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-CHAPTER IV 
-THE TIMAEUS 
 
 
-I The Introductory Conversation (17a-27b) 
+\defpnote{2.1}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work}, p. 2.}
+\defpnote{2.2}{Cornford, \bt{Plato's Cosmology}, p. 2.}
 
+\defpnote{2.3}{Gauss, \bt{Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos}, p. 157}
+\defpnote{2.4}{Cornford, op. cit., appendix, p. 365.}
+\defpnote{2.5}{P. Frutiger, \bt{Les Myths de Platon}, (Paris: 1930), pp. 244 ff.}
 
-We have seen in the foregoing two chapters that the 
-Timaeus-Critias-Laws is the last group of writings to which 
-Plato devoted his attention. The argument was divided into 
-two logically interrelated parts: first, tradition, 
-stylistic researches, biography, and autobiography led to 
-the conclusion of the second chapter that the Timaeus was 
-actually written late; second, the gradual modification and 
-development of the doctrine of the middle period, as 
-exemplified by the Republic, was traced through the 
-Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus 
+\defpnote{2.6}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 14.}
 
+\defpnote{2.7}{Q. Lauer, S.J., \et{The Being of Non-Being in Plato's Sophist} (unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham University).}
 
-in the third chapter. We shall now investigate how the 
-Timaeus synthesizes the themes of eternity, image, and 
-time in a new and more unified way. 
+\defpnote{2.8}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 8.}
 
-Because of the sheer bulk of commentary we shall 
-make on the doctrines of the Timaeus, the reader will find 
-two chapters devoted to this last Aiatoeue: The present 
-chapter deals with the introductory remarks to the dialogue 
-and to the introductory remarks which Timaeus delivers as 
-a prelude to his rather extended monologue. The next 
-chapter examines the relations of eternity, image, and time 
-in the light of the purposes which the introductory pore 
+\defpnote{2.9}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Plato: The Man and His Work}, p. 440.}
+\defpnote{2.10}{Cf., V.J. Gioscia, \et{A Perspective for Role Theory,} \jt{The American Catholic Sociological Review,} XXII, 2 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff.}
 
+\defpnote{2.11}{Cornford, op. cit., p. 24.}
 
-tions of the dialogue reveal. The introductory remarks 
+\defpnote{2.12}{Ibid., p. 28.}
+\defpnote{2.13}{Ibid., p. 30.}
 
+\defpnote{2.14}{Ibid., pp. 31--32.}
 
-> 
+\defpnote{2.15}{R.D. Archer-Hind, \bt{Commentary on the Timaeus}, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1888), p. 86, n, 14.}
 
+\defpnote{2.16}{T.T. Taylor, \bt{The Timaeus and Critias of Plato},
+(Washington: Pantheon Books Inc., 1952), p. 112. }
 
+\defpnote{2.17}{Ibid., p. 17.}
 
-"found in the Timaeus set the foundations, not only for 
-Plato's later philosophy of time but also for the function-~ 
-al significance this philosophy has in relation to Plato's 
-view of the best possible society. 
-
-The first hint that the Timaeus will interest itself 
-in temporal questions comes in the list of persons who are 
-scheduled to hold the dialectical conversation. We know 
-that Critias was the name shared by Plato's grandfather 
-and his greategrandfather, His grandfather was a poet in 
-his own right and a collector of constitutions, and his 
-greategrandfather was associated with Solon. | We note that 
-Hermocrates, a general famous for his defense of Athens and 
-for his attempt to establish a just regime in Syracuse, is 
-also scheduled to speak. We note the presence of Socrates, 
-who has spoken relatively little in the late group of 
-dialogues, but who reappeared in the Philebus. And finally, 
-
-
-we note Timaeus of Locri, an Italian city well-governed by 
-Pythagoreans. 
-
-Here is a strange assembly; Critias is a very old man 
-of considerable political experience in Athens; Timaeus is 
-a Pythagorean Stranger who is in Athens for the festival 
-of Athena; Hermocrates is an Athenian general distinguished 
-
-
-in the Peloponnesian War; and we note that Socrates is now 
-
-
-' AVE. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 2. 
-
-
-2 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 2. 
-
-
-
-described as a very old man. One might almost conclude 
-from this cast alone that questions about the morality of 
-ancient Athenian politics will be discussed. 
-
-Socrates opens the dialogue. His discussion of 
-"yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"" of some of the doctrines 
-of the Republic, (books II-VI) namely, the description of 
-the farmers, craftsmen, and guardians who make up the 
-"best form of society" (17c). The occupational specialization which alloted one and only one role to each individual 
-citizen because he was best fitted for one and only one 
-role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversation." The statement is made that this brief recapitulation 
-leaves nothing out and is an exact description of the 
-contents of yesterday's conversation. Thus, one should 
-not conclude that this recapitulation includes the entire 
-contents of the Republic, for this would create a manifest 
-contradiction. The Republic conprises ten books, much of 
-which are not recapitulated here. Quite obviously, something has been left out, and Socrates implies clearly that 
-he intends to discuss only those doctrines which he has 
-summarized above. One might add, however, that the recapitulation does deal with those doctrines of the Republic 
-which are central to the whole dialogue, namely, the 
-
-
-occupational specialization of three classes of citizens, 
-
-
-3 Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den 
-Dialogen Platos, p. rey 
-
-
-
-'who do not mix the functions of the others into their own 
-allotted lives, just as the Forms on which their respective 
-perfections are based do not mix or combine. 
-
-Socrates says that the description of these citizens 
-(of the Republic) makes him feel like "a man who has been 
-looking at some noble creatures in a painting, or perhaps 
-at real animals, alive but motionless, and conceives a 
-desire to watch them in motion and actively exercising 
-the powers promised by their form" (19b,c). 
-
-Two features of this statement are particularly 
-remarkable. First, we notice Socrates’ apparent indecision 
-as to whether he is looking at a painting (a mere copy) or 
-at real animals who are motionless ( a genuine image but 
-motionless). Second, it is unusual to see Socrates admit 
-his inability to extract the doctrine he seeks through his 
-accustomed midwifery. These aspects of the introductory 
-
-
-conversation hint that the Timaeus will attempt to go 
-
-
-beyond earlier Socratic positions. 
-
-Socrates goes on at some length to spell out his 
-precise inability, and he connects it explicitly with the 
-firmness of his aged opinions about the poets (19d), 
-although he stated in the Theatetus that he had no opinions 
-
-
-of his own. He says that he does not mean to imply that he 
-has @ lowly opinion of the poets in general (which he had 
-in the Republic) but he feels now that the good imitator 
-(there are none such in the Republic) should be familiar 
-
-
-
-with the surroundings which he is going to imitate (19e). 
-On the surface, this statement pertains to the history of 
-ancient Athens; allegorically, it says that Socrates' 
-viewpoint is not the one to be followed in this dialogue. 
-Socrates does not usually speak of genuine imitation, for 
-this sort of imitation is introduced by the Stranger in the 
-Sophist. Just as the Sophists move about from city to city 
-too often, and do not remain in any one city long enough to: 
-become familiar with it, so Socrates is said to be unfamiliar with the matters about to be discussed. Plato seems to 
-say here in the gentlest way that he has great respect for 
-his old teacher but that Socrates' viewpoint is not the 
-most fruitful one for his present concern. 
-
-Timaeus, however, is a well-born citizen of Locri, 
-which is a well-governed state, so he is better qualified 
-to discuss the constitution of the society which Socrates 
-would like to see in motion. Timaeus is better suited by 
-reason of his philosophical training, and, in addition, he 
-has the necessary qualifications for statesmanship which 
-
-
-were described in the Statesman. 
-
-
-Hermocrates sets the foundation for the discourse by 
-telling us that Critias remembers a story which bears 
-directly on the trend of their discussion. It is a story 
-of ancient Athens and the way she conducted herself in 
-ancient times. It is said to be true on no less authority 
-than Solon's own words, since Solon himself is said to 
-
-
-have told the story to Critias' grandfather. The story had 
-
-
-
-been forgotten through lapse of time and the destruction of 
-human lives by a catastrophe (20e). 
-
-Socrates inquires why the tale was not recorded, and 
-Critias tells him that Solon had been forced to lay it 
-aside because, after he had returned from Egypt, there 
-were too many troubles in the city (21c). (If it is true 
-that Plato himself traveled in Egypt, this statement might 
-be interpreted as Plato's own excuse for not writing the 
-Timaeus sooner because of the difficulties he himself 
-experienced on his own return to Athens. The awe with 
-which the origins of Athens would be regarded by its 
-citizens would confront a writer of new legends about 
-Athens with the need for a great deal of caution, and the 
-reservation that there were too many political difficulties 
-would serve as an excellent excuse, should Plato have felt 
-the need for one). 
-
-Thus, the story of ancient Athens was not lost only 
-because Solon did not have time to write it but also 
-because of the intervention of a catastrophe which destroyed the actors in the drama. Solon says, however, that 
-when he himself was travelling in Egypt, he was received 
-with great respect, because the Egyptian priests who knew 
-the ancient history of Athens claimed that there is a kinship between Athenians and Egyptians, and they even said 
-that the name of their own city-god is the Egyptian word 
-for Athena (21e). Solon was of course interested to hear 
-
-
-about Athenian antiquity, and recounted for the Egyptians 
-
-
-
-the venerable legends with which he was familiar. 
-
-But the Egyptian priest sighs with benigh patience, 
-and says, "Ah Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children; 
-in Greece there is no such thing as an old man" (22b). 
-
-This would be an interesting remark no matter what 
-
-
-the chronology of the Timaeus, but, since the Timaeus is so 
-
-
-late in the series of late dialogues, the remark becomes 
-crucial. Several times in the preceding dialogues, the 
-childishness of certain opinions is mentioned, and the 
-rigours of dialectical discipline are extolled as the only 
-remedy. In the Parmenides, Socrates' youth is blamed for 
-the naivete of the early form-doctrine (130) and in the 
-
-
-Theatetus (175) Socrates himself chides Theatetus for his 
-
-
-youthful impatience. Plato used this form of criticism 
-increasingly in the late dialogues, during which he came 
-to realize that a certain maturity is prerequisite for 
-right philosophy. Now we are told that no amount of individual or personal maturity is of consequence for the 
-Greeks, for collectively they are all children. Here is a 
-very definite indication that the sort of knowledge which 
-Timaeus will put forward is not reachable by that heretofore most favored of philosophical paths, the doctrine of 
-individual, personal reminiscence. In short, reflection is 
-only the source of some knowledge, not of all. Taken in 
-conjunction with the stated purpose of the dialogue, that 
-is, the conditions of the best society, it delivers a 
-
-
-- fatal blow to the Socratic procedure of questioning 
-
-
-
-contemporaries. There are some things about which 
-contemporaries have no knowledge, and it is necessary to 
-know these things in order to describe the best society. 
-One needs to know the origins of a society, and it is 
-probable that one's contemporaries do not know this. This 
-is precisely the difference between memory and history, and 
-it constitutes a significant expansion of doctrine beyond 
-the earlier dialogues. In earlier dialogues, myths were 
-presented to perform the function of carrying the individual memory beyond its contemporary confines, but we saw 
-in the Sophist that these myths (not all myths) were 
-"childish." 
-
-In short, more than the maturity of the individual 
-person is required for true knowledge of the best society; 
-the best society requires its citizens to have a knowledge 
-of its origins; allegorically, this translates into the 
-need for a society to know its ultimate origins, and it is 
-this interpretation which makes the Timaeus' relation of 
-cosmology and sociology intelligible. In the process of 
-tracing the historical antiquity of Athens, the Timaeus 
-will discern the origins of the whole cosmos. As history 
-includes memory, so cosmology includes sociology: this is 
-the import of Timaeus' tale. And in both aspects of the 
-proportion, the cardinal issue is the "amount" of time 
-involved. 
-
-
-Solon, however, does not understand the appellation 
-
-
-
-"children, " and inquires what the priest means when he says 
-that he, Solon, an old man, is a "child." The priest 
-explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to temporary deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular 
-orbits, and that, at these times, the deviations bring 
-about floods. These floods wreak havoc on most people but 
-the Egyptians are saved by their irrigation system. + For 
-this reason, the Egyptians have been able to maintain a 
-continuous record which covers a period of 8,000 years, 
-but the Athenians were destroyed in one of these periodic 
-catastrophes, and therefore have no continuous records. 
-Thus they had to begin afresh, like children, to trace 
-their origins (22b-23d). 
-
-Solon is astonished, and asks for a more complete 
-account of ancient Athens. The Egyptian priest responds 
-willingly, saying that it is good for the city for him to 
-tell the story. He says that Athens was founded by the 
-goddess a thousand years before Egypt was founded, which 
-means 9,000 years ago. Thus, according to the priest 
-Solon's stories are nothing more than nursery tales since 
-they recount only one deluge, when in fact there have 
-been several. Furthermore, the priest says that the 
-Athenians were once counted among the bravest of people in 
-
-
-the era just before the last catastrophe, and that present 
-
-
-4 Cornford, op, cit., appendix, p. 365. 
-
-
-
-'Athenians are descended from their seed. (24) 
-
-The priest describes the Egyptian caste system of 
-priests, craftemen, and soldiers, in which system each 
-class performs one and only one function, and he adds that 
-these contemporary Egyptian institutions are continuous 
-with those olden days when the goddess instructed both 
-Athens and Egypt in these ways. Furthermore, the laws of 
-Egypt are said to reflect the "order of the world, deriving 
-from those divine things the discovery of all arts applied 
-to human affairs..." (24b). As we shall see, this is almost 
-how Timaeus will describe the origin of all human arts. 
-
-There are other records which pertain to Athens, and 
-the priest decides to inform Solon about one exploit in 
-particular, the greatest which Athens ever performed; it is 
-the fable of Atlantis (24e). The story recounts how Athens 
-once vanquished foes who invaded her even after her allies 
-had been defeated, and suggests that the invaders came 
-from an island which has now vanished beneath the sea. 
-Frutiger is not alone in the opinion that no such island 
-ever existed, and concludes that it must be credited to 
-Plato's imagination. It is nevertheless fascinating to 
-follow Cornford into the opinion that the island of 
-
-
-Atlantis was the staging area for invaders who crossed the 
-
-
-> Pp, Frutiger, Les Myths de Platon (Paris: 1930), 
-pp. 244 ff. 
-
-
-
-'Atlantic, perhaps from America. © 
-
-It 4s interesting to forecast the almost exact 
-thematic parallel of the tale of the Egyptian priest and 
-the tale which Timaeus will deliver. In both, the cosmological origins of the art of healing are described. Plato 
-of course viewed the proper function of statecraft to be 
-the healing of society, as, for example, in his repeated 
-comparisons of the statesman to the physician. 
-
-Critias himself tells Socrates that he is surprised 
-to notice how Socrates’ story (the recapitulation of 
-Republic doctrines) and the tale of Atlantis resemble each 
-other in so many details (25e). Critias had expected that 
-it would be difficult to find a basis for their conversation of today, and so he carefully rehearsed the story of 
-Atlantis before he spoke it (26). He assures us that the 
-tale is exactly as he heard it because he says, 
-
-How true is the saying that what we learn in 
-
-childhood has a wonderful hold on the memory. 
-
-I doubt if I could recall everything I heard 
-
-yesterday, but I should be surprised if I 
-
-have lost any detail of this story told me 
-
-80 long ago (26b). 
-
-In addition to guaranteeing the accuracy of the tale, 
-this remark of Critias tells us something else of equal 
-4mportance, for it reminds us that his tale is introduced 
-
-
-only as a basis of today's conversation, and as the raw 
-
-
-material for the discourse of Timaeus. Critias himself says 
-
-
-6 Cornford, op, cit., p. 14. 
-
-
-
-'he has only approached the main points when he says: 
-
-
-We will transfer the state you (Socrates) described 
-yesterday and its citizens from the region of 
-theory to concrete fact; we will take the city of 
-Athens and say that your imaginary citizens are 
-those actual ancestors of ours of whom the priest 
-spoke. They will fit perfectly and there will be 
-
-no inconsistency in declaring them to be the real 
-men of ancient times (26d). 
-
-
-Thus it seems to be Plato's purpose to see beyond 
-the recapitulation of Republic doctrines which Socrates 
-made in the beginning of the Timaeus, and this is confirmed 
-
-
-by the statement that Critias' story will serve only as 
-
-
-material for today's discourse. For, if Critias’ story 
-
-
-were not only the basis but was in fact the perfect match 
-between Socrates imaginary realm and the ancient city of 
-Athens, the dialogue could end here, with the conclusion 
-that the Republic once existed. The doctrine of the 
-Timaeus, however, concerns not only what the best society 
-ought to be and what it was, but what is the origin of the 
-best society and what is ita basis. 
-
-Socrates agrees that fitting the Republic citizens 
-into ancient Athenian society is a proper basis for today's 
-discourse, and goes so far as to say that if this is not 
-the basis, there can be no other (26e). 
-
-The plan of the projected trilogy is now revealed; 
-Timaeus, who knows more of astronomy than anyone else 
-present, will begin with the birth of the world and carry 
-the account forward until he reaches the birth of man. 
-
-
-Critias will start from the origin of man and carry the 
-
-
-
-'account to the birth of Athens. In this way, the actual 
-origins of society will be discovered. Interestingly, 
-no mention is made of the proposed content of the 
-Hermocrates. Once before, Plato hinted at a projected 
-trilogy, and seems not to have completed the third dialogue. Perhaps, as before, we shall learn so much in the 
-two dialogues that the third seems unnecessary.’ Or perhaps 
-Plato wrote the Laws instead. In any case, the point at 
-issue is whether the fitting of the Republic's citizens 
-into the ancient Athenian polis suffices to describe the 
-origins and bases of the best society. It is agreed that 
-Timaeus will account for the origin of man from his 
-astronomical beginnings, and that this is necessary as a 
-preliminary for the investigations into the actual origins 
-of society. 
-
-One cannot therefore follow Taylor into the opinion 
-that this introductory conversation is actually only an 
-introduction to the Critias.? By extending this logic, the 
-Parmenides and Theatetus are only introductions to the 
-
-
-Sophist, and the Sophist only an introduction to the 
-
-
-7 Q. Lauer, 8.J., The Being of Non-Being in Plato's 
-Sophist (unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham 
-University). 
-
-8 Cornford, op, cit., p. 8. 
-
-
-9 A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 440. 
-
-
-
-
-
-'Statesman, etc. Such a linearization of Plato's philosophy 
-
-
-leaves everything behind in which case we should read only 
-the Laws and dismiss all else as preliminary introduction. 
-
-In the next section, we shall confront Timaeus’ own 
-introduction, and as we shall see, he connects his remarks 
-to the general introductory remarks we have just discussed. 
-II_ The Role of Image 27c-29d 
-
-Timaeus invokes the blessings of the gods, as custom 
-requires, but says that the other members of the conversation must also call upon their own powers, so that they can 
-understand Timaeus' thoughts on the proposed theme (27c). 
-
-The first distinction to be made is that between 
-
-what is always re\&l and has no becoming and what 
-
-it is which is always becoming and is never real. 
-
-That which is apprehensible by thought with a 
-
-rational account is the thing which is always 
-
-unchangeably real; whereas that which is the 
-
-object of belief together with unreasoning 
-
-sensation is the thing that becomes and passes 
-
-away, but never has real being (28a). 
-
-At first, this seems to be the familiar dichotomy 
-between the eternal and the temporal, but it 4s not. In 
-dividing the line of knowledge here, Plato deliberately 
-accentuates the "top" and the "bottom," but leaves out the 
-other intermediary divisions which he has established. In 
-the Cave, opinion and false images were placed in between 
-
-
-the Forms and mere sensation; in the Theatetus, right 
-
-
-opinion was established; in the Sophist, genuine images; 
-and in the Philebus, the need to mix the Forms and the 
-
-
-four levels of knowledge. Thus the meaning of the sentences 
-
-
-Le 
-
-
-
-
-
-which open this section of discourse are illuminated by a 
-summary of the doctrines of some of the preceding dialogues. 
-
-This is confirmed by Timaeus' next sentence. He says, 
-
-Again all that becomes must needs become by the 
-
-agency of some cause, for without a cause nothing 
-
-can come to be. Now whenever the maker of anything 
-looks to that which is always unchanging and uses 
-
-a model of that description in fashioning the form 
-
-and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something 
-
-that has come to be and uses a generated model, 
-
-4t will not be good (28b). 
-
-Here is a recapitulation of the preliminary doctrine 
-of the good painter of the Sophist, where those imitations 
-which faithfully represent the proportions of the original 
-are good images, but those which distort the original are 
-mere fantasies (234, 235). The main point here is that in 
-the early dialogues, an imitation would necessarily falsify; 
-in the late dialogues, an imitation must be carefully made 
-in order to preserve the proportions of its model, and if 
-it does so, it may properly be called good. This is 
-especially true in the Philebus, where the cause of the 
-mixture of elements is responsible for the quality of the 
-mixture (27a). Here, Timaeus says that if the maker is to 
-use \& generated model (a copy of the original) he will be 
-copying a copy, whereas he should copy the original, and 
-by preserving its proportion, imitate genuinely. 
-
-This much could have been said in the Philebus, and 
-was in fact said in other words. But now this doctrine must 
-
-
-be generalized and tested on a cosmological scale. Therefore, 
-
-
--Timaeus uses the phrase, "concerning the whole 'heaven’ or 
-
-
-
-'world’ (not heaven and world)..." (27b), parenthetically 
-adding that the name can be chosen to suit heaven itself. It 
-
-
-is interesting to observe that the term heaven (ouranos) is 
-
-
-now taken to be synonymous with the whole cosmos, whereas 
-formerly, a strict division was made between heaven and 
-
-the visible world. This foreshadows the entire theme of the 
-dialogue, in which the former gap between heaven and earth 
-is now to be supplanted by a richer and more meaningful 
-relation. 
-
-Has this heaven, or universe, always been, or did it 
-begin from some beginning? Timaeus answers his own rhetorical question by saying that it must have begun because it 
-has a body and is apprehensible by sensation together with 
-right opinion, and it was formerly established that those 
-things which are so apprehensible are things which become 
-
-
-and are generated. This refers to the Theatetus where it 
-
-
-was established that sensation and true opinion do have a 
-measure of the truth but are not the sources of that truth, 
-and to the Sophist, where it was established that images, if 
-genuine, have a measure of truth because they are not 
-absolutely notebeing but have a reality ot their own. The 
-doctrine of the Philebus is brought into the account in the 
-
-
-next line where we read "But again that which becomes, we 
-Say, must necessarily become by the agency of some 
-cause" (28c). 
-
-Next comes the often quoted statement "The maker and 
-
-
-'father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and 
-
-
-
-having found him it would be impossible to declare him to 
-all mankind" (28c). This statement is absolutely central to 
-the exposition of the remainder of the dialogue. It asserts 
-that the gap between the eternal and the temporal realms 
-is not only a cosmological but a sociological one. It is 
-not an impossible task to find the father of the universe; 
-it is hard. But it is impossible to declare him to all 
-mankind. For this reason, as it was said in the Statesman, 
-some authors make myths and childish stories when they 
-confront this impossibility of declaration, and even the 
-One and the Many is said to be such a myth, made for minds 
-incapable of genuine dialectic. 
-
-Now the problem is not that there is a gap in the 
-structure of the universe, but that some kinds of communication are impossible. On the one hand, some truths are 
-ineffable, on the other hand some people cannot be told 
-the glaring truth because it would momentarily blind them 
-as it did the prisoner of the Cave when he was released 
-to see the Sun. But the Sun is there, and those few who 
-can and do see it, ought to lead others to it. 
-
-There is a further difficulty. The insight into the 
-ultimate origins of being is not only the subject of myths 
-and stories which the people feed themselves on; they hold 
-on to these myths with rigid conviction, and the innovator 
-in this area must beware lest he invite the hemlock with 
-which Socrates was sentenced to death. Plato has already 
-
-
-aid several times that these myths are for children, but, 
-
-
-
-'evidently, he has underestimated his own age. This relates 
-directly to the whole purpose of the dialogue, which is 
-to replace what Plato regards as dangerous fantasies about 
-the ultimate origins of the universe, with a more rational 
-account. Notice he does not intend to make an absolutely 
-rational account, which the learned elite of Pythagoreans, 
-Eleatics, and Academicians, might demand. The account of 
-Timaeus cannot be written in the arcane language of the 
-intellectualist; some way must be found to declare the 
-father of the universe to all mankind. This need springs 
-from Plato's conviction that the best state is composed of 
-the best citizens, and, those citizens are best who know 
-their traditions (Atlantis) and their ultimate origins. 
-In short, the experience so familiar to the teacher of a 
-aifficult doctrine was also Plato's experience-how to tell 
-the student by example without distorting the truth of the 
-original meaning. 
-
-This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the 
-myths of the origin of the universe were probably held 
-with the fervor of blind conviction by Plato's contemporaries, much as they sometimes are by our own contemporaries, 
-so that the attempt to redefine them would be regarded as 
-blasphemy by those whose hold on these myths was invested 
-with the unshakable grasp of an inflexible conservatisn. 
-This seems to be his meaning when Timaeus says that the 
-maker of the universe clearly looked to the eternal for 
-
-
-his model, and that the contrary supposition "...cannot be 
-
-
-
-spoken without blasphemy..." (29). 
-
-Plato is caught between two extreme difficulties: on 
-the one hand the childish myths must be corrected, but 
-'this might be regarded by the people as blasphemy; on the 
-other hand, the people to whom Plato wishes to speak the 
-correction cannot understand the deeper truths behind the 
-myths, so that he has to put them in examples which are not 
-perfectly appropriate; but this involves the danger of 
-blasphemy in his own mind. The difficulty of finding the 
-father is compounded by the impossibility of revealing 
-him adequately. It is extremely important that this dual 
-difficulty be born in mind in what follows, because it 
-bears directly on the use of genuine images and Plato's 
-repeated insistence that the dialogue is a probable myth 
-(eikota mython). One makes a mistake in expecting Plato to 
-speak out boldly in a purely rational language about the 
-maker of the universe for two reasons; first, as we noted, 
-some truths seem ineffable; second, one would miss Plato's 
-concern for the prisoners of the cave who would be blinded 
-by the pure truth but left in the dark by anything less. 
-The efficacy of the act of communication involves taking 
-the audience's view into account, and Plato was far from 
-
-
-ignorant on this point. !° 
-
-
-10 or, vig. Gioscia, "A Perspective for Role Theory," 
-
-
-The American Catholic Sociological Review, XXII, 2 
-Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff. 
-
-
-
-
-This accounts for the strangely popular grounds on 
-which the argument (whether the model of the universe is 
-eternal or generated) 1s settled. Timaeus says "Everyone, 
-then, must see that (the father) looked to the eternal..." 
-(29a). 
-
-The next portion of the paragraph adds a peculiar 
-reaffirmation for the eternity of the model of the universe. 
-It states "...for the world is the best of things that 
-have Hadoiie: and he (the father) is the best of causes." 
-There is no preparation for this statement in all of Plato, 
-as far as I know. One could expect that the father of the 
-universe would be described as the best of causes on the 
-extension of the theme of avoiding blasphemy which runs 
-through the whole dialogue. But there seems to be no 
-preparation for Plato's statement that the world is the 
-best of things that have become, unless it is Plato's 
-knowledge that he is going to describe the world as the 
-result of the best of causes, and therefore knows it must 
-be the best of "effects." But this creates the very 
-difficulty which this dialogue is trying to avoid, and 
-that is the description of the best cause as one whose 
-action can only bring about the best results. For, in one 
-sense, the world is the best result of the best cause, but 
-in another sense, it is only the best of things that have 
-become, and becoming is not the best sort of being. In 
-short, there has already been a slight movement from the 
-
-
-etrictly univocal causality of the best cause, toward some 
-
-
-
-kind of intermediary causation. In this way, Plato continues to pose the whole problem of some sort of mid-ground 
-between eternity and the realm of becoming. This is confirm~ 
-ed in what follows next. 
-
-Timaeus says, 
-
-
-Again, these things being so, our world must 
-necessarily be a likeness (eikona) of something. 
-Now in every matter it 1s of great moment to 
-start at the right point in accordance with the 
-nature of the subject (kata physin archen). 
-Concerning a likeness (eikonos) then, and its 
-model (paradeigmatos) we must make this 
-distinction; an account (logos) 1s of the same 
-order (suggenes) as the thing it sets forth
-an account of that which is abiding and stable 
-and discoverable by the aid of reason will 
-itself be abiding and unchangeable (so far as 
-it is possible and it lies in the nature of 
-the account to be incontrovertible and 
-irrefutable, there must be no falling short of 
-that); while an account of what is made in the 
-image (eikonos) of that other, but is only a 
-likeness (eikona) will itself be but likely 
-(eikotas) standing to accounts of the former 
-in a proportion: as reality is to becoming so 
-is truth to belief (29b-c, Cornford). 
-
-
-Since this passage is absolutely central to the 
-whole exposition of Plato's philosophy of time, imaze, and 
-eternity, it may be well to compare other translations of 
-this paragraph. 
-
-Archer-Hind has it: 
-
-
-Granting this, it must needs be that this universe 
-is a likeness of something. Now it is all important 
-to make our beginning according to nature: and this 
-affirmation must be laid down with regard to a 
-likeness and its model, that the words must be akin 
-to the subjects of which they are the interpreters: 
-therefore of that which is abiding and sure and 
-discoverable by the aid of reason the words too 
-Must be abiding and unchanging and so far as it 
-lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable 
-
-
-
-
-
-they must in no wise fall short of this; but 
-those which deal with that which is made in 
-the image of the former and which is a likeness, must be likely and duly corresponding 
-with their subject: as being 1s to becoming, 
-so ia truth to belief (29b-c, Archer-Hind). 
-
-
-Jowett has: 
-
-
-And being of such a nature the world has been 
-framed by him with a view to that which is 
-apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and if this be admitted must of necessity 
-be a copy of something. Now that the beginning 
-of everything should be according to nature is 
-a great matter. Let us then assume about the 
-copy and original that the words are akin to 
-the matter which they describe, and that when 
-they relate to the lasting and the permanent 
-and intelligible, they ought to be lasting 
-
-and unfailing, and as far as is in the nature 
-of words irrefutable and immovable, and nothing 
-less than this. But the words which are the 
-expression of the immitation of the eternal 
-things, which 1s an image only, need only be 
-likely and analogous to the former words. 
-
-What essence is to generation, that truth is 
-
-to belief (29b, c, Jowett). 
-
-
-T.f. Taylor has: 
-
-
-And from hence it is perfectly necessary that 
-this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to 
-nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In 
-this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are 
-allied to the things of which they are the 
-interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we 
-speak of that which is stable and firm and 
-intellectually apparent, that our reasons 
-
-should be in like manner stable and immutable, 
-and as much as possible irreprehensible, with every 
-perfection of a similar kind. But that, when we 
-speak concerning the image of that which is 
-4mmutable, we should employ only probable 
-arguments, which have the same analogue to the 
-former as a resemblance to its exemplar. And, 
-indeed, as essence is to generation, so is truth 
-to faith (29bec, .T. Taylor). 
-
-
-
-R.G. Bury has: 
-
-
-Again if these premises be granted, it is wholly 
-necessary that this Cosmos should be a Copy of 
-something. Now in regard to every matter it is 
-most important to begin at the natural beginning. 
-Accordingly, in dealing with a copy and its model, 
-we must affirm that the accounts given will 
-themselves be akin to the diverse objects which 
-they serve to explain; those which deal with what 
-is abiding and firm and discernible by the aid of 
-thought will be abiding and unshakable; and in so 
-far as it is possible and fitting for statements 
-to be irrefutable and invincible, they must in no 
-wise fall short thereof; whereas the accounts of 
-that which is copied after the likeness of that 
-Model, and is itself a likeness, will be analogous 
-thereto and posess liklihood; for as Being is to 
-Becoming, so is Truth to Belief (29b-c, Bury). 
-
-
-These five translations and the commentaries on the 
-passage will be reviewed in order. First, Cornford holds 
-that the chief point established in this prelude is that 
-the visible world, of which an account is to be given, is 
-
-
-a changing image or likeness (eikon) of an eternal model, 
-
-
-and reasons that it is not a realm of being but of becoming. 
-He says, therefore, that we must not expect anything more 
-than a "likely" account, because only that which is stable 
-can produce a stable account, and becoming is not stable. 
-"There can never be a final statement of exact truth about 
-this changing object."!! Having taken this view, Cornford 
-goes on to comment on the distinction of being and becoming. 
-It 18 to be noticed that he delivers his comment as a 
-
-
-derivative of his view that the account of becoming is 
-
-
-1 Cornford, op, cit., p. 24. 
-
-
-
-only likely because it is unstable. 
-
-Cornford comments that the opening sentence of the 
-preceding passage divides the world into two veulne: the 
-one of Forms which intelligence grasps, and the other of 
-sensation, which is always imprecise and in flux. We have 
-seen however that this two-fold division is not a dichotomy, 
-but rather an emphasis on the extremes of a four-fold 
-division. We differ, therefore, with Cornford's conclusion 
-that the use of the word "becoming" (genesis) by Plato is 
-"ambiguous" by which he indicates that it has only two 
-meanings, one which means that a thing comes into existence, 
-acd the other which means that a thing is in the process of 
-change. There are many more senses in which the word 
-"becoming" can be understood, as Plato showed in the 
-
-
-Parmenides (151e-152e). For example, one may say "is 
-
-
-becoming," "was becoming," "becoming older," "becoming 
-younger," "will be becoming," etc. On the basis of his 
-simple division into two meanings, Cornford adopts the 
-conclusion that the second meaning cannot be what Plato 
-means and that therefore the world must have begun in time. 
-He then differs with A.E. Taylor, who attributes the 
-Christian theory of creation to Plato via Whitehead's 
-theory of time. The point here is the fact that Cornford 
-has assumed Plato to have spoken a simple dichotomy, the 
-familiar dichotomy between the realm of Forms and the reaim 
-of becoming. Thus, for example, he says that the Sophist 
-similarly divided the kinds of production in two (265b) 
-
-
-
-'whereas it is clear that there are several kinds of 
-production stated theres human and divine, fantasy ad 
-image, proportional and non-proportional. This is especially 
-important, because the Sophist divides genuine production 
-into human production and divine production, but omits 
-speaking of false divine production whereesa it does speak 
-of false human production. It is precisely this problen, 
-i.e., how can a divine product be lacking in any divine 
-perfection, which Plato is now examining. But it is not a 
-mere repetition; it is now the starting point for Plato's 
-expanded doctrine. Just as the Sophist investigated the 
-relation between not-being and divine production in the 
-
-
-realm of things, so now the Timaceus is investigating the 
-
-
-relation between notebeing and the divine production of 
-
-the entire cosmos. One need not suppose that the familiar 
-doctrine of the split between the realm of Forms and the 
-realm of things has remained unmodified between the Republic 
-
-
-and the Timaeus. One need not assume that there is no 
-
-
-difference between the Sophist doctrine and the Republic 
-doctrine with respect to the reality of not-being. Yet 
-Cornford introduces the Sophist's division (which he sees 
-as a dichotomy) into the Timaeus, which he similarly 
-
-
-dichotomizes. 
-Cornford notes that the distinction to be made is 
-not simply between being and becoming, but between eternal 
-
-
-being and that which is always becoming. It seems better 
-
-
-= 
-
-
-
-to state that Plato is here distinguishing that which is 
-
-
-only becoming and always becoming, from another sort of 
-becoming, which it is the business of this dialogue to 
-
-
-discuss. Therefore, while it is perfectly true to Plato to 
-say that, clearly, the world has become, it does not follow 
-to say that the world is only becoming, for, on that 
-supposition, how could it be the best of things that have 
-become? 
-
-Consistently, then, Cornford concludes that the 
-maker of the universe is merely mythical and that therefore 
-there was no "moment of creation." This follows from 
-Cornford's division of the passage into only two realms, 
-which he concludes must therefore be either true or mythical. 
-But the whole division in two is not the only interpretation 
-possible, for it does not follow Plato through his development. 
-
-Thus, Cornford is led to take literally the dictum 
-
-
-of the Seventh Letter that there neither was nor is nor 
-
-
-shall be a doctrine of Plato's on the subject, and that 
-Plato is only revealing a mythical figure of the maker of 
-universe, but not the real exact truth. Cornford's view 
-makes it impossible to conclude that the difficulty of 
-revealing the maker to all mankind is not a sociological 
-aifficulty inherent in the crass and hollow mentality of 
-most men, nor the impossibility of an ineffable truth, but 
-Plato's refusal to speak out what he knows perfectly well. 
-
-
-fhis seems to be only one interpretation of the passage 
-
-
-
-which states clearly that the maker can be found, admittedly 
-with difficulty, but cannot be revealed. Cornford precludes 
-the interpretation that the difficulties of communication 
-necessitate the mythical figure or that it might be true to 
-say that the maker is ineffably inscrutable and should not 
-be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpretations seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal 
-development of the late dialogues. Thus Cornford says that 
-a similar "device" was employed in the Republic, referring 
-probably to the Myth of Er. But in the late dialorues, 
-Plato repeatedly criticises these myths as childish. Yet 
-Cornford's interpretation of myth is responsible for his 
-dichotomy here, where, it seems possible to offer there 
-other interpretations. 
-
-It will be the business of our concluding chapter 
-to show why Cornford's interpretation narrowly construes 
-Timaeus' mythical language. Suffice it at this point to 
-indicate what that conclusion will be. Plato does not 
-stop at a merely mythical account in the Timaeus. True, 
-
-
-there is another myth of "creation" in the Timaeus, but 
-
-
-4t is not all that is to be found there. In addition to 
-the mythical, Plato is, as usual, revealing what he feels 
-
-
-to be the truth, so that he who sees what the myth means 
-
-
-has seen more than the myth. In this way, the Timaeus can be 
-
-
-read either as myth and myth alone, or it can also be 
-interpreted as a new doctrine in which Plato points 
-
-
-,clearly beyond mere myth. This view is clearest in the 
-
-
-
-ending of the passage cited, where Plato says that we must | 
-see, not mere myth, but a likely myth, just as in the 
-Theatetus we must have, not only opinion, but right opinion, 
-
-
-or in the Sophist and opening passages of the Timaeus, we 
-
-
-must see, not mere images, but moving images, which 
-faithfully reproduce the proportions of the original model. 
-
-Thus, Cornford can say, 
-
-In the application here it is argued that, since 
-
-the world is in fact good, its maker must have 
-
-copied a model that is eternal. The world then is 
-
-a@ copy, an image, of the real. It is not, indeed, 
-
-like an artist's painting, at a third remove from 
-
-tettaty but on the other hand it is not wholly 
-
-real,! 
-Notice that Cornford does not distinguish, as the Sophist 
-does (at 266d) between a good painter's faithful copy, and 
-@ poor painter's unfaithful distortion. Cornford implies 
-that images are separated from the ultimate reality. 
-Cornford seems to ignow the distinction between a genuine 
-image and a mere copy in this case. He says, "The cosmology 
-of the Timaeus is poetry, an image that may come nearer the 
-truth than some other cosmologies."13 He seems to mean 
-mere poetry, as opposed to genuine poetry. This does not 
-help us to understand Timaeus' statement that he will give 
-the best possible account, which seems to mean genuine 
-
-
-poetry. 
-
-
-But what does the statement that the Timaeus is 
-
-
-12 Ipaa., p. 28. 
-'S tIpid., p. 30. 
-
-
-
-poetry mean for Cornford, It means that 
-
-eeeinexactness and inconsistency are inherent in 
-
-the nature of the subject; they cannot be removed 
-
-by a stripping off the veil of allegory. An 
-allegory, like a cypher, has a key; the Pilgrim's 
-
-Progress can be retranslated into the terms of 
-
-Bunyan's theology. But there is no key to poetry 
-
-or myth.!4 
-. Certainly there is poetry, and myth, and imagery. 
-But these must not be seen in the youthful light of the 
-myths which Plato himself calls childish; they must be 
-seen as the best possible account to reveal this doctrine 
-to all mankind. Cornford's interpretation would lead one 
-always to insert "only" when ever he refers to images, 
-since, in such a view, things are either perfectly true 
-or they are only images. But for Plato, this simple 
-dichotomy has long outlived its utility, and the doctrine 
-of notebeing, and the mixture of being and not-being is, 
-in the Timaeus, a further effort on Plato's part to 
-clarify his thought on these matters. 
-
-Archer-Hind comments that the eternal model of the 
-universe and its creation in time represents Plato's use 
-of allegory, and that there can be 
-
-no question whatsoever of the beginning of the 
-
-universe in time. The creation in time is simply 
-
-part of the figurative representation; in Plato's 
-
-highly poetical and allegorical exposition, a 
-
-
-logical analysis is represented as taking place 
-in time, and to reach his true meaning we must 
-
-
-14 Ipta., pp. 31-2. 
-
-
-strip off the veil of allegory.1!5 
-Here 4s the source of Cornford's statement that it is 
-impossible to "strip off the veil of allegory." Later in 
-his commentary, Archer-Hind writes that although Plato is 
-talking about "absolute thought thinking itself" Plato 
-has put this idea into the figure of a gradually unfolding 
-process. My view is that it is not necessary to strip off 
-the veil of allegory to see Plato's meaning, for the 
-allegory does not conceal but enhances the doctrine. For 
-those who see only the allegory, it affords a pretty image 
-of the truth. But for those who see the doctrine, the image 
-4s an added richness, which does not cloud the doctrine, 
-but actually helps it to radiate of itself, and to shine 
-more radiantly. However, one notices that Archer-Hind does 
-not translate the final portion of the passage in question 
-by the phrase "only an image"; he says, simply, that an 
-image is "likely" and "duly corresponding" with its 
-subject. Thus Archer-Hind 1s able to conclude that words 
-stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent as the images do, and that this proportion is a 
-special case of the more general formula at the end of the 
-passage, which has it that becoming is to being as probability is to truth, This is not mere imagery, for words 
-
-
-themselves, in this setting, become images. Later, when 
-
-
-15 R.D. Archer-Hind, Commentary on the Timaeus 
-London: The Macmillan Company, 1000), p. 00, n. 14. 
-
-
-
-the whole cosmos is termed an image, Cornford's diminution 
-of imagery will suffer because he has not allowed anything 
-less than pure being to be called being, and so, whatever 
-is less than pure must be somehow less than real. Thus 
-Archer-Hind has escaped the claws of this argument by 
-interpreting Plato's text to mean that words and images 
-must correspond to that which they represent, 36 that a 
-moving cosmos described without the use of a moving image 
-would violate the canons Plato sets down for faithful 
-representation. 
-
-However, Archer=-Hind seems not to follow his own 
-conviction that the later dialogues show a constant 
-progression, because he adds that this analogy is precisely 
-what one finds at Republic 511e. But there we find, not a 
-division into two parts which are proportional, but 4 
-fourfold division of the powers of the soul where images 
-are the lowest level of intelligence, and not the proportional representation of truths of reason. 
-
-Jowett too holds that the images which are only 
-4mitations of eternal things must be only images. Jowett's 
-well-known Kantian bias is clearly evident here, since 
-those kinds of knowledge which give anything less than the 
-inscrutable nature of the Forms cannot be satisfactorily 
-called true knowledge, but only images and copies. The 
-fact that Jowett places the Timaeus next after the Republic 
-is in part based on his claim that there is little differeme 
-between the doctrine of the two dialogues. This is a 
-
-
-
-
-
-function of two factors; first, Jowett wrote his translations before the stylometrists ushered in the new era of 
-
-
-Platonic criticism, and second, if one reads the Timaeus 
-with the expectation that its doctrine will ot differ 
-materially from the doctrine of the middle period, and 
-then translates the text with that view in mind, it is not 
-only consistent but logically necessary to write "only an 
-image." But if one follows the majority of scholars who 
-placed the Timaeus in the late period, then one may see in 
-
-
-the Timaeus certain doctrinal reformulations, so that it 
-
-
-is not necessary to expect Plato to speak in the same 
-epistemological voice which the later dialogues clearly 
-modulate. 
-
-But a point worth making is partially confirmed by 
-Jowett, in that he agrees with Archer-Hind that Plato 
-makes words proportional to their referents, just as 
-images are proportional to their paradigms. Although 
-Cornford's translation of "accounts" is somewhat cumbersome, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating 
-the second half of the proportion "what essence is to 
-generation, so truth is to belief," although Cornford 
-prefers being to essence. 
-
-The little=-consulted work of T.T. Taylor is also 
-instructive with regard to the passage in question. [f.T. 
-Taylor translates paradeigmatos not as paradigm, nor as 
-model, but as exemplar. This translation could lead to the 
-
-
-game difficulty into which Cornford was led, since the 
-
-
-
-
-
-word exemplar has inescapably transcendental connotations, 
-creating the impression that there is a spatial separation 
-between the world of exemplars and the world of images, 
-and this in turn would lead to the diminution of the role 
-of images and the arguments based upon them. And so, T.T. 
-Taylor says that in the discussion of images, "we should 
-employ only probable arguments," thereby separating what 
-Plato is trying to put together in a new way. However, T.T. 
-Taylor says, 
-The faith which Plato now assumes appears to be 
-different from that of which he speaks in the 
-sixth book of the Republic, in the section of 
-aline; for that is irrational knowledge, whence 
-also it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged 
-according to sense. But the present faith is 
-rational, although it is mingled with irrational 
-knowledges, employing sense and conjecture; aud 
-hence is filled with much that is unstable.! 
-He goes on to say that for Plato there are four kinds of 
-truth, and that some must be conjoined with sensibles. 
-This opinion is noteworthy since it was written in 1804, 
-@ full half-century before the scholars decided to resort 
-to language tables to sort the dialogues into their 
-chronological context. Here is a scholar who sees that 
-
-
-Plato's reference is to the four truths, not of the Republic, 
-
-
-but of the Philebus, where the Good is said to impart 
-
-
-
-purity to the mixture. 
-
-
-16 T.T. Taylor, The Timaeus and Critias of Plato 
-(Washington: Pantheon Books Inc., 1952), p. 112. 
-
-
-'7 Ip4a., p. 17. 
-
-
-
-Bury does not relate the four truths of the Timaeus 
-to the four divisions of the Philebus, but, instead, 
-dichotomizes being and becoming, '8 Thus in the last few 
-lines of his translation, he says that, on the one hand, . 
-statements which copy the eternal must be, 
-in so far as it is possible and fitting for 
-statements to be, irrefutable and invincible, they 
-must in no wise fall short thereof, whereas the 
-accounts of that which is copied after the likeness 
-of that model, and is itself a likeness, will be 
-analogous thereto and posess likelihood; 
-Although Bury does not insert an "only" in this passage, 
-the feeling tone is indicated in his tra*slation by his 
-use of "whereas," which makes it seem that he has shifted 
-the field and is now speaking of the opposite side of the 
-dichotomy. His translation makes it seem that the universe 
-4s only a copy of a copy, and therefore probably lese than 
-true. This seems to go against the aim of the passage, 
-
-
-which is to account for the use of imagery, which, in 
-
-
-earlier dialogues (Republic, Phaedo) were unworthy vehicles 
-
-
-of the truth, but in later dialogues (Sophist, Statesman) 
-are not only worthy but somehow necessary to describe the 
-notebeing integral to every real thing. 
-
-It is A.E. Taylor's view that the Platonic theory 
-
-
-of creation in the Timaeus is a perfectly Christian vision, 
-
-
-and that, futhermore, Plato's view is best understood by 
-
-
-applying to it the fundamentals of Whitehead's theory of 
-
-
-18 Bury, "Plato and History," p. 5. 
-
-
-
-
-
-time, as set out in the "Concept of Nature." There are 
-here actually two "heresies," as Cornford says. The first 
-ig the assertion that Plato's theory of creation is 
-assimilable to the Christian notion: the second 1s that 
-Whitehead's theory is both Christian and Platonic. It 
-might seem that these theological disputes are not to the 
-point, but, unfortunately, Taylor has introduced them in 
-explanation of the passage which is under discussion. 
-Taylor first determines that Plato has said that 
-the world clearly must have had an eternal model but that 
-the world itself is mutable. Then he says, "This is 
-virtually what Whitehead means when he says in his own 
-terminology that objects are 'angredient'"!9 in events. 
-From this he draws the inference that Plato insists on a 
-provisional character of representation because the senses 
-only perceive roughly, and because it takes a long time for 
-the coarseness of sensory perception to cross-check itself 
-and finally arrive at precise and exact perceptions. 
-Cornford seems right here when he says that A.E. Taylor's 
-speculations derive from A.E. Taylor and hardly at all 
-from Plato. It might be true to assert that Plato held 
-the senses not to be "infinitely acute" but this is a 
-long way from the claim that Plato offers a provisional 
-
-
-account because the senses are so dull and because they 
-
-
-19 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 73. 
-
-
-
-
-
-can only report what they perceive at a given time, °° 
-
-
-AE, Taylor nevertheless does not insert the "only" which 
-others want. His translation reads: 
-
-We must lay it down that discourses are akin in 
-
-character to that which they expound, discourses 
-
-about the permanent and stable and apprehensible 
-
-by thought themselves permanent and unchanging 
-
-(so far as it is possible and proper for discourses 
-
-to be irrefutable and final, there must be no 
-
-fallingshort of thate-), discourses about that 
-which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding to their objects.2! 
-
-However, he adds the comment that Timaeus' discourse 
-and Timaeus' "warning" about proportionality pertain to 
-the whole cosmology. 
-
-It is not given as a finally true account of 
-
-anything but simply (only?) as the account which, 
-
-so far as Timaeus can see, best "saves," i.e., 
-
-does full justice to all the "appearances" so far 
-
-as they are known to him.22 
-So, although A.E. Taylor does not insert "only" in his 
-translation, he asks that the passage be interpreted as a 
-warning that the account is simply the best one which 
-Timaeus can devise to save the appearances. This follows 
-
-
-upon Taylor's assumption that the Timaeus is a dialogue in 
-
-
-which we should expect to find "nothing more" than the 
-doctrine of a fifth-century Pythagorean, a "provisional 
-
-
-tale," the "best approximation" Timaeus could manage. This 
-
-
-20 tpi. 
-21 Ipid., p. 74. 
-22 tpid. 
-
-
-
-
-
-interpretation makes it impossible for Taylor to accept 
-the Timaeus as a dialogue which contains anything of the 
-"later Platonic theory. "2 
-
-Rather than enter into a detailed discussion of this 
-Taylorian "heresy," as Cornford calls it, and rather than 
-give the details of a long and involved series of quotations 
-from the Ancients, it seems more appropriate to state 
-Cornford's view of A.E. Taylor's unique and solitary 
-opinion that the Timaeus is only Plato's eclectic and 
-rather artificial combination of Empedoclean biology on to 
-the stock of Pythagorean mathematics and astronomy. Cornford 
-says, in summary, 
-
-It is hard to understand how anyone acquainted 
-
-with the literature and art of the classical 
-
-period can imagine that the greatest philosopher 
-
-of that period, at the height of his powers, 
-
-could have wasted his time on so frivolous and 
-
-futile an exercise in pastiche.@ 
-
-
-In addition, Cornford feels that "There is more of Plato 
-in The Adventures of Ideas than there is of Whitehead in 
-
-
-the Timaeus."29 
-
-
-Except for Bury's, the most recent translation of the 
-passages under discussion (29b=c) is Cornford's, which has 
-the additional merit of supplying a detailed commentary, 
-
-
-familiar at once with the sources and the conclusions of 
-
-
-23 Ipid., p. 19. 
-
-
-24 Cornford, op. cit., pe. x. 
-
-
-25 Ibid., pp. 11=12, 
-
-
-
-Platonic scholars. Yet Cornford's translation contains the 
-
-
-assumption that the doctrine of the Timaeus cannot go 
-
-
-beyond the dialogues of the late period which precede it. 
-Yet Cornford himself places the Timeaeus after the Philebus 
-
-
-on doctrinal grounds; he feels that the Timaeus generalizes 
-
-
-the divisions of the Philebus into the far more general 
-
-
-topic of cosmology. But he fails to see that the Timaeus 
-does not merely apply the Philebus’ doctrine to cosmology; 
-
-
-the Timaeus seeks a broader generalization of insight, 
-
-
-proportional to the broader range of inquiry. Thus, in the 
-passage in question, one should not conclude with Cornford 
-that Timaeus is apologizing for the use of image because 
-of Plato's repudiation of images in the middle period. 
-There is an explanation which is much more simple; the 
-
-
-Timaeus says quite simply that the image by which the 
-
-
-universe is to be described is proportional to its model. 
-The simplest view is that Plato now introduces an image 
-into his most mature doctrine, and one can plausibly draw 
-the inference that Plato's mature doctrine contains a 
-rejwassesment of the value of an image. To force Plato to 
-hold fast to his earlier repudiation of the value of images 
-is to preclude the need for the whole Timaeus, which, 
-nevertheless, Plato wrote in his last years. 
-
-Thus, the simplest interpretation of 29b-c seems 
-best. We must accept Plato's statement that the Universe 
-
-
-is an image, and we ought not inflict our interpretations 
-
-
-
-of the earlier Platonic Philosophy on the philosophy Plato 
-
-
-writes in the Timaeus. This interpretation saves us the 
-
-
-trouble of inserting cumbersome deviations from Plato's 
-simple language. It seems too circuitous to assert that, 
-although Plato says the Universe is an image, what he 
-really means is that the Universe is not an image but only 
-allegorically described as if it were an image. It seems 
-simpler and more correct to say, with Plato, that our 
-Universe is an image. 
-
-Now the problem becomes more philosophical, for we 
-must inquire of the succeeding passages about the reality 
-of an image, what an image is and why an image is, and, 
-
-
-with Plato and the whole Timaeus, when an image is. This 
-
-
-inquiry, as we shall see, is not to be separated from the 
-
-
-main theme of the trilogy of which the Timaeus is the first 
-
-
-dialogue; what are the conditions of the best form of 
-society. 
-
-It would seem then, that the sense of 29b-c is as 
-follows: 
-
-
-Granting these premises, we must see now that our 
-Universe is an image of something. Now in all things 
-4t is most important to start at the natural beginning. Concerning an image, then, and its paradigm, we 
-must state the following: as a word is proportional 
-to the reality it describes,-a description of that 
-which is stable and abiding and discoverable by the 
-aid of reason being itself stable and abiding (so 
-far as it is possible for descriptions to be so
-there must be no falling short of that) so, a 
-description which describes an image will be 
-proportional to the image it describes; as reality 
-is to becoming, so is truth to rational faith. 
-
-
-
-
-This reading, it seems, restores the whole proportional tone of the passage, which is a carefully balanced 
-set of proportional propositions, culminating in the statement that reality is to becoming what truth is to a rational 
-faith. : 
-
-Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the participants of the dialogue should accept the account he is 
-about to give as a "probable myth" (eikota mython) (29d) 
-4t need not be understood as "only" a myth but, in 
-contradistinction to the childish myths which are for those 
-who can see no further, the myth which Timaeus is about 
-to tell is a likely or probable myth. This follows out the 
-theme established in the former passage. Just as the image 
-which our world is, is not merely an image, so the myth of 
-Timaeus is not merely a myth. As the image is proportional 
-to its model, so the myth will be proportional to its 
-model. The myth is a description of the Universe, and the 
-Universe is an image. And since the image is faithful to 
-the proportions of the original, as the Sophist stated it 
-must be to have its measure of truth, so the myth will be 
-proportional to the image, so that it can have its measure 
-of truth. For some images are fantasies, and some myths are 
-childish. But the universe is a genuine image and the myth 
-which describes it is faithful to the proportions of the 
-image, its model. As reality is to becoming, so image is 
-to myth. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the 
-reality and hence the reliability of images and myths 
-
-
-
-
-
-depends on the account given to images in the Sophist 
-which goes beyond the sterile purity of the isolated Forms 
-
-
-of the Parmenides, which were there described as due to the 
-
-
-naivete of the youthful Socrates. In this connection, it 
-
-
-must equally be stressed that Plato is not vindicating any 
-
-
-and all myths. He explicitly says only faithful images 
-
-(in the Sophist) and only probable myths (in the Timaeus). 
-But this is new. For Plato had written myths in each of the 
-dialogues in the late period, and the famous myth of Er of 
-the Republic 1s easily remembered. In the Sophist even 
-
-some views of the One and the Many are called childish 
-myths. And in the Seventh Letter, Plato tells us that there 
-
-
-neither was nor is nor shall there ever be a doctrine of 
-Plato's on the subject of the ultimate Forms. In view of 
-29bec this paradoxical statement becomes intelligible. It 
-means that there cannot be a doctrine of the ultimate Forms 
-in isolation. Since the Universe is an image, the account 
-of its ultimate Forms must be proportional to its reality. 
-thus the account of the origins of the Universe, which is a 
-locus of the Forms and the powers which they promise, must 
-be mythical; not merely mythical, but genuinely mythical. 
-It is Plato's sense of the inneffable and his poetic genius 
-to see beyond every exact and fixed statement. The need not 
-to blaspheme and yet the need to communicate can only be 
-united in a properly proportional account of the subject. 
-One must, and yet one dares not, speak the Name of the 
-
-
-Ultimate Form. One may find the father of this universe 
-
-
-_ 194 
-but it is impossible to reveal him to all mankind. This 
-speaks the double necessity not to lie and not to distort, 
-and this double necessity is met by the true myth, which 
-functions to reveal yet hide, to speak yet remain silent. 
-Thus, while the myth speaks Plato's doctrine, in a sense, 
-4t does not constitute a doctrine. It is precisely this 
-notespeaking which constitutes the connecting theme between 
-
-
-the Timaeus and the Sophist, but, at the same time, it is 
-
-
-the generalization of this theme to a cosmic level, united 
-to the investigation of time and eternity insofar as they 
-relate to the best society, which constitutes the Timaeus 
-as a culmination of the themes of eternity, image, and time, 
-as they were gradually developed in the later dialogues. 
-Granted that the Timaeus is poetry, it is not only poetry; 
-
-
-it is, above all, Plato's philosophical poetry. 
-
-So far, then, we have been told about the role which 
-an image is to play in Plato's description of the origin 
-of the Universe. We have been told that the Universe is an 
-image and that one properly makes use of a myth to describe 
-an image as accurately as it can be described. It remains 
-for Plato to tell us what an image 1s, how the Universe is 
-an image, and, most especially, how the description of the 
-Universe as an image explains the relation of time and 
-
-
-eternity to the best society. 
+\defpnote{2.18}{Bury, \bt{Plato and History},\ednote{book or essay?} p. 5.}
 
+\defpnote{2.19}{A.E. Taylor, \bt{Commentary}, p. 73.}
 
+\defpnote{2.20}{Ibid.}
+\defpnote{2.21}{Ibid., p. 74.}
+\defpnote{2.22}{Ibid.}
 
+\defpnote{2.23}{Ibid., p. 19.}
+\defpnote{2.24}{Cornford, op. cit., p. x.}
+\defpnote{2.25}{Ibid., pp. 11--12.}
 
 
 CHAPTER V