a ton of fixes to philosophy proper, but not done yet

1 files changed, 430 insertions, 428 deletions

diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index 45fb9a2..984c5ef 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
-\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
-\subsection*{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
+\newcommand{\stress}[1]{\textbf{#1}}
+
+\chapter[Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)][Philosophy Proper]{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
+\renewcommand*{\thesection}{\Alph{section}}
+\subsection[Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)][Introduction]{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be 
-an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are 
-tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. 
+an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are 
+tentatively defined to be \emph{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}
 Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by 
 their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as 
-corresponding to non-tautologous propositions. 
+corresponding to \emph{non-tautologous propositions.}
 
 Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or 
 supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is 
@@ -18,14 +21,14 @@ continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which
 philosophers have dealt with it. 
 
 All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are 
-normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be heipful to 
+normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be helpful to 
 examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here 
 beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this 
 monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain 
 approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold 
 beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
 
-it is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that 
+It is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that 
 they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on 
 their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, 
 quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some 
@@ -34,9 +37,9 @@ to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare.
 Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy 
 non-cognitive needs. 
 
-To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I
-could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is 
-true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which 
+To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as \enquote{\emph{I
+could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so,}} or \enquote{\emph{Even if so-and-so is 
+true I don't want to know it.}} These remarks manifest the needs with which 
 we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level 
 of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit 
 and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing 
@@ -51,35 +54,36 @@ being considered here are admitted self-deceptions.
 
 A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for 
 non-cognitive reasons follows. 
-
-\begin{enumerate}
-\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it." 
+\vskip 0.5em
+\begin{enumerate}[nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
+\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. \enquote{\emph{I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God.}} \enquote{\emph{If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it.}}
 
 \item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
 
-\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons. 
+\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Ca\-tho\-li\-cism for esthetic reasons. 
 
 \item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
 
 \item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one 
 who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the 
 inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. 
-Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of 
+Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called \term{theologizing,} in recognition of 
 the archetypal activity in this category. 
+\end{enumerate}
 
 When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are 
 instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive 
 motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific 
 method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he 
-believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a 
+believed in the \enquote{\emph{real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a 
 common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who 
-discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a 
+discovers it bit by bit.}} The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a 
 commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he 
 must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. 
 The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry 
 begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows 
-that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a 
-demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then 
+that science is an instance of \term{theologizing.} If scientists cannot welcome a 
+demonstration that their \enquote{metaphysical} presuppositions are invalid, then 
 their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
 
 The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the 
@@ -93,6 +97,8 @@ or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other
 hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a 
 single alternative is welcome. 
 
+\vskip 0.5em
+\begin{enumerate}[resume, nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
 \item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested 
 in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To 
 academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had 
@@ -111,6 +117,7 @@ comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it
 seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. 
 \end{enumerate}
 
+\vskip 0.5em
 This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, 
 limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or 
 self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The 
@@ -119,18 +126,20 @@ whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to
 our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this 
 monograph. 
 
-\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
+\plainbreak{2}
+
+\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
 unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without 
 change.)}
 
 \section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-\subsection*{Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts}
+\subsection[Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts][Preliminary Concepts]{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of 
 philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing 
 language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might 
 tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, 
-formulations of them (for example, \formulation{Other persons have minds} as 
+formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as 
 representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem 
 will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be 
 driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or 
@@ -148,63 +157,63 @@ doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the
 truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the 
 others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. 
 
-The first concept is a new one, that of "explication". Explication of a 
+The first concept is a new one, that of \emph{explication}. Explication of a 
 familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding 
 a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is 
-wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing 
+wanted that the expression \enquote{mean}. To explain: I will be discussing 
 philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their 
-"meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
+\enquote{meaning} needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
 use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which 
-the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as 
+the \enquote{meanings}, uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as 
 replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, 
 which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses 
 are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be 
 replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to 
 the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be 
-concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the 
+concerned with the suggestion of clear \emph{uses}, of the expressions of which the 
 uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the 
 expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of 
 acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of 
 which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents 
-(and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. 
+(and non-referents), then the new expressions must clearly have referents. 
 Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents 
 in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, 
 especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. 
-(I will not say here just how I use "connotation". What the connotations of 
+(I will not say here just how I use \enquote{connotation}. What the connotations of 
 an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a 
 supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are 
-supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
-supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, 
-for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the 
+supposed to be like.) \enquote{Finding}, or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
+supposed to be acceptable to oneself as a replacement, of the kind described, 
+for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be \term{explicating} the 
 expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to 
-be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". 
+be the \term{explicandum}, and the suggested replacement, the \term{explication}. 
 Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is 
 inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the 
 same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. 
 
-I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of 
+I should mention that my use of \term{explication} is different from that of 
 Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very 
-problematic "definition". For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
+problematic \term{definition}. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
 of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, 
 suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of 
-"work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
+\enquote{work}); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
 clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. 
 
 Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an 
-expression is suggested, as an explication for "thing having a mind" (if 
+expression is suggested, as an explication for \enquote{thing having a mind} (if 
 supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the 
 things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other 
-"overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
-expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for "thing 
-having a mind", since "thing having a mind" presumably has the connotations 
-for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
+\enquote{overt} behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
+expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for \enquote{thing 
+having a mind}, since \enquote{thing having a mind} presumably has the connotations 
+for the reader \enquote{\emph{that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
 higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt 
 behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by 
-the thing having it", and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
+the thing having it}}, and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
 the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the 
-proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causual 
+proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causal 
 connection between having a mind and the other things, because the 
-expression 'thing having a mind' itself, and not the supposed effects of 
+expression \enquote{thing having a mind} itself, and not the supposed effects of 
 having a mind, is what is under discussion. 
 
 As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating 
@@ -221,117 +230,128 @@ connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases
 when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with 
 philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly 
 be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the 
-explications for "thing having a mind" mentioned above. 
+explications for \enquote{thing having a mind} mentioned above. 
 
 The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be 
-discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
+discussing the \enquote{truth} of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
 chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a 
 good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify 
-the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for "true statement". 
+the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for \enquote{true statement}. 
 (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the 
 explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
 
-Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be 
-"statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language 
+Well, what is a \term{statement}? How do what are usually said to be 
+\term{statements} state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language 
 you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What 
 does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just 
 about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their 
 arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that 
 when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy 
 ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important 
-connotations of "true statement", and, more generally, of "statement", as 
-traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion 
-which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content", as it is sometimes 
-said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbal" part of a statement is 
-supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at 
+connotations of \term{true statement}, and, more generally, of \emph{statement}, as 
+traditionally and commonly used, is that a \term{statement} is an \enquote{assertion 
+which has truth value} (is true or false) (or \enquote{has content}, as it is sometimes 
+said, rather misleadingly). That is, the \enquote{verbal} part of a statement is 
+supposed to be related in a certain way to something \enquote{non-verbal}, or at 
 least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a 
-statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do 
+statement is supposed to be \enquote{true} or not because of something having to do 
 with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is 
-related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and 
+related. (The exceptions are the \enquote{statements} of formalist logic and 
 mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus 
 irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are 
-interested in.) Thus, if "true statement" is to be explicated, "assertion having 
-truth value" and "is true" (and "has content" in a misleading use) have to be 
+interested in.) Thus, if \enquote{\term{true statement}} is to be explicated, \enquote{assertion having 
+truth value} and \enquote{is true} (and \enquote{has content} in a misleading use) have to be 
 explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication 
-for "true statement" deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
-"assertion having truth value" and "is true". One important conclusion from 
-these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or 
-bodes of marks such as "The man talks") are often said to be "statements", 
-would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate "statement" by simply 
-identifying it with "sentence" (in my sense); something must be said about 
+for \enquote{\term{true statement}} deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
+\enquote{assertion having truth value} and \enquote{is true}. One important conclusion from 
+these observations is that although \enquote{sentences} (the bodies of sound or 
+bodes of marks such as \enquote{The man talks}) are often said to be \enquote{statements}, 
+would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate \enquote{\term{statement}} by simply 
+identifying it with \enquote{sentence} (in my sense); something must be said about 
 such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same 
-reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify "statement" 
-with "sentence", the latter being explicated in terms of the ("formal") rules 
+reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify \enquote{\term{statement}}
+with \enquote{sentence}, the latter being explicated in terms of the (\enquote{formal}) rules 
 for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no 
 reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. 
 
-In explicating "true statement" I will use the most elegant approach, one 
+In explicating \enquote{\term{true statement}} I will use the most elegant approach, one 
 relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having 
 truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way 
 to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to 
-make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" \term{table} to 
-the thing. It is supposed that \term{table} has been "interpreted", that is, that it is 
-"determinate" to which, of all things, applications of \term{table} are (to be said 
-to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
-"determinate" which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word 
-"table", are expressions "equivalent to" "table".) The word "determinate" is 
+make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to \enquote{apply} \uline{table} to 
+the thing. It is supposed that \uline{table} has been \enquote{interpreted}, that is, that it is 
+\enquote{\emph{determinate}} to which, of all things, applications of \uline{table} are (to be said 
+to be) \enquote{true}. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
+\enquote{determinate} which, of all things (events), are \enquote{occurrences of the word 
+\enquote{table}}, are expressions \enquote{equivalent to} \uline{table}.) 
+The word \enquote{\emph{determinate}} is 
 the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit 
-myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one 
-can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and 
-"then" the thing. 'point out' is restricted to refer to "ostension", pointing 
-out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to "directing 
-attention to things not in one's presence" as well. The assertion is 'true', of 
-course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things 
-to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) 
-"true", otherwise "false". It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 
-"first" thing and a "second", the first being an interpreted expression, is an 
+myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for \enquote{apply}, one 
+can \enquote{apply} the word to the thing by pointing out \enquote{first} the word and 
+\enquote{then} the thing. \enquote{point out} is restricted to refer to \term{ostension}, pointing 
+out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to \enquote{directing 
+attention to things not in one's presence} as well. The assertion is \enquote{true}, of 
+course, if and only if the thing to which \uline{table} is applied is one of the things 
+to which it is determinate that the application of \uline{table} is (to be said to be) 
+\enquote{true}, otherwise \enquote{false}. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 
+\enquote{first} thing and a \enquote{second}, the first being an interpreted expression, is an 
 assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further 
-suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to 
-this explication, the things to which equivalent names ("occurances of a 
-name") may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, 
+suggest \enquote{\term{interpreted expression}} as an explication for \enquote{name}; with respect to 
+this explication, the things to which equivalent names (\enquote{occurrences of a 
+name}) may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, 
 other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the 
 concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple 
 assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is 
-how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
-between name and referents is an "objective, metaphysical entity", which 
+\emph{how a name has referents}; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
+between name and referents is an \enquote{objective, metaphysical entity}, which 
 would be getting into philosophy proper. 
 
 The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that 
-what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the 
-context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" 
-kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first 
-let us say that the "complex name" gotten by replacing a sentence's "main 
-verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the 
-sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is 
-'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
+what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the 
+context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} 
+kind; thus an explication for \enquote{\term{true statement}} can be found. To do so, first 
+let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \enquote{main 
+verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the 
+sentence. For example, the associated name of \enquote{Boston is in Massachusetts} is 
+\enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
 clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main 
-verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: \said{The 
+verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. 
+
+\vskip 0.5em
+
+Example:  \\
+\textbf{sentence:} \enquote{The 
 table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one 
-man while the other man talked}; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been 
-pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
+man while the other man talked}; \\
+\textbf{main verb:} \enquote{will have been} or \enquote{had been 
+pushed}. 
+
+\vskip 0.5em
+
+Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
 but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be 
 invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to 
-make a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this 
-"asserted name" being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
-doesn't assert names; names just have referents---it is statements that one 
-makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate 
-this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
-kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. In other 
+make a statement, is to so to speak \enquote{assert} its associated name; this 
+\enquote{asserted name} being \enquote{true} if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
+doesn't \emph{assert} names; names just have referents---it is statements that one 
+makes, \enquote{asserts}, and that are \enquote{true} or \enquote{false}. How, then, do we explicate 
+this \enquote{\term{asserting}} of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
+kind, which is the application of \uline{having a referent} to the name. In other 
 words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a 
 statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and 
 puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying 
-'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in 
-Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the 
-application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. 
+\uline{having a referent} to it. For example, the sentence \enquote{Boston is in 
+Massachusetts} should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the 
+application of \uline{having a referent} to \enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. 
 
-Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader 
+Now this approach may seem \enquote{unnatural} or incomplete to the reader 
 for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is 
-replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). 
+replaced by a statement \enquote{about} it (or to be precise its associated name). 
 Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to 
 describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a 
 statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even 
 more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of 
-interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to 
+interpreting \enquote{simple names} (Fries' \term{Class 1 words}), but not so natural to 
 speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of 
 course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from 
 simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus 
@@ -339,18 +359,18 @@ referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which
 they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex 
 names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex 
 names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such 
-words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
+words as \enquote{the}; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
 of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be 
 clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these 
 relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything 
-about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents (and 
+about what the \enquote{meaning} (intension), as opposed to the referents (and 
 non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension 
 unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for 
 my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells 
 the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is 
 true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly 
 philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous 
-word 'determinate', because I haven't said anything about how names get 
+word \enquote{determinate}, because I haven't said anything about how names get 
 referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how 
 one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards 
 explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with 
@@ -358,21 +378,21 @@ formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if
 language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in 
 some form must have the central role in it.) 
 
-"Statements", then, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind 
+\term{Statements}, then, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind 
 which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have 
-described. I could thus explicate 'true statement' as referring to those true 
-"simple" assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this 
-would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of 'true 
-statement' having to do with the method of apptying the first member to the 
+described. I could thus explicate \enquote{\emph{true statement}} as referring to those true 
+\enquote{simple} assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this 
+would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of \enquote{true 
+statement} having to do with the method of applying the first member to the 
 second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to 
 do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more 
-elegant to explicate 'true statement' as referring to all true assertions of the 
-"simple" kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of 
+elegant to explicate \enquote{true statement} as referring to all true assertions of the 
+\enquote{simple} kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of 
 the two explications the reader prefers. 
 
 So much for the preliminaries. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 3 : "Experience"}
+\subsection[Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}][\enquote{Experience}]{Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}}
 
 I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step 
 in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical 
@@ -384,55 +404,55 @@ think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern
 philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are 
 relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
 
-First, consider the term 'non-experience'. Although the concept of a 
-non-experience is intrinsically far more "difficult" than the concept of 
-"experience" which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, 
-presupposed in all "natural languages" and throughout philosophy, is so 
+First, consider the term \enquote{\term{non-experience}}. Although the concept of a 
+non-experience is intrinsically far more \enquote{difficult} than the concept of 
+\enquote{\term{experience}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, 
+presupposed in all \enquote{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so 
 taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should 
-have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are 
+have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are 
 perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of 
 it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the 
 future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects 
 from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily 
-understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and 
+understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and 
 their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the 
-second chapter); unperceivable "things" (microscopic objects (of course, 
+second chapter); unperceivable \enquote{things} (microscopic objects (of course, 
 viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), 
 essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, 
-normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To 
+normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\footnote{To 
 simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am 
 speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing 
-the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.) 
+the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}
 Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that 
 there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one 
-can not know whether there are any---this is not a non-belief but a complex 
+can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex 
 belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the 
 mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is 
-presumably a connotation of 'other minds' for the reader, as explained in the 
+presumably a connotation of \enquote{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the 
 second chapter. 
 
-In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. 
+In the history of philosophy, the concept of \term{non-experience} comes first. 
 Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about 
-non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or 
-experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that 
-one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
+non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a \term{perception}, or 
+\term{experience} of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that 
+one knows about \term{non-experiences} by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
 of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes 
 (assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by 
-having a "visual-table-experience". The theory goes on to say that these 
+having a \enquote{visual-table-experience}. The theory goes on to say that these 
 perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in 
 one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now 
 there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, 
 saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they 
 are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a 
-table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". 
-The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to 
-the second source of confusion. Does the English word 'table', as ordinarily 
+table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem \enquote{mental}. 
+The theory that they are in the mind is a \textbf{belief}. This point leads directly to 
+the second source of confusion. Does the English word \enquote{table}, as ordinarily 
 used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity 
 external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's 
 perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between 
 the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to 
-the reader, then he probably uses 'table', 'perceived table', and 
-'table-experience' as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, 
+the reader, then he probably uses \enquote{table}, \enquote{perceived table}, and 
+\enquote{table-experience} as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, 
 is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not 
 perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this 
 confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being 
@@ -441,8 +461,8 @@ perceptions.
 
 Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are 
 experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term 
-'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
-start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy 
+\enquote{\term{experience}} is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
+start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably 
 knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are 
 experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional 
 philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not 
@@ -450,21 +470,21 @@ know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective
 table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, 
 has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences 
 not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one 
-unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there 
-is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like. 
+unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that \stress{there 
+is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like.}
 One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would 
-be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, "thinking" that one doesn't have 
+be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, \enquote{thinking} that one doesn't have 
 one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be 
 shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest 
 idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the 
 reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably 
 known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some 
 philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say 
-cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some 
-philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In 
+cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity.\footnote{For example, some 
+philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds.} In 
 speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a 
 lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by 
-appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy 
+appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy 
 which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One 
 does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective 
 tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other 
@@ -472,57 +492,58 @@ persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's
 table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as 
 will be shown). 
 
-I have explained the current use of the term 'experience'. Now I want 
+I have explained the current use of the term \enquote{\term{experience}}. Now I want 
 to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, 
 will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing 
-'non-experience' I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of 
-the term, in the case of 'experience' I am going to suggest a new use for the 
-term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of 
-experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the 
-former. What I am interested in, however, is not 'experience' as it implies. 
-'perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind', but as it refers to that 
+\enquote{\term{non-experience}} I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of 
+the term, in the case of \enquote{\term{experience}} I am going to suggest a new use for the 
+term.) As I explained, the concept of \term{non-experience} preceded that of 
+\term{experience}, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the 
+former. What I am interested in, however, is not \enquote{experience} as it implies. 
+\enquote{perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind}, but as it refers to \stress{that 
 which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not 
-something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it 
-already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that 
+something one believes exists}. I am going to use \enquote{\term{experience}} to refer, as it 
+already does, to that immediate \enquote{world}, but \stress{without the implication that 
 experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same 
-referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use 
-'experience' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
-non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally 
+referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use 
+\enquote{\term{experience}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
+non-experiences, is not an antonym for \enquote{\term{non-experience}} as conventionally 
 used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a 
 leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy 
-between 'experience' as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences 
-or in particular the realm where they could be, and 'experience' without 
+between \enquote{experience} as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences 
+or in particular the realm where they could be, and \enquote{\term{experience}} without 
 these connotations. 
 
 Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be 
-obvious that although my term 'experience' was introduced last, it is 
+obvious that although my term \enquote{\term{experience}} was introduced last, it is 
 intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the 
 terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I 
 discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I 
-have used the perspective of the Western philsophical tradition to explain my 
+have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my 
 term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, 
-especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader's 
-conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and 
-especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he 
-ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term 
-'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. 
-
-I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. 
-As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it 
+especially, the theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences}. Even if the reader's 
+conceptual background does not involve the concept of \term{non-experience,} and 
+especially the modern Western theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences,} he 
+ought to be able to understand, and realize the \enquote{primacy} of, my term 
+\enquote{\term{experience}}. The term should be supra-cultural. 
+
+I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \enquote{experience}. 
+As I have said, it is \enquote{intrinsically} the simplest term, but I can not define it 
 by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including 
-the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based 
+the traditional term \enquote{experience}, the antonym of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, is based 
 on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, 
 in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for 
-different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes 
-(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as "The table is 
-black" implies the formulation \formulation{Material objects are real} (to the materialist), 
-or \formulation{So-called objects are ideas in the mind} (to the idealist), or \formulation{Substances 
-and attributes are real}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
+different philosophers according as their metaphysics\footnote{Or, as is sometimes 
+(incorrectly) said, \enquote{ontologies}.} differ. Even such a sentence as \enquote{The table is 
+black} implies the formulation \enquote{\uline{Material objects are real}} (to the materialist), 
+or \enquote{\uline{So-called objects are ideas in the mind}} (to the idealist), or 
+\enquote{\uline{Substances 
+and attributes are real}}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
 explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, 
 ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I 
 use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of 
 \term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example 
-when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be 
+when I say that the connotation of relatedness to \term{non-experience} is to be 
 dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is 
 not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied 
 philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, 
@@ -531,23 +552,24 @@ other natural language, but by having referents.
 
 As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my 
 \term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything 
-about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that 
-there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
-most important in this book. The fact that although it is the "simplest" and 
+about \term{non-experiences}, since in English there is always the implication that 
+there could be \term{non-experiences}. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
+most important in this book. The fact that although it is the \enquote{simplest} and 
 least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain 
 using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the 
 philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my 
 \term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as 
-an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this 
+an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences.\footnote{It's good that this 
 isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be 
 no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this 
-realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the 
+realm would have to be a non-experience.} If he is lucky he will just find the 
 book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from 
 the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is 
 past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may 
 already realize what I'm going to say. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution}
+
+\subsection[Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution][The Linguistic Solution]{Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution}
 
 Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the 
 book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the 
@@ -560,9 +582,9 @@ philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will
 not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to 
 explore all its implications; that will come later. 
 
-However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this 
+However, in the hope that it will make the main \enquote{argument} of this 
 chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous 
-version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight" behind the main 
+version of it, which should give the \enquote{intuitive insight} behind the main 
 argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is 
 true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified 
 from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without 
@@ -570,76 +592,76 @@ appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot
 know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a 
 contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be 
 right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if 
-they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but 
-inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively 
+they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The \enquote{necessity}, but 
+inconsistency, of skepticism \enquote{shows} my conclusion in an intuitively 
 understandable way. 
 
-To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that 
-one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
-that other that \name{black table} has to \name{table}: a referent of the former is 
+To get on to the definitive version of my \enquote{argument}. I will say that 
+one name \enquote{\term{depends}} on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
+that other that \uline{black table} has to \uline{table}: a referent of the former is 
 necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names 
 mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any 
-statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity depends on 
-'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
-example, \name{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the 
-formulation \formulation{Other persons have minds}, certainly depends on 
-\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-experience} will be true of the 
+statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity \term{depends} on 
+\term{non-experience}, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
+example, \enquote{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the 
+formulation \enquote{Other persons have minds}, certainly \term{depends} on 
+\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-ex\-per\-ience} will be true of the 
 associated name of any formulation of a belief. 
 
 In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of 
-non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
+non-ex\-per\-ience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
 \term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions 
-\term{non-experience} and \term{experience} (traditional). What I did not go on to 
+\term{non-experience} and experience (traditional). What I did not go on to 
 show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, 
 one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What 
 follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the 
 reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's 
-experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there 
+\term{experience} (used in my, \enquote{neutral}, sense unless I say otherwise). Could there 
 be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was 
 awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to 
 non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of 
 non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in 
-the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) 
+the last chapter.\footnote{Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) 
 justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it 
-without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were 
-just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience 
+without appealing to other beliefs.} If there could be, if such awareness were 
+just an experience, the distinctness of \term{experience} from experience 
 (traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience 
 (traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have 
 them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into 
-experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience 
+\term{experience}. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience 
 which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there 
 is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience 
 (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in 
-one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
-which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as 
-they are supposed to be understood. And for "understanding"
+one's \term{experience}---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
+which is \enquote{understanding the concepts} of non-experience and the rest as 
+they are supposed to be understood. And for \enquote{understanding}
 \term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its 
 referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an 
 experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and 
-non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an experience 
+non-referents) of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, which to name an experience 
 (traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 
-'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and \triquote{non-experience}; but here 
-one is, using "non-experience" and \triquote{non-experience} to say so (which 
+\term{non-experience}---and \enquote{\term{non-experience}}---and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}}; but here 
+one is, using \enquote{\term{non-experience}} and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}} to say so (which 
 certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible 
 for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the 
-concept of non-experience, it collapses. 
+concept of \term{non-experience}, it collapses. 
 
 (A final point for the expert. This 
 tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does 
 not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot 
 name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences 
-about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that 
+about names, which show contradictions---that one must not assume that 
 one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say 
-so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) 
+so (does assume it)---with explicit stratification.) 
 
 My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
 what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about 
 experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken 
-as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' 
-(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
+as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \enquote{experience} 
+(traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
 said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is 
-a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' 
-(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" 
+a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \enquote{experience} 
+(traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest, it shows that one who \enquote{accepts} 
 the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent 
 desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no 
 explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the 
@@ -650,13 +672,13 @@ experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a
 formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is 
 not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is 
 an important point about method which should be brought out. If all 
-"non-experiential language", "belief language", is inconsistent, how can I 
+\enquote{non-experiential language}, \enquote{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I 
 show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer 
 is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into 
 contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I 
 want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we 
-have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of 
-beliefs are false'. 
+have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as \enquote{all formulations of 
+beliefs are false}. 
 
 Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about 
 belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is 
@@ -672,22 +694,22 @@ to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one
 who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that 
 it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an 
 expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some 
-way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. 
+way. Now there is another important point about \enquote{method} to be made. 
 The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one 
-can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
+can \enquote{know}, be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
 The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of 
 the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. 
 (Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the 
 way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like 
-being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to 
-be a "table"".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
+being aware with respect to a table, \enquote{that in my language, this is to be said to 
+be a \enquote{table}}.) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
 a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its 
 referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this 
 belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be 
 discussed here. 
 
-The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes, 
-but...' thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
+The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes, 
+but...} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
 formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of 
 linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if 
 embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how 
@@ -699,150 +721,130 @@ rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be
 impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these 
 matters. 
 
-
-\clearpage
-
-
-2/22/1963 
-
-
-Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate 
-against Lincoln Center, February 22, 
-
-
-1963 
-(photo by Jack Smith)
-
-\clearpage
-
-
-\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-
-
 \subsection*{Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts}
 
-
 In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by 
-discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be 
+discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be 
 talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of 
 the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will 
-not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
-"common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
+not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
+\enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
 relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I 
 discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
 
-I should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed 
-to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
-non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
+I should say immediately that \enquote{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed 
+to refer to \enquote{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
+non-experience}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
 This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one 
-does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having 
-beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for "belief" in the 
+does or does not \enquote{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having 
+beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \enquote{belief} in the 
 use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of 
-the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an 
-experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of 
-consciously having a belief", of what is "in one's head" when one says that 
-one "believes a certain thing". Further, I will, for convenience in 
-distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief "that others have minds", for example, 
-or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation 
+the last part. Now when I speak of a \enquote{belief} I will be speaking of an 
+experience, what might be said to be \enquote{an act of consciously believing, of 
+consciously having a belief}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that 
+one \enquote{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in 
+distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \enquote{that others have minds}, for example, 
+or in general of belief \enquote{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation 
 marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be 
-"about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
-about experiences; I will not be trying to talk "about the realm of 
-non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already 
+\enquote{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
+about experiences; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of 
+non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already 
 fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has 
 any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his 
-"beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously 
-believing', although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
+\enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{act of consciously 
+believing}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
 What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, 
-use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
+use of a word (\enquote{belief}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
 rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
 
 There is a further point about terminology. The reader should 
-remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that 
-perceptions are in the mind", one can make a distinction between mental 
+remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \enquote{that 
+perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental 
 and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
-one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
-going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For 
+one's eyes closed, and a \enquote{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
+going to say that visualizations and the like are \enquote{imagined-experiences}. For 
 example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an 
-"imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by 
-"imagined" I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I 
-use "imagined" because saying 'mental-table-experience" is too much like 
-saying "table in the mind" and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way 
+\enquote{imagined-visual-table-experience}. The reader should not suppose that by 
+\enquote{imagined} I mean that the experiences are 
+\enquote{hallucinations}, are \enquote{unreal}. I 
+use \enquote{imagined} because saying \enquote{mental-table-experience} is too much like 
+saying \enquote{table in the mind} and because just using \enquote{visualization} leaves no way 
 of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
-an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
+an \enquote{imagined-table-experience} seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
 a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
-experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of 
-a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
+experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \enquote{of 
+a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
 like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). In other words, an 
-imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it 
+imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a \enquote{valid} experience, all right, but it 
 is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
-(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
+(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \enquote{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
 imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this 
 terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the 
 conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by 
-saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". 
+saying that they are imaginings \enquote{of one or another non-mental experiences}. 
 
-I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, 
-not perceived by oneself, behind one now", or anything else. Well, in the 
+I can at last ask what one does when one believes \enquote{that there is a table, 
+not perceived by oneself, behind one now}, or anything else. Well, in the 
 first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an 
 imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization 
 of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed 
 statement, such as \lexpression{There is a table behind me}. This is not all one does, 
 however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said 
-to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The 
-additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" 
+to be a \enquote{belief} (a point about the explication of my \enquote{belief}). The 
+additional, \enquote{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \enquote{attitude} 
 toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe 
 that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief 
 about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
 other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental 
-action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not 
-be, at all like the claim "that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
-correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The 
-question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise 
+action. Now the claim that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving} is not, could not 
+be, at all like the claim \enquote{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
+correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}. The 
+question of \enquote{what is going on in the realm of non-experience} does not arise 
 here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, 
 the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is 
-"consciously, deliberately" self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I 
-don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
-is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the 
+\enquote{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \enquote{self-deception experience}. I 
+don't have to \enquote{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
+is going on in the realm of non-experience}; when I have described the 
 attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good 
-explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". 
+explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
 
 I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one 
 is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as 
-mentioned above. The attitude is "peripheral", is a matter of the way one is 
-atttentive. Saying that the attitude is "conscious, deliberate", is a little 
+mentioned above. The attitude is \enquote{peripheral}, is a matter of the way one is 
+attentive. Saying that the attitude is \enquote{conscious, deliberate}, is a little 
 strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am 
-trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception 
+trying to say is that it is not an \enquote{objective} or \enquote{subconscious} self-deception 
 such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This 
 is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the 
 inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; 
-with respect to English the attitude is a "vague, elusive" thing, very difficult 
+with respect to English the attitude is a \enquote{vague, elusive} thing, very difficult 
 to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by 
-saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think 
-I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the 
+saying that it is the attitude \enquote{that such and such} (the reader must not think 
+I mean the belief \enquote{that such and such}). If the experience to which the 
 attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the 
-self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a 
-(non-mental) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief "that there is 
-a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
+self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{that the imagined-x-experience is a 
+(non-mental) x-experience}. As an example, consider the belief \enquote{that there is 
+a table behind one}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
 expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an 
 imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself 
 (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving 
-attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
-to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
+attitude \enquote{that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
+to a table}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
 a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
-an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not 
-inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that 
-one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked 
-the question, one stops believing "that there is a table behind one" and starts 
-believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
-non-experience", a different matter (different belief). 
+an imagined-experience but \enquote{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not 
+inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \enquote{that 
+one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience}; secondly, when one is asked 
+the question, one stops believing \enquote{that there is a table behind one} and starts 
+believing \enquote{that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
+non-experience}, a different matter (different belief). 
 
 lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression 
 (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), 
-the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a 
-referent". With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's 
+the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{that the expression has a 
+referent}. With respect to the belief \enquote{that there is a table behind one}, one's 
 attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \expression{There is a table 
 behind me}, pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and 
-one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent". 
+one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{that this name has a referent}. 
 Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of 
 beliefs. 
 
@@ -850,11 +852,11 @@ beliefs.
 the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the 
 version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving 
 language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an 
-imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in 
+imagined-x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an x-experience, whereas in 
 the version involving language, the attention is on something which is 
-"regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). 
-For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove", and 
-correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs 
+\enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). 
+For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{that the reality is at one remove}, and 
+correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs 
 doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
 referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make 
 believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in 
@@ -864,7 +866,7 @@ one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one
 has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the 
 version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the 
 thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving 
-"language" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a 
+\enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a 
 referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, 
 which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does 
 so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the 
@@ -882,67 +884,67 @@ attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief.
 
 Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather 
 unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of 
-"attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
+\enquote{attitudes}, then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
 something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it 
-to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive", so that I am 
-calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to 
+to be a \enquote{belief}; this something is \enquote{peripheral and elusive}, so that I am 
+calling the something an \enquote{attitude}, the most appropriate way in English to 
 speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the 
 experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
-"self-deceiving", is a "(conscious) self-deception experience", because when 
+\enquote{self-deceiving}, is a \enquote{(conscious) self-deception experience}, because when 
 aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just 
-about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere 
+about has to be a (\enquote{conscious}) self-deception experience to transform mere 
 taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to 
-be a "belief". The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
-"self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of 
-the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be 
+be a \enquote{belief}. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
+\enquote{self-deceiving} is to be made without trying to think \enquote{about the relation of 
+the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience}, to do which would be 
 to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which 
 would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is 
 to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more 
-than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving". 
+than to say that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
 
 In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention 
-some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, 
+some things often associated with believing but not \enquote{essential} to it. First, 
 one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the 
 one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and 
-believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing 
+believes \enquote{that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing 
 table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so 
 believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in 
-believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence 
-for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation 
+believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be "evidence 
+for, confirmation of, one's belief} (more will be said about confirmation 
 shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic 
-expression 'x', one may give attention to a referent of 
-'imagined-x(-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to 
+expression "x", one may give attention to a referent of 
+"imagined-x(-experience)", an \enquote{imagined-referent} of "x"; or to 
 imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
-"analogous to the referent of 'x'". In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
+\enquote{analogous to the referent of "x"}. In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
 mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be 
 to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is 
 visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 
-'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-y-experiences 
+"There being a table behind one". An example of imagined-y-experiences 
 (such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
-"analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
-beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
-Being". 
+\enquote{analogous to referents}, in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
+beliefs \enquote{about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
+Being}. 
 
-Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", 
-"arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate 
+Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical \enquote{justifications}, 
+\enquote{arguments}, for them, \enquote{defenses} of them. I will not bother to explicate 
 the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong 
 with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would 
 show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language 
 and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested 
 before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the 
 justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive 
-justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be 
+justification, the kind involving the citing of experience supposed to be 
 evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical 
 assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them 
 inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has 
-four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that") any other table has four 
+four legs; therefore (\enquote{it is more probable that}) any other table has four 
 legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it 
 superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, 
 argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can 
 show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, 
 weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to 
 believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, 
-then one already had the belief "implicitly" (it was a conjunct of a belief 
+then one already had the belief \enquote{implicitly} (it was a conjunct of a belief 
 one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. 
 
 I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions 
@@ -950,24 +952,24 @@ my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material,
 I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my 
 position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, 
 and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it 
-is ironic that 'disbeliever', without qualification, has been used by believers 
+is ironic that "disbeliever", without qualification, has been used by believers 
 as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some 
-belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the 
-existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to 
+belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny \enquote{the 
+existence of non-experience}, to \enquote{cause non-experiences to vanish}, so to 
 speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental 
-experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
-is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either 
+experiences, \enquote{perceived objects}. My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
+is not, for example, the belief \enquote{that there is a realm where there could either 
 be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are 
-inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere 
-"decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies 
-"the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
-of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", 
+inadequate for finding which is the case.} My position is not a mere 
+\enquote{decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}. The philosopher who denies 
+\enquote{the existence of non-experiences}, or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
+of any belief, or who merely \enquote{decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}, 
 has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. 
 
 What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of 
 beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In 
 the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions 
-dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect them 
+dependent on "non-experience", and pointed out that those who expect them 
 to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting 
 the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have 
 described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the 
@@ -976,21 +978,21 @@ To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right
 philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief 
 one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
+\subsection*{Chapter 6 --- Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
 
 In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
 given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
 I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just 
 what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the 
-entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
-least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, 
+entire \enquote{history of world thought}, the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
+least partly \enquote{systems of knowledge} which constitute it, Platonism, 
 psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, 
 phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, 
 comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each 
 with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, 
 associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not 
-hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential 
-language", and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
+hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how \enquote{non-experiential 
+language}, and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
 always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and 
 belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter 
 of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an 
@@ -1001,76 +1003,76 @@ what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are
 incomplete and confused. 
 
 What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a 
-few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of "knowledge"; 
+few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of \enquote{knowledge}; 
 have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are 
 thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so 
-"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as 
+\enquote{basic} (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as 
 too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if 
 they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
 The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
-these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's 
+these beliefs, that not having them is not \enquote{inconsistent} with one's 
 experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
 of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
 of not having it. 
 
-Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered", beliefs 
-formulated in "natural laws", beliefs "about substance", and the like. 
-Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived 
-world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
-beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is 
-("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
-non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is associated with beliefs 
-"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the 
-world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
-"perceived world" is not part of what is "essential" in these beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
+Consider beliefs to the effect \enquote{that the world is ordered}, beliefs 
+formulated in \enquote{natural laws}, beliefs \enquote{about substance}, and the like. 
+Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's \enquote{perceived 
+world} is not \enquote{chaotic}, is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
+beliefs \enquote{that the world is ordered} I do not say that his \enquote{perceived world} is 
+(\enquote{subjectively}) chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
+non-strange character of one's \enquote{perceived world} is associated with beliefs 
+\enquote{about substance} and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not \enquote{the 
+world being ordered}; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
+\enquote{perceived world} is not part of what is \enquote{essential} in these beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of \enquote{spatio-temporal} beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
 After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from 
-oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict 
+oneself? Of course one can \enquote{watch oneself wave one's hand} (in a non-strict 
 sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
-formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave 
-one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are spatially 
-distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a 
-visual---"moving"---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
+formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can \enquote{watch oneself wave 
+one's hand} (in the non-strict sense) does not imply \enquote{that there are spatially 
+distant, and past and future events}; and although experiences such as a 
+visual---\enquote{moving}---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
 beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
-Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring" may 
-seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", 
+Rejection of beliefs \enquote{about the objectivity of linguistic referring} may 
+seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a \enquote{table}, 
 doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
 things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
-slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should 
+slightest intention of saying that it is a \enquote{non-table}? The reader should 
 observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs 
-"about the objectivity of referring", but they are not "objective referring"; 
+\enquote{about the objectivity of referring}, but they are not \enquote{objective referring}; 
 and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
 
-Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
-have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other 
-humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
-rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived 
-other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
-associated with the belief "that others have minds", but it is not "other 
-humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
-part of what is essential in believing "that others have minds", points I 
+Rejection of the belief \enquote{that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
+have minds} my seem to lead to a problem. After all, \enquote{perceived other 
+humans} talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
+rejecting the belief \enquote{that others have minds} I do not deny that \enquote{perceived 
+other humans} talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
+associated with the belief \enquote{that others have minds}, but it is not \enquote{other 
+humans having minds}; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
+part of what is essential in believing \enquote{that others have minds}, points I 
 anticipated in the second chapter. 
 
 Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of 
-temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form "If \x, then \y\ 
-will follow in the future", especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is 
+temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form \enquote{If \x, then \y\ 
+will follow in the future}, especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is 
 something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the 
 switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear 
-"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge". They say, 
-for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
-and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the 
-light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
+\enquote{that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge}. They say, 
+for example, \enquote{that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
+and drink water, or one won't live}. Now \enquote{one's throwing the switch and the 
+light's coming on} (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
 with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
-not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not 
-part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the 
-light will come on". As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about 
-the necessity of such knowledge for survival", it is just more beliefs of the 
+not imply \enquote{that there are past or future events}, and taking note of it is not 
+part of what is essential in the belief \enquote{that if one throws the switch, then the 
+light will come on}. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe \enquote{about 
+the necessity of such knowledge for survival}, it is just more beliefs of the 
 same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt 
 dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows 
 how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. 
-Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" 
+Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to \enquote{save} 
 beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
 
 By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their 
@@ -1100,9 +1102,9 @@ result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use
 English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
 associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
 among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
-always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to 
+always been used that way, except by a few \enquote{metaphysicians}. I have had to 
 so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
-the introduction of my use of "experience" in the third chapter. Thus, some 
+the introduction of my use of \enquote{experience} in the third chapter. Thus, some 
 of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
 for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
 book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
@@ -1111,7 +1113,7 @@ experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and
 which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
 announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
 
-It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I 
+It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I 
 was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be 
 understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented 
 my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This 
@@ -1123,11 +1125,11 @@ be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually
 get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by 
 suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than 
 beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English 
-in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to 
+in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!) to 
 learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
 unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
-\subsection*{Chapter 7 : Summary}
+\subsection*{Chapter 7 --- Summary}
 
 The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
 am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
@@ -1141,15 +1143,15 @@ supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This
 statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in 
 connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that 
 my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible 
-argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain 
-unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to "doubt, question" it, or 
-to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not 
+argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to \enquote{remain 
+unconvinced} of the rightness of my position, or to \enquote{doubt, question} it, or 
+to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can \enquote{question} (not 
 believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief 
-to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the 
+to be \enquote{skeptical} of my position in the sense of believing \enquote{that although the 
 position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is 
-objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
+objectively wrong}.) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
 reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less 
-credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a 
+credulous. If one \enquote{questions my position} then one is misconstruing it as a 
 belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to 
 decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or 
 the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to 
@@ -1163,11 +1165,11 @@ Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without
 beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for 
 example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. 
 Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to 
-be "true or false", to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
-to believe something, for example, to believe "that there is a table behind 
-you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
-continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing 
-yourself with your back to a table"), you are going to have to have the 
+be \enquote{true or false}, to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
+to believe something, for example, to believe \enquote{that there is a table behind 
+you}. Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
+continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, \enquote{visualizing 
+yourself with your back to a table}), you are going to have to have the 
 attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, 
 deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going 
 to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
@@ -1183,9 +1185,9 @@ you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my
 language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to 
 do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the 
 complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to 
-be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language"); if you 
+be flawless to unquestionably discredit \enquote{non-experiential language}); if you 
 don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just 
-ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
+ignore the book, and \enquote{justify} your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
 about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not 
 therefore valueless. 
 
@@ -1193,17 +1195,17 @@ So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having
 beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete 
 transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter 
 position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, 
-"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
-proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical 
-problems (for example, "Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
-impossible?", "Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
-capable of intersubjective verification?") arising from them? And again, one 
+\enquote{obvious}? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
+proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the \enquote{profound} philosophical 
+problems (for example, \enquote{Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
+impossible?}, \enquote{Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
+capable of intersubjective verification?}) arising from them? And again, one 
 begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is 
-wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be "Why 
+wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be \enquote{Why 
 bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving 
-myself". Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
+myself}. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
 And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one 
-"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
+\enquote{naturally} tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
 (that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, 
 since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts 
 which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived.