diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'essays/dream_reality.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | essays/dream_reality.tex | 661 |
1 files changed, 661 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/essays/dream_reality.tex b/essays/dream_reality.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aab289d --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/dream_reality.tex @@ -0,0 +1,661 @@ +\chapter{The Dream Reality} + +\section{Memo on the Dream Project} + +Original aim: To recreate the effect of e.g. Pran Nath's singing---transcendent +inner escape---in direct life rather than art. I needed material which could +function as an alien civilization (since the source of Pran Nath's expression is +an alien civilization relative to me); yet which was encultured in me and not +an affectation or pretense. I decided to use dreams as the material, assuming +that my dreams would take me to alien worlds. But mostly they did not. +Mostly my dreams consist of long periods of tawdry, familiar life interrupted +occasionally by senseless, unmotivated anomalies. In contrast, my original +aim required alluring, psychically gratifying material. + +The emphasis shifted to redefining reality so that dreams were on the same +level as waking life; so that they were apprehended as what they seem to be: +literal reality (and not memory, precognition, or symbolism). The project +was still arcane, but in a drastically different way. I was getting into an +alternate reality which was extremely bizarre but not psychically gratifying. +It was boringly frightful and sometimes obscene. I became concerned with +analytical study of the natural order of the dream world, a para-scientific +investigation. As I grappled with the rational arguments against treating +dreams as literal reality, the project became a difficult analytical exercise in +the philosophy of science. The original sensuous-esthetic purpose was lost. + +Now I would like to return to the original aim, but how to do it? Obtain +other people's dreams---see if they are more suitable? Work only with my +very rare dreams which do take me to alien worlds? Try to alter the content +of my raw dreams? Attempt to affect content of dreams by experiment in +which many people sleep in same room and try to communicate in their +sleep? The most uncertain approach to a solution: set up a transformation +on my banal dreams, so that to the first-order activity of raw dreaming is +added a second-order activity. The transformation procedure to somehow +combine conscious ideational direction---coding of the banal dreams---with +alteration of my experience, my esthesia, my lived experience. + + +\section{Dreams and Reality---An Experimental Essay} + +Excerpts from my dream diary which are referred-to in the essay that +follows. + +\dreamdate{12/11/1973} + +I notice a state between waking and dreaming: a waking dream. I have +been asleep; I wake up; I close my eyes to sleep again. While not yet asleep, I +experience isolated objects before me as in a dream, but with no +background, only a dark void. In this case, there are two pocket combs, both +with teeth broken. In the waking world, I threw away one of my two pocket +combs because I broke it; the other comb is still in good condition. + +\dreamdate{12/30/1973} + +I am chased by the police for one block west on West Market Street in +Greensboro. I reach the intersection with Eugene Street, and in the north +direction there is a steep hill rather than the street. The surface of the hill is +bare ground and grass. I run up the hill, sensing that if I can get over the hill +I will find Friendly Road and the general neighborhood of my mother's +houses on the other side. The police start shooting. If I can get a few yards +farther on the top of the hill I will be past the line of fire. I take a headlong +dive and awaken in the middle of the dive to find myself diving forward on +my mattress in the front room of my apartment. The action is carried on +continuously through waking up and through the associated change of +setting. + + +\dreamdate{1/12/1974} + +Just before I go to sleep for the night, I am lying in bed drowsy. I think +of being, and suddenly am, at the south edge of the Courant Institute plaza, +which is several feet above the sidewalk. The edge of the plaza and the drop +are all I see. It is night; and there is only a void where the peripheral +environment should be. (Comment: It is of great theoretical importance that +while most of the internal reality cues were present in this experience, some, +like the peripheral environment, were not. In my dream experiences, all +reality cues are present.) The drop expands to twenty or thirty feet, and I +start to fall off. Fright jolts me completely awake. I have had something like +a waking nightmare and have awakened from being awake. I thought of the +scene, was suddenly in it (except for peripheral reality cues), lost control and +became endangered by it, and then snapped back to my bedroom. + +\dreamdate{1/1-/1974} + +One or two nights after 1/12/74 I was lying in bed just before going to +sleep. I could see women standing on a sidewalk. The scene was real, but I +was not in it; I was a disembodied spectator. Also, the peripheral +environment was absent. The reality was between that of a waking +visualization and that of the Courant Institute incident of 1/12/74. +Comment: The differences between this experience and a waking +visualization are that the latter is less vivid than seeing and is accompanied +by waking reality cues such as cues of bodily location. + + +\dreamdate{1/16/1974} + +\begin{enumerate} +\item I am in an apartment vaguely like the first place in which I lived, at +1025 Madison Avenue in Greensboro. I am a spy. I am teen-aged and short; +and I am in the apartment with several enemy men, who are middle-aged and +adult-sized. My code sheets look like the sheets of Yiddish I have been +copying out in waking life. Eventually the men discover me in the front +room with the code sheets on a fold-up desk. They chase me out the front +door and onto the west side of the lawn, and shoot me with a needle gun. At +that moment my consciousness jumps from my body and becomes that of a +disembodied spectator watching from an eastward location, as if I were +watching a film. + +\item I am living in a dormitory in a rural setting with other males. At one +point I walking barefoot in weeds outside the dormitory, and Supt. Toro +tells me I am walking in poison ivy. My feet begin to show the rash, but I +recognize that I am in a dream and think that the rash will not carry over to +the waking state. I then begin to will away the rash in the dream, and I +succeed, +\end{enumerate} + + +\dreamdate{1/20/1974} + +For some reason the dream associates Simone Forti with flute-like +music. It is shortly before midnight. In the dream I believe that Simone lives +in a loft on the east side of Wooster Street. The blocks in SOHO are very +small. If I walk through the streets and whistle, she will hear me. I start to +whistle but can only whistle a single high note. I half awaken but continue +whistling, or trying to; the dream action continues into waking. But I cannot +change pitch or whistle clearly because my mouth is taped. As I realize this, I +awaken fully. + +Comments: I tape my mouth at night so I will sleep with my mouth closed. I +experimented at trying to whistle with the tape on while fully awake. The +breath just hisses against the tape. The pitch of the hiss can be varied. + + +\dreamdate{2/1/1974} + +1. I try to assist a man in counterfeiting ten dollar bills by taking half +of a ten, scotch taping it to half of a one, and then coloring over the one +until it looks like the other half of the ten. The method fails because I bring +old crumpled tens rather than new tens, and the one doilar bills are new. + + +Comments: There are no natural anomalies in this dream at all. What is +anomalous is that this counterfeiting method seems perfectly sensible, and I +only begin to question it when we try to fit the crumpled half-bill to the +crisp half-bill. Why am I so foolish in this dream? I retain my identity as +Henry Flynt, and yet my outlook, my sense of what is rational, is so +different that it is that of a different person. More generally, the person I am +in my dreams is much more limited in certain ways that I am in waking life. +My waking preoccupations are totally absent from my dreams. Instead there +is bland material about my early life which could apply to any child or +teen-ager. Thus, I must warn readers who know me only from this diary not +to try to make the image of me here fit my waking life. + + +\dreamdate{2/3/1974} + +3. I have had several dreams that I am taking the last courses of my +student career. (In waking life I have completed all course work.) I am +usually failing them. Tonight I dream that I have gone all semester without +studying (in a course in English?). Now I am in the final exam and sinking. I +will have to repeat these courses. Subsequently, I am sitting in a school +office (of a professor or psychologist?), giving him a long list (of words, a +foreign vocabulary?). (I mention this episode because I remember that while +I retained my nominal identity as Henry Flynt, I had the mind of a different +person. I experienced another person's existence instead of mine. Professor +Nell also appeared somewhere in this dream; as he has in several school +dreams I have had recently. + + +\dreamdatecomment{2/3/1974}{This is the date I recorded, but it seems that it would have to be later.} + +I get up in the morning and decide to have a self-indulgent breakfast +because of the unpleasantness of working on my income tax the day before. +So I put two slices of pizza in the oven, and also eat two bakery sweets, +possibly \'{e}clairs. Then I think that a Mexican TV dinner would have been +better all around, but it is too late; I have to eat what I am already preparing. +Subsequently, I go with John Alten to a Shoreham Cafeteria at Houston and +Mercer Streets. The cafeteria chain is a good one, but this cafeteria is dark +and extremely dingy upstairs where the serving line is. John complains that +there is no ventilation and that he is suffocating, and he stalks out. + +Comment: When I awoke, my first thought was that the pizza in the oven +would be burning. (I assumed that I had arisen, put the pizza in the oven, +and gone back to sleep.) But then I realized that the breakfast was a dream. I +got up and prepared the Mexican dinner which I had decided was best in the +dream, but I also ate one \'{e}clair. + +\dreamdate{7/8/1974} + +I am caught out in a theft of money, and I feel that the rest of my life +will be ruined. + +Comment: The quality of the episode depended on my +strong belief in the reality of the social future and in my ability to form +accurate expectations about it. When I awakened, the whole misadventure +vanished. + + +End of excerpts from my dream diary. + +\begin{quotation} +"... It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views +or perceptions... But ... inasmuch as it is the common objective world that +renders ... general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist +will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views, though +just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. ... the common objective +world, whether such a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is +indispensable to science ... +."\footnote{A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), pp. 176--7} +\end{quotation} + + +\textbf{A.} We wish to postulate that dreams are exactly what they seem to be +while we are dreaming, namely, literal reality. Naively, we want to get closer +to literal empiricism than natural science is. But science has worked out a +very comfortable world-view on the assumption that both dreams and +semi-conscious quasi-dreams are mere subjective phenomena of individual +consciousness. If we wish to carry through the postulate that dreams are +literal reality, then we will have to adopt a cognitive model quite different +from that of natural science. It is of crucial importance that we are not +interested in superstition. We do not wish to adopt a cognitive model which +would simply be defeated in competition with science. We wish to be at least +as rational, as empirical, and as cognitively parsimonious as science is. We +want our cognitive model to be compelling, and not to be a plaything which +is easily taken up and easily discarded. + +The question is whether there can be a rational empiricism which +differs from science in placing dreamed episodes on the same level as waking +episodes, but which stops short of the "nihilistic empiricism" of my +philosophical essay entitled \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}. (In effect, the +latter essay rejects other minds, causality, persistent objective entities, past +time, the possibility of objective categories and significant language, and so +forth, ending up with ungraded immediate experience.) + +As an example of our problem, the waking scientific outlook assumes +that a typewriter continues to exist even when we turn our backs on it +(persistence of objective entities). In many of our dreams we make the same +sort of assumption. In other words, in some of our dreams the natural order +is not noticeably different from that of the waking world; and in many +dreams our conscious world-view has much in common with waking +common sense or scientific pragmatism. On 2/3/1974 I had a dream in which +a typewriter was featured. I certainly assumed that the typewriter continued +to exist when my back was turned to it. On 7/8/1974 I dreamed that I was +caught out in a theft of money, and I felt my life would be ruined because of +it. I certainly assumed the reality of the social future, and my ability to form +accurate expectations about it. These examples illustrate that we are not +nihilistic empiricists in our dreams. The question is whether acceptance of +the pragmatic outlook which we have in dreams is consistent with not +regarding the dream-world as a subjective phenomenon of individual +consciousness. Can we accept dreams as "literal reality"; or must we reject +the very concept of "reality" on order to defend the placing of the dream +world on the same level as the waking world? + +In summary, the question is whether we can place dreams on the same +fevel as the waking world while stopping short of nihilistic empiricism. A +further difficulty in accomplishing this aim is that neurological science might +succeed in gaining complete experimental control of dreams. Scientists might +become able to produce dreams at will and to monitor them. The whole +phenomenon of dreaming would then tend to be totally assimilated to the +outlook of scientists. Their decision to treat dreams as subjective phenomena +of individual consciousness would be greatly supported by these +developments. Would we have to go all the way to nihilistic empiricism in +order to have a basis for rejecting the neurologists' accomplishments? + +Still another difficulty is presented for us by semi-conscious +quasi-dreams such as the ones described in my diary. Semi-conscious +quasi-dreams exhibit some reality cues, but lack other important internal +reality cues. Science handles these experiences easily, by dismissing them +along with dreams as subjective phenomena of individual consciousness. +Suppose we accept that the semi-conscious quasi-dreams are illusory reality. +But if they can be illusory reality, how can we exclude the possibility that +dreams might be also? If, on the other hand, we accept the quasi-dreams as +literal reality, what about the missing reality cues? Can we justify different +treatment for dreams and quasi-dreams by saying that all reality cues have to +be present before an experience is accepted as non-illusory? If we propose +to do so, the question then becomes whether we should accept the weight +which common sense places on reality cues. + +Why do we wish to stop short of nihilistic empiricism? Because we do +wish to assert that dreams can be remembered; that they can be described in +permanent records; that they can be compared and studied rationally. We do +want to cite the past as evidence; we do want to distinguish between actual +dream experience and waking fabrications, waking lies about what we have +dreamed; and we do want to describe what we experience in intersubjective +language. + +As easy way out which would offend nobody would be to treat dreams +as simulations of alternate universes. But this approach is a cowardly evasion +for several reasons. It excludes the phenomenon of the semi-conscious +quasi-dream, which poses the problem of internal reality cues in the sharpest +way. Further, we cannot give up the notion that our project is nearer to +literal empiricism than natural science is. We cannot accept the notion that +we must dismiss some of our experiences as mere illusions, but not all of +them. We do not see dreams as simulations of anything. Some of the most +interesting observations I have made about connections between adjacent +dreamed and waking episodes in my own experience are noticeable only +because I take both dreamed and waking experience literally. + +\gap + + +\textbf{B.} Before we continue our attempt to resolve our methodological +problem, we will provide more detail on topics which we have mentioned in +passing. We begin with the purported empiricism of natural science. The +philosopher Hume postulated that experience was the only raw material of +reality or cognition. However, he did not content himself with ungraded +experience. He insisted on draping the experiential raw material on an +intellectual framework in such a way that experience was used to simulate +the inherited conception of. reality, a conception which we will call +Aristotelian realism. Similarly for the purported empiricism of natural +science. In fact, the working scientist learns to think of the framework or +model as primary, and of experiences and verification procedures as ancillary +to it. The quotation by d'Abro which heads this essay concedes as much. + +What we are investigating is whether experiences can be draped on a +different intellectual framework in which dreamed and waking life come out +as equally real. Some examples of alternate verification conventions follow. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Accept intersubjective confirmation of my experience of the dream world +which occurs within the dream as confirmation of the reality of the dream +world. + +\item Accept intersubjective confirmation of the past of the dream world which +occurs in the dream itself as confirmation of the reality of the dreamed past. + +\item Recognize that there is no infallible way to tell whether other people are +lying about their dreamed experience or their waking experience. + +\item Develop sophisticated interrogation techniques as a limited test of +whether people are telling the truth about their dreams. + +\item Accept that a certain category of anomalies occurs in dreams only when +several people have reported experiences in that category. +\end{enumerate} + +The principal characteristic of the approach which these conventions +represent is that each dream is treated as a separate world. There is no +attempt to arrive at an account, for a given "objective" time period, which is +consistent with more than one dream or with both dreamed and waking +periods. Thus, many parallel worlds could be confirmed as real. As our +discussion proceeds, we will move away from this approach, probably out of +a sense that it is pointless to maintain a strong notion of reality and yet to +forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. + +\textbf{C.} Something that I have learned from a study of my dream records is +that while dreams are not chaotic, while they can be compared and +classified, it is not possibie to apply the method of natural science to them in +the sense of discerning a consistent, impersonal natural order in the dream +world. It is not that the natural order is different in dreams from what it is in +the waking world; it is that the dream worlds are incommensurate with the +discernment of a natural order in the scientific sense. Here are some specific +observations which relate to this whole question. + +\begin{enumerate} + \item Some dreams are not noticeably anomalous. The laws of science are not +violated in them. This observation is important in giving us a normal base for +our investigation. Dreams are not all crazy and chaotic. + +\item In some dreams, it is impossible to abstract an impersonal natural order +from personal experiences and anecdotes. There are no impersonal events. +There is no nature whose order can be defined impersonally. The dreams are +full of personal magic which cannot be generalized to a characteristic of an +impersonal natural order. + +\item As a special case of (2), in some dreams, we jump back in time and move +discontinuously in time and space. Chronological personal magic. + +\item In dreams, the distinction between myself and other people is blurred in +many different ways. Also, I sometimes become a disembodied +consciousness. + +\item As a generalization of (4), sometimes it becomes impossible to distinguish +objects from our sensing and perceiving function. The mediating sensory +function becomes obtrusively anomalous. Stable object gestalts cannot be +identified. + +\item Sometimes we experience the logically impossible in dreams. My father +was both dead and buried, and alive and walking around, in one dream. + +\item The possibility of identifying causal relationships is sometimes lacking in +dreams. It is not just that actions have unexpected effects. It is that events +are strung together like beads on a string. There is no sense of willful acting +on the world or manipulation of the world which can be objectified as a +causal relation between impersonal events. +\end{enumerate} + +The possibility arises of using dreams as philosophical experiments in +worlds in which one or more of the preconditions for application of the +scientific method is absent. (But in the one case in which Alten and I tried +this, we reached opposite conclusions. Alten said that dreams in which one +can jump around in time proved that the irreversibility of time is the basis +for distinguishing between time and space; I said that the dreams proved that +time and space can be distinguished even when the irreversibility of time is +lacking.) + +Observation (2) above can lead us to an insight about the waking world. +Perhaps science insists on the elimination of personal anecdotes from the +natural order which it recognizes because the scientist wants results which +can be transferred from one life to another and which will give one person +power over another. At any rate, science excludes anecdotal anomalies which +cannot be made somehow into "objective" events. As an example, I may be +walking down the street and suddenly find myself on the other side of the +street with no awareness of any act of crossing the street. + +What dreams provide us with is worlds in which anecdotal anomalies +cannot be relegated to limbo as they are in waking science. They are so +prominent in dreams that we can become accustomed to identifying them +there. We may then learn to recognize analogous anomalies in the waking +world, where we had overlooked them before because of our scientific +indoctrination. + +Of course, we run the risk that superstitious people will misuse our +theory to justify their folly. But the difference between our theory and +superstition is clear. When the superstitious person says that he +communicates with spirits, he either lies outright; or alse he misinterprets his +experiences---embedding them in an extraneous pre-scientific belief system, +or treating them as controversions of scientific propositions. We, on the +other hand, maintain more literally than science does that the only raw +material of cognition is experience. We differ from science in draping +experiences on a different organizational framework. The "reality" we arrive +at is incommensurate with science; it does not falsify any scientific +proposition. As for science and superstition, we headed this essay with the +quotation by d'Abro to emphasize that the scientist himself is superstitious: +he is determined to believe in the common objective world, even though it is +a fiction, because it is necessary to science. The superstitious person wants +you to believe that his communication with spirits is intersubjectively +consequential. Thus our theory, which tends toward the attitude that +nothing is intersubjectively consequential, offers him even less comfort than +science does. + +\textbf{D.} We next turn to semi-conscious quasi-dreams. Referring to my +experience on the morning of 1/12/1974, I describe the experience by saying +that I was on the Courant Institute plaza. But I cannot conclude that I was +on the Courant Institute plaza. The reason is that important internal reality +cues are missing in the experience. For one thing, the peripheral environment +is missing; in its place is a void. Referring to my experience on 1/1-/1974, +still other cues are missing. I am awake, and the scene is unstable and +momentary. The slightest attention shift will cause the scene to vanish. + +When we recognize that we have disallowed falling asleep, awaking, and +anomalous phenomena in dreams as evidence of unreality, a careful analysis +yields only two types of reality cues. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Presence of the peripheral environment. + +\item "Single consciousness." This cue is missing when we see a +three-dimensional scene and move about in it, and yet have a background +awareness that we are awake in bed; and lose the scene through a mere shift +of attention. Its absence is even more marked if the scene is a momentary +one between two waking periods. +\end{enumerate} + +Let us recall our earlier discussion of the empiricism of science. Science +does not content itself with ungraded experience. it drapes experience on an +intellectual framework in such a way as to simulate Aristotelian realism. It +feeds experience into a maze of verification procedures in order to confirm a +model which is not explicit in ungraded experience. It short, science grades +experience as to its reality on the basis of standards which are +"intellectually" supplied. Internal reality cues are thus characteristics of +experience which are given special weight by the grading procedure. The +immediate problem for us is that ordinary descriptive language implicitly +recognizes these reality cues; one would never say without qualification that +one was on the Courant Institute plaza if the peripheral environment was +missing and if one was also aware of being awake in bed at the time. (In +contrast, it is fair to use ordinary descriptive language with respect to +dreamed episodes when our consciousness is singulary, that is, when +everything seems real and unqualified.) + +For purposes of further comparison I may mention an experience I +have had on rare occasions while lying on my back in bed fully awake. It is +as if colored spheres whose centers are located a few feet or yards in front of +my chest expand until they press against me, one after the other. I use the +phrase "as if" because reality cues are missing in this experience, and thus I +cannot use the language of stable object gestalts without qualification in +describing it. The colors are not vivid as real colors are. They are like +visualized colors. The spheres pass through each other, and through me---with +only a moderate sensation of pressure. I can turn the experience off by +getting out of bed. The point, again, is that it is inherent in ordinary +language not to use unqualified object descriptions in these circumstances. +Yet the only language I have for such sensory configurations is the language +of stable object gestalts-this is particularly obvious in the example of the +Courant Institute plaza. (Is "ringing in the ears' in the same class of +phenomena?) + +An insight that is crucial in elucidating this problem is that when I +describe episodes, the descriptions implicitly convey not only sensations but +beliefs, as when I speak of a typewriter in a dream on the assumption that it +persisted while I was not looking at it. The peculiar quality of a quasi-dream +comes about not only because it is an anomaly in my sensations but because +it is an anomaly in the scientific-pragmatic cognitive model which underlies +ordinary language. If I discard this cognitive model and then report the +event, it will not be the same event: the beliefs implicit in ordinary language +helped give the event its quality. As a further example, now that I have +recognized experiences such as that of 1/12/1974, I am willing to entertain +the possibility that they are the basis for claims by superstitious persons to +have projected astrally. But to use the phrase "astral projection" is to embed +the experiences in a pre-scientific belief system extraneous to the +experiences themselves. If we learn to report such experiences by using +idioms like "ringing in the ears" and blocking any comparison with notions +of objective reality or intersubjective import, we will have flattened out +experience and will have moved in the direction of ungraded experience and +nihilistic empiricism. + +\textbf{E.} We next take up connections between adjacent dreamed and waking +periods. As a preliminary, we reject conventional notions that dreams are +fabricated from memories of waking reality; or that dreams are precognitions +of waking reality; or that dreams are mental phenomena which symbolize +waking reality. We reject these notions because they conflict with the placing +of the dream world on the same level as the waking world. + +Connections between dream and waking periods are important in this +study because we may wish to create such connections deliberately, and even +to attribute causal significance to them. Initially, we define the concept of +dream control: it is to conduct one's waking life so that it is supportive of +one's dreamed life in some sense. We also define controlled dreaming: it is to +manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep (or during sleep) so as to +influence the content of that person's dreams. (An example would be to give +somebody a psychoactive sleeping pill.) + +A careful analysis of connections between dream and waking periods +yields the following classification of such connections. + +\begin{enumerate} + \item I walk around the kitchen in a dream, then awaken and walk around the +kitchen. Voluntary continued action. + +\item Given a project with causally separate components, voluntarily +assembled, I can carry out the project entirely while awake, entirely in +dreams, or partly while awake and partly in dreams. + +\item I walk around the kitchen while awake, then sleep. I may then walk +around the kitchen in a dream. Also, I draw a glass of water while awake. I +may have the glass of water to use in the dream. We could postulate that +such connections are not mere coincidences, if they occur. However, we +certainly cannot produce such connections at will. We call these connections +echoes of waking actions in dreams. Note the case in which I taped my +mouth shut before sleeping, and could not whistle in the subsequent dream. + +\item We next have connections from dreamed to waking periods which can be +postulated to have causal significance. First, misfortune or danger in dreams +is regularly followed by immediate awaking. Secondly, I have had +experiences in which a headlong dive or an attempt to whistle continued +from dream to waking, right through waking up. These experiences are +causally continuous actions. However, I cannot bring them about at will. + +\item We can manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep (or during sleep) +so as to influence the content of that person's dreams. The dream is not an +echo of the waking action; the causal relationship is manipulative. Examples +are to give someone a psychoactive sleeping drug or to create a special +environment for sleep. The case in which I taped my mouth shut before +sleeping was a remarkable borderline case between an echo and a +manipulation. +\end{enumerate} + +in conclusion, dream control is any of the connections described in +(1)--(4). Controlled dreaming is (5). We have analyzed these concepts +meticulously because we want to exclude all attempts at magic, all +superstition from the project of placing dreamed and waking life on the same +level. There must be no rain dancing, no false causality, in this project. + +\textbf{F.} Until now, we have analyzed our experience episode by episode. We +could make this approach into a principle by assuming that each episode is a +separate and complete world, which has its reality confirmed internally. In +particular, the notion of objective location in space and time would be +maintained if it appeared in a dream and was intersubjectively confirmed in +the dream, but the notion would be purely internal to each episode. The +objection to these assumptions, as we mentioned at the end of (B), is that +they propose to maintain the notion of objective location, and yet they +forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. if we adopt +these assumptions and then compare all the reports of our dreamed and +waking periods, we may find that we have experienced different events +attributed to the same location---and indeed, that is exactly what we do +experience. + +One of the main discoveries of this essay has been that dreamed and +waking periods are more symmetrical than our scientific-pragmatic +indoctrination would have us suppose. The reality of the dream world is +intersubjectively confirmed---within the dream. Anecdotal anomalies can be +found in waking periods as well as in dreams. Entities which resemble +common object gestalts but which lack some of the reality cues of object +gestalts can be encountered whicle we are fully awake. Now we can +recognize a further symmetry between dreamed and waking life. A dreamed +misfortune is usually "lost" when we awaken, and its disappearance is taken +as evidence of the unreality of the dream (the nightmare). But we can also +"lose" a waking misfortune by going to sleep and dreaming. Further, just as +a waking misfortune can persist from one waking period to another, a +dreamed misfortune can persist from one dream to another (recurrent +nightmares). Thus, we conclude that in regard to the consistency of episodes +with each other, there is no basis for preferring any one episode, dreamed or +waking, as the standard by which the reality of other episodes will be judged. +Of course, rather than maintaining the reality of each episode as a separate +world, we can block all attributions of events to objective locations. This +approach would alter the quality of the events and bring us closer to +nihilistic empiricism. + +A further problem arises if we take the dream reports of other people as +reports of reality. Suppose I am awake in my apartment at 3 AM on +2/6/1974, but that someone dreams at that time that I am out of my +apartment. Multiple existences which I do not even experience are now being +attributed to me. (My own episodes also pose a problem of whether +"multiple existences" are being attributed to me, but that problem concerns +events I experience myself.) What we should recognize is that the problem of +"multiple existences" is not as unique to our investigation as may at first +appear. Natural science has an analogous problem in disposing of the notion +of other minds. The notion of the existence of many minds, none of which +can experience any other, is difficult to assimilate to the cognitive model of +science. On the other hand, to deny the existence of any mind, as +behaviorists do, is to repudiate the scientist's observations of his own mental +life. And if the scientist's observations of his own mental life are repudiated, +then there is no good reason not to repudiate the scientist's observations of +his budily sensations and of external phenomena also; that is, to repudiate +the very possibility of scientific observation. Further, when behaviorists try +to convince people that they have no awareness, whom (or what) are they +trying to convince? And what is the behaviorist explanation of the origin of +the fiction of consciousness? Who benefits from perpetuating this fiction, +and how does he benefit? + +We must emphasize that the above critique is not applicable to every +philosophical outlook. It applies specifically to science---because the scientist +wants to have the benefits of two incompatible conceptual frameworks. +Some of the common sense about other minds is necessary in the operational +preliminaries to formal science; and the scientist's role as observer is +indispensable to formal science. Yet the conceptual framework of science is +essentially physicalistic, and can allow only for external objects. What this +difficulty reveals is that the cognitive model of science has stabilized and +prevailed even though it has blatent discrepancies in its foundations. The +foremost discrepancy, of course, is that the scientist is willing to have his +enterprise rest on a fiction, that of the common objective world. Thus, the +example of science suggests an additional way of dealing with the problems +which arise for our theory: we can allow discrepancies to persist unresolved. + +There is an interesting observation to be made about one's own dreams +in connection with multiple existences. I have found that the person I am in +my dreams is significantly different from the waking identity I take for +granted, as in my dream of 2/1/1974. As for the problem of other people's +dreams, one way of handling them would be simply to reject the existence of +other people's dream worlds and of their consciousnesses, and to limit one's +consideration to one's own dreams. But perhaps the most productive way to +handle the problem would be to construe it as one involving language in the +way that the problems concerning quasi-dreams did. Our descriptive language +is a language of stable object gestalts, of scientific-pragmatic reality. If we +accept reports of other people's dreams in language which blocks any +implications concerning objective reality, then our perceptual interpretations +will be different and the quality of the events will be fundamentally +different. The experience-world will be flatter. But maybe this is a +revolutionary advance. Maybe reports of our appearances in other people's +dreams, in language which blocks any implications about reality, are what we +should strive for. And if ve cease to be stable object gestalts for others, +maybe our stable object gestalts will not even appear in their dreams. + + +\section*{Note on how to remember dreams} + +The trick in remembering a dream is to fix in your mind one incident or +theme in the dream immediately upon awaking from it. You will then be +able to remember the whole dream well enough to write a description of it +the next day, and you will probably find that for weeks afterwards you can +add to the description and correct it. + + |