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diff --git a/plato_time_notes.otx b/plato_time_notes.otx index 20cc571..bb4e500 100644 --- a/plato_time_notes.otx +++ b/plato_time_notes.otx @@ -178,1738 +178,49 @@ edition.} % ch iii % ch iv -CHAPTER IV -THE TIMAEUS -I The Introductory Conversation (17a-27b) +\defpnote{2.1}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work}, p. 2.} +\defpnote{2.2}{Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, p. 2.} +\defpnote{2.3}{Gauss, \bt{Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos}, p. 157} +\defpnote{2.4}{Cornford, op. cit., appendix, p. 365.} +\defpnote{2.5}{P. Frutiger, \bt{Les Myths de Platon}, (Paris: 1930), pp. 244 ff.} -We have seen in the foregoing two chapters that the -Timaeus-Critias-Laws is the last group of writings to which -Plato devoted his attention. The argument was divided into -two logically interrelated parts: first, tradition, -stylistic researches, biography, and autobiography led to -the conclusion of the second chapter that the Timaeus was -actually written late; second, the gradual modification and -development of the doctrine of the middle period, as -exemplified by the Republic, was traced through the -Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus +\defpnote{2.6}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 14.} +\defpnote{2.7}{Q. Lauer, S.J., \et{The Being of Non-Being in Plato's Sophist} (unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham University).} -in the third chapter. We shall now investigate how the -Timaeus synthesizes the themes of eternity, image, and -time in a new and more unified way. +\defpnote{2.8}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 8.} -Because of the sheer bulk of commentary we shall -make on the doctrines of the Timaeus, the reader will find -two chapters devoted to this last Aiatoeue: The present -chapter deals with the introductory remarks to the dialogue -and to the introductory remarks which Timaeus delivers as -a prelude to his rather extended monologue. The next -chapter examines the relations of eternity, image, and time -in the light of the purposes which the introductory pore +\defpnote{2.9}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work}, p. 440.} +\defpnote{2.10}{Cf., V.J. Gioscia, \et{A Perspective for Role Theory,} \jt{The American Catholic Sociological Review,} XXII, 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff.} +\defpnote{2.11}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 24.} -tions of the dialogue reveal. The introductory remarks +\defpnote{2.12}{Ibid., p. 28.} +\defpnote{2.13}{Ibid., p. 30.} +\defpnote{2.14}{Ibid., pp. 31--32.} -> +\defpnote{2.15}{R.D. Archer-Hind, \bt{Commentary on the Timaeus}, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1888), p. 86, n, 14.} +\defpnote{2.16}{T.T. Taylor, \bt{The Timaeus and Critias of Plato}, +(Washington: Pantheon Books Inc., 1952), p. 112. } +\defpnote{2.17}{Ibid., p. 17.} -"found in the Timaeus set the foundations, not only for -Plato's later philosophy of time but also for the function-~ -al significance this philosophy has in relation to Plato's -view of the best possible society. - -The first hint that the Timaeus will interest itself -in temporal questions comes in the list of persons who are -scheduled to hold the dialectical conversation. We know -that Critias was the name shared by Plato's grandfather -and his greategrandfather, His grandfather was a poet in -his own right and a collector of constitutions, and his -greategrandfather was associated with Solon. | We note that -Hermocrates, a general famous for his defense of Athens and -for his attempt to establish a just regime in Syracuse, is -also scheduled to speak. We note the presence of Socrates, -who has spoken relatively little in the late group of -dialogues, but who reappeared in the Philebus. And finally, - - -we note Timaeus of Locri, an Italian city well-governed by -Pythagoreans. - -Here is a strange assembly; Critias is a very old man -of considerable political experience in Athens; Timaeus is -a Pythagorean Stranger who is in Athens for the festival -of Athena; Hermocrates is an Athenian general distinguished - - -in the Peloponnesian War; and we note that Socrates is now - - -' AVE. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 2. - - -2 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 2. - - - -described as a very old man. One might almost conclude -from this cast alone that questions about the morality of -ancient Athenian politics will be discussed. - -Socrates opens the dialogue. His discussion of -"yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"" of some of the doctrines -of the Republic, (books II-VI) namely, the description of -the farmers, craftsmen, and guardians who make up the -"best form of society" (17c). The occupational specialization which alloted one and only one role to each individual -citizen because he was best fitted for one and only one -role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversation." The statement is made that this brief recapitulation -leaves nothing out and is an exact description of the -contents of yesterday's conversation. Thus, one should -not conclude that this recapitulation includes the entire -contents of the Republic, for this would create a manifest -contradiction. The Republic conprises ten books, much of -which are not recapitulated here. Quite obviously, something has been left out, and Socrates implies clearly that -he intends to discuss only those doctrines which he has -summarized above. One might add, however, that the recapitulation does deal with those doctrines of the Republic -which are central to the whole dialogue, namely, the - - -occupational specialization of three classes of citizens, - - -3 Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den -Dialogen Platos, p. rey - - - -'who do not mix the functions of the others into their own -allotted lives, just as the Forms on which their respective -perfections are based do not mix or combine. - -Socrates says that the description of these citizens -(of the Republic) makes him feel like "a man who has been -looking at some noble creatures in a painting, or perhaps -at real animals, alive but motionless, and conceives a -desire to watch them in motion and actively exercising -the powers promised by their form" (19b,c). - -Two features of this statement are particularly -remarkable. First, we notice Socrates’ apparent indecision -as to whether he is looking at a painting (a mere copy) or -at real animals who are motionless ( a genuine image but -motionless). Second, it is unusual to see Socrates admit -his inability to extract the doctrine he seeks through his -accustomed midwifery. These aspects of the introductory - - -conversation hint that the Timaeus will attempt to go - - -beyond earlier Socratic positions. - -Socrates goes on at some length to spell out his -precise inability, and he connects it explicitly with the -firmness of his aged opinions about the poets (19d), -although he stated in the Theatetus that he had no opinions - - -of his own. He says that he does not mean to imply that he -has @ lowly opinion of the poets in general (which he had -in the Republic) but he feels now that the good imitator -(there are none such in the Republic) should be familiar - - - -with the surroundings which he is going to imitate (19e). -On the surface, this statement pertains to the history of -ancient Athens; allegorically, it says that Socrates' -viewpoint is not the one to be followed in this dialogue. -Socrates does not usually speak of genuine imitation, for -this sort of imitation is introduced by the Stranger in the -Sophist. Just as the Sophists move about from city to city -too often, and do not remain in any one city long enough to: -become familiar with it, so Socrates is said to be unfamiliar with the matters about to be discussed. Plato seems to -say here in the gentlest way that he has great respect for -his old teacher but that Socrates' viewpoint is not the -most fruitful one for his present concern. - -Timaeus, however, is a well-born citizen of Locri, -which is a well-governed state, so he is better qualified -to discuss the constitution of the society which Socrates -would like to see in motion. Timaeus is better suited by -reason of his philosophical training, and, in addition, he -has the necessary qualifications for statesmanship which - - -were described in the Statesman. - - -Hermocrates sets the foundation for the discourse by -telling us that Critias remembers a story which bears -directly on the trend of their discussion. It is a story -of ancient Athens and the way she conducted herself in -ancient times. It is said to be true on no less authority -than Solon's own words, since Solon himself is said to - - -have told the story to Critias' grandfather. The story had - - - -been forgotten through lapse of time and the destruction of -human lives by a catastrophe (20e). - -Socrates inquires why the tale was not recorded, and -Critias tells him that Solon had been forced to lay it -aside because, after he had returned from Egypt, there -were too many troubles in the city (21c). (If it is true -that Plato himself traveled in Egypt, this statement might -be interpreted as Plato's own excuse for not writing the -Timaeus sooner because of the difficulties he himself -experienced on his own return to Athens. The awe with -which the origins of Athens would be regarded by its -citizens would confront a writer of new legends about -Athens with the need for a great deal of caution, and the -reservation that there were too many political difficulties -would serve as an excellent excuse, should Plato have felt -the need for one). - -Thus, the story of ancient Athens was not lost only -because Solon did not have time to write it but also -because of the intervention of a catastrophe which destroyed the actors in the drama. Solon says, however, that -when he himself was travelling in Egypt, he was received -with great respect, because the Egyptian priests who knew -the ancient history of Athens claimed that there is a kinship between Athenians and Egyptians, and they even said -that the name of their own city-god is the Egyptian word -for Athena (21e). Solon was of course interested to hear - - -about Athenian antiquity, and recounted for the Egyptians - - - -the venerable legends with which he was familiar. - -But the Egyptian priest sighs with benigh patience, -and says, "Ah Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children; -in Greece there is no such thing as an old man" (22b). - -This would be an interesting remark no matter what - - -the chronology of the Timaeus, but, since the Timaeus is so - - -late in the series of late dialogues, the remark becomes -crucial. Several times in the preceding dialogues, the -childishness of certain opinions is mentioned, and the -rigours of dialectical discipline are extolled as the only -remedy. In the Parmenides, Socrates' youth is blamed for -the naivete of the early form-doctrine (130) and in the - - -Theatetus (175) Socrates himself chides Theatetus for his - - -youthful impatience. Plato used this form of criticism -increasingly in the late dialogues, during which he came -to realize that a certain maturity is prerequisite for -right philosophy. Now we are told that no amount of individual or personal maturity is of consequence for the -Greeks, for collectively they are all children. Here is a -very definite indication that the sort of knowledge which -Timaeus will put forward is not reachable by that heretofore most favored of philosophical paths, the doctrine of -individual, personal reminiscence. In short, reflection is -only the source of some knowledge, not of all. Taken in -conjunction with the stated purpose of the dialogue, that -is, the conditions of the best society, it delivers a - - -- fatal blow to the Socratic procedure of questioning - - - -contemporaries. There are some things about which -contemporaries have no knowledge, and it is necessary to -know these things in order to describe the best society. -One needs to know the origins of a society, and it is -probable that one's contemporaries do not know this. This -is precisely the difference between memory and history, and -it constitutes a significant expansion of doctrine beyond -the earlier dialogues. In earlier dialogues, myths were -presented to perform the function of carrying the individual memory beyond its contemporary confines, but we saw -in the Sophist that these myths (not all myths) were -"childish." - -In short, more than the maturity of the individual -person is required for true knowledge of the best society; -the best society requires its citizens to have a knowledge -of its origins; allegorically, this translates into the -need for a society to know its ultimate origins, and it is -this interpretation which makes the Timaeus' relation of -cosmology and sociology intelligible. In the process of -tracing the historical antiquity of Athens, the Timaeus -will discern the origins of the whole cosmos. As history -includes memory, so cosmology includes sociology: this is -the import of Timaeus' tale. And in both aspects of the -proportion, the cardinal issue is the "amount" of time -involved. - - -Solon, however, does not understand the appellation - - - -"children, " and inquires what the priest means when he says -that he, Solon, an old man, is a "child." The priest -explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to temporary deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular -orbits, and that, at these times, the deviations bring -about floods. These floods wreak havoc on most people but -the Egyptians are saved by their irrigation system. + For -this reason, the Egyptians have been able to maintain a -continuous record which covers a period of 8,000 years, -but the Athenians were destroyed in one of these periodic -catastrophes, and therefore have no continuous records. -Thus they had to begin afresh, like children, to trace -their origins (22b-23d). - -Solon is astonished, and asks for a more complete -account of ancient Athens. The Egyptian priest responds -willingly, saying that it is good for the city for him to -tell the story. He says that Athens was founded by the -goddess a thousand years before Egypt was founded, which -means 9,000 years ago. Thus, according to the priest -Solon's stories are nothing more than nursery tales since -they recount only one deluge, when in fact there have -been several. Furthermore, the priest says that the -Athenians were once counted among the bravest of people in - - -the era just before the last catastrophe, and that present - - -4 Cornford, op, cit., appendix, p. 365. - - - -'Athenians are descended from their seed. (24) - -The priest describes the Egyptian caste system of -priests, craftemen, and soldiers, in which system each -class performs one and only one function, and he adds that -these contemporary Egyptian institutions are continuous -with those olden days when the goddess instructed both -Athens and Egypt in these ways. Furthermore, the laws of -Egypt are said to reflect the "order of the world, deriving -from those divine things the discovery of all arts applied -to human affairs..." (24b). As we shall see, this is almost -how Timaeus will describe the origin of all human arts. - -There are other records which pertain to Athens, and -the priest decides to inform Solon about one exploit in -particular, the greatest which Athens ever performed; it is -the fable of Atlantis (24e). The story recounts how Athens -once vanquished foes who invaded her even after her allies -had been defeated, and suggests that the invaders came -from an island which has now vanished beneath the sea. -Frutiger is not alone in the opinion that no such island -ever existed, and concludes that it must be credited to -Plato's imagination. It is nevertheless fascinating to -follow Cornford into the opinion that the island of - - -Atlantis was the staging area for invaders who crossed the - - -> Pp, Frutiger, Les Myths de Platon (Paris: 1930), -pp. 244 ff. - - - -'Atlantic, perhaps from America. © - -It 4s interesting to forecast the almost exact -thematic parallel of the tale of the Egyptian priest and -the tale which Timaeus will deliver. In both, the cosmological origins of the art of healing are described. Plato -of course viewed the proper function of statecraft to be -the healing of society, as, for example, in his repeated -comparisons of the statesman to the physician. - -Critias himself tells Socrates that he is surprised -to notice how Socrates’ story (the recapitulation of -Republic doctrines) and the tale of Atlantis resemble each -other in so many details (25e). Critias had expected that -it would be difficult to find a basis for their conversation of today, and so he carefully rehearsed the story of -Atlantis before he spoke it (26). He assures us that the -tale is exactly as he heard it because he says, - -How true is the saying that what we learn in - -childhood has a wonderful hold on the memory. - -I doubt if I could recall everything I heard - -yesterday, but I should be surprised if I - -have lost any detail of this story told me - -80 long ago (26b). - -In addition to guaranteeing the accuracy of the tale, -this remark of Critias tells us something else of equal -4mportance, for it reminds us that his tale is introduced - - -only as a basis of today's conversation, and as the raw - - -material for the discourse of Timaeus. Critias himself says - - -6 Cornford, op, cit., p. 14. - - - -'he has only approached the main points when he says: - - -We will transfer the state you (Socrates) described -yesterday and its citizens from the region of -theory to concrete fact; we will take the city of -Athens and say that your imaginary citizens are -those actual ancestors of ours of whom the priest -spoke. They will fit perfectly and there will be - -no inconsistency in declaring them to be the real -men of ancient times (26d). - - -Thus it seems to be Plato's purpose to see beyond -the recapitulation of Republic doctrines which Socrates -made in the beginning of the Timaeus, and this is confirmed - - -by the statement that Critias' story will serve only as - - -material for today's discourse. For, if Critias’ story - - -were not only the basis but was in fact the perfect match -between Socrates imaginary realm and the ancient city of -Athens, the dialogue could end here, with the conclusion -that the Republic once existed. The doctrine of the -Timaeus, however, concerns not only what the best society -ought to be and what it was, but what is the origin of the -best society and what is ita basis. - -Socrates agrees that fitting the Republic citizens -into ancient Athenian society is a proper basis for today's -discourse, and goes so far as to say that if this is not -the basis, there can be no other (26e). - -The plan of the projected trilogy is now revealed; -Timaeus, who knows more of astronomy than anyone else -present, will begin with the birth of the world and carry -the account forward until he reaches the birth of man. - - -Critias will start from the origin of man and carry the - - - -'account to the birth of Athens. In this way, the actual -origins of society will be discovered. Interestingly, -no mention is made of the proposed content of the -Hermocrates. Once before, Plato hinted at a projected -trilogy, and seems not to have completed the third dialogue. Perhaps, as before, we shall learn so much in the -two dialogues that the third seems unnecessary.’ Or perhaps -Plato wrote the Laws instead. In any case, the point at -issue is whether the fitting of the Republic's citizens -into the ancient Athenian polis suffices to describe the -origins and bases of the best society. It is agreed that -Timaeus will account for the origin of man from his -astronomical beginnings, and that this is necessary as a -preliminary for the investigations into the actual origins -of society. - -One cannot therefore follow Taylor into the opinion -that this introductory conversation is actually only an -introduction to the Critias.? By extending this logic, the -Parmenides and Theatetus are only introductions to the - - -Sophist, and the Sophist only an introduction to the - - -7 Q. Lauer, 8.J., The Being of Non-Being in Plato's -Sophist (unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham -University). - -8 Cornford, op, cit., p. 8. - - -9 A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 440. - - - - - -'Statesman, etc. Such a linearization of Plato's philosophy - - -leaves everything behind in which case we should read only -the Laws and dismiss all else as preliminary introduction. - -In the next section, we shall confront Timaeus’ own -introduction, and as we shall see, he connects his remarks -to the general introductory remarks we have just discussed. -II_ The Role of Image 27c-29d - -Timaeus invokes the blessings of the gods, as custom -requires, but says that the other members of the conversation must also call upon their own powers, so that they can -understand Timaeus' thoughts on the proposed theme (27c). - -The first distinction to be made is that between - -what is always re\&l and has no becoming and what - -it is which is always becoming and is never real. - -That which is apprehensible by thought with a - -rational account is the thing which is always - -unchangeably real; whereas that which is the - -object of belief together with unreasoning - -sensation is the thing that becomes and passes - -away, but never has real being (28a). - -At first, this seems to be the familiar dichotomy -between the eternal and the temporal, but it 4s not. In -dividing the line of knowledge here, Plato deliberately -accentuates the "top" and the "bottom," but leaves out the -other intermediary divisions which he has established. In -the Cave, opinion and false images were placed in between - - -the Forms and mere sensation; in the Theatetus, right - - -opinion was established; in the Sophist, genuine images; -and in the Philebus, the need to mix the Forms and the - - -four levels of knowledge. Thus the meaning of the sentences - - -Le - - - - - -which open this section of discourse are illuminated by a -summary of the doctrines of some of the preceding dialogues. - -This is confirmed by Timaeus' next sentence. He says, - -Again all that becomes must needs become by the - -agency of some cause, for without a cause nothing - -can come to be. Now whenever the maker of anything -looks to that which is always unchanging and uses - -a model of that description in fashioning the form - -and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something - -that has come to be and uses a generated model, - -4t will not be good (28b). - -Here is a recapitulation of the preliminary doctrine -of the good painter of the Sophist, where those imitations -which faithfully represent the proportions of the original -are good images, but those which distort the original are -mere fantasies (234, 235). The main point here is that in -the early dialogues, an imitation would necessarily falsify; -in the late dialogues, an imitation must be carefully made -in order to preserve the proportions of its model, and if -it does so, it may properly be called good. This is -especially true in the Philebus, where the cause of the -mixture of elements is responsible for the quality of the -mixture (27a). Here, Timaeus says that if the maker is to -use \& generated model (a copy of the original) he will be -copying a copy, whereas he should copy the original, and -by preserving its proportion, imitate genuinely. - -This much could have been said in the Philebus, and -was in fact said in other words. But now this doctrine must - - -be generalized and tested on a cosmological scale. Therefore, - - --Timaeus uses the phrase, "concerning the whole 'heaven’ or - - - -'world’ (not heaven and world)..." (27b), parenthetically -adding that the name can be chosen to suit heaven itself. It - - -is interesting to observe that the term heaven (ouranos) is - - -now taken to be synonymous with the whole cosmos, whereas -formerly, a strict division was made between heaven and - -the visible world. This foreshadows the entire theme of the -dialogue, in which the former gap between heaven and earth -is now to be supplanted by a richer and more meaningful -relation. - -Has this heaven, or universe, always been, or did it -begin from some beginning? Timaeus answers his own rhetorical question by saying that it must have begun because it -has a body and is apprehensible by sensation together with -right opinion, and it was formerly established that those -things which are so apprehensible are things which become - - -and are generated. This refers to the Theatetus where it - - -was established that sensation and true opinion do have a -measure of the truth but are not the sources of that truth, -and to the Sophist, where it was established that images, if -genuine, have a measure of truth because they are not -absolutely notebeing but have a reality ot their own. The -doctrine of the Philebus is brought into the account in the - - -next line where we read "But again that which becomes, we -Say, must necessarily become by the agency of some -cause" (28c). - -Next comes the often quoted statement "The maker and - - -'father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and - - - -having found him it would be impossible to declare him to -all mankind" (28c). This statement is absolutely central to -the exposition of the remainder of the dialogue. It asserts -that the gap between the eternal and the temporal realms -is not only a cosmological but a sociological one. It is -not an impossible task to find the father of the universe; -it is hard. But it is impossible to declare him to all -mankind. For this reason, as it was said in the Statesman, -some authors make myths and childish stories when they -confront this impossibility of declaration, and even the -One and the Many is said to be such a myth, made for minds -incapable of genuine dialectic. - -Now the problem is not that there is a gap in the -structure of the universe, but that some kinds of communication are impossible. On the one hand, some truths are -ineffable, on the other hand some people cannot be told -the glaring truth because it would momentarily blind them -as it did the prisoner of the Cave when he was released -to see the Sun. But the Sun is there, and those few who -can and do see it, ought to lead others to it. - -There is a further difficulty. The insight into the -ultimate origins of being is not only the subject of myths -and stories which the people feed themselves on; they hold -on to these myths with rigid conviction, and the innovator -in this area must beware lest he invite the hemlock with -which Socrates was sentenced to death. Plato has already - - -aid several times that these myths are for children, but, - - - -'evidently, he has underestimated his own age. This relates -directly to the whole purpose of the dialogue, which is -to replace what Plato regards as dangerous fantasies about -the ultimate origins of the universe, with a more rational -account. Notice he does not intend to make an absolutely -rational account, which the learned elite of Pythagoreans, -Eleatics, and Academicians, might demand. The account of -Timaeus cannot be written in the arcane language of the -intellectualist; some way must be found to declare the -father of the universe to all mankind. This need springs -from Plato's conviction that the best state is composed of -the best citizens, and, those citizens are best who know -their traditions (Atlantis) and their ultimate origins. -In short, the experience so familiar to the teacher of a -aifficult doctrine was also Plato's experience-how to tell -the student by example without distorting the truth of the -original meaning. - -This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the -myths of the origin of the universe were probably held -with the fervor of blind conviction by Plato's contemporaries, much as they sometimes are by our own contemporaries, -so that the attempt to redefine them would be regarded as -blasphemy by those whose hold on these myths was invested -with the unshakable grasp of an inflexible conservatisn. -This seems to be his meaning when Timaeus says that the -maker of the universe clearly looked to the eternal for - - -his model, and that the contrary supposition "...cannot be - - - -spoken without blasphemy..." (29). - -Plato is caught between two extreme difficulties: on -the one hand the childish myths must be corrected, but -'this might be regarded by the people as blasphemy; on the -other hand, the people to whom Plato wishes to speak the -correction cannot understand the deeper truths behind the -myths, so that he has to put them in examples which are not -perfectly appropriate; but this involves the danger of -blasphemy in his own mind. The difficulty of finding the -father is compounded by the impossibility of revealing -him adequately. It is extremely important that this dual -difficulty be born in mind in what follows, because it -bears directly on the use of genuine images and Plato's -repeated insistence that the dialogue is a probable myth -(eikota mython). One makes a mistake in expecting Plato to -speak out boldly in a purely rational language about the -maker of the universe for two reasons; first, as we noted, -some truths seem ineffable; second, one would miss Plato's -concern for the prisoners of the cave who would be blinded -by the pure truth but left in the dark by anything less. -The efficacy of the act of communication involves taking -the audience's view into account, and Plato was far from - - -ignorant on this point. !° - - -10 or, vig. Gioscia, "A Perspective for Role Theory," - - -The American Catholic Sociological Review, XXII, 2 -Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff. - - - - -This accounts for the strangely popular grounds on -which the argument (whether the model of the universe is -eternal or generated) 1s settled. Timaeus says "Everyone, -then, must see that (the father) looked to the eternal..." -(29a). - -The next portion of the paragraph adds a peculiar -reaffirmation for the eternity of the model of the universe. -It states "...for the world is the best of things that -have Hadoiie: and he (the father) is the best of causes." -There is no preparation for this statement in all of Plato, -as far as I know. One could expect that the father of the -universe would be described as the best of causes on the -extension of the theme of avoiding blasphemy which runs -through the whole dialogue. But there seems to be no -preparation for Plato's statement that the world is the -best of things that have become, unless it is Plato's -knowledge that he is going to describe the world as the -result of the best of causes, and therefore knows it must -be the best of "effects." But this creates the very -difficulty which this dialogue is trying to avoid, and -that is the description of the best cause as one whose -action can only bring about the best results. For, in one -sense, the world is the best result of the best cause, but -in another sense, it is only the best of things that have -become, and becoming is not the best sort of being. In -short, there has already been a slight movement from the - - -etrictly univocal causality of the best cause, toward some - - - -kind of intermediary causation. In this way, Plato continues to pose the whole problem of some sort of mid-ground -between eternity and the realm of becoming. This is confirm~ -ed in what follows next. - -Timaeus says, - - -Again, these things being so, our world must -necessarily be a likeness (eikona) of something. -Now in every matter it 1s of great moment to -start at the right point in accordance with the -nature of the subject (kata physin archen). -Concerning a likeness (eikonos) then, and its -model (paradeigmatos) we must make this -distinction; an account (logos) 1s of the same -order (suggenes) as the thing it sets forth -an account of that which is abiding and stable -and discoverable by the aid of reason will -itself be abiding and unchangeable (so far as -it is possible and it lies in the nature of -the account to be incontrovertible and -irrefutable, there must be no falling short of -that); while an account of what is made in the -image (eikonos) of that other, but is only a -likeness (eikona) will itself be but likely -(eikotas) standing to accounts of the former -in a proportion: as reality is to becoming so -is truth to belief (29b-c, Cornford). - - -Since this passage is absolutely central to the -whole exposition of Plato's philosophy of time, imaze, and -eternity, it may be well to compare other translations of -this paragraph. - -Archer-Hind has it: - - -Granting this, it must needs be that this universe -is a likeness of something. Now it is all important -to make our beginning according to nature: and this -affirmation must be laid down with regard to a -likeness and its model, that the words must be akin -to the subjects of which they are the interpreters: -therefore of that which is abiding and sure and -discoverable by the aid of reason the words too -Must be abiding and unchanging and so far as it -lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable - - - - - -they must in no wise fall short of this; but -those which deal with that which is made in -the image of the former and which is a likeness, must be likely and duly corresponding -with their subject: as being 1s to becoming, -so ia truth to belief (29b-c, Archer-Hind). - - -Jowett has: - - -And being of such a nature the world has been -framed by him with a view to that which is -apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and if this be admitted must of necessity -be a copy of something. Now that the beginning -of everything should be according to nature is -a great matter. Let us then assume about the -copy and original that the words are akin to -the matter which they describe, and that when -they relate to the lasting and the permanent -and intelligible, they ought to be lasting - -and unfailing, and as far as is in the nature -of words irrefutable and immovable, and nothing -less than this. But the words which are the -expression of the immitation of the eternal -things, which 1s an image only, need only be -likely and analogous to the former words. - -What essence is to generation, that truth is - -to belief (29b, c, Jowett). - - -T.f. Taylor has: - - -And from hence it is perfectly necessary that -this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to -nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In -this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are -allied to the things of which they are the -interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we -speak of that which is stable and firm and -intellectually apparent, that our reasons - -should be in like manner stable and immutable, -and as much as possible irreprehensible, with every -perfection of a similar kind. But that, when we -speak concerning the image of that which is -4mmutable, we should employ only probable -arguments, which have the same analogue to the -former as a resemblance to its exemplar. And, -indeed, as essence is to generation, so is truth -to faith (29bec, .T. Taylor). - - - -R.G. Bury has: - - -Again if these premises be granted, it is wholly -necessary that this Cosmos should be a Copy of -something. Now in regard to every matter it is -most important to begin at the natural beginning. -Accordingly, in dealing with a copy and its model, -we must affirm that the accounts given will -themselves be akin to the diverse objects which -they serve to explain; those which deal with what -is abiding and firm and discernible by the aid of -thought will be abiding and unshakable; and in so -far as it is possible and fitting for statements -to be irrefutable and invincible, they must in no -wise fall short thereof; whereas the accounts of -that which is copied after the likeness of that -Model, and is itself a likeness, will be analogous -thereto and posess liklihood; for as Being is to -Becoming, so is Truth to Belief (29b-c, Bury). - - -These five translations and the commentaries on the -passage will be reviewed in order. First, Cornford holds -that the chief point established in this prelude is that -the visible world, of which an account is to be given, is - - -a changing image or likeness (eikon) of an eternal model, - - -and reasons that it is not a realm of being but of becoming. -He says, therefore, that we must not expect anything more -than a "likely" account, because only that which is stable -can produce a stable account, and becoming is not stable. -"There can never be a final statement of exact truth about -this changing object."!! Having taken this view, Cornford -goes on to comment on the distinction of being and becoming. -It 18 to be noticed that he delivers his comment as a - - -derivative of his view that the account of becoming is - - -1 Cornford, op, cit., p. 24. - - - -only likely because it is unstable. - -Cornford comments that the opening sentence of the -preceding passage divides the world into two veulne: the -one of Forms which intelligence grasps, and the other of -sensation, which is always imprecise and in flux. We have -seen however that this two-fold division is not a dichotomy, -but rather an emphasis on the extremes of a four-fold -division. We differ, therefore, with Cornford's conclusion -that the use of the word "becoming" (genesis) by Plato is -"ambiguous" by which he indicates that it has only two -meanings, one which means that a thing comes into existence, -acd the other which means that a thing is in the process of -change. There are many more senses in which the word -"becoming" can be understood, as Plato showed in the - - -Parmenides (151e-152e). For example, one may say "is - - -becoming," "was becoming," "becoming older," "becoming -younger," "will be becoming," etc. On the basis of his -simple division into two meanings, Cornford adopts the -conclusion that the second meaning cannot be what Plato -means and that therefore the world must have begun in time. -He then differs with A.E. Taylor, who attributes the -Christian theory of creation to Plato via Whitehead's -theory of time. The point here is the fact that Cornford -has assumed Plato to have spoken a simple dichotomy, the -familiar dichotomy between the realm of Forms and the reaim -of becoming. Thus, for example, he says that the Sophist -similarly divided the kinds of production in two (265b) - - - -'whereas it is clear that there are several kinds of -production stated theres human and divine, fantasy ad -image, proportional and non-proportional. This is especially -important, because the Sophist divides genuine production -into human production and divine production, but omits -speaking of false divine production whereesa it does speak -of false human production. It is precisely this problen, -i.e., how can a divine product be lacking in any divine -perfection, which Plato is now examining. But it is not a -mere repetition; it is now the starting point for Plato's -expanded doctrine. Just as the Sophist investigated the -relation between not-being and divine production in the - - -realm of things, so now the Timaceus is investigating the - - -relation between notebeing and the divine production of - -the entire cosmos. One need not suppose that the familiar -doctrine of the split between the realm of Forms and the -realm of things has remained unmodified between the Republic - - -and the Timaeus. One need not assume that there is no - - -difference between the Sophist doctrine and the Republic -doctrine with respect to the reality of not-being. Yet -Cornford introduces the Sophist's division (which he sees -as a dichotomy) into the Timaeus, which he similarly - - -dichotomizes. -Cornford notes that the distinction to be made is -not simply between being and becoming, but between eternal - - -being and that which is always becoming. It seems better - - -= - - - -to state that Plato is here distinguishing that which is - - -only becoming and always becoming, from another sort of -becoming, which it is the business of this dialogue to - - -discuss. Therefore, while it is perfectly true to Plato to -say that, clearly, the world has become, it does not follow -to say that the world is only becoming, for, on that -supposition, how could it be the best of things that have -become? - -Consistently, then, Cornford concludes that the -maker of the universe is merely mythical and that therefore -there was no "moment of creation." This follows from -Cornford's division of the passage into only two realms, -which he concludes must therefore be either true or mythical. -But the whole division in two is not the only interpretation -possible, for it does not follow Plato through his development. - -Thus, Cornford is led to take literally the dictum - - -of the Seventh Letter that there neither was nor is nor - - -shall be a doctrine of Plato's on the subject, and that -Plato is only revealing a mythical figure of the maker of -universe, but not the real exact truth. Cornford's view -makes it impossible to conclude that the difficulty of -revealing the maker to all mankind is not a sociological -aifficulty inherent in the crass and hollow mentality of -most men, nor the impossibility of an ineffable truth, but -Plato's refusal to speak out what he knows perfectly well. - - -fhis seems to be only one interpretation of the passage - - - -which states clearly that the maker can be found, admittedly -with difficulty, but cannot be revealed. Cornford precludes -the interpretation that the difficulties of communication -necessitate the mythical figure or that it might be true to -say that the maker is ineffably inscrutable and should not -be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpretations seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal -development of the late dialogues. Thus Cornford says that -a similar "device" was employed in the Republic, referring -probably to the Myth of Er. But in the late dialorues, -Plato repeatedly criticises these myths as childish. Yet -Cornford's interpretation of myth is responsible for his -dichotomy here, where, it seems possible to offer there -other interpretations. - -It will be the business of our concluding chapter -to show why Cornford's interpretation narrowly construes -Timaeus' mythical language. Suffice it at this point to -indicate what that conclusion will be. Plato does not -stop at a merely mythical account in the Timaeus. True, - - -there is another myth of "creation" in the Timaeus, but - - -4t is not all that is to be found there. In addition to -the mythical, Plato is, as usual, revealing what he feels - - -to be the truth, so that he who sees what the myth means - - -has seen more than the myth. In this way, the Timaeus can be - - -read either as myth and myth alone, or it can also be -interpreted as a new doctrine in which Plato points - - -,clearly beyond mere myth. This view is clearest in the - - - -ending of the passage cited, where Plato says that we must | -see, not mere myth, but a likely myth, just as in the -Theatetus we must have, not only opinion, but right opinion, - - -or in the Sophist and opening passages of the Timaeus, we - - -must see, not mere images, but moving images, which -faithfully reproduce the proportions of the original model. - -Thus, Cornford can say, - -In the application here it is argued that, since - -the world is in fact good, its maker must have - -copied a model that is eternal. The world then is - -a@ copy, an image, of the real. It is not, indeed, - -like an artist's painting, at a third remove from - -tettaty but on the other hand it is not wholly - -real,! -Notice that Cornford does not distinguish, as the Sophist -does (at 266d) between a good painter's faithful copy, and -@ poor painter's unfaithful distortion. Cornford implies -that images are separated from the ultimate reality. -Cornford seems to ignow the distinction between a genuine -image and a mere copy in this case. He says, "The cosmology -of the Timaeus is poetry, an image that may come nearer the -truth than some other cosmologies."13 He seems to mean -mere poetry, as opposed to genuine poetry. This does not -help us to understand Timaeus' statement that he will give -the best possible account, which seems to mean genuine - - -poetry. - - -But what does the statement that the Timaeus is - - -12 Ipaa., p. 28. -'S tIpid., p. 30. - - - -poetry mean for Cornford, It means that - -eeeinexactness and inconsistency are inherent in - -the nature of the subject; they cannot be removed - -by a stripping off the veil of allegory. An -allegory, like a cypher, has a key; the Pilgrim's - -Progress can be retranslated into the terms of - -Bunyan's theology. But there is no key to poetry - -or myth.!4 -. Certainly there is poetry, and myth, and imagery. -But these must not be seen in the youthful light of the -myths which Plato himself calls childish; they must be -seen as the best possible account to reveal this doctrine -to all mankind. Cornford's interpretation would lead one -always to insert "only" when ever he refers to images, -since, in such a view, things are either perfectly true -or they are only images. But for Plato, this simple -dichotomy has long outlived its utility, and the doctrine -of notebeing, and the mixture of being and not-being is, -in the Timaeus, a further effort on Plato's part to -clarify his thought on these matters. - -Archer-Hind comments that the eternal model of the -universe and its creation in time represents Plato's use -of allegory, and that there can be - -no question whatsoever of the beginning of the - -universe in time. The creation in time is simply - -part of the figurative representation; in Plato's - -highly poetical and allegorical exposition, a - - -logical analysis is represented as taking place -in time, and to reach his true meaning we must - - -14 Ipta., pp. 31-2. - - -strip off the veil of allegory.1!5 -Here 4s the source of Cornford's statement that it is -impossible to "strip off the veil of allegory." Later in -his commentary, Archer-Hind writes that although Plato is -talking about "absolute thought thinking itself" Plato -has put this idea into the figure of a gradually unfolding -process. My view is that it is not necessary to strip off -the veil of allegory to see Plato's meaning, for the -allegory does not conceal but enhances the doctrine. For -those who see only the allegory, it affords a pretty image -of the truth. But for those who see the doctrine, the image -4s an added richness, which does not cloud the doctrine, -but actually helps it to radiate of itself, and to shine -more radiantly. However, one notices that Archer-Hind does -not translate the final portion of the passage in question -by the phrase "only an image"; he says, simply, that an -image is "likely" and "duly corresponding" with its -subject. Thus Archer-Hind 1s able to conclude that words -stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent as the images do, and that this proportion is a -special case of the more general formula at the end of the -passage, which has it that becoming is to being as probability is to truth, This is not mere imagery, for words - - -themselves, in this setting, become images. Later, when - - -15 R.D. Archer-Hind, Commentary on the Timaeus -London: The Macmillan Company, 1000), p. 00, n. 14. - - - -the whole cosmos is termed an image, Cornford's diminution -of imagery will suffer because he has not allowed anything -less than pure being to be called being, and so, whatever -is less than pure must be somehow less than real. Thus -Archer-Hind has escaped the claws of this argument by -interpreting Plato's text to mean that words and images -must correspond to that which they represent, 36 that a -moving cosmos described without the use of a moving image -would violate the canons Plato sets down for faithful -representation. - -However, Archer=-Hind seems not to follow his own -conviction that the later dialogues show a constant -progression, because he adds that this analogy is precisely -what one finds at Republic 511e. But there we find, not a -division into two parts which are proportional, but 4 -fourfold division of the powers of the soul where images -are the lowest level of intelligence, and not the proportional representation of truths of reason. - -Jowett too holds that the images which are only -4mitations of eternal things must be only images. Jowett's -well-known Kantian bias is clearly evident here, since -those kinds of knowledge which give anything less than the -inscrutable nature of the Forms cannot be satisfactorily -called true knowledge, but only images and copies. The -fact that Jowett places the Timaeus next after the Republic -is in part based on his claim that there is little differeme -between the doctrine of the two dialogues. This is a - - - - - -function of two factors; first, Jowett wrote his translations before the stylometrists ushered in the new era of - - -Platonic criticism, and second, if one reads the Timaeus -with the expectation that its doctrine will ot differ -materially from the doctrine of the middle period, and -then translates the text with that view in mind, it is not -only consistent but logically necessary to write "only an -image." But if one follows the majority of scholars who -placed the Timaeus in the late period, then one may see in - - -the Timaeus certain doctrinal reformulations, so that it - - -is not necessary to expect Plato to speak in the same -epistemological voice which the later dialogues clearly -modulate. - -But a point worth making is partially confirmed by -Jowett, in that he agrees with Archer-Hind that Plato -makes words proportional to their referents, just as -images are proportional to their paradigms. Although -Cornford's translation of "accounts" is somewhat cumbersome, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating -the second half of the proportion "what essence is to -generation, so truth is to belief," although Cornford -prefers being to essence. - -The little=-consulted work of T.T. Taylor is also -instructive with regard to the passage in question. [f.T. -Taylor translates paradeigmatos not as paradigm, nor as -model, but as exemplar. This translation could lead to the - - -game difficulty into which Cornford was led, since the - - - - - -word exemplar has inescapably transcendental connotations, -creating the impression that there is a spatial separation -between the world of exemplars and the world of images, -and this in turn would lead to the diminution of the role -of images and the arguments based upon them. And so, T.T. -Taylor says that in the discussion of images, "we should -employ only probable arguments," thereby separating what -Plato is trying to put together in a new way. However, T.T. -Taylor says, -The faith which Plato now assumes appears to be -different from that of which he speaks in the -sixth book of the Republic, in the section of -aline; for that is irrational knowledge, whence -also it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged -according to sense. But the present faith is -rational, although it is mingled with irrational -knowledges, employing sense and conjecture; aud -hence is filled with much that is unstable.! -He goes on to say that for Plato there are four kinds of -truth, and that some must be conjoined with sensibles. -This opinion is noteworthy since it was written in 1804, -@ full half-century before the scholars decided to resort -to language tables to sort the dialogues into their -chronological context. Here is a scholar who sees that - - -Plato's reference is to the four truths, not of the Republic, - - -but of the Philebus, where the Good is said to impart - - - -purity to the mixture. - - -16 T.T. Taylor, The Timaeus and Critias of Plato -(Washington: Pantheon Books Inc., 1952), p. 112. - - -'7 Ip4a., p. 17. - - - -Bury does not relate the four truths of the Timaeus -to the four divisions of the Philebus, but, instead, -dichotomizes being and becoming, '8 Thus in the last few -lines of his translation, he says that, on the one hand, . -statements which copy the eternal must be, -in so far as it is possible and fitting for -statements to be, irrefutable and invincible, they -must in no wise fall short thereof, whereas the -accounts of that which is copied after the likeness -of that model, and is itself a likeness, will be -analogous thereto and posess likelihood; -Although Bury does not insert an "only" in this passage, -the feeling tone is indicated in his tra*slation by his -use of "whereas," which makes it seem that he has shifted -the field and is now speaking of the opposite side of the -dichotomy. His translation makes it seem that the universe -4s only a copy of a copy, and therefore probably lese than -true. This seems to go against the aim of the passage, - - -which is to account for the use of imagery, which, in - - -earlier dialogues (Republic, Phaedo) were unworthy vehicles - - -of the truth, but in later dialogues (Sophist, Statesman) -are not only worthy but somehow necessary to describe the -notebeing integral to every real thing. - -It is A.E. Taylor's view that the Platonic theory - - -of creation in the Timaeus is a perfectly Christian vision, - - -and that, futhermore, Plato's view is best understood by - - -applying to it the fundamentals of Whitehead's theory of - - -18 Bury, "Plato and History," p. 5. - - - - - -time, as set out in the "Concept of Nature." There are -here actually two "heresies," as Cornford says. The first -ig the assertion that Plato's theory of creation is -assimilable to the Christian notion: the second 1s that -Whitehead's theory is both Christian and Platonic. It -might seem that these theological disputes are not to the -point, but, unfortunately, Taylor has introduced them in -explanation of the passage which is under discussion. -Taylor first determines that Plato has said that -the world clearly must have had an eternal model but that -the world itself is mutable. Then he says, "This is -virtually what Whitehead means when he says in his own -terminology that objects are 'angredient'"!9 in events. -From this he draws the inference that Plato insists on a -provisional character of representation because the senses -only perceive roughly, and because it takes a long time for -the coarseness of sensory perception to cross-check itself -and finally arrive at precise and exact perceptions. -Cornford seems right here when he says that A.E. Taylor's -speculations derive from A.E. Taylor and hardly at all -from Plato. It might be true to assert that Plato held -the senses not to be "infinitely acute" but this is a -long way from the claim that Plato offers a provisional - - -account because the senses are so dull and because they - - -19 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 73. - - - - - -can only report what they perceive at a given time, °° - - -AE, Taylor nevertheless does not insert the "only" which -others want. His translation reads: - -We must lay it down that discourses are akin in - -character to that which they expound, discourses - -about the permanent and stable and apprehensible - -by thought themselves permanent and unchanging - -(so far as it is possible and proper for discourses - -to be irrefutable and final, there must be no - -fallingshort of thate-), discourses about that -which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding to their objects.2! - -However, he adds the comment that Timaeus' discourse -and Timaeus' "warning" about proportionality pertain to -the whole cosmology. - -It is not given as a finally true account of - -anything but simply (only?) as the account which, - -so far as Timaeus can see, best "saves," i.e., - -does full justice to all the "appearances" so far - -as they are known to him.22 -So, although A.E. Taylor does not insert "only" in his -translation, he asks that the passage be interpreted as a -warning that the account is simply the best one which -Timaeus can devise to save the appearances. This follows - - -upon Taylor's assumption that the Timaeus is a dialogue in - - -which we should expect to find "nothing more" than the -doctrine of a fifth-century Pythagorean, a "provisional - - -tale," the "best approximation" Timaeus could manage. This - - -20 tpi. -21 Ipid., p. 74. -22 tpid. - - - - - -interpretation makes it impossible for Taylor to accept -the Timaeus as a dialogue which contains anything of the -"later Platonic theory. "2 - -Rather than enter into a detailed discussion of this -Taylorian "heresy," as Cornford calls it, and rather than -give the details of a long and involved series of quotations -from the Ancients, it seems more appropriate to state -Cornford's view of A.E. Taylor's unique and solitary -opinion that the Timaeus is only Plato's eclectic and -rather artificial combination of Empedoclean biology on to -the stock of Pythagorean mathematics and astronomy. Cornford -says, in summary, - -It is hard to understand how anyone acquainted - -with the literature and art of the classical - -period can imagine that the greatest philosopher - -of that period, at the height of his powers, - -could have wasted his time on so frivolous and - -futile an exercise in pastiche.@ - - -In addition, Cornford feels that "There is more of Plato -in The Adventures of Ideas than there is of Whitehead in - - -the Timaeus."29 - - -Except for Bury's, the most recent translation of the -passages under discussion (29b=c) is Cornford's, which has -the additional merit of supplying a detailed commentary, - - -familiar at once with the sources and the conclusions of - - -23 Ipid., p. 19. - - -24 Cornford, op. cit., pe. x. - - -25 Ibid., pp. 11=12, - - - -Platonic scholars. Yet Cornford's translation contains the - - -assumption that the doctrine of the Timaeus cannot go - - -beyond the dialogues of the late period which precede it. -Yet Cornford himself places the Timeaeus after the Philebus - - -on doctrinal grounds; he feels that the Timaeus generalizes - - -the divisions of the Philebus into the far more general - - -topic of cosmology. But he fails to see that the Timaeus -does not merely apply the Philebus’ doctrine to cosmology; - - -the Timaeus seeks a broader generalization of insight, - - -proportional to the broader range of inquiry. Thus, in the -passage in question, one should not conclude with Cornford -that Timaeus is apologizing for the use of image because -of Plato's repudiation of images in the middle period. -There is an explanation which is much more simple; the - - -Timaeus says quite simply that the image by which the - - -universe is to be described is proportional to its model. -The simplest view is that Plato now introduces an image -into his most mature doctrine, and one can plausibly draw -the inference that Plato's mature doctrine contains a -rejwassesment of the value of an image. To force Plato to -hold fast to his earlier repudiation of the value of images -is to preclude the need for the whole Timaeus, which, -nevertheless, Plato wrote in his last years. - -Thus, the simplest interpretation of 29b-c seems -best. We must accept Plato's statement that the Universe - - -is an image, and we ought not inflict our interpretations - - - -of the earlier Platonic Philosophy on the philosophy Plato - - -writes in the Timaeus. This interpretation saves us the - - -trouble of inserting cumbersome deviations from Plato's -simple language. It seems too circuitous to assert that, -although Plato says the Universe is an image, what he -really means is that the Universe is not an image but only -allegorically described as if it were an image. It seems -simpler and more correct to say, with Plato, that our -Universe is an image. - -Now the problem becomes more philosophical, for we -must inquire of the succeeding passages about the reality -of an image, what an image is and why an image is, and, - - -with Plato and the whole Timaeus, when an image is. This - - -inquiry, as we shall see, is not to be separated from the - - -main theme of the trilogy of which the Timaeus is the first - - -dialogue; what are the conditions of the best form of -society. - -It would seem then, that the sense of 29b-c is as -follows: - - -Granting these premises, we must see now that our -Universe is an image of something. Now in all things -4t is most important to start at the natural beginning. Concerning an image, then, and its paradigm, we -must state the following: as a word is proportional -to the reality it describes,-a description of that -which is stable and abiding and discoverable by the -aid of reason being itself stable and abiding (so -far as it is possible for descriptions to be so -there must be no falling short of that) so, a -description which describes an image will be -proportional to the image it describes; as reality -is to becoming, so is truth to rational faith. - - - - -This reading, it seems, restores the whole proportional tone of the passage, which is a carefully balanced -set of proportional propositions, culminating in the statement that reality is to becoming what truth is to a rational -faith. : - -Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the participants of the dialogue should accept the account he is -about to give as a "probable myth" (eikota mython) (29d) -4t need not be understood as "only" a myth but, in -contradistinction to the childish myths which are for those -who can see no further, the myth which Timaeus is about -to tell is a likely or probable myth. This follows out the -theme established in the former passage. Just as the image -which our world is, is not merely an image, so the myth of -Timaeus is not merely a myth. As the image is proportional -to its model, so the myth will be proportional to its -model. The myth is a description of the Universe, and the -Universe is an image. And since the image is faithful to -the proportions of the original, as the Sophist stated it -must be to have its measure of truth, so the myth will be -proportional to the image, so that it can have its measure -of truth. For some images are fantasies, and some myths are -childish. But the universe is a genuine image and the myth -which describes it is faithful to the proportions of the -image, its model. As reality is to becoming, so image is -to myth. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the -reality and hence the reliability of images and myths - - - - - -depends on the account given to images in the Sophist -which goes beyond the sterile purity of the isolated Forms - - -of the Parmenides, which were there described as due to the - - -naivete of the youthful Socrates. In this connection, it - - -must equally be stressed that Plato is not vindicating any - - -and all myths. He explicitly says only faithful images - -(in the Sophist) and only probable myths (in the Timaeus). -But this is new. For Plato had written myths in each of the -dialogues in the late period, and the famous myth of Er of -the Republic 1s easily remembered. In the Sophist even - -some views of the One and the Many are called childish -myths. And in the Seventh Letter, Plato tells us that there - - -neither was nor is nor shall there ever be a doctrine of -Plato's on the subject of the ultimate Forms. In view of -29bec this paradoxical statement becomes intelligible. It -means that there cannot be a doctrine of the ultimate Forms -in isolation. Since the Universe is an image, the account -of its ultimate Forms must be proportional to its reality. -thus the account of the origins of the Universe, which is a -locus of the Forms and the powers which they promise, must -be mythical; not merely mythical, but genuinely mythical. -It is Plato's sense of the inneffable and his poetic genius -to see beyond every exact and fixed statement. The need not -to blaspheme and yet the need to communicate can only be -united in a properly proportional account of the subject. -One must, and yet one dares not, speak the Name of the - - -Ultimate Form. One may find the father of this universe - - -_ 194 -but it is impossible to reveal him to all mankind. This -speaks the double necessity not to lie and not to distort, -and this double necessity is met by the true myth, which -functions to reveal yet hide, to speak yet remain silent. -Thus, while the myth speaks Plato's doctrine, in a sense, -4t does not constitute a doctrine. It is precisely this -notespeaking which constitutes the connecting theme between - - -the Timaeus and the Sophist, but, at the same time, it is - - -the generalization of this theme to a cosmic level, united -to the investigation of time and eternity insofar as they -relate to the best society, which constitutes the Timaeus -as a culmination of the themes of eternity, image, and time, -as they were gradually developed in the later dialogues. -Granted that the Timaeus is poetry, it is not only poetry; - - -it is, above all, Plato's philosophical poetry. - -So far, then, we have been told about the role which -an image is to play in Plato's description of the origin -of the Universe. We have been told that the Universe is an -image and that one properly makes use of a myth to describe -an image as accurately as it can be described. It remains -for Plato to tell us what an image 1s, how the Universe is -an image, and, most especially, how the description of the -Universe as an image explains the relation of time and - - -eternity to the best society. +\defpnote{2.18}{Bury, \bt{Plato and History},\ednote{book or essay?} p. 5.} +\defpnote{2.19}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 73.} +\defpnote{2.20}{Ibid.} +\defpnote{2.21}{Ibid., p. 74.} +\defpnote{2.22}{Ibid.} +\defpnote{2.23}{Ibid., p. 19.} +\defpnote{2.24}{Cornford, op. cit., p. x.} +\defpnote{2.25}{Ibid., pp. 11--12.} CHAPTER V |