From 88bbfc2bf09d909ee07e0ddc5c6275cb3d6068fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: grr Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 17:46:55 -0400 Subject: cleaning aling --- blueprint.tex | 1294 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------------- 1 file changed, 495 insertions(+), 799 deletions(-) (limited to 'blueprint.tex') diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex index ef48678..49cfd11 100644 --- a/blueprint.tex +++ b/blueprint.tex @@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ \newcommand{\essaytitle}[1]{ \emph{#1}} +\newcommand{\gap}{\plainbreak{2}} + +% --- typesetting aids for some subtle syntax of flynt +\newcommand{\formulation}[1]{'\textit{#1}'} + +\newcommand{\triquote}[1]{'''#1'''} + \begin{document} \graphicspath{{img/}} @@ -388,7 +395,7 @@ refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to -nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word 'table' is supposed to denote an +nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word "table" is supposed to denote an object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that @@ -398,10 +405,10 @@ words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more -immediately than in the case of 'nonexperience,' that this question is +immediately than in the case of "nonexperience," that this question is caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and -nonexperiences? Is there an expression, 'Empire State Building,' which is +nonexperiences? Is there an expression, "Empire State Building," which is related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire State Building or not? ) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask @@ -412,7 +419,7 @@ natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned -before, the aphorism that 'saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an +before, the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. in summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, @@ -481,7 +488,7 @@ that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of having to accept the dare that "you have to do it to prove you don't believe -it's dangerous'? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? +it's dangerous"? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. @@ -519,7 +526,7 @@ blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I -have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that 'if I try to walk +have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that "if I try to walk through the wall I wil! fail and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a @@ -632,7 +639,6 @@ phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. - \item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I @@ -668,10 +674,10 @@ emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if -my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily--- the +my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily---the object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. -\plainbreak{2} +\gap \item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other @@ -692,7 +698,7 @@ hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only -way of confirming a model, but to construct a mode! of the relation between +way of confirming a model, but to construct a model of the relation between the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. \item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative @@ -736,7 +742,7 @@ walking through a wail or not. At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a -hair's-breadth of difference between the state ! propose and mental +hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. @@ -752,7 +758,7 @@ over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an objective relation between words and things.) The !anguage we "see" is a -shell whose 'transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. +shell whose "transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. \item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical @@ -761,11 +767,12 @@ motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to -classify.) The contradiction in "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs" has to do first +classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. +\end{enumerate} { @@ -797,341 +804,48 @@ Comments from the audience \chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality} +\begin{enumerate} -1. STOP ALL "GROSS BELIEVING," SUCH AS BELIEF IN OTHER -MINDS, CAUSALITY, AND THE PHANTOM ENTITIES OF SCIENCE -(ATOMS, ELECTRONS, ETC.). - - -2. STOP THINKING IN PROPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE. - - -3. STOP ALL SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESIZING. DO NOT CONSIDER -YOUR "SIGHTINGS" OF THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING AS -CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS THERE WHEN YOU ARE NOT LOOKING -AT !T-OR FOR THAT MATTER, AS CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS -THERE WHEN YOU ARE LOOKING AT IT. - - -4. STOP ORGANIZING VISUAL EXPERIENCES AND TACTILE -EXPERIENCES INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. STOP ORGANIZING -SO-CALLED "DIFFERENT SPATIAL ORIENTATIONS OR DIFFERENT -TOUCHED SURFACES OF OBJECTS" INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. THAT -IS, STOP HAVING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTS. - - -5. STOP BELIEVING IN PAST AND FUTURE TIME. THAT 15, LIVE -OUT OF TIME. STOP FEELING LONGING, DREAD, OR REGRET. - - -6. STOP BELIEVING THAT YOU CAN MOVE YOUR BODY. +\item \textsc{ Stop all \enquote{gross believing,} such as belief in other minds, causality, and the phantom entities of science (atoms, electrons, \etc).} +\item \textsc{Stop thinking in propositional language.} -7. STOP BELIEVING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY -OBJECTIVE MEANING. +\item \textsc{Stop all scientific hypothesizing. Do not consider your "sightings" of the empire state building as confirmations that it is there when you are not looking at it --- or for that matter, as confirmations that it is there when you \emph{are} looking at it.} +\item \textsc{Stop organizing visual experiences and tactile experiences into object-gestalts. Stop organizing so-called "different spatial orientations or different touched surfaces of objects" into object-gestalts. That is, stop having perceptions of objects.} -8. YOU ARE NOW FREE TO WALK THROUGH WALLS (IF YOU CAN -FIND THEM). +\item \textsc{Stop believing in past and future time. That is, live out of time. Stop feeling longing, dread, or regret.} +\item \textsc{Stop believing that you can move your body.} -25 +\item \textsc{Stop believing that these instructions have any objective meaning.} +\item \textsc{You are now free to walk through walls (if you can find them).} -6. Some Objections to My Philosophy +\chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy} -A. The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in -euucated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the +\textbf{A.} The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in +educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See -Philosophical Investigations, $420.) Statements which imply that other +Philosophical Investigations, \S 420.) Statements which imply that other people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because -they subject the statements to criticism by logical! standards which are -irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (§ § 402, 412, 119, 116.) +they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are +irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.) For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real -case.' (§303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's +case." (\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. -Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs - - -In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any -given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter -I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just -what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the -entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at -least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, -psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, -phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, -comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each -with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, -associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not - - -26 - - -ee eR eT A ee OE eT Ee a - - -hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential -language', and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not -always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and -belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter -of fact is unquestionably does involve betiefs, is not for example an -anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of- knowledge are -difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has -to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind -what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are -incomplete and confused. - -What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a -few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of 'knowledge'; -have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are -thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so -"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity} that they are either just assumed, as -too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if -they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. -The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have -these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's -experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea -of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and -of not having it. - -Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered', beliefs -formulated in 'natural laws", beliefs "about substance', and the like. -Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived -world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting -beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is -("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The -non-strange character of one's 'perceived world" is associated with beliefs -"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the -world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's -"perceived world" is not part of what is 'essential' in these beliefs. - -Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. -After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from -oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict -sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a -formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave -one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply 'that there are spatially -distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a -visual - "moving" - hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal -beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. - - -27 - - -Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring' may -seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", -doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that -things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the -slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should -observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs -"about the objectivity of referring', but they are not "objective referring'; -and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. - -Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself -have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other -humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in -rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived -other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is -associated with the belief 'that others have minds', but it is not "other -humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not -part of what is essentia! in believing "that others have minds", points I -anticipated in the second chapter. - -Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of -temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form 'If x, then y -will follow in the future', especially if y is something one wants, and x is -something one can do. {After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the -switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear -"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge'. They say, -for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, -and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the -light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated -with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does -not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not -part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the -light will come on'. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about -the necessity of such knowledge for survivai", it is just more beliefs of the -same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt -dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows -how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. -Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" -beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. - -By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their -formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most -suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with -non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the -beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in - - -28 - - -ee ee ee eR - - -defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he -continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the -experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do -so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to -deny that he has the experiences. Now {I am not denying that he has the -experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the -reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the -self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary -of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs -after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It -sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief -language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language -to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's -usually because one has beliefs. - -The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences -is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all -English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a -result, those who want to talk about experiences {my use) and still use -English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly -associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often -among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have -always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to -so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being -the introduction of my use of 'experience' in the third chapter. Thus, some -of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't -for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the -book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third -chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to -experiences, languag2 with which they are very strongly associated and -which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by -announcing when the language is used for that purpose. - -It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I -was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be -understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented -my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This -does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They -are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, -which is not having beliefs {and realizing, for any belief one happens to think -of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not -be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope f will eventually -get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by - - -29 - - -suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than -beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English -in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to -learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having -unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. - - -Chapter 7 : Summary - - -The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I -am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore -beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he -will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to -construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a -formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or -the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of -them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is -supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This -statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in -connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that -my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible -argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain -unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to 'doubt, question" it, or -to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not -believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief -to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the -position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is -objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to -reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less -credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a -belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to -decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or -the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well! take one a long time to -understand my position, but if one is taking a jong time to decide whether it -is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be -wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the -matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my -position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. - -Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without -beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for - - -30 - - -example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. -Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to -be "true or false', to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you -to believe something, for example, to believe 'that there is a table behind -you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to -continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing -yourself with your back to a table'), you are going to have to have the -attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, -deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you do do? ) You are going -to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. - -As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, -intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to -realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The -important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true -statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the -expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences -associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when -you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my -language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to -do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the -complete realization of what the right position is on you {it doesn't have to -be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language'); if you -don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just -ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said -about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not -therefore valueless. - -So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having -beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete -transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter -position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, -"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic -proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical -problems (for example, 'Could an omnipotent god do the literally -impossible? ', 'Are statements about what I did in the past while alone -capable of intersubjective verification? ') arising from them? And again, one -begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is -wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be 'Why -bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving -myself'. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. -And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one -"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so - - -31 - - -(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, -since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts -which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. - In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they @@ -1141,8 +855,8 @@ Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have -today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay "The -Flaws Underlying Beliefs" shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that +today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay \essaytitle{The +Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It Is @@ -1151,8 +865,8 @@ totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per cent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we -need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. "The Flaws Underlying -Beliefs" shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural +need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying +Beliefs} shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural sciences, involve outright self-deception. These discoveries have consequences far more important than the @@ -1162,8 +876,8 @@ the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to -doubt in a real case, as in my essay "Philosophical Aspects of Walking -Through Walls." I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of +doubt in a real case, as in my essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking +Through Walls.} I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these consequences. @@ -1172,11 +886,6 @@ can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in - - -32 - - the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic @@ -1196,8 +905,8 @@ Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as inadmissible. -Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the Empire -State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The +Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the \textsc{Empire +State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to @@ -1216,27 +925,23 @@ to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish intellectual dishonesty. +\gap -B. In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which +\textbf{B.} In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if - - -33 - - there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the -middle of the argument by a play on the words "subject" and "object." +middle of the argument by a play on the words \enquote{subject} and \enquote{object.} When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be "proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, -etc. from immediate experience, then ail these phenomena would be +etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it @@ -1254,12 +959,9 @@ describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with - - crossed fingers.) -Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are - +Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of @@ -1273,27 +975,17 @@ transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing - - -34 - - fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental arguments are supposed to prove. - -35 - - -7. Philosophy Proper ("Version 3," 1961) -Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973) - +\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)} +\subsection*{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)} This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be -an inquiry as to which beliefs are 'true,' or right. The right beliefs are +an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as @@ -1325,14 +1017,9 @@ to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy non-cognitive needs. -To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "! +To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which - - -36 - - we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing @@ -1340,31 +1027,27 @@ subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in -the denial! of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are +the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have -not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self- deceptions +not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for non-cognitive reasons follows. -1. Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to -live if 1 didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to -know it." +\begin{enumerate} +\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it." -2. One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews -to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. +\item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. -3. The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in -Catholicism for esthetic reasons. +\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons. -4, Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their -efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. +\item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. -5. A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one +\item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. -Such a circumscribed inquiry wil! be called 'theologizing," in recognition of +Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of the archetypal activity in this category. When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are @@ -1382,10 +1065,6 @@ that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then their interest in science cannot be cognitive. - -37 - - The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not @@ -1397,14 +1076,14 @@ or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a single alternative is welcome. -6. Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested +\item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had -made vatid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians +made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. -7. The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is +\item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is provided by the person who holds a fearful! belief which is widely considered to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would @@ -1413,33 +1092,28 @@ that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. +\end{enumerate} This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, -limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self- deception, or +limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this monograph. - -(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used +\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without -change.) - - -38 - - -Part I : The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems -Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts +change.)} +\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems} +\subsection*{Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts} In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, -formulations of them (for example, 'Other persons have minds' as +formulations of them (for example, \formulation{Other persons have minds} as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or @@ -1457,10 +1131,10 @@ doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. -The first concept is a new one, that of 'explication'. Explication of a +The first concept is a new one, that of "explication". Explication of a familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is -wanted that the expression 'mean'. To explain: I will be discussing +wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their "meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which @@ -1469,48 +1143,43 @@ replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to -the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that ! will be +the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of -acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions {expressions of - - -39 - - +acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents (and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. -(1 will not say here just how I use 'connotation'. What the connotations of +(I will not say here just how I use "connotation". What the connotations of an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are -supposed to be like.) 'Finding', or constructing, an expression (with its use) +supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced wil! be said to -be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the 'explication'. +be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very -problematic 'definition'. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher +problematic "definition". For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of "work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an -expression is suggested, as an explication for 'thing having a mind' (if +expression is suggested, as an explication for "thing having a mind" (if supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other "overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this -expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for 'thing -having a mind', since 'thing having a mind' presumably has the connotations +expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for "thing +having a mind", since "thing having a mind" presumably has the connotations for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by @@ -1523,11 +1192,6 @@ having a mind, is what is under discussion. As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are - - -40 - - for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of @@ -1540,13 +1204,13 @@ connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the -explications for 'thing having a mind' mentioned above. +explications for "thing having a mind" mentioned above. The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify -the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for 'true statement'. +the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for "true statement". (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) @@ -1558,47 +1222,42 @@ about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important -connotations of 'true statement', and, more generally, of 'statement', as +connotations of "true statement", and, more generally, of "statement", as traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion -which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content', as it is sometimes -said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbai" part of a statement is +which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content", as it is sometimes +said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbal" part of a statement is supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is -related. {The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and +related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are -interested in.) Thus, if 'true statement' is to be explicated, 'assertion having -truth value' and 'is true' (and 'has content' in a misleading use) have to be +interested in.) Thus, if "true statement" is to be explicated, "assertion having +truth value" and "is true" (and "has content" in a misleading use) have to be explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication - - -41 - - -for 'true statement' deserves the connotations which were suggested with -'assertion having truth value' and 'is true'. One important conclusion from +for "true statement" deserves the connotations which were suggested with +"assertion having truth value" and "is true". One important conclusion from these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or -bodes of marks such as 'The man talks') are often said to be "statements", -would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate 'statement' by simply -identifying it with 'sentence' (in my sense); something must be said about +bodes of marks such as "The man talks") are often said to be "statements", +would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate "statement" by simply +identifying it with "sentence" (in my sense); something must be said about such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same -reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify 'statement' -with 'sentence', the latter being explicated in terms of the ('formal') rules +reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify "statement" +with "sentence", the latter being explicated in terms of the ("formal") rules for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. -In explicating 'true statement' I wil! use the most elegant approach, one +In explicating "true statement" I will use the most elegant approach, one relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to -make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" 'table' to -the thing. It is supposed that 'table' has been "interpreted", that is, that it is -"determinate" to which, of ail things, applications of 'table' are (to be said +make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" \term{table} to +the thing. It is supposed that \term{table} has been "interpreted", that is, that it is +"determinate" to which, of all things, applications of \term{table} are (to be said to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is -'determinate' which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word -'table", are expressions "equivalent to" 'table'.) The word 'determinate' is +"determinate" which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word +"table", are expressions "equivalent to" "table".) The word "determinate" is the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and @@ -1617,13 +1276,9 @@ other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation -between name and referents is an 'objective, metaphysical entity", which +between name and referents is an "objective, metaphysical entity", which would be getting into philosophy proper. - -42 - - The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" @@ -1633,20 +1288,18 @@ verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main -verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: 'The +verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: \said{The table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one -man while the other man talked'; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been +man while the other man talked}; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to -make Henry Flynt - - -v -er - - -. -TaySs - +\img{terry_flynt_name} will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee -[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved] - - -67 - - -3. +\signoffnote{[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved]} -letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62 +\clearpage +\section{letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62} Dear Henry, +\gap + perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most -admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage & +admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage \& Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding "new" ideas has not shown too much more than that it has become established as a traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be @@ -2649,9 +2393,9 @@ react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have -only had a few good ones. {I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't +only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand -way---but what I mean by "new ideas" is not only what you might call! +way---but what I mean by "new ideas" is not only what you might call "Concept Art" but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants @@ -2666,29 +2410,17 @@ since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with "just liked" things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art (some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or -memory or however}. As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and +memory or however). As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and when avoiding "given" structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and -decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. {f I need concentration, +decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. If I need concentration, which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. One accepts language, one accepts logic. -Best regards, - -Bob Morris - - -68 - - -> -i -fe -Ff - - -4, +\signoff{Best regards,} +\signoff{Bob Morris} +\section{} FROM "CULTURE" TO VERAMUSEMENT Boston-New York @@ -3866,7 +3598,7 @@ of the M*-Memory, indirect implication is not only thinkable but mechanical. It is not superfluous because cross-method contact of mental states is not necessarily transitive. The outside observer can decide whether a sentence is a theorem by the following mechanical procedure. Check -whether the sentence's M*-assertion has acually been thought; if so, check ail +whether the sentence's M*-assertion has acually been thought; if so, check all sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; if not, check all the sentences which imply the sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; etc. The number of possible methods is given as finite, so the procedure is @@ -3929,7 +3661,7 @@ the three are adjacent {and can be written Sit: S;, Si-1 ), and are such that 6 5 = xj44-Xj raat Sy is the implicand. (The function of Sj+4 is to give the duration 6,= +1 -%; of Sj. Sj states that event;, the first dae' of s? "4, ended ata aitence: Zj inte the past, where zj is smaller -than s $s own vduretian The diagram indicates the relations.) +than s \$s own vduretian The diagram indicates the relations.) G2: evenby obi: event 3 @@ -4446,7 +4178,7 @@ contact between states. Conclusion 3.3. For an M*-Memory, to remember is to choose the mental state in which the remembering is required to occur (by the -memory). After ail, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the +memory). After all, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the A,.-required things you are doing while you remember. @@ -4659,7 +4391,7 @@ Consider the consecutive thinking of each D-sentence precisely once, in minimum time, while the number of sentences remains constant. Such a "D-paragraph" is a permutation of the D-sentences. Let H™ be a D-paragraph when the number of sentances equals the integer m. There are -m! SA" s. When f(t) = m = 3, one of the sixH" sis sais}, thought in +m! SA" s. When f(t) = m = 3, one of the sixH" sis sais\}, thought in minimum time. Assume that the duration A of a D-paragraph depends only on the number of D-sentences and the bi. We can write @@ -4679,7 +4411,7 @@ i translation, and does not appear in the ®*- Memory. -Conclusion 7. Given a $*-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not +Conclusion 7. Given a \$*-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not only will there be a gap in the awareness of when what events occurred; it will be forgotten which method has actually been used. @@ -5202,7 +4934,7 @@ throughout. The organism has available different (single) methods, has different methods it could try. The different sequences, of all units, are assigned to the different (single) methods available to the organism to signify them; are symbols for them. (Thus, the number of available methods -increases as units are added to the memory.) /Now ail this only approximates +increases as units are added to the memory.) /Now all this only approximates what is the case, because contrary to what I may have implied, which method is used is not a matter of "fact" as are the temporal intervals and amounts of progress. As I have said, having all units in any succession @@ -5223,7 +4955,7 @@ total memory, total recall ("factually"), although different sequences signify different methods used./ #As an indicator of the method used, the whole memory is a multiplex symbol. Names for each of the methods are combined in a single symbol, the totality of units. In remembering, the organism -separates any single name by going through ail the units in succession, and +separates any single name by going through all the units in succession, and that name is the complete reading of the multiplex symbol, the complete information about the method used. I will not be concerned to "explain" the matter of the increasing number of available methods; or the matter of @@ -5250,7 +4982,7 @@ indefinite variety of contents, as humans have particular imagings, in its conscious states of mind. I will outline the principal contents. There are "visualized" fluid regions of color (like colored liquids), first-order contents. There are 'visualized' radient surfaces, and non-radient surfaces or regions -("holes"}, the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are +("holes"), the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are "projective" constructs of imaged geometric surfaces, "covers," "lattices," and "shells." Fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. They can occur in certain series, "channels"; and in certain arrays, "reservoirs." A channel can @@ -5317,7 +5049,7 @@ Speaking as accurately as possible in English, in each reservoir there is precisely one point of "maximum mixture' of the primary colors. (The rest of the reservoirs are not significant: the primary colors are mentally mixed in any way to get the right amount of mixture, as pigments are mixed on a -palette.) X_ For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a +palette.) X\_ For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a scale of amounts of color mixture. For the second memory, the points are two points on a scale of vertical distances from the imaginary horizontal! line which bisects the rectangular surface, divides it into lower and upper halves. @@ -5518,23 +5250,21 @@ edges of the surface and intersecting the four points in the ashes nearest the four edges of the surface) must exactly cover the film); develop film-- s. 3 is the negative -$.2 and s.3 imply s.4: melt s.3 and cool in mold to form plastic doubly +\$.2 and s.3 imply s.4: melt s.3 and cool in mold to form plastic doubly convex lens with small curvature; take color photograph of ashes' rectangle in yellow light using this lens; develop film-- s. 4 is color negative -$.2 and s.4 imply s.5: repeat last step with s.4 (instead of 3), using red +\$.2 and s.4 imply s.5: repeat last step with s.4 (instead of 3), using red light-- s. 5 is second color negative S.2 and s.5 imply s.6: repeat last step with s.5, using blue light-- s. 6 is third color negative -$.2 and s.6 imply s.7: make lens from s.6 mixed with the ashes which have +\$.2 and s.6 imply s.7: make lens from s.6 mixed with the ashes which have been being photographed; make black and white photograph, in white fight, of that part of the white surface where the ashes' rectangle was; develop film -128 - - s.7 is second black and white negative @@ -5938,40 +5668,6 @@ and follow the instructions, go immediately to Page 6. 137 - - -(81% {(sy0ua)I ) s It all uvk (d, - - -Ss -? ay u3/4e9s8 uk[syv (8, fS2kv) taydu - - -vas] Sid6> \solu -89183 $7] $3 -ca -*S;v \S> ne -§1V s Si\> tiiad I -S24 83 - fl s_ 3A ($482) -(ae, -S23 83 S 3 - - 138 @@ -5987,7 +5683,7 @@ expressed without it. uemeans you -S, $4, Sp, $3 mean different sights from the machine +S, \$4, Sp, \$3 mean different sights from the machine t, ty, tg, tg mean different touches from the machine @@ -6166,7 +5862,7 @@ sights. UA -A s,a ($12) U oe S2 +A s,a (\$12) U oe S2 S2V¥0 (6,252) u [s, S21 @@ -6249,7 +5945,7 @@ a, S24 (2.152) us Se 3. -* sv ($48) ule +* sv (\$48) ule (Change: you blow on Sz) @@ -6320,7 +6016,7 @@ tc MEANS jFE IGNEAR GROUND RELATIVE TO You 9 No change. Ga S2N (5,2) uv -- -$2V (S12) uz % +- -\$2V (S12) uz % 10. The previous Instr. 10 applies if sy is near the ground, that is, it @@ -6409,16 +6105,16 @@ The rest of the instructions apply when your eyes are open. ya —224 (6152) uv' -4 $2VvE (1/2) Ur Sz +4 \$2VvE (1/2) Ur Sz -\f $9's eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high. +\f \$9's eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high. & y AA Sag (S13s2) us S, -You blow on $9'S hand unless it is too high. +You blow on \$9'S hand unless it is too high. 9. Adding to Instr. 6, if you have time left over from following @@ -7869,7 +7565,7 @@ which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can he counted on to represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I have explained, is distant from my own. {In March 1970, at the Institute for Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he -would murder his own mother, and murder ail his friends, if by doing so he +would murder his own mother, and murder all his friends, if by doing so he could get the aliens to take him to another star and show him a higher civilization. My own position is the same as Johnson's.) -- cgit v1.2.3