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diff --git a/plato_time.otx b/plato_time.otx index 32a8f63..444b634 100644 --- a/plato_time.otx +++ b/plato_time.otx @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ insight. It will be established that the \ul{Timaeus} is very probably the last dialogue Plato completed and edited, that -it 1s followed only by the incomplete \ul{Critias} and the +it is followed only by the incomplete \ul{Critias} and the unedited \ul{Laws}. These facts, taken together with the fact that the \ul{Timaeus} recapitulates some doctrines of the \ul{Republic}, give the \ul{Timaeus} a central importance in Plato's @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ dialogues, where the use of an image becomes gradually more appropriate. These problems form a cluster about a deeper point, -and it 1s this deeper point which deserves the best efforts +and it is this deeper point which deserves the best efforts towards clarification. Since Plato investigates the meaning of time, eternity, and image together in his effort to describe the basis of the best form of society, it is @@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ determine the exact date of every dialogue.\pnote{1.19}} Before entering into this lively controversy, it is necessary to distinguish a few crucial points; otherwise, Jaeger's claim that the movement discredited itself will not -be intelligible. First, let it be noted that it 1s sometimes +be intelligible. First, let it be noted that it is sometimes impossible to distinguish very well between the date of composition of a dialogue, that is, the period of time during which Plato is said to have actually written @@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ number of clausulae. Thus objections to the use of stylometric scholarship need not carry equal weight if referred to stylistic scholarship. It would be impossible, for example, to put words of the \ul{Laws} into a computer and -arrive at the conclusion that the \ul{Laws} 1s a late dialogue, +arrive at the conclusion that the \ul{Laws} is a late dialogue, without at the same time programming into the computer the criteria according to which one says that a certain language style is late or early. There are similar studies @@ -1792,122 +1792,78 @@ especially attractive. \sec The Doctrine of the Dialogues \secc Introduction - In the foregoing chapter, the chronology of the dialogues according to reputable scholars was presented. - - -The conclusion that the Iimaeus is a late dialogue was - - +The conclusion that the \ul{Timaeus} is a late dialogue was reached by these scholars by utilizing several criteria, -including stylistic interpretations, biographical information, agreement among some of the ancients, and certain - - -relevant information which Plato set down in his Seventh - - -Letter. It 1s now the task before us to confirm this - - -cgnelusion by appeal to doctrinal development in the -dialogues which precede the Timaeus. This will be done by +including stylistic interpretations, biographical information, +agreement among some of the ancients, and certain +relevant information which Plato set down in his \ul{Seventh Letter}. +It is now the task before us to confirm this +conclusion by appeal to doctrinal development in the +dialogues which precede the \ul{Timaeus}. This will be done by showing that there are significant themes in the dialogues -which precede the Timaeus, which are gradually modified - - +which precede the \ul{Timaeus}, which are gradually modified and expanded until they are treated in a new way in the -Timaeus. +\ul{Timaeus}. It is obviously impossible in these few pages to present a detailed summary of all of the philosophical doctrines which Plato treated in each of the dialogues to -be discussed. Therefore, only those themes which specifically culminate in the Timaeus will be passed in review. - -It 1s assumed that no significant distortion of Plato's +be discussed. Therefore, only those themes which specifically +culminate in the \ul{Timaeus} will be passed in review. +It is assumed that no significant distortion of Plato's philosophy will be made by selecting three themes which - - -Plato discusses together in the Timaeus, and that no - - - +Plato discusses together in the \ul{Timaeus}, and that no distortion will be introduced by tracing these themes as Plato develops them in the dialogues which intervene - - -between a logical starting point and the Timaeus. - +between a logical starting point and the \ul{Timaeus}. The first problen, then, is to determine a logical - - -point to begin our investigations. The Timaeus itself gives - - -us the starting point because it begins with a recapitulation of certain themes in the Republic. This seems to be a +point to begin our investigations. The \ul{Timaeus} itself gives +us the starting point because it begins with a recapitulation +of certain themes in the \ul{Republic}. This seems to be a clear indication that the investigation of Plato's later philosophy must include some sort of comparison with the -Republic and the doctrines of the so-called middle period. +\ul{Republic} and the doctrines of the so-called middle period. In the discussion which follows, it will be assumed that -the doctrines of the Republic may fairly be taken as +the doctrines of the \ul{Republic} may fairly be taken as representative of the doctrines of the entire middle period, and that reference to the other dialogues of the middle period will be made only when it seems clearly -necessary. Thus little mention will be found of the Phaedo, - - -Phaedrus, and Symposium, and our inquiry will focus mainly - - -on the Republic. -The Parmenides and the Theatetus constitute a special - +necessary. Thus little mention will be found of the \bt{Phaedo}, +\bt{Phaedrus}, and \bt{Symposium}, and our inquiry will focus mainly +on the \ul{Republic}. +The \ul{Parmenides} and the \ul{Theatetus} constitute a special group of dialogues, as Ritter has observed. In these dialogues a special critique of the doctrines of the middle period is undertaken by Plato himself. Thus, if one plans to trace the development of certain doctrinal themes by starting with the Republic and continuing through the late -dialogues, one ought to interpose between the Republic - - -and the "late" dislogues, the Parmenides and the Theatetus, - - - +dialogues, one ought to interpose between the \ul{Republic} +and the "late" dislogues, the \ul{Parmenides} and the \ul{Theatetus}, and their respective doctrines, insofar as they discuss the themes in question. In the subsequent discussion of the doctrines of the late dialogues, it will be shown that the critique of -the middle doctrines by the Parmenides and Theatetus had - - -brought Plato to the recognition of a need for new doctrinal formulations. Thus, it will not only clarify the doctrine -of the Republic but it will shed light on the Sophist, -Statesman, and Philebus if we examine carefully the critique made by the Parmenides and Theatetus. In this way, one +the middle doctrines by the \ul{Parmenides} and \ul{Theatetus} had +brought Plato to the recognition of a need for new doctrinal +formulations. Thus, it will not only clarify the doctrine +of the \ul{Republic} but it will shed light on the \ul{Sophist}, +\ul{Statesman}, and \ul{Philebus} if we examine carefully the critique +made by the \ul{Parmenides} and \ul{Theatetus}. In this way, one May examine the sequence of doctrinal modifications which Plato made as he matured, and one may discuss both the doctrines and the doctrinal advances as one treats each succeeding dialogue. - -Certain confirmations of the view that the Timaeus - - +Certain confirmations of the view that the \ul{Timaeus} reformulates old doctrines in a new way will be sought - - -in relevant passages from the Critias and the Laws, but - - +in relevant passages from the \ul{Critias} and the \ul{Laws}, but these are only taken as lateral confirmations, and not as - - -indices, of the extent to which the Timaeus contains - - +indices, of the extent to which the \ul{Timaeus} contains significantly new doctrinal formulations. They form, as it were, testable corollaries of the main hypothesis. @@ -1916,59 +1872,38 @@ are the themes of eternity, image, and time. It should be noted that the words eternity, image, and time are not technical terms for Plato, and that their meaning will be found to change as the sequence of dialogues approaches the - - -Le - - - - - -Timaeus. For this reason, I prefer to call them themes and ; - - +\ul{Timaeus}. For this reason, I prefer to call them themes and not terms or ideas or doctrines. I have also made a methodological choice. It would -be possible to select the passages from each of the dialogues which discuss eternity, image, and time, and by placing +be possible to select the passages from each of the dialogues + which discuss eternity, image, and time, and by placing them together, one could discuss each theme separately. But there is another way, which seems more faithful to Plato's own method, and that 18 to pass each dialogue in review, -and, in passing, point out those passages which are relevant to the themes of eternity, image and time. This latter +and, in passing, point out those passages which are relevant +to the themes of eternity, image and time. This latter method has been adopted. In the chapters which follow the present one, a more or less interlinear commentary will be offered on those - - -passages of the Timaeus which are relevant to the three - - +passages of the \ul{Timaeus} which are relevant to the three themes I have selected for study. In this way, the gradual advance of Plato's thought is given what I feel is an appropriately developmental context. I maintain, then, that in the middle period, i.e., in -the Republic, Plato formulated a doctrinal position with +the \ul{Republic}, Plato formulated a doctrinal position with respect to the relations of eternity, image, and time, - - -that he began a critique of this position in the Parmenides - - -and Theatetus, and that he began a new formulation in the -Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus, which reached a new -height in the Timaeus. The reader is asked to judge for +that he began a critique of this position in the \ul{Parmenides} +and \ul{Theatetus}, and that he began a new formulation in the +\ul{Sophist}, \ul{Statesman}, and \ul{Philebus}, which reached a new +height in the \ul{Timaeus}. The reader is asked to judge for himself in what follows whether this claim is credible. +\secc The Republic - - - -The Republic -In the Republic, Plato retains the doctrine of the - - +In the \ul{Republic}, Plato retains the doctrine of the Forms, and seeks particularly to find the Form of Justice, its nature and origin (357 d). However, this is a hard task which can only be performed by those whose eyesight @@ -1979,7 +1914,8 @@ perfect, so that, instead of attempting to gaze directly on the Form of Justice, it will be better to adopt a "shortsighted" method, namely, seeing Justice where it is writ large, in the state (369 a). This will bring about an -unfortunate mutilation of pure vision, but it is inescapable. Moreover, it is a better method than the one adopted +unfortunate mutilation of pure vision, but it is inescapable. +Moreover, it is a better method than the one adopted by such "story tellers" as Hesiod and Homer who rather tell lies than avoid distortion (377 e). These authors do not realize that "children" do not know the difference between @@ -1990,24 +1926,20 @@ is that truths must be represented, if at all, ina true way, worthy of their contents (379 b). "Because we do not know the truth of ancient traditions, we make falsehoods as much like the truth as we can, and there is no use in -this."(382 4d) +this." (382 d) Here in the opening passages of Book II, Plato tells - - us that one encounters difficulty in attempting to reveal - - - -those truths which have been seen by one's excellent eyesight, to those with less than perfect vision. Images of +those truths which have been seen by one's excellent eyesight, +to those with less than perfect vision. Images of truth are, for such men, dangerous, and should be avoided. Nevertheless, Plato does not stop the process of inquiry. Reluctantly, he will try to see the truth of the Form of Justice as it is writ large in the state. This -tells us that the whole Republic is, in its own way, an +tells us that the whole \ul{Republic} is, in its own way, an allegory, designed not so much to spell out the legal -machinations of a polis as to take a shortsighted view of +machinations of a \e{polis} as to take a shortsighted view of the Form of Justice. We know this interest in Justice to be a lifelong concern of Plato. It is cited here to document the fact that even in the middle dialogues, Plato is not @@ -2016,22 +1948,16 @@ that at this point in his development he uses a short-e sighted method. He makes the decision to undertake a vision of Justice in the state despite his awareness that his description of the state will only imperfectly incarnate -Justice in an image, which in this case, is an allegory (%9 -a). The problem is that allegories only imperfectly imitate the Form of Justice, which Plato tells us next in the +Justice in an image, which in this case, is an allegory (368 +a). The problem is that allegories only imperfectly imitate +the Form of Justice, which Plato tells us next in the famous allegory of the guardians and their education. It is necessary for the guardians to know the Forms, or else their guidance shall be lacking in some perfection, yet they are surrounded in their youth by "images of moral deformity (401 b)." Physicians, like judges, must cure by - - use of mind, and "a virtuous nature, educated by time, will - - - acquire a knowledge of both virtue and vice (409 e)." - - Thus, it will be necessary for the guardians to be exposed to both perfect and imperfect images of Justice, and, if they are strong, and if their souls are in harmony (410 e), @@ -2043,8 +1969,10 @@ and the "audacious fiction" (414 b). It is recognized that the sights of youth are like dreams, and that their education is an acquaintance with "appearance," but youth ie in a process of formation in the womb of the earth. -Perhaps it might not be possible to so educate the guardians in the first generation, but in the next, their sons -will probably adopt this view (415 b). Here Plato anticipates the difficulty that a new set of laws may not be +Perhaps it might not be possible to so educate the guardians +in the first generation, but in the next, their sons +will probably adopt this view (415 b). Here Plato anticipates +the difficulty that a new set of laws may not be accepted with open arms by a generation of men, but the need is great; new laws must be found and promulgated. Yet the basis for new laws, i.e., a clear sight of the Forms, @@ -2055,50 +1983,36 @@ need to know the truth) cannot be denied. Eventually, the guardians will see through the mere images of their education if they are instructed in these matters "and others not mentioned (423 e)." For that reason, there is - - no need to legislate about particulars, since these will - - - flow from the character of the institutions (425 c). In order to legislate about the "greatest and noblest" institution (427 b) the one which deals with temples and sacrifices, Plato introduces the "method of residues" which we would call the method of gradual elimination. - By presenting the given activities, which are presumed to - be known, and by eliminating all the unacceptable ones, -Plato arrives at a list of virtues which ought to characterize the guardians (428 a). (As we shall see, this method - +Plato arrives at a list of virtues which ought to characterize +the guardians (428 a). (As we shall see, this method of residues is by no means the same as the method of -division in the Sophist). Then, by eliminating lesser +division in the \ul{Sophist}). Then, by eliminating lesser virtues, Plato arrives at the conclusion that the guardians ought to be temperate, wise, courageous, and just (432 b). And by further use of the method of residues, it is - -decided that Justice 1s the ultimate basis of the perfection -of the state (435 a). As we shall see, this conclusion will -be expanded in the Timaeus, where Time, not Justice is - +decided that Justice is the ultimate basis of the perfection +of the state (433 a). As we shall see, this conclusion will +be expanded in the \ul{Timaeus}, where \e{Time,} not Justice is said to be the basis of perfection. Justice itself is said to be "the having and doing -what is a man's own, and belongs to him (435 b)." If a +what is a man's own, and belongs to him (433 b)." If a man does what he does, and does not attempt to do what others do, then Justice will have introduced harmony into the relations of the citizens. Just as the classes of the state are to be in harmony with each other, so the soul's virtues will be in harmony - - with each other, if education proceeds correctly. Yet - - -TT Socrates confessed that he does not understand this notion of harmony too well. The technical insight into music and the harmony of string lengths is best left to the musician, @@ -2107,7 +2021,7 @@ Socrates relates the need for harmony in the soul; the images of this harmony in the particular instances of music and gymnastics are not directly his concern. -'This is true because it behooves a man, and a state, +This is true because it behooves a man, and a state, to be a unity, whereas a skill in a large number of particulars strains unity. 'thus, each class in the state has one and only one function, just as each man in the @@ -2123,27 +2037,15 @@ the discussion seems to be bogging down in particulars. However, he hopes to "strike a spark" and in that way release a vision of his subject (434 e). He says: -I must confess that the method we are employing - +\Q{I must confess that the method we are employing seems to be altogether inadequate to the accurate - solution of this questions for the true method is another and a longer one. Still, we may arrive at - -a@ solution not below the level of the previous - -Anquiry (435 a)." +a solution not below the level of the previous +inquiry (435 a).} This is the same intractable necessity to reveal - - visions of a more perfect eye to those with less than - - -Toes - - - perfect vision. However, the method of employing images aoes reveal a "shadow" of Justice, and therefore, it is useful (443 c). So, on this basis he traces out the @@ -2151,27 +2053,27 @@ division of labor in a society, showing that each man who fulfills his appointed task is just only insofar as he does not encroach upon the appointed task of another. To do what another ought to do is a double injustice, both to oneself -and to the other. The solidarity of the "imaginary commonwealth" (456 d) rests on this Justice, and, in the same way, -the soul of the man who tries to cross his line of responsibility will be unjust. The relation of these divided +and to the other. The solidarity of the "imaginary commonwealth" +(456 d) rests on this Justice, and, in the same way, +the soul of the man who tries to cross his line of responsibility +will be unjust. The relation of these divided responsibilities is injustice. We must assume this to be so, for we are reminded that the allegorical investigation of the Form of Justice is like dreamers feasting on a -dream, and that the state here investigated is ""imaginary (458 a)." +dream, and that the state here investigated is "imaginary (458 a)." -Does unity, achieved by the harmony of each individual (soul or class) performing his one task, really work. +Does unity, achieved by the harmony of each individual +(soul or class) performing his one task, really work. "The inquiry has yet to be made whether such a community will be found possible...and in what way...(471 c)." To answer this, we must inquire what is the least change to be introduced into the state which would bring -about the imaginary harmony we seek. The philosopher-~ -king is the person who will accomplish this. Why do we +about the imaginary harmony we seek. The philosopher-king +is the person who will accomplish this. Why do we need the philosopher-king? Because it is he who sees the Forms in their direct "Beauty" (476 b) and he knows the - - - -difference between knowledge of something and knowledge of : +difference between knowledge of something and knowledge of nothing. When one knows, he knows something, and this is true knowledge. When one knows nothing, he is in "ignore ance" (477 b). The realm of opinion is in between, where @@ -2180,7 +2082,8 @@ the immutable and the eternal, and only this is rightly called knowledge (478 e). this sort of knowledge and this sort alone should characterize the philosopher-king, and all those who deal in opinions about the Justice of this -or that or the Beauty of this or that occupy some intermediary region which will not fit them for ruling, nor for +or that or the Beauty of this or that occupy some intermediary +region which will not fit them for ruling, nor for introducing into the atate the least change which will make it a just state. Only knowledge of the eternal and immutable is knowledge. And yet, as Galileo remarked in @@ -2196,17 +2099,7 @@ speech. Such men cannot deserve the honor of navigating at the helm of state, for they follow the fancies of the demanding crew, whom they are supposed to lead (488 a). Just as most do not possess the clarity of vision to see - - Justice, these men do not know how sweet philosophy is. - - -LL - - - - - Few know this (496 c). For this reason, there has never been a state ruled by the philosopher king, and none exists at the present (499 a). We see how necessary it is to @@ -2218,24 +2111,16 @@ the form of justice, we had better imagine a state where youths are educated from the start to see through the dreams which characterize the realm of opinion. -If then, in the countless ages of the past or at - +\Q{If then, in the countless ages of the past or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is - far away and beyond our ken, the perfect philosopher - 4s or has been or shall be hereafter compelled by a - superior power to have charge of the state, we are - ready to assert to the death that this our constitution has been, is, and yea, will be at - any time, only when the muse of philosophy is - queen. Neither is there any impossibility in - -this: the difficulty we do not deny (499 4). +this: the difficulty we do not deny (499 d).} Here is a striking juncture, for in it, Plato tells us that the vision of the eternal and immutable Form of @@ -2247,35 +2132,21 @@ perhaps at present, or perhaps in the future. The themes of eternity, image, and time, are joined in one passage. The eternal realm of Forms is the domain of the philosopher, not the Sophist, who dwells in the realm of opinion and - - changing imagery. At present, we have no philosopher-king, - - - - - but, since he is not impossible, he may be sought in another time; perhaps past, perhaps future, or perhaps in the present somewhere far away. -What will be the task of the philosopher-king. - -eoeHe will look at Justice and Beauty as they are +\Q{What will be the task of the philosopher-king. +...He will look at Justice and Beauty as they are in nature and again at the corresponding quality - in mankind, and then inlay the true human image, - moulding and selecting out of the various forms - of life: and this He will conceive according to - that other image, which, when existing among - men, Homer calls the form and likeness of - -God" (501 b). +God (501 b).} It will be his task to see the forms and to legislate in such a way that men are made in him image. To do so @@ -2285,7 +2156,7 @@ will not be allowed to take the shortsighted path: theirs will be the "long way." To this astonishing exhortation, it is objected: is there a higher form than Justice, and the still more astonishing answer is: yes. This is the idea of -the Good and the Beautiful (504 ad). +the Good and the Beautiful (504 d). The Good and the Beautiful are not to be represented on the same level as Justice. For them, nothing short of @@ -2294,32 +2165,19 @@ even the best opinion is only like a blind man hoping to find his way along a straight road (506). To discuss the 4dea of the Good is too much of a task for the present, but Socrates deigns to discuss the "child of the good"; - - he warns his hearers to be on guard lest he render a false - - account, although he has no intention of deceit (506 e). - - - - What follows is an extended metaphor concerring sunlight, the eyes, and the things seen, in which Socrates explains that the sun is not sight but the source of sight, -he whom I call the child of the Good, whom the - +\Q{he whom I call the child of the Good, whom the Good begat in his own likeness, to be in the - visible world in relation to sight and the - things of sight what the Good is in the - intellectual world in relation to mind and - -the things of the mind" (508 b). +the things of the mind (508 b).} This is the immediate prelude to the famous allegory of the divided line, in which the ambivalence which Plato @@ -2336,18 +2194,13 @@ and opinions (510 a). In the intelligible realm, images function as hypotheses, suggesting but not confirming the Forms and the ideas. -Perhaps the most famous of all philosophical allegories is the next image which Socrates presents, the allegory +Perhaps the most famous of all philosophical allegories +is the next image which Socrates presents, the allegory of the cave (514 a). We are told that the divided line can be seen more concretely in the cave allegory. Going from the lowest to the highest of knowledge, we first have - - shadows, then the objects which cast the shadows, themselves - - - - -only images of the Forms. Then, the understanding captures . +only images of the Forms. Then, the understanding captures images of the Forms and finally, reason sees the Form (515e). It is noteworthy, despite the familiarity of this allegory, to point out that the path of philosophical knowledge is @@ -2367,19 +2220,14 @@ weve copies, dangerous and to be avoided. But, Plato has not brought the realm of the Forms any closer: rather, he has added a small measure of validity to the images of the Forms. It is no longer true that no truth whatever can be -had in the visible wordl: now, some images are valid, +had in the visible wordl: now, \e{some} images are valid, others are not. It is still true, however, that images do not perfectly reveal the Forms. There is one further step in the treatment of images -in the Republic which deserves emphasis. After Socrates +in the \ul{Republic} which deserves emphasis. After Socrates describes the visible universe and the starry heaven as - - the most beautiful and perfect of all visible things (on - - - this basis the guardians are to be instructed in geometry and astronomy) he says that these sciences are not to be learned for their own sake, but because they contain @@ -2407,23 +2255,12 @@ right direction, i1.e., toward greater insight. This is an important doctrine in several respects, not the least of which is the new validity which images - - have been given. It is also important to stress the - - - relativity of images to the respective truths which they reveal, because it is just this function of revealing the - - -higher truth which the Timaeus develops in a new way. In - - -the Republic, Plato admits the functional role of images -with some hesitation. In the Timaeus, this hesitation is - - +higher truth which the \ul{Timaeus} develops in a new way. In +the \ul{Republic}, Plato admits the functional role of images +with some hesitation. In the \ul{Timaeus}, this hesitation is gone, and images are said to be perfectly appropriate revelations in themselves, since they are proportional to their paradigms. @@ -2436,7 +2273,7 @@ perfect stpirelede circle is one whose diameter is a perfect number; i.e., one which is the sum of its divisors, as six is divided by and is the sum of 1, 2, and 3. Unevenly divided circles introduce strife in the state. -This 1s the sort of tale the muses tell, and Homer speaks +This is the sort of tale the muses tell, and Homer speaks their language (545 e). However, while these tales are true in their way, Plato says that there are more pressing investigations, and little is made of the whole procedure. @@ -2446,20 +2283,19 @@ represented by a revolving sphere, and, like a sphere, has a beginning, a middle and an end, so that the forms of government which correspond to the periods of time have a definite sequence. One might extract here a whole political -_philosophy of history in the Pythagorean idiom, but it can | - - - -be shown by a discussion of the Timaeus, that a philosophy +philosophy of history in the Pythagorean idiom, but it can +be shown by a discussion of the \ul{Timaeus}, that a philosophy of political forms and their temporal sequence along Pythagorean lines is far from the sort of treatment Plato can give to this subject. Plato resorts once again to an image of the soul, -but this time it 1s an ideal image, the best possible. -The soul is pictured as consisting of one part polycephalous beast, one part lion, and one part man (588 c), just +but this time it is an ideal image, the best possible. +The soul is pictured as consisting of one part polycephalous +beast, one part lion, and one part man (588 c), just as the state consists of three classes, one of knowledge, -one of ambition, and one of money (580 da). Having discovered this as a result of the inquiry into the state as the +one of ambition, and one of money (580 da). Having discovered +this as a result of the inquiry into the state as the image of the justice of the soul, Socrates says now that the ideal city is a pattern laid up in heaven, and "he who desires may behold this, and beholding, govern himself @@ -2467,7 +2303,7 @@ accordingly. But whether there really is or ever will be such a one is of no importance to him, for he will act according to the laws of that city and no other" (592 b). -The last book of the Republic again takes up the +The last book of the \ul{Republic} again takes up the problem of representing this ideal realm in images which the short-sighted might be able to see. Here Plato rejects imitative poetry as mere copy-making, so that even the @@ -2476,15 +2312,9 @@ painter, who paints new images which did not exist before, which the carpenter makes of wood, even the wooden bed is only an imitation of the Form of all beds. The painter copies, the carpenter copies, but the idea of the bed is - - -ie - - - original and is not a copy of any thing or of any idea. -Thus, the doctrine of the Republic, insofar as it +Thus, the doctrine of the \ul{Republic}, insofar as it concerns the realm of Forms, describes this realm as a sphere in which what is remains what it is, and does not become something else. These Forms are the archetypes of @@ -2494,7 +2324,7 @@ are subject to time in the guises of generation and corrup~ tion, and are changeable, and, therefore, are not truly real, since they are not immutable and eternal. -One last doctrinal theme of the Republic remains to +One last doctrinal theme of the \ul{Republic} remains to be cited before we pass on to the next dialogue. It is the Myth of Er. Like the small Pythagorean allegory which purported to explain the origin of strife, it represents @@ -2502,21 +2332,16 @@ an attempt on Plato's part to plumb not only the depths of things but to discern their origins. The Myth of goes beyond the Pythagorean myth of political philosophy in that it is meant to be a brief cosmogony, not just the -origin of this or that political form. ''o those who search -the Republic for a literal political philosophy and its +origin of this or that political form. To those who search +the \ul{Republic} for a literal political philosophy and its correlations with the soul, it might seem strange that -the Republic should end on a note of myth. However, to -those who see that the Kepublic is an allegorical attempt +the \ul{Republic} should end on a note of myth. However, to +those who see that the \ul{Republic} is an allegorical attempt to portray the realm of Justice, (which is timeless) in terms which the shortsighted can comprehend, (namely, the - - images of the changing present) it comes as no surprise - - -tote) -that the Republic ends in a myth. In fact, since the whole -Republic itself, 1s confessedly only a short-sighted +that the \ul{Republic} ends in a myth. In fact, since the whole +\ul{Republic} itself, is confessedly only a short-sighted representation of an eternal realm, there should be no jarring of consciousness when the Myth of Er is presented. The whole dialogue reads like an attempt to say what seems @@ -2525,7 +2350,7 @@ are true. However, there are certain characteristics of the Myth of Er which ought to be singled out, in addition to -its cosmogonical character, +its cosmogonical character. The Myth of Er recounts the alleged journey of a slain warrior into the world after death, where he is @@ -2533,59 +2358,46 @@ allowed to see what happens to the souls who perish. Some are doomed to wander beneath the earth for ten times the normal lifespan (reckoned as ten times one hundred) and others are allowed to spend their time in a realm of -""4nconceivable Beauty." Thereafter, the souls are allowed +"inconceivable Beauty." Thereafter, the souls are allowed to choose from a wide assortment of lives those they think they would enjoy in their next mortal period on earth. The more interesting feature of this myth is the description of the stars and planets spinning in their relative spheres around the spindle of Necessity; the -Fates, daughters of Necessity, may interrupt these revolutions momentarily or give them direction. The fates +Fates, daughters of Necessity, may interrupt these revolutions +momentarily or give them direction. The fates represent the tenses of time, one for the present, one for the past, and one for the future. Here is the circular - - image of time again, in which the revolutions of the - - - -spheres of the heavens is taken to be the meaning of time: / +spheres of the heavens is taken to be the meaning of time: that is, the spinning of the spheres is the motion we call -time. Notice, however, that here in the Republic, time +time. Notice, however, that here in the \ul{Republic}, time derives from necessity. As we shall see, this is quite -different from the doctrine of the Timaeus. +different from the doctrine of the \ul{Timaeus}. One of the most provocative features of this myth, -48 the perpetual recurrence which 1s said to characterize +is the perpetual recurrence which is said to characterize life, and the circular imagery in which this doctrine is cloaked. For, if it is taken seriously as a myth, it tells us that the number of souls must be a constant, and the careers of men are predetermined by their former lives. How could the experience of such a realm elude our conscious thought in the mortal portion of life? We are told that the -souls must drink of the "waters of forgetfulness and negligence" before they return to a mortal abode (621 a). +souls must drink of the "waters of forgetfulness and negligence" +before they return to a mortal abode (621 a). this is a strange metaphor, especially when coupled with the doctrine of reminiscence, or with the description - - -of the after-life in the Phaedo. What is the meaning of - - +of the after-life in the \ul{Phaedo}. What is the meaning of the "water of forgetfulness"? It pertains to the theme we -have been describing throughout the Republic: the eternal +have been describing throughout the \ul{Republic}: the eternal realm of Forms, the visible world of time, and the strange distance between them which makes the truth of the eternal realm almost impossibly unintelligible to the visible life. Here in the Myth of Er the souls who have lived for a thousand years in the realm of "inconceivable Beauty" are made to forget this experience by imbibing the waters of - - -ES - - - forgetfulness. In this way, a mythical answer is made to the problem of the difficulty of remembering the realm of Forms, the true home of the soul. Since the soul has been @@ -2601,76 +2413,61 @@ to a very high level. On the other hand, it puts the whole responsibility of achieving insight into the Forms on a lesser and inferior type of insight. This contradiction did not escape Plato, but he did not resolve it in the -Republic. We shall have to look to succeeding dialogues for +\ul{Republic}. We shall have to look to succeeding dialogues for its resolution. -Summary of the Republic +\secc Summary of the Republic -We have seen that the Republic presents an attempt to -gain insight into the eternal realm through the investigation of Justice as it is in the state, that this is an +We have seen that the \ul{Republic} presents an attempt to +gain insight into the eternal realm through the investigation +of Justice as it is in the state, that this is an allegorical attempt to see the Form of justice in the soul, and in that way to see Justice itself. However, we are told repeatedly that one needs good vision for this, and that not everyone has good vision. Further, even those with good vision have a difficult time communicating with those who have less than perfect vision. This forces him who has seen - - -ithe Form of Justice to resort to images and copies of the - - - - -Form of Justice, which, unfortunately results ina . -Mutilation of the truth of the Form. We are forced to rely +the Form of Justice to resort to images and copies of the +Form of Justice, which, unfortunately results in a +mutilation of the truth of the Form. We are forced to rely on myths which are like the truth but are not the truth. They bring us close to the truth but not close enough. The height and distance of the Forms is the reason for this difficulty, and it is only partially diminished by the use -of imagery, which is unfortunately always changing, becoming, and passing away. We must have the truth as it is, +of imagery, which is unfortunately always changing, becoming, +and passing away. We must have the truth as it is, yet we cannot, for the realms of eternity and time are too discrete. While time derives from necessity, the Forms derive from eternity, and images constitute an in-between realm of compromise. -The Parmenides - -It is generally agreed that the Parmenides and the -Theatetus must be placed midway between the middle and the - - -late dialogues. If it is true that Plato gradually develop= -ed his doctrines, one should expect to find in the Parmenides some criticism of the Form-theory as it was developed -in the Republic, and some sort of further development of -doctrine. In order to present the details of this hypothesized development, it is now necessary to examine the - - -doctrines of the Parmenides which pertain to the themes of - +\secc The Parmenides + +It is generally agreed that the \ul{Parmenides} and the +\ul{Theatetus} must be placed midway between the middle and the +late dialogues. If it is true that Plato gradually developed +his doctrines, one should expect to find in the \ul{Parmenides} +some criticism of the Form-theory as it was developed +in the \ul{Republic}, and some sort of further development of +doctrine. In order to present the details of this hypothesized +development, it is now necessary to examine the +doctrines of the \ul{Parmenides} which pertain to the themes of eternity, image, and time, and to see how Plato modifies his view of the relation of these themes to each other and in what way the meaning of these themes in themselves - - is changed. As we shall see, the eternal realm of the Forms - - - and the relation of this realm to the realm of visible -things, as described in the Republic, is brought face to +things, as described in the \ul{Republic}, is brought face to face with some sharp criticisms, in the light of which -Plato modifies the positions he took in the Republic. +Plato modifies the positions he took in the \ul{Republic}. -It 18 also generally agreed that one may logically -divide the Parmenides into two parts, the first of which 1s +It is also generally agreed that one may logically +divide the \ul{Parmenides} into two parts, the first of which is a dramatic introduction and the second of which constitutes the body of doctrine. In this second part, Plato divides his subject into a series of eight hypotheses. Before we discuss them, it might be wise to describe what the word - - -hypothesis means as Plato uses it in the Parmenides. - +hypothesis means as Plato uses it in the \ul{Parmenides}. First, Plato does not mean by hypothesis what is usually meant by this word in contemporary usage in our @@ -2684,21 +2481,13 @@ the conditions, describe them as impartially and fairly as we can, and thereafter determine with what accuracy the conditions resemble those we predicted would obtain. -But Plato's method in the Parmenides is different +But Plato's method in the \ul{Parmenides} is different from the methods just described. He proceeds in a similar but not identical way: for he first decides to examine - - whether a given proposition is true or false and then, - - -ee - - - first assumes the truth and then the falsity of the -proposition in question, which he follows with a demonstrae -tion of the logical consequences of these assumptions. If +proposition in question, which he follows with a demonstration +of the logical consequences of these assumptions. If he arrives at an absurd consequence by assuming the proposition to be false, he begins again by logically deducing the consequences of assuming the proposition to @@ -2710,13 +2499,13 @@ our hypothetical propositions with observations which may or may not agree with predicted observations. Plato examines the logical consequences of a given view; we predict which observations shall be made if the hypothesis is true. - While these two methods have much in common, they are obviously not identical. The eight hypotheses which Plato discusses in the -Parmenides are not equally relevant to the themes of eternity, image and time, so that the short summary of the -doctrine of the Parmenides which follows should not be +\ul{Parmenides} are not equally relevant to the themes of eternity, +image and time, so that the short summary of the +doctrine of the \ul{Parmenides} which follows should not be regarded as an attempt to summarize the entire significance of the dialogue. @@ -2724,17 +2513,12 @@ The dialogue begins with a recitation of a youthful work of Zeno's, which asserts that the existence of the many leads to logical absurdities even more ridiculous than the alleged absurdities which are said to flow from the - - -tes - - - assertion of the existence of the One. The basis for this assertion of absurdity is the statement that the many would have to be both like and unlike, and that therefore the Like would be Unlike and the Unlike Like, i.e., since -there are both like and unlike things, both Like and Unlike would have to be said of them (127 e). +there are both like and unlike things, both Like and Unlike +would have to be said of them (127 e). Socrates asks whether it is possible to assert that there is a Form of Like and a Form of Unlike, and that, @@ -2744,7 +2528,8 @@ things will only share in these Forms and will not have to be both like and unlike in themselves (129 a). While it would not be difficult to think that things shared in the Forms in this dual way, it would of course be impossible to -assert that the idea of Like and the idea of Unlike themselves shared in a dual way in some higher Form, A thing +assert that the idea of Like and the idea of Unlike themselves +shared in a dual way in some higher Form. A thing might participate in the One and in the Many and in that way it could share in both of them without being both of them, and thus different from itself. In the same way, @@ -2752,38 +2537,29 @@ things could share in both Rest and Motion, Same and Different, and other pairs of opposites (129 e). Parmenides and Zeno smile in admiration at this -view, as if they were amused at the craft of this philosophical child named Socrates, who, at the time of this -dialogue, 1s said to be no more than twenty years old (130). - +view, as if they were amused at the craft of this philosophical +child named Socrates, who, at the time of this +dialogue, is said to be no more than twenty years old (130). Parmenides elicits from Socrates the admission that - - -i 95 -his method leads to the assertion of a Form for the Just, : +his method leads to the assertion of a Form for the Just, the Good, and the Beautiful, and of all that class of notions (130 a). Therefore, there must be a Form of man, of fire, of water, etc. Similarly, there must be a Form of hair, dirt, mud, etc. -eeevVisible things such as these are as they appear - +\Q{...Visible things such as these are as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an - absurdity in assuming an idea of them, although I - sometimes get disturbed and begin to think that - there is nothing without an idea; but then again when I have taken this position, I run away, - -because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottonmless pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to - +because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottonmless +pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and +busy myself with them (130 d).} -busy myself with them (130 d). - -Parmenides responds that this is due to Socrates' youth, +\noindent Parmenides responds that this is due to Socrates' youth, and that a time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp. @@ -2791,21 +2567,16 @@ Parmenides then puts the issue squarely: are there or are there not Forms in which things participate, and in that way come to have the qualities of the Forms. Socrates says there are (131 a). Here we have the central problem -of the Parmenides posed with exact precision: are there +of the \ul{Parmenides} posed with exact precision: are there Forms and is there an eternal unchanging realm where they abide. This realm and its characteristics are assumed to exist so that they can be examined in a new way. The problem of the manner in which the Many participate in the One is chosen as the topic by which this issue is best -focused, and they agree to discusa it. . - -The first ob jection Parmenides offers to this view is - +focused, and they agree to discuss it. +The first objection Parmenides offers to this view is the problem of accounting for the way in which a Form could - - - be said to be in the many and yet remain one Forn. For, . if the Form were in the many, it would seem to be divided among them, and hence, not one Form, but many. Nor is it @@ -2818,7 +2589,7 @@ arises as the Idea under which the many are comprehended, must not an Idea of the Idea arise which is the source both of the Idea and of its distribution in the many, and then an Idea of it, and so on, until an infinite regress -4a reached (1352 b)? +4a reached (132 b)? Socrates attempts to evade this by asking whether the Idea may not be only a mental unity assigned to the @@ -2833,14 +2604,9 @@ them. This is subjected to the same critique: another Idea would have to arise in which both the pattern and the thing would be like. -"The theory, then, that other things participate in +\Q{The theory, then, that other things participate in the Ideas by resemblance has to be given up, and some - - -other mode of participation has to be devised" (133 a). - - - +other mode of participation has to be devised (133 a).} These are not even the gravest objections which can be raised against the theory of the Forms. Even worse @@ -2854,7 +2620,7 @@ laborious demonstration can remove this difficulty, which necessitates much training, (not good eyesight alone). Parmenides begins then, by facing directly the -problem which the Republic began to examine; i.e., if there +problem which the \ul{Republic} began to examine; i.e., if there is a realm of Forms separated from the realm of things, the relation of one realm to the other seems impossible, and with that impossibility of separation, partially bridged by @@ -2870,14 +2636,7 @@ training. Parmenides holds out a hopes he says that there is more truth to be found, if, after affirming the hypothesis - - -,of separated realms and inapecting its logical results, - - - - - +of separated realms and inapecting its logical results, the hypothesis is also denied, and the results of this denial are similarly subjected to logical investigation. One should further test this method by both affirming and @@ -2886,18 +2645,16 @@ of the One and the Many, Rest and Motion, Like and Unlike, Generation and Destruction (136 b). Notice the characteristics of this method. The -existence and the non-existence, Rest and Motion, Generation and Destruction, are to be tested. Both sides of the +existence \e{and} the non-existence, Rest \e{and} Motion, Generation +\e{and} Destruction, are to be tested. \e{Both} sides of the argument are to be followed. Nowhere has the question yet -been asked whether there are two sides. It is assumed. As +been asked whether there \e{are} two sides. It is assumed. As we shall see, it is this assumption of a dualism running through the nature of Forms, Ideas, things, perceptions, etc., which Plato is subjecting to the light of his analysis. - -So much for part one of the Parmenides. In the next - - +So much for part one of the \ul{Parmenides}. In the next portion Parmenides employs his method of affirmation and denial in eight hypotheses. In them, he subjects nothing less than the basis of the theory of Forms to a searching @@ -2909,64 +2666,49 @@ many (137 c). From this it follows that it has no parts, no beginning, middle, end, is not like or unlike itself or another, is neither same nor different, is neither at rest nor in motion, is neither great nor small, limited not - - -(unlimited, equal or unequal. The relation of the One and - - - +unlimited, equal or unequal. The relation of the One and time is set forth as follows: The One cannot be older, or younger, or the same age as itself, because that would imply Likeness, which it was shown not to have (140 a). Therefore it cannot exist in -time at all (141 a). "And if the One 1s without participation in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was +time at all (141 a). "And if the One is without participation +in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was at any former time, or has now become or is becoming, or is or will become, or will have become or will be hereafter." -"Most true. - -"But are there any modes of being other than these? - -"There are none. - -"Then the One cannot possibly partake of being. - -"That is the inference. - -"Then the One is not. (14%) - -"But can all this be true about the One? +\Q{Most true.\nl +But are there any modes of being other than these?\nl +There are none.\nl +Then the One cannot possibly partake of being.\nl +That is the inference.\nl +Then the One is not. (141 a) -" I think not" (142 a). +But can all this be true about the One? +I think not. (142 a)} -The result of the first hypothesis is clear: starting on the assumption of the One as unrelated, it follows +The result of the first hypothesis is clear: starting +on the assumption of the One as unrelated, it follows that nothing can be said about it, not even that it is One. Assuming the logic to be impeccable, the hypothesis leads to its own contradiction. Such an hypothesis is untenable. Therefore, all the things which we tried to predicate of it, and found ourselves unable to predicate of -it, are not predicable of it @f it 18 what we assumed it to -be), that is, unrelated. If it is unrelated, it is unspeakably other. Therefore, we must seek for other ways to +it, are not predicable of it \e{(if it is what we assumed it to +be),} that is, unrelated. If it is unrelated, it is unspeakably +other. Therefore, we must seek for other ways to speak intelligently about it. Here is the first clear attempt to close the gap - - -between the unreachably eternal and the irrevocably temporal, a gap which 1s now clearly faced and admitted to - - -te - - - +between the unreachably eternal and the irrevocably temporal, +a gap which is now clearly faced and admitted to present an obstacle to intelligent thought. The One, therefore, cannot be in a completely separated eternal realm. It must somehow be in some sort of relation to the temporal realm. The ways in which the One is so related are the topics of the next hypotheses. -The second hypothesis (142 e=155 a) begins with a +The second hypothesis (142 e--155 a) begins with a different assumption. It affirms that if the One is, its unity and its being are different. Therefore, it is a vhole of two parts, unity and being. Each part, furthermore, @@ -2989,12 +2731,6 @@ younger than itself (152 e). In the same way, it is younger, older, and the same age as the Other and the Others (153 e). And, in the same - - -ls - - - way, it is not older, younger, or the same age as the Other or the Others (154 a). @@ -3002,38 +2738,30 @@ Therefore, since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and becoming younger than itself and the Others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than the Others, the One is aid wee and will be, and was -becoming, 1s becoming, and will be becoming. "And, if we +becoming, is becoming, and will be becoming. "And, if we are right in all this, then there is an opinion and science -and perception of the One" (155 da). +and perception of the One" (155 d). -Two conclusions may be drawn from the second hypothesis. First, the One, by hypothesis, is no longer so +Two conclusions may be drawn from the second hypothesis. +First, the One, by hypothesis, is no longer so separate and so isolated that nothing can be known or said of it, so that it is now said to be in time and becoming, -and not in time and becoming. Second, it is, by the same - - -token, both like and unlike itself. But this is far from - - -the final doctrine of the Parmenides. - +\e{and} not in time and becoming. Second, it is, by the same +token, \e{both} like and unlike itself. But this is far from +the final doctrine of the \ul{Parmenides}. In the first hypothesis, the One was indivisibly One and nothing could be said or known of it. In the second hypothesis, the One is divisible and therefore, everything -can be said and known of it. But this is nor more satisfactory than before. Previously, we avoided contradictory +can be said and known of it. But this is nor more satisfactory +than before. Previously, we avoided contradictory predications at the expense of knowledge; now, we have -knowledge, but it pays the price of contradictory predications. Since it ia no more helpful to say everything of it - - +knowledge, but it pays the price of contradictory predications. +Since it ia no more helpful to say everything of it than it is to say nothing of it, another way must be found to discuss the One intelligently. - Hypothesis IIA interposes another method by which - - - the One can be intelligently discussed. The One cannot be the bare unity of hypothesis I nor the divided unity of hypothesis II. Hypothesis IIA tries to see whether one can @@ -3043,11 +2771,11 @@ one time at which the contradictory predicates of hypothesis II need to be applied simultaneously. In its own way, it introduces some considerations of not-being, which, as we shall see, are pursued further in subsequent dialogues, -especially in the Sophist. +especially in the \ul{Sophist}. If, as hypothesis II asserts, the One is divided, and partakes of time, it cannot both be and not be at the -same time (155 6). (This is precisely what is to be proved). +same time (155 a). (This is precisely what is to be proved). Therefore, there must be an instant between the instant when the One is (said to be anything) and the One is not (said to be anything) (156 a). Similarly, there must be an @@ -3061,18 +2789,13 @@ if the predicates which we assert of the One are asserted of the One insofar as it is in time, the instant between these instants cannot be in time, and might therefore be called not-time. Plato does not use this term. He calls it - - -_& "queer instant" and says that the divided One of - - - -hypothesis II leads to the conclusion of contradictory : +"queer instant" and says that the divided One of +hypothesis II leads to the conclusion of contradictory predicates, and that these cannot be simultaneously asserted (157 a). But if they cannot be asserted at the same instants, perhaps they can be asserted at different instants. Yet at any given instant, if we do not assert -both sets of predicates and neither, (1i.e., both affirm +\e{both} sets of predicates \e{and} neither, (i.e., both affirm and deny them) this instant cannot be in time at all. Hypothesis IIA may be called the "linear" hypothesis, @@ -3095,28 +2818,23 @@ nor can we say that the pairs of predicates switch over from one instand to another in an interstitial instant. For, if a predicate is asserted of the first instant and the contradictory predicate is asserted of the third - - -iinstant, at the point of the second instant, nothing can - - - +instant, at the point of the second instant, nothing can be asserted, and we are back to hypothesis I where we can neither affirm nor deny anything of the One. However, this philosophical gymnastic has not been unfruitful. We know now that the need to make intelligent statements about -the One is not satisfied by assuming that it is a completely separate One. We know that we cannot say that it is +the One is not satisfied by assuming that it is a completely +separate One. We know that we cannot say that it is completely divided, for then it is really a Two. And we know that we cannot insert the instant between the One and the Two in order to fasten predicates on either end and allow the middle to be the transition, for then the middle -ie neither One nor Two. -I hope it does no violence to the spirit of philosophical continuity to say at this juncture that the remainder of the Parmenides may be briefly summarized. The - - -Parmenides does not attempt to solve its problem within - +is neither One nor Two. +I hope it does no violence to the spirit of philosophical +continuity to say at this juncture that the remainder +of the \ul{Parmenides} may be briefly summarized. The +\ul{Parmenides} does not attempt to solve its problem within itself, but leads one beyond it. The third hypothesis points out that parts in their multiplicity, and parts in their relation as parts of a whole, must be distinguished, @@ -3129,20 +2847,14 @@ participate in the One as parts, but that parts by them selves are merely unlimited. The fourth hypothesis considers the relation of the - - -(One to Others, that 1s, each part, as a One, has some of - - - +One to Others, that is, each part, as a One, has some of the properties of the Other insofar as it is a part. The fifth hypothesis considers the need to understand how the One, the parts, and the Others limit each other. (This -point will be pursued at some length in the Philebus). The - - +point will be pursued at some length in the \ul{Philebus}). The sixth hypothesis examines the characteristic of the Other -insofar as it is only other. The seventh hypothesis considers the result of assuming the existence of the many +insofar as it is only other. The seventh hypothesis considers +the result of assuming the existence of the many without assuming the existence of the One. This is said to result in mere opinion, which is inadequate precisely insofar as it sees only the many as many and ignores the @@ -3150,83 +2862,58 @@ many as parts of the whole. The elgth hypothesis points out that the assumption of the existence of the Many without the One results in a contradiction because without the One there is no Many. -Summary + +\secc Summary I would like to summarize the doctrine of the -Parmenides insofar as it pertains to the hypothesis of this -study. It is, I think, an examination of the naive assumption that the realm of the Forms in its bare unrelated +\ul{Parmenides} insofar as it pertains to the hypothesis of this +study. It is, I think, an examination of the naive assumption +that the realm of the Forms in its bare unrelated purity renders intelligent predication, and therefore, all intelligent discourse, impossible. It asks how and in -what way we may both speak of the Forms and speak of +what way we may \e{both} speak of the Forms \e{and} speak of appearances without separating their respective realms. -It states that the realms are related (in some way-hypothesis III) but it never really reveals this way with any +It states that the realms are related (in some way-hypothesis +III) but it never really reveals this way with any precision or clarity. - However, for the purposes of this study, an important, - - - conclusion has been stated. We saw in hypothesis IIA, that it is not possible to regard time as a series of instants strung out along an imaginary line, and that the instant is, in some way, not-time, a "queer instant." As we shall see, in one of the next dialogues, the -Sophist, the generalization of this problem of not-time is +\ul{Sophist}, the generalization of this problem of not-time is examined: i.e., the problem of not-being. A new method of -division of predicates is introduced in the Sophist and -developed in the Statesman. The question of limit and - - -measure is examined in the Philebus, and, finally, the - - +division of predicates is introduced in the \ul{Sophist} and +developed in the \ul{Statesman}. The question of limit and +measure is examined in the \ul{Philebus}, and, finally, the divisions of becoming and the nature of time are examined +in the \ul{Timaeus}. - -in the Timaeus. - - -However, between the Parmenides and the Sophist - - +However, between the \ul{Parmenides} and the \ul{Sophist} there is another dialogue which intervenes, the dialogue - - -which is generally agreed to follow the Parmenides. It - - +which is generally agreed to follow the \ul{Parmenides}. It seems to be the task of this next dialogue to examine the protagonists of hypothesis VII, in which it is said that there are those who hold that the Many exist and can be -known. This is the subject of the Theatetus. +known. This is the subject of the \ul{Theatetus}. +\secc The Theatetus -The Theatetus This dialogue sets itself the problem of examining - - knowledge, and asks itself to answer such questions as - "do we know," "how do we know," and "are there kinds of -knowledge." Where the Parmeyides focused on the consequences of hypothesizing that the realm of Forms is completely - - -separated from the realm of things, the Theatetus inquires - - -,into the basis of knowledge from the other direction, - - - -namely, it focuses on the world of things and seeks the : +knowledge." Where the \ul{Parmenides} focused on the consequences +of hypothesizing that the realm of Forms is completely +separated from the realm of things, the \ul{Theatetus} inquires +into the basis of knowledge from the other direction, +namely, it focuses on the world of things and seeks the basis for speaking of it intelligently and knowingly. In the interests of brevity, only those portions of -the Theatetus which are directly relevant to the analysis - - +the \ul{Theatetus} which are directly relevant to the analysis of the themes of eternity, image, and time will receive comment in what follows, and no implication should be drawn that the entire significance of the dialogue consists in @@ -3234,9 +2921,9 @@ these portions to the exclusion of other important aspects of the dialogue. It is the business of the following comments to focus on the significance of the problem of knowledge and the attendant problem of error to show that -the Theatetus constitutes something of an advance over the -Parmenides precisely because it takes some of the conclusions of the Parmenides into account. - +the \ul{Theatetus} constitutes something of an advance over the +\ul{Parmenides} precisely because it takes some of the conclusions +of the \ul{Parmenides} into account. Theatetus suggests that knowledge is perception (151e). Socrates reminds Theatetus that this position makes all @@ -3248,16 +2935,9 @@ becoming, and therefore we may not say that things are being or something, because they are all in flow and flux (152 6). In perception as well as in matters of the soul, motion, not rest, is the source of health, according to - these philosophers. - Socrates then reaches the conclusion that whatever - - - - - appears can only be while it is appearing. He remarks "Let us follow out our recent statement and lay it down that there is no single thing that is in and by itself" (153 e), @@ -3268,7 +2948,7 @@ long as it remains equal with itself" (155 a). Again, we find "...a thing to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away is neither diminished nor increased, but always remains the same in amount" (155 a). And -",.emust we not say...that a thing which was not at an +"...must we not say...that a thing which was not at an earlier instant cannot be at a later instant without becoming, and being in process of becoming" (155 b)? On the basis of these axioms, things both change and do not @@ -3280,26 +2960,21 @@ out altogether" (157 b). All is flux, each is flux. Socrates wants to make sure that the point has been firmly made so he asks: "Once more, then, tell me whether you like this notion that nothing is but is always becoming -good, or beautiful, or any of the other things we mentioned" (157 a). +good, or beautiful, or any of the other things we mentioned" (157 d). The bearing these questions have on the three themes of eternity, image, and time which we are pursuing is, - - -ibriefly, this; perception deals with appearance and the - - - - - +briefly, this; perception deals with appearance and the world of appearance is a fluxion in which all things are becoming. Therefore, the forms cannot be located in a -completely separate eternal realm which guarantees knowledge. Yet we seem to know. The question is, are the images -which perception furnishes us true because they are neither eternal nor mere appearance? Plato is again posing - +completely separate eternal realm which guarantees knowledge. +Yet we seem to know. The question is, are the images +which perception furnishes us true because they are neither +eternal nor mere appearance? Plato is again posing the problem: how can the visible world participate in the -eternal world? In the Theatetus, the question becomes: do -the images which perception gives us make possible a knowledge of the eternal? . +eternal world? In the \ul{Theatetus}, the question becomes: do +the images which perception gives us make possible a knowledge +of the eternal? Socrates reminds us that the "men of flux" constitute only one group, which is opposed by another group, consisting of Parmenides and Melissus, who hold that "all things @@ -3309,7 +2984,7 @@ little by little, our advance has brought us, without our knowing it, between the two lines..." (180 e). Socrates says that the inquiry will succeed best if the flux doctrine is examined, and if the re-examination of the -forms is postponed (183 A). +forms is postponed (183 a). But let us not be deceived by the atatement that Parmenides' view is to be postponed. For, no sooner has @@ -3317,24 +2992,18 @@ Socrates said it, than he enters into discussion of what is known, and, asks whether all the things that we say we know are perceived by sense. We say, for example, that a flower is white and that the flower is. Surely the faculty - -_that says it is white and no white and the faculty that - - -J - - - +that says it is white and no white and the faculty that says it is and is not, surely these cannot be the same faculty. -You mean existence and non-existence, likeness and +\Q{You mean existence and non-existence, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also unity and numbers in general as applied to them; and clearly your question covers even and odd and all that kind of notions. You are asking through what -part of the body our mind perceives these (185 c)? -Socrates congratulates Theatetus on reaching the conclusion +part of the body our mind perceives these? (185 c)} + +\noindent Socrates congratulates Theatetus on reaching the conclusion that the mind is its own instrument in perceiving, since it saves him a long argument (185 e). Thus, we go beyond the statement that knowledge is perception, for we know the @@ -3344,29 +3013,21 @@ reflection is temporal, for all those qualities of which we spoke (the Parmenidean pairs of contraries) "seem to me above all to be things whose being is considered, one in comparison with another, by the mind, when it reflects -upon the past and present with an eye to the future" (186a). +upon the past and present with an eye to the future" (186 a). Such reflections upon perception only come, if they come at all, to those who go through a long and troublesome process -of education (186 c). For, if one cannot reach the existence of a thing, he cannot reach the truth (186 c). +of education (186 c). For, if one cannot reach the existence +of a thing, he cannot reach the truth (186 c). + Welcome as it seems, this statement only pushes the difficulty further back. If the mind's reflection on itself is like two voices of the mind speaking to each other, why do we assume that the voices always agree. - - Cannot the voices of the mind disagree; in short, are all - - judgments necessarily true? We dismissed Protagoras because - - -tes - - - he made all perceptions infallible: are we to say we have gone beyond his position only to assert that all judgments -are infallible (187 a). | +are infallible (187 a). The suggested approach to the problem of false judgment is the famous allegory of the wax tablet (191b ff.). @@ -3388,17 +3049,12 @@ because it is "high": we are now asked to see that false judgments can arise out of faulty matching of remembered images, present images, and reflections on images with "an eye to the future." This is a significant advance -over the Republic. +over the \ul{Republic}. The discussion of knowledge is further complicated because we may confuse past images with present images, -past perceptions with present perceptions, past knowledge . - - -.with present knowledge, and each of these may be faulty - - - +past perceptions with present perceptions, past knowledge +with present knowledge, and each of these may be faulty both by reason of faulty wax, varying strengths of impres- 7 sion, or mismatching. Even Theatetus complains of the complexity. In addition, we have again only pushed the @@ -3410,9 +3066,10 @@ false judgment: it was in order to avoid the conclusion that the same man must at the same time know and not know the same thing" (196 c). -Socrates reminds Theatetus that the whole conversa~ -tion assumes both that we know, and that we do not know, -what we say. If we do not assume that we can know, convergation is impossible (197 a); If we do not assume that we may +Socrates reminds Theatetus that the whole conversation +assumes both that we know, and that we do not know, +what we say. If we do not assume that we can know, +conversation is impossible (197 a); If we do not assume that we may not know, all knowledge is infallible. Another allegory is introduced to supplement the @@ -3425,14 +3082,8 @@ Although reflection upon images gives rise to thoughts, these thoughts soar and must be recaptured in recollection 4f we are really to know. Here again we are shown that there is a temporal emphasis to be placed on the acts of - - knowledge, for, in a sense, knowing is relearning what we - - - - -'knew before (198 e). Yet, if we ask whether some of these +knew before (198 e). Yet, if we ask whether some of these recollections might not also be false, we see that the criterion of true knowledge remains to be found (200 b). @@ -3443,60 +3094,49 @@ gives rise to true belief and opinion. Socrates shows that this conclusion is due to an inaccuracy. For example, he says, the syllable was not, until the letters were combined in just that fashion; it - - -4s a one after its parts become parts of it (204 a). Here - - -is another recapitulation of the arguments of the Parmenides. It is the same with number: a sum is not a sum -until its component integers are added, and only thereafter -is it one sum (204 e). But this 1s the distinction to be -made (as it was made in the Parmenides): the whole consists +is a one \e{after} its parts become parts of it (204 a). Here +is another recapitulation of the arguments of the \ul{Parmenides}. +It is the same with number: a sum is not a sum +\e{until} its component integers are added, and only thereafter +is it one sum (204 e). But this is the distinction to be +made (as it was made in the \ul{Parmenides}): the whole consists of the parts; not just any parts, considered in themselves, as unrelated ones, but parts as related. In other words, the difficulty is only apparent, and it vanishes as soon -as we see that the whole and the parts are not two different things in isolation but related aspect of a One (205 b). - -To conclude, then; if, on the one hand, the +as we see that the whole and the parts are not two different +things in isolation but related aspect of a One (205 b). +\Q{To conclude, then; if, on the one hand, the syllable is the same thing as a number of - letters and is a whole with the letters as - parts, then the letters must be neither - more nor less knowable and explicable than - syllables, since we made out that all the +parts are the same thing as the whole (205 a).} -parts are the same thing as the whole (205 a). -Therefore, Socrates concludes that those who hold that the +\noindent Therefore, Socrates concludes that those who hold that the elements or the whole are more or less knowable than each - - -Other, are playing with us. We can know the elements, as - - - +other, are playing with us. We can know the elements, as parts, and therefore, an opinion with an account is knowledge. -But what is an account (logos)? It cannot be only an +But what is an account (\e{logos})? It cannot be only an enumeration of parts as isolated parts (207 e). The other -meaning might be "the image of thought spoken in sound" +meaning might be "the image of thought spoken in sound" or language (208 c). This is the problem, not the answer. Perhaps marking off a thing and distinguishing it from all others constitutes a good account (208 d). An account will then mean putting the thing's "difference" into words. (209a) -But Socrates quickly shows that we must first know the -common to distinguish the different, which begs the question of knowledge. (209 e) Therefore it does not seem true +But Socrates quickly shows that we must first \e{know} the +common to distinguish the different, which begs the question +of knowledge. (209 e) Therefore it does not seem true to say that knowledge is opinion with an account of difference, unless we already know the common on the basis of which we distinguish the difference. (Although this is -what we do, it 1s not a definition of knowledge since it +what we do, it is not a definition of knowledge since it includes "knowing the common" in its "definition"). -| The dialogue ends a few lines later with Socrates +The dialogue ends a few lines later with Socrates saying that all the definitions of knowledge so far adduced are mere "wind-eggs" (210 b). Theatetus is told that the mid-wife's art is a heavenly gift which Socrates @@ -3504,31 +3144,20 @@ uses on those in whom beauty resides, and that as a result of this gymnastic they have engaged in, Theatetus will thereafter be better enabled to know what knowledge is. The conclusion, on the surface, is that we know, but cannot - - define what knowledge is. Actually, we have said several - - - - -'things about what it is not, and therefore Theatetus has +things about what it is not, and therefore Theatetus has made progress along the "long way" which is required for this sort of knowledge. That is why the last words of the dialogue are "But tomorrow morning, Theatetus, let us meet again" (210 d). -Summary + +\secc Summary What have we learned about eternity, moving images, and time? A great deal, it seems. And what we have learned cannot be separated from the doctrines of the dialogues we - - -have considered so far. We see in the Theatetus that some - - -of the positions of the Republic and of the Parmenides have - - +have considered so far. We see in the \ul{Theatetus} that some +of the positions of the \ul{Republic} and of the \ul{Parmenides} have been reexamined and certain modifications have taken place. We know now that knowledge must include, but is not exhaustively defined by, moving images of thought, (birds); @@ -3536,115 +3165,89 @@ that we cannot refer to parts in isolation but must discuss them as they are related in a One; that the mere enumeration of elements does not comprise an explanation; and, above all, that we know, but do not know how we know. In addition, - and perhaps this is the most striking conclusion of all, - we have seen that the mind can be viewed as conversing - with itself, and that this internal dialogue consists of - the attempt to put images and reflection on the past, present, and future in their right order. We have advanced far beyond the naive view that the mind is a static camera -whose job it is to escape the transient shadows of perception in a flight to eternal forms. We are now told that it - - -1 : - - - +whose job it is to escape the transient shadows of perception +in a flight to eternal forms. We are now told that it is the task of mind to discern the right temporal order of -ita ingredients, so to speak. However, even after all +its ingredients, so to speak. However, even after all these things have been done, we still do not have a definition of knowledge. The important point to notice is - - -that the steps and hypotheses of the Theatetus are no - - +that the steps and hypotheses of the \ul{Theatetus} are no longer regarded as inferior but as necessary preliminaries in the "long way" which the mind must take to true knowledge. Somehow, we have found, not what knowledge is, but what complete knowledge is not. This insight, namely, that somehow what is not, in some way, must be included in what -is, will be examined in the next dialogue, the Sophist, +is, will be examined in the next dialogue, the \ul{Sophist}, which can, from certain points of view, be regarded as a triumphant breakthrough into another whole way of philosophizing. -The Sophist +\secc The Sophist -We enter now into the series of dialogues unanimously regarded as the late group, in which Plato's evolved -reflections are to be found. The Sophist begins with a +We enter now into the series of dialogues unanimously +regarded as the late group, in which Plato's evolved +reflections are to be found. The \ul{Sophist} begins with a dramatic introduction which includes the participants of the -Theatetus, but now we meet an additional person, an Eleatic -Stranger. This scems to be the fulfillment of the Theatetus' +\ul{Theatetus}, but now we meet an additional person, an Eleatic +Stranger. This scems to be the fulfillment of the \ul{Theatetus}' promise to consider the Parmenidean approach to truth -after the Theatetug dealt with the "men of flux." It is +after the \ul{Theatetus} dealt with the "men of flux." It is further interesting to note that the Stranger begins the whole dialogue by using a method which is unavailable to -_the men of flux, namely, the method of division, which - - - +the men of flux, namely, the method of division, which seemed to the men of flux to presume knowledge, not to - - -seek it. (This point will be expanded in the Statesman). - - -The Stranger does not allude to this hypothetical difficulty, and he employs the method without question. This confirms the hint that we are now to inspect the heritage of - - -the Parmenides, not in the manner of the Theatetus, nor - - -exactly in the manner of the Parmenides, but in some new +seek it. (This point will be expanded in the \ul{Statesman}). +The Stranger does not allude to this hypothetical difficulty, +and he employs the method without question. This confirms +the hint that we are now to inspect the heritage of +the \ul{Parmenides}, not in the manner of the \ul{Theatetus}, nor +exactly in the manner of the \ul{Parmenides}, but in some new way to deal with philosophical inquiry. And, as we shall see, we are told new things about eternity, images, and time. It is agreed that a trial run of this method should -be had before the Sophist is defined, and they agree to +be had before the \ul{Sophist} is defined, and they agree to use an easy example, the angler one familiar to them all. This is important because it assumes the results of the -Theatetus; the angler is at once a familiar experience but +\ul{Theatetus}; the angler is at once a familiar experience but an undefined reality. The definition of the Angler is reached, and the method of "halving" is satisfactorily put to the test. What is of special interest to us here is the difference -between this kind of division, and the method of elimination which Plato had previously used in the Republic. - +between this kind of division, and the method of elimination +which Plato had previously used in the \ul{Republic}. In the sort of dividing which Plato accomplishes here, it -4a necessary for the divider to proceed very carefully and +is necessary for the divider to proceed very carefully and to divide the subject into exact halves, so that only what actually pertains to the subject is retained and what ta found not to pertain to the subject nevertheless - - reveals something about the subject (221 b). If the - - - division is not well made, the remainder will contain too much, that is, the definition will remain too vague. Only by carefully determining what something is not can one reach a precise knowledge of what something is. Thus it is incorrect to equate the method of division which we find -in the Sophist to the method of residues which we confronted -in the Republic. The latter proceeds by eliminating classes +in the \ul{Sophist} to the method of residues which we confronted +in the \ul{Republic}. The latter proceeds by eliminating classes of objects, the former by dividing within a class of objects. -It 4s necessary to notice, however, that the Stranger +It is necessary to notice, however, that the Stranger provides the divisions, and that Plato passes over the fact that in some way the Stranger knows what divisions are most helpful. It is almost as if the Stranger already has a higher wisdom. In other words, he does not draw his distinctions from appearance, but somehow draws them from -a higher kind of knowledge. It 1s important to emphasize +a higher kind of knowledge. It is important to emphasize this point because it is in strong contrast to the method -advocated by the men of flux in the Theatetus. +advocated by the men of flux in the \ul{Theatetus}. Having defined the Angler, Socrates now attempts to define the Sophist. To those he convinces, the Sophist @@ -3653,119 +3256,94 @@ but such competence is impossible. Now we approach the central concern. For the Sophist cannot truly be what he claims to be, yet he certainly appears to be. Appearance and reality cannot be the same, yet the question is, how - - do they differ. This question might be called the most - - - -important question in all of Plato's dialogues so far. The — +important question in all of Plato's dialogues so far. The definition of the Sophist, then, is a case in point: we are to investigate this partisuien gentleman, as we investigated the Angler, in order to discover how reality is, and what appearance seems to be; in the language of -this study, how the eternal forms are related to the temporal world. +this study, how the eternal forms are related to the temporal +world. The Stranger asserts that the Sophist is an imitator, and that sufficient division of the imitative art will reveal him. Just as imitation may be divided in two kinds, so the images which imitation produces are of two kinds; -some images (eikastike) are like reality in that they are -faithful to the proportions of the original (235 da); others +some images (\e{eikastike}) are like reality in that they are +faithful to the proportions of the original (235 d); others distort the proportions of the reality, and these we shall -call fantasies (phantastike) (236 b). But now the problem +call fantasies (\e{phantastike}) (236 b). But now the problem becomes even greater, because to distinguish the image from the reality we have to say that the image is not the -reality. How can @ man say what is not true, or assert the +reality. How can a man say what is not true, or assert the existence of what is not. The word which Parmenides forbade -Must be uttered - not-being (237 a). No sooner do we +Must be uttered---not-being (237 a). No sooner do we distinguish the image from the reality than we distinguish -notebeing from being. At this point, Plato leaps beyond the +not-being from being. At this point, Plato leaps beyond the level of Parmenides' and of his own earlier philosophy, and reaches out into virgin territory. And at this point, Plato's most crucial discussion of the meaning of the word - - image is begun. - - - Surely, the Stranger asserts, we cannot just say -that what ia, is not. Yet we say "notebeing" as if it were +that what ia, is not. Yet we say "not0being" as if it were a singular; we say "not-beings" in the plural. We agree -that not=being is unutterable and inconceivable, and yet +that not-being is unutterable and inconceivable, and yet we speak the words; in short, in the act of saying we cannot say it, we are saying it (238 c). This is the dark hole into which the Sophist retreats when we try to refute him, for, if we say that an opinion of his is false, we -assert that it 4s-not true, and in so doing, we assert -that it isenot, and he therby chides us on this contradiction (239 a). This is precisely what happens if we ask +assert that it is-not true, and in so doing, we assert +that it is-not, and he therby chides us on this contradiction +(239 a). This is precisely what happens if we ask him what an image is. "How can I describe an image except -as another made in the likeness of the true" (240 a). But -1f it is other than the true, it is other than what is, and - - +as \e{another} made in the likeness of the true" (240 a). But +1f it is \e{other} than the true, it is \e{other} than what is, and hence it isenot. The Stranger then begs not to be accused of patricide, for, if they are to catch the Sophist in their dialectical trap, the philosophy of Parmenides must be put -to the test (241 a). In a certain sense, we must say that -notebeing is, and being is-not. +to the test (241 d). In a certain sense, we must say that +not-being is, and being is-not. The Stranger then says that the predicament in which they now find themselvea is due to the fact that the former philosophers treated their hearers with disdain, as if -dealing with children. They followed their arguments whereever they led and left the children to wonder at their +dealing with children. They followed their arguments whereever +they led and left the children to wonder at their meanings, because they spoke in myths, among which he classes the One and the Many (242 e), the myths of strife - - - and peace, the three principles at war in the soul, the moist and the dry, and includes in this group the Ionian -and Sicilian explanations in mythical garb (242 da). He +and Sicilian explanations in mythical garb (242 d). He says that a discussion of most of these myths may be deferred to a later occasion; at present, the chief of iheus will be discussed; the myth of the One and the Many. The Stranger proceeds to recapitulate several of the - - -points made in the Parmenides, citing this as the main - - -difficulty among all those presented by the myth~makers. +points made in the \ul{Parmenides}, citing this as the main +difficulty among all those presented by the myth-makers. He shows that both the unity and the existence of a One cannot be the same parts, nor can any of the pairs of predicates be reduced to a simple identity, since, if one of a pair is chosen as being, the other must then be other -than being, i.e., notebeing (245 a). +than being, i.e., not-being (245 d). The materialists who claim that only the tangible exists are then subjected to a critique. Their opponents are also brought forward, and these are the "friends of the -Forms," who disolve tangible realities in a sea of corruption and generation. None of these schools, Plato tells us, +Forms," who disolve tangible realities in a sea of corruption +and generation. None of these schools, Plato tells us, are able to deal intelligently with the question now before -them: the question of notebeing. Having reached this point, +them: the question of not-being. Having reached this point, Plato can no longer choose from existing alternatives. The Stranger says "Let us improve them, if we can" (245 e). - The doctrine he develops to accomplish this improvement is the doctrine for which this dialogue is noted, the doctrine - - -of notebeing. It must be shown how justly this doctrine may - - - - - +of not-being. It must be shown how justly this doctrine may be said to constitute an advance, by comparing and contrasting it to earlier philosophies. For example, if, - on the one hand, the materialists were to admit that there is a difference between things and thoughts, they would - be forced to admit that there are some incorporeal existences, and if this were admitted, they could be asked Whether being is common to both. If pa the other hand, the @@ -3784,18 +3362,16 @@ be no knowledge at all. So there must be motion in knowing. "and, Oh Heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with Being. Can we imagine Being to be devoid of life and mind, -and to remain in awful unmeaning and everlasting fixture" (248 e)? Clearly, they cannot. Therefore, "We must -include motion under being, and that which is moved" (249b). - +and to remain in awful unmeaning and everlasting fixture" +(248 e)? Clearly, they cannot. Therefore, "We must +include motion under being, and that which is moved" (249 b). As we shall see, this is an important anticipation - - - -of the Timaeus. And yet, if all things are in motion, there +of the \ul{Timaeus}. And yet, if all things are in motion, there can be no sameness or permanence or relation to the same. The philosopher must be equally deaf to those who say all -is in motion and to those who say there is no motion. Somehow, we must have both, yet somehow we can have neither +is in motion and to those who say there is no motion. Somehow, +we must have both, yet somehow we can have neither alone. Further, if we have only a third, this third will not be either nor will it be both (250 b). @@ -3807,7 +3383,7 @@ summary, I am all too aware of the danger of flatly stating the results of a long philosophical process. However, brevity must be attempted. -We see, then, that being and notebeing are equally +We see, then, that being and not-being are equally perplexing. The Stranger suggests that we try to work out the doctrine of not-being, in the realm of predication. Can we say that all of the Forms indicated by names, of which @@ -3819,57 +3395,39 @@ These tentative conclusions are tested on the examples of grammar and music, where we see now that only some letters go with certain others, and only certain notes go with certain others. Similarly, he who develops - - the art which knows which of the forms go with which other - - - forms, is truly the philosopher, and the art of division is his art and his alone. The philosopher knows that Rest and Motion, Same and Other, are the most general divisions of being, although he is hard to see by excess of light (254 a). (As we saw in -the Republic cave). Rest and Motion do not communicate with +the \ul{Republic} cave). Rest and Motion do not communicate with each other, but being communicates with them both. Same and Other do not communicate with each other, but being communicates with them both. But Motion and Rest communicate with Same and Other, and therefore, Motion is both Same and Other than being. In other words, Motion is both -being and notebeing. And Rest is both being and not-being. -And Same is both being and notebeing. "Every class, than, -has plurality of being and infinity of notebeing" (256 e). +being and not-being. And Rest is both being and not-being. +And Same is both being and not-being. "Every class, than, +has plurality of being and infinity of not-being" (256 e). And -Whereas, we have not only shown that things which - +\Q{Whereas, we have not only shown that things which are not exist, but we have also shown what form - -of being notebeing is; for we have shown that the - +of being not-being is; for we have shown that the nature of the other exists and is distributed over - all things in their mutual relations, and when each part of the other is contrasted with being, that is -precisely what we have ventured to call note - -being (258 e). +precisely what we have ventured to call not-being. (258 e)} There is one last refuge, the realm of images, into which the Sophist will now try to escape. The Sophist will contend that only some images partake of falsity, but the ones that he uses do not. Images are again divided, as before, into two sorts, the images which are like the - - original in proportion, and the others, which are fantasies - - and distortions. If the art of philosophical division will - - - be applied to images, the Sophist will be deprived of his last refuge (264 e). @@ -3877,45 +3435,33 @@ Since images are either divinely produced or humanly produced (265 b), the Stranger himself suggests that they discuss divinely produced images at greater length. -Looking now at the world and all the animals and - +\Q{Looking now at the world and all the animals and plants which grow upon the earth from seeds and - roots, and at inanimate substances which form within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence, not having existed previously, in any way but by creation - of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion - -about them (265 c)? +about them? (265 c)} Notice that the creation of the world is spoken -in @ context of a division of images, not of Forms. Plato +in a context of a division of \e{images,} not of \e{Forms.} Plato will expand on this point at much greater length when he -reaches the Timaeus, but now, since Theatetus agrees with +reaches the \ul{Timaeus}, but now, since Theatetus agrees with him the Stranger says he will postpone this extended discussion: right now he wants to trap the Sophist, once and for all. We now confront, yet again, a divided line. But, like the previous discussion of images, it is a more -developed doctrine than it was in the Republic. Having +developed doctrine than it was in the \ul{Republic}. Having divided image-making into human and divine, we now must divide images into genuine images and fantasies (266 e). Thus, there are both human and divine images, and human and divine fantasies. As an example of divine images which are genuine, we have the whole world of things. As - - an example of fantasies, we have shadows caused by things - - interrupting firelight, as in the analogy of the cave. - - - - Human images can be seen in those genuine imitations which preserve the proportions of the originals, as for example in true speech. The next subdivision, false images, or @@ -3924,9 +3470,11 @@ human fantasies, is found to be the realm of the Sophist. One further division remains. He who imitates and knows that he imitates genuinely, is not a Sophist, but a philosopher. It is the Sophist who imitates fantasies. -Summary -What have we learned from this dialogue, with reference to the themes of eternity, image, and time. Obviously, +\secc Summary + +What have we learned from this dialogue, with reference +to the themes of eternity, image, and time. Obviously, the most significant doctrinal advances were made with respect to images, where we learn that their production is both a human and a divine art. But more deeply, it has @@ -3942,12 +3490,7 @@ time is unfruitful, and Plato has advanced beyond the Parmenidean position. The realm of the Forms cannot be a separate realm, as it was described in foregoing dialogues. Just as we have advanced from a faulty conception of being - - -through a notion of notebeing, so we have advanced from a - - - +through a notion of not-being, so we have advanced from a faulty notion of the realm of the Forms through notions of what the Forms are not. Of time, we are told little in an explicit way. But one should notice that the Parmenidean @@ -3955,34 +3498,29 @@ an explicit way. But one should notice that the Parmenidean generalized, for the Sophist shows that not-being is to being what not-time is to time. - -The Statesman - +\secc The Statesman The participants of this dialogue begin their dialectical search for the definition of the Statesman, -utilizing the method of division developed in the Sophist. +utilizing the method of division developed in the \ul{Sophist}. But, the Eleatic Stranger now cautions the hearers not to divide arbitrarily and too quickly, but to make sure that -the divisions they follow in the argument are real divisions into real classes, and not arbitrary divisions for +the divisions they follow in the argument are real divisions +into real classes, and not arbitrary divisions for which names are invented. The general point deserves to be underscored. Plato is reminding us that division which proceeds only in haste to reach a fore-ordained conclusion is sophistic. Such a -division ignores the fact, established in the Sophist, that -not all classes communicate with each other, and so division must follow the lines which mark off real classes from +division ignores the fact, established in the \ul{Sophist}, that +not all classes communicate with each other, and so division +must follow the lines which mark off real classes from fantasies. "We must not attempt too general a division of the class..." (263 e). "More haste...(means)...less speed" (264 b). It is especially necessary to draw out the implication that an empirical acquaintance with classes - - of objects is necessary for the process of right division. - - - the dialogue proceeds with the method of dividing until it reaches the conclusion that the Statesman is he who uses the predictive art of knowledge, runs herds of @@ -3997,23 +3535,20 @@ not to be a retelling of the familiar myth of Kronos, but the Stranger's own version, which, he says, is the basis of all such stories. In so saying, Plato undercuts the myths he has told in the preceding dialogues, from the myth -of Er in the Republic, through and including the One and +of Er in the \ul{Republic}, through and including the One and Many, which he presents and criticises, respectively, in -the Parmenides and the Sophist. We shall see that even the -myth of Kronos shall be transcended in the Timaeus. +the \ul{Parmenides} and the \ul{Sophist}. We shall see that even the +myth of Kronos shall be transcended in the \ul{Timaeus}. -'the Stranger tells us that the universe was once +The Stranger tells us that the universe was once helped in its rotation by the god who framed it in the beginning, but that it completed its circle of rotation and then set itself in rotation in the opposite direction. -It did so of its own natural necessity, which the Stranger -will now explain (269 4d). +It did so of its own natural \e{necessity,} which the Stranger +will now explain (269 d). -It 4s the only prerogative of divine things to be +It is the only prerogative of divine things to be steadfast and abiding, but the universe, since it partakes - - - of the bodily, cannot enjoy this rank. However, as far as possible, it will have uniform rotation (269 e), and rotation in reverse is at least in a uniform direction, @@ -4033,7 +3568,7 @@ life itself reverses, and the old grow younger and younger become children and finally wither away (270 e). On the other hand, the race of eartheborn men, long dead, now are reborn out of the earth, as they were in the former -rotation (271 ¢c). +rotation (271 c). Since a reversal of motion takes place at both the restoration of proper motion and at the onset of reversal, @@ -4041,26 +3576,21 @@ the Stranger tells about the time when the universe was helped in its rotation by the god. In that era, all things came about without men's labor. When this god was shepherd, there were no political constitutions and no personal - - possession of wives or children, since all men rose up - - - fresh out of the earth with no memories. (This is the analogue of the "waters of forgetfulness" in the myth of Er). Neither did they need clothing or beds but disported -themselves in the open. Such was the reign of Kronos (272b). +themselves in the open. Such was the reign of Kronos (272 b). -"The crucial question is-did the nurselings of Kronos -make a right use of their time" (272 b)? They certainly had +"The crucial question is---did the nurselings of Kronos +make a right use of their time?" (272 b) They certainly had the opportunity to engage in philosophy, since they had the requisite leisure, and if they did, their happiness would be a thousandfold greater than ours. "Be that as it -may, let us leave this question aside until we find some~ -one (Timaeus?) who can inform us accurately whether or not +may, let us leave this question aside until we find someone +(Timaeus?) who can inform us accurately whether or not their hearts were set on gaining knowledge and engaging -in discussion" (272 a). +in discussion." (272 d) When the era of Kronos came to an end, the drastic experiences of reversal of motion again took place. The @@ -4073,19 +3603,15 @@ god again beholds it, and seeing its time of trouble, again resumes the helm. But we are not now in the era of Kronos. It has now -been ordained that the universe must take sole responsibility for its course, and, following and imitating the change +been ordained that the universe must take sole responsibility +for its course, and, following and imitating the change in the universe, all things have to change, and, in - - -,particular, a new law of birth and nurture is now binding - - - +particular, a new law of birth and nurture is now binding on all creatures (274 8). Since we do not have this guardianship of the god to follow, but, "imitating the universe and following it through all time, we live and grow at one time in this way and at another time in -that" (274 e). As we shall see, the Timaeus advances beyond +that" (274 e). As we shall see, the \ul{Timaeus} advances beyond these doctrines, especially beyond this particular doctrine of necessity. @@ -4095,7 +3621,7 @@ in either era of rotation, men who were sired in the former era, we must be careful to look for the right models of the Statesman. In the era of the gods' rule, the shepherds experience no strife, since all is in harmony; but in the -subsequent era, the shepherd is forced of necessity to care +subsequent era, the shepherd is forced of \e{necessity} to care for a strife-torn flock. Which of these is the Statesman most like (275 a)? @@ -4107,16 +3633,9 @@ is framed by inserting order into chaos, that time is governed by the motion of the revolving universe, and that the bodily element is the cause of the corruption and decay of an era. This would seem to reverse the claim of the - - -mature character of the Statesman, since it resembles the - - +mature character of the \ul{Statesman}, since it resembles the doctrine of bodily imperfection, an early doctrine. However, - - - -it 48 a children's tale, and, as we shall see, Plato will +it is a children's tale, and, as we shall see, Plato will not allow it to pass without criticism. The most important feature, for our purposes, is the intimacy with which the notion of right rule is connected with the right time and @@ -4125,12 +3644,8 @@ the bland assertion that there is a single pattern laid up in heaven which he who is willing can easily discern. Now we are charged with the need to see how right order in the state is dependent on the order of the heavens because they - - -are linked by time. We should further note the Statesman's - - -anticipation of the Timaeus in its description of the +are linked by time. We should further note the \ul{Statesman}'s +anticipation of the \ul{Timaeus} in its description of the demiurge and the world soul in the universe described as a living creature. @@ -4147,12 +3662,7 @@ responsibility, but, as usual, we went too fast in our haste to arrive at a definition (277 b). The Stranger admits that it is difficult to explain - - anything without the use of examples, and he is now in the - - - strange predicament of using examples to explain his doctrine of examples (277 d)! The familiar pedagogical device of the alphabet is again resuscitated, and the use @@ -4172,18 +3682,14 @@ but he needs the carder, who separates fibers, so that the weavers art consists of both separating and combining (283b) In other words, the proper art of dialectic consists in the skillful handling of both the warp and the woof of being, -or, as we saw in the Sophist, the correet analysis of +or, as we saw in the \ul{Sophist}, the correet analysis of being and not-being. It is noteworthy that the Stranger -here, as he did in the Sophist, agrees to supply the -divisions, or else the argument would have become interminable. Here 1s another hint that he who uses the method of +here, as he did in the \ul{Sophist}, agrees to supply the +divisions, or else the argument would have become interminable. +Here is another hint that he who uses the method of division must know in advance where he is going, a point which the men of flux advanced. But, instead of confronting - - this objection head-on, the Stranger attacks it from - - - another direction; through the question of relative measure, of excess and of defect. @@ -4191,13 +3697,14 @@ It is quickly ascertained that if the greater is greater only by relation to the smaller, and the smaller is smaller only by relation to the greater, there is no way to say what is right in itself (283 e). Therefore, there -must be a standard of wieaeuse to which they both approximate in some way. (And so the Forms are reasserted). In the +must be a standard of wieaeuse to which they both approximate +in some way. (And so the Forms are reasserted.) In the same manner, if there were no standard, there would be no way of dividing the unjust from the just man, nor, for that matter, would it be possible to discern the right practice of any art. "Must we not do now what we had to do when we discussed the Sophist. We felt constrained there -to admit that what is not-x nevertheless exists..." (284 b) +to admit that what is not-$x$ nevertheless exists..." (284 b) So there must be two standards of measure, one having to do with measures relative to each other, and the second those which "comprise arts concerned with due measure, due @@ -4210,69 +3717,49 @@ there are two sorts of measure, and who therefore are prohibited from seeing that there are real classes of things with affinities for one another, just as there are real differences between some things which therefore have - - -no affinity for one another (285 a,b,c). It is necessary - - - +no affinity for one another (285 a--c). It is necessary to divide according to real classes, not merely to divide every item from every other. This is another recapitulation -of the Sophist: only some forms communicate with each +of the \ul{Sophist}: only some forms communicate with each other. This view is asserted in another way when the Stranger says, -Some of the things that have true existence and are - +\Q{Some of the things that have true existence and are easy to understand have images in nature which are - accesible to the senses, so that when someone asks for an account of any one of them, one has no - trouble at alleone can simply point to the sensible - image and dispense with any account in words. But - to the highest and most important class of existents - (being) there are no corresponding images, no work - -of nature clear for all to look upon (285 e). +of nature clear for all to look upon. (285 e)} In short, the classes of being have images, but being itself does not. The important political corollary of this becomes evident in the Stranger's description of the -unlikelihood of the many ever achieving the art of statecraft, since the true science of statecraft is like the +unlikelihood of the many ever achieving the art of statecraft, +since the true science of statecraft is like the true science of being: it has no images, and it would be quite out of the question to look for fifty kings at any -one time (292 e). +one time. (292 e) -It 4s important here to comment on what has been +It is important here to comment on what has been said about the lack of images of being, for, at first sight, it seems to contradict the trend we have been tracing through the late dialogues. Plato has told us (in -the Sophist) that only some of the classes of being +the \ul{Sophist}) that only some of the classes of being communicate with each other, and he reminds us of it here. - - When he says that there are no images of being, he seems to - - -(Mean, that there are no sensory images for the sort of - - - -pure unmixed being which Parmenides described. But we have — -already seen another sort of being in the Sophist. The +mean, that there are no sensory images for the sort of +pure unmixed being which Parmenides described. But we have +already seen another sort of being in the \ul{Sophist}. The lack of images, then, pertains to the classes of being, not to being as such nor to beings as such. I do not wish to enter into a lengthy exegesis of the -Statesman concerning law and political philosophy. Let it - - +\ul{Statesman} concerning law and political philosophy. Let it suffice here to write that the Statesman should posess the true art of law-making, that this art depends on his real knowledge, of which the laws will be images, and that he @@ -4281,25 +3768,20 @@ departments of life together as best he can, for he can best do so. Those who follow those laws, and who know them to be images, live in Justice. Those who follow the laws and do not know they are images, at least follow a just life -unknowingly (291-300). +unknowingly. (291--300) The final task of the dialogue is to describe how the life of the state is woven by the Statesman. We are confronted with the daring statement that the virtues which comprise the state are, in contradistinction to those -described in the Republic, not at harmony with each other, +described in the \ul{Republic}, \e{not} at harmony with each other, which means that the several parts of goodness are actue ally not in accord (306 c). What is the Statesman to do about this? He is to establish a training program to bring out the best qualities of future citizens, some of whom will have opposite virtues. He weaves both sorts into the fabric of the state, some forming the warp and some - - -_ forming the woof. This training program "first unites that - - - +forming the woof. This training program "first unites that element in their soul which is eternal, by a divine bond, since it is akin to the divine. After this divine bond, it will in turn unite their animal nature by human bonds" @@ -4323,22 +3805,12 @@ gentle to the brave. Socrates ends the dialogue by saying "You have drawn to perfection, sir, the image of the true king and statesman" (311 c). +\secc Summary -Summary After a rather comical beginning, the Statesman - - quickly discards the first definition of the Statesman. The Myth of Kronos is put between it and the next attempt, - - -Ls - - - - - -'and ita results are that the Statesman must have a real +and it results are that the Statesman must have a real knowledge of the rotation of the universe in order to ascertain the right time for the right kind of image of the ruler. There are certain necessities of cosmic motion @@ -4349,41 +3821,33 @@ for real classes and true dialectic. But perhaps the clearest indication of Plato's development of the themes of eternity, image, and time in this dialogue is to be found in the view that the true -Statesman is he who weaves the being and notebeing of +Statesman is he who weaves the being and not-being of opposing virtues into the fabric of the state, an eternal warp and a temporal woof, which are to be interbred via marriage across real classes. -wo themes stand out as clear anticipations of the -Timaeus: the concern for cosmological time, in the myth +Two themes stand out as clear anticipations of the +\ul{Timaeus}: the concern for cosmological time, in the myth of Kronos, and the introduction of the sexual allegory, +which, as we shall see, in the \ul{Timaeus}, is generalized. +However, before we reach the \ul{Timaeus}, we must see +how the \ul{Philebus} treats these themes. -which, as we shall see, in the Timaeus, is generalized. - - -However, before we reach the Timaeus, we must see -how the Philebus treats these themes. -The Philebus - +\secc The Philebus -If one approaches the Philebus with the expectation +If one approaches the \ul{Philebus} with the expectation that it will deal with some of the topics of the Statesman in a more developed manner, its opening passages seem to be anachronistic, for the dialogue begins with a discussion of - - the relative merits of pleasure and wisdom (11 a), subjects - - - -discussed in great detail in the Republic. But it soon +discussed in great detail in the \ul{Republic}. But it soon becomes apparent that the discussion will be anything but a simple repetition. For example, when Socrates asks whether there might not be a third state even better than pleasure or wisdom, or whether some mixture of the two is preferable, we see that the theme of mixture, as introduced -in the Sophist and evolved in the Statesman, is actually to +in the \ul{Sophist} and evolved in the \ul{Statesman}, is actually to be reexamined in the context of an ethical inquiry. It is agreed that there are many pleasures, each of @@ -4392,37 +3856,24 @@ serves to reintroduce the problem of the One and the Many on an ethical level, and with this reintroduction, we will be confronted with the modifications and developments which the subjects of pleasure and wisdom must receive in the -light of Plato's later reflections. hus, 1t is agreed +light of Plato's later reflections. Thus, it is agreed that unity and diversity of pleasures is "the same old argument" (13 c). Somehow, the unity and diversity of pleasure must be understood, not in the old way, but in a -new way. 'he key to the new way is the principle of +new way. The key to the new way is the principle of Difference. It is said that this principle of Difference is a marvel of nature because it asks us to affirm that "one would be many or many one" (13 e). No one any longer argues -that it 1s marvelous to assert that Socrates is many and +that it is marvelous to assert that Socrates is many and one because he has many limbs but is only one Socrates: - - everyone has agreed to dismiss this as childish (14 d). - -is - - - - - Here the initial impression of anachronism fades completely, for the passage clearly asserts that it is childish to continue to play on the words "one" and "many" - - -now that the Parmenides and the Sophist and the Statesman - - +now that the \ul{Parmenides} and the \ul{Sophist} and the \ul{Statesman} have advanced so far beyond this verbal naivete. He who asserts that the One or the Beautiful or the Good have a real existence which in some way is beyond generation or @@ -4436,25 +3887,20 @@ way, if one asserts that these Forms can be dispersed and multiplied in the world of generation and the endless number of things which compose this world, he involves himself ina difficulty, for he seems to assert that the -Forms are at once what they are in themselves and at the -Same time in the world of many things (15 c). In short, +Forms are at once what they are in themselves and \e{at the +same time} in the world of many things (15 c). In short, he who asserts that there are many pleasures and who says at the same time that Pleasure is a One, involves himself in the difficulties of "the old argument" and since the old argument has not been resolved, one cannot pretend -that it 1s a simple assertion when he says that there are +that it is a simple assertion when he says that there are many pleasures, all of which are Pleasure. To put the matter in our own way, we should say that - - -(the statement "there are many pleasures, each of which - - - +the statement "there are many pleasures, each of which shares in the idea of Pleasure" involves all of the aifficulties which Plato has been examining in the -Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Statesman. In short, we +\ul{Parmenides}, the \ul{Sophist}, and the \ul{Statesman}. In short, we are confronted with nothing less than a philosophical summary of the problems and doctrines which Plato confronted in the late dialogues. @@ -4473,109 +3919,76 @@ too that these questions about pleasure and wisdom are not mere allegories or childrens' stories; they are the points of departure. Plato intends, as we shall see, to apply the method of division, which he has been perfecting in - - -the Sophist and the Statesman, to the questions of ethical - - +the \ul{Sophist} and the \ul{Statesman}, to the questions of ethical import involved in a discussion of pleasure and wisdom and their relative merits. But in addition to applying the method, he will perfect it further, and greater insight 4nto the method as well as its applicability will be - - reached. It is no longer possible to begin with the simple - - - separation of the One and the Many, because the method of division has gone beyond this level of simplicity. The One and the Many, therefore are said to "run -about everywhere together, in and out of every word" (15 a} +about everywhere together, in and out of every word" (15 a) Therefore, we must not divide too quickly between the One and the Many, or run too quickly from the Many to the One. The endless number of the Many is a kind of infinity, that is, a lack of determined specificity, or, in another sense, & vague and indefinite formlessness. -The infinite must not be allowed to approach the - +\Q{The infinite must not be allowed to approach the many until the entire number of species - intermediate between unity and infinity has been - found out-then and not until then may we rest - -from division (16 e). +from division. (16 e)} The familiar analogy of the alphabet is offered, and it is agreed that every sound we utter is both one and -infinite, that is, a sound is at once just this sound, -but in another sense it is only a sound, which by itself +infinite, that is, a sound is at once just \e{this} sound, +but in another sense it is only \e{a} sound, which by itself has no meaning, just as letters by themselves have no meaning until they are related to each other in words. But the precise knowledge of the number and nature of each sound is the special province of the grammarian (17 b), just as the precise knowledge of tones and their intervals -4s the province of the musician (17 c). +4s the province of the musician. (17 c) In this way, Plato seems to say quite clearly that the way to knowledge is neither the addition of elements to each other without regard to the kinds of relations - - these elements must have to be intelligible, nor the - - - simple recitation of the name we give to them to create the appearance of their simple unity. - -Since these themes were treated in the Statesman - - -it seems reasonable to place the Philebus after it. It was +Since these themes were treated in the \ul{Statesman} +it seems reasonable to place the \ul{Philebus} after it. It was necessary to insert this point here because the degree of -unanimity with which the scholars agree that the Statesman -succeeds the Sophist 1s not had in the placement of the - - -Philebus after the Statesman. It seems now that the Philebus can be read more intelligently by placing it after the -Statesman but before the Timaeus, but we shall have to see -whether this is true after reading the Timaeus. - -The method of division, as developed in the Statesman, - - +unanimity with which the scholars agree that the \ul{Statesman} +succeeds the \ul{Sophist} is not had in the placement of the +\ul{Philebus} after the \ul{Statesman}. It seems now that the \ul{Philebus} +can be read more intelligently by placing it after the +\ul{Statesman} but before the \ul{Timaeus}, but we shall have to see +whether this is true after reading the \ul{Timaeus}. + +The method of division, as developed in the \ul{Statesman}, is summoned here in the Philebus to do service in the - - quest for the nature of pleasure and the nature of wisdom. We have seen that Plato regards Unity as the dialectical -opposite of infinity, which, for him, means the indeterminite vagueness or an unspecific description of an element, +opposite of infinity, which, for him, means the indeterminite +vagueness or an unspecific description of an element, without some account of its manner of relation to its fellows. In this respect, it is striking to note a brief allegory of the god Theuth, whom the Egyptians describe as the author and divider and enumerator of sounds in music +and grammar (18 ad). As we shall see, the \ul{Timaeus} will test +the method of division on a cosmic scale in a tale similarly +attributed to an Egyptian priest. - -and grammar (18 ad). As we shall see, the Timaeus will test - - -the method of division on a cosmic scale in a tale similarly attributed to an Egyptian priest. In any event, the problem now is not merely to - - assert the unity and the infinity of number, or pleasure, - - - - - or wisdom, but to ascertain the kinds of each, and, by -implication, the Unity, Likeness, Sameness and the opposites in everything (19 b). Whereas Socrates once preferred +implication, the Unity, Likeness, Sameness \e{and} the opposites +in everything (19 b). Whereas Socrates once preferred to discuss the Forms and to avoid the realm of things, he does not fear to enter into this latter problem now, because, just at this instant, some god appears to have @@ -4594,22 +4007,21 @@ pleasure or pain would be unfeeling. Therefore, somehow we must have both in a union, which is a kind of third (22 a). But, on this account, neither pleasure nor wisdom can be the good, which was decided (at 19) to be the most perfect. -Socrates exempts divine mind from this refutation, admitting only that human minds are excluded from exclusive +Socrates exempts divine mind from this refutation, admitting +only that human minds are excluded from exclusive posession of the Good (22 c). For, the divine mind may turn out to be the cause of the three, and, in that case, -4t will be a fourth. There may even be a fifth, but that +it will be a fourth. There may even be a fifth, but that will be discussed later. - - - -When we say something is hotter or colder, we make : -& comparison, and such comparisons are always relative, +When we say something is hotter or colder, we make +a comparison, and such comparisons are always relative, admitting of degrees, and this is an endless business because such measures suggest no way to establish a stable measure. Thus, the class of all such comparatives includes -an infinite, i.e., an unlimited number. However, the class -of unnumbered things itself is the unity of such comparatives (25 a). On the other hand, its opposite, the class of +an infinite, i.e., an unlimited number. However, the \e{class } +of unnumbered things itself \e{is} the unity of such comparatives +(25 a). On the other hand, its opposite, the class of all numbered things, admits quantity and is therefore finite, or limited, and here too, the class itself is the unity of these (25 b). @@ -4626,34 +4038,19 @@ for, obviously, pleasure is of the first class since it always admits of degree. In this regard, the question is raised: -ee eWhether all of this which they call the universe - +\Q{...Whether all of this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of an irrational and random - chance, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have - -declared, ordered and governed by a@ marvelous - +declared, ordered and governed by a marvelous intelligence and wisdom...Wide asunder are the two - assertions, Socrates, for that which you are now - - saying is blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the respect of - - - - - the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and -of the whole circle of the heavens;...(28 da). -Here, quite obviously, is a clear anticipation of - - -the Timaeus. In addition, we are next presented with an - +of the whole circle of the heavens;...(28 d)} +Here, quite obviously, is a clear anticipation of +the \ul{Timaeus}. In addition, we are next presented with an analysis of the elements of bodies, which are said to be the traditional fire, air, water and earth, and, just as before, the mere enumeration of their discreteness does not @@ -4669,30 +4066,25 @@ consist of four elements, so the four classes previously discovered may be considered as these elements; that is, the unlimited, the limited, their offspring, mixture, and the cause of their union, are in fact the true meanings of -fire, air, earth and water. The universal fire which 1s +fire, air, earth and water. The universal fire which is the cause of our fire is the hidden meaning of mind as the cause of the universe (30 d). So we must conclude that the universe consists of four elements and that we are similarly constructed, and our construction depends on its. + Fire, earth, water, and land correspond to the unlimited, limited, mixture and cause. It is not said - - -le - - - which elements correspond to which elements, but it is clear that mind corresponds to fire, both in us and in the universe, It goes without too much comment that this -doctrine goes beyond a simple Heracliteanism or Pythagoreanism or Anaxagoreanism, or Anaximanders3anism. It is, in +doctrine goes beyond a simple Heracliteanism or Pythagoreanism +or Anaxagoreanism, or Anaximandersanism. It is, in my view, the seed of the more exact and detailed view +which we shall find in the \ul{Timaeus}. - -which we shall find in the Timaeus. - - -In the remainder of the dialogue, there is a delineation and cross comparison of the types of pleasure and pain, including the cognate emotions, and desires. It would +In the remainder of the dialogue, there is a delineation +and cross comparison of the types of pleasure and +pain, including the cognate emotions, and desires. It would be tempting to enter into a detailed commentary on this section of Plato's philosophy to show some of its origins or that certain doctrines of the modern giants of depth @@ -4708,27 +4100,19 @@ there are four classes of pleasures, four of pains, four of emotions, four of desires, and the intermixture of each of these with every other gives rise to innumerable variety. Plato himself does not even attempt an exhaustive treatment - - What is significant for our purposes is the treatment of - - - -memory and perception. We saw in the Sophist and the -Statesman that certain images could be false while others +memory and perception. We saw in the \ul{Sophist} and the +\ul{Statesman} that certain images could be false while others could be true. In the realm of feeling, the feelings -attendant upon true or false images will be correspondingly true or false. Thus Plato develops the significant +attendant upon true or false images will be correspondingly +true or false. Thus Plato develops the significant ethical dictum that pleasures (or pains or emotions) though felt, may be false. We meet again the artist in the soul (imagination) which sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly inscribes the memory-images of past, present, and future experiences (39 a). Thus, the question of images, irrevocably linked to the tenses of imagination, is, in - - -the Philebus, introduced into the discussion of pleasure, - - +the \ul{Philebus}, introduced into the discussion of pleasure, pain, and emotion. Again, since the number of combinations of pleasures, whether unlimited, or limited or mixed or causative, is innumerable, the multiplication of this @@ -4744,29 +4128,21 @@ possible" (63 b). The end of the dialogue, interpreted in the light of the gradual growth of Plato's thought through the late - - -tee - - - group, is striking, for it asserts unequivocally that . neither mind and wisdom nor pleasure and pain are simply superior to one another: there must be mixture. Formerly, mind and knowledge of the forms would have been indubitably best; now, mixture is necessary. However, this is not to be interpreted as a simple linear progression, because, as -we shall see in the Timaeus, what is necessary and what is +we shall see in the \ul{Timaeus}, what is necessary and what is good are not due to comparable causes and are not therefore subject to the same criterion for choosing which is better. It may well be that what is better is unfortunately not what is necessary. +\secc Summary -Summary -There are unmistakable hints in the Philebus that - - +There are unmistakable hints in the \ul{Philebus} that the dialogue which succeeds it will take up certain strands of Pythagorean logic and develop them further, as for exe ample the whole question of the manner in which the cause @@ -4780,92 +4156,65 @@ with the extension of the method of division to the realm of pleasure and knowledge of pleasure. The purist position that either pleasure or mind must be affirmed as the best is abandoned as "childish" and as an "old argument," which, - - it is agreed, no longer captures philosophic interest. - - - - -'The isolated eternality of the forms, modified by the +The isolated eternality of the forms, modified by the Sophist and the Statesman, is further modified by the assertion that pleasures or any Form or class cannot be -both good and alone. | +both good and alone. Lastly, the familiar doctrine of the aviary of images -4s maintained, and developed insofar as it is now employed +is maintained, and developed insofar as it is now employed to explain the basis of false pleasures, feelings, and emotions. A beginning is made into the physiology of reminiscence and an intimate connection is drawn between such a physiology and the first outlines of a concrete cosmology. For this intimate connection and a fuller description of the relations between a psychogeny and a -cosmogeny, we must look to the Timaeus. - +cosmogeny, we must look to the \ul{Timaeus}. Summary of the Chapter -Tracing the hypothesized modification and development - +Tracing the hypothesized modification and development of the tripartite theme of eternity-image-time through -the Republic, Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, Statesman, - - -and Philebus, it emerges that Plato's treatment of these +the \ul{Republic}, \ul{Parmenides}, \ul{Theatetus}, \ul{Sophist}, \ul{Statesman}, +and \ul{Philebus}, it emerges that Plato's treatment of these topics is not a simple linear progression. I think I have shown that these themes are, in fact, treated together wherever discussion of any one of them is broached, and that to speak of one involves the need to speak of. the others. -From the eternal realm of the Forms and the shadow-~ -like copies of them in the Republic's cave, we saw the +From the eternal realm of the Forms and the shadow-like +copies of them in the \ul{Republic}'s cave, we saw the initial doctrine of the Forms of the middle dialogues - - - -subjected to the criticism of the Parmenides. There we are | +subjected to the criticism of the \ul{Parmenides}. There we are told that the naive view of the Forms as separated from what appears to us leads to logically untenable positions, from a series of unreal instants to hypostasizing none -existence. A hint of the doctrine of notetime emerges. 'the - - -Theatetus informs us that we must examine the reality of - - +existence. A hint of the doctrine of not-time emerges. The +\ul{Theatetus} informs us that we must examine the reality of moving images, as if the results of perception were flying -birds in an aviary-like memory. the Sophist examines note +birds in an aviary-like memory. The \ul{Sophist} examines note being and concludes with the extraordinary assertion that -notebeing in some way is, so that the artificial separation +not-being in some way is, so that the artificial separation of the world into what is either eternal or temporal, -agreed to be inadequate in the Parmenides, is now shown, +agreed to be inadequate in the \ul{Parmenides}, is now shown, not only to be inadequate, but to be impossible. Things - are not isolated absolutes sharing in isolated absolute Forms, for images have their own sort of reality. The - - -Statesman acknowledges that this reality of images must be - - +\ul{Statesman} acknowledges that this reality of images must be generalized beyond a psychological doctrine, and implies that there might well be cosmic images, which are better and more intelligible than the myths and fables of the -historical story-tellers. The Philebus shows that there +historical story-tellers. The \ul{Philebus} shows that there are far-reaching ethical implications of this doctrine, and especially, leads to a discussion of the cause (s) of mixed classes and mixed realities. In short, from an initial position which asserted the realm of Forms to be eternally separated from the - - world of moving images, Plato comes to assert that moving - - - -images have a reality which is in no way to be despised or | +images have a reality which is in no way to be despised or neglected in favor of a naively-viewed eternity. The world of time and the moving images in it cannot be intelligently separated from the eternal. @@ -4883,25 +4232,15 @@ evolution, such a treatment will have to synthesize all that has gone before, in a way which will not excise any real progress made before it. This means that there will have to be a discussion of the psychology of knowledge as -well as a cosmology of being, and that these two preponderant interests will have to be united in a way which spells +well as a cosmology of being, and that these two preponderant +interests will have to be united in a way which spells out their intimate relation. This is exactly what the - - -Timaeus will do. If the Timaeus accomplishes this task, - - -4t follows that the Timaeus should be regarded as a later - - +\ul{Timaeus} will do. If the \ul{Timaeus} accomplishes this task, +it follows that the \ul{Timaeus} should be regarded as a later dialogue and that we should find in it a new synthesis of - - the doctrines of eternity, image, and time. - -CHAPTER IV -THE TIMAEUS - +\sec The Timaeus I The Introductory Conversation (17a-27b) @@ -5512,7 +4851,7 @@ was established that sensation and true opinion do have a measure of the truth but are not the sources of that truth, and to the Sophist, where it was established that images, if genuine, have a measure of truth because they are not -absolutely notebeing but have a reality ot their own. The +absolutely not-being but have a reality ot their own. The doctrine of the Philebus is brought into the account in the @@ -5631,7 +4970,7 @@ Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff. This accounts for the strangely popular grounds on which the argument (whether the model of the universe is -eternal or generated) 1s settled. Timaeus says "Everyone, +eternal or generated) is settled. Timaeus says "Everyone, then, must see that (the father) looked to the eternal..." (29a). @@ -5671,12 +5010,12 @@ Timaeus says, Again, these things being so, our world must necessarily be a likeness (eikona) of something. -Now in every matter it 1s of great moment to +Now in every matter it is of great moment to start at the right point in accordance with the nature of the subject (kata physin archen). Concerning a likeness (eikonos) then, and its model (paradeigmatos) we must make this -distinction; an account (logos) 1s of the same +distinction; an account (logos) is of the same order (suggenes) as the thing it sets forth an account of that which is abiding and stable and discoverable by the aid of reason will @@ -5718,7 +5057,7 @@ lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable they must in no wise fall short of this; but those which deal with that which is made in the image of the former and which is a likeness, must be likely and duly corresponding -with their subject: as being 1s to becoming, +with their subject: as being is to becoming, so ia truth to belief (29b-c, Archer-Hind). @@ -5740,7 +5079,7 @@ and unfailing, and as far as is in the nature of words irrefutable and immovable, and nothing less than this. But the words which are the expression of the immitation of the eternal -things, which 1s an image only, need only be +things, which is an image only, need only be likely and analogous to the former words. What essence is to generation, that truth is @@ -5872,7 +5211,7 @@ relation between not-being and divine production in the realm of things, so now the Timaceus is investigating the -relation between notebeing and the divine production of +relation between not-being and the divine production of the entire cosmos. One need not suppose that the familiar doctrine of the split between the realm of Forms and the @@ -6056,7 +5395,7 @@ always to insert "only" when ever he refers to images, since, in such a view, things are either perfectly true or they are only images. But for Plato, this simple dichotomy has long outlived its utility, and the doctrine -of notebeing, and the mixture of being and not-being is, +of not-being, and the mixture of being and not-being is, in the Timaeus, a further effort on Plato's part to clarify his thought on these matters. @@ -6097,7 +5436,7 @@ more radiantly. However, one notices that Archer-Hind does not translate the final portion of the passage in question by the phrase "only an image"; he says, simply, that an image is "likely" and "duly corresponding" with its -subject. Thus Archer-Hind 1s able to conclude that words +subject. Thus Archer-Hind is able to conclude that words stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent as the images do, and that this proportion is a special case of the more general formula at the end of the passage, which has it that becoming is to being as probability is to truth, This is not mere imagery, for words @@ -6256,7 +5595,7 @@ earlier dialogues (Republic, Phaedo) were unworthy vehicles of the truth, but in later dialogues (Sophist, Statesman) are not only worthy but somehow necessary to describe the -notebeing integral to every real thing. +not-being integral to every real thing. It is A.E. Taylor's view that the Platonic theory @@ -6279,7 +5618,7 @@ applying to it the fundamentals of Whitehead's theory of time, as set out in the "Concept of Nature." There are here actually two "heresies," as Cornford says. The first ig the assertion that Plato's theory of creation is -assimilable to the Christian notion: the second 1s that +assimilable to the Christian notion: the second is that Whitehead's theory is both Christian and Platonic. It might seem that these theological disputes are not to the point, but, unfortunately, Taylor has introduced them in @@ -6569,7 +5908,7 @@ and all myths. He explicitly says only faithful images (in the Sophist) and only probable myths (in the Timaeus). But this is new. For Plato had written myths in each of the dialogues in the late period, and the famous myth of Er of -the Republic 1s easily remembered. In the Sophist even +the Republic is easily remembered. In the Sophist even some views of the One and the Many are called childish myths. And in the Seventh Letter, Plato tells us that there @@ -6690,7 +6029,7 @@ shall be most surely right to accept from men of understanding (296). Here the first part of the problem of an eternal -becoming 1s stated. Plato has established that the model +becoming is stated. Plato has established that the model of the Universe must clearly be the eternal, and that the maker of the Universe introduced order, and that this order is the most valid basis of becoming. Yet, the @@ -6722,7 +6061,7 @@ possible. It is thus a living being with reason and soul. Yet soul is presumably eternal. It is important to realize that this problem, namely the reconciliation of eternity and becoming, is kept alive during the succeeding passages, -and has not yet been resolved. this 1s no oversight: Plato +and has not yet been resolved. this is no oversight: Plato means to hold this question in readiness until the doctrine he is developing can supply the answer. @@ -6895,7 +6234,7 @@ pp. 29 ff. the structured, leveled unity of these realms must be spelled out, for the Universe shares in the intelligibility of 4ts model, which comprehends all the things within it -in a single unity. It 1s as if Plato were building suspense +in a single unity. It is as if Plato were building suspense into his drama of creation. There is a difference between @& metaphysical dramatist, who writes drama with metaphysical overtones and suggestions, and the dramatic metaphysician, @@ -6974,7 +6313,7 @@ cannot age or succumb to sickness for this would require elements outside it, of which there are none (33). But the shape of the body of the Universe is "that -which is fitting to its nature" (33b); it 1s spherical. +which is fitting to its nature" (33b); it is spherical. This is an extremely important phrase, since some regard Plato's image of time as circular and therefore interpret the Platonic Universe as closed, and subject only to @@ -7085,7 +6424,7 @@ and an eternal being has not yet been made clear. It is still held out for later comment. In short, during his description of the shape of the Universe, Plato has not yet said how it can be that the Universe can be an eternal -becoming. The spherical shape of the Universe 1s basic but +becoming. The spherical shape of the Universe is basic but not sufficient for an insight into Plato's philosophy of time. @@ -7332,7 +6671,7 @@ Forms as early as the Phaedo and the Republic. But in the Sophist, the Different was introduced, based on Plato's recognition that it is necessary to say what is-not in order to say what is. In short, the entire doctrine of -notebeing of the Sophist has reappeared in the Timaeus. +not-being of the Sophist has reappeared in the Timaeus. But, just as the initial recapitulation of the Republic at the beginning of the Timaeus (28a) does not rest with a @@ -7408,9 +6747,9 @@ eidolon, a little Form, so to speak. The Universe is an eikon, which now comes to mean that it is like the perfection of the most perfect. cut even this is not the high point of Plato's analysis, as we shall see. Nevertheless -it 1s central to the exposition of this passage to notice +it is central to the exposition of this passage to notice that the doctrine of the Sophist, which makes it necessary -to somehow include notebeing in the realm of Forms, is now +to somehow include not-being in the realm of Forms, is now recapitulated, but, in addition, it is not only the reality of the Forms but the reality of the whole Universe which must now be explained. And in this connection, Plato has @@ -7484,14 +6823,14 @@ image; yet it was not explained how there could be any reality to such an intermediary thing. The basis for the reality of the Universe as an image has now been laid. For the World-Soul itself is neither simply eternal nor simply -becoming; it 1s a proportional unity of the Same and the +becoming; it is a proportional unity of the Same and the Different. But, from basis to doctrine is not an immediate step. The lesson of the Philebus and the Statesman, which was the caution not to divide too quickly, but to proceed by following the right divisions according to the way things -are, 1s not foreign to the author of these lessons. Before +are, is not foreign to the author of these lessons. Before he gives the details of the reconciliation between eternal being and mere becoming, Plato follows out the division of the World-Soul into its precise portions. @@ -7556,7 +6895,7 @@ makes the same point 16), It 48 anticlimactic to note that Plato knew the solar system to be heliocentric, although -this 1s not universally agreed upon. +this is not universally agreed upon. 13 T.T. Taylor, op, cit., Introduction. @@ -7587,7 +6926,7 @@ own limits, made a divine beginning of ceaseless and intelligent life for all time (36e). -It 1s unnecessary to point out in this age of +It is unnecessary to point out in this age of possible thermonuclear holocaust that Plato's optimism is derived from the perfection of the Universe which is the image of the perfection of the model, and not from the @@ -7609,7 +6948,7 @@ might wish to derive a sense of optimism from the possibility that the Universe does not harbor any human life. For Plato refers to the life of the World-Soul as it inspires the body of the Universe, and not to the life of man, which, Plato was -aware, 1s all too short. In the Myth of Er, the Republic +aware, is all too short. In the Myth of Er, the Republic describes the life of man as a span of one hundred years, and the cycle of good life as a span of ten thousand years. @@ -7989,7 +7328,7 @@ becoming. He states openly that the model is the Living Being who is eternal but the Universe is a generated thing -which therefore cannot be eternal in the same way. It 1s +which therefore cannot be eternal in the same way. It is this difference between the model and the Universe which @@ -8115,7 +7454,7 @@ Universe out of the material of an original chaos, but fashioned Time out of the material of eternity. This is not only a philosophical difficulty but also a function of translation. For, in English (American?) we say that -something 1s an image of something, which does not mean, +something is an image of something, which does not mean, for example, that the image of Freud, is made out of the material of his flesh. An image of Freud can be made of photosensitive paper, of clay, or bronze, or the graphite @@ -8242,7 +7581,7 @@ philosophy, Plato repeatedly uses the phrase "as far as possible" without giving a doctrine of possibility which would explain the meaning of the phrase. Both the need for a model and the limit of possibility are related to the -doctrine of notebeing. The meaning of this doctrine of +doctrine of not-being. The meaning of this doctrine of not-being for the realm of the Forms, was first revealed in the Sophist, where it becomes the Different. The Universe is both the same as and different from its model, so that @@ -8251,7 +7590,7 @@ Having said that the Universe is a Unity of the Same and the Different, and having said that Time gives the closest approximation to perfection that the generated Universe can attain, one should expect that Plato will now develop -his doctrine of notebeing on a cosmological scale, as he +his doctrine of not-being on a cosmological scale, as he has developed his doctrines of eternity and image and Time on a cosmological scale. This new doctrine of cosmic note being is found in the second half of the dialogue, where @@ -8591,7 +7930,7 @@ Cornford has "circuits." -It 1s not necessary to follow Plato into the +It is not necessary to follow Plato into the detailed descriptions which he gives for the motions of each of the planets and for each of the spheres, since as we noted previously, his observations were limited as much @@ -8814,7 +8153,7 @@ can say that the basis of society in one dialogue is eternity and the basis of society in another dialogue is Time, and that the one view is "4mplicit" in the other. -Similarly, it 1s hard to see the grounds for A.E. +Similarly, it is hard to see the grounds for A.E. Taylor's assertion that the Timaeus is only an introduction @@ -8841,7 +8180,7 @@ Plato's reflections concerning the basis of the best possible form of society, after a life-long concern for -this subject. If it 1s true that Plato's Sicilian adventures +this subject. If it is true that Plato's Sicilian adventures were of such a nature as to discourage and disillusion the @@ -8914,7 +8253,7 @@ for the best possible form of society, and no writer in the modern era has seen in it the culmination of Plato's gradual development beyond the doctrine of eternity in the Republic. And yet this seems to be precisely what Plato has done. -This 1s not the place to examine and comment in +This is not the place to examine and comment in detail on the elements which, according to Plato, would @@ -8939,7 +8278,7 @@ ever present the Timaeus. specifications are to be found in part in the Critias and in -great detail in the Laws. It 1s not our purpose here to +great detail in the Laws. It is not our purpose here to describe exhaustively Plato's later sociology. The issue here is the role of Plato's image of Time as a basis for his later sociology, insofar as this can be ascertained @@ -9250,7 +8589,7 @@ it is true to say that our modern notion of process is -imagine, it 1s also true to say that there was some +imagine, it is also true to say that there was some degree of openness in the Greek Universe and that it would be false to state simply that it was a closed world. @@ -9499,7 +8838,7 @@ has so closely related cosmogenesis and anthropogenesis by reason of their mutual participation in time that it is also possible to relate the ontogenesis of the individual citizen to the same basis in time. While it was always possible to say with Plato that the older man is probably -the wiser man, it 1s possible, after a careful reading of +the wiser man, it is possible, after a careful reading of the later dialogues, to assert that the older man ought to pe the wiser because of his fuller participation in time. Or to put the matter in more modern language, the gradual |