some fixes to dissociation of physics

1 files changed, 51 insertions, 48 deletions

diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index 9c93395..aa19a69 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 \chapter{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}
 
 
+
+
+
+
+
 From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and 
 touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the 
 objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the 
@@ -61,18 +66,20 @@ intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further,
 our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm 
 will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There 
 remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us 
-denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1), (T_1, V_2), (T_2, V_1), (T_2, V_2)$. In 
+denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In 
 reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us 
 designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following 
 notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the 
-ith row and jth column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as 
+$i$th row and $j$th column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as 
 appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of 
 regularities in our present world. 
 
-$$\begin{pmatrix}
+\begin{equation}
+\begin{pmatrix}
 	p & p\\
 	f & p 
-\end{pmatrix}$$
+\end{pmatrix}
+\end{equation}
 
 
 So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the présent 
@@ -85,15 +92,23 @@ We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate
 more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a 2x2 array, there are 
 16 ways it can be filled with p's and f's. That is, there are 16 imaginable 
 states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the 
-present state
-$\begin{pmatrix}
+present state (\ref{physpresent}) to another state such as \ref{physafter}.
+
+\vskip 1em
+{\centering
+\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{
+	\parbox{1.5in}{
+		\begin{equation}\label{physpresent}
+\begin{pmatrix}
 	p & p \\
 	f & p
-\end{pmatrix}$ to another state such as
-$\begin{pmatrix}
+\end{pmatrix}
+		\end{equation}}\parbox{1.5in}{\begin{equation}\label{physafter}
+\begin{pmatrix}
 	p & f \\
 	p & p
-\end{pmatrix}$.
+\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}}}
+\vskip 1em
 
 However, 
 we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is 
@@ -107,19 +122,13 @@ changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are
 changes in the place of the one f; the change to the state having only p's; 
 and finally 
 
-
-\begin{tabular}{ r c l }
-	$\begin{pmatrix}
-		p & p \\
-		f & p
-	\end{pmatrix}$ &
-	->
-	&
-	$\begin{pmatrix}
-		f & p \\
-		p & f
-	\end{pmatrix}$ \\
-\end{tabular}
+\vskip 1em
+{\centering
+\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering
+	\parbox{0.75in}{\raggedleft $\begin{pmatrix} p & p \\ f & p \end{pmatrix}$}
+		\parbox{0.5in}{\centering \huge $\rightarrow$ }
+		\parbox{0.75in}{$\begin{pmatrix} f & p \\ p & f \end{pmatrix}$}}}
+\vskip 1em
 
 In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint 
 classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are $[T_j]$ and $[V_j]$. The 
@@ -130,16 +139,20 @@ although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one
 change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is 
 important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a 
 conposition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state 
-lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a genera! rule for rewriting 
-states. A 2X2 rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from
-$\begin{pmatrix}a & b \\ c & d\end{pmatrix}$ to
-$\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}$.
+lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a general rule for rewriting 
+states. A $2\times2$ rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from \ref{physegcwa} to \ref{physegcwb}.
+
+\vskip 1em
+			{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering
+\parbox{1.25in}{\raggedleft\begin{equation}\label{physegcwa}\begin{pmatrix}a & b \\ c & d\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}
+\parbox{1.25in}{\begin{equation}\label{physegcwb}\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}}}
+	\vskip 1em
 
 But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new 
 rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change 
-changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}
-changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining 
-changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes 
+changes, and states having only $f$'s. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}
+changes, changes to states with rows or columns of $f$'s. Of the remaining 
+changes, some merely forbid, replacing $p$'s with $f$'s. The rest of the changes 
 are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
 
 As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave 
@@ -152,9 +165,9 @@ If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of
 investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and 
 apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation 
 concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will 
-(observable as electrochemica! impulses along efferent neurons). If a change 
+(observable as electrochemical impulses along efferent neurons). If a change 
 occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a 
-formerly forbidden concurrence, is it T or V that conflicts with the 
+formerly forbidden concurrence, is it $T$ or $V$ that conflicts with the 
 command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight 
 to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes 
 close anyway? 
@@ -164,17 +177,17 @@ our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he
 may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that 
 the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an 
 extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole 
-change series occurs. Let p's be black dots and f's be white dots, and imagine 
+change series occurs. Let $p$'s be black dots and $f$'s be white dots, and imagine 
 a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from 
 time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the 
 extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary 
 English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between 
 scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the 
-same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the 
+same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the 
 anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect 
-everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
+everything---everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
 sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference 
-point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomaties are really 
+point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomalies are really 
 outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
 If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as 
 a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have 
@@ -254,7 +267,7 @@ First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to
 discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time. 
 There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge 
 are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't 
-automatically introduced in the other. !f the ratio of the repetitions of the 
+automatically introduced in the other. If the ratio of the repetitions of the 
 two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into 
 equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real 
 line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman). 
@@ -265,7 +278,7 @@ manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten,
 our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. 
 \enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
 futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The 
-empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the 
+empirical importance of Alten's idea is that it raises the question of what the 
 perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of 
 futurity. 
 
@@ -295,7 +308,7 @@ be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures.
 Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of 
 the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our 
 experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying 
-concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being 
+concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to tell us how to avoid being 
 fooled. 
 
 We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in 
@@ -317,13 +330,3 @@ may be to develop substates which express the differences between those
 object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that 
 aren't---the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment. 
 
-
-\clearpage
-{ 2/22/1963 
-
-
-Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstrate against the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
-February 22, 1963 \\
-(foto\footnote{sic} by Tony Conrad) 
-} \clearpage
-