% chapter i \defpnote{0.1}{A.N. Whitehead, \bt{Process and Reality} (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 63.} \defpnote{0,2}{W.H. Walsh, \et{Plato and the Philosophy of History: History and Theory in the Republic,} \jt{History and Theory} (The Hague: Mouton \& Co., 1962), II, 1, pp. 1--16.} \defpnote{0.3}{K.R. Popper, \bt{The Open Society and its Enemies} (2 vols.; 2\tss{nd} ed. rev.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).} \defpnote{0.4}{Walsh, op. cit., p. 6.} \defpnote{0.5}{See, for example. R.L. Nettleship, \bt{Lectures on the Republic of Plato } (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), and E. Barker, \bt{Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle} (New York: Dover Publications, Imnc., 1959). Both of these authors make slight reference to the \bt{Timaeus} while discussing Plato's \dq{Political Philosophy.}} \defpnote{0.6}{R.G. Bury, \et{Plato and History,} \jt{Classical Quarterly,} New Series, 1--2, pp. 86--94.} \defpnote{0.7}{Edward MacKinnon, S.J., \et{Time in Contemporary Physics,} \jt{International Philosophical Quarterly,} II, 3, (September, 1962), p. 429.} \defpnote{0.8}{Hermann Gauss, \bt{Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos}, vol. III part 2 (Bern: Herbart Lang, 1961)} \defpnote{0.9}{Bertrand Russell, \bt{Mysticism and Logic} (Garden City, New York: Doubleday \& Co., 1917). } \defpnote{0.10}{Whitehead, loc, cit.} \defpnote{0.11}{Werner Heisenberg, \bt{Physics and Philosophy} (New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1955), ch. 4.} \defpnote{0.12}{See, for example. F.M. Cornford, \bt{From Religion to Philosophy} (New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1957).} \defpnote{0.13}{F.M. Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1937), p. 8.} \defpnote{0.14}{Carl G. Hempel, \et{Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science,} \bt{International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science}, vols. I and IT; \ul{Foundations of the Unity of Science} vol. II, no. 7 (University of Chicago Press, 1952)} \defpnote{0.15}{Hans Meyerhoff, ed., \bt{The Philosophy of History in Our Time} (New York: Doubleday \& Co., 1959), which contains a valuable anthology of the important authors in this field and some of their most representative views.} % chapter ii \defpnote{1.1}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary on Plato's Timaeus} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 4.} \defpnote{1.2}{F.M. Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, p. viii.} \defpnote{1.3}{Werner Jaeger, \bt{Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture} (3 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), II, pp. 77--78. } \defpnote{1.4}{Ibid., p. 78.} \defpnote{1.5}{Ibid., p. 79.} \defpnote{1.6}{C.F. Hermann, \bt{Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie} (Heidelberg: 1839), in Jaeger, op. cit., p. 79} \defpnote{1.7}{Jaeger, op. cit., p. 79.} \defpnote{1.8}{Ibid., p. 80.} \defpnote{1.9}{Theodor Gompers, \bt{Greek Thinkers}, trans. G.G. Berry (London: John Murray, 1905).} \defpnote{1.10}{Ibid., p. 275.} \defpnote{1.11}{Ibid., p. 278.} \defpnote{1.12}{Ibid.} \defpnote{1.13}{Ibid., pp. 279, 283.} \defpnote{1.14}{Ibid., p. 284.} \defpnote{1.15}{Ibid., p. 285.} \defpnote{1.16}{Ibid.} \defpnote{1.17}{Ibid., p. 286.} \defpnote{1.18}{Ibid., p. 287.} \defpnote{1.19}{Jaeger, loc. cit.} \defpnote{1.20}{L. Campbell, \et{Plato,} \bt{Encyclopaedia Britannica,} 11\tss{th} ed., Vol. XXI, pp. 808--824.} \defpnote{1.21}{Ibid., p. 810.} \defpnote{1.22}{Ibid.} \defpnote{1.23}{Ibid.} \defpnote{1.24}{U.V. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, \bt{Platon}, I, (2\tss{nd} ed.; Berlin: Weidman, 1920), in Jaeger, op. cit., p. 80.} \defpnote{1.25}{Jaeger, op. cit., p. 84.} \defpnote{1.26}{A.E. Taylor, \et{Plato,} \bt{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, XVIII (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1957), p. 49.} \defpnote{1.27}{Ibid.} \defpnote{1.28}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 4.} \defpnote{1.29}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work} (6\tss{th} ed.; 5\tss{th} print.; New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p. 346} \defpnote{1.30}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 4.} \defpnote{1.31}{Constantin Ritter, \bt{The Essence of Plato's Philosophy}, trans. Adam Alles (London: George Allen \& Unwin, Ltd., 1933).} \defpnote{1.32}{W. Lutoslawski, \bt{Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic} (New York: Longmans, 1928.)} \defpnote{1.33}{John Burnet, \bt{Greek Philosophy} (London: Macmillan \& Co., Ltd., 1914), Part I, p. 212.} \defpnote{1.34}{Cornford, op, cit.} \defpnote{1.35}{Wilamowitz, \bt{Platon}, I, p. 591, in Jaeger, op. cit., p. 8O.} \defpnote{1.36}{Constantin Ritter, \bt{Neue Untersuchungen uber Platon} (Munich: 1910), p. 181.} \defpnote{1.37}{Ritter, \bt{The Essence of Plato's Philosophy}, p. 9.} \defpnote{1.38}{Ibid., p. 27.} \defpnote{1.39}{Ibid., pp. 29--30.} \defpnote{1.40}{G.C. Field, \bt{Plato and His Contemporaries: A Study in Fourth-Century Life and Thought} (London: Methuen \& Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 68.} \defpnote{1.41}{Ross has summarized these results in tabular form: see Appendix A.} \defpnote{1.42}{A.E. Taylor, \et{Plato,} \bt{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, pp. 48--64.} \defpnote{1.43}{Field, op. cit., p. 4.} \defpnote{1.44}{According to Field, Plato's benefactor was Archytas (Field, op. cit., p. 16), but according to Gompers it was Anniceria (Gompers, op. cit., p. 261).} \defpnote{1.45}{Field, op. cit., p. 18.} \defpnote{1.46}{Gompers, op, cit., p. 261.} \defpnote{1.47}{Ritter, \bt{The Essence of Plato's Philosophy}, pp. 21--22.} \defpnote{1.48}{Ibid., p. 22.} \defpnote{1.49}{Ibid., p. 23.} \defpnote{1.50}{Ibid.} \defpnote{1.51}{Ibid., p. 24.} \defpnote{1.52}{Ibid., p. 25.} \defpnote{1.53}{Ibid., pe 26.} \defpnote{1.54}{Ibid., p. 27.} \defpnote{1.55}{Ritter op. cit., pp. 329 ff.; \bt{Untersuchungen uber Platon} (Stutheeres 1888), pp. 88 ff.} \defpnote{1.56}{J. Harward, \bt{The Platonic Epistles} (Cambridge: The University Press, 1932).} \defpnote{1.57}{Harward, op, cit., p. 60.} \defpnote{1.58}{B. Jowett, \bt{The Dialogues of Plato} (3\tss{rd} ed.; New York: Scribner, Armstrong, \& Co., 1878) preface.} \defpnote{1.59}{H.T. Karsten, \bt{De Epistolis quae feruntur Platonicis} (Utrecht: 1864), in Harward, op, cit., p. 61.} \defpnote{1.60}{Harward, op. cit., pp. 71--72.} \defpnote{1.61}{Field, op. cit., p. 16.} \defpnote{1.62}{Harward, op. cit., p. 76.} \defpnote{1.63}{Ibid., pp. 86--96.} \defpnote{1.64}{Ibid., p. 86.} \defpnote{1.65}{Ritter, \bt{Neue Untersuchungen uber Platon}, p. 408.} \defpnote{1.66}{\bt{Tusc, Disp.} V, 35, in Harward, op. cit., p. 189.} \defpnote{1.67}{Harward, op. cit., p. 192.} \defpnote{1.68}{Not \e{learned.} Plato is talking about the communication of philosophy, not the stating of it, nor the acquisition of it, but the process in which, so to speak, philosophy happens.} \defpnote{1.69}{See the Cave Allegory of the \bt{Republic} 507.} \defpnote{1.70}{i.e., it is in all probability not a posthumous edition.} % ch iii % ch iv \defpnote{2.1}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work}, p. 2.} \defpnote{2.2}{Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, p. 2.} \defpnote{2.3}{Gauss, \bt{Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos}, p. 157} \defpnote{2.4}{Cornford, op. cit., appendix, p. 365.} \defpnote{2.5}{P. Frutiger, \bt{Les Myths de Platon}, (Paris: 1930), pp. 244 ff.} \defpnote{2.6}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 14.} \defpnote{2.7}{Q. Lauer, S.J., \et{The Being of Non-Being in Plato's Sophist} (unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham University).} \defpnote{2.8}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 8.} \defpnote{2.9}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work}, p. 440.} \defpnote{2.10}{Cf., V.J. Gioscia, \et{A Perspective for Role Theory,} \jt{The American Catholic Sociological Review,} XXII, 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff.} \defpnote{2.11}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 24.} \defpnote{2.12}{Ibid., p. 28.} \defpnote{2.13}{Ibid., p. 30.} \defpnote{2.14}{Ibid., pp. 31--32.} \defpnote{2.15}{R.D. Archer-Hind, \bt{Commentary on the Timaeus}, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1888), p. 86, n, 14.} \defpnote{2.16}{T.T. Taylor, \bt{The Timaeus and Critias of Plato}, (Washington: Pantheon Books Inc., 1952), p. 112. } \defpnote{2.17}{Ibid., p. 17.} \defpnote{2.18}{Bury, \bt{Plato and History},\ednote{book or essay?} p. 5.} \defpnote{2.19}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 73.} \defpnote{2.20}{Ibid.} \defpnote{2.21}{Ibid., p. 74.} \defpnote{2.22}{Ibid.} \defpnote{2.23}{Ibid., p. 19.} \defpnote{2.24}{Cornford, op. cit., p. x.} \defpnote{2.25}{Ibid., pp. 11--12.} % ch 5 \defpnote{3.1}{Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, p. 31.} \defpnote{3.2}{One is tempted to restore the hiatus which Cornford habitually tries to remove as \dq{intolerable.} Then the passage would read, \dq{he desired that all things should come as near as possible to being, like himself.}} \defpnote{3.3}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 37.} \defpnote{3.4}{Ibid., p. 78.} \defpnote{3.5}{T.T. Taylor, \bt{The Timaeus and Critias of Plato}, pp. 29 ff.} \defpnote{3.6}{e.g., Alexandre Koyre, \bt{From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe}, (New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1958).} \defpnote{3.7}{E.R. Dodds, \bt{The Greeks and the Irrational} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).} \defpnote{3.8}{George S. Claghorn, \bt{Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's \sq{Timaeus}} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 87.} \defpnote{3.9}{Cornford, op, cit., p. 59.} \defpnote{3.10}{Ibid., p. 61.} \defpnote{3.11}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 128.} \defpnote{3.12}{Cornford, loc. cit., "Kinds" is a peculiar expression which is repeated here only to assure an accurate representation of Cornford's view.} \defpnote{3.13}{T.T. Taylor, op. cit., \et{Introduction.}} \defpnote{3.14}{According to T.T. Taylor, loc. cit.} \defpnote{3.15}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, Appendix.} \defpnote{3.16}{Heisenberg, \bt{Physics and Philosophy}, ch. 4. See also MacKinnon, \bt{Time in Contemporary Physics}, pp. 428--457.} \defpnote{3.17}{Dodds, op. cit.} \defpnote{3.18}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 113.} \defpnote{3.19}{A.E. Taylor, Cornford, Archer-Hind, Bury.} \defpnote{3.20}{Cornford has \dq{So.}} \defpnote{3.21}{Cornford, op. cit.} \defpnote{3.22}{They do not really wander; see \bt{Laws} 822a.} \defpnote{3.23}{Cornford has \dq{circuits.}} CHAPTER VI TIME AND SOCIETY While it has not escaped the attention of the scholars whose interest leads them to the Timaeus that its doctrine of Time is inseparable from the doctrine of the eternal model, the purpose or role of Plato's Time image is frequently overlooked. ! Similarly, while it is true that Plato fashions his image of Time with great care and is conscious throughout his formulation of a desire not to distort the ineffable while yet speaking of it, it seems that insufficient attention has been paid to the relevance of the introductory remarks in the opening section of the Gialogue to this image, and the relation of these remarks to Plato's doctrine of Time. To rectify this oversight, it is only necessary to recall the opening passages of the Timaeus where Socrates had agreed to the plans which Timaeus and Critias had made for their talk: Timaeus intends to describe the origin of the Universe and to carry on his account until it had reached the time when man made his appearance; thereafter, Critias intends to take up the account and to describe ' For example, in his chapter on the doctrine of the Timaeus, Ross (W.D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951).) discusses the role of Time not at all. ancient Athens; both of these accounts are to be given so that Socrates may fulfill his wish to hear an account of a real city, not an imaginary one; not a tale of "some noble creatures in a painting, or perhaps of real animals, alive but motionless" but an account of real creatures, "in motion, and actively exercising the powers promised by their form" (19c). In this way, Plato gently suggests that the power to describe the actual origins of the best society are beyond Socrates, and it must be the task of others to supply it. This is the meaning of the obviously inadequate recapitulation of the doctrines of the Republic, which are mUch too briefly summarized in the opening passages of the Timaeus. There is no need to look for deeper or more arcane meanings in Socrates' confession of inability to construct such an account; it is not the absence of opinion on Socrates part, as it was in the Theatetus. In the Timaeus, Socrates does not say that he is "only" an opinionless midwife who must deliver the philosophical offspring of those pregnant with the truth; on the contrary, he says quite openly that he is not up to the task, and that the power to tell such a story is beyond him. It has been generally agreed among the scholars that the opening passages of the Timaeus "recapitulate" the Republic, © and most of those who do not agree on the order of the 2 Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar zu_ den Dialogen Platos, p. Le dialogues as they have been described in chapter II agree that the Timaeus must be later than the Republic for this interpretative reason. And it has long been agreed that the Republic is the work in which Plato reveals a political philosophy, or, as we call it, a philosophy of society. But if we take separate conclusions, on which the scholars agree, and, if we attempt to see them in relation to each other, we shall arrive at a simple and yet, to the best of my knowledge, an uncommon conclusion. If (1) 1t is true that the Republic is a dialogue in which Plato has attempted to see the powers of the soul "writ large," that is, if the Republic is a dialogue in which the state is seen as a magnification of the soul; and, together with this, 4f (2) we see that the Timaeus is a dialogue in which the "alive but motionless," society of the Republic is recapitulated, and, if we add to this (3) the fact that the Timaeus first develops a doctrine of Time before setting out the details of the best form of society, we may draw a startling conclusion; Plato has made the doctrine of Time the basis of a new Platonic sociology. Where the Republic describes a State based on the view that only the eternal is real and all else is mere becoming, the Timaeus describes a society based on the perfection which Time confers on the discordant motions of a primordial chaos. Plato has 3 Jowett, Ihe Dialogues of Plato, II, pp. 456~7. shifted the basis of his sociology from the eternal to the temporal; no longer is it his view that the realms of eternity and becoming are separated by an unbridgeable chasm; now, in the Timaeus, through the gradual process we described in Chapter II, Plato has arrived at the formulation of a doctrine in which Time is, so to speak, the bridge between these two realms. But this image of Time as a bridge falls short of Plato's meaning. It would be better to say that the Universe which the Timaeus reveals is a proportional unity of many levels, and that Time is the proportion between eternal being and incessant becoming. But further, it is necessary to recall that Plato does not use this sort of intellectually precise language; he prefers to say that Time is the moving image of eternity, because the richness and allegorical suggestiveness of the phrase "moving image" captures two very different levels of meaning, i.e., both the ineffable truth of the eternal model of the Universe, and the magnificent beauty of the concrete relations within the visible Universe. To the best of my knowledge, Bury is the only writer who has seen that the Republic is Plato's first Philosophy of History, and that in the Timaeus Plato modifies this view. But Bury nevertheless concludes that there has been 4 Bury, "Plato and History," p. 5. () no growth of Plato's doctrine, and that the conclusions of the Timgeus are implicit in the views stated in the Republic, This seems to stretch the meaning of the term "implicit" beyond reasonable bounds, for, on this basis, we should have to conclude that Plato's movement from an eternal basis to a temporal basis is no development, but merely an explication of former views. It is difficult to see how one can say that the basis of society in one dialogue is eternity and the basis of society in another dialogue is Time, and that the one view is "4mplicit" in the other. Similarly, it 1s hard to see the grounds for A.E. Taylor's assertion that the Timaeus is only an introduction to the Critias, since, as we said above, such a view would so linearize Plato's philosophy that we should have to view the Laws as the only source of Plato's mature philosophy. One should not ignore the early works of a genius such as Plato when one reads his later works, since this procedure deprives one of the measure of the man and the gradual maturity which he was able to reveal in his late writings. It seems to us more reasonable to follow Cornford into the opinion that the Timaeus was the first of a projected trilogy of dialogues, which were to have revealed Plato's reflections concerning the basis of the best possible form of society, after a life-long concern for this subject. If it 1s true that Plato's Sicilian adventures were of such a nature as to discourage and disillusion the great man from his life-long hopes to bring about good government, we should expect to see bitterness and pessimism in the works written after these experiences. But we find no shallow despair in the Seventh Letter or in the Timaeus; rather we confront a dialogue which is written in a style especially designed to appeal to those whose philosophical training was not so arduous nor so disciplined as Plato's own. Plato does not become a disdainful elitist, nor is the Timaeus a children's allegory, written by a sour old grandfather, for there is a great deal in it which requires strenuous philosophical reflection and painstaking attention. Yet, even those without philosophical training and exacting logical skill can be moved by the poetry which Plato has made in the Timaeus. It is both a mature philosophy and a beautiful myth which seems to be designed as well for the elite philosopher as for the untutored statesman. | Thus it seems pointless to criticise the Timaeus as an uneven dialogue which skips about from the level of thought to the level of myth, and, on the basis of such a criticism, to prefer to look to other dialogues for more philosophical meanings because the style of earlier dialogues 4s more even and their philosophy more exactly stated. This is not unlike preferring to look in the pantry for the broom only because there is a light in the pantry, when, in fact, the broom is in a darker but more 'spacious room in the attic. If it is true that the Timaeus was written after Plato's later and more mature reflections on the requisites for the best possible society, as we tried to establish in the third chapter, one should not ook to the Republic for Plato's most mature doctrines of society. And yet those writers who wish to discuss Plato's philosophy of society as a philosophy of history or as a political philosophy seem more drawn to the Republic, and few of them go to the Timaeus as the source of Plato's teaching on this subject." This is not to complain that scholarly inattention plagues the Timaeus, for the Timaeus has not gone without @ great deal of comment by writers in almost every century in the West. Yet it has not been viewed as the dialogue in which Plato makes his most explicit statements on the basis for the best possible form of society, and no writer in the modern era has seen in it the culmination of Plato's gradual development beyond the doctrine of eternity in the Republic. And yet this seems to be precisely what Plato has done. This 1s not the place to examine and comment in detail on the elements which, according to Plato, would characterize the best form of society, since these ) Walsh, Plato and the Philosophy of History. See also Barker, Politica ought of Plato and istotle, Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic of Pilato, Popper, The Open Society and ite Bpentes, and numerous anthologies which present Plato's Republic but seldom if ever present the Timaeus. specifications are to be found in part in the Critias and in great detail in the Laws. It 1s not our purpose here to describe exhaustively Plato's later sociology. The issue here is the role of Plato's image of Time as a basis for his later sociology, insofar as this can be ascertained by a careful reading of the Timaeus in its chronological and doctrinal context. The Timaeus seems to be unequivocally clear on this issue, for Plato shows repeatedly in this dialogue that the basis for a sound understanding of his sociology is the role of Time in the nature of the Universe. Thus, betore Critias can accomplish his promise to furnish Socrates with an account of ancient Athens in her prime of social life, Timaeus speaks a monologue which comprises almost the entire work which bears his name. In the first half of the dialogue, which discusses the Universe insofar as it is due to the Work of Reason, Plato leads gradually and ineluctably to the basis of the rational perfections which are brought to the Universe by time. In the Republic the perfections of society derive from a participation of the state in eternal justice; in the Timaeus, society is perfected by ame, which brings order to chaos. The most serious objection to our conclusion is the claim that Plato only speaks of the gradual construction of the Universe as if it were gradually brought into existence, when his actual meaning remains hidden between the lines. A.E, Taylor adopts this view, when he says that Plato believes the Universe is eternal, and therefore it does not actually have a temporal character (Archer-Hind also holds this view). In short, Taylor claims that Plato described the Universe as if it were gradually brought into being because it would be easier for Plato's readers to comprehend his meaning in this way.° Happily, Plato himself seems to upset this view in the Timaeus, when he distinguishes quite carefully between the eternal and the becoming, between a false image and a genuine image, between a mere myth and a genuine myth. If the Timaeus were only a myth designed to create the appearance of the truth but not to reveal the actual truth, it would follow that Plato has cast his whole account of the origin of the Universe into the deceptively simple mold of orderly succession. But the discrepancy between the deliberately temporal image which Plato has created and the calm stillness of the eternal, which he recurrently describes, seems too wide to support the interpretation that Plato remained an eternalist in the midst of a temporalist account. ¢ It seems better to view Plato's statements about the temporality of the Universe as the basis of its perfection, 6 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, pp. 689 ff. f J.F. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), r tly says that A.E. Taylor errs here because of his adoption of Aristotle's notion of Time. and to reject the assertion that Plato's Universe is actually eternal even though he says it is temporal. But there is a deeper point, and it is this; to continue to distinguish so sharply between eternity and Time after reading the Timaeus is to miss a major doctrine of the Timaeus, which describes philosophically-mythologically the proportional relation between the realms of eternity and becoming, and to view the role of Time as the mediator between these realms, such that they are no longer as separate as they were described to be in the Republic, but are aspects of a proportionally united Universe. The assertion that Plato separates eternity and Time ignores Plato's description of their relation in the Timaeus, where Time is said to be the proportional unification of becoming and eternity. By viewing Plato's doctrine of Time as the "mediation" of becoming, one can reach the basis of Plato's late sociology, since Plato repeatedly has Timaeus say that the gradual origin of man must be sought in the gradual origin of the Universe, and it is precisely Timaeus' function to reveal Plato's doctrine of Time so that Critias can take up the account of man. To assert that Plato held a static view of the Universe but spoke of it as a gradual process, because he was unable to discuss the whole Universe at once, seems to misinterpret the crucial significance of Plato's definition of Time as an image. For the Image is the whole Universe, and, furthermore, it ia deliberately described as a moving image. As we have said repeatedly above, Plato was not unable to describe the whole Universe at once; he did so in an image, and while it is true that he gradually reveals the elements and aspects of the image in a serialized description, he nevertheless insists that the Universe is one image. In short, Plato no longer impales himself on the horns of a dilemma by separating eternity and Time; he has transcended such an impasse by describing a Universe which is both hierarchical and processual, yet neither in isolation. One may continue to dissect logically Plato's Universe into one part hierarchy and one part process, but it seems to see that it is the dissector and not Plato who s0 bifurcates the Platonic Universe. That is, one may analyze the Platonic Universe into logically discrete categories, and focus now on the hierarchic aspect and now on the processual aspect, but one can also say that Plato's Universe is a proportional unity in which the temporal hierarchy (or the hierarchical temporality) are concretely related. Thus one could reject A.E. Taylor's view that Plato believed the Universe to be eternal but described it as if it were temporal, so that Plato could communicate better to the philosophically ill-equipped. However, it should be borne in mind that the Timaeus does not itself contain a new sociology, but presents the basis for one, for we must look to the Critias and the Laws for the details of Plato's later view of society. It is our contention here that this later view is unintelligible oe without a sound interpretation of Plato's moving image of eternity. It follows that the entire basis of society and the communal life of man is not to be found completely within those aspects of the Universe which are due to the orderly perfections which derive from Time. For our analysis has stopped midway in the monologue of Timaeus; we have described, up to this point, only the works of reason, and have not presented any discussion of those aspects of the Universe which derive from necessity. Plato has not described the demiurge as absolutely omnipotent, for even the demiurge must attempt to persuade necessity, not force it, to yield to the urgings of Time and order.® The admission that Time itself is not all powerful, but must confront, so to speak, the cosmological inertia of necessity, serves to strengthen, not weaken, the 8 There are several aspects of Plato's discussion of Time and Society which bear a marked resemblance to some aspects of the philosophy of Anaximander, but a discription of these similarities and differences would require a lengthy discussion which would take us into the origin of Plato's doctrines, whereas it is only our purpose here to present and examine Plato's doctrine. For example, while it would be instructive to investigate the extent of Plato's indebtedness to Anaximande:''s dark saying about the reparation which things offer in Time for their injustices, (see, for example, John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (4th ed.; London: Adam and Charles Black; New York: Tne Macmillan Co., 1930), pp. 52-53.) it would necessitate more comment than we have room to present here. conclusion that Time brings perfection. Whereas it was once possible to say that Plato viewed the eternal as the only source of perfection and viewed the temporal realm of becoming as the source of imperfection, it now emerges that Plato has made a sharp distinction between incessant becoming, which is indeed less than perfect, and 'time, which brings perfection even to becoming. When becoming 1s ordered by Time it is no longer merely incessant, nor only a ceaseless and perpetual fluxion of chaotic changes, but an ordered motion which is perfected by Time, the source of orderly motion. Necessity belongs to mere becoming; Time belongs to reason and eternity. It follows that a society will be perfect insofar as it regards Time as the paradigm of its style of life, and that society will be imperfect insofar as it regards mere becoming as the model for its political flux. And these are exactly the doctrines which Plato develops in the Critias and the Laws. The Critias, as much as we have of it, describes the "mythical" kingdom of Atlantis, and we have a brief foretaste of this description in the opening passages of the Timaeus. In the third book of the Laws, we have what the moderns would call a philosophy of history, or, in other terms, what could well be described as an incipient philosophical anthropology. The third book of the Laws dwells at aveat length on the questions which we are now examining; it is concerned with "immense periods of Time" and "thousands of cities" which came to be and have now disappeared from memory, and puts the question to itself whether there may not be a discernible pattern in the rise and fall of these cities. Or, to see the matter from another point of view, one could point to the tenth book of the Laws where questions about what we might call divine providence are raised and discussed, in a context which is explicity temporal. Or again, one could cite quotation after quotation from almost any book of the Laws which would show that Plato was much interested in the relative durations of various things, from constitutions to kingdoms and from mountains to men. But these investigations must be left to another time when they can be treated with the exhaustive documentation they deserve. It has been our purpose to spell out in detail the reasons for adopting the view that there is a Platonic philosophy of time and that this philosophy is inseparable from Plato's concern for the best possible society. Before the final words are written, however, it seems appropriate to state a few opinions which have emerged during the course of this study. While it would be impossible to draw final conclusions about the relevance of Plato's philosophy of time to the intellectual pursuits of the modern world without at the same time presente ing a history of Platonic scholarship for all of the intervening years between Plato's era and our own, it is possible to state a few opinions which have been reached on this subject, providing caution is advised about the extent to which we may derive philosophical satisfaction from a careful reading of Plato's works. Perhaps the most persistent opinion which comes to mind concerning Plato's philosophy of time is the frequents ly stated view that the Greeks viewed the world as closed and that their view of history was in sharp contrast to our modern view of the open Universe. While it is not possible to state that this view of the Greek world as closed is without any foundation, it is not only possible but necessary to confront the closed view with the import of the doctrine of time which we find in the Timaeus. It is simply incorrect and therefore, unscholarly to repeat the naive eternalism of the Republic, if the Timaeus is as late a work as it seems to be. One should not continue to separate the eternal from the temporal after one has studied the Timaeus, and one could say with some accuracy that the whole import of the Timaeus has been to remove this intolerable dichotomy by revealing the manner of relation of these two aspects of the Universe. This is not to assert that Plato came in the end to a simple monism in which all things are merely becoming. As we have said repeatedly, time perfects becoming. But there is an ineluctable gradualism in the Universe the Timaeus describes which cannot be ignored, and, while it is true to say that our modern notion of process is 'richer by far and more concrete than ever a Greek could imagine, it 1s also true to say that there was some degree of openness in the Greek Universe and that it would be false to state simply that it was a closed world. The political implications of this openness deserve some attention although it is only possible to suggest some more obvious points here. If the Universe is closed and is in some way a completed whole, it becomes the business of the statesman to discern those Laws by which the Universe attains its style of perfection and to fashion human laws in such a way that human perfection is sought in copying the perfection of the Universe. In this way the constitution of the state should be only a copy and an imitation of the Universe. If, on the other hand, the Universe is open ard is in some way incomplete and unfinished, it becomes the business of the statesman to model his constitution as far as possible on the pertection of the Universe and thereafter to improvise and invent those measures which seem best under the circumstances. If such a statesman can be found, he will understand that the sources of imperfection are not solely derived from the failure of the citizens to model themselves on the eternal forms, but might result from the very incompletion of the statesman's actions. In other words, it follows from a completed world that its citizens must adjust themselves to its patterns; 4t follows from an incomplete world that its citizens play a part in its completion. It does not follow that the citizens of an incomplete world must live ina totalitarian regime where all law emanates from an elite few who claim to have discovered the basis of all law. To put the matter differently, it can be said that a closed Universe has no room for human innovation, whether it be political, scientific, or philosophical; the converse statement would read that only in an open Universe can the citizenry aspire to creative participation in the processes of the state. Unfortunately, this simple division of worlds into those that are closed and those that are open is not applicable to Plato's Universe, since it is a world in which there are eternal models as well as incomplete republics. Something of a similar view obtains in current anthropology in which one may read many statements to the effect that there are some basic exigencies of human nature which must be met in any culture, but that there are a number of ways in which cultures can set about handling these exigencies in their own respective styles. Plato's Universe is neither simply open or simply closed; nor does it suffice to say that it is both. The Platonic philosophy handles this question in a different way, for it describes a world in which there are stages of completion and degrees of openness. Thus for Plato it is possible to claim the best of both possible worlds, for he can assert that there are eternal models for human political action and that there are necessary innovations and inventions which the statesman must create. To the extent that the human invention resembles the temporal order which the Universe achieves, to that extent is it good. In other language, one can say that the Platonic conception of perfection which appears in the Timaeus is a gradualist notion, such that a thing is perfect if it is as good as it can be at a given time. Perfection then is a stage concept which refers itself inevitably to a basic pace at which perfec~ tion is achievable. In this way, one can see that the Platonic Universe is neither simply open nor simply closed, and that he who uses the paradigm "open or closed" really uses a spatial idea, not a temporal one, and is therefore guilty of a species of philosophical reductionism. The question is not whether the Universe is closed or open but whether there is in the Universe sufficient ground for the gradual attainment of perfection. Even this last statement seems to put perfection at the end of the process, whereas in fact it is possible to say in the Platonic idiom that a thing is as perfect as it can be while it is proceeding at its proper pace of attainment. In this way, one does not need to assert that perfection is attainable only in some otherworldly realm, or that only those things which have achieved release from the quagmire of time have entered into eternity. On the contrary, those things which have nothing of time in them but share only in the incessant flux of becoming have no measure of eternity in them precisely because eternity can be brought to becoming only by time. To use another perspective, the same point can be made in another way. In a Universe in which the eternal is removed from the temporal by a radical division, only those things which have transcended the Aaviaton may properly be called eternal. Thus, no individuality can be claimed for any person who has not transcended time and achieved eternity. But in Plato's Universe, each person who finds his proper pace of achievement may be said to be as eternal as he can be at the moment, or that his perfection consists of the entire process of attainment. It is therefore necessary for the citizens of the Republic to model thenselves entirely upon the eternal forms or be called failures, where the citizens of the realm founded on the philosophy of the Timaeus may be said to posess individuality insofar as they attain perfection to the extent that it is possible to attain it at the time. In this way, another of the frequently asserted opinions about the world of the Greeks is found wanting. In conversation with philosophers, 'one frequently hears that there were no genuine individuals in the Greek world, since genuine individuality would scandalize the Greek notion of an ordered and predictable world. We must clarify the statement that there is individuality in the Greek world; a more accurate statement would read that there is a genuine basis of individuality in the philosophy which Plato reveals in the Timaeus, but this statement must be quickly followed by the statement that there were few Greek individuals. While it is true on the one hand to state that most Greeks felt the Universe to be closed, it is nonetheless true that Plato's Timaeus does not reveal such a Universe. This creates something of a problem for the historian who would like to see one ethos in the age which produced both Plato and Aristotle. If the Timaeus reveals the | philosophy herein described, we must separate Plato from his pupil even more widely than is sometimes the practice, for it does seem to be true that Aristotle's Universe is closed, since it is a world in which time is described as an accident. Surely this is far from Plato's view of time as the source of the perfections which make it possible for him to regard the Universe as a shrine. It is necessary to state that the gap between the moving image of eternity and the measure of motion is even wider than it has usually been described, if the viewpoint herein adopted is credible. Again, this is not the place to discourse upon a philosophical prejudice, nor is it claimed that the philosophy of Plato is superior to the philosophy of Aristotle. Such statements do violence to the historical view which regards philosophies as different because they were written by different men in different times with different needs. Aristotle was not confronted with the same political realities that confronted Plato, and to that extent, at least, we should, expect their political philosophies to differ. However, it remains true that Plato placed time at the very heart of his doctrine and that Aristotle placed time at the accidental periphery of his. To that extent, Plato's philosophy of time is more congenial to the modern mind which occupies itself with questions of historical process and temporal being. Viewed in this light, it becomes possible to see the basis of Whitehead's remark that Plato has spawned almost the entire philosophical heritage of the West. Furthermore, it becomes possible to compare Science in the Modern jiorld to the Timaeus, since the authors of both works attempted not only to write a history of contemporary science but also to show in their discussions of the scientific theories prevalent in their respective eras that beyond the reach of the sciences there were insights upon which the sciences unknowingly depended. In that same spirit, I have attempted to write of Plato's image of time, since it is my conviction that every age, and not only Plato's or even Whitehead's, depends unknowlingly on a view of time and derives its basic cognitive orientation from its time-view. If 4t 18 true that Plato matured until the last, and that he sought in the end to plumb the awesome mystery of time and eternity, I felt that his search could only enlighten the attempts of a working sociologist to make some sense out of his own era by viewing it, in the last analysis, as a moving image of eternity. There is one aspect of the temporal perfection of the Universe which deserves special attention in the light of modern interests, and that is the special perfection which develops in the individual man in time. We pointed out in chapter three that Plato made frequent use of the age of the speaker in several dialogues, sometimes accusing the speaker of naivete because of his youth and sometimes praising the venerable age of the speaker and the wisdom which came to him because of his age. For example, in the Parmenides, Socrates is very young and Parmenides is very old, and Plato implies clearly that the very young do not yet have the requisite insight for profound subjects. This is again true in the Theatetus wherein Socrates is now the old and wise man, as opposed to the young and malleable Theatetus. In view of the fact that the Timaeus casts the whole middle doctrine of individual reminiscence into \& more generalized sociological frame of reference, it should be pointed out that Plato has not abandoned his reminiscence theory in the later dialogues: actually, he has fortified it by showing that there is a cosmological basis for the sort of memory which a society must have in order to be as fully societal as it is possible to be. Thus, just as the society develops in time, so the individual citizen develops in time, and in time, the | citizen not only ages, but he matures and grows wise. It is this very maturity of insight which Plato himself experienced with his own advancing years, and it is therefore unsurprising that we find in the later dialogues a doctrine in to which the perfection of reason is attained by those individuals who have participated more fully in time than those younger philosophers whose maturity is yet unreached. To put the matter somewhat more technically, Plato has so closely related cosmogenesis and anthropogenesis by reason of their mutual participation in time that it is also possible to relate the ontogenesis of the individual citizen to the same basis in time. While it was always possible to say with Plato that the older man is probably the wiser man, it 1s possible, after a careful reading of the later dialogues, to assert that the older man ought to pe the wiser because of his fuller participation in time. Or to put the matter in more modern language, the gradual development of the individual person takes place not only according to psychological processes, but also according to sociological and cosmological processes, since all of these processes may be seen as particular manifestations of the pertections which Time brings to the Universe. Therefore, I assert that a careful reading of the Timaeus in its doctrinal and chronological context leads to the following conclusions. Plato's final formulation of a doctrine of Time was revealed in his Timaeus. In that work, he tells us that Time is the basis of society, from which the society derives the perfections of life and mind in motion. Thus it is false to divide eternity and time from each other since Time delivers perfections and perfects mere becoming s0 that it most resembles the source of perfections. It is g00d to regard Time as a moving image of eternity since this phrase indicates the mediatory role of time. The simple division of eternity versus time is false, since eternity differs most from mere becoming. Time perfects becoming by relating it concretely to eternity. In this way, the things of the Universe may achieve individuality since they need not be either completely eternal nor merely becoming but may be best what they are by being as fully as possible what they are when they are. Thus, from the early formedoctrine of the middle dialogues, Plato has advanced to a new position. It is neither a renunciation of the Form-doctrine nor a simple extension or reapplication of it. In the Timaeus, the Forms are paradigms and have reality only to the extent to which the things modelled upon them derive their perfections from them. The earlier Form-doctrine described a number of perfect Forms from which things differed by reason of their imperfection; the later form-doctrine describes a set of Forms which are originative, such that they give of their perfection in a process called Time. In such a world, society is not a realm removed from @ penultimate world of silent and unspeaking self posession, but becomes the way in which eternal perfection discloses itself, which Plato calls the moving image of eternity. APPENDIX A Ross! gives a tabular presentation of the order of the dialogues according to "five leading students" of the subject. Since the order of the early works is not in question here, the table is abbreviated to show the order of the dialogues starting with the Republic, on which there is wide agreement. However it should be noted that Ross does not distinguish between stylistic criteria and stylometric criteria and uses the two interchangeably in his chapter on the order of the dialogues. With the exception of the Phacdrus, the scholars cited by Ross give substantially the order I have adopted as the most probable. Arnim _ Lutoslawski Raeder Ritter Wilamowitz Rep. 2-10 Rep. 2=10 Rep. Rep. Rep. Theaet. Phaedr. Phaedr. Phaedr. Phaedr. Parm. Theaet. Theaet. Theaet. Parn. Phaedr. Parn. Parn. Parn. Theaet. Soph. Soph. Soph. Soph. Soph. Pol. Pol. Pol. Pol. Pol. Phil. Phil. Phil. Tin. Tin. Tin. Tim. Critias Critias Critias Critias Phil. Phil. Laws Laws Laws Laws Laws Epin. ' wep. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 2. BIBLIOGRAPHY Archer-Hind, R.D. Commentary on the Timaeus. London: The Macmilian Co., 1888. Barker, E. Political Thought of Plato and iecarotie: New York: Dover frublications, Inc., 1959. Burnet, John. Greek Philosophy. rart I. London: Macmilian \& Co., Ltd., i914. Bury, R.G. "Plato and History," Classical Quarterly, New Series, 1-2, pp. 86-94. Callahan, J.F. Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Fress, 1946. Campbell, L. "Plato," kncyclopaedia Britannica. Tith ed., Vol. XxXI, pp. 0 = 2 e Claghorn, George 8S. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 'Timaeus'. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. Cornford, F.M. From Religion to Philosophy. New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1957. __.____ Plato's Cosmology. London: Routledge « Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1937. Dodds, E.K. The Greeks and the Irrational. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Field, G.C. Plato and His Contemporaries: A Study in Fourth-Century Life and Thougnt. London: Methuen \& UO., td., 1930. rrutiger, P. Les Myths de Platon. Paris: 1930. Gauss, Hermann. Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos. 5 tir. part 2. bern: Herbart ng, 1961. Gioscia, V.J. "A Perspective for Role Theory," The American Catholic Sociological Review. XXII, No. 2, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961, pp. 143 ff. Gompers, Theodor. Greek Thinkers. trans. G.G. ery. Londons John Murray, 1! ° Harward, J. The Platonic poieties. Cambridge: the University ess, 1952. Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1955. Hempel, Carl G. "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vols. 1 and 11; Foundations of The Unit f 'Science, vol. II, No. 7. University of Chicago Press, 1952. Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943. Jowett, B. The Dialogues of Plato. 3rd ed.; New York: Scribner, Armstrong, \& Co., 1878. Koyre, Alexandre. Krom the Closed world to the Infinite Universe. New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1958. Lauer, Q., S.J. The Being of Non-sHeing in Plato's Sophist. unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham University. Lutoslawski, W. Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic. New York: Longmans, 1925. Mackinnon, Edward, S.J. "Time in Contemporary Physics," International Philosophical Quarterly, II, No. 3, (September, 1962). Meyerhoff, Hans (ed.) The Philosophy of History in Our Time. New York: Doubleday \& Co., 1959. Nettleship, #.L. Lectures on the Republic of Plato. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Popper, K.R. The Open Society and its Enemies. 2 vols., ed ed. rev., London: Routledge \& Kegan Paul, 1952. Ritter, Constantin. Untersuchungen uber Platon. Stuttgart: 1888. - Neue Untersuchungen uber Platon. Munich: 1910. . The Essence of Plato's Philosophy. trans. Adam es. London: George en \& Unwin, Ltd., 1933. Koss, W.D. Plato's Theory of Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Russell, Bertrand. Mysticism and Logic. Garden City, New York: Doubleday \& Co., 1917. Taylor, A.\&. Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 192%. - "Plato," Encyclopaedia britannica. XVIII. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, inc., 1957. - Plato: 'the Man and His Work. 6th ed. 5th print. New York: Meridian books, Inc., 1959. Taylor, 1t.T. The fimaeus and Critias of Plato. Washington: Pantheon Books inc., 1952. Walsh, W.H. "Plato and the Philosophy of History: History and 'theory in the Kepublic," History and Theory, II, No. 1 (1962), pp. 1-16. Whitehead, A.N. Process and kKeality. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U.v. Platon. 2 vols., Berlin: Weidman, 1920. ABSTRACT Victor Joseph Gioscia B.S8., Fordham College M.A., Fordham University Plato's Image of Time Dissertation directed by J. Quentin Lauer, Ph.D. The most explicit formulation which Plato made of his philosophy of Time is found in his Timaeus. In this dialogue, he reexamines some of the doctrines he had formulated in the Republic. By reference to a wide concensus of scholarly opinion, it is established that the timaeus is very probably the last dialogue Plato completed and edited, that it is tollowed only by the incomplete Critias and the unedited Laws. These facts, taken together with the fact that the Timaeus recapitulates some doctrines of the Republic, Give the Timaeus a central importance in Plato's reflections on society. This means that the Timaeus contains a "later" doctrine than the Republic and that in the Timaeus we rind a reflective advance over the doctrines ot the "early" and "middle" dialogues of Plato. The study traces the evolution of the three themes of eternity, image, and time anda shows that Plato discussed them in an increasingly generalized fashion as he grew older. It traces the development or these themes from the Republic through the Parmenides, Theatetus, Sopnist, Statesman, and Philebus. | The study espouses the view that the Timaeus contains Plato's most mature reflections on the themes of eternity, image, and time, and that the formulation in the Timaeus reformulates some of the doctrines of the Republic, and therefore one ought not to regard the Republic as the final trormulation of Plato's pnilosophy of eternity, image, and time. | Further, the themes of eternity, image, and time are treated in the Timaeus in an explicitly sociological framework, and are said to be part and parcel or the 4nquiry into the best society and its basis in time. Plato included cosmology and sociology within a larger perspective, in which the origin of the Universe and the origin of society were seen as stages in a temporal process. His account of these matters in the Timaeus is preceded by statements to the erfect that it is only on the broad canvass of the entire Universe that the best account of society's origins can be painted. The use ot such metaphorical phraseology is not arbitrary, and one must frequently deal in metaphor to explain Plato's meaning because Plato makes extensive use of metaphor throughout his Timaeus, indeed, throughout most of his philosophy. Plato's discussion of temporal processes contains a definition whose central term is the word image (eikon not eidolon). Since Plato defines time as an image, it becomes the problem of the commentator to reveal as clearly as possible the significance or this definition and the use of image as one of its principal terms. the study concludes that Plato viewed the entire Universe as an Image and sees Time as the Life of Society. VITA Victor Joseph Gioscia, son of Joseph and Anne D'Onofrio Gioscia, was born June 13, 1930, in New York, New York. He attended Xavier High School, New York City, and was graduated in June 1948. He entered Springhill College in September 1948, transferred to Fordham College in September 1950, and received the degree of Bachelor of Science in June 1952. He received the Hughes Award in Philosophy and an Assistantship in Philosophy. He was accepted as a graduate student and was given a Research Assistantship in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Fordham University in September of 1956. He majored in Theoretical Sociology under the mentorship of Professor N.S. Timasheff and received the degree of Master of Arts in February 1957. He was employed as a Lecturer in Sociology nt Fordham College in 1958, as an Instructor in Sociology at Fordham University School of Education in 1959, and as a Lecturer in Anthropology-Sociology at Queens College of the City University of New York in 1961 and 1962. He was accepted as a graduate student in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Fordham University in February 1957, where he majored in the Philosophy of Society under the mentorship of Professor J. Quentin Laver, S.d.