Merge branch 'master' of git.sr.ht:~ratsgod/blueprint

12 files changed, 595 insertions, 608 deletions

diff --git a/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex b/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex
index f66bb98..e95b85f 100644
--- a/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex
+++ b/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ could we convey the substance underlying the notations which we call
 admissble contradictions, and motivate the unusual collection of postulates 
 which we will adopt. 
 
-All properties will be thought of as "parameters," such as time, 
+All properties will be thought of as \enquote{parameters,} such as time, 
 location, color, density, acidity, etc. Different parameters will be represented 
 by the letters x, y, z, .... Different values of one parameter, say x, will be 
 represented by $x_1$, $x_2$, .... Each parameter has a domain, the set of all values 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ indefinitely large. By giving a possible phenomenon fixed values for every
 parameter, I assure that there will be only one such possible phenomenon. In 
 other words, my intension sets are all singletons. Another point is that if we 
 specify some of the parameters and specify their ranges, we limit the 
-phenomena which can be represented by our "ensembles." If our first 
+phenomena which can be represented by our \enquote{ensembles.} If our first 
 parameter is time and its range is $R$, and our second parameter is spatial 
 location and its range is $R^2$, then we are limited to phenomena which are 
 point phenomena in space and time. If we have a parameter for speed of 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Let ($x_1$, $y$, $z$, ...), ($x_2$, $y$, $z$, ...), etc. stand for possible phen
 which all differ from each other in respect to parameter x but are identical in 
 respect to every other parameter $y$, $z$, ... . (If the ensembles were intension 
 sets, they would be disjoint precisely because $x$ takes a different value in 
-each.) A "simple contradiction family" of ensembles is the family [($x_1$,$y$,$z$, 
+each.) A \enquote{simple contradiction family} of ensembles is the family [($x_1$,$y$,$z$, 
 ...), ($x_2$, $y$, $z$, ...), ...]. The family may have any number of ensembles. It 
 actually represents many families, because $y$, $z$, ... are allowed to vary; but 
 each of these parameters must assume the same value in all ensembles in any 
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ any one family, values which may be fixed. A parameter which has the same
 value throughout any one family will be referred to as a consistency 
 parameter. A parameter which has a different value in each ensemble in a 
 given family will be referred to as a contradiction parameter. 
-"Contradiction" will be shortened to "con." A simple con family is then a 
+\enquote{Contradiction} will be shortened to \enquote{con.} A simple con family is then a 
 family with one con parameter. The consistency parameters may be dropped 
 from the notation, but the reader must remember that they are implicitly 
 present, and must remember how they function. 
@@ -64,19 +64,19 @@ value from the first subset, one from the second subset, etc.
 
 Con families can be defined which have more than one con parameter, 
 i.e. more than one parameter satisfying all the conditions we put on x. Such 
-con families are not "simple." Let the cardinality of a con family be 
-indicated by a number prefixed to "family," and let the number of con 
-parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to "con." Remembering that 
+con families are not \enquote{simple.} Let the cardinality of a con family be 
+indicated by a number prefixed to \enquote{family,} and let the number of con 
+parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to \enquote{con.} Remembering that 
 consistency parameters are understood, a 2-con $\infty$-family would appear as 
 [($x_1$, $y_1$). ($x_2$, $y_2$), ...].
 
-A "contradiction" or "$\varphi$-object" is not explicitly defined, but it is 
-notated by putting "$\varphi$" in front of a con family. The characteristics of $\varphi$-objects, 
+A \enquote{contradiction} or \enquote{$\varphi$-object} is not explicitly defined, but it is 
+notated by putting \enquote{$\varphi$} in front of a con family. The characteristics of $\varphi$-objects, 
 or cons, are established by introducing additional postulates in the 
 theory. 
 
-In this theory, every con is either "admissible" or "not admissible." 
-"Admissible" will be shortened to "am." The initial amcons of the theory 
+In this theory, every con is either \enquote{admissible} or \enquote{not admissible.} 
+\enquote{Admissible} will be shortened to \enquote{am.} The initial amcons of the theory 
 are introduced by postulate. Essentially, what is postulated is that cons with 
 a certain con parameter are am. (The cons directly postulated to be am are 
 on 1-con families.) However, the postulate will specify other requirements for 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ the literary description of the waterfall illusion!) Note the implicit
 requirements that the con family must be a 2-family, and that $s$ must be 
 selected from $[O]$ in one ensemble and from ${s:s>O}$ in the other ensemble. 
 
-If $t$ is time, $t\in R$, consideration of the phrase "b years ago," which is an 
+If $t$ is time, $t\in R$, consideration of the phrase \enquote{b years ago,} which is an 
 amcon in the natural language, suggests that we postulate $\varphi[(t):a-b\leq t\leq v-b \&a\leq v]$ to be am,
 where $a$ is a fixed time expressed in years A.D., $b$ is a fixed 
 number of years, and $v$ is a variable---the time of the present instant in years 
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ obvious. But in this case, there are more requirements in the postulate of
 admissibility. May we apply the postulate twice? May we admit first 
 $\varphi[(p\in P_1),(p\in P_2)]$ and then $\varphi[(p\in P_3),(p\in P_4)]$, where $P_3$ and $P_4$ are arbitrary 
 $P_i$'s different from $P_1$ and $P_2$? The answer is no. We may admit 
-$\varphi[(p\in P_1),(p\in P_2)]$ for arbitrary $P_1$ and $P_2$, $P_1\cap P_2=\emptyset$, but having made this "initial 
-choice," the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary $P_3$ and $P_4$. A second 
+$\varphi[(p\in P_1),(p\in P_2)]$ for arbitrary $P_1$ and $P_2$, $P_1\cap P_2=\emptyset$, but having made this \enquote{initial 
+choice,} the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary $P_3$ and $P_4$. A second 
 con $\varphi[(p\in P_3),(p\in P_4)]$, $P_3\cap P_4=\emptyset$, may be postulated to be am only if 
 $P_1\cup P_3$,$P_2\cup P_3$,$P_1\cup P_4$, and $P_2\cup P_4$ are not connected. In other words, you 
 may postulate many cons of the form $\varphi[(p\in P_i),(p\in P_j)]$ to be am, but 
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Our present notation cannot express this result, because it does not
 distinguish between different types of uniform motion throughout a finite 
 region, \ie the types $M$, $C_1$, $C_2$, $D_1$, and $D_2$. Instead, we have infinitesimal 
 motion, which is involved in all the latter types of motion. Questions such as 
-"whether the admissibility of $\varphi[M,S]$ implies the admissibility of $\varphi[C_1,S]$" 
+\enquote{whether the admissibility of $\varphi[M,S]$ implies the admissibility of $\varphi[C_1,S]$} 
 drop out. The reason for the omission in the present theory is our choice of 
 parameters and domains, which we discussed earlier. Our present version is 
 thus not exhaustive. However, the deficiency is not intrinsic to our method; 
@@ -233,8 +233,8 @@ implication was empirically false. The realm of the logically possible is not
 the entire realm of connotative thought; it is just the realm of normal 
 perceptual routines. When the mind is temporarily freed from normal 
 perceptual routines---especially in perceptual illusions, but also in dreams and 
-even in the use of certain "illogical" natural language phrases---it can imagine 
-and visualize the "logically impossible." Every text on perceptual 
+even in the use of certain \enquote{illogical} natural language phrases---it can imagine 
+and visualize the \enquote{logically impossible.} Every text on perceptual 
 psychology mentions this fact, but logicians have never noticed its immense 
 significance. The logically impossible is not a blank; it is a whole layer of 
 meaning and concepts which can be superimposed on conventional logic, but 
diff --git a/essays/art_or_brend.tex b/essays/art_or_brend.tex
index ef758d7..89f115a 100644
--- a/essays/art_or_brend.tex
+++ b/essays/art_or_brend.tex
@@ -16,18 +16,18 @@ advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations
 and an outstanding mathematical theory. ts the work of art such an 
 analysis? 
 
-The motives behind the "scientific" justification of art are utterly sinister. 
+The motives behind the \enquote{scientific} justification of art are utterly sinister. 
 Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an 
 academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a pedantic 
-pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music", intends 
-nothing less than the suppression of the culture of "lower classes" and 
-"ower races." 
+pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his \enquote{scientific music}, intends 
+nothing less than the suppression of the culture of \enquote{lower classes} and 
+\enquote{ower races.} 
 
 It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to 
-the "scientific" justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in 
+the \enquote{scientific} justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in 
 artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters 
 all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the 
-audience than all the works that "obey" the laws. 
+audience than all the works that \enquote{obey} the laws. 
 
 \item The artist or entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other 
 people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to 
@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to
 defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of 
 art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but 
 they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one 
-artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is "Do 
-you like it?" Once the "scientific" justification of art is discredited, the 
+artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is \enquote{Do 
+you like it?} Once the \enquote{scientific} justification of art is discredited, the 
 artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no 
-reason why you should "consume" it. 
+reason why you should \enquote{consume} it. 
 
 There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political 
 dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be 
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find
 their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would 
 have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as 
 your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's 
-product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to "be oneself" for 
-other people, to "express oneself" for them. 
+product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to \enquote{be oneself} for 
+other people, to \enquote{express oneself} for them. 
 
 \item There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and 
 entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of 
diff --git a/essays/concept_art.tex b/essays/concept_art.tex
index bfe4c79..79247a6 100644
--- a/essays/concept_art.tex
+++ b/essays/concept_art.tex
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Now what is artistic, aesthetic, about a work which is a body of
 concepts? This question can best be answered by telling where concept art 
 came from; I developed it in an attempt to straighten out certain traditional 
 activities generally regarded as aesthetic. The first of these is structure art, 
-music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is "structure." My 
+music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is \enquote{structure.} My 
 definitive discussion of structure art is in my unpublished essay \essaytitle{Structure 
 Art and Pure Mathematics}; here I will just summarize that discussion. Much 
 structure art is a vestige of the time when \eg music was believed to be 
@@ -169,15 +169,15 @@ reduction together constitute the theorem.
 \section*{Concept Art: Innpersegs (May--July 1961)}
 
 \begin{sysrules}
-A "halpoint" iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo 
+A \enquote{halpoint} iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo 
 which appears to surround a small bright light when one looks at it through 
 glasses fogged by having been breathed on, for as long as the point is in the 
 halo. 
 
-An "init`point" iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo. 
+An \enquote{init`point} iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo. 
 
 
-An "inn`perseq" iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the 
+An \enquote{inn`perseq} iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the 
 halpoints are on one (initial) radius of a halo; the members of the first 
 sequence are initpoints; for each of the other sequences, the first member (a 
 consequent) is got from the non-first members of the preceding sequence 
diff --git a/essays/creep.tex b/essays/creep.tex
index f2a491d..5bd9b13 100644
--- a/essays/creep.tex
+++ b/essays/creep.tex
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 \chapter{Creep}
 
-When Helen Lefkowitz said I was "such a creep" at Interlochen in 
+When Helen Lefkowitz said I was \enquote{such a creep} at Interlochen in 
 1956, her remark epitomized the feeling that females have always had about 
 me. My attempts to understand why females rejected me and to decide what 
-to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961-1962, I tried to 
+to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961--1962, I tried to 
 develop a theory of the creep problem. This theory took involuntary 
 celibacy as the defining characteristic of the creep. Every society has its 
 image of the ideal young adult, even though the symbols of growing up 
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ with condescending scorn, amusement, or pity.
 Because he seems weak and inferior in the company of others, and 
 cannot maintain his self-respect, the creep is pressed into isolation. There, 
 the creep doesn't have the pressure of other people's presence to make him 
-feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not te be 
+feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not to be 
 inferior. The creep can develop the morale required to differ. The creep also 
 tends to expand his fantasy life, so that it takes the place of the 
 interpersonal life from which he has been excluded. The important 
@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ My problem actually has to do with the enormous discrepancy between
 the ways I can relate to males and the ways I can relate to females. The 
 essence of the problem has to do with the social values of females, which are 
 completely different from my own. The principal occupation of my life has 
-been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in "writings." Now 
+been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in \enquote{writings.} Now 
 most males have the same social values that I find in all females. But there 
 have always been a few males with exceptional values; and my activities have 
 developed through exchanges of ideas with these males. These exchanges 
 have come about spontaneously and naturally. In contrast, I have never had 
 such an exchange of ideas with females, for the following reasons. Females 
 have nothing to say that applies to my activities. They cannot understand 
-that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the "masses" who 
+that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the \enquote{masses} who 
 oppose and have tried to discourage my activities. 
 
 The great divergence between myself and females comes in the area 
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ prerequisites, no institutional barriers to entry. One enters it by defining
 oneself as being in it. Yet no female has chosen to enter it. Or consider such 
 figures as Galileo and Galois. By the standards of their contemporaries, these 
 individuals were engaged in utterly ridiculous, antisocial pursuits. Society 
-does not give anybody the "opportunity" to engage in such pursuits. Society 
+does not give anybody the \enquote{opportunity} to engage in such pursuits. Society 
 tries to prevent everybody from being a Galileo or Galois. To be a Galileo is 
 really a matter of choosing sides, of choosing to take a certain stand.) 
 
@@ -126,9 +126,9 @@ the women's group of the Art Workers Coalition in New York. Many of the
 women there had seen my Down With Art pamphlet. Ail the females who 
 have seen this pamphlet have reacted negatively, and it is quite clear what 
 their attitude is. They believe that they are courageously defending modern 
-art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a "modern 
-museum art appreciation course." The more they are pressed, the more 
-proudiy do they defend "Great Art." Now the objective validity of my 
+art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a \enquote{modern 
+museum art appreciation course.} The more they are pressed, the more 
+proudiy do they defend \enquote{Great Art.} Now the objective validity of my 
 opposition to art is absolutely beyond question. To defend modern art is 
 precisely what a hopeless mediocrity would consider courageous. Again, it is 
 clear that the opposition between myself and females is in the area where 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ important part of my life; and to adopt a facade of conformity. Thus, I
 perceive females as persons who cannot function in my occupation. I 
 perceive them as being like an employment agency, like an institution to 
 which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can he counted on to 
-represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I 
+represent the most \enquote{social, human} point of view, a point of view which, as I 
 have explained, is distant from my own. (In March 1970, at the Institute for 
 Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he 
 would murder his own mother, and murder all his friends, if by doing so he 
diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index d78631a..9c93395 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore
 we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of 
 touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest 
 expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal 
-organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" 
+organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} 
 includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is 
 a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same 
 as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation 
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us
 denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1), (T_1, V_2), (T_2, V_1), (T_2, V_2)$. In 
 reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us 
 designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following 
-notation. Consider a rectangular array of "places" such that the place in the 
+notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the 
 ith row and jth column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as 
 appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of 
 regularities in our present world. 
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is
 excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only f's, which 
 amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of f's leaves 
 one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to 
-open-eye sights); such an "impairment" is of little interest. Of the remaining 
+open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining 
 changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: 
 closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the 
 changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ $\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}$.
 
 But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new 
 rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change 
-changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about "impairing"
+changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}
 changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining 
 changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes 
 are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the
 anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect 
 everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
 sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference 
-point in the "world." The question of "whether the anomaties are really 
-outside or only in the mind" comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
+point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomaties are really 
+outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
 If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as 
 a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have 
 had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be 
@@ -198,23 +198,23 @@ However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet
 satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the 
 subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his 
 perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely 
-chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say "I see a book 
-in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil." These assumptions may not be 
-justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, "I don't even 
+chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book 
+in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be 
+justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even 
 know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know 
 whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is 
-visual." In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
+visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
 never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the 
 changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are 
 defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that 
 everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may 
 literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this 
-compensation may become habitual and "pre-conscious." In this case, if the 
+compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the 
 physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a 
 temporary psychological malfunction. 
 
 These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are 
-actually learned, "unconscious" interpretations of raw data which by 
+actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by 
 themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast 
 number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the 
 subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is 
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile
 clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished 
 manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, 
 our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. 
-"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
+\enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
 futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The 
 empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the 
 perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of 
@@ -286,13 +286,13 @@ object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence.
 The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which 
 resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. 
 To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the 
-concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
+concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
 The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight 
 and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the 
 physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its 
 immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot 
 be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. 
-Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of 
+Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of 
 the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our 
 experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying 
 concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being 
diff --git a/essays/dream_reality.tex b/essays/dream_reality.tex
index aab289d..33b901c 100644
--- a/essays/dream_reality.tex
+++ b/essays/dream_reality.tex
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ added a second-order activity. The transformation procedure to somehow
 combine conscious ideational direction---coding of the banal dreams---with 
 alteration of my experience, my esthesia, my lived experience. 
 
-
 \section{Dreams and Reality---An Experimental Essay}
 
 Excerpts from my dream diary which are referred-to in the essay that 
@@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ my mattress in the front room of my apartment. The action is carried on
 continuously through waking up and through the associated change of 
 setting. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{1/12/1974}
 
 Just before I go to sleep for the night, I am lying in bed drowsy. I think 
@@ -90,7 +88,6 @@ Comment: The differences between this experience and a waking
 visualization are that the latter is less vivid than seeing and is accompanied 
 by waking reality cues such as cues of bodily location. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{1/16/1974}
 
 \begin{enumerate}
@@ -113,7 +110,6 @@ the waking state. I then begin to will away the rash in the dream, and I
 succeed, 
 \end{enumerate}
 
-
 \dreamdate{1/20/1974}
 
 For some reason the dream associates Simone Forti with flute-like 
@@ -129,7 +125,6 @@ Comments: I tape my mouth at night so I will sleep with my mouth closed. I
 experimented at trying to whistle with the tape on while fully awake. The 
 breath just hisses against the tape. The pitch of the hiss can be varied. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{2/1/1974}
 
 1. I try to assist a man in counterfeiting ten dollar bills by taking half 
@@ -137,7 +132,6 @@ of a ten, scotch taping it to half of a one, and then coloring over the one
 until it looks like the other half of the ten. The method fails because I bring 
 old crumpled tens rather than new tens, and the one doilar bills are new. 
 
-
 Comments: There are no natural anomalies in this dream at all. What is 
 anomalous is that this counterfeiting method seems perfectly sensible, and I 
 only begin to question it when we try to fit the crumpled half-bill to the 
@@ -150,7 +144,6 @@ is bland material about my early life which could apply to any child or
 teen-ager. Thus, I must warn readers who know me only from this diary not 
 to try to make the image of me here fit my waking life. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{2/3/1974}
 
 3. I have had several dreams that I am taking the last courses of my 
@@ -165,7 +158,6 @@ person. I experienced another person's existence instead of mine. Professor
 Nell also appeared somewhere in this dream; as he has in several school 
 dreams I have had recently. 
 
-
 \dreamdatecomment{2/3/1974}{This is the date I recorded, but it seems that it would have to be later.}
 
 I get up in the morning and decide to have a self-indulgent breakfast 
@@ -194,21 +186,19 @@ strong belief in the reality of the social future and in my ability to form
 accurate expectations about it. When I awakened, the whole misadventure 
 vanished. 
 
-
 End of excerpts from my dream diary.
 
 \begin{quotation}
-"... It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views 
-or perceptions... But ... inasmuch as it is the common objective world that 
-renders ... general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist 
+"\ldots\ It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views 
+or perceptions\ldots\ But \ldots\ inasmuch as it is the common objective world that 
+renders \ldots\ general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist 
 will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views, though 
-just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. ... the common objective 
+just as real, will be treated as its perspectives \ldots\ the common objective 
 world, whether such a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is 
-indispensable to science ... 
-."\footnote{A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), pp. 176--7}
+indispensable to science \ldots"
+\footnote{A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), pp. 176--7 }
 \end{quotation}
 
-
 \textbf{A.} We wish to postulate that dreams are exactly what they seem to be 
 while we are dreaming, namely, literal reality. Naively, we want to get closer 
 to literal empiricism than natural science is. But science has worked out a 
@@ -649,7 +639,6 @@ dreams, in language which blocks any implications about reality, are what we
 should strive for. And if ve cease to be stable object gestalts for others, 
 maybe our stable object gestalts will not even appear in their dreams. 
 
-
 \section*{Note on how to remember dreams}
 
 The trick in remembering a dream is to fix in your mind one incident or 
@@ -657,5 +646,3 @@ theme in the dream immediately upon awaking from it. You will then be
 able to remember the whole dream well enough to write a description of it 
 the next day, and you will probably find that for weeks afterwards you can 
 add to the description and correct it. 
-
-
diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
index 79f8b7a..857efe1 100644
--- a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
+++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 \chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
 
 We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my 
-"immediate experience." Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist 
+\enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist 
 even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, 
 then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask 
 whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be 
 yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in 
-order for the phrase "a realm beyond my experience" to have any meaning. 
+order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. 
 Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap 
 between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion 
 \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we
 are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our 
 argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, 
 and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. 
-The only possible pproach for this paper is an internal critique of common 
+The only possible approach for this paper is an internal critique of common 
 sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to 
 aspects of themselves. 
 
@@ -53,25 +53,25 @@ which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in
 the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has 
 traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian 
 atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing 
-aboui nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the 
+about nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the 
 natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that 
 belief-assertions are not substantive. 
 
 Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my 
-experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts. (We 
+experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts.\footnote{We 
 understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my 
 experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal 
-formulation.) Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire 
+formulation.} Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire 
 State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the 
 \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture 
 that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a 
 distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called 
 perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may 
 close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of 
-"reality," two different types of experiences can be distinguished, 
+\enquote{reality,} two different types of experiences can be distinguished, 
 non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act 
 consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a 
-non-mental experience. The "attitude" which is involved is not a 
+non-mental experience. The \enquote{attitude} which is involved is not a 
 proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only 
 introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving 
 psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the 
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ belief-assertion.
 
 The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as 
 the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that 
-although the problem originally seems to center on "nonexperience," it 
-turns out to center on "language." Philosophical problems exist only if there 
+although the problem originally seems to center on \enquote{nonexperience,} it 
+turns out to center on \enquote{language.} Philosophical problems exist only if there 
 is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in 
 belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the 
 existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that 
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond
 experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic 
 expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark 
 parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to 
-nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word "table" is supposed to denote an 
+nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word \enquote{table} is supposed to denote an 
 object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. 
 Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as 
 follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that 
@@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of
 all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is 
 true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is 
 whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more 
-immediately than in the case of "nonexperience," that this question is 
+immediately than in the case of \enquote{nonexperience,} that this question is 
 caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is 
 there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and 
-nonexperiences? Is there an expression, "\textsc{Empire State Building,}" which is 
+nonexperiences? Is there an expression, \enquote{\textsc{Empire State Building,}} which is 
 related to an object outside one's experience, the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and 
 which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the \textsc{Empire 
 State Building} or not?) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask 
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the
 natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of 
 the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this 
 container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There 
-is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned 
-before, the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an 
+is no way to \enquote{go back before the natural language.} As we mentioned 
+before, the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so} is an 
 example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
 
 In summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, 
diff --git a/essays/introduction.tex b/essays/introduction.tex
index 73c36ef..721d241 100644
--- a/essays/introduction.tex
+++ b/essays/introduction.tex
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that
 the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, 
 political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual 
 undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution 
-(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the'individual has 
+(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the individual has 
 a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social 
 philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain 
 the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond 
@@ -31,25 +31,25 @@ I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation.
 Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have 
 pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and 
 demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still 
-consider it "necessary" to believe in God; but the Soviet government has 
+consider it \enquote{necessary} to believe in God; but the Soviet government has 
 managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which 
 beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled 
 \essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and 
 \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. 
-The question of whether a given belief is valid 
-depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate 
-experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I 
+The question of whe\-ther a given belief is valid 
+depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate 
+experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I 
 am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be 
-a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase 'a realm 
-beyond my experience' could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of 
+a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase \enquote{a realm 
+beyond my experience} could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of 
 descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a 
 realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it 
 cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs 
 depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, 
 an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or 
 meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that 
-the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I 
-imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this 
+the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it, I 
+imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this 
 mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The 
 attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to 
 the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs 
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also.
 The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth 
 as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to 
 have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that 
-an activity may perfectly weil employ false statements and still have 
+an activity may perfectly well employ false statements and still have 
 objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that 
 are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary 
 phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental
 reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and 
 phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It 
 must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to 
-pre-scientific trrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more 
+pre-scientific irrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more 
 than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you 
 to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, 
 explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get 
@@ -82,13 +82,13 @@ value; its value is claimed to be entertainmental or amusemental. What about
 art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which 
 are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each 
 individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely 
-subjective. (Call these experiences "brend.") The difference between brend 
+subjective. (Call these experiences \term{brend.}) The difference between brend 
 and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and 
 turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to 
 overlook their brend, and they do so because of the same factors which 
 perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization 
 of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning 
-which causes one to venerate "great art" is also a conditioning to dismiss 
+which causes one to venerate \enquote{great art} is also a conditioning to dismiss 
 one's own brend. If one can become aware of one's brend without the 
 distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's brend is 
 superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality 
@@ -115,29 +115,29 @@ prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game.
 What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into 
 little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write 
 down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call 
-the result a "modern poem," people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas 
+the result a \enquote{modern poem,} people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas 
 they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly 
 mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in 
 their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial 
 amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets. 
 
 Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between 
-the products which result from this attempt to "save" art, and activities in 
+the products which result from this attempt to \enquote{save} art, and activities in 
 the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse 
 activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art 
-products which are claimed to be "scientific" and therefore objectively 
+products which are claimed to be \enquote{scientific} and therefore objectively 
 valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked 
 about art products. 
-\begin{enumerate}
+\begin{enumerate}[itemsep=3pt, parsep=0pt, topsep=3pt, leftmargin=1cm]
 \item If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be 
-worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to "carry" it? 
+worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to \enquote{carry} it? 
 
 \item Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific 
 discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the 
 field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, 
 why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it 
 only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to 
-perform "Swan Lake" in order to do antigravity experiments? 
+perform \enquote{Swan Lake} in order to do antigravity experiments? 
 \end{enumerate}
 To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to 
 isolate the active principle---not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo. 
@@ -167,22 +167,22 @@ must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something
 which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful 
 independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. 
 
-We can now consider the following principle. "spontaneously and 
-without any prompting to sweep human culture aside and to carry out 
-elaborate, completely self-justifying activities." Relative to the social context 
+We can now consider the following principle. \enquote{spontaneously and 
+without any prompting: to sweep human culture aside and to carry out 
+elaborate, completely self-justifying activities.} Relative to the social context 
 of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to 
 respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary 
 antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, 
 it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. 
-In the light of The Flaws Underlying Beliefs and the brend theory, however, 
+In the light of \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} and the \term{brend} theory, however, 
 the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted 
 correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The 
 activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be 
 standardized. 
 
-The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism},
+The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism},
 \essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. 
-\essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very 
+\essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very 
 possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an 
 activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional 
 gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena 
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ outside itself.
 
 \essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963}
 uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental 
-reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories}, and this led 
+reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Mem\-or\-ies}, and this led 
 in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}.
 
 The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} 
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us
 to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the 
 logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to 
 obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are 
-"admissible." The theory investigates the implications of admitting some 
+\enquote{admissible.} The theory investigates the implications of admitting some 
 contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of 
 many-valued numbers is also presented. 
 
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to
 \essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose 
 significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay 
 defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it 
-impossibie for physicists to "construct the object from experience." Finally, 
+impossible for physicists to \enquote{construct the object from experience.} Finally, 
 \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of 
 false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I 
 favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not 
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ generated a series of applications as the other activities have.
 
 To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They 
 are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities 
-having objective value, together with cach individual's brend. Consider the 
+having objective value, together with each individual's brend. Consider the 
 individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the 
 significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the 
 business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of 
@@ -249,6 +249,6 @@ I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official
 intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot 
 be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the 
 beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is 
-presumably not inherent in my intelectual modality; but under present 
+presumably not inherent in my intellectual modality; but under present 
 social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. 
 
diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
index 41bf1ce..5e0eedf 100644
--- a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
 
-\begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide]
+\begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these 
 intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why 
 are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this
 way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical 
 anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. 
 
-\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" 
+\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective \enquote{anthropology} 
 of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
 Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I 
 have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between 
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require
 propositional thought. 
 
 Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations 
-(relative to my field of vision) as "the same object" a belief? Apparently, 
+(relative to my field of vision) as \enquote{the same object} a belief? Apparently, 
 but this is very ambiguous. 
 
-Is my identification of tactile and visual "pencil-perceptions" as aspects 
+Is my identification of tactile and visual \enquote{pencil-perceptions} as aspects 
 of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through 
 different senses) a belief? Yes. 
 
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it.
 
 \gap
 
-\item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
+\item At one point Alten\editornote{A classmate of Flynt's at Harvard.} claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
 take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other 
-evidence. Our "immediate experience" is mediated; it is a derived 
+evidence. Our \enquote{immediate experience} is mediated; it is a derived 
 phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our 
 subjective standpoint. 
 
@@ -119,12 +119,12 @@ phenomenon, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the
 pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness 
 and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is
 the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy 
-exposes. "I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I 
-cannot now perceive it." 
+exposes. \enquote{\emph{I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I 
+cannot now perceive it.}} 
 \end{enumerate}
 
 \item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain 
-self-vitiating "nodes" in the logic of common sense. These nodes include the 
+self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} il the logic of common sense. These nodes include the 
 concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often 
 find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from 
 cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ unmistakable the reason why I attribute so much importance to these
 philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few 
 isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only 
 significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation 
-of why the life---world is subject to being undermined. 
+of why the life-world is subject to being undermined. 
 
 When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of 
 trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day 
@@ -149,35 +149,35 @@ pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside
 the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go 
 directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive 
 orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or 
-have "object perceptions," and thus wouldn't know whether one was 
-walking through a wail or not. 
+have \enquote{object perceptions,} and thus wouldn't know whether one was 
+walking through a wall or not. 
 
 At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my 
 genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of 
 non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a 
 hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental 
-incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
+incompetence or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
 this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. 
 
 \item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are 
 now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing 
 over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does 
 not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two 
-circumstances in conflict. The "fact" that we are talking is one of the two 
+circumstances in conflict. The \enquote{fact} that we are talking is one of the two 
 circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other 
-circumstance being the self-vitiating "nodes" I have mentioned. To repeat 
+circumstance being the self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} I have mentioned. To repeat 
 over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. 
 
 Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking 
-suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an 
-objective relation between words and things.) The language we "see" is a 
-shell whose "transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. 
+suggests, we do not \enquote{see} language. (That is, we do not experience an 
+objective relation between words and things.) The language we \enquote{see} is a 
+shell whose \enquote{transcendental reference} is provided by self-deception. 
 
-\item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in 
+\item Does the theory of amcons\editornote{"Admissable contradictions", defined in \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissable Contradictions} in this volume.} show that the contradiction exposed in 
 \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical 
 force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary 
 motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of 
-contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline 
+contradictory qualities. (But \enquote{\emph{He left an hour ago}} begins to be a borderline 
 case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which 
 violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to 
 classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first 
diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index 45fb9a2..984c5ef 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
-\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
-\subsection*{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
+\newcommand{\stress}[1]{\textbf{#1}}
+
+\chapter[Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)][Philosophy Proper]{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
+\renewcommand*{\thesection}{\Alph{section}}
+\subsection[Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)][Introduction]{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be 
-an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are 
-tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. 
+an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are 
+tentatively defined to be \emph{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}
 Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by 
 their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as 
-corresponding to non-tautologous propositions. 
+corresponding to \emph{non-tautologous propositions.}
 
 Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or 
 supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is 
@@ -18,14 +21,14 @@ continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which
 philosophers have dealt with it. 
 
 All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are 
-normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be heipful to 
+normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be helpful to 
 examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here 
 beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this 
 monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain 
 approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold 
 beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
 
-it is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that 
+It is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that 
 they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on 
 their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, 
 quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some 
@@ -34,9 +37,9 @@ to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare.
 Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy 
 non-cognitive needs. 
 
-To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I
-could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is 
-true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which 
+To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as \enquote{\emph{I
+could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so,}} or \enquote{\emph{Even if so-and-so is 
+true I don't want to know it.}} These remarks manifest the needs with which 
 we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level 
 of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit 
 and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing 
@@ -51,35 +54,36 @@ being considered here are admitted self-deceptions.
 
 A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for 
 non-cognitive reasons follows. 
-
-\begin{enumerate}
-\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it." 
+\vskip 0.5em
+\begin{enumerate}[nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
+\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. \enquote{\emph{I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God.}} \enquote{\emph{If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it.}}
 
 \item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
 
-\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons. 
+\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Ca\-tho\-li\-cism for esthetic reasons. 
 
 \item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
 
 \item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one 
 who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the 
 inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. 
-Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of 
+Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called \term{theologizing,} in recognition of 
 the archetypal activity in this category. 
+\end{enumerate}
 
 When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are 
 instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive 
 motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific 
 method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he 
-believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a 
+believed in the \enquote{\emph{real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a 
 common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who 
-discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a 
+discovers it bit by bit.}} The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a 
 commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he 
 must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. 
 The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry 
 begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows 
-that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a 
-demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then 
+that science is an instance of \term{theologizing.} If scientists cannot welcome a 
+demonstration that their \enquote{metaphysical} presuppositions are invalid, then 
 their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
 
 The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the 
@@ -93,6 +97,8 @@ or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other
 hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a 
 single alternative is welcome. 
 
+\vskip 0.5em
+\begin{enumerate}[resume, nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
 \item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested 
 in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To 
 academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had 
@@ -111,6 +117,7 @@ comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it
 seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. 
 \end{enumerate}
 
+\vskip 0.5em
 This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, 
 limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or 
 self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The 
@@ -119,18 +126,20 @@ whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to
 our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this 
 monograph. 
 
-\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
+\plainbreak{2}
+
+\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
 unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without 
 change.)}
 
 \section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-\subsection*{Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts}
+\subsection[Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts][Preliminary Concepts]{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of 
 philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing 
 language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might 
 tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, 
-formulations of them (for example, \formulation{Other persons have minds} as 
+formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as 
 representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem 
 will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be 
 driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or 
@@ -148,63 +157,63 @@ doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the
 truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the 
 others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. 
 
-The first concept is a new one, that of "explication". Explication of a 
+The first concept is a new one, that of \emph{explication}. Explication of a 
 familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding 
 a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is 
-wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing 
+wanted that the expression \enquote{mean}. To explain: I will be discussing 
 philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their 
-"meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
+\enquote{meaning} needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
 use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which 
-the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as 
+the \enquote{meanings}, uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as 
 replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, 
 which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses 
 are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be 
 replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to 
 the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be 
-concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the 
+concerned with the suggestion of clear \emph{uses}, of the expressions of which the 
 uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the 
 expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of 
 acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of 
 which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents 
-(and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. 
+(and non-referents), then the new expressions must clearly have referents. 
 Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents 
 in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, 
 especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. 
-(I will not say here just how I use "connotation". What the connotations of 
+(I will not say here just how I use \enquote{connotation}. What the connotations of 
 an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a 
 supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are 
-supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
-supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, 
-for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the 
+supposed to be like.) \enquote{Finding}, or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
+supposed to be acceptable to oneself as a replacement, of the kind described, 
+for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be \term{explicating} the 
 expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to 
-be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". 
+be the \term{explicandum}, and the suggested replacement, the \term{explication}. 
 Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is 
 inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the 
 same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. 
 
-I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of 
+I should mention that my use of \term{explication} is different from that of 
 Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very 
-problematic "definition". For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
+problematic \term{definition}. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
 of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, 
 suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of 
-"work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
+\enquote{work}); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
 clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. 
 
 Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an 
-expression is suggested, as an explication for "thing having a mind" (if 
+expression is suggested, as an explication for \enquote{thing having a mind} (if 
 supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the 
 things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other 
-"overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
-expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for "thing 
-having a mind", since "thing having a mind" presumably has the connotations 
-for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
+\enquote{overt} behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
+expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for \enquote{thing 
+having a mind}, since \enquote{thing having a mind} presumably has the connotations 
+for the reader \enquote{\emph{that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
 higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt 
 behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by 
-the thing having it", and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
+the thing having it}}, and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
 the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the 
-proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causual 
+proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causal 
 connection between having a mind and the other things, because the 
-expression 'thing having a mind' itself, and not the supposed effects of 
+expression \enquote{thing having a mind} itself, and not the supposed effects of 
 having a mind, is what is under discussion. 
 
 As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating 
@@ -221,117 +230,128 @@ connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases
 when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with 
 philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly 
 be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the 
-explications for "thing having a mind" mentioned above. 
+explications for \enquote{thing having a mind} mentioned above. 
 
 The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be 
-discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
+discussing the \enquote{truth} of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
 chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a 
 good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify 
-the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for "true statement". 
+the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for \enquote{true statement}. 
 (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the 
 explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
 
-Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be 
-"statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language 
+Well, what is a \term{statement}? How do what are usually said to be 
+\term{statements} state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language 
 you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What 
 does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just 
 about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their 
 arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that 
 when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy 
 ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important 
-connotations of "true statement", and, more generally, of "statement", as 
-traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion 
-which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content", as it is sometimes 
-said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbal" part of a statement is 
-supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at 
+connotations of \term{true statement}, and, more generally, of \emph{statement}, as 
+traditionally and commonly used, is that a \term{statement} is an \enquote{assertion 
+which has truth value} (is true or false) (or \enquote{has content}, as it is sometimes 
+said, rather misleadingly). That is, the \enquote{verbal} part of a statement is 
+supposed to be related in a certain way to something \enquote{non-verbal}, or at 
 least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a 
-statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do 
+statement is supposed to be \enquote{true} or not because of something having to do 
 with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is 
-related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and 
+related. (The exceptions are the \enquote{statements} of formalist logic and 
 mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus 
 irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are 
-interested in.) Thus, if "true statement" is to be explicated, "assertion having 
-truth value" and "is true" (and "has content" in a misleading use) have to be 
+interested in.) Thus, if \enquote{\term{true statement}} is to be explicated, \enquote{assertion having 
+truth value} and \enquote{is true} (and \enquote{has content} in a misleading use) have to be 
 explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication 
-for "true statement" deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
-"assertion having truth value" and "is true". One important conclusion from 
-these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or 
-bodes of marks such as "The man talks") are often said to be "statements", 
-would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate "statement" by simply 
-identifying it with "sentence" (in my sense); something must be said about 
+for \enquote{\term{true statement}} deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
+\enquote{assertion having truth value} and \enquote{is true}. One important conclusion from 
+these observations is that although \enquote{sentences} (the bodies of sound or 
+bodes of marks such as \enquote{The man talks}) are often said to be \enquote{statements}, 
+would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate \enquote{\term{statement}} by simply 
+identifying it with \enquote{sentence} (in my sense); something must be said about 
 such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same 
-reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify "statement" 
-with "sentence", the latter being explicated in terms of the ("formal") rules 
+reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify \enquote{\term{statement}}
+with \enquote{sentence}, the latter being explicated in terms of the (\enquote{formal}) rules 
 for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no 
 reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. 
 
-In explicating "true statement" I will use the most elegant approach, one 
+In explicating \enquote{\term{true statement}} I will use the most elegant approach, one 
 relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having 
 truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way 
 to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to 
-make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" \term{table} to 
-the thing. It is supposed that \term{table} has been "interpreted", that is, that it is 
-"determinate" to which, of all things, applications of \term{table} are (to be said 
-to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
-"determinate" which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word 
-"table", are expressions "equivalent to" "table".) The word "determinate" is 
+make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to \enquote{apply} \uline{table} to 
+the thing. It is supposed that \uline{table} has been \enquote{interpreted}, that is, that it is 
+\enquote{\emph{determinate}} to which, of all things, applications of \uline{table} are (to be said 
+to be) \enquote{true}. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
+\enquote{determinate} which, of all things (events), are \enquote{occurrences of the word 
+\enquote{table}}, are expressions \enquote{equivalent to} \uline{table}.) 
+The word \enquote{\emph{determinate}} is 
 the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit 
-myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one 
-can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and 
-"then" the thing. 'point out' is restricted to refer to "ostension", pointing 
-out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to "directing 
-attention to things not in one's presence" as well. The assertion is 'true', of 
-course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things 
-to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) 
-"true", otherwise "false". It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 
-"first" thing and a "second", the first being an interpreted expression, is an 
+myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for \enquote{apply}, one 
+can \enquote{apply} the word to the thing by pointing out \enquote{first} the word and 
+\enquote{then} the thing. \enquote{point out} is restricted to refer to \term{ostension}, pointing 
+out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to \enquote{directing 
+attention to things not in one's presence} as well. The assertion is \enquote{true}, of 
+course, if and only if the thing to which \uline{table} is applied is one of the things 
+to which it is determinate that the application of \uline{table} is (to be said to be) 
+\enquote{true}, otherwise \enquote{false}. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 
+\enquote{first} thing and a \enquote{second}, the first being an interpreted expression, is an 
 assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further 
-suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to 
-this explication, the things to which equivalent names ("occurances of a 
-name") may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, 
+suggest \enquote{\term{interpreted expression}} as an explication for \enquote{name}; with respect to 
+this explication, the things to which equivalent names (\enquote{occurrences of a 
+name}) may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, 
 other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the 
 concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple 
 assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is 
-how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
-between name and referents is an "objective, metaphysical entity", which 
+\emph{how a name has referents}; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
+between name and referents is an \enquote{objective, metaphysical entity}, which 
 would be getting into philosophy proper. 
 
 The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that 
-what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the 
-context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" 
-kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first 
-let us say that the "complex name" gotten by replacing a sentence's "main 
-verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the 
-sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is 
-'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
+what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the 
+context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} 
+kind; thus an explication for \enquote{\term{true statement}} can be found. To do so, first 
+let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \enquote{main 
+verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the 
+sentence. For example, the associated name of \enquote{Boston is in Massachusetts} is 
+\enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
 clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main 
-verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: \said{The 
+verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. 
+
+\vskip 0.5em
+
+Example:  \\
+\textbf{sentence:} \enquote{The 
 table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one 
-man while the other man talked}; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been 
-pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
+man while the other man talked}; \\
+\textbf{main verb:} \enquote{will have been} or \enquote{had been 
+pushed}. 
+
+\vskip 0.5em
+
+Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
 but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be 
 invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to 
-make a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this 
-"asserted name" being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
-doesn't assert names; names just have referents---it is statements that one 
-makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate 
-this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
-kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. In other 
+make a statement, is to so to speak \enquote{assert} its associated name; this 
+\enquote{asserted name} being \enquote{true} if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
+doesn't \emph{assert} names; names just have referents---it is statements that one 
+makes, \enquote{asserts}, and that are \enquote{true} or \enquote{false}. How, then, do we explicate 
+this \enquote{\term{asserting}} of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
+kind, which is the application of \uline{having a referent} to the name. In other 
 words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a 
 statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and 
 puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying 
-'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in 
-Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the 
-application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. 
+\uline{having a referent} to it. For example, the sentence \enquote{Boston is in 
+Massachusetts} should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the 
+application of \uline{having a referent} to \enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. 
 
-Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader 
+Now this approach may seem \enquote{unnatural} or incomplete to the reader 
 for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is 
-replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). 
+replaced by a statement \enquote{about} it (or to be precise its associated name). 
 Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to 
 describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a 
 statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even 
 more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of 
-interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to 
+interpreting \enquote{simple names} (Fries' \term{Class 1 words}), but not so natural to 
 speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of 
 course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from 
 simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus 
@@ -339,18 +359,18 @@ referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which
 they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex 
 names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex 
 names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such 
-words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
+words as \enquote{the}; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
 of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be 
 clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these 
 relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything 
-about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents (and 
+about what the \enquote{meaning} (intension), as opposed to the referents (and 
 non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension 
 unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for 
 my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells 
 the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is 
 true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly 
 philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous 
-word 'determinate', because I haven't said anything about how names get 
+word \enquote{determinate}, because I haven't said anything about how names get 
 referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how 
 one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards 
 explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with 
@@ -358,21 +378,21 @@ formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if
 language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in 
 some form must have the central role in it.) 
 
-"Statements", then, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind 
+\term{Statements}, then, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind 
 which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have 
-described. I could thus explicate 'true statement' as referring to those true 
-"simple" assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this 
-would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of 'true 
-statement' having to do with the method of apptying the first member to the 
+described. I could thus explicate \enquote{\emph{true statement}} as referring to those true 
+\enquote{simple} assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this 
+would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of \enquote{true 
+statement} having to do with the method of applying the first member to the 
 second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to 
 do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more 
-elegant to explicate 'true statement' as referring to all true assertions of the 
-"simple" kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of 
+elegant to explicate \enquote{true statement} as referring to all true assertions of the 
+\enquote{simple} kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of 
 the two explications the reader prefers. 
 
 So much for the preliminaries. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 3 : "Experience"}
+\subsection[Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}][\enquote{Experience}]{Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}}
 
 I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step 
 in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical 
@@ -384,55 +404,55 @@ think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern
 philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are 
 relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
 
-First, consider the term 'non-experience'. Although the concept of a 
-non-experience is intrinsically far more "difficult" than the concept of 
-"experience" which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, 
-presupposed in all "natural languages" and throughout philosophy, is so 
+First, consider the term \enquote{\term{non-experience}}. Although the concept of a 
+non-experience is intrinsically far more \enquote{difficult} than the concept of 
+\enquote{\term{experience}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, 
+presupposed in all \enquote{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so 
 taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should 
-have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are 
+have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are 
 perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of 
 it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the 
 future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects 
 from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily 
-understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and 
+understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and 
 their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the 
-second chapter); unperceivable "things" (microscopic objects (of course, 
+second chapter); unperceivable \enquote{things} (microscopic objects (of course, 
 viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), 
 essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, 
-normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To 
+normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\footnote{To 
 simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am 
 speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing 
-the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.) 
+the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}
 Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that 
 there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one 
-can not know whether there are any---this is not a non-belief but a complex 
+can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex 
 belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the 
 mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is 
-presumably a connotation of 'other minds' for the reader, as explained in the 
+presumably a connotation of \enquote{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the 
 second chapter. 
 
-In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. 
+In the history of philosophy, the concept of \term{non-experience} comes first. 
 Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about 
-non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or 
-experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that 
-one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
+non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a \term{perception}, or 
+\term{experience} of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that 
+one knows about \term{non-experiences} by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
 of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes 
 (assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by 
-having a "visual-table-experience". The theory goes on to say that these 
+having a \enquote{visual-table-experience}. The theory goes on to say that these 
 perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in 
 one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now 
 there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, 
 saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they 
 are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a 
-table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". 
-The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to 
-the second source of confusion. Does the English word 'table', as ordinarily 
+table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem \enquote{mental}. 
+The theory that they are in the mind is a \textbf{belief}. This point leads directly to 
+the second source of confusion. Does the English word \enquote{table}, as ordinarily 
 used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity 
 external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's 
 perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between 
 the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to 
-the reader, then he probably uses 'table', 'perceived table', and 
-'table-experience' as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, 
+the reader, then he probably uses \enquote{table}, \enquote{perceived table}, and 
+\enquote{table-experience} as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, 
 is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not 
 perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this 
 confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being 
@@ -441,8 +461,8 @@ perceptions.
 
 Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are 
 experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term 
-'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
-start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy 
+\enquote{\term{experience}} is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
+start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably 
 knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are 
 experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional 
 philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not 
@@ -450,21 +470,21 @@ know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective
 table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, 
 has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences 
 not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one 
-unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there 
-is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like. 
+unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that \stress{there 
+is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like.}
 One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would 
-be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, "thinking" that one doesn't have 
+be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, \enquote{thinking} that one doesn't have 
 one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be 
 shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest 
 idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the 
 reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably 
 known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some 
 philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say 
-cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some 
-philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In 
+cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity.\footnote{For example, some 
+philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds.} In 
 speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a 
 lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by 
-appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy 
+appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy 
 which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One 
 does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective 
 tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other 
@@ -472,57 +492,58 @@ persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's
 table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as 
 will be shown). 
 
-I have explained the current use of the term 'experience'. Now I want 
+I have explained the current use of the term \enquote{\term{experience}}. Now I want 
 to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, 
 will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing 
-'non-experience' I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of 
-the term, in the case of 'experience' I am going to suggest a new use for the 
-term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of 
-experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the 
-former. What I am interested in, however, is not 'experience' as it implies. 
-'perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind', but as it refers to that 
+\enquote{\term{non-experience}} I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of 
+the term, in the case of \enquote{\term{experience}} I am going to suggest a new use for the 
+term.) As I explained, the concept of \term{non-experience} preceded that of 
+\term{experience}, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the 
+former. What I am interested in, however, is not \enquote{experience} as it implies. 
+\enquote{perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind}, but as it refers to \stress{that 
 which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not 
-something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it 
-already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that 
+something one believes exists}. I am going to use \enquote{\term{experience}} to refer, as it 
+already does, to that immediate \enquote{world}, but \stress{without the implication that 
 experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same 
-referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use 
-'experience' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
-non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally 
+referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use 
+\enquote{\term{experience}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
+non-experiences, is not an antonym for \enquote{\term{non-experience}} as conventionally 
 used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a 
 leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy 
-between 'experience' as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences 
-or in particular the realm where they could be, and 'experience' without 
+between \enquote{experience} as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences 
+or in particular the realm where they could be, and \enquote{\term{experience}} without 
 these connotations. 
 
 Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be 
-obvious that although my term 'experience' was introduced last, it is 
+obvious that although my term \enquote{\term{experience}} was introduced last, it is 
 intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the 
 terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I 
 discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I 
-have used the perspective of the Western philsophical tradition to explain my 
+have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my 
 term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, 
-especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader's 
-conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and 
-especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he 
-ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term 
-'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. 
-
-I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. 
-As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it 
+especially, the theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences}. Even if the reader's 
+conceptual background does not involve the concept of \term{non-experience,} and 
+especially the modern Western theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences,} he 
+ought to be able to understand, and realize the \enquote{primacy} of, my term 
+\enquote{\term{experience}}. The term should be supra-cultural. 
+
+I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \enquote{experience}. 
+As I have said, it is \enquote{intrinsically} the simplest term, but I can not define it 
 by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including 
-the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based 
+the traditional term \enquote{experience}, the antonym of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, is based 
 on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, 
 in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for 
-different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes 
-(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as "The table is 
-black" implies the formulation \formulation{Material objects are real} (to the materialist), 
-or \formulation{So-called objects are ideas in the mind} (to the idealist), or \formulation{Substances 
-and attributes are real}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
+different philosophers according as their metaphysics\footnote{Or, as is sometimes 
+(incorrectly) said, \enquote{ontologies}.} differ. Even such a sentence as \enquote{The table is 
+black} implies the formulation \enquote{\uline{Material objects are real}} (to the materialist), 
+or \enquote{\uline{So-called objects are ideas in the mind}} (to the idealist), or 
+\enquote{\uline{Substances 
+and attributes are real}}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
 explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, 
 ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I 
 use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of 
 \term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example 
-when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be 
+when I say that the connotation of relatedness to \term{non-experience} is to be 
 dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is 
 not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied 
 philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, 
@@ -531,23 +552,24 @@ other natural language, but by having referents.
 
 As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my 
 \term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything 
-about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that 
-there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
-most important in this book. The fact that although it is the "simplest" and 
+about \term{non-experiences}, since in English there is always the implication that 
+there could be \term{non-experiences}. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
+most important in this book. The fact that although it is the \enquote{simplest} and 
 least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain 
 using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the 
 philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my 
 \term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as 
-an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this 
+an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences.\footnote{It's good that this 
 isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be 
 no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this 
-realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the 
+realm would have to be a non-experience.} If he is lucky he will just find the 
 book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from 
 the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is 
 past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may 
 already realize what I'm going to say. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution}
+
+\subsection[Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution][The Linguistic Solution]{Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution}
 
 Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the 
 book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the 
@@ -560,9 +582,9 @@ philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will
 not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to 
 explore all its implications; that will come later. 
 
-However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this 
+However, in the hope that it will make the main \enquote{argument} of this 
 chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous 
-version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight" behind the main 
+version of it, which should give the \enquote{intuitive insight} behind the main 
 argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is 
 true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified 
 from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without 
@@ -570,76 +592,76 @@ appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot
 know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a 
 contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be 
 right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if 
-they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but 
-inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively 
+they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The \enquote{necessity}, but 
+inconsistency, of skepticism \enquote{shows} my conclusion in an intuitively 
 understandable way. 
 
-To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that 
-one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
-that other that \name{black table} has to \name{table}: a referent of the former is 
+To get on to the definitive version of my \enquote{argument}. I will say that 
+one name \enquote{\term{depends}} on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
+that other that \uline{black table} has to \uline{table}: a referent of the former is 
 necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names 
 mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any 
-statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity depends on 
-'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
-example, \name{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the 
-formulation \formulation{Other persons have minds}, certainly depends on 
-\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-experience} will be true of the 
+statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity \term{depends} on 
+\term{non-experience}, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
+example, \enquote{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the 
+formulation \enquote{Other persons have minds}, certainly \term{depends} on 
+\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-ex\-per\-ience} will be true of the 
 associated name of any formulation of a belief. 
 
 In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of 
-non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
+non-ex\-per\-ience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
 \term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions 
-\term{non-experience} and \term{experience} (traditional). What I did not go on to 
+\term{non-experience} and experience (traditional). What I did not go on to 
 show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, 
 one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What 
 follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the 
 reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's 
-experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there 
+\term{experience} (used in my, \enquote{neutral}, sense unless I say otherwise). Could there 
 be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was 
 awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to 
 non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of 
 non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in 
-the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) 
+the last chapter.\footnote{Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) 
 justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it 
-without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were 
-just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience 
+without appealing to other beliefs.} If there could be, if such awareness were 
+just an experience, the distinctness of \term{experience} from experience 
 (traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience 
 (traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have 
 them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into 
-experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience 
+\term{experience}. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience 
 which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there 
 is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience 
 (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in 
-one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
-which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as 
-they are supposed to be understood. And for "understanding"
+one's \term{experience}---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
+which is \enquote{understanding the concepts} of non-experience and the rest as 
+they are supposed to be understood. And for \enquote{understanding}
 \term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its 
 referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an 
 experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and 
-non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an experience 
+non-referents) of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, which to name an experience 
 (traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 
-'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and \triquote{non-experience}; but here 
-one is, using "non-experience" and \triquote{non-experience} to say so (which 
+\term{non-experience}---and \enquote{\term{non-experience}}---and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}}; but here 
+one is, using \enquote{\term{non-experience}} and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}} to say so (which 
 certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible 
 for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the 
-concept of non-experience, it collapses. 
+concept of \term{non-experience}, it collapses. 
 
 (A final point for the expert. This 
 tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does 
 not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot 
 name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences 
-about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that 
+about names, which show contradictions---that one must not assume that 
 one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say 
-so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) 
+so (does assume it)---with explicit stratification.) 
 
 My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
 what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about 
 experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken 
-as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' 
-(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
+as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \enquote{experience} 
+(traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
 said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is 
-a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' 
-(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" 
+a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \enquote{experience} 
+(traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest, it shows that one who \enquote{accepts} 
 the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent 
 desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no 
 explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the 
@@ -650,13 +672,13 @@ experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a
 formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is 
 not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is 
 an important point about method which should be brought out. If all 
-"non-experiential language", "belief language", is inconsistent, how can I 
+\enquote{non-experiential language}, \enquote{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I 
 show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer 
 is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into 
 contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I 
 want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we 
-have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of 
-beliefs are false'. 
+have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as \enquote{all formulations of 
+beliefs are false}. 
 
 Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about 
 belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is 
@@ -672,22 +694,22 @@ to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one
 who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that 
 it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an 
 expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some 
-way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. 
+way. Now there is another important point about \enquote{method} to be made. 
 The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one 
-can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
+can \enquote{know}, be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
 The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of 
 the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. 
 (Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the 
 way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like 
-being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to 
-be a "table"".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
+being aware with respect to a table, \enquote{that in my language, this is to be said to 
+be a \enquote{table}}.) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
 a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its 
 referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this 
 belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be 
 discussed here. 
 
-The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes, 
-but...' thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
+The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes, 
+but...} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
 formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of 
 linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if 
 embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how 
@@ -699,150 +721,130 @@ rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be
 impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these 
 matters. 
 
-
-\clearpage
-
-
-2/22/1963 
-
-
-Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate 
-against Lincoln Center, February 22, 
-
-
-1963 
-(photo by Jack Smith)
-
-\clearpage
-
-
-\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-
-
 \subsection*{Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts}
 
-
 In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by 
-discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be 
+discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be 
 talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of 
 the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will 
-not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
-"common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
+not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
+\enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
 relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I 
 discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
 
-I should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed 
-to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
-non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
+I should say immediately that \enquote{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed 
+to refer to \enquote{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
+non-experience}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
 This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one 
-does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having 
-beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for "belief" in the 
+does or does not \enquote{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having 
+beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \enquote{belief} in the 
 use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of 
-the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an 
-experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of 
-consciously having a belief", of what is "in one's head" when one says that 
-one "believes a certain thing". Further, I will, for convenience in 
-distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief "that others have minds", for example, 
-or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation 
+the last part. Now when I speak of a \enquote{belief} I will be speaking of an 
+experience, what might be said to be \enquote{an act of consciously believing, of 
+consciously having a belief}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that 
+one \enquote{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in 
+distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \enquote{that others have minds}, for example, 
+or in general of belief \enquote{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation 
 marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be 
-"about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
-about experiences; I will not be trying to talk "about the realm of 
-non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already 
+\enquote{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
+about experiences; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of 
+non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already 
 fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has 
 any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his 
-"beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously 
-believing', although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
+\enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{act of consciously 
+believing}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
 What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, 
-use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
+use of a word (\enquote{belief}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
 rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
 
 There is a further point about terminology. The reader should 
-remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that 
-perceptions are in the mind", one can make a distinction between mental 
+remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \enquote{that 
+perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental 
 and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
-one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
-going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For 
+one's eyes closed, and a \enquote{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
+going to say that visualizations and the like are \enquote{imagined-experiences}. For 
 example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an 
-"imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by 
-"imagined" I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I 
-use "imagined" because saying 'mental-table-experience" is too much like 
-saying "table in the mind" and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way 
+\enquote{imagined-visual-table-experience}. The reader should not suppose that by 
+\enquote{imagined} I mean that the experiences are 
+\enquote{hallucinations}, are \enquote{unreal}. I 
+use \enquote{imagined} because saying \enquote{mental-table-experience} is too much like 
+saying \enquote{table in the mind} and because just using \enquote{visualization} leaves no way 
 of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
-an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
+an \enquote{imagined-table-experience} seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
 a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
-experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of 
-a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
+experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \enquote{of 
+a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
 like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). In other words, an 
-imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it 
+imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a \enquote{valid} experience, all right, but it 
 is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
-(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
+(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \enquote{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
 imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this 
 terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the 
 conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by 
-saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". 
+saying that they are imaginings \enquote{of one or another non-mental experiences}. 
 
-I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, 
-not perceived by oneself, behind one now", or anything else. Well, in the 
+I can at last ask what one does when one believes \enquote{that there is a table, 
+not perceived by oneself, behind one now}, or anything else. Well, in the 
 first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an 
 imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization 
 of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed 
 statement, such as \lexpression{There is a table behind me}. This is not all one does, 
 however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said 
-to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The 
-additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" 
+to be a \enquote{belief} (a point about the explication of my \enquote{belief}). The 
+additional, \enquote{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \enquote{attitude} 
 toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe 
 that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief 
 about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
 other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental 
-action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not 
-be, at all like the claim "that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
-correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The 
-question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise 
+action. Now the claim that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving} is not, could not 
+be, at all like the claim \enquote{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
+correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}. The 
+question of \enquote{what is going on in the realm of non-experience} does not arise 
 here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, 
 the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is 
-"consciously, deliberately" self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I 
-don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
-is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the 
+\enquote{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \enquote{self-deception experience}. I 
+don't have to \enquote{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
+is going on in the realm of non-experience}; when I have described the 
 attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good 
-explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". 
+explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
 
 I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one 
 is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as 
-mentioned above. The attitude is "peripheral", is a matter of the way one is 
-atttentive. Saying that the attitude is "conscious, deliberate", is a little 
+mentioned above. The attitude is \enquote{peripheral}, is a matter of the way one is 
+attentive. Saying that the attitude is \enquote{conscious, deliberate}, is a little 
 strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am 
-trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception 
+trying to say is that it is not an \enquote{objective} or \enquote{subconscious} self-deception 
 such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This 
 is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the 
 inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; 
-with respect to English the attitude is a "vague, elusive" thing, very difficult 
+with respect to English the attitude is a \enquote{vague, elusive} thing, very difficult 
 to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by 
-saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think 
-I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the 
+saying that it is the attitude \enquote{that such and such} (the reader must not think 
+I mean the belief \enquote{that such and such}). If the experience to which the 
 attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the 
-self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a 
-(non-mental) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief "that there is 
-a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
+self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{that the imagined-x-experience is a 
+(non-mental) x-experience}. As an example, consider the belief \enquote{that there is 
+a table behind one}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
 expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an 
 imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself 
 (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving 
-attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
-to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
+attitude \enquote{that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
+to a table}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
 a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
-an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not 
-inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that 
-one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked 
-the question, one stops believing "that there is a table behind one" and starts 
-believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
-non-experience", a different matter (different belief). 
+an imagined-experience but \enquote{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not 
+inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \enquote{that 
+one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience}; secondly, when one is asked 
+the question, one stops believing \enquote{that there is a table behind one} and starts 
+believing \enquote{that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
+non-experience}, a different matter (different belief). 
 
 lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression 
 (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), 
-the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a 
-referent". With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's 
+the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{that the expression has a 
+referent}. With respect to the belief \enquote{that there is a table behind one}, one's 
 attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \expression{There is a table 
 behind me}, pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and 
-one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent". 
+one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{that this name has a referent}. 
 Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of 
 beliefs. 
 
@@ -850,11 +852,11 @@ beliefs.
 the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the 
 version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving 
 language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an 
-imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in 
+imagined-x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an x-experience, whereas in 
 the version involving language, the attention is on something which is 
-"regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). 
-For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove", and 
-correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs 
+\enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). 
+For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{that the reality is at one remove}, and 
+correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs 
 doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
 referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make 
 believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in 
@@ -864,7 +866,7 @@ one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one
 has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the 
 version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the 
 thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving 
-"language" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a 
+\enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a 
 referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, 
 which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does 
 so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the 
@@ -882,67 +884,67 @@ attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief.
 
 Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather 
 unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of 
-"attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
+\enquote{attitudes}, then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
 something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it 
-to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive", so that I am 
-calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to 
+to be a \enquote{belief}; this something is \enquote{peripheral and elusive}, so that I am 
+calling the something an \enquote{attitude}, the most appropriate way in English to 
 speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the 
 experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
-"self-deceiving", is a "(conscious) self-deception experience", because when 
+\enquote{self-deceiving}, is a \enquote{(conscious) self-deception experience}, because when 
 aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just 
-about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere 
+about has to be a (\enquote{conscious}) self-deception experience to transform mere 
 taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to 
-be a "belief". The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
-"self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of 
-the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be 
+be a \enquote{belief}. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
+\enquote{self-deceiving} is to be made without trying to think \enquote{about the relation of 
+the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience}, to do which would be 
 to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which 
 would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is 
 to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more 
-than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving". 
+than to say that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
 
 In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention 
-some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, 
+some things often associated with believing but not \enquote{essential} to it. First, 
 one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the 
 one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and 
-believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing 
+believes \enquote{that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing 
 table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so 
 believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in 
-believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence 
-for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation 
+believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be "evidence 
+for, confirmation of, one's belief} (more will be said about confirmation 
 shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic 
-expression 'x', one may give attention to a referent of 
-'imagined-x(-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to 
+expression "x", one may give attention to a referent of 
+"imagined-x(-experience)", an \enquote{imagined-referent} of "x"; or to 
 imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
-"analogous to the referent of 'x'". In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
+\enquote{analogous to the referent of "x"}. In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
 mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be 
 to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is 
 visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 
-'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-y-experiences 
+"There being a table behind one". An example of imagined-y-experiences 
 (such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
-"analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
-beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
-Being". 
+\enquote{analogous to referents}, in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
+beliefs \enquote{about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
+Being}. 
 
-Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", 
-"arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate 
+Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical \enquote{justifications}, 
+\enquote{arguments}, for them, \enquote{defenses} of them. I will not bother to explicate 
 the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong 
 with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would 
 show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language 
 and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested 
 before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the 
 justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive 
-justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be 
+justification, the kind involving the citing of experience supposed to be 
 evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical 
 assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them 
 inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has 
-four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that") any other table has four 
+four legs; therefore (\enquote{it is more probable that}) any other table has four 
 legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it 
 superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, 
 argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can 
 show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, 
 weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to 
 believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, 
-then one already had the belief "implicitly" (it was a conjunct of a belief 
+then one already had the belief \enquote{implicitly} (it was a conjunct of a belief 
 one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. 
 
 I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions 
@@ -950,24 +952,24 @@ my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material,
 I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my 
 position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, 
 and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it 
-is ironic that 'disbeliever', without qualification, has been used by believers 
+is ironic that "disbeliever", without qualification, has been used by believers 
 as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some 
-belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the 
-existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to 
+belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny \enquote{the 
+existence of non-experience}, to \enquote{cause non-experiences to vanish}, so to 
 speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental 
-experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
-is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either 
+experiences, \enquote{perceived objects}. My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
+is not, for example, the belief \enquote{that there is a realm where there could either 
 be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are 
-inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere 
-"decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies 
-"the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
-of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", 
+inadequate for finding which is the case.} My position is not a mere 
+\enquote{decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}. The philosopher who denies 
+\enquote{the existence of non-experiences}, or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
+of any belief, or who merely \enquote{decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}, 
 has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. 
 
 What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of 
 beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In 
 the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions 
-dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect them 
+dependent on "non-experience", and pointed out that those who expect them 
 to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting 
 the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have 
 described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the 
@@ -976,21 +978,21 @@ To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right
 philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief 
 one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
+\subsection*{Chapter 6 --- Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
 
 In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
 given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
 I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just 
 what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the 
-entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
-least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, 
+entire \enquote{history of world thought}, the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
+least partly \enquote{systems of knowledge} which constitute it, Platonism, 
 psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, 
 phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, 
 comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each 
 with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, 
 associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not 
-hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential 
-language", and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
+hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how \enquote{non-experiential 
+language}, and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
 always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and 
 belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter 
 of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an 
@@ -1001,76 +1003,76 @@ what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are
 incomplete and confused. 
 
 What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a 
-few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of "knowledge"; 
+few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of \enquote{knowledge}; 
 have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are 
 thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so 
-"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as 
+\enquote{basic} (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as 
 too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if 
 they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
 The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
-these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's 
+these beliefs, that not having them is not \enquote{inconsistent} with one's 
 experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
 of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
 of not having it. 
 
-Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered", beliefs 
-formulated in "natural laws", beliefs "about substance", and the like. 
-Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived 
-world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
-beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is 
-("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
-non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is associated with beliefs 
-"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the 
-world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
-"perceived world" is not part of what is "essential" in these beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
+Consider beliefs to the effect \enquote{that the world is ordered}, beliefs 
+formulated in \enquote{natural laws}, beliefs \enquote{about substance}, and the like. 
+Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's \enquote{perceived 
+world} is not \enquote{chaotic}, is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
+beliefs \enquote{that the world is ordered} I do not say that his \enquote{perceived world} is 
+(\enquote{subjectively}) chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
+non-strange character of one's \enquote{perceived world} is associated with beliefs 
+\enquote{about substance} and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not \enquote{the 
+world being ordered}; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
+\enquote{perceived world} is not part of what is \enquote{essential} in these beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of \enquote{spatio-temporal} beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
 After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from 
-oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict 
+oneself? Of course one can \enquote{watch oneself wave one's hand} (in a non-strict 
 sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
-formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave 
-one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are spatially 
-distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a 
-visual---"moving"---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
+formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can \enquote{watch oneself wave 
+one's hand} (in the non-strict sense) does not imply \enquote{that there are spatially 
+distant, and past and future events}; and although experiences such as a 
+visual---\enquote{moving}---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
 beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
-Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring" may 
-seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", 
+Rejection of beliefs \enquote{about the objectivity of linguistic referring} may 
+seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a \enquote{table}, 
 doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
 things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
-slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should 
+slightest intention of saying that it is a \enquote{non-table}? The reader should 
 observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs 
-"about the objectivity of referring", but they are not "objective referring"; 
+\enquote{about the objectivity of referring}, but they are not \enquote{objective referring}; 
 and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
-Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
-have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other 
-humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
-rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived 
-other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
-associated with the belief "that others have minds", but it is not "other 
-humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
-part of what is essential in believing "that others have minds", points I 
+Rejection of the belief \enquote{that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
+have minds} my seem to lead to a problem. After all, \enquote{perceived other 
+humans} talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
+rejecting the belief \enquote{that others have minds} I do not deny that \enquote{perceived 
+other humans} talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
+associated with the belief \enquote{that others have minds}, but it is not \enquote{other 
+humans having minds}; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
+part of what is essential in believing \enquote{that others have minds}, points I 
 anticipated in the second chapter. 
 
 Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of 
-temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form "If \x, then \y\ 
-will follow in the future", especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is 
+temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form \enquote{If \x, then \y\ 
+will follow in the future}, especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is 
 something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the 
 switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear 
-"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge". They say, 
-for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
-and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the 
-light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
+\enquote{that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge}. They say, 
+for example, \enquote{that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
+and drink water, or one won't live}. Now \enquote{one's throwing the switch and the 
+light's coming on} (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
 with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
-not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not 
-part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the 
-light will come on". As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about 
-the necessity of such knowledge for survival", it is just more beliefs of the 
+not imply \enquote{that there are past or future events}, and taking note of it is not 
+part of what is essential in the belief \enquote{that if one throws the switch, then the 
+light will come on}. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe \enquote{about 
+the necessity of such knowledge for survival}, it is just more beliefs of the 
 same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt 
 dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows 
 how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. 
-Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" 
+Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to \enquote{save} 
 beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
 
 By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their 
@@ -1100,9 +1102,9 @@ result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use
 English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
 associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
 among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
-always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to 
+always been used that way, except by a few \enquote{metaphysicians}. I have had to 
 so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
-the introduction of my use of "experience" in the third chapter. Thus, some 
+the introduction of my use of \enquote{experience} in the third chapter. Thus, some 
 of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
 for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
 book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
@@ -1111,7 +1113,7 @@ experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and
 which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
 announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
 
-It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I 
+It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I 
 was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be 
 understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented 
 my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This 
@@ -1123,11 +1125,11 @@ be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually
 get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by 
 suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than 
 beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English 
-in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to 
+in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!) to 
 learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
 unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 7 : Summary}
+\subsection*{Chapter 7 --- Summary}
 
 The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
 am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
@@ -1141,15 +1143,15 @@ supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This
 statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in 
 connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that 
 my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible 
-argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain 
-unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to "doubt, question" it, or 
-to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not 
+argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to \enquote{remain 
+unconvinced} of the rightness of my position, or to \enquote{doubt, question} it, or 
+to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can \enquote{question} (not 
 believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief 
-to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the 
+to be \enquote{skeptical} of my position in the sense of believing \enquote{that although the 
 position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is 
-objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
+objectively wrong}.) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
 reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less 
-credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a 
+credulous. If one \enquote{questions my position} then one is misconstruing it as a 
 belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to 
 decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or 
 the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to 
@@ -1163,11 +1165,11 @@ Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without
 beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for 
 example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. 
 Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to 
-be "true or false", to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
-to believe something, for example, to believe "that there is a table behind 
-you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
-continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing 
-yourself with your back to a table"), you are going to have to have the 
+be \enquote{true or false}, to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
+to believe something, for example, to believe \enquote{that there is a table behind 
+you}. Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
+continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, \enquote{visualizing 
+yourself with your back to a table}), you are going to have to have the 
 attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, 
 deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going 
 to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
@@ -1183,9 +1185,9 @@ you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my
 language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to 
 do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the 
 complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to 
-be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language"); if you 
+be flawless to unquestionably discredit \enquote{non-experiential language}); if you 
 don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just 
-ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
+ignore the book, and \enquote{justify} your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
 about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not 
 therefore valueless. 
 
@@ -1193,17 +1195,17 @@ So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having
 beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete 
 transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter 
 position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, 
-"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
-proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical 
-problems (for example, "Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
-impossible?", "Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
-capable of intersubjective verification?") arising from them? And again, one 
+\enquote{obvious}? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
+proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the \enquote{profound} philosophical 
+problems (for example, \enquote{Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
+impossible?}, \enquote{Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
+capable of intersubjective verification?}) arising from them? And again, one 
 begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is 
-wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be "Why 
+wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be \enquote{Why 
 bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving 
-myself". Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
+myself}. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
 And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one 
-"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
+\enquote{naturally} tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
 (that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, 
 since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts 
 which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. 
diff --git a/essays/some_objections.tex b/essays/some_objections.tex
index 1954d9e..6da14fd 100644
--- a/essays/some_objections.tex
+++ b/essays/some_objections.tex
@@ -1,47 +1,47 @@
 \chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
 
 
-\textbf{A.} The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in 
+\begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
+\item The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in 
 educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the 
 philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The 
 Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply 
 that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that 
 other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a 
-philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See 
-Philosophical Investigations, \S 420.) Statements which imply that other 
+philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language.\footnote{See 
+\booktitle{Philosophical Investigations}, \S 420.} Statements which imply that other 
 people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were 
 intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because 
 they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are 
-irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.) 
+irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage.\footnote{\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.}
 
 For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, 
-and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things 
-which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real 
-case." (\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's 
-memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in 
+and the \textsc{Empire State Building} (when I am not looking at it) are all things 
+which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt \enquote{in a real 
+case.}\footnote{\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's 
+memoir.} The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in 
 God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. 
 
-
 In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason 
 why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read 
 that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they 
 would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as 
-Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt "in a real case." 
+Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt \enquote{in a real case.} 
 Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet 
 Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the 
 latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as 
 inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have 
 today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay \essaytitle{The 
 Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that 
-the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief 
+the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief 
 that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no 
-different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It Is 
+different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It is 
 perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is 
 totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also 
 possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be 
 absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per 
-cent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we 
-need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying 
+cent certainty that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists; the point is that we 
+need not believe in the \textsc{Empire State Building} at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying 
 Beliefs} shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural 
 sciences, involve outright self-deception. 
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical
 maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not 
 necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical 
 connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in 
-the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural 
+the aphorism that \enquote{the meaning is the use} (as an explication of the natural 
 language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive 
 linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic 
 than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted. 
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not
 arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing 
 Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver 
 is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the 
-paradoxes uncovered by "bad" philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary 
+paradoxes uncovered by \enquote{bad} philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary 
 language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary 
-language because they uncover paradoxes is ordinary language propositions. 
+language because they uncover paradoxes in ordinary language propositions. 
 Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in 
 ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then 
 Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to 
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to
 this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use 
 ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The 
 philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as 
-improper because it leads to problems. The reason why "the proper use of 
-ordinary language never leads to paradoxes" is that Wittgenstein has defined 
+improper because it leads to problems. The reason why \enquote{the proper use of 
+ordinary language never leads to paradoxes} is that Wittgenstein has defined 
 proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not 
 resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. 
 Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and 
@@ -101,9 +101,7 @@ to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious
 inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish 
 intellectual dishonesty. 
 
-\gap
-
-\textbf{B.} In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which 
+\item In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which 
 cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality 
 are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if 
 there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there 
@@ -116,12 +114,12 @@ When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the
 attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within 
 experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it 
 would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be 
-"proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, 
+\enquote{proved} that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, 
 etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be 
 trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be 
 my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its 
 otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it 
-would be trivial. We ask how I know that the Empire State Building exists 
+would be trivial. We ask how I know that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists 
 when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate 
 experience, then objective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The 
 dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the 
@@ -140,11 +138,11 @@ crossed fingers.)
 Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are 
 addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have 
 conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step 
-such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of 
+such as the following, for example. We can have \enquote{real knowledge} of 
 particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive 
 words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. 
 This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the 
-alternative that we don't have this "real knowledge." 
+alternative that we don't have this \enquote{real knowledge.} 
 
 In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that 
 transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring 
@@ -157,3 +155,4 @@ psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes
 as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental 
 arguments are supposed to prove. 
 
+\end{enumerate}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
index 04ec9d2..6c76551 100644
--- a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
+++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
 
-
 We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to 
 believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. 
 Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a 
@@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs.
 I am told that \enquote{if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will 
 be hurt.} Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not 
 convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the 
-"evidence" implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to 
+\enquote{evidence} implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to 
 see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both 
 blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the 
 action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in 
@@ -56,8 +55,8 @@ whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose
 that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, 
 shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? 
 Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of 
-having to accept the dare that "you have to do it to prove you don't believe 
-it's dangerous"? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? 
+having to accept the dare that \enquote{you have to do it to prove you don't believe 
+it's dangerous}? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? 
 The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief 
 should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. 
 
@@ -72,14 +71,14 @@ see---would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an
 immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by 
 lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by 
 lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold 
-the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I tive is so 
+the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I live is so 
 profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one 
-"sighting."}
+\enquote{sighting.}}
 
 In general, the so-called evidence doesn't work. There is a swindle 
 somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful 
 belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the 
-whole conglomeration of "evidence" somehow overwhelmed medieval 
+whole conglomeration of \enquote{evidence} somehow overwhelmed medieval 
 people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away 
 with something that they could not get away with. 
 
@@ -95,8 +94,8 @@ blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I
 structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. 
 
 The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I 
-have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that "if I try to walk 
-through the wall I will fail and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am 
+have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that \enquote{if I try to walk 
+through the wall I will fail and will bruise myself} is also discardable. I am 
 sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. 
 But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a 
 fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring 
@@ -129,11 +128,11 @@ the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme.
 We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to 
 overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of 
 the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive 
-"objects" is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for 
-this correlation is "the contribution of intermodal organization to the 
-object Gestalt."}
+\enquote{objects} is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for 
+this correlation is \enquote{the contribution of intermodal organization to the 
+object Gestalt.}}
 
-From a different traditon, the critique of scientific fact and of 
+From a different tradition, the critique of scientific fact and of 
 measurable time which is suggested in Luk\'{a}cs' \booktitle{Reification and the 
 Consciousness of the Proletariat} might be of value if it were developed.\footnote{Luk\'{a}cs also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist 
 society---that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to