thesis notes.ch5

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@@ -222,2024 +222,50 @@ edition.}
 \defpnote{2.24}{Cornford, op. cit., p. x.}
 \defpnote{2.25}{Ibid., pp. 11--12.}
 
+% ch 5
+\defpnote{3.1}{Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, p. 31.}
 
-CHAPTER V 
-TIME AND THE UNIVERSE 
+\defpnote{3.2}{One is tempted to restore the hiatus which Cornford habitually tries to remove as \dq{intolerable.} Then the passage would read, \dq{he desired that all things should come as near as possible to being, like himself.}}
 
+\defpnote{3.3}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 37.}
 
-I The Motive of Creation (29d-30b 
+\defpnote{3.4}{Ibid., p. 78.}
 
-So far, we have been told that the World is a becoming image of an eternal realm. But this is precisely the 
-problem. How can like be unlike, or how can the maker 
-generate less perfectly than the perfect model. We recall 
-the Sophist (265b) distinguishes divine and human production 
-and that the Philebus has told us that the cause is the 
+\defpnote{3.5}{T.T. Taylor, 
+\bt{The Timaeus and Critias of Plato}, pp. 29 ff.}
 
+\defpnote{3.6}{e.g., Alexandre Koyre, \bt{From the Closed World to the
+Infinite Universe}, (New York: Harper \& Brothers, 1958).}
 
-maker. But these distinctions only seem to introduce new 
-problems. How can there be eternal becoming; would the 
-cause of such an eternal becoming have to be a perpetually 
-sustaining cause; or does eternal becoming mean that what 
-becomes never began, or that what began shall perpetually 
-become and continue. These questions must now be confronted, 
-for the general issue which underlies them is "what is the 
-relation of a becoming image to reality." 
+\defpnote{3.7}{E.R. Dodds, \bt{The Greeks and the Irrational}
+(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).}
 
-Cornford states that "Plato denied reality to what is 
-commonly called matter."! The materiality of this universe, 
-however, is not unconnected with the motive for the generation of the Universe by its maker. We shall investigate the 
-two issues simultaneously. Timaeus informs us of this motive 
+\defpnote{3.8}{George S. Claghorn, \bt{Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 
+\sq{Timaeus}} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 87.}
 
+\defpnote{3.9}{Cornford, op, cit., p. 59.}
+\defpnote{3.10}{Ibid., p. 61.}
+\defpnote{3.11}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 128.}
 
-when he tells us that the father of this Universe is good, 
+\defpnote{3.12}{Cornford, loc. cit., "Kinds" is a peculiar expression which is repeated here only to assure an accurate representation of Cornford's view.}
 
+\defpnote{3.13}{T.T. Taylor, op. cit., \et{Introduction.}}
+\defpnote{3.14}{According to T.T. Taylor, loc. cit.}
+\defpnote{3.15}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, Appendix.}
+\defpnote{3.16}{Heisenberg, \bt{Physics and Philosophy}, ch. 4. See 
+also MacKinnon, \bt{Time in Contemporary Physics}, pp. 428--457.}
 
-1 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 31. 
-
-
-
-and hence, not jealous of his perfection, so that "he 
-desired that all things should come as near as possible to 
-being like himself" (29e).° The father therefore: 
-
-took over all that was visible-not at rest-but in 
-
-discordant and unordered motioneand brought it 
-
-from disorder into order, since he judged that 
-
-order was in every way better (70a). 
-But the moat striking is: 
-
-That this is the supremely valid principle of 
-
-becoming and of the order of the world, we 
-
-shall be most surely right to accept from men 
-
-of understanding (296). 
-
-Here the first part of the problem of an eternal 
-becoming 1s stated. Plato has established that the model 
-of the Universe must clearly be the eternal, and that the 
-maker of the Universe introduced order, and that this 
-order is the most valid basis of becoming. Yet, the 
-following statement creates the problem, for it asserts; 
-"Now it was not nor can it ever be permitted that the 
-work of the supremely good should be anything but that 
-which is the best" (30b). Here is the antithesis clearly 
-stated: The Universe resembles an eternal model, yet it is 
-a becoming Universe, and becoming, heretofore, could not 
-
-
-be described in superlatives. Becoming is as perfect as it 
-
-
-can be after it is ordered and endowed with intelligence. 
-
-
-2 one is tempted to restore the hiatus which Cornford 
-habitually tries to remove as "intolerable." Then the 
-passage would read, "he desired that all things should 
-come as near as possible to being, like himself." 
-
-
-
-
-Plato leaves the problem unresolved at this juncture. 
-He says only that the Universe was framed as perfectly as 
-possible. It is thus a living being with reason and soul. 
-Yet soul is presumably eternal. It is important to realize 
-that this problem, namely the reconciliation of eternity 
-and becoming, is kept alive during the succeeding passages, 
-and has not yet been resolved. this 1s no oversight: Plato 
-means to hold this question in readiness until the doctrine 
-he is developing can supply the answer. 
-
-thus it is important to notice that the demiurge 
-
-
-fashions the Universe to the end and by nature toward 
-
-
-perfection, which seems to mean that its present state is 
-incomplete, and yet the Universe is ordered and given 
-intellizence so that it might be as perfect as possible. 
-Later (in 48a and 52d) we shall have occasion to point 
-
-out the relative omnipotence of the demiurge. At this point, 
-
-
-we have not yet been told how it is possible to place the 
-eternal and the realm of becoming in a harmony without 
-flaws. The relation of the eternal model and the becoming 
-Universe remains problematic. 
-
-Cornford states that it "...is not easy for us to 
-understand" the relative and not absolute omnipotence of 
-
-
-the demiurge. For it is clear that the demiurge has not 
-
-
-created ex nihilo, but has ordered the discordant motions 
-only in so far as it was possible. Cornford concludes that 
-the set of discordant motions, the chaos, the material 
-
-
-which the demiurge orders, is an eternally present 
-
-
-
-
-
-material, and so the demiurge cannot be simply equated 
-with the God of the Christians.> Cornford wants to help 
-Plato avoid the "impossibly absolute divinity" who, being 
-absolute, could not involve himself in earthly affairs. 
-But this seems unnecessary, since the demiurge is in no 
-danger of being impossibly absolute; rather is he in 
-danger of being so completely relativized in Cornford's 
-description that he becomes, not only not the God of the 
-Christians, but not even the demiurgic divinity which 
-Plato describes. 
-
-II The Model of the Universe (30c-3ib 
-
-In the next paragraph Timaeus speaks of the model 
-after which the demiurge fashioned this Universe. He says 
-that we must not suppose that the model was any specific 
-Form, for then the Universe would lack the perfections of 
-the other Forms after which the Universe was not copied. 
-The Universe is most like that Living Being of which all 
-the other things are parts, and it contains them all. In 
-this, the Universe is very much like the model because 
-there are no specific perfections lacking to it. 
-
-What can this Living Being be to whom no perfection 
-is lacking and who serves as the model for each specific 
-perfection. It cannot be any one Form, for on this supposition there might be others (31a). Nor can it be a Form 
-
-
-of all Forms, for this position involved the difficulties 
-
-
-3 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 37. 
-
-
-
-
-mentioned in the Parmenides. Is it The Form of The Good, 
-or perhaps the Demiurge Himself? None of these answers 
-satiafy. If it were the Good, Plato could easily have said 
-so, as he did in the Republic. Nor does the demiurge regard 
-his own perfection as a model; he is said to regard a 
-model, but he is not described as looking to himself. It 
-is hard to see the grounds for Taylor's assertion that the 
-demiurge fashions by "an overflow of his goodness. "4 
-
-Plato himself "recapitulates" the third man argument 
-
-
-of the Parmenides to the effect that the model which 
-
-
-embraces all the intelligible things there are cannot be 
-
-one of a pair (the simplest number) 
-for then there would have to be yet another Living 
-Creature embracing those two, and they would be 
-parts of it; and thus our world would be more 
-truly described as likeness, not of them, but of 
-that other which would embrace them (31a). 
-
-The Universe must be one, like its model. Here again the 
-
-
-Timaeus marches out boldly beyond the doctrines of its 
-
-
-predecessors, for that One after which the Universe is 
-modelled is not the sort of One which is put into the 
-mouth of Parmenides in the dialogue which hears his name, 
-but a new sort of One which is now to be described. Or 
-rather, Timaeus will now present a mythical account of that 
-One of which the Universe is the image. 
-
-III The Body of the Universe 1b-32c 
-
-
-But Plato does not launch immediately into a 
-
-
-+ tp1a., p. 78. 
-
-
-
-
-
-description of the One. Instead, he takes the lesson of 
-
-
-the Philebus to heart and proceeds to reveal how the 
-
-
-Universe is composed of four primary elements, first the 
-traditional fire and earth, and then the third which 
-unites them, "for two cannot be satisfactorily united 
-without a third" (31b). 
-
-Here Taliaferro'’s brilliant analysis of Plato's 
-Pythagoreanism is apropos. He shows how the necessity of 
-
-
-proportion between lines, planes, and spheres, is a 
-
-
-generalization of the proportions within lines, planes, 
-
-
-and spheres. That is, just as the extremities which make 
-up a line are proportional to each other, so the plane 
-and the sphere have proportional elements; but further, 
-the proportion between the line and the plane is proportionally the same as the proportion between the plane and the 
-sphere. In the same way, the realms of physics and geometry 
-are proportional to each other, as the realm of matter is 
-proportional to the realm of soul, and the realm of soul 
-with the realm of being. Plato seems to be suggesting that 
-there is a general proportionality between being and 
-becoming. ° 
-
-Yet this is abstract, and Plato wants to present the 
-tale with all the richness of which a myth is capable. 
-
-
-Although a radical unity of realms has been introduced, 
-
-
-5 T.T. Taylor, The Timaeus and Critias of Plato, 
-pp. 29 ff. 
-
-
-
-the structured, leveled unity of these realms must be 
-spelled out, for the Universe shares in the intelligibility 
-of 4ts model, which comprehends all the things within it 
-in a single unity. It 1s as if Plato were building suspense 
-into his drama of creation. There is a difference between 
-@\& metaphysical dramatist, who writes drama with metaphysical 
-overtones and suggestions, and the dramatic metaphysician, 
-who writes metaphysics with dramatic overtones. Plato seems 
-
-
-to be one of the latter sort, since his Timaeus portrays 
-
-
-the metaphysical origins of the Universe, in such a fashion 
-
-that Timaeus’ account manages to create dramatic suspense. 
-Since the Universe is visible, it must be bodily, 
-
-and that which is bodily must have come to be. But, the 
-
-Philebus informed us that the visible must have fire to be 
-
-
-visible and earth to be tangible, and, since no two can 
-be united without a third, fire and earth cannot be united 
-without a third. Here in the Timaeus, the third must unite 
-
-
-fire and earth in the best way possible, which is in the 
-manner of a geometric proportion (31c). This is the best 
-because "in that way all will necessarily come to play 
-the same part toward one another, and by so doing they 
-will all make a unity" (32a). Plato speaks here of the 
-relation of proportional elements to each other; 2 is to 
-4 as 4 is to 8. By transposition, 4 is to 2 as 8 is to 4, 
-and in this way the mean, 4, comes to be the outside term 
-and therefore it seems to be the outer boundary of the 
-
-
-proportion. This is the arithmetical way of allegorizing 
-
-
-
-the doctrine that proportion is what unifies, just as the 
-side of the plane forms the outer boundary of its area, 
-There is no need to dwell on the obvious Pythagorean style 
-of this image. The point is that the elements of fire and 
-earth need to be united in a proportion so that they 
-define each other in the unity which they form. But on the 
-basis of a simple proportion of this type, the Universe 
-would have a plane surface with no depth. Yet we see that 
-the World is a solid, "and solids are always conjoined, 
-not by one mean, but by two" (32b). Therefore the god set 
-water and air between fire and earth, and made then 
-proportional to one another. In this way the unity of the 
-Universe was achieved, and the proportionality of its 
-four elements to each other is their boundary. Further, 
-only he who set the elements in proportion could disolve 
-it (32c). All of the elements were used up in the construction of the Universe, and in this way the Universe resembles 
-its model's perfect unity, for none of the materials were 
-left over and it is therefore, in its way, complete. It 
-4s also, on that basis, simple, that is, one Universe, and 
-hence resembles the unity of its model. Since only he who 
-made the Universe can disrupt its unity, and since there 
-are no materials left over which could attack the Universe, 
-it-.ia free from old age and sickness, which come about by 
-the introduction of materials from without. This at first 
-seems to mean that the Universe resembles the eternity of 
-
-
-its model in that those elements which might bring about 
-
-
-
-
-
-age and sickness to the eternal would have to be outside ite 
-definition, and so, the Universe, in its fashion, similarly 
-cannot age or succumb to sickness for this would require 
-elements outside it, of which there are none (33). 
-
-But the shape of the body of the Universe is "that 
-which is fitting to its nature" (33b); it 1s spherical. 
-This is an extremely important phrase, since some regard 
-Plato's image of time as circular and therefore interpret  
-the Platonic Universe as closed, and subject only to 
-eternal recurrence, without novelty or growth or process.° 
-Therefore it is necessary to dwell on this phrase, for it 
-says precisely and unambiguously that the spherical shape 
-of the body of the Universe is proper to its nature. The 
-foregoing passage clearly tells us that the Universe 
-resembles its model in its own way, and that the perfection 
-of the Universe is the aspect of the model from which the 
-spherical shape derives. It is one thing to say that the 
-Platonic Universe is spherical and therefore closed; it 
-48 quite another thing to say that the Platonic Universe, 
-which is a becoming image, is as perfect as it can be, and 
-therefore allegorically spherical. This latter view cannot 
-be stressed too strongly, because it is common to regard 
-the Platonic Universe as nonetemporal, or as imperfect 
-
-
-because it is only spherically temporal. Plato, on the 
-
-
-eS aS ST TS ES 
-
-
-6 E.g., Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the — 
-Infinite Universe (New York: Harper rothers, 1 ° 
-
-
-
-contrary, tells us clearly that the perfection of the 
-model is the paradigm for the perfection of the Universe, 
-which is a becoming image, so that it is appropriate to 
-its setyle of perfection for it to be spherical. It is 
-necessary to state simply that the question of the temporal 
-character of this Universe has yet to be broached and will 
-not be introduced by Plato until the discussion of the 
-soul of the Universe has been undertaken. It follows that 
-descriptions of the temporal character of the Universe 
-based on its spherical shape do not follow the logical 
-order of the dialogue, for they extract elements of the 
-dialogue out of their context, in order to put them 
-together in an order which was foreign to Plato's stated 
-order. The spherical shape of the body of the Universe as 
-Plato describes it, is the way in which the body of the 
-Universe resembles the perfection of its model, insofar as 
-that model is a self-comprehending figure, that is, a 
-figure which is a proportional unity. It is not the — 
-function of the spherical shape to resemble the eternity 
-of the model; on the contrary; it is the function of the 
-revolution of the sphere, governed by the world-soul, to 
-resemble the eternity of the model. In so far as the body 
-of the Universe is spherical, to that extent does it 
-resemble the unity of the model. One must call to mind 
-here the impossibility of describing each and every 
-
-
-characteristic of the Universe at the same time and by the 
-
-
-
-same set of words. Plato, like every other writer, cannot 
-speak simultaneously of every aspect of his vision; it 
-takes time to describe every feature of what one describes. 
-The function of an image in this context becomes somewhat 
-more evident, and the truism that a picture is worth a 
-thousand words is not irrelevant to this characteristic of 
-written description. For an image, a picture, can put 
-forward thousands of details ina simple simultaneous 
-unity, whereas the description of the picture in written 
-
-
-words must focus on one aspect at a time. Thus Plato 
-
-
-describes his Universe as a becoming image, to indicate 
-that the unity of its elements is complete and harmonious: 
-but to reason immediately from its spherical shape to its 
-temporal character is an instance of cart-before-the-horsemanship. We must wait until the discussion of the body 
-of the Universe has been completed, and then for the 
-discussion of the soul of the Universe. Then, and only 
-then, does Plato introduce his doctrine of time and the 
-relation of time to the eternal model. 
-
-Thus Plato states that the spherical body of the 
-Universe is without organs or limbs, because the Universe 
-which embraces all living things within itself ought to 
-have that shape which comprehends all shapes within itself. 
-The sphere is the most perfect shape because it "comprehends 
-in itself all the figures there are" (33b). The shape of the 
-Universe is proportional to its model: as the model is the 
-
-
-most perfect model, the sphere is the most perfect shape. 
-
-
-
-
-
-To accomplish his stated purpose, Plato describes how the 
-Universe, as an image, is proportional to its model. In so 
-doing, Plato continues to follow his own injunction; as 
-reality is to becoming, so is truth to faith. 
-
-But again, it is important to notice that the precise 
-description of the relation between an eternal becoming 
-and an eternal being has not yet been made clear. It is 
-still held out for later comment. In short, during his 
-description of the shape of the Universe, Plato has not 
-yet said how it can be that the Universe can be an eternal 
-becoming. The spherical shape of the Universe 1s basic but 
-not sufficient for an insight into Plato's philosophy of 
-time. 
-
-Similarly, one cannot pass immediately from Plato's 
-aphenteal Universe to Plato's philosophy of time. The motion 
-of the sphere, which he is about to reveal, is basic, but 
-even thie will not be sufficient for the explication of 
-Plato's time-doctrine. The spherical Universe has no 
-organs for sight or food, and is therefore not dependent 
-on anything else. It has the sort of metion which, above 
-all, belongs to reason and intelligence, namely, uniform 
-rotation. It does not go from up to down, nor from down to 
-up; nor from left to right, nor right to left; nor does 
-it go from forward to backward, nor from backward to 
-forward; the maker took these six motions away from it in 
-the process of ordering its discorcant wanderings. It 
-
-
-revolves uniformly within its own limits (34a). 
-
-
-
-In his description of the body of the Universe, it 
-is important to see that the divisions of the Philebus and 
-
-
-the arrangement of the elements in their proportions are 
-recapitulated here in the Timaeus. Otherwise, one fails to 
-notice that the relation of fire, air, earth, and water, in 
-
-
-the Timaeus is a subtle transfiguration of the Pythagorean 
-
-
-number four, and also a substitution of proportion for the 
-Amity which the elements had when ordered by the Nous of 
-
-
-Anaxagoras, which, as Socrates complained in the Phaedo, 
-
-
-Anaxagoras introduces early in his work but soon proceeds 
-to ignore. Here Plato carries the theme of proportional 
-unity into the relation of the elements themselves, It is 
-doubly important to take note of this proportionality as 
-constituent of the Universe, because Plato has described 
-the relation of proportionality as the best sort of unity 
-for the Universe, and the Universe must be the best 
-possible because it is an image of its model. As we shall 
-see, the world soul is similarly the best possible, for, 
-not only is it too a resemblance of the model but it is 
-the deeper source of the proportional perfection of the 
-Universe. 
-IV The Soul of the Universe 
-
-The plan of the god who makes the Universe into the 
-best image of the best model could not exclude soul from 
-his activity, so that the excellent body of the Universe, 
-which is spherical, and therefore not dependent on anything 
-
-
-outside of itself, must in some way be related to a soul. 
-
-
-208. 
-
-
-The Soul of the Universe was set in the center, but 
-further "wrapped ita body round with soul on the outside" 
-(340). Here the transposability of the elements of a proportion comes into the account. For, at first, it seems 
-that the center of the Universe cannot at the same time be 
-the periphery. But, just as the mean term of a proportion 
-can become the extremes by transposition, so the Soul, 
-which is first described as the center (the mean) now 
-becomes the outer boundary. This use of mathematical image 
-seems to be Plato's way to indicate allegorically that the 
-very heart of the Universe is also its limit, and that its 
-center is not to be taken as a strictly spatial point but 
-as the inner principle of the Cosmos, which therefore also 
-animates its sphere of functioning and the limits of that 
-functioning. Because the Soul of the Universe is both its 
-center and its limiting boundary, it is described as a 
-"blessed god" (34b). 
-
-One might easily wonder why the body of the 
-Universe is discussed before the Soul, which is said to be 
-the most excellent source of perfection. Plato explains in 
-the next paragraph why this was done. He says that we 
-should not suppose, merely because the Soul came later in 
-the account of the Universe, that it is therefore younger, 
-for that would be an insufferable perversion of right 
-order. Already, "There is in us too much of the casual and 
-the random which shows itself in our speech..." (34c). The 
-priority of Soul in perfection is not absolute and total; 
-
-
-
-there are still too many obvious wanderings and deviations 
-from the orderly to assert that the Soul is prior in every 
-way.! Plato is all too aware that the Universe cannot be 
-empirically described as exhibiting the perfections of 
-Soul. It seems likely that Plato described the body of the 
-Universe before describing the Soul in order to follow out 
-
-
-his initial premise that the Timaeus will reveal the plan 
-
-
-of the Universe in an image, so that, by first establishing 
-the visible shape of the Universe, he will then be able to 
-make use of the shape he attributed to it to fashion images 
-of the Soul. This was the procedure of the Republic, for 
-there, it was explicitly agreed that the best plan for the 
-investigation of the Soul would be to see it writ large in 
-the State. So here, it seems that Plato is saying that we 
-shall come to understand the Soul of the Universe writ 
-
-
-large in its body. Throughout the Timaeus the details of 
-
-
-the image are described before the image itself, but this 
-is only an apparent reversal of the order in which the 
-Universe was fashioned. It does not seem wise to interpret 
-this, (as Cornford and A.E. Taylor do) as "inconsistent." 
-If one understands from the outset that the best description 
-of the Universe must be proportional "te its reality, then 
-the details of the allegorical level of explanation are not 
-inconsistent with the details of the reality of the 
-
-
-7 E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational 
-(Boston: Beacon Press, 19 . 
-
-
-
-Universe. Only on the supposition that Plato is following 
-@ linear plan of description would it follow that details 
-are out of place. But if one accepts Plato's approach 
-through image, then one remembers that the exigencies of 
-written description create the appearance of a linear 
-account, whereas, in fact, Plato concentrates on one 
-aspect and then another of the entire image, which, in its 
-unity, does not serialize or linearize the elements of the 
-account. Plato's Universe does not consist of a series of 
-elements which must therefore be described one at a time. 
-One could more easily attempt to fashion a length of rope 
-from grains of sana.° Thus, if one starts from an expectae 
-tion that the description of the Universe must be a linear 
-account, one should conclude that Plato's description of 
-the World-Soul snould have preceeded his account of the 
-Body of the Universe. But, if one starts from the awareness 
-that Plato is describing those aspects of the Universe 
-which will lead to an insight into the whole Universe in 
-a simple image, which is the best kind of account of the 
-Universe because it is proportional to its kind of being, 
-one is not disappointed that Plato describes the Soul of 
-the Universe after the body. One ought to recall in this 
-regard Plato's deep concern that it is, after all, impossible to reveal the maker of the Universe to all mankind. 
-
-
-8 George S. Claghorn, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 
-'Timaeus’ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. Bf. 
-
-
-ett. 
-He attempts, by means of his imagery, to communicate to as 
-Many as possible. In this way, the recipient of his account 
-has been presented with the shape of the body of the 
-Universe, and he can now elevate this image by perceiving 
-how it has Soul at the center and all around it. 
-
-However, the World-Soul is not so simple that its 
-description can rest on the characteristics of centrality 
-and periphery. The description of the "parts" of the 
-World-Soul follows next, in a passage which Cornford has 
-described as "one of the most obscure of the whole dialogue."? Further, he says that the passage "would be 
-simply unintelligible to anyone who had not read and 
-understood the Sophist."!9 In a note he adds that A.E. 
-Taylor has precluded this basis for understanding the 
-World-Soul because A.E. Taylor denies a knowledge of the 
-Sophist to Timaeus.!! 
-
-By his reference to the Sophist, Cornford points 
-out that the "ingredients" of the Soul will be the Forms 
-which Plato there said communicated with each other, 
-namely, Unity, Sameness, and Difference. Particularly, 
-Difference has the character of not-being, yet these Forms 
-communicate with each other. In the following passage from 
-
-
-the Timaeus, Plato describes how the World-Soul comes to be 
-
-
-9 Cornford, op, cit., p. 59. 
-
-
-10 Inaa., p. 61. 
-
-
-
-! A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 128. 
-
-
-
-formed, and how the communication of these Forms is 
-accomplished in the World-Soul. 
-
-
-The things of which he composed soul and the manner 
-of its composition were as follows: Between the 
-indivisible existence that is ever in the same 
-state, and the divisible existence that becomes 
-
-in bodies, he compounded a third form of existence 
-composed of both. Again, in the case of Sameness 
-and that of Difference, he also on the same 
-principle made a compound intermediate between 
-that kind of them which is indivisible and the 
-kind that is divisible in bodies. Then, taking 
-the three, he blended them all into a unity, 
-forcing the nature of difference, hard as it was 
-to mingle, into union with sameness, and mixing 
-them together with existence (25a-b). 
-
-
-This passage bears extensive comment, for several of 
-its points are crucial to Plato's development of his 
-philosophy of time. 
-
-First, it is clear that the Forms have not been 
-
-
-repudiated by the Timaeus, since the passage begins with a 
-
-
-description of the Forms which recapitulates their treatment in the Sophist. The kind of existence which is always 
-the same is proper to the Forms, and was proper to the 
-
-
-Forms as early as the Phaedo and the Republic. But in the 
-
-
-Sophist, the Different was introduced, based on Plato's 
-recognition that it is necessary to say what is-not in 
-order to say what is. In short, the entire doctrine of 
-notebeing of the Sophist has reappeared in the Timaeus. 
-But, just as the initial recapitulation of the Republic at 
-the beginning of the Timaeus (28a) does not rest with a 
-
-
-simple repetition but proceeds further, so here the 
-
-
-recapitulation of the Sophist doctrine of not-being, on 
-
-
-
-the level of the Forms, i.e., Difference, will not end 
-Plato's discussion. He means to go beyond this point. Or, 
-to put the matter differently, Plato will now investigate 
-the relevance of the doctrine of not-being insofar as it 
-helps to explain the constitution of the World-Soul. 
-
-The second point to be noticed is the recognition 
-that there are, as Cornford translates it, "kinds" of 
-existences: there is the "kind" of existence proper to the 
-Forms, there is the "kind" of existence proper to divisible 
-bodies, and in addition, there is a third "kind" of 
-existence, between them, an intermediate existence, proper 
-to the Soul of the Universe. Further, these three "kinds" 
-are further divided and then further recombined, so that 
-there is a whole hierarchy of "kinds" of existence. 
-Cornford's diagram is instructive on this point, !@ 
-
-
-First Mixture Final Mixture 
-
-
-Indivisible existence 
-Divisible existence Intermediate existence 
-
-
-Indivisible sameness 
-
-
-Divisible sameness Intermediate sameness Soul 
-
-
-Indivisible difference 
-Divisible difference Intermediate difference 
-
-
-Note that it is no longer possible to assert that 
-
-
-there is only one "kind" of existence which deserves the 
-
-
-le Cornford, loc. cit. "Kinds" is a peculiar 
-expression which is repeated here only to assure an 
-accurate representation of Cornford's view. 
-
-
-
-name, the sort reserved for the Forms in the Republic, 
-where all else is mere shadows. In this connection, it 
-should be recalled that the Sophist distinguished sharply 
-between the kinds of images (eidola), and reached the 
-
-
-conclusion that some images are false (phantasiai) but 
-some are genuine. Of those that are genuine one must 
-further distinguish those that are of human origin and 
-those that are of divine origin (240a). The Sophist therefore credits images with some sort of existence. But the 
-Timaeus does not simply describe the Universe as an 
-eidolon, a little Form, so to speak. The Universe is an 
-
-
-eikon, which now comes to mean that it is like the perfection of the most perfect. cut even this is not the high 
-point of Plato's analysis, as we shall see. Nevertheless 
-
-it 1s central to the exposition of this passage to notice 
-that the doctrine of the Sophist, which makes it necessary 
-to somehow include notebeing in the realm of Forms, is now 
-recapitulated, but, in addition, it is not only the reality 
-of the Forms but the reality of the whole Universe which 
-must now be explained. And in this connection, Plato has 
-shifted from a description which accords some sort of being 
-to images, to a description of the whole Universe as an 
-
-
-image, and that the transition from eidolon to eikon is 
-
-
-intrinsic to this development of doctrine. 
-Thus, between the two orders of existence with which 
-we were formerly acquainted in the Sophist, namely, the 
-
-
-eternal and the becoming, Plato has now inserted a third. 
-
-
-
-This is a further development of his doctrine of proportion, 
-of which we saw the first usage in this dialogue in the 
-composition of the body of the Universe. The sort of 
-mixture which the Philebus prefigures is now developed in 
-Plato's attempt to construct the entire Cosmos on this 
-
-
-basis. But, in the Philebus, the precise details of the 
-
-
-manner in which this mixture was to be accomplished were 
-left somewhat less clear than they are now painted, for 
-
-
-the Philebus insisted that the cause of the mixture was in 
-
-
-fact the god, but the god was not described as the maker 
-of the whole Universe; he was there only the mixer of the 
-Forms in some things. 
-
-This passage, like the passage at 29, is a radical 
-innovation on Plato's part, which takes the doctrine of 
-the Timaeus far beyond the doctrines of its predecessor 
-dialogues. It is a recapitulation, but the recapitulation 
-serves as a basis for an advance. Where once only the 
-Forms were ultimately real, now there are "kinds" or 
-"sorts" or "levels" of reality; but these are not to be 
-distinguished from each other as merely Different; they are 
-also the Same, and, further, they are in a proportional 
-Unity. The significance of this proportional unity is the 
-basis of the succeeding passages, where we notice that the 
-basis of knowledge itself has undergone a radical growth. 
-And, in addition, the basis of the former division of the 
-
-
-world into the eternal and the becoming has similarly 
-
-
-
-undergone a radical growth, wherein it will no longer be 
-possible for Plato to distinguish simply between the eternal and the becoming as separated realms, but the relation 
-of the eternal to the becoming will have to be described 
-in a new way. Somehow, the eternal and the becoming will 
-be related in a way which will explain how it is possible 
-to have an eternal becoming. 
-
-This pertains to the statement that the Universe is 
-an image. For, as we saw, the Universe is an image which in 
-some way is like its eternal model and yet is a becoming 
-image; yet it was not explained how there could be any 
-reality to such an intermediary thing. The basis for the 
-reality of the Universe as an image has now been laid. For 
-the World-Soul itself is neither simply eternal nor simply 
-becoming; it 1s a proportional unity of the Same and the 
-Different. 
-
-But, from basis to doctrine is not an immediate step. 
-The lesson of the Philebus and the Statesman, which was 
-the caution not to divide too quickly, but to proceed by 
-following the right divisions according to the way things 
-are, 1s not foreign to the author of these lessons. Before 
-he gives the details of the reconciliation between eternal 
-being and mere becoming, Plato follows out the division of 
-the World-Soul into its precise portions. 
-
-Of course, we should not expect that Plato's 
-passages on the motions of the planets will be adequate 
-
-
-from the point of view of contemporary astronomy, so that 
-
-
-
-a detailed commentary on the exact motions of the planets 
-will be of interest only to those whose taste runs to 
-collecting the opinions of the ancients and constructing a 
-history of opinions with no care about their relevance or 
-utility to contemporary experience. Plato had no Galileo 
-to instruct him, nor a Newton. Furthermore, the invention 
-of the telescope and the mass spectrometer have outmoded 
-most of Plato’s astronomy. But it is interesting to note 
-that Plato looked to astronomy as a case in point. For, if 
-the World-Soul united the Same and the Different within 
-4tself, and if the World-Soul, by reason of its superior 
-dignity, is actually responsible for the motions of the 
-planets, it should follow that the revolutions of the 
-planets will occur in what Plato will describe as the 
-revolution of the Same, the Different, and their Unity in 
-the revolution of the uniforn. 
-
-This is precisely the description which we confront 
-in Plato's astronomy. It emerges that the seven divisions 
-of the Soul are intermediate between the seven basic 
-Forms, on the one hand, and the seven planetary distances, 
-on the other, which in turn are proportional to the seven 
-basic string lengths. Plato tells us that the harmony of 
-the musical scale is only one level (or sort, or kind) of 
-harmony, and that the Soul of the World is itself an 
-intermediate between the ultimate Forms and the body of 
-
-
-the Universe. The fundamental truth is the assertion of 
-
-
-
-proportionality and the harmony of the elements of the 
-proportions. !> Plato goes on to construct an intricate 
-allegory of the circles of the Same and of the Different; 
-he describes how these circles have been joined in the 
-center of the Soul, and how the revolution of the Same 
-circumscribes the revolution of the Different (the allegorical indication that the Same is the "outer" limit of the 
-Different). The seven circles of the Soul represent the 
-proportional share which the Soul has in the seven Forms, '4 
-just as the seven tones reflect the seven planetary distances, The point is not merely the number of circles, but 
-the motion of the circles, since planets and music certainly move. 
-
-Plato tries very hard to make his allegory exact in 
-every detail. He indicates that motions are shared 
-proportionately by the seven planets, which means, (as 
-A.E. Taylor has seen 13) that Plato anticipated our own 
-contemporary relativity theory of motion. (Heisenberg 
-makes the same point 16), It 48 anticlimactic to note that 
-Plato knew the solar system to be heliocentric, although 
-
-
-this 1s not universally agreed upon. 
-
-
-13 T.T. Taylor, op, cit., Introduction. 
-es According to T.T. Taylor, loc, cit. 
-
-
-15 A.E,Taylor, Commentary, Appendix. 
-
-
-16 Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, ch. 4. See 
-also MacKinnon, "Time in Contemporary Physics," pp. 428-457. 
-
-
-
-
-Plato next relates the seven motions of the Soul 
-to the seven dimensions of the body, which is fashioned 
-later than Soul, although it was described earlier. He 
-says in summary; 
-
--e-the soul, being everywhere interwoven from the 
-
-center to the outermost heaven, enveloping heaven 
-
-all around on the outside, revolving within its 
-
-own limits, made a divine beginning of ceaseless 
-
-and intelligent life for all time (36e). 
-
-It 1s unnecessary to point out in this age of 
-possible thermonuclear holocaust that Plato's optimism is 
-derived from the perfection of the Universe which is the 
-image of the perfection of the model, and not from the 
-sort of empirical observation which has created pessimism 
-in many quarters. However, one should note that Plato's 
-
-
-Sicilian adventures did result in a sadness which Plato 
-
-
-describes in his Seventh Letter. The difference between 
-
-
-Plato's sadness over the outcome of Sicilian politics and 
-the contemporary pessinism lies in the world-wide scale 
-
-on which contemporary destruction can be accomplished. One 
-might wish to derive a sense of optimism from the possibility that the Universe will go on even if the planet earth 
-does not harbor any human life. For Plato refers to the 
-life of the World-Soul as it inspires the body of the 
-Universe, and not to the life of man, which, Plato was 
-aware, 1s all too short. In the Myth of Er, the Republic 
-describes the life of man as a span of one hundred years, 
-and the cycle of good life as a span of ten thousand years. 
-
-
-Here in the Timaeus intelligen life is "ceaseless." 
-
-
-
-
-
-But the discourse concerning the World-Soul was not 
-written only to illustrate that Plato was master of the 
-Pythagorean system of numbers. Where Pythagoras would 
-derive the proportions of any body from the numbers 1, 2, 
-3, and 4, Plato establishes harmonic intervals which do not 
-sum to the perfect number 10; instead, he leaves the end 
-of the proportions open, so that the scale of tones or the 
-planetary differences might be further calculated, if one 
-wished. '7 Here one could agree with A.E. Taylor that Plato 
-has given a "provisional" tone to his dialogue, 8 but, at 
-the same time, one would have to disagree that Timaeus does 
-nothing more than recite fifth-century Pythagoreanism, for 
-Plato's Universe is not strictly Pythagorean. There seem 
-to be several reasons for this, not the least of which is 
-Plato's use of Pythagorean numerology in a description of a 
-Universe which has far more complexity, and, at the same 
-time, far more simplicity than the Universe of Pythagoras. 
-This is most evident in the Pythagorean insistence that the 
-Forms (numbers) are the ultimately real, and the World of 
-appearance is less real. In what follows, Plato will reveal 
-that there is a kind of knowledge proper to the World-Soul 
-which transcends a knowledge of number, by including it in 
-
-
-\&@ more comprehensive knowledge. 
-
-
-'T Dodds, op. cit. 
-
-
-18 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 113. 
-
-
-
-
-Thus, the body of the Universe is visible, but the 
-Soul of the Universe is invisible, and is the "best of 
-things brought into being by the most excellent of things 
-intelligible and eternal" (37a). Because the Soul has been 
-blended out of the Same, the Different, and the Existent, 
-she is "in contact with anything that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible" (37a) 
-In this way the Soul is like anything that is, and it can 
-therefore know anything that is, "either in the sphere of 
-things that become or with regard to things that are always 
-changeless" (37b). 
-
-Thus, even though the World-Soul is the intermediate 
-form of existence between what is eternal and what becomes, 
-Plato can still say that there are two "levels" of existence, 
-one eternal and one becoming. But he no longer says that 
-there are only two forms of existence, nor that these two 
-"levels" or spheres are exhaustive of all existence. Since 
-the Soul is intermediate, it is a third "level" of existence. 
-Yet, one courts danger by the simple enumeration of the 
-number of forms of existence for one misses the whole 
-emphasis which Plato has put on proportionality throughout 
-the Timaeus. The Soul could not know either realm if it 
-
-
-were simply in between the eternal and the becoming; the 
-point is that the Soul is in a proportional unity with the 
-eternal and the becoming, and so, it is part of each and 
-each is part of it. Plato tells us in the following 
-
-
-passage that both the circle of the same and the circle 
-
-
-ke) 
-
-
-
-
-
-of the different transport their respective judgments into 
-
-
-the Soul: 
-
-Now whenever discourse that is alike true, whether 
-
-it takes place concerning that which is different 
-
-or that which is the same, being carried on without 
-
-speech or sound within the thing that is self-moved, 
-
-is about that which is sensible, and the circle of 
-the different, moving aright, carriea its message 
-through all its soul-then there arise judgments 
-
-and beliefs that are sure and true. But whenever 
-
-discourse is concerned only with the rational, 
-
-and the circle of the same, running smoothly, 
-
-declares it, the result must be rational 
-
-understanding and knowledge (37b, c). 
-
-Several features of this passage bear comment. First, 
-it states that belief arises from the circle of the 
-Different, (which includes the realm of the many, the 
-dispersed, and the sensible objects of perception) and that 
-beliefs must be sure and true if they arise from the 
-proper revolution of the circle of the Different. Second, 
-it describes this sort of judgment as intrinsic to the 
-World-Soul, and not an inferior sort of knowledge. For the 
-Same and the Different constitute Soul; no longer is Soul 
-only the superior portion of the divided line. Third, the 
-knowledge of the Same and the knowledge of the Different 
-both comprise Soul, and are both proper functions of Soul, 
-having allegorically, the relation to each other of 
-proportionality. This is not to say that rational knowledge 
-alone is not better; rather, it asserts that belief and 
-opinion are not bad or impossible. Both judgments are 
-necessary to what Soul is, and both sorts of knowledge arise 
-
-
-when Soul does what Soul does; namely, generate the motions 
-
-
-
-of the Universe. Lastly, the judgment by the Soul is 
-called an aesthesis, which, unlike the English word 
-
-
-"judgment," extends to feeling and to the appreciation of 
-beauty as well as of truth. This capacity to Know aesthetic'ally is of the utmost significance in Plato's Universe, and 
-it is especially necessary for a consideration of the next 
-topic to which Plato addresses himself, namely, time. For 
-
-if time is a Form then reason alone will comprehend it. But 
-if time is an image, then its beauty is as important as its 
-truth. 
-
-V Time as Image (to 39e) 
-
-Up to this point in his development of the construction of the Universe, Plato has insisted that the Universe 
-embodies in its proportional way the perfection of its 
-model, and yet the model is consistently described as 
-eternal, while the Universe is said to be an eternal becoming. The Universe is described throughout the foregoing 
-passages as a reality which is as perfect as it can be, and 
-yet Plato nowhere says how a visible and tangible body can 
-be like its eternal indivisible model. Even the existence 
-of the World-Soul and its participation in the whole of the 
-Universe, in its divisible as well as its indivisible aspects 
-that is, in its sameness and in its difference, is not 
-sufficient to confer on the Universe the closest approximnation to the perfection of the eternal model, even though 
-Plato usually attributes the highest perfections to Soul. 
-
-
-In the following passage, Plato finally makes explicit the 
-
-
-
-way in which the Universe of becoming most resembles the 
-eternity of its model. To all the perfection which he has 
-attributed to the Universe, including intelligence, 
-judgment, and uniform revolution, he now adds the perfection 
-which enables the Universe to resemble its eternal model 
-to the fullest extent possible, the ultimate perfection of 
-which the Universe is capable. Plato writes: 
-
-When the father who had begotten it saw it set in 
-
-motion and alive, a shrine brought into being for 
-
-the everlasting gods, he rejoiced and being well 
-
-pleased he took thought to make it yet more like 
-
-its pattern (37c). 
-
-When the Universe was set "in motion and made alive," 
-the requirements which Socrates had laid down in the 
-beginning of the dialogue were met. However, Plato does 
-not end his sentence on this condition; he adds that the 
-Universe was alive and in motion, and, in addition, it was 
-a shrine (agalma). This peculiar word has caused the 
-commentators no small difficulty.'9 Its meaning is not 
-fixed and precise, since it may mean a statue or it may 
-mean a thing of joy. But the connotation of the word 
-suggests that either the statue or the thing of joy are 
-made by the lover who beholds in the statue an image of 
-his loved one, which makes the agalma both a statue and 
-a thing of joy. One recalls that the dialogues of the late 
-
-
-period, especially the Sophist, have consistently lent 
-
-
-49 aly, Taylor, Cornford, Archer-Hind, Bury. 
-
-
-
-themselves to an exposition of the difference betweer a 
-mere statue, which may or may not be faithful to the 
-proportions of the original model, and a genuine image,  
-which is faithful to the proportions of the original model. 
-The agaima is not only faithful to its original model but 
-the model is a loved one whose very visage brings joy to 
-the heart of the beholder. Heretofore, the Universe was 
-described as an image, (eikon) but in this passage it is 
-described as agalma, an image which brings joy to the 
-heart of the beholder. 
-
-But the Sophist distinguished between human and 
-divine images. One can understand that a human craftsman 
-might take delight in an image of his loved one, but when 
-the maker of the Universe takes delight in the image of 
-the perfection of the eternal model, it is another matter. 
-For this image is said to be a shrine for the everlasting 
-gods, and the plural is unmistakable. For the plural gods 
-have not made the Universe; this was the work of the 
-demiurge; yet the Universe is not described as a shrine 
-for the demiurge but for the everlasting gods. It is 
-tempting to conclude from what first seems to be a glaring 
-inconsistency that Plato had made the Universe to be a 
-place in which the gods may worship the Living Being who 
-is the model of the Universe. Or, going beyond the surface 
-of the allegory, one might conclude that the One Living 
-Being who is the maker of the Universe takes delight in 
-Himself in the image of Himself which is called the 
-
-
-
-Universe, since Plato clearly says that the maker rejoiced 
-when he beheld it. But it is first necessary to state that 
-Plato does not offer these interpretations himself, and we 
-are forced once again to remind ourselves that the finding 
-of the maker of the Universe is a hard task and the 
-revelation of the maker to all mankind is impossible. It 
-seems best to interpret the passage in the light of Plato's 
-own statement that the exact and specific description of 
-the maker is impossible. Nor does it seem wise to expect 
-that Plato is trying to bring us to the point where we 
-ourselves experience the reality behind the veil of 
-allegory, in the hope that we will experience what he means, 
-even though he does not say it explicitly. Although this 
-might very well be Plato's intention, we have no way of 
-knowing whether he has designed this passage, indeed, this 
-entire dialogue, to create the basis of such an experience, 
-Although it is impossible to pretend that we do not 
-project our own views on to the structure of Plato's 
-philosophy, since we are moderns and our minds are attuned, 
-as it were, to our own era, nevertheless we ought to 
-attempt to plumb Plato's meaning, so far as we can. To 
-assert that this is impossible is to abandon all historical 
-scholarship; to assert that this poses no difficulty at all 
-is naivyete in the extreme. Thus, despite the agreement 
-which Augustine and many other philosophers felt when 
-confronting this passage, we ought not to conclude that 
-
-
-Plato has "anticipated," as the saying goes, the doctrines 
-
-
-
-of Christianity. One could as well say that the ineffability which characterizes Plato's maker of the Universe is 
-due to his acquaintance with Buddhist or Mosaic doctrines 
-of the ineffability of the Divine. 
-
-One must rest at Plato's statement that the Universe 
-is an agalma, and that the maker rejoiced when he saw that 
-it was alive and in motion. In the Phaedrus (at 252d) 
-there is a similar usage of agalma, in which the lover 
-chooses his love (eros) as if the love were a shrine 
-
-
-(agalma). There is another use in the Laws (931a) where 
-
-
-parents who receive proper veneration from their children 
-are regarded as instances of agalma. 
-
-However, one must recall that Plato has said all 
-through the Timaeus that the Universe was fashioned by the 
-demiurge, who in turn looks to the perfection of the 
-eternal model, and not to himself as the locus of the 
-eternal model, so that the simple equation of the eternal 
-model with the demiurge runs counter to the stated details 
-of the allegory. Again, it would seem to be a modern 
-projection to interpret this division of the model from the 
-demiurge as a justification for the claim that Plato 
-distinguished the Father from the Creator. From such an 
-interpretation one could reach out to the conclusion that, 
-for Plato, Summun Bonum est diffusivum Sui, but this 
-stretches interpretation far beyond Plato's stated words. 
-
-The attempt on the part of some commentators to 
-
-
-assert or to deny these implications of Plato's words, 
-
-
-
-then, seems to represent an attempt to fit Plato's 
-meaning into more contemporary doctrines. One cannot quarrel with those who find inspiration in Plato's text, but 
-this is not the question. The question is, what did Plato 
-mean? And in this context, it seems beside the point to 
-fit Platonism into more recent doctrines of creation, and 
-rather more to the point to relate the details of Plato's 
-intricate allegory to what is clearly demonstrable and 
-attributable to Plato as a fourthecentury genius, and not 
-@ twentieth-century commentator on twentieth-century 
-investigations. The great controversy which Plato's 
-demiurge has created will not be settled in these pages. 
-The point under discussion is the distinction between the 
-Universe as a shrine and the Universe as an image, and the 
-fact that Plato described the Universe as an image (eikon) 
-throughout the preceding passages, but now refers to it as 
-a shrine (agalma). 
-
-But a relatively full view of this shift of emphasis 
-must include stylistic as well as theological considerations. 
-For, Plato will put forward in the next few passages, a 
-doctrine of time as a special sort of image, and, in 
-order to avoid calling both the Universe and time by the 
-same name, Plato has elevated the Universe to the status of 
-\& shrine-image so that he can refer to time as another 
-
-
-sort of image. Recall that the beginning of the Timaeus 
-
-
-confronts the reader with the need to avoid blasphemy, and 
-
-
-yet the equally insistent need not to demean the Universe 
-
-
-
-or to rob it of any due measure of perfection. Thus the 
-Universe as a shrine becomes the locus of divine function, 
-and as we shall see, the Universe as temporal becomes the 
-manner of divine function: respectively the place where 
-the demiurge acts and the way in which he acts. There is a 
-further note which should be added. For a shrine may be 
-occasionally empty of the presence of the god to whom it 
-is dedicated, or it may be filled with his presence. And 
-it is precisely this distinction which bears on the 
-following passage. For the Universe has so far been endowed 
-with body and Soul, but the maker sought to make 1t yet 
-more like its eternal model, not only a shrine in space 
-but in some way an eternal shrine, as much like its model 
-as it can be. 
-
-(Just )2° as that pattern is the Living Being that 
-
-is forever existent, so he sought to make this 
-
-Universe also like it, so far as it might be, in 
-
-that respect. Now the nature of the Living Being 
-
-was eternal, and this character it was impossible 
-
-to confer in full completeness on the generated 
-
-thing (374d). 
-
-Here Plato speaks the paradox which has run through 
-the previous discussion of the Universe as an eternal 
-becoming. He states openly that the model is the Living 
-Being who is eternal but the Universe is a generated thing 
-
-
-which therefore cannot be eternal in the same way. It 1s 
-
-
-this difference between the model and the Universe which 
-
-
-20 Cornford has "So." 
-
-
-
-must be reconciled in order to describe the Universe as a 
-thing which is as much like its model as possible. And to 
-accomplish this, Plato says: 
-
-But he took thought to make, as it were, a moving 
-
-likeness (eikona) of eternity; and at the same 
-
-time that he ordered heaven, he made, of eternity 
-
-that abides in unity, an everlasting likeness 
-
-moving according to number-that to which we have 
-
-given the name Time (37d). 
-
-In this passage, the themes of eternity, image, and 
-time culminate in a synthesis, of which there are several 
-aspects. First, notice that the act of the demiurge which 
-brought order to the original chaos, which Plato has 
-already described, is said in this passage to be the same 
-act as the act of making time. Second, notice that time as 
-an image is made, not of chaos but of eternity. Third, 
-note that Time is a moving image and an everlasting image. 
-Fourth, note that Time is said to move according to number, 
-Fifth, note that we have given it the name of Time. I shall 
-discuss each of these aspects in turn. 
-
-1. The activity of the demiurge.--The Universe has been 
-described throughout the Timaeus as made by an act of the 
-
-
-demiurge, whose activity brings order out of the discordant 
-motions which confront him. This feature of the allegory 
-has elicited much comment, and some of the commentators 
-would like to conclude that the demiurge does not create 
-ex nihilo because Plato clearly says that the demiurge 
-
-
-was confronted by a chaos of discordant motions. ©! Others 
-
-
-21 Cornford, op. cit. 
-
-
-
-would like to conclude that it is merely a detail of the 
-allegory which does not jibe with the details of literal 
-experience, so that one can dismiss the chaos as only a 
-mythical element but not a real thing. Both views seem 
-
-
-unnecessary, for Plato was neither writing mere allegory 
-
-
-nor Christian Theology. It seems more to the point to show 
-that Plato once before introduced a prior consideration 
-into his account after he has introduced a later consideration, as we saw, for example, when he described the World-Soul after the World-body. There, it was to give the reader 
-the necessary materials out of which he could fashion the 
-image through which Plato put forward his account of the 
-process. Plato of course attributes to Soul a superior sort 
-of perfection than that which he attributes to body, but 
-not because these parts of the Universe stand in an 
-external hierarchy of items which are spatially and existentially discrete; rather, the proportional unity of the 
-entire Universe is his primary desideratum, and he says 
-repeatedly that the Universe is an image, and that we 
-must see it as we see images, in their unity. But one 
-cannot simply call off a list of parts if one wishes the 
-reader to appreciate and know the unity of the image, since 
-the list would create the impression of a linear, serial 
-juxtaposition of parts, whereas the Universe is the most 
-excellent unity of things that have become. 
-
-So here, the doctrine of Time, the aspect of the 
-
-
-Universe by which it most resembles its eternal model, has 
-
-
-
-been introduced last in the account of the perfected 
-Universe, and we are told that the making of Time is 
-accomplished by the demiurge in the same act as the order~ 
-ing of the original chaos. Plato has again introduced the 
-most difficult aspect of the doctrine he is fashioning, 
-after the materials have been- provided for the reader to 
-see the doctrine in its unity. Logically, since the act of 
-ordering the Universe is the same as the act of making Time, 
-one might expect that these two aspects of the act of 
-constructing the Universe should have been discussed toget~ 
-her. But this runs into a severe difficulty, which is the 
-simple fact that Plato did not do so, which leads to the 
-contradiction that what we should expect Plato to say is 
-not what we should expect Plato to say; in other words, if 
-we are being faithful to the development of Plato's logic, 
-we ought not to expect him to put the making of Time and 
-the making of order into the same paragraph since he did 
-not do so. It is only necessary to perceive that these 
-aspects are united better in an image than by serial logic, 
-to follow Plato's meaning as exactly as he states it. Thus 
-the function of image as an explanation of the relation 
-between time and eternity is not less than logical; on the 
-contrary, the image provides the basis to transcend the 
-linear appearance of philosophical logic and to reach into 
-the heart of Plato's doctrine of the Unity of the Universe. 
-
-
-2. Time is said to be made as an image of eternity.--At 
-first, this seems to mean that the demiurge fashioned the 
-
-
-
-Universe out of the material of an original chaos, but 
-fashioned Time out of the material of eternity. This is 
-not only a philosophical difficulty but also a function of 
-translation. For, in English (American?) we say that 
-something 1s an image of something, which does not mean, 
-for example, that the image of Freud, is made out of the 
-material of his flesh. An image of Freud can be made of 
-photosensitive paper, of clay, or bronze, or the graphite 
-scratchings of a pencil, or colored pigments, etc. However, 
-when one discusses the Universe as an image, a Universe 
-which has been described as exhausting all of the four 
-elements out of which it is made, what can the image be 
-made of. But the answer stares us in the face. Plato has 
-said that the Universe is a Unity of the four elements of 
-fire, earth, air, and water, which has Soul indivisibly in 
-each and every one of its parts. One cannot then expect the 
-image, which the Universe is, to be made of any one of these 
-so-called ingredients; the Universe is an image precisely 
-because it is a Unity. Just as the Universe is a Unity, so 
-4s it an image, and one can as reasonably ask of what is 
-unity made as one can ask of what is an image made. The 
-Universe, as image, is like the Soul of the Universe; it 
-is indivisible from its existence. Thus, insofar as Time 
-is an image, it is not compounded out of the elements of 
-chaos or out of the perfection of eternity. Time as image 
-is Plato's way of describing, "as it were," the temporal 
-
-
--unity of the Universe. The phrase "made of" seems 
-
-
-
-ambiguous only because in English, the preposition "of" 
-is sometimes used to indicate apposition, sometimes to 
-indicate the genitive, as in derivation. The "of" here is 
-appositive. 
-3. Time is said to be a moving image, and an everlasting 
-one.--We have already been given the ingredients of this 
-aspect of the Universe from which we may construct an image. 
-For the motions of the circles of the planets have been 
-described as due to the ordering perfection of the Soul of 
-the Universe, and we are aware that the several motions of 
-the circles within the Universe take place within that 
-sort of motion which is best suited to the perfection of 
-the Universe, namely, uniform rotation. Because Uniform 
-rotation is the best sort of motion, which best suits the 
-sort of perfection the Yniverse has, we know that the 
-Universe is a sphere which revolves and comprehends all the 
-other motions of the circles within itself. Just as the 
-Soul comprehends all that can be comprehended because it is 
-indivisible from every area of the Universe, so uniform 
-rotation includes the several motions of the circles which 
-revolve within the sphere of the Universe. The question now 
-arises whether the motion which characterizes Time is the 
-uniform motion of the entire sphere itself, considered 
-apart from the subsidiary motion of the interior circles, 
-or whether it is one of the lesser motions of one or some 
-of these circles, or whether it is all of these motions 
-
-
-in some sort of unity. But we have been given the material 
-
-
-
-from which to reach this conclusion, for we have been told 
-that the making of Time is the same act as the making of 
-order. Thus, Time is the proportional unity of all the 
-motions of all the circles, including the motion of the 
-outer sphere, insofar as these are a unity. For, as order 
-unifies chaos, Time unifies motion. Once order has brought 
-the elements of chaos into a unity, they are no longer 
-elements of chaos, but of unity. So, once Time has brought 
-unity into the several motions of the circles, they are no 
-longer only several circles, but are now the elements of 
-the proportional Unity of Time. It would be wrong to 
-suppose that order is the principle according to which the 
-many elements of the spatial universe have been united 
-into a One and that Time is the principle according to 
-which the many elements of the temporal Universe have been 
-united into a One, because that would lead to the conclusion that there are two Ones. Two Ones would create the 
-third man problem which has been adduced already in the 
-Timaeus to show that the Universe is One and only One, or 
-one One. The Universe is a radical Unity, not simply of 
-spaces and Times, but, one ought to say, of Time-space. 
-
-At the same time, however, one must assert that the Unity 
-of the Universe is not a simply homogeneity without parts, 
-for that would be the destruction and not the construction 
-of a Universe. Plato's Universe is neither atomistic nor 
-pantheistic; it is a unity of proportional realities, a 
-
-
-moving image. 
-
-
-
-
-The second aspect of the moving image is the everlasting character of its motion. Again, we have been furnished with the material to construct an understanding of 
-this characteristic. 'e have already called attention to 
-Plato's optimism in his use of the word "ceaseless," by 
-which he seems to indicate that the Universe must resemble 
-eternity by being indestructible. This feature of the 
-Universe might well be called its alleged immortality, and 
-it is therefore appropriate to recall again that the 
-Universe exhausted all the elements out of which it was 
-fashioned. It was said, on this basis, that there were no 
-forces outside of it which might attack it and that it 
-was therefore impervious to age and sickness. There is 
-nothing outside the Universe which might attack it and so 
-it must be immortal, ceaseless, indestrutible, everlasting. 
-Can Plato have concluded naively that there are no dangers 
-to which the Universe is subject? To answer this, it is 
-necessary to recall the reservation with which the whole 
-character of Time has been prefaced. Plato says clearly 
-that the perfection of Time was given to the Universe as 
-far as it was possible to do so. but why should it not be 
-fully possible? For two reasons. First, if the Universe 
-were as eternal as its model it would be identical with 
-its model and there would then be no difference between the 
-model and the reality. But this cannot be, for the Universe, 
-being visible, must have been generated, and must therefore 
-
-
--have been fashioned on a model. Secondly, throughout his 
-
-
-
-philosophy, Plato repeatedly uses the phrase "as far as 
-possible" without giving a doctrine of possibility which 
-would explain the meaning of the phrase. Both the need for 
-a model and the limit of possibility are related to the 
-doctrine of notebeing. The meaning of this doctrine of 
-not-being for the realm of the Forms, was first revealed in 
-the Sophist, where it becomes the Different. The Universe 
-is both the same as and different from its model, so that 
-it is like its model and yet it is-not like its model. 
-Having said that the Universe is a Unity of the Same and 
-the Different, and having said that Time gives the closest 
-approximation to perfection that the generated Universe 
-can attain, one should expect that Plato will now develop 
-his doctrine of notebeing on a cosmological scale, as he 
-has developed his doctrines of eternity and image and Time 
-on a cosmological scale. This new doctrine of cosmic note 
-being is found in the second half of the dialogue, where 
-the relation of necessity and the receptacle of becoming 
-is discussed. One can conclude at this point only that the 
-perfection of Time is as perfect as it is possible for the 
-demiurge to make it, but, since the demiurge is not 
-absolutely omnipotent, the full character of eternity could 
-not be conferred on the Universe. The demiurge must 
-persuade necessity, not force it. 
-
-Or, to put the matter in another way, insofar as the 
-perfection of the Universe depends on the activity of the 
-
-
-rational demiurge, it is perfect; but insofar as the 
-
-
-
-Universe depends on the reluctance of necessity to be 
-persuaded by the demiurge, it lacks perfection. Thus the 
-everlasting image, which we call Time, is subject to the 
-recalcitrance of necessity. In recognising this, we rescue 
-Plato from the charge of naive optimism, for the perfection 
-of the Universe is its everlasting character, but this is 
-not the same as asserting that the Universe is absolutely 
-perfect; even Time must confront necessity. 
-4, Time 18 said to move according to number.--Again, we 
-have been furnished with the material to understand this 
-assertion. We know already that the Universe considered as 
-a whole is a sphere, but considered as the proportional 
-unity of the many circles and living beings which inhabit 
-it, it 18 a populated sphere. Thus Time is neither the 
-revolution only of the outer periphery nor only the sum of 
-the rotations of the many circles which inhabit the interior of the sphere. Time is the order which the One Universe 
-enjoys; (correlatively, the order of the Universe is the 
-Time it enjoys). Time encompasses both the Unity and the 
-multiplicity of the Universe insofar as it is the perfection of the Universe which makes it most like its eternal 
-model. It would be a serious misreading of this phrase to 
-assert that Plato's Universe is simply a Pythagorean 
-Universe because Time moves in it according to number. 
-Such a view focuses on the plurality of motions within the 
-Universe but ignores the proportional Unity which these 
-
-
-motions have in the Universe. This is not to say that 
-
-
-
-Plato's Universe is non-Pythagorean. On the contrary, there 
-is a great deal of Pythagorean wisdom in this dialogue, and 
-one should not forget that Timaeus, the principle speaker 
-of the dialogue, is represented as a Pythagorean. But it is 
-a long way from the assertion that there are Pythagorean 
-
-
-elements and themes in Plato's Timaeus to the assertion 
-
-
-that the whole dialogue is only a Pythagorean tale. Time 
-moves, no doubt. Time orders the Universe. And the many 
-motions which the Universe includes are not excluded from 
-the ordering perfection which Time brings to the Universe. 
-But it seems more reasonable to say that Time moves the 
-many, and that Time brings order to the many by moving 
-them in accordance with the perfection of which Time is the 
-image. To derive the reality of Time from the number of 
-motions in the Universe would be tantamount to the 
-assertion that Time is a subsidiary perfection of multiplicity, whereas the passage clearly states that Time 
-brings the Universe into a closer and more perfect relation 
-to its eternal model. 
-
-5. We have given it the name Time.--Once before, Plato 
-expressed a desire to use the right name for the Universe, 
-and he said there that we ought to give the name to it 
-which is most appropriate and acceptable to it (24b). It 
-
-is inetructive to recall that the difficulty of finding 
-the right name would remind Plato of Cratylus, his first 
-teacher, as it calls up for us the dialogue which bears 
-
-
-_his name. But one should also recall that the difficulty 
-
-
-
-of finding the right name for the Universe, and for Time, 
-are related to Plato's concern to avoid blasphemy. For we 
-must remember that the majority of simple Athenians had 
-deities and names for those aspects of the Universe which 
-they regarded as mysterious. Thus the name of Time could 
-very well have precipitated controversial discussions in 
-Plato's Athens which could swell to the dimensions which 
-they had reached with Socrates. The Phaedo would convince 
-anyone that Plato was not afraid of death, and so it does 
-not follow that Plato is cautious out of fear. It is better 
-to think that Plato regarded thinking through the doctrine 
-of the Timaeus as a more important work than entering into 
-a polemic with those who could not understand it, especially 
-if we are correct in asserting that the Timaeus is not only 
-a synthesis of doctrine but a preparation for the Critias 
-and the Laws, which were intended to have direct political 
-influence. 
-
-These five aspects of Plato's doctrine of Time, then, 
-show that Plato has come to relate eternity, image, and 
-Time in a new synthesis, which passes far beyond the way in 
-which these doctrines were treated separately in prior 
-dialogues. But we shall not conclude that the passage just 
-discussed is sufficient to establish our hypothesis, for 
-Plato has not completed his discussion of Time. Before we 
-can conclude that Plato's image of Time is the high 
-synthesis we claim it to be, we ought to have the entirety 
-
-
-of Plato's doctrine of Time before us. 
-
-
-
-
-Before adding, the final details, perhaps a small 
-summing up is in order. Plato has said that the Universe 
-is a shrine, and that its deepest perfection is its 
-temporality, which is the way it is ordered. Time is a 
-moving image, because the Universe resembles its eternal 
-model as closely as possible. 
-
-Plato now speaks of the parts of Time, having already 
-spoken of the Unity of Time. He says that there were no 
-days and nights, or months and years, before the Universe 
-came to be, and that all of these came into being simultaneously. However, he says 
-
-All these are parts of Time, and 'was' and 'shall be' 
-are forms of Time that have come to be; we are wrong 
-to transfer them unthinkingly to eternal being. We 
-say that it was and is and shall be but '1is' alone 
-really belongs to it and describes it truly; 'was' 
-and 'shall be’ are properly used of becoming which 
-proceeds in Time, for they are motions (37e). 
-
-There is much that is important in this passage, but 
-the central point which concerns our exposition of Time is 
-the phrase "becoming which proceeds in Time." By this small 
-phrase, Plato indicates that there is a distinction to be 
-made between becoming and Time, and that these two worda 
-do not indicate the same reality. It is important to notice 
-that the familiar antithesis between eternity and time is 
-not identical with the antithesis of eternity and becoming. 
-For it is clearly said that becoming proceeds in Time. We 
-must attempt to see how Plato relates Time, Becoming, and 
-
-
-eternity in a meaningful way. Plato does not put them in 
-
-
-_@ simple juxtaposition, for there are clearly three of 
-
-
-é 
-" 
-
-
-
-them, and their relation to each other is not a simple 
-opposition. We have seen that Time introduces the perfect 
-order which characterizes the Universe, and we have been 
-told that the Universe is a becoming image. How are these 
-statements to be reconciled so that the Universe may 
-continue to have the perfection which it has been said to 
-have. The key to this problem is given in the following: 
-
-But that which is forever in the same state 
-
-immovably cannot be becoming older or younger 
-
-by lapse of time nor can it ever become s0; 
-
-neither can it now have been nor will it be 
-
-in the future; and in general nothing belongs 
-
-to it of all that Becoming attaches to the 
-
-moving things of sense; but these have come 
-
-into being as forms of Time, which images 
-
-eternity and revolves according to number (38a). 
-
-The important consideration here is the phrase 
-"moving things of sense," for it specifies the realm of 
-becoming, as the realm of the moving things of sense. Here 
-is Plato's familiar doctrine that the things of sense keep 
-moving and therefore give rise to difficulties for the 
-intelligence which would like them to be still so that the 
-things of sense would be as stable as the names we give to 
-them. But the context of the doctrine has been changed. 
-Formerly, intelligence had to go beyond the merely visible 
-because the constant changes in the visible realm made 
-knowledge impossible. This early conviction of Plato led 
-to the theory of Forms, which are eternal and therefore 
-sufficiently stable for intellectual comprehension. But 
-
-
-now, the greatest perfection of which the Universe is 
-
-
-capable is the perfection which Time brings as the 
-
-
-
-principle of order. We are now informed that becoming 
-proceeds in Time. Thus it is inexact to say "...that what 
-is past is past, what happens now is happening, and again 
-what will happen is what will happen, and that the non-existent is the non-existent" (38b). Plato has affirmed 
-that the ordering of the Universe has been made even more 
-like its model by Time, the moving image of eternity. The 
-theory of the Forms, up to this point, has told us that 
-things share in Forms and therefore achieve a certain 
-resemblance to being. But Plato tells us now that resem-= 
-blance is not enough, for it leaves too wide a gap between 
-being and becoming. Thus the Forms by which things resemble 
-being are further perfected by Time, by which, things share 
-in the eternity of being, as much as possible. Time, then, 
-even perfects the Forms because Time helps things share in 
-the intimacy of eternity's own nature. By Time, things 
-share in the divine ordering of the Universe. 
-
-Time came into being together with the Heaven in 
-
-order that, as they were brought together, so 
-
-they might be dissolved together, if ever their 
-
-dissolution should come to pass: and it is made 
-
-after the pattern of the everenduring nature, in 
-
-order that it may be as like that pattern as 
-
-possible: for the pattern is a thing that has 
-
-being for all eternity, whereas the Heaven has 
-
-been and is and shall be perpetually throughout 
-
-all time (38b, c). 
-
-Thus Time embraces all. By it, becoming most "becomes" 
-Being. It has been generated like the forms of Time but it 
-
-
-transcends them, because it has been made to increase the 
-
-
-great intimacy which becoming has been brought to have 
-
-
-
-with Being. 
-
-This could be paraphrased in several ways. One could 
-speak of the relation between becoming and being as that 
-of Time, such that they are constituted by that relation 
-with respect to each other. One could say that Time is the 
-consummation of the contact which becoming and being have 
-with each other. One could speak in Hegelian language and 
-say that Time is the Mediation of Becoming, by which 
-becoming "becomes"being. But out of profound admiration for 
-Plato's greatness as a stylist, Plato's imagery should be 
-retained. But the truth must be understood as well as seen. 
-"Time, the moving image of eternity," is spoken in the 
-language of philosophical poetry, a language largely of 
-Plato's invention. The phrase is beautiful as well as 
-truthful, for it not only relates the realms of eternity and 
-becoming truthfully but it also relates them beautifully, 
-in the kind of elegant simplicity we expect of great truths. 
-Time has so perfected the Universe that what merely becomes 
-incessantly is now enabled to share in the perfection of 
-eternal being. Time transfigures what merely becomes into 
-what really is, without destroying its becoming. 
-
-Thus it is not illegitimate to ask "where is time," 
-and Plato answers that, since the World-Soul is responsible 
-both for the order and the motion of the numbered Universe, 
-Time lives in the Soul of the Universe. Time accomplishes 
-the ceaseless transcendence of becoming, for, by Time, 
-
-
-things which only became, now "become" being. 
-
-
-
-
-It is important to state that Time does not so 
-completely accomplish its transfiguration of mere becoming 
-that nothing any longer becomes; the unification which Time 
-introduces into the manifold realm of becoming is a 
-proportional Unity, so that becoming no longer needs to te 
-excluded from the perfection of the Universe, but can now 
-enter into it on its own terms. Things which become, become 
-intelligible by Time, because Time introduces order into 
-their motions, whereas ceaseless becoming as such, unordered by Time, has no order at all, and hence no intelligibility. Thus, where once Plato insisted that only the eternal 
-is intelligible, now he asserts that Time brings becoming 
-into the realm of the intelligible by introducing order 
-into the realm of the incessantly becoming. 
-
-The basis for the often-asserted statement that 
-Plato's image of Time is circular, derives in part from his 
-description of the Universe as a sphere which revolves 
-uniformly, and in part from the following passage: 
-
-In virtue then of this plan and intent of the god 
-
-for the birth of Time, in order that Time might 
-
-be brought into being, Sun, Moon, and five other 
-
-stars-wanderers as they are called 22 were made 
-
-to define and preserve the numbers of Time. 
-
-Having made a body for each of them, the god set 
-
-them in orbits 23 in which the revolution of the 
-
-
-Different was movingein seven orbits seven 
-bodies (38c). 
-
-
-22 They do not really wander; see Laws 822a. 
-
-
-Cornford has "circuits." 
-
-
-
-
-It 1s not necessary to follow Plato into the 
-detailed descriptions which he gives for the motions of 
-each of the planets and for each of the spheres, since as 
-we noted previously, his observations were limited as much 
-by the lack of such modern instruments as the telescope, 
-the mass spectrometer, radio telescopes and 200-inch lenses 
-as by the absence of Kepler, Copernicus, and Newton. The 
-general point is this; Time is the perfection of the 
-Universe and is coterminous with the ordering activity of 
-the demiurge; the numbers of Time, corresponding to the 
-many of bodies, are made visible by the bodies we call 
-Planets, which revolve both in their various orbits within 
-the circle of the Different and the circle of the Same. 
-Time gives rise to the orderly motions of the bodies 
-called the planets and the stars. "Thus for these reasons 
-day and night came into being, the period of the single 
-and most intelligent revolution" (39c). And again: 
-
-In this way then, and for these ends were brought 
-
-into being all those stars that have turnings on 
-
-their journey through the Heaven: in order that 
-
-this world may be as like as possible to the 
-
-perfect and intelligible Living Being in respect 
-
-of imitating its ever-enduring nature (39e). 
-
-The planets, then, are living beings who follow out 
-prescribed courses according to number, But the perfection 
-of the Universe which Time introduces is not merely the 
-month or the year or the day or the night; these are the 
-numbers of Time, just as was ard shall be are the forms 
-
-
-of Time. Time, the reality, is the order of the Universe in 
-
-
-
-motion. Time is neither motion nor the result of motion 
-(indeed, quite the reverse is true; motion is the result 
-of the order which the demiurge elicits from chaos). Nor 
-is Time becoming, for becoming proceeds in Time. In short, 
-Time is the Life of the Universe, which was foreshadowed 
-in the Sophist, where the Stranger Bays: 
-
-And, Oh Heavens, can we ever be made to believe 
-that motion and lite and soul and mind are not 
-present with sNeing. Can we imagine Being to be 
-
-
-devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful 
-unmeaning and everlasting fixture (249a)? 
+\defpnote{3.17}{Dodds, op. cit.}
+\defpnote{3.18}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 113.}
 
+\defpnote{3.19}{A.E. Taylor, Cornford, Archer-Hind, Bury.}
 
+\defpnote{3.20}{Cornford has \dq{So.}}
 
+\defpnote{3.21}{Cornford, op. cit.}
 
+\defpnote{3.22}{They do not really wander; see \bt{Laws} 822a.}
+\defpnote{3.23}{Cornford has \dq{circuits.}}
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 TIME AND SOCIETY