fix some quotes

6 files changed, 63 insertions, 76 deletions

diff --git a/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex b/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex
index f66bb98..e95b85f 100644
--- a/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex
+++ b/essays/admissible_contradictions.tex
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ could we convey the substance underlying the notations which we call
 admissble contradictions, and motivate the unusual collection of postulates 
 which we will adopt. 
 
-All properties will be thought of as "parameters," such as time, 
+All properties will be thought of as \enquote{parameters,} such as time, 
 location, color, density, acidity, etc. Different parameters will be represented 
 by the letters x, y, z, .... Different values of one parameter, say x, will be 
 represented by $x_1$, $x_2$, .... Each parameter has a domain, the set of all values 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ indefinitely large. By giving a possible phenomenon fixed values for every
 parameter, I assure that there will be only one such possible phenomenon. In 
 other words, my intension sets are all singletons. Another point is that if we 
 specify some of the parameters and specify their ranges, we limit the 
-phenomena which can be represented by our "ensembles." If our first 
+phenomena which can be represented by our \enquote{ensembles.} If our first 
 parameter is time and its range is $R$, and our second parameter is spatial 
 location and its range is $R^2$, then we are limited to phenomena which are 
 point phenomena in space and time. If we have a parameter for speed of 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Let ($x_1$, $y$, $z$, ...), ($x_2$, $y$, $z$, ...), etc. stand for possible phen
 which all differ from each other in respect to parameter x but are identical in 
 respect to every other parameter $y$, $z$, ... . (If the ensembles were intension 
 sets, they would be disjoint precisely because $x$ takes a different value in 
-each.) A "simple contradiction family" of ensembles is the family [($x_1$,$y$,$z$, 
+each.) A \enquote{simple contradiction family} of ensembles is the family [($x_1$,$y$,$z$, 
 ...), ($x_2$, $y$, $z$, ...), ...]. The family may have any number of ensembles. It 
 actually represents many families, because $y$, $z$, ... are allowed to vary; but 
 each of these parameters must assume the same value in all ensembles in any 
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ any one family, values which may be fixed. A parameter which has the same
 value throughout any one family will be referred to as a consistency 
 parameter. A parameter which has a different value in each ensemble in a 
 given family will be referred to as a contradiction parameter. 
-"Contradiction" will be shortened to "con." A simple con family is then a 
+\enquote{Contradiction} will be shortened to \enquote{con.} A simple con family is then a 
 family with one con parameter. The consistency parameters may be dropped 
 from the notation, but the reader must remember that they are implicitly 
 present, and must remember how they function. 
@@ -64,19 +64,19 @@ value from the first subset, one from the second subset, etc.
 
 Con families can be defined which have more than one con parameter, 
 i.e. more than one parameter satisfying all the conditions we put on x. Such 
-con families are not "simple." Let the cardinality of a con family be 
-indicated by a number prefixed to "family," and let the number of con 
-parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to "con." Remembering that 
+con families are not \enquote{simple.} Let the cardinality of a con family be 
+indicated by a number prefixed to \enquote{family,} and let the number of con 
+parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to \enquote{con.} Remembering that 
 consistency parameters are understood, a 2-con $\infty$-family would appear as 
 [($x_1$, $y_1$). ($x_2$, $y_2$), ...].
 
-A "contradiction" or "$\varphi$-object" is not explicitly defined, but it is 
-notated by putting "$\varphi$" in front of a con family. The characteristics of $\varphi$-objects, 
+A \enquote{contradiction} or \enquote{$\varphi$-object} is not explicitly defined, but it is 
+notated by putting \enquote{$\varphi$} in front of a con family. The characteristics of $\varphi$-objects, 
 or cons, are established by introducing additional postulates in the 
 theory. 
 
-In this theory, every con is either "admissible" or "not admissible." 
-"Admissible" will be shortened to "am." The initial amcons of the theory 
+In this theory, every con is either \enquote{admissible} or \enquote{not admissible.} 
+\enquote{Admissible} will be shortened to \enquote{am.} The initial amcons of the theory 
 are introduced by postulate. Essentially, what is postulated is that cons with 
 a certain con parameter are am. (The cons directly postulated to be am are 
 on 1-con families.) However, the postulate will specify other requirements for 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ the literary description of the waterfall illusion!) Note the implicit
 requirements that the con family must be a 2-family, and that $s$ must be 
 selected from $[O]$ in one ensemble and from ${s:s>O}$ in the other ensemble. 
 
-If $t$ is time, $t\in R$, consideration of the phrase "b years ago," which is an 
+If $t$ is time, $t\in R$, consideration of the phrase \enquote{b years ago,} which is an 
 amcon in the natural language, suggests that we postulate $\varphi[(t):a-b\leq t\leq v-b \&a\leq v]$ to be am,
 where $a$ is a fixed time expressed in years A.D., $b$ is a fixed 
 number of years, and $v$ is a variable---the time of the present instant in years 
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ obvious. But in this case, there are more requirements in the postulate of
 admissibility. May we apply the postulate twice? May we admit first 
 $\varphi[(p\in P_1),(p\in P_2)]$ and then $\varphi[(p\in P_3),(p\in P_4)]$, where $P_3$ and $P_4$ are arbitrary 
 $P_i$'s different from $P_1$ and $P_2$? The answer is no. We may admit 
-$\varphi[(p\in P_1),(p\in P_2)]$ for arbitrary $P_1$ and $P_2$, $P_1\cap P_2=\emptyset$, but having made this "initial 
-choice," the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary $P_3$ and $P_4$. A second 
+$\varphi[(p\in P_1),(p\in P_2)]$ for arbitrary $P_1$ and $P_2$, $P_1\cap P_2=\emptyset$, but having made this \enquote{initial 
+choice,} the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary $P_3$ and $P_4$. A second 
 con $\varphi[(p\in P_3),(p\in P_4)]$, $P_3\cap P_4=\emptyset$, may be postulated to be am only if 
 $P_1\cup P_3$,$P_2\cup P_3$,$P_1\cup P_4$, and $P_2\cup P_4$ are not connected. In other words, you 
 may postulate many cons of the form $\varphi[(p\in P_i),(p\in P_j)]$ to be am, but 
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Our present notation cannot express this result, because it does not
 distinguish between different types of uniform motion throughout a finite 
 region, \ie the types $M$, $C_1$, $C_2$, $D_1$, and $D_2$. Instead, we have infinitesimal 
 motion, which is involved in all the latter types of motion. Questions such as 
-"whether the admissibility of $\varphi[M,S]$ implies the admissibility of $\varphi[C_1,S]$" 
+\enquote{whether the admissibility of $\varphi[M,S]$ implies the admissibility of $\varphi[C_1,S]$} 
 drop out. The reason for the omission in the present theory is our choice of 
 parameters and domains, which we discussed earlier. Our present version is 
 thus not exhaustive. However, the deficiency is not intrinsic to our method; 
@@ -233,8 +233,8 @@ implication was empirically false. The realm of the logically possible is not
 the entire realm of connotative thought; it is just the realm of normal 
 perceptual routines. When the mind is temporarily freed from normal 
 perceptual routines---especially in perceptual illusions, but also in dreams and 
-even in the use of certain "illogical" natural language phrases---it can imagine 
-and visualize the "logically impossible." Every text on perceptual 
+even in the use of certain \enquote{illogical} natural language phrases---it can imagine 
+and visualize the \enquote{logically impossible.} Every text on perceptual 
 psychology mentions this fact, but logicians have never noticed its immense 
 significance. The logically impossible is not a blank; it is a whole layer of 
 meaning and concepts which can be superimposed on conventional logic, but 
diff --git a/essays/art_or_brend.tex b/essays/art_or_brend.tex
index ef758d7..89f115a 100644
--- a/essays/art_or_brend.tex
+++ b/essays/art_or_brend.tex
@@ -16,18 +16,18 @@ advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations
 and an outstanding mathematical theory. ts the work of art such an 
 analysis? 
 
-The motives behind the "scientific" justification of art are utterly sinister. 
+The motives behind the \enquote{scientific} justification of art are utterly sinister. 
 Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an 
 academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a pedantic 
-pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music", intends 
-nothing less than the suppression of the culture of "lower classes" and 
-"ower races." 
+pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his \enquote{scientific music}, intends 
+nothing less than the suppression of the culture of \enquote{lower classes} and 
+\enquote{ower races.} 
 
 It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to 
-the "scientific" justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in 
+the \enquote{scientific} justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in 
 artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters 
 all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the 
-audience than all the works that "obey" the laws. 
+audience than all the works that \enquote{obey} the laws. 
 
 \item The artist or entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other 
 people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to 
@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to
 defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of 
 art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but 
 they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one 
-artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is "Do 
-you like it?" Once the "scientific" justification of art is discredited, the 
+artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is \enquote{Do 
+you like it?} Once the \enquote{scientific} justification of art is discredited, the 
 artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no 
-reason why you should "consume" it. 
+reason why you should \enquote{consume} it. 
 
 There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political 
 dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be 
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find
 their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would 
 have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as 
 your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's 
-product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to "be oneself" for 
-other people, to "express oneself" for them. 
+product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to \enquote{be oneself} for 
+other people, to \enquote{express oneself} for them. 
 
 \item There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and 
 entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of 
diff --git a/essays/concept_art.tex b/essays/concept_art.tex
index bfe4c79..79247a6 100644
--- a/essays/concept_art.tex
+++ b/essays/concept_art.tex
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Now what is artistic, aesthetic, about a work which is a body of
 concepts? This question can best be answered by telling where concept art 
 came from; I developed it in an attempt to straighten out certain traditional 
 activities generally regarded as aesthetic. The first of these is structure art, 
-music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is "structure." My 
+music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is \enquote{structure.} My 
 definitive discussion of structure art is in my unpublished essay \essaytitle{Structure 
 Art and Pure Mathematics}; here I will just summarize that discussion. Much 
 structure art is a vestige of the time when \eg music was believed to be 
@@ -169,15 +169,15 @@ reduction together constitute the theorem.
 \section*{Concept Art: Innpersegs (May--July 1961)}
 
 \begin{sysrules}
-A "halpoint" iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo 
+A \enquote{halpoint} iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo 
 which appears to surround a small bright light when one looks at it through 
 glasses fogged by having been breathed on, for as long as the point is in the 
 halo. 
 
-An "init`point" iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo. 
+An \enquote{init`point} iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo. 
 
 
-An "inn`perseq" iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the 
+An \enquote{inn`perseq} iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the 
 halpoints are on one (initial) radius of a halo; the members of the first 
 sequence are initpoints; for each of the other sequences, the first member (a 
 consequent) is got from the non-first members of the preceding sequence 
diff --git a/essays/creep.tex b/essays/creep.tex
index f2a491d..5bd9b13 100644
--- a/essays/creep.tex
+++ b/essays/creep.tex
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 \chapter{Creep}
 
-When Helen Lefkowitz said I was "such a creep" at Interlochen in 
+When Helen Lefkowitz said I was \enquote{such a creep} at Interlochen in 
 1956, her remark epitomized the feeling that females have always had about 
 me. My attempts to understand why females rejected me and to decide what 
-to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961-1962, I tried to 
+to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961--1962, I tried to 
 develop a theory of the creep problem. This theory took involuntary 
 celibacy as the defining characteristic of the creep. Every society has its 
 image of the ideal young adult, even though the symbols of growing up 
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ with condescending scorn, amusement, or pity.
 Because he seems weak and inferior in the company of others, and 
 cannot maintain his self-respect, the creep is pressed into isolation. There, 
 the creep doesn't have the pressure of other people's presence to make him 
-feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not te be 
+feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not to be 
 inferior. The creep can develop the morale required to differ. The creep also 
 tends to expand his fantasy life, so that it takes the place of the 
 interpersonal life from which he has been excluded. The important 
@@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ My problem actually has to do with the enormous discrepancy between
 the ways I can relate to males and the ways I can relate to females. The 
 essence of the problem has to do with the social values of females, which are 
 completely different from my own. The principal occupation of my life has 
-been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in "writings." Now 
+been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in \enquote{writings.} Now 
 most males have the same social values that I find in all females. But there 
 have always been a few males with exceptional values; and my activities have 
 developed through exchanges of ideas with these males. These exchanges 
 have come about spontaneously and naturally. In contrast, I have never had 
 such an exchange of ideas with females, for the following reasons. Females 
 have nothing to say that applies to my activities. They cannot understand 
-that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the "masses" who 
+that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the \enquote{masses} who 
 oppose and have tried to discourage my activities. 
 
 The great divergence between myself and females comes in the area 
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ prerequisites, no institutional barriers to entry. One enters it by defining
 oneself as being in it. Yet no female has chosen to enter it. Or consider such 
 figures as Galileo and Galois. By the standards of their contemporaries, these 
 individuals were engaged in utterly ridiculous, antisocial pursuits. Society 
-does not give anybody the "opportunity" to engage in such pursuits. Society 
+does not give anybody the \enquote{opportunity} to engage in such pursuits. Society 
 tries to prevent everybody from being a Galileo or Galois. To be a Galileo is 
 really a matter of choosing sides, of choosing to take a certain stand.) 
 
@@ -126,9 +126,9 @@ the women's group of the Art Workers Coalition in New York. Many of the
 women there had seen my Down With Art pamphlet. Ail the females who 
 have seen this pamphlet have reacted negatively, and it is quite clear what 
 their attitude is. They believe that they are courageously defending modern 
-art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a "modern 
-museum art appreciation course." The more they are pressed, the more 
-proudiy do they defend "Great Art." Now the objective validity of my 
+art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a \enquote{modern 
+museum art appreciation course.} The more they are pressed, the more 
+proudiy do they defend \enquote{Great Art.} Now the objective validity of my 
 opposition to art is absolutely beyond question. To defend modern art is 
 precisely what a hopeless mediocrity would consider courageous. Again, it is 
 clear that the opposition between myself and females is in the area where 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ important part of my life; and to adopt a facade of conformity. Thus, I
 perceive females as persons who cannot function in my occupation. I 
 perceive them as being like an employment agency, like an institution to 
 which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can he counted on to 
-represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I 
+represent the most \enquote{social, human} point of view, a point of view which, as I 
 have explained, is distant from my own. (In March 1970, at the Institute for 
 Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he 
 would murder his own mother, and murder all his friends, if by doing so he 
diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index d78631a..9c93395 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore
 we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of 
 touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest 
 expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal 
-organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" 
+organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} 
 includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is 
 a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same 
 as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation 
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us
 denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1), (T_1, V_2), (T_2, V_1), (T_2, V_2)$. In 
 reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us 
 designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following 
-notation. Consider a rectangular array of "places" such that the place in the 
+notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the 
 ith row and jth column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as 
 appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of 
 regularities in our present world. 
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is
 excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only f's, which 
 amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of f's leaves 
 one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to 
-open-eye sights); such an "impairment" is of little interest. Of the remaining 
+open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining 
 changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: 
 closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the 
 changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ $\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}$.
 
 But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new 
 rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change 
-changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about "impairing"
+changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}
 changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining 
 changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes 
 are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the
 anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect 
 everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
 sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference 
-point in the "world." The question of "whether the anomaties are really 
-outside or only in the mind" comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
+point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomaties are really 
+outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
 If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as 
 a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have 
 had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be 
@@ -198,23 +198,23 @@ However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet
 satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the 
 subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his 
 perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely 
-chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say "I see a book 
-in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil." These assumptions may not be 
-justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, "I don't even 
+chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book 
+in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be 
+justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even 
 know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know 
 whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is 
-visual." In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
+visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
 never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the 
 changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are 
 defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that 
 everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may 
 literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this 
-compensation may become habitual and "pre-conscious." In this case, if the 
+compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the 
 physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a 
 temporary psychological malfunction. 
 
 These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are 
-actually learned, "unconscious" interpretations of raw data which by 
+actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by 
 themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast 
 number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the 
 subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is 
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile
 clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished 
 manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, 
 our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. 
-"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
+\enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
 futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The 
 empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the 
 perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of 
@@ -286,13 +286,13 @@ object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence.
 The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which 
 resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. 
 To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the 
-concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
+concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
 The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight 
 and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the 
 physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its 
 immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot 
 be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. 
-Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of 
+Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of 
 the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our 
 experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying 
 concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being 
diff --git a/essays/dream_reality.tex b/essays/dream_reality.tex
index aab289d..33b901c 100644
--- a/essays/dream_reality.tex
+++ b/essays/dream_reality.tex
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ added a second-order activity. The transformation procedure to somehow
 combine conscious ideational direction---coding of the banal dreams---with 
 alteration of my experience, my esthesia, my lived experience. 
 
-
 \section{Dreams and Reality---An Experimental Essay}
 
 Excerpts from my dream diary which are referred-to in the essay that 
@@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ my mattress in the front room of my apartment. The action is carried on
 continuously through waking up and through the associated change of 
 setting. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{1/12/1974}
 
 Just before I go to sleep for the night, I am lying in bed drowsy. I think 
@@ -90,7 +88,6 @@ Comment: The differences between this experience and a waking
 visualization are that the latter is less vivid than seeing and is accompanied 
 by waking reality cues such as cues of bodily location. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{1/16/1974}
 
 \begin{enumerate}
@@ -113,7 +110,6 @@ the waking state. I then begin to will away the rash in the dream, and I
 succeed, 
 \end{enumerate}
 
-
 \dreamdate{1/20/1974}
 
 For some reason the dream associates Simone Forti with flute-like 
@@ -129,7 +125,6 @@ Comments: I tape my mouth at night so I will sleep with my mouth closed. I
 experimented at trying to whistle with the tape on while fully awake. The 
 breath just hisses against the tape. The pitch of the hiss can be varied. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{2/1/1974}
 
 1. I try to assist a man in counterfeiting ten dollar bills by taking half 
@@ -137,7 +132,6 @@ of a ten, scotch taping it to half of a one, and then coloring over the one
 until it looks like the other half of the ten. The method fails because I bring 
 old crumpled tens rather than new tens, and the one doilar bills are new. 
 
-
 Comments: There are no natural anomalies in this dream at all. What is 
 anomalous is that this counterfeiting method seems perfectly sensible, and I 
 only begin to question it when we try to fit the crumpled half-bill to the 
@@ -150,7 +144,6 @@ is bland material about my early life which could apply to any child or
 teen-ager. Thus, I must warn readers who know me only from this diary not 
 to try to make the image of me here fit my waking life. 
 
-
 \dreamdate{2/3/1974}
 
 3. I have had several dreams that I am taking the last courses of my 
@@ -165,7 +158,6 @@ person. I experienced another person's existence instead of mine. Professor
 Nell also appeared somewhere in this dream; as he has in several school 
 dreams I have had recently. 
 
-
 \dreamdatecomment{2/3/1974}{This is the date I recorded, but it seems that it would have to be later.}
 
 I get up in the morning and decide to have a self-indulgent breakfast 
@@ -194,21 +186,19 @@ strong belief in the reality of the social future and in my ability to form
 accurate expectations about it. When I awakened, the whole misadventure 
 vanished. 
 
-
 End of excerpts from my dream diary.
 
 \begin{quotation}
-"... It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views 
-or perceptions... But ... inasmuch as it is the common objective world that 
-renders ... general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist 
+"\ldots\ It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views 
+or perceptions\ldots\ But \ldots\ inasmuch as it is the common objective world that 
+renders \ldots\ general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist 
 will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views, though 
-just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. ... the common objective 
+just as real, will be treated as its perspectives \ldots\ the common objective 
 world, whether such a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is 
-indispensable to science ... 
-."\footnote{A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), pp. 176--7}
+indispensable to science \ldots"
+\footnote{A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), pp. 176--7 }
 \end{quotation}
 
-
 \textbf{A.} We wish to postulate that dreams are exactly what they seem to be 
 while we are dreaming, namely, literal reality. Naively, we want to get closer 
 to literal empiricism than natural science is. But science has worked out a 
@@ -649,7 +639,6 @@ dreams, in language which blocks any implications about reality, are what we
 should strive for. And if ve cease to be stable object gestalts for others, 
 maybe our stable object gestalts will not even appear in their dreams. 
 
-
 \section*{Note on how to remember dreams}
 
 The trick in remembering a dream is to fix in your mind one incident or 
@@ -657,5 +646,3 @@ theme in the dream immediately upon awaking from it. You will then be
 able to remember the whole dream well enough to write a description of it 
 the next day, and you will probably find that for weeks afterwards you can 
 add to the description and correct it. 
-
-