more work on philosophy proper

2 files changed, 136 insertions, 124 deletions

diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex
index f992240..0abb381 100644
--- a/blueprint.tex
+++ b/blueprint.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-\documentclass[10pt,twoside]{memoir}
+\documentclass[10pt,twoside,draft]{memoir}
+
+
+
+
+
 
 \usepackage{salitter}
 \usletterlayout
@@ -89,6 +94,8 @@
 \chapterstyle{tandh}
 \openany
 
+\renewcommand*{\thesection}{\Alph{section}}
+
 \renewcommand*{\cftpartfont}{\bfseries\scshape}
 \renewcommand*{\cftchapterfont}{\normalfont}
 \renewcommand*{\cftsectionfont}{\itshape}
@@ -184,7 +191,7 @@
 \tocline
 \input{essays/admissible_contradictions.tex}
 \input{essays/propositional_vibration.tex}
-\input{extra/repressed_content.tex}
+% \input{extra/repressed_content.tex}
 % \input{extra/apprehension_of_plurality.tex}
 
 \backmatter
@@ -192,6 +199,7 @@
 \input{extra/structure_art_pure_mathematics.tex}
 \input{essays/exercise_awareness_states.tex}
 \input{extra/general_acognitive_culture.tex}
+\input{extra/primary_study_paraphrase.tex}
 % input{extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex}
 
 \end{document}
diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index 984c5ef..0e5e7ef 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 \newcommand{\stress}[1]{\textbf{#1}}
+\settocdepth{subsection}
 
 \chapter[Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)][Philosophy Proper]{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
-\renewcommand*{\thesection}{\Alph{section}}
 \subsection[Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)][Introduction]{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be 
 an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are 
-tentatively defined to be \emph{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}
+tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}
 Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by 
 their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as 
-corresponding to \emph{non-tautologous propositions.}
+corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
 
 Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or 
 supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is 
@@ -126,12 +126,13 @@ whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to
 our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this 
 monograph. 
 
-\plainbreak{2}
+\vfill
 
 \signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
 unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without 
 change.)}
 
+\clearpage
 \section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
 \subsection[Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts][Preliminary Concepts]{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}
 
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses
 are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be 
 replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to 
 the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be 
-concerned with the suggestion of clear \emph{uses}, of the expressions of which the 
+concerned with the suggestion of clear \stress{uses}, of the expressions of which the 
 uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the 
 expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of 
 acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of 
@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other
 \enquote{overt} behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
 expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for \enquote{thing 
 having a mind}, since \enquote{thing having a mind} presumably has the connotations 
-for the reader \enquote{\emph{that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
+for the reader \enquote{\stress{that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
 higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt 
 behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by 
 the thing having it}}, and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ former. What I am interested in, however, is not \enquote{experience} as it impl
 which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not 
 something one believes exists}. I am going to use \enquote{\term{experience}} to refer, as it 
 already does, to that immediate \enquote{world}, but \stress{without the implication that 
-experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same 
+\term{experience} is perception of \term{non-experience}, and in the mind: the same 
 referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use 
 \enquote{\term{experience}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
 non-experiences, is not an antonym for \enquote{\term{non-experience}} as conventionally 
@@ -656,21 +657,21 @@ so (does assume it)---with explicit stratification.)
 
 My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
 what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about 
-experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken 
+experience (traditional), \term{non-experience}, and the rest, because I have spoken 
 as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \enquote{experience} 
 (traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
 said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is 
 a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \enquote{experience} 
-(traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest, it shows that one who \enquote{accepts} 
+(traditional), \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, and the rest, it shows that one who \enquote{accepts} 
 the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent 
 desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no 
 explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the 
 expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, 
 remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are 
 completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to 
-experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a 
-formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is 
-not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is 
+\term{experiences} (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a 
+formulation of a belief does have a good \term{explication} for the reader, then it is 
+not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to \term{experiences}.) Now there is 
 an important point about method which should be brought out. If all 
 \enquote{non-experiential language}, \enquote{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I 
 show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer 
@@ -685,14 +686,14 @@ belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is
 right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since 
 the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a 
 belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable 
-explication which was true; in short, the belief would have a true 
+\term{explication} which was true; in short, the belief would have a true 
 formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a 
 formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point 
 answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of 
 belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not 
 to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one 
 who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that 
-it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an 
+it could have an acceptable \term{explication} for him, could not turn out to be an 
 expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some 
 way. Now there is another important point about \enquote{method} to be made. 
 The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one 
@@ -709,23 +710,25 @@ belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be
 discussed here. 
 
 The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes, 
-but...} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
+but\ldots} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
 formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of 
 linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if 
-embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how 
-well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said 
+embarrassing) curiosity.\footnote{Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how 
+well the reader understands that.} And there does remain a lot to be said 
 about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in 
 them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its 
 formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose 
-rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be 
+rejection as wrong would conflict with \term{experience}, or which it would be 
 impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these 
 matters. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts}
+\clearpage
+\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}
+\subsection[Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts][Beliefs as Mental Acts]{Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts}
 
 In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by 
 discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be 
-talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of 
+talking about mental acts and \term{experience}, it must be clear that this part of 
 the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will 
 not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
 \enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
@@ -733,78 +736,78 @@ relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I
 discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
 
 I should say immediately that \enquote{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed 
-to refer to \enquote{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
-non-experience}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
+to refer to \enquote{\term{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
+non-experience}}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
 This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one 
 does or does not \enquote{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having 
 beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \enquote{belief} in the 
 use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of 
 the last part. Now when I speak of a \enquote{belief} I will be speaking of an 
-experience, what might be said to be \enquote{an act of consciously believing, of 
-consciously having a belief}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that 
+\term{experience}, what might be said to be \enquote{\emph{an act of consciously believing, of 
+consciously having a belief}}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that 
 one \enquote{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in 
 distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \enquote{that others have minds}, for example, 
 or in general of belief \enquote{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation 
 marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be 
 \enquote{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
-about experiences; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of 
+about \term{experiences}; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of 
 non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already 
 fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has 
 any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his 
-\enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{act of consciously 
-believing}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
+\enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{\emph{act of consciously 
+believing}}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
 What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, 
-use of a word (\enquote{belief}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
+use of a word (\enquote{\term{belief}}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
 rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
 
 There is a further point about terminology. The reader should 
 remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \enquote{that 
 perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental 
-and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
+and non-mental \term{experiences}, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
 one's eyes closed, and a \enquote{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
-going to say that visualizations and the like are \enquote{imagined-experiences}. For 
+going to say that visualizations and the like are \enquote{\term{imagined-experiences}}. For 
 example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an 
-\enquote{imagined-visual-table-experience}. The reader should not suppose that by 
+\enquote{\term{imagined-visual-table-experience}}. The reader should not suppose that by 
 \enquote{imagined} I mean that the experiences are 
 \enquote{hallucinations}, are \enquote{unreal}. I 
 use \enquote{imagined} because saying \enquote{mental-table-experience} is too much like 
 saying \enquote{table in the mind} and because just using \enquote{visualization} leaves no way 
-of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
-an \enquote{imagined-table-experience} seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
-a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
-experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \enquote{of 
+of speaking of mental \term{experiences} which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
+an \enquote{\term{imagined-table-experience}} seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
+a mental \term{experience}, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
+\term{experiences} by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \enquote{of 
 a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
 like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). In other words, an 
-imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a \enquote{valid} experience, all right, but it 
-is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
-(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \enquote{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
+\term{imagined-\x-experience} (to generalize) is a \enquote{valid} experience, all right, but it 
+is not a non-mental \x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
+(non-mental) \x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \enquote{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
 imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this 
 terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the 
-conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by 
-saying that they are imaginings \enquote{of one or another non-mental experiences}. 
+conventional method of distinguishing different mental \term{experiences} by 
+saying that they are imaginings \enquote{of one or another non-mental \term{experiences}}. 
 
-I can at last ask what one does when one believes \enquote{that there is a table, 
-not perceived by oneself, behind one now}, or anything else. Well, in the 
+I can at last ask what one does when one believes \enquote{\emph{that there is a table, 
+not perceived by oneself, behind one now}}, or anything else. Well, in the 
 first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an 
 imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization 
 of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed 
-statement, such as \lexpression{There is a table behind me}. This is not all one does, 
+statement, such as \enquote{\emph{There is a table behind me}}. This is not all one does, 
 however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said 
-to be a \enquote{belief} (a point about the explication of my \enquote{belief}). The 
+to be a \enquote{belief} (a point about the explication of my \enquote{\term{belief}}). The 
 additional, \enquote{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \enquote{attitude} 
-toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe 
+toward the \term{experience}. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe 
 that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief 
-about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
+about the \term{experience} because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
 other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental 
 action. Now the claim that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving} is not, could not 
-be, at all like the claim \enquote{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
-correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}. The 
-question of \enquote{what is going on in the realm of non-experience} does not arise 
-here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, 
-the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is 
-\enquote{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \enquote{self-deception experience}. I 
-don't have to \enquote{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
-is going on in the realm of non-experience}; when I have described the 
+be, at all like the claim \enquote{\emph{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
+correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}}. The 
+question of \enquote{\emph{what is going on in the realm of non-experience}} does not arise 
+here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an \term{experience}; it is that the attitude, 
+the \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} of believing, is 
+\enquote{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \enquote{self-deception \term{experience}}. I 
+don't have to \enquote{\emph{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
+is going on in the realm of non-experience}}; when I have described the 
 attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good 
 explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
 
@@ -816,35 +819,35 @@ strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am
 trying to say is that it is not an \enquote{objective} or \enquote{subconscious} self-deception 
 such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This 
 is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the 
-inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; 
+inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental \term{experiences}; 
 with respect to English the attitude is a \enquote{vague, elusive} thing, very difficult 
 to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by 
 saying that it is the attitude \enquote{that such and such} (the reader must not think 
-I mean the belief \enquote{that such and such}). If the experience to which the 
-attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the 
-self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{that the imagined-x-experience is a 
-(non-mental) x-experience}. As an example, consider the belief \enquote{that there is 
-a table behind one}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
-expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an 
+I mean the belief \enquote{that such and such}). If the \term{experience} to which the 
+attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-\x-experience, then the 
+self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the imagined-\x-experience is a 
+(non-mental) \x-experience}}. As an example, consider the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is 
+a table behind one}}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
+expression, it will be on an \term{imagined-experience} such as an 
 imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself 
 (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving 
-attitude \enquote{that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
-to a table}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
-a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
-an imagined-experience but \enquote{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not 
-inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \enquote{that 
-one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience}; secondly, when one is asked 
-the question, one stops believing \enquote{that there is a table behind one} and starts 
-believing \enquote{that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
-non-experience}, a different matter (different belief). 
+attitude \enquote{\stress{that the \term{imagined-experience} is a table or oneself with one's back 
+to a table}}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-\x-experience is 
+a (non-mental) \x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
+an \term{imagined-experience} but \enquote{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not 
+inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \enquote{\stress{that 
+one's imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience}}; secondly, when one is asked 
+the question, one stops believing \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}} and starts 
+believing \enquote{\stress{that one's \term{imagined-experience} corresponds in a certain way to a 
+non-experience}}, a different matter (different belief). 
 
 lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression 
 (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), 
-the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{that the expression has a 
-referent}. With respect to the belief \enquote{that there is a table behind one}, one's 
-attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \expression{There is a table 
-behind me}, pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and 
-one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{that this name has a referent}. 
+the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the expression has a 
+referent}}. With respect to the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}}, one's 
+attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \enquote{\stress{There is a table 
+behind me}}, pretty much regarded as \enquote{\stress{There being a table behind me}}, and 
+one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{\stress{that this name has a referent}}. 
 Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of 
 beliefs. 
 
@@ -852,48 +855,48 @@ beliefs.
 the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the 
 version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving 
 language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an 
-imagined-x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an x-experience, whereas in 
+imagined-\x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an \x-experience, whereas in 
 the version involving language, the attention is on something which is 
 \enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). 
-For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{that the reality is at one remove}, and 
+For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{\stress{that the reality is at one remove}}, and 
 correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs 
-doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
+doesn't desire to have as \term{experiences}, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
 referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make 
-believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in 
+believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-\x-experience in 
 the version of the belief not involving language, has something which 
 functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language 
 one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one 
-has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the 
+has the attitude that the imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience in the 
 version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the 
-thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving 
+thing believed in is a mere \term{imagined-experience}, so in the version involving 
 \enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a 
-referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, 
+referent could only be a (mere) \term{experience}. One who expects an expression, 
 which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does 
 so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the 
 belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires 
 with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the 
 way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for 
-awareness of the referent to be part of one's experience corresponds to the 
+awareness of the referent to be part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the 
 attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it 
 not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's 
-experience corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. 
+\term{experience} corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. 
 Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which 
 it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving 
-language consists of being attentive to an imagined-experience and having the 
-attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief. 
+language consists of being attentive to an \term{imagined-experience} and having the 
+attitude that it is not an \term{imagined-experience}, discredits that belief. 
 
 Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather 
 unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of 
 \enquote{attitudes}, then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
-something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it 
+something more to a mental act than just taking note of an \term{experience} for it 
 to be a \enquote{belief}; this something is \enquote{peripheral and elusive}, so that I am 
 calling the something an \enquote{attitude}, the most appropriate way in English to 
-speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the 
-experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
+speak of it; the attitude, an \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the 
+\term{experience} which \stress{is} the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
 \enquote{self-deceiving}, is a \enquote{(conscious) self-deception experience}, because when 
 aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just 
 about has to be a (\enquote{conscious}) self-deception experience to transform mere 
-taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to 
+taking note of an \term{experience} into something remotely deserving to be said to 
 be a \enquote{belief}. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
 \enquote{self-deceiving} is to be made without trying to think \enquote{about the relation of 
 the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience}, to do which would be 
@@ -912,18 +915,18 @@ believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in
 believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be "evidence 
 for, confirmation of, one's belief} (more will be said about confirmation 
 shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic 
-expression "x", one may give attention to a referent of 
-"imagined-x(-experience)", an \enquote{imagined-referent} of "x"; or to 
-imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
-\enquote{analogous to the referent of "x"}. In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
+expression \enquote{\x}, one may give attention to a referent of 
+\enquote{imagined-\x(-experience)}, an \enquote{imagined-referent} of \enquote{\x}; or to 
+imagined-\y-experiences such that \y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
+\enquote{analogous to the referent of \enquote{\x}}. In the latter case the \y-experiences will be 
 mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be 
 to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is 
 visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 
-"There being a table behind one". An example of imagined-y-experiences 
-(such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
+\enquote{There being a table behind one}. An example of imagined-\y-experiences 
+(such that \y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
 \enquote{analogous to referents}, in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
-beliefs \enquote{about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
-Being}. 
+beliefs \enquote{\stress{about entities wholly other than, transcending, \term{experience}, such as 
+Being}}. 
 
 Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical \enquote{justifications}, 
 \enquote{arguments}, for them, \enquote{defenses} of them. I will not bother to explicate 
@@ -933,7 +936,7 @@ show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language
 and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested 
 before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the 
 justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive 
-justification, the kind involving the citing of experience supposed to be 
+justification, the kind involving the citing of \term{experience} supposed to be 
 evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical 
 assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them 
 inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has 
@@ -941,7 +944,7 @@ four legs; therefore (\enquote{it is more probable that}) any other table has fo
 legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it 
 superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, 
 argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can 
-show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, 
+show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a lesser, 
 weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to 
 believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, 
 then one already had the belief \enquote{implicitly} (it was a conjunct of a belief 
@@ -957,9 +960,9 @@ as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some
 belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny \enquote{the 
 existence of non-experience}, to \enquote{cause non-experiences to vanish}, so to 
 speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental 
-experiences, \enquote{perceived objects}. My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
+\term{experiences}, \enquote{perceived objects}. My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
 is not, for example, the belief \enquote{that there is a realm where there could either 
-be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are 
+be or not be certain entities not \term{experiences}, but our means of knowing are 
 inadequate for finding which is the case.} My position is not a mere 
 \enquote{decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}. The philosopher who denies 
 \enquote{the existence of non-experiences}, or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
@@ -969,7 +972,7 @@ has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit.
 What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of 
 beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In 
 the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions 
-dependent on "non-experience", and pointed out that those who expect them 
+dependent on "\term{non-experience}", and pointed out that those who expect them 
 to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting 
 the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have 
 described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the 
@@ -978,7 +981,8 @@ To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right
 philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief 
 one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 6 --- Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
+
+\subsection[Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs][Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs]{Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
 
 In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
 given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
@@ -1011,7 +1015,7 @@ too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if
 they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
 The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
 these beliefs, that not having them is not \enquote{inconsistent} with one's 
-experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
+\term{experience}; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
 of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
 of not having it. 
 
@@ -1032,8 +1036,8 @@ oneself? Of course one can \enquote{watch oneself wave one's hand} (in a non-str
 sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
 formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can \enquote{watch oneself wave 
 one's hand} (in the non-strict sense) does not imply \enquote{that there are spatially 
-distant, and past and future events}; and although experiences such as a 
-visual---\enquote{moving}---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
+distant, and past and future events}; and although \term{experiences} such as a 
+visual---\enquote{moving}---hand \term{experience} are associated with spatio-temporal 
 beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
 Rejection of beliefs \enquote{about the objectivity of linguistic referring} may 
@@ -1041,7 +1045,7 @@ seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a \enquote{t
 doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
 things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
 slightest intention of saying that it is a \enquote{non-table}? The reader should 
-observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs 
+observe that I do not deny this. These \term{experiences} are associated with beliefs 
 \enquote{about the objectivity of referring}, but they are not \enquote{objective referring}; 
 and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
@@ -1063,7 +1067,7 @@ switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear
 \enquote{that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge}. They say, 
 for example, \enquote{that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
 and drink water, or one won't live}. Now \enquote{one's throwing the switch and the 
-light's coming on} (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
+light's coming on} (in a non-strict sense) is like the \term{experiences} associated 
 with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
 not imply \enquote{that there are past or future events}, and taking note of it is not 
 part of what is essential in the belief \enquote{that if one throws the switch, then the 
@@ -1082,34 +1086,34 @@ non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the
 beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in 
 defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he 
 continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the 
-experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do 
+\term{experiences} associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do 
 so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to 
-deny that he has the experiences. Now I am not denying that he has the 
-experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the 
-reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the 
+deny that he has the \term{experiences}. Now I am not denying that he has the 
+\term{experiences}. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the 
+reader that he doesn't have \term{experiences} he has, but to point out to him the 
 self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary 
 of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs 
-after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It 
+after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to \term{experiences}. It 
 sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief 
 language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language 
-to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's 
+to refer to \term{experiences}, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's 
 usually because one has beliefs. 
 
-The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences 
+The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}
 is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all 
 English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a 
-result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use 
+result, those who want to talk about \term{experiences} (my use) and still use 
 English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
-associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
+associated \term{experiences}, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
 among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
 always been used that way, except by a few \enquote{metaphysicians}. I have had to 
 so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
-the introduction of my use of \enquote{experience} in the third chapter. Thus, some 
+the introduction of my use of \enquote{\term{experience}} in the third chapter. Thus, some 
 of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
 for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
 book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
 chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to 
-experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and 
+\term{experiences}, language with which they are very strongly associated and 
 which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
 announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
 
@@ -1129,7 +1133,7 @@ in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!)
 learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
 unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 7 --- Summary}
+\subsection[Chapter 7: Summary][Summary]{Chapter 7: Summary}
 
 The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
 am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
@@ -1179,7 +1183,7 @@ intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to
 realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The 
 important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true 
 statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the 
-expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences 
+expressions in them being construed as referring to the \term{experiences}
 associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when 
 you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my 
 language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to