; make black and white photograph, in white fight, 
 of that part of the white surface where the ashes' rectangle was; develop film 
 
 
-128 
-
 
 - s.7 is second black and white negative 
 
@@ -5938,40 +5668,6 @@ and follow the instructions, go immediately to Page 6.
 
 
 137 
-
-
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-
-
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-? ay u3/4e9s8 uk[syv<ds,A<I 
-
-
-ux Alt > (8, fS2kv) taydu 
-
-
-vas] Sid6> \solu 
-89183 $7] $3 
-ca 
-*S;v \S> ne 
-§1V s Si\> tiiad I 
-S24 83 - fl s_ 3A ($482) 
-(ae, 
-S23 83 S<Vv 3 
-
-
-u [s3<} ( {ual $V 
-
-
-S v<]S_v< 
-2 1 
-
-
-u_{s,I 
-Soe ful u/s 
-ty toJus I Sus s 8) > 3 
-
-
 138 
 
 
@@ -5987,7 +5683,7 @@ expressed without it.
 
 uemeans you 
 
-S, $4, Sp, $3 mean different sights from the machine 
+S, \$4, Sp, \$3 mean different sights from the machine 
 
 t, ty, tg, tg mean different touches from the machine 
 
@@ -6166,7 +5862,7 @@ sights.
 UA 
 
 
-A s,a ($12) U oe S2 
+A s,a (\$12) U oe S2 
 S2V¥0 (6,252) u [s, S21 
 
 
@@ -6249,7 +5945,7 @@ a, S24 (2.152) us Se
 
 
 3. 
-* sv ($48) ule 
+* sv (\$48) ule 
 (Change: you blow on Sz) 
 
 
@@ -6320,7 +6016,7 @@ tc MEANS jFE IGNEAR GROUND RELATIVE TO You
 
 9 No change. 
 Ga S2N (5,2) uv 
-- -$2V (S12) uz % 
+- -\$2V (S12) uz % 
 
 
 10. The previous Instr. 10 applies if sy is near the ground, that is, it 
@@ -6409,16 +6105,16 @@ The rest of the instructions apply when your eyes are open.
 
 
 ya —224 (6152) uv' 
-4 $2VvE (1/2) Ur Sz 
+4 \$2VvE (1/2) Ur Sz 
 
 
-\f $9's eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high. 
+\f \$9's eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high. 
 
 
 & y AA Sag (S13s2) us S, 
 
 
-You blow on $9'S hand unless it is too high. 
+You blow on \$9'S hand unless it is too high. 
 
 
 9. Adding to Instr. 6, if you have time left over from following 
@@ -7869,7 +7565,7 @@ which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can he counted on to
 represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I 
 have explained, is distant from my own. {In March 1970, at the Institute for 
 Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he 
-would murder his own mother, and murder ail his friends, if by doing so he 
+would murder his own mother, and murder all his friends, if by doing so he 
 could get the aliens to take him to another star and show him a higher 
 civilization. My own position is the same as Johnson's.)