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diff --git a/plato_time.otx b/plato_time.otx index c725487..b394600 100644 --- a/plato_time.otx +++ b/plato_time.otx @@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF \Q{But now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years have created number and have given us a conception of time, and the power of inquiring about the nature of the universe, and from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man.} \Qs{Tim\ae us 47} -\sec CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION - +\sec Introduction If one knew of an important writer who had written a number of consecutive and cumulative works, but if one @@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ In this age of process philosophies, we seldom witness scholarly interest in Plato's views of time and history. And yet Whitehead has remarked that not only the process philosophies, but, in some sense, all european -Philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.\fnote{A.N. Whitehead, \bt{Process and Reality} (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 63.} +Philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.\pnote{1} If it could be shown that there is a Platonic philosophy of time and that this philosophy is as seminal @@ -87,28 +86,16 @@ investigate the relations between Plato's philosophy of time and contemporary process-philosophies. Several writers have addressed themselves to reconsiderations of the meanings of Plato's theory of time and the implications -which this theory might have for contemporary investigations. For example, W.H. Walsh discusses the controversy - - +which this theory might have for contemporary investigations. For example, W.H. Walsh\pnote{2} discusses the controversy which arose after the publication of K. Popper's two - - -2 W.H. Walsh, "Plato and the Philosophy of History: -History and Theory in the Republic,” History and Theory -(The Hagues Mouton & Co., 1962), II, 1, pp. 1-16. - - - -volumes, 9 in which Popper wrote, somewhat angrily, that - - -Plato's “view of the world" was "fundamentally historical." +volumes,\pnote{3} in which Popper wrote, somewhat angrily, that +Plato's "view of the world" was "fundamentally historical." Although Walsh later agrees with Popper's assertion that Plato was at bottom a "totalitarian"* he disagrees strongly that Plato's view of the world was historical at all, and, in the remainder of his article, examines with great care and patience Books VIII and 1X of the Republic to show -that Plato did not really posess a “philosophy of History." +that Plato did not really posess a "philosophy of History." While it is not the aim of this study to discuss these two writers, it is instructive to cite them as examples because they contain views which are representative @@ -136,7 +123,7 @@ Aristotle (New York: Dover Publications, i 1959). Both of these authors make slight reference to the -Timaeug while discussing Plato's “Political Philosophy.” +Timaeug while discussing Plato's "Political Philosophy." @@ -169,14 +156,14 @@ theory. The dee teuporany student of Plato nas been delighted with the extensive commentary which has been flowing from -the pen of Gauss” in his six volume Handkommentar, and it +the pen of Gauss" in his six volume Handkommentar, and it might be mentioned that in the final volume Gauss devotes considerable attention to Plato's Timaeus and the social -6 R.G. bury, “Plato and History,” Classical +6 R.G. bury, "Plato and History," Classical Quarterly, New Series, 1-2, pp. 86-94, @@ -199,7 +186,7 @@ vintage, one notices in Bertrand Russell's Mysticism and Logic? an extended discussion of the relation between a conception of time and the sort of insight which he describes as "mystical." There the reader confronts the -statement that Plato, like ail “mystical” writers, regarded +statement that Plato, like ail "mystical" writers, regarded the reality of time as illusory, and Russe.l: supports his claim by appeal to the Parmenides. He does not distinguish between tne character or Parmenides which Plato has @@ -210,7 +197,7 @@ works bequeathed to us through the ages. There is the now familiar quotation from Whitehead's Process and Keality to the effect that an analysis of Plato's thought is rar from an antiquarian interest; it -reads in full, “The safest general characterization of +reads in full, "The safest general characterization of the Guropean philosophical tradition is that 1t consiste of a series of footnotes to Plato."!9 This statment is of considerable import since it appears in @ major work of a @@ -430,7 +417,7 @@ reality of time. It is necessary to clarify the claim that the Timaeus, 4s the last completed dialogue of Plato. The claim that the -Timaeus is a “late” dialogue means that the doctrine of the +Timaeus is a "late" dialogue means that the doctrine of the Timaeus contains certain generalizations of doctrine which show it to be a more mature work, the result of subsequent reflection on the doctrines of prior works. The words "more @@ -440,9 +427,9 @@ mature" therefore mean that the doctrine of the Timaeus includes, generalizes, and goes beyond other dialogues -which are therefore doctrinally “earlier.” Therefore, it +which are therefore doctrinally "earlier." Therefore, it should be evident that the characterization of a dialogue -as "late" or “early” or "middle" refers not only to the +as "late" or "early" or "middle" refers not only to the period of Plato's life during which it was composed but also to the degree to which its doctrine represents 4 @@ -461,7 +448,7 @@ Critias and the Laws and succeeds the Republic means not only that these dialogues were written before and after each other respectively; it means also that the doctrine of -the Timaeus is a "later doctrine” than the Republic, i.e., +the Timaeus is a "later doctrine" than the Republic, i.e., that is a reflective advance over the doctrine of the Republic. owevens 4b should be pointed out that the precise meaning of this hypothesized advance will have to @@ -542,7 +529,7 @@ in time. It is necessary to clarify the special use of the term "hypothesis" as it will be employed in this study. By hypothesis is meant nothing more than a tentative -assertion of a conclusion, such that one states an hypothesis and then musters “arguments” in favor of it. The +assertion of a conclusion, such that one states an hypothesis and then musters "arguments" in favor of it. The hypothesis in this study is a tripartite one: it involves the tentative assertion that the Timaeus is a "late" dialogue, that is, it was written during Plato's last years @@ -555,14 +542,14 @@ that the doctrines of the Timaeus constitute a maturation and are the results of a progressive evolution which can be traced through the group of dialogues which the scholars -have agreed to call the “late” group; and it invoives the +have agreed to call the "late" group; and it invoives the tentative assertion that the themes of eternity, image, and time, can be focused upon as those themes which Plato devoted his maturing efforts to expand and deepen by repeated reflection upon them. Finally, the tripartite hypothesis involves the tentative assertion that Plato's thoughts on the basis of society gradually shifted from an -"eternalist” to a “temporalist"™ orientation; that is, in +"eternalist" to a "temporalist"™ orientation; that is, in his early works, Plato reasoned to the conclusion that @@ -577,7 +564,7 @@ process, or, to be more exact, in the reality of time itself. Thus it is necessary to distinguish the word -“hypothesis” from other uses of the term. For example, in +"hypothesis" from other uses of the term. For example, in the Parmenides Plato discusses eight "hypotheses" and his meaning there seems to be that one may tentatively assert @ proposition, and then, by reasoning logically to the @@ -595,10 +582,10 @@ whether it says what we say it says. Finally, it is necessary to distinguish the term hypothesis from the usage of the so-called physical -sciences, wherein “data" are brought forward to "validate, +sciences, wherein "data" are brought forward to "validate, verify, and confirm" the hypothesis. In the sciences, an -hypothesis is said to be a “testable” proposition by -reason of “operationalizing” its terms; i.e., describing +hypothesis is said to be a "testable" proposition by +reason of "operationalizing" its terms; i.e., describing the operations through which the investigator has gone @@ -633,10 +620,10 @@ this study that the Timaeus is a late dialogue in which Plato has united several themes from the late dialogues -14 Garl G. Hempel, “Fundamentals of Concept +14 Garl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept -Formation in Enpirical Science,” International Encyclopaedia +Formation in Enpirical Science," International Encyclopaedia of Unified § ce, vols. I and IT; Foundations of the ° ence, C. reas, 1 e @@ -661,7 +648,7 @@ of time into its Platonic context, it is necessary to show the chronological relation of the Ltimaeus as a dialogue -to the other dialogues. ‘this is an “external argument" +to the other dialogues. ‘this is an "external argument" which attempts to establish the relative chronology of the dialogues by relatively non-interpretative criteria, i.e., criteria which do not demand an insight into the @@ -1094,7 +1081,7 @@ the treatment Plato received at the academy of the Medicis, where Marsilius Ficinus taught from the text of the -Timaeug.” +Timaeug." Jaeger notes a change in the eighteenth century, @@ -1103,7 +1090,7 @@ was nonetheless very much alive. However, theretofore, Plato had been regarded as a mystic and as a theologian whose doctrine was as systematic and systematized as the Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen. Plato was regarded only -as the author of the theory of ideas.” +as the author of the theory of ideas." According to Jaeger, it was Schleierzacher's contention that the form which a philosophy took was a @@ -1111,7 +1098,7 @@ creative expression of the philosopher's individuality, and it was Plato's genius, he thought, to dramatize, and to -use philosophy as a “continuous philosophical discussion +use philosophy as a "continuous philosophical discussion aimed at discovering the truth. "> @@ -1394,7 +1381,7 @@ so that his students could gradually master his philosophical systen. Campbell says that Schleiermacher's conception of a -“complete system gradually revealed" was a stirring one +"complete system gradually revealed" was a stirring one which caused a renaissance of Platonic scholarship. Later, @@ -1533,7 +1520,7 @@ every dialogue" is undertaken. Thus, Campbell's argument should read as follows; if the Laws is agreed to be last, then the remainder follows on stylistic grounds. And it should be tallied against Jaeger that the placement of the -Laws as last does not rest on "purely mechanical” criteria. +Laws as last does not rest on "purely mechanical" criteria. This conclusion bears directly on the question of @@ -1558,10 +1545,10 @@ Which the Seventh Letter makes available was taken over = 40 -by the stylists,-” 25 and added to their attempts to : +by the stylists,-" 25 and added to their attempts to : establish the order of the avavoedee: Again, this shows that the stylistic criteria cannot be viewed as "purely -machanical.” On the one hand this limite the extent to +machanical." On the one hand this limite the extent to which stylistic criteria may be said to be non-interpretative; on the other hand, since interpretative sources enter into stylistic researches, it seems to add to the reliability of stylistic criteria in establishing the @@ -1615,7 +1602,7 @@ Commentary on the Timaeus, -° there is a rather extensive description of the stylistic and stylometric criteria and @ rather extensive reliance on both of them, albeit accompanied by a critique. Later, in Plato, the Man and -his Work, “2 there is a recapitulation of the stylistic +his Work, "2 there is a recapitulation of the stylistic criteria and a somewhat limited reliance upon them. One can only conclude that Taylor did not deem it worthwhile to inform the readers of the Britannica on the intricasies @@ -1649,7 +1636,7 @@ ed.;3 Aa print.; New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), 4, periodic versus poetic style-0 He says, in addition, that the last dialogue which bears the marks of Plato's earlier style must be the Theatetus, -and that he shares this view with Ritter”! and +and that he shares this view with Ritter"! and Lutoslawek1.>* A.E. Taylor's recapitulation of the stylistic @@ -1744,20 +1731,20 @@ doctrine rather than for reasons of style. Ritter says that he learned most "from the English," meaning Burnet, Taylor, and Cornford, and that his own -researches brought him into “remarkably close agreement... +researches brought him into "remarkably close agreement... with respect to their chronological determinations."-/ Briefly, his conclusions are theses there are six major groupings of dialogues, and the last group, composed of the Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, and -Laws, must be late because a "careful study of the differences in language and expression" creates an “indubitable +Laws, must be late because a "careful study of the differences in language and expression" creates an "indubitable means of determining their genuineness as well as the approximate date of their appearance." >° In addition, he says that there are changes in style and writing which are less precise but no less observable by the trained observer, and that perhaps the strongest of these -considerations is the transition from the “poetic” style +considerations is the transition from the "poetic" style in the early works to the "didactic" style of the later @@ -1776,7 +1763,7 @@ chronology of the works of Goethe, 40 Perhaps a summary of the stylistic controversy is -in order at this point. “1 Briefly, it began with the +in order at this point. "1 Briefly, it began with the efforts of Schleiermacher to reveal what he felt was the pedagogical gradualiem of Plato's dialogues. But Hermann felt that the gradual development in the dialogues revealed @@ -1932,7 +1919,7 @@ was of the family of Solon. 42 a sister, Potone, whose son, Speusippus was therefore -42 alk. Taylor, “Plato,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, +42 alk. Taylor, "Plato," Encyclopaedia Britannica, pp. 48-64. @@ -1945,7 +1932,7 @@ Strategus of Tarentum) was extremely fortunate since Archytas later rescued Plato from slavery, into which he had been sold by Dionysius 11.44 the incident of Plato's slavery was also recorded by Philodemus in his Index -Academicorum. “5 However, without the Seventh Letter it is +Academicorum. "5 However, without the Seventh Letter it is not possible to set a precise date for this event. Cicero only tells us that Plato was in Sicily and that he was ransomed by Archytas from the slavery into which he had @@ -1992,7 +1979,7 @@ for a few years. 49 Plato also travelled to Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and Italy and Sicily. The Sicilian travels were "of great -significance” for Plato's philosophy. In addition to +significance" for Plato's philosophy. In addition to Archytas of Tarentum he met other Pythagoreans in Syracuse. It was during these travels that he also met Dion and Dionysius I. Plato was at this time fourty years old; Dion @@ -2110,7 +2097,7 @@ give several hints, through the Parmenides, Theatetus, and in the whole group of late dialogues, of the extent to -which the doctrines of these dialogues are “beyond" +which the doctrines of these dialogues are "beyond" Socrates, that is, ask the sort of questions which Socrates probably would not have asked. @@ -2238,7 +2225,7 @@ any unprejudiced reader it (the Seventh Letter) cannot fail to produce the impression of the natural outspokenness of a narrative of personal experience. "65 Cicero himself -says, “praeclara epistula Platonis ad Dionis propinquos..."66 +says, "praeclara epistula Platonis ad Dionis propinquos..."66 To these, Harward adds his own views since Plato regarded Kallipos as a "fiend incarnate," and since it was Kallipos who had Dion murdered, and since Kallipos wrote to Plato @@ -2322,7 +2309,7 @@ succession of tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (326 d). However, while there, he instructs the young Dion who is extraordinarily adept at this sort of learning, and -Dion resolves to “live for the future” which of course +Dion resolves to "live for the future" which of course makes him terribly unpopular at the court (327 b,c) However it is his hope that Dionysius will learn too, and in this way peace and happiness will be introduced (327 d). @@ -2398,7 +2385,7 @@ philosophical digression into the nature of the process wherein philosophy is "imparted" so that the student will -_gsee a “marvellous road" open before him (340 b,c). Here +_gsee a "marvellous road" open before him (340 b,c). Here @@ -2488,7 +2475,7 @@ taken, naught will avail the ambitious, such as Dionysius. In addition, if there is no "natural inclination," even these steps will lead nowhere (344 a). -What is needed is a “sudden flash" which will arrive +What is needed is a "sudden flash" which will arrive only occasionally and then only after long preperation (344b). Therefore, Plato warns his audience, do not expect to plumb the deepest meanings of philosophy too rapidly. And, even @@ -2889,7 +2876,7 @@ on the Form of Justice, it will be better to adopt a "shortsighted" method, namely, seeing Justice where it is writ large, in the state (369 a). This will bring about an unfortunate mutilation of pure vision, but it is inescapable. Moreover, it is a better method than the one adopted -by such “story tellers" as Hesiod and Homer who rather tell +by such "story tellers" as Hesiod and Homer who rather tell lies than avoid distortion (377 e). These authors do not realize that "children" do not know the difference between allegory and fact. It were better that the truth be not @@ -2947,10 +2934,10 @@ they are strong, and if their souls are in harmony (410 e), they will rule well, despite the limitations which mere images of Justice impose on their thought. -This limitation of images is termed the “royal lie" -and the “audacious fiction" (414 b). It is recognized that +This limitation of images is termed the "royal lie" +and the "audacious fiction" (414 b). It is recognized that the sights of youth are like dreams, and that their -education is an acquaintance with “appearance,” but youth +education is an acquaintance with "appearance," but youth ie in a process of formation in the womb of the earth. Perhaps it might not be possible to so educate the guardians in the first generation, but in the next, their sons will probably adopt this view (415 b). Here Plato anticipates the difficulty that a new set of laws may not be @@ -3029,7 +3016,7 @@ residues is working very well. He reminds us that we are seeking a knowledge of Justice and that we are trying to achieve it by seeing Justice writ large in the state, but the discussion seems to be bogging down in particulars. -However, he hopes to "strike a spark” and in that way +However, he hopes to "strike a spark" and in that way release a vision of his subject (434 e). He says: I must confess that the method we are employing @@ -3054,18 +3041,18 @@ Toes perfect vision. However, the method of employing images -aoes reveal a “shadow” of Justice, and therefore, it is +aoes reveal a "shadow" of Justice, and therefore, it is useful (443 c). So, on this basis he traces out the division of labor in a society, showing that each man who fulfills his appointed task is just only insofar as he does not encroach upon the appointed task of another. To do what another ought to do is a double injustice, both to oneself -and to the other. The solidarity of the “imaginary commonwealth" (456 d) rests on this Justice, and, in the same way, +and to the other. The solidarity of the "imaginary commonwealth" (456 d) rests on this Justice, and, in the same way, the soul of the man who tries to cross his line of responsibility will be unjust. The relation of these divided responsibilities is injustice. We must assume this to be so, for we are reminded that the allegorical investigation of the Form of Justice is like dreamers feasting on a -dream, and that the state here investigated is "“imaginary (458 a)." +dream, and that the state here investigated is ""imaginary (458 a)." Does unity, achieved by the harmony of each individual (soul or class) performing his one task, really work. "The inquiry has yet to be made whether such a community @@ -3303,7 +3290,7 @@ like the truth, but is not the truth (533 c). The seeds of a new insight are here, but it would be stretching the point to say that we are now fully 4nstructed in it. It becomes true to say that for every -level of truth, the level just beneath it "images” it. +level of truth, the level just beneath it "images" it. For this reason, there are two kinds of image in the divided line: from the higher vantage point of perception, mere sensation is only a shadow, the lowliest kind of image. @@ -3370,7 +3357,7 @@ The soul is pictured as consisting of one part polycephalous beast, one part lio as the state consists of three classes, one of knowledge, one of ambition, and one of money (580 da). Having discovered this as a result of the inquiry into the state as the image of the justice of the soul, Socrates says now that -the ideal city is a pattern laid up in heaven, and “he who +the ideal city is a pattern laid up in heaven, and "he who desires may behold this, and beholding, govern himself accordingly. But whether there really is or ever will be such a one is of no importance to him, for he will act @@ -3442,7 +3429,7 @@ allowed to see what happens to the souls who perish. Some are doomed to wander beneath the earth for ten times the normal lifespan (reckoned as ten times one hundred) and others are allowed to spend their time in a realm of -"“4nconceivable Beauty." Thereafter, the souls are allowed +""4nconceivable Beauty." Thereafter, the souls are allowed to choose from a wide assortment of lives those they think they would enjoy in their next mortal period on earth. @@ -3487,7 +3474,7 @@ realm of Forms, the visible world of time, and the strange distance between them which makes the truth of the eternal realm almost impossibly unintelligible to the visible life. Here in the Myth of Er the souls who have lived for a -thousand years in the realm of “inconceivable Beauty" are +thousand years in the realm of "inconceivable Beauty" are made to forget this experience by imbibing the waters of @@ -3769,7 +3756,7 @@ the relation of one realm to the other seems impossible, and with that impossibility of separation, partially bridged by the reluctant admission of images, the basis of true knowledge (and Justice, Good, Beauty, etc.) disappears. -One falls thereafter into a “pit of nonsense." The further +One falls thereafter into a "pit of nonsense." The further consequence is that anyone who might have knowledge of the Forms would be unable to have knowledge of us, since we are in a different realm (134 e). Separated realms leads to @@ -3829,7 +3816,7 @@ time is set forth as follows: The One cannot be older, or younger, or the same age as itself, because that would imply Likeness, which it was shown not to have (140 a). Therefore it cannot exist in -time at all (141 a). “And if the One 1s without participation in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was +time at all (141 a). "And if the One 1s without participation in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was at any former time, or has now become or is becoming, or is or will become, or will have become or will be hereafter." @@ -3911,7 +3898,7 @@ Therefore, since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and becoming younger than itself and the Others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than the Others, the One is aid wee and will be, and was -becoming, 1s becoming, and will be becoming. “And, if we +becoming, 1s becoming, and will be becoming. "And, if we are right in all this, then there is an opinion and science and perception of the One" (155 da). @@ -4079,7 +4066,7 @@ However, for the purposes of this study, an important, conclusion has been stated. We saw in hypothesis IIA, that it is not possible to regard time as a series of instants strung out along an imaginary line, and that the -instant is, in some way, not-time, a “queer instant." +instant is, in some way, not-time, a "queer instant." As we shall see, in one of the next dialogues, the Sophist, the generalization of this problem of not-time is @@ -4118,8 +4105,8 @@ This dialogue sets itself the problem of examining knowledge, and asks itself to answer such questions as -"do we know," “how do we know," and "are there kinds of -knowledge.” Where the Parmeyides focused on the consequences of hypothesizing that the realm of Forms is completely +"do we know," "how do we know," and "are there kinds of +knowledge." Where the Parmeyides focused on the consequences of hypothesizing that the realm of Forms is completely separated from the realm of things, the Theatetus inquires @@ -4177,17 +4164,17 @@ long as it remains equal with itself" (155 a). Again, we find "...a thing to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away is neither diminished nor increased, but always remains the same in amount" (155 a). And -“,.emust we not say...that a thing which was not at an +",.emust we not say...that a thing which was not at an earlier instant cannot be at a later instant without becoming, and being in process of becoming" (155 b)? On the basis of these axioms, things both change and do not -change and are perceived and are not perceived. “The +change and are perceived and are not perceived. "The conclusion from all this, is, as we said at the outset, that nothing is one thing by itself but is always in process of becoming for someone, and being is to be ruled out altogether" (157 b). All is flux, each is flux. Socrates wants to make sure that the point has been firmly -made so he asks: “Once more, then, tell me whether you +made so he asks: "Once more, then, tell me whether you like this notion that nothing is but is always becoming good, or beautiful, or any of the other things we mentioned" (157 a). @@ -4211,7 +4198,7 @@ eternal world? In the Theatetus, the question becomes: do the images which perception gives us make possible a knowledge of the eternal? . Socrates reminds us that the "men of flux" constitute -only one group, which is opposed by another group, consisting of Parmenides and Melissus, who hold that “all things +only one group, which is opposed by another group, consisting of Parmenides and Melissus, who hold that "all things are a unity which stays still by itself, having no room to move in. How are we to deal with all these combatants? For, little by little, our advance has brought us, without our @@ -4296,7 +4283,7 @@ because they are "low," and knowledge is not better merely because it is "high": we are now asked to see that false judgments can arise out of faulty matching of remembered images, present images, and reflections on images with -“an eye to the future." This is a significant advance +"an eye to the future." This is a significant advance over the Republic. The discussion of knowledge is further complicated @@ -4403,11 +4390,11 @@ to say that knowledge is opinion with an account of difference, unless we already know the common on the basis of which we distinguish the difference. (Although this is what we do, it 1s not a definition of knowledge since it -includes “knowing the common" in its "definition"). +includes "knowing the common" in its "definition"). | The dialogue ends a few lines later with Socrates saying that all the definitions of knowledge so far -adduced are mere “wind-eggs" (210 b). Theatetus is told +adduced are mere "wind-eggs" (210 b). Theatetus is told that the mid-wife's art is a heavenly gift which Socrates uses on those in whom beauty resides, and that as a result of this gymnastic they have engaged in, Theatetus will @@ -4421,7 +4408,7 @@ define what knowledge is. Actually, we have said several ‘things about what it is not, and therefore Theatetus has -made progress along the “long way" which is required for +made progress along the "long way" which is required for this sort of knowledge. That is why the last words of the dialogue are "But tomorrow morning, Theatetus, let us meet again" (210 d). @@ -4472,7 +4459,7 @@ that the steps and hypotheses of the Theatetus are no longer regarded as inferior but as necessary preliminaries -in the “long way” which the mind must take to true knowledge. +in the "long way" which the mind must take to true knowledge. Somehow, we have found, not what knowledge is, but what complete knowledge is not. This insight, namely, that @@ -4601,8 +4588,8 @@ image is begun. Surely, the Stranger asserts, we cannot just say -that what ia, is not. Yet we say “notebeing" as if it were -a singular; we say "not-beings” in the plural. We agree +that what ia, is not. Yet we say "notebeing" as if it were +a singular; we say "not-beings" in the plural. We agree that not=being is unutterable and inconceivable, and yet we speak the words; in short, in the act of saying we cannot say it, we are saying it (238 c). This is the dark @@ -4747,7 +4734,7 @@ communicates with them both. But Motion and Rest communicate with Same and Other, and therefore, Motion is both Same and Other than being. In other words, Motion is both being and notebeing. And Rest is both being and not-being. -And Same is both being and notebeing. “Every class, than, +And Same is both being and notebeing. "Every class, than, has plurality of being and infinity of notebeing" (256 e). And @@ -4860,7 +4847,7 @@ through a notion of notebeing, so we have advanced from a faulty notion of the realm of the Forms through notions of what the Forms are not. Of time, we are told little in an explicit way. But one should notice that the Parmenidean -“queer instant," what we have called "not-time" has been +"queer instant," what we have called "not-time" has been generalized, for the Sophist shows that not-being is to being what not-time is to time. @@ -4991,10 +4978,10 @@ in the universe, all things have to change, and, in on all creatures (274 8). Since we do not have this -guardianship of the god to follow, but, “imitating the +guardianship of the god to follow, but, "imitating the universe and following it through all time, we live and grow at one time in this way and at another time in -that” (274 e). As we shall see, the Timaeus advances beyond +that" (274 e). As we shall see, the Timaeus advances beyond these doctrines, especially beyond this particular doctrine of necessity. @@ -5109,7 +5096,7 @@ when we discussed the Sophist. We felt constrained there to admit that what is not-x nevertheless exists..." (284 b) So there must be two standards of measure, one having to do with measures relative to each other, and the second those -which “comprise arts concerned with due measure, due +which "comprise arts concerned with due measure, due occasion, due time, due performance, and all such standards as have removed their abode from the extremes and are now settled about the mean" (284 e). This seems to refer to @@ -5310,7 +5297,7 @@ Difference. It is said that this principle of Difference is a marvel of nature because it asks us to affirm that "one -would be many or many one” (13 e). No one any longer argues +would be many or many one" (13 e). No one any longer argues that it 1s marvelous to assert that Socrates is many and one because he has many limbs but is only one Socrates: @@ -5326,7 +5313,7 @@ is Here the initial impression of anachronism fades completely, for the passage clearly asserts that it is -childish to continue to play on the words “one” and "many" +childish to continue to play on the words "one" and "many" now that the Parmenides and the Sophist and the Statesman @@ -5495,7 +5482,7 @@ not even have full pleasure if he did not also have mind and aenery and knowledge, because, without them, he would not know whether he was experiencing pleasure. Similarly if he had no memory he would not remember pleasure, which -4s also pleasant, nor, without “true opinion" would he be +4s also pleasant, nor, without "true opinion" would he be able to perceive present pleasures. In the same way, had he no knowledge, he would be unable to calculate future pleasures (21 b). Similarly, a life of mind without @@ -5649,7 +5636,7 @@ the whole by using the middle voice of his native grammar. However, he assures us that he has not forgotten his own former dialogues, when he says "...for any class to be alone and in perfect solitude is not good nor altogether -possible” (63 b). +possible" (63 b). The end of the dialogue, interpreted in the light of the gradual growth of Plato's thought through the late @@ -5848,7 +5835,7 @@ tions of the dialogue reveal. The introductory remarks -“found in the Timaeus set the foundations, not only for +"found in the Timaeus set the foundations, not only for Plato's later philosophy of time but also for the function-~ al significance this philosophy has in relation to Plato's view of the best possible society. @@ -5891,10 +5878,10 @@ from this cast alone that questions about the morality of ancient Athenian politics will be discussed. Socrates opens the dialogue. His discussion of -"yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"” of some of the doctrines +"yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"" of some of the doctrines of the Republic, (books II-VI) namely, the description of the farmers, craftsmen, and guardians who make up the -"best form of society” (17c). The occupational specialization which alloted one and only one role to each individual +"best form of society" (17c). The occupational specialization which alloted one and only one role to each individual citizen because he was best fitted for one and only one role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversation." The statement is made that this brief recapitulation leaves nothing out and is an exact description of the @@ -6093,7 +6080,7 @@ Solon, however, does not understand the appellation -“children, " and inquires what the priest means when he says +"children, " and inquires what the priest means when he says that he, Solon, an old man, is a "child." The priest explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to temporary deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular orbits, and that, at these times, the deviations bring @@ -6133,7 +6120,7 @@ class performs one and only one function, and he adds that these contemporary Egyptian institutions are continuous with those olden days when the goddess instructed both Athens and Egypt in these ways. Furthermore, the laws of -Egypt are said to reflect the “order of the world, deriving +Egypt are said to reflect the "order of the world, deriving from those divine things the discovery of all arts applied to human affairs..." (24b). As we shall see, this is almost how Timaeus will describe the origin of all human arts. @@ -6388,7 +6375,7 @@ was in fact said in other words. But now this doctrine must be generalized and tested on a cosmological scale. Therefore, --Timaeus uses the phrase, “concerning the whole ‘heaven’ or +-Timaeus uses the phrase, "concerning the whole ‘heaven’ or @@ -6429,7 +6416,7 @@ next line where we read "But again that which becomes, we Say, must necessarily become by the agency of some cause" (28c). -Next comes the often quoted statement “The maker and +Next comes the often quoted statement "The maker and ‘father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and @@ -6557,7 +6544,7 @@ preparation for Plato's statement that the world is the best of things that have become, unless it is Plato's knowledge that he is going to describe the world as the result of the best of causes, and therefore knows it must -be the best of “effects.” But this creates the very +be the best of "effects." But this creates the very difficulty which this dialogue is trying to avoid, and that is the description of the best cause as one whose action can only bring about the best results. For, in one @@ -6749,8 +6736,8 @@ change. There are many more senses in which the word Parmenides (151e-152e). For example, one may say "is -becoming,” “was becoming,” “becoming older," "becoming -younger," “will be becoming," etc. On the basis of his +becoming," "was becoming," "becoming older," "becoming +younger," "will be becoming," etc. On the basis of his simple division into two meanings, Cornford adopts the conclusion that the second meaning cannot be what Plato means and that therefore the world must have begun in time. @@ -6857,7 +6844,7 @@ necessitate the mythical figure or that it might be true to say that the maker is ineffably inscrutable and should not be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpretations seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal development of the late dialogues. Thus Cornford says that -a similar “device” was employed in the Republic, referring +a similar "device" was employed in the Republic, referring probably to the Myth of Er. But in the late dialorues, Plato repeatedly criticises these myths as childish. Yet Cornford's interpretation of myth is responsible for his @@ -6991,9 +6978,9 @@ in time, and to reach his true meaning we must strip off the veil of allegory.1!5 Here 4s the source of Cornford's statement that it is -impossible to "strip off the veil of allegory.“ Later in +impossible to "strip off the veil of allegory." Later in his commentary, Archer-Hind writes that although Plato is -talking about “absolute thought thinking itself" Plato +talking about "absolute thought thinking itself" Plato has put this idea into the figure of a gradually unfolding process. My view is that it is not necessary to strip off the veil of allegory to see Plato's meaning, for the @@ -7004,8 +6991,8 @@ of the truth. But for those who see the doctrine, the image but actually helps it to radiate of itself, and to shine more radiantly. However, one notices that Archer-Hind does not translate the final portion of the passage in question -by the phrase “only an image"; he says, simply, that an -image is "likely" and "duly corresponding” with its +by the phrase "only an image"; he says, simply, that an +image is "likely" and "duly corresponding" with its subject. Thus Archer-Hind 1s able to conclude that words stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent as the images do, and that this proportion is a special case of the more general formula at the end of the @@ -7076,9 +7063,9 @@ But a point worth making is partially confirmed by Jowett, in that he agrees with Archer-Hind that Plato makes words proportional to their referents, just as images are proportional to their paradigms. Although -Cornford's translation of “accounts” is somewhat cumbersome, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating +Cornford's translation of "accounts" is somewhat cumbersome, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating the second half of the proportion "what essence is to -generation, so truth is to belief,” although Cornford +generation, so truth is to belief," although Cornford prefers being to essence. The little=-consulted work of T.T. Taylor is also @@ -7099,7 +7086,7 @@ between the world of exemplars and the world of images, and this in turn would lead to the diminution of the role of images and the arguments based upon them. And so, T.T. Taylor says that in the discussion of images, "we should -employ only probable arguments,” thereby separating what +employ only probable arguments," thereby separating what Plato is trying to put together in a new way. However, T.T. Taylor says, The faith which Plato now assumes appears to be @@ -7148,9 +7135,9 @@ must in no wise fall short thereof, whereas the accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of that model, and is itself a likeness, will be analogous thereto and posess likelihood; -Although Bury does not insert an “only" in this passage, +Although Bury does not insert an "only" in this passage, the feeling tone is indicated in his tra*slation by his -use of “whereas,” which makes it seem that he has shifted +use of "whereas," which makes it seem that he has shifted the field and is now speaking of the opposite side of the dichotomy. His translation makes it seem that the universe 4s only a copy of a copy, and therefore probably lese than @@ -7185,7 +7172,7 @@ applying to it the fundamentals of Whitehead's theory of -time, as set out in the “Concept of Nature.” There are +time, as set out in the "Concept of Nature." There are here actually two "heresies," as Cornford says. The first ig the assertion that Plato's theory of creation is assimilable to the Christian notion: the second 1s that @@ -7206,7 +7193,7 @@ and finally arrive at precise and exact perceptions. Cornford seems right here when he says that A.E. Taylor's speculations derive from A.E. Taylor and hardly at all from Plato. It might be true to assert that Plato held -the senses not to be “infinitely acute" but this is a +the senses not to be "infinitely acute" but this is a long way from the claim that Plato offers a provisional @@ -7222,7 +7209,7 @@ account because the senses are so dull and because they can only report what they perceive at a given time, °° -AE, Taylor nevertheless does not insert the “only” which +AE, Taylor nevertheless does not insert the "only" which others want. His translation reads: We must lay it down that discourses are akin in @@ -7241,7 +7228,7 @@ fallingshort of thate-), discourses about that which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding to their objects.2! However, he adds the comment that Timaeus' discourse -and Timaeus' “warning” about proportionality pertain to +and Timaeus' "warning" about proportionality pertain to the whole cosmology. It is not given as a finally true account of @@ -7253,7 +7240,7 @@ so far as Timaeus can see, best "saves," i.e., does full justice to all the "appearances" so far as they are known to him.22 -So, although A.E. Taylor does not insert “only” in his +So, although A.E. Taylor does not insert "only" in his translation, he asks that the passage be interpreted as a warning that the account is simply the best one which Timaeus can devise to save the appearances. This follows @@ -7266,7 +7253,7 @@ which we should expect to find "nothing more" than the doctrine of a fifth-century Pythagorean, a "provisional -tale," the “best approximation" Timaeus could manage. This +tale," the "best approximation" Timaeus could manage. This 20 tpi. @@ -7304,7 +7291,7 @@ could have wasted his time on so frivolous and futile an exercise in pastiche.@ -In addition, Cornford feels that “There is more of Plato +In addition, Cornford feels that "There is more of Plato in The Adventures of Ideas than there is of Whitehead in @@ -7436,7 +7423,7 @@ faith. : Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the participants of the dialogue should accept the account he is about to give as a "probable myth" (eikota mython) (29d) -4t need not be understood as “only” a myth but, in +4t need not be understood as "only" a myth but, in contradistinction to the childish myths which are for those who can see no further, the myth which Timaeus is about to tell is a likely or probable myth. This follows out the @@ -7564,7 +7551,7 @@ become and continue. These questions must now be confronted, for the general issue which underlies them is "what is the relation of a becoming image to reality." -Cornford states that “Plato denied reality to what is +Cornford states that "Plato denied reality to what is commonly called matter."! The materiality of this universe, however, is not unconnected with the motive for the generation of the Universe by its maker. We shall investigate the two issues simultaneously. Timaeus informs us of this motive @@ -7717,7 +7704,7 @@ model, but he is not described as looking to himself. It is hard to see the grounds for Taylor's assertion that the demiurge fashions by "an overflow of his goodness. "4 -Plato himself "recapitulates” the third man argument +Plato himself "recapitulates" the third man argument of the Parmenides to the effect that the model which @@ -7766,7 +7753,7 @@ the Philebus to heart and proceeds to reveal how the Universe is composed of four primary elements, first the traditional fire and earth, and then the third which unites them, "for two cannot be satisfactorily united -without a third” (31b). +without a third" (31b). Here Taliaferro'’s brilliant analysis of Plato's Pythagoreanism is apropos. He shows how the necessity of @@ -7833,7 +7820,7 @@ fire and earth in the best way possible, which is in the manner of a geometric proportion (31c). This is the best because "in that way all will necessarily come to play the same part toward one another, and by so doing they -will all make a unity” (32a). Plato speaks here of the +will all make a unity" (32a). Plato speaks here of the relation of proportional elements to each other; 2 is to 4 as 4 is to 8. By transposition, 4 is to 2 as 8 is to 4, and in this way the mean, 4, comes to be the outside term @@ -7852,8 +7839,8 @@ earth need to be united in a proportion so that they define each other in the unity which they form. But on the basis of a simple proportion of this type, the Universe would have a plane surface with no depth. Yet we see that -the World is a solid, “and solids are always conjoined, -not by one mean, but by two” (32b). Therefore the god set +the World is a solid, "and solids are always conjoined, +not by one mean, but by two" (32b). Therefore the god set water and air between fire and earth, and made then proportional to one another. In this way the unity of the Universe was achieved, and the proportionality of its @@ -7972,7 +7959,7 @@ Thus Plato states that the spherical body of the Universe is without organs or limbs, because the Universe which embraces all living things within itself ought to have that shape which comprehends all shapes within itself. -The sphere is the most perfect shape because it “comprehends +The sphere is the most perfect shape because it "comprehends in itself all the figures there are" (33b). The shape of the Universe is proportional to its model: as the model is the @@ -8063,7 +8050,7 @@ outside of itself, must in some way be related to a soul. The Soul of the Universe was set in the center, but -further "wrapped ita body round with soul on the outside” +further "wrapped ita body round with soul on the outside" (340). Here the transposability of the elements of a proportion comes into the account. For, at first, it seems that the center of the Universe cannot at the same time be the periphery. But, just as the mean term of a proportion @@ -8087,7 +8074,7 @@ should not suppose, merely because the Soul came later in the account of the Universe, that it is therefore younger, for that would be an insufferable perversion of right order. Already, "There is in us too much of the casual and -the random which shows itself in our speech...” (34c). The +the random which shows itself in our speech..." (34c). The priority of Soul in perfection is not absolute and total; @@ -8121,7 +8108,7 @@ is only an apparent reversal of the order in which the Universe was fashioned. It does not seem wise to interpret this, (as Cornford and A.E. Taylor do) as "inconsistent." If one understands from the outset that the best description -of the Universe must be proportional “te its reality, then +of the Universe must be proportional "te its reality, then the details of the allegorical level of explanation are not inconsistent with the details of the reality of the @@ -8571,7 +8558,7 @@ intelligible and eternal" (37a). Because the Soul has been blended out of the Same, the Different, and the Existent, she is "in contact with anything that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible" (37a) In this way the Soul is like anything that is, and it can -therefore know anything that is, “either in the sphere of +therefore know anything that is, "either in the sphere of things that become or with regard to things that are always changeless" (37b). @@ -8581,7 +8568,7 @@ Plato can still say that there are two "levels" of existence, one eternal and one becoming. But he no longer says that there are only two forms of existence, nor that these two "levels" or spheres are exhaustive of all existence. Since -the Soul is intermediate, it is a third “level” of existence. +the Soul is intermediate, it is a third "level" of existence. Yet, one courts danger by the simple enumeration of the number of forms of existence for one misses the whole emphasis which Plato has put on proportionality throughout @@ -8785,7 +8772,7 @@ which Augustine and many other philosophers felt when confronting this passage, we ought not to conclude that -Plato has “anticipated,” as the saying goes, the doctrines +Plato has "anticipated," as the saying goes, the doctrines @@ -9303,7 +9290,7 @@ proceeds in Time, for they are motions (37e). There is much that is important in this passage, but the central point which concerns our exposition of Time is -the phrase “becoming which proceeds in Time.” By this small +the phrase "becoming which proceeds in Time." By this small phrase, Plato indicates that there is a distinction to be made between becoming and Time, and that these two worda do not indicate the same reality. It is important to notice @@ -9320,7 +9307,7 @@ _@ simple juxtaposition, for there are clearly three of é -“ +" @@ -9373,7 +9360,7 @@ capable is the perfection which Time brings as the principle of order. We are now informed that becoming -proceeds in Time. Thus it is inexact to say “...that what +proceeds in Time. Thus it is inexact to say "...that what is past is past, what happens now is happening, and again what will happen is what will happen, and that the non-existent is the non-existent" (38b). Plato has affirmed that the ordering of the Universe has been made even more @@ -9429,7 +9416,7 @@ with respect to each other. One could say that Time is the consummation of the contact which becoming and being have with each other. One could speak in Hegelian language and say that Time is the Mediation of Becoming, by which -becoming “becomes"being. But out of profound admiration for +becoming "becomes"being. But out of profound admiration for Plato's greatness as a stylist, Plato's imagery should be retained. But the truth must be understood as well as seen. "Time, the moving image of eternity," is spoken in the @@ -9605,7 +9592,7 @@ ancient Athens; both of these accounts are to be given so that Socrates may fulfill his wish to hear an account of a real city, not an imaginary one; not a tale of "some noble creatures in a painting, or perhaps of real animals, alive -but motionless" but an account of real creatures, “in +but motionless" but an account of real creatures, "in motion, and actively exercising the powers promised by their form" (19c). In this way, Plato gently suggests that the power to describe the actual origins of the best society @@ -9652,7 +9639,7 @@ But if we take separate conclusions, on which the scholars agree, and, if we attempt to see them in relation to each other, we shall arrive at a simple and yet, to the best of my knowledge, an uncommon conclusion. If (1) 1t is true -that the Republic is a dialogue in which Plato has attempted to see the powers of the soul "writ large,” that is, +that the Republic is a dialogue in which Plato has attempted to see the powers of the soul "writ large," that is, if the Republic is a dialogue in which the state is seen @@ -9714,14 +9701,14 @@ view. But Bury nevertheless concludes that there has been no growth of Plato's doctrine, and that the conclusions of the Timgeus are implicit in the views stated in the Republic, -This seems to stretch the meaning of the term “implicit” +This seems to stretch the meaning of the term "implicit" beyond reasonable bounds, for, on this basis, we should have to conclude that Plato's movement from an eternal basis to a temporal basis is no development, but merely an explication of former views. It is difficult to see how one can say that the basis of society in one dialogue is eternity and the basis of society in another dialogue is -Time, and that the one view is “4mplicit" in the other. +Time, and that the one view is "4mplicit" in the other. Similarly, it 1s hard to see the grounds for A.E. @@ -9808,7 +9795,7 @@ writers who wish to discuss Plato's philosophy of society as a philosophy of history or as a political philosophy seem more drawn to the Republic, and few of them go to the Timaeus as the source of Plato's teaching on this -subject.” +subject." This is not to complain that scholarly inattention @@ -10235,7 +10222,7 @@ tion is achievable. In this way, one can see that the Platonic Universe is neither simply open nor simply closed, and that he who -uses the paradigm “open or closed" really uses a spatial +uses the paradigm "open or closed" really uses a spatial idea, not a temporal one, and is therefore guilty of a species of philosophical reductionism. The question is not whether the Universe is closed or open but whether there is @@ -10527,7 +10514,7 @@ Burnet, John. Greek Philosophy. rart I. London: Macmilian & Co., Ltd., i914. -Bury, R.G. "Plato and History,” Classical Quarterly, New +Bury, R.G. "Plato and History," Classical Quarterly, New Series, 1-2, pp. 86-94. @@ -10560,7 +10547,7 @@ rrutiger, P. Les Myths de Platon. Paris: 1930. Gauss, Hermann. Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos. 5 tir. part 2. bern: Herbart ng, 1961. -Gioscia, V.J. "A Perspective for Role Theory,” The +Gioscia, V.J. "A Perspective for Role Theory," The American Catholic Sociological Review. XXII, No. 2, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961, pp. 143 ff. @@ -10578,7 +10565,7 @@ University ess, 1952. Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. -Hempel, Carl G. “Fundamentals of Concept Formation in +Hempel, Carl G. "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vols. 1 and 11; Foundations of The Unit f ‘Science, vol. II, No. 7. University @@ -10657,7 +10644,7 @@ Taylor, 1t.T. The fimaeus and Critias of Plato. Washington: Pantheon Books inc., 1952. -Walsh, W.H. “Plato and the Philosophy of History: +Walsh, W.H. "Plato and the Philosophy of History: History and ‘theory in the Kepublic," History and Theory, II, No. 1 (1962), pp. 1-16. @@ -10708,7 +10695,7 @@ doctrine than the Republic and that in the Timaeus we rind a reflective advance over the doctrines ot the -“early” and "middle" dialogues of Plato. +"early" and "middle" dialogues of Plato. The study traces the evolution of the three themes of eternity, image, and time anda shows that Plato discussed |