clean up hyphens

1 files changed, 236 insertions, 512 deletions

diff --git a/plato_time.otx b/plato_time.otx
index 107c0cc..0ddf98d 100644
--- a/plato_time.otx
+++ b/plato_time.otx
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ which he is attracted, by reminding the reader that he
 ignored the possibility of later modifications of doctrine 
 which Plato may have attained. 
 
-in this age of process philosophies, we seldom 
+In this age of process philosophies, we seldom 
 witness scholarly interest in Plato's views of time and 
 history. And yet Whitehead has remarked that not only the 
 process philosophies, but, in some sense, all european 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ to investigate this topic with some thoroughness. In
 addition, he who begins to read the scholars who have 
 written in this area will quickly discover that many of 
 them seem to prefer to study those dialogues which have 
-come to be called the "middle" group. | 
+come to be called the "middle" group. 
 
 As the reader will see in the pages to come, there 
 has recently been a quickening of interest on the part of 
@@ -87,8 +87,7 @@ investigate the relations between Plato's philosophy of
 time and contemporary process-philosophies. Several writers 
 have addressed themselves to reconsiderations of the 
 meanings of Plato's theory of time and the implications 
-which this theory might have for contemporary investiga- 
-tions. For example, W.H. Walsh discusses the controversy 
+which this theory might have for contemporary investigations. For example, W.H. Walsh discusses the controversy 
 
 
 which arose after the publication of K. Popper's two 
@@ -113,8 +112,7 @@ that Plato did not really posess a “philosophy of History."
 While it is not the aim of this study to discuss 
 these two writers, it is instructive to cite them as 
 examples because they contain views which are representative 
-of certain aspects of Platonic scholarship in our genera- 
-tion.> Walsh represents the tendency to view the Republic 
+of certain aspects of Platonic scholarship in our generation.> Walsh represents the tendency to view the Republic 
 as the final source of Plato's philosophy of the Polis; 
 Popper represents that view which regards Plato as one 
 of the first "social scientists" whose interest it was to 
@@ -247,8 +245,7 @@ said that mathematical forms and not fundamental particles
 of a solid stuff are at the basis of the Universe. 
 
 Iwo groups of writers can be distinguished in the 
-foregoing citations; one group of writers concern them- 
-selves with political and sociologicaL questions, and the 
+foregoing citations; one group of writers concern themselves with political and sociologicaL questions, and the 
 others are concerned with cosmological questions. It is 
 therefore a matter of importance to note that Plato does 
 not suffer from this division of subject matter; in the 
@@ -260,8 +257,7 @@ Timaeus, it is precisely these two seemingly disparate
 themes which he unites. Thus it is something of a 
 problem for modern writers to account for the separation 
 of cosmology from politics which most writers assume in 
-approaching Plato's written works, although this separ- 
-ation is foreign to Plato himself. 
+approaching Plato's written works, although this separation is foreign to Plato himself. 
 
 Therefore, in addition to showing the relevance of 
 
@@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ Plato's thought to modern speculation, we must point out
 York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), ch. 4. 
 
 
-that some modern writers have divided Plato against hin- 
-self, and have viewed his philosophy as if it were divided 
+that some modern writers have divided Plato against himself, and have viewed his philosophy as if it were divided 
 among the academic specializations which characterize 
 modern universities. Or, to put the matter differently, 
 
@@ -367,13 +362,11 @@ history of sociological theory, endeavors to examine Plato's
 ‘philosophy of society. Since, however, Plato does not 
 separate his sociological theory from his cosmological 
 philosophy, the sociologist is faced with the necessity of 
-familiarizing himself with those parts of Plato's philo- 
-sophy which most contemporary sociologists would exclude 
+familiarizing himself with those parts of Plato's philosophy which most contemporary sociologists would exclude 
 from current definitions of the province of sociology. 
 This ought not give rise to the conclusion that the 
 contemporary sociologist has forsaken his calling; rather, 
-4t should be interpreted as the willingness of the socio- 
-logist to extend his inquiry into those regions of 
+4t should be interpreted as the willingness of the sociologist to extend his inquiry into those regions of 
 thought where the theorist he is following has taken hin. 
 
 
@@ -468,7 +461,7 @@ Critias and the Laws and succeeds the Republic means not
 
 only that these dialogues were written before and after 
 each other respectively; it means also that the doctrine of 
-the Timacus is a "later doctrine” than the Republic, i.e., 
+the Timaeus is a "later doctrine” than the Republic, i.e., 
 that is a reflective advance over the doctrine of the 
 Republic. owevens 4b should be pointed out that the 
 precise meaning of this hypothesized advance will have to 
@@ -500,8 +493,7 @@ that Plato was perfectly conscious of a precise and
 detailed plan to write the Critias and then the Laws, and 
 
 
-that he knew full well in advance what the exact formula- 
-tions of doctrine were to be in these future dialogues. 
+that he knew full well in advance what the exact formulations of doctrine were to be in these future dialogues. 
 
 No such definite finality is necessary to follow out the 
 hypothesis of this study. Most Platonic scholars agree 
@@ -550,8 +542,7 @@ in time.
 It is necessary to clarify the special use of the 
 term "hypothesis" as it will be employed in this study. 
 By hypothesis is meant nothing more than a tentative 
-assertion of a conclusion, such that one states an hypo- 
-thesis and then musters “arguments” in favor of it. The 
+assertion of a conclusion, such that one states an hypothesis and then musters “arguments” in favor of it. The 
 hypothesis in this study is a tripartite one: it involves 
 the tentative assertion that the Timaeus is a "late" 
 dialogue, that is, it was written during Plato's last years 
@@ -592,8 +583,7 @@ meaning there seems to be that one may tentatively assert
 @ proposition, and then, by reasoning logically to the 
 conclusions which flow from it, and by asking whether these 
 conclusions seem acceptable or not, either accept or reject 
-the hypothesis. This is not the meaning of the term hypo- 
-thesis as it will be employed here, for we do not intend 
+the hypothesis. This is not the meaning of the term hypothesis as it will be employed here, for we do not intend 
 to begin with the assertion that the Timaeus is a late 
 
 
@@ -627,11 +617,9 @@ views as reasonable conclusions because he has interpreted
 certain passages in a certain way. The term hypothesis is 
 used because the writer does not regard his conclusions as 
 definitive and exhaustive, but as probable and reasonable 
-conclusions. In this, the method of hypothesis and argu- 
-ments in favor of adopting the hypothesis as a conclusion 
+conclusions. In this, the method of hypothesis and arguments in favor of adopting the hypothesis as a conclusion 
 resemble but are not identical with the methods of the 
-sciences, because it is impossible to measure an inter- 
-pretation with physical instruments or to reveal by what 
+sciences, because it is impossible to measure an interpretation with physical instruments or to reveal by what 
 processes or operations one has reached his conclusions. 
 Nevertheless, it is claimed that, by focusing his attention 
 on the passages discussed, another student of Plato will 
@@ -710,7 +698,7 @@ consulted in this attempt, and when he is, the Republic is
 most frequently consulted. If it can be shown that Plato 
 
 
-in the Timacus devotes his most mature reflections to the 
+in the Timaeus devotes his most mature reflections to the 
 
 
 meaning of human life in society in its historical setting, 
@@ -723,10 +711,7 @@ for our times.
 
 As to the format of this study, certain preliminary 
 remarks are in order. In the second chapter will be found 
-@ discussion of those arguments drawn from relatively non- 
-
-
-interpretative sources which set the Timaeus in its 
+a discussion of those arguments drawn from relatively non-interpretative sources which set the Timaeus in its 
 
 
 15 Hans Meyerhoff, ed., The Philosophy of History 
@@ -837,13 +822,7 @@ The plan of the thesis, then, is quite simple. The
 second chapter will show that there is a significant 
 measure of scholarly agreement on the order of the 
 dialogues. The third chapter will trace the doctrines of 
-eternity, image, and time through the late group of dia- 
-logues. The fourth and fifth chapters will show the inter- 
-
-
-relation of these themes in the Timaeus. The concluding 
-
-
+eternity, image, and time through the late group of dialogues. The fourth and fifth chapters will show the interrelation of these themes in the Timaeus. The concluding 
 chapter will show the relationships between Plato's 
 philosophy of time and his philosophy of society, and 
 
@@ -879,8 +858,7 @@ one should not conclude that Plato has simply shiftea from
 one pole of a dichotomy to its opposite, for such a view 
 would be incorrect. Rather, one should follow Plato 
 through the doctrinal reformulations he accomplishes in 
-his late dialogues to see how he has expanded his philo- 
-sophical horizons, and in that way, one may arrive, as 
+his late dialogues to see how he has expanded his philosophical horizons, and in that way, one may arrive, as 
 the writer has, at the view that Plato has ascended new 
 philosophical heights, in which the simple dichotomy 
 between time and eternity is no longer valid or fruitful, 
@@ -906,8 +884,7 @@ the Timaeus is a late dialogue in which Plato significantly
 
 
 reformulates his earlier doctrines of eternity, image, and 
-time. It was stated that the hypothesis was to be invest- 
-igated by dividing it into two logically interrelated 
+time. It was stated that the hypothesis was to be investigated by dividing it into two logically interrelated 
 aspects; first, the order of the dialogues will be 
 established and their relative chronology will be documented; 
 second, the doctrines of the late dialogues will be 
@@ -940,8 +917,7 @@ than another is therefore necessarily a more mature work.
 This is precisely what must be demonstrated. In this 
 chapter, the chronology of the dialogues is ascertained 
 insofar as this is possible by citing the conclusions of 
-those scholars who have specialized in the use of styl- 
-istic criteria. If one establishes the chronological 
+those scholars who have specialized in the use of stylistic criteria. If one establishes the chronological 
 order of composition there is a valid presumption that 
 it also representa some sort of development in doctrine. 
 If, then, one shows in addition that the doctrines 
@@ -1154,8 +1130,7 @@ Culture (3vols.; New York: Oxford University Press,
 29 
 
 Immediately after Schleiermacher's view became 
-known, there followed a period during which the philo- 
-logical investigation of every last minute hypothesis of 
+known, there followed a period during which the philological investigation of every last minute hypothesis of 
 Plato's was undertaken with the painstakingly precise 
 attention for which philologists are deservedly famous. 
 However, it soon became evident that the forest was being 
@@ -1166,11 +1141,9 @@ It remained for C.F. Hermann®
 
 
 to regard the problems 
-of authenticating not only the authorship but the chrono- 
-logy of Plato's dialogues as of paramount importance, and 
+of authenticating not only the authorship but the chronology of Plato's dialogues as of paramount importance, and 
 Jaeger tells us that Hermann came to regard the dialogues 
-as "stages in the gradual development of Plato's philo- 
-sophy."? Thus Hermann brought "into the center of interest 
+as "stages in the gradual development of Plato's philosophy."? Thus Hermann brought "into the center of interest 
 @& problem which had hitherto been little considered, and 
 gave it much greater importance. This was the problem of 
 the dates at which the several dialogues had been written, "8 
@@ -1236,8 +1209,7 @@ it was Schleiermacher who first attempted to find his own
 31 
 way out of this myriad of opinions. By viewing Plato's 
 doctrine developmentally, and, starting with Aristotle's 
-guarantees as to certain authentic passages and chronolo- 
-gies, he set about constructing an orderly arrangement of 
+guarantees as to certain authentic passages and chronologies, he set about constructing an orderly arrangement of 
 the dialogues. However, this attempt got off to a wrong 
 start because, since only approximately half of Aristotle's 
 works are extent, it became possible for some to construct 
@@ -1333,20 +1305,14 @@ have been completed. !
 However, Jaeger claimed, 
 
 This method, in its turn, was at first successful; 
-
-but it was later discredited by its own exagger- 
-
-ations. It actually undertook, by the purely 
-
+but it was later discredited by its own exaggerations. It actually undertook, by the purely 
 mechanical application of language tables, to 
-
 determine the exact date of every dialogue.19 
 
 Before entering into this lively controversy, it is 
 necessary to distinguish a few crucial points; otherwise, 
 Jaeger's claim that the movement discredited itself will not 
-be intelligible. First, let it be noted that it 1s some- 
-times impossible to distinguish very well between the 
+be intelligible. First, let it be noted that it 1s sometimes impossible to distinguish very well between the 
 date of composition of a dialogue, that is, the period of 
 time during which Plato is said to have actually written 
 down his thoughts, and the date at which the dialogue 
@@ -1443,10 +1409,8 @@ llth ed., Vol. XXI, pp. 808-824.
 
 C.F. Hermann's statement that the gradual development of 
 Plato's thought in the dialogues was not a pedagogical 
-gradualism but reflected the slow maturation and develop- 
-ment of Plato's mind, brought about a quickening of 
-interest beyond even that which Schleilermacher had precip- 
-itated. Ueberweg discerned that the Sophist and the 
+gradualism but reflected the slow maturation and development of Plato's mind, brought about a quickening of 
+interest beyond even that which Schleilermacher had precipitated. Ueberweg discerned that the Sophist and the 
 Statesman must be placed between the Republic and the Laws 
 
 
@@ -1534,8 +1498,7 @@ attempt on Plato's part to have his passage read more
 smoothly and without unnecessary interruptions. Such 
 devices as the avoidance of hiatus and the use of 
 anacoluthic sentence endings are here called stylistic. 
-The term stylometry refers to the application of statisti- 
-cal procedures to the number of particles in a paragraph, 
+The term stylometry refers to the application of statistical procedures to the number of particles in a paragraph, 
 or to the frequency of certain words in one dialogue as 
 against another; clearly, it carries metric connotations, 
 and necessitates only the sort of competence which can 
@@ -1544,16 +1507,12 @@ reader must understand what he reads, the stylometric
 reader ought to avoid understanding the passage he 
 subjects to statistical criteria. A similar difference 
 could be found between counting a number of unknown 
-objects, which, by analogy, would represent the stylo- 
-metric method, and concluding that the objects so counted 
+objects, which, by analogy, would represent the stylometric method, and concluding that the objects so counted 
 are a strange lot of objects, which be analogy, would 
 represent the stylistic method. It is one thing to count 
 the number of clausulae and quite another to notice that a 
 passage reads more smoothly because of the presence of a 
-number of clausulae. Thus objections to the use of stylo- 
-
-
-,metric scholarship need not carry equal weight if referred | 
+number of clausulae. Thus objections to the use of stylometric scholarship need not carry equal weight if referred | 
 
 
 39 
@@ -1569,8 +1528,7 @@ criteria according to which one says that a certain
 language style is late or early. There are similar studies 
 concerning the language of Homer in progress at Columbia 
 University, and there too, the criteria of "lateness" 
-must be agreed upon before the "purely mechanical applica- 
-tion of language tables to determine the exact date of 
+must be agreed upon before the "purely mechanical application of language tables to determine the exact date of 
 every dialogue" is undertaken. Thus, Campbell's argument 
 should read as follows; if the Laws is agreed to be last, 
 then the remainder follows on stylistic grounds. And it 
@@ -1604,8 +1562,7 @@ by the stylists,-” 25 and added to their attempts to :
 establish the order of the avavoedee: Again, this shows 
 that the stylistic criteria cannot be viewed as "purely 
 machanical.” On the one hand this limite the extent to 
-which stylistic criteria may be said to be non-interpreta- 
-tive; on the other hand, since interpretative sources 
+which stylistic criteria may be said to be non-interpretative; on the other hand, since interpretative sources 
 enter into stylistic researches, it seems to add to the 
 reliability of stylistic criteria in establishing the 
 order of the dialogues. 
@@ -1613,18 +1570,14 @@ order of the dialogues.
 A.E. Taylor says that the real impetus for the 
 
 
-stylometric method was received from Campbell's ground- 
-
-
-breaking edition of the Sophist and Statesman, and that 
+stylometric method was received from Campbell's groundbreaking edition of the Sophist and Statesman, and that 
 
 
 Dittenberger, Ritter, and Lutoslawski continued and 
 extended Campbell's efforts, but, he adds, these scholars 
 were able to agree further that there was a definite break 
 in style between the Theatetus and the whole group of 
-dialogues Which Campbell had called the late group. How- 
-ever, Taylor says that the stylometric tabulations, while 
+dialogues Which Campbell had called the late group. However, Taylor says that the stylometric tabulations, while 
 they could establish whole groups of dialogues which 
 shared a style, could not effectively establish the order 
 
@@ -1764,8 +1717,7 @@ effect that Timaeus speaks with an authoritative tone, and
 makes little use of the gently poetic questionings of 
 Socrates. Cornford also cites Ritter to the effect that 
 the fourth person of the Timaeys is left unknown, perhaps 
-because Plato wanted to keep open the possibility of writ- 
-ing a fourth dialogue in the series. © 
+because Plato wanted to keep open the possibility of writing a fourth dialogue in the series. © 
 
 
 34 Gornford, op, cit. 
@@ -1799,8 +1751,7 @@ groupings of dialogues, and the last group, composed of
 the Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, and 
 
 
-Laws, must be late because a "careful study of the differ- 
-ences in language and expression" creates an “indubitable 
+Laws, must be late because a "careful study of the differences in language and expression" creates an “indubitable 
 means of determining their genuineness as well as the 
 approximate date of their appearance." >° In addition, he 
 says that there are changes in style and writing which 
@@ -1820,8 +1771,7 @@ works.-? It 18 interesting to observe that when Zeller
 
 45 
 challenged Ritter to try the stylistic methods on a 7 
-modern writer's works, whose chronology could be independant- 
-ty verified, Ritter was able to arrive at the correct 
+modern writer's works, whose chronology could be independantty verified, Ritter was able to arrive at the correct 
 chronology of the works of Goethe, 40 
 
 Perhaps a summary of the stylistic controversy is 
@@ -1944,10 +1894,7 @@ and honorable tradition which regards the Timaeus as the
 
 work of Plato's old age, and that atylistic criteria, used 
 by a small but highly reputable number of Platonic scholars, 
-has brought about a condition of wide and detailed agree- 
-
-
-|ment that the Timaeus is Plato's work and that he wrote it 
+has brought about a condition of wide and detailed agreement that the Timaeus is Plato's work and that he wrote it 
 
 
 i 
@@ -2051,8 +1998,7 @@ It was during these travels that he also met Dion and
 Dionysius I. Plato was at this time fourty years old; Dion 
 was twenty and Dionysius forty-three, 99 
 
-Many years later, after the unfortunate and miscon- 
-ceived rivalry between Dion and Dionysius II, Plato was 
+Many years later, after the unfortunate and misconceived rivalry between Dion and Dionysius II, Plato was 
 
 
 sold into slavery at the island of Aegina but was soon 
@@ -2086,8 +2032,7 @@ again to Athens in 360. Three years later, Dion assembles
 an army and marches on Syracuse. He meets with some success 
 but is later assassinated. According to Ritter, 52 Plato 
 mourns with deeper grief than he had for Socrates, 
-although Ritter does not reveal the source of his informa- 
-tion. 
+although Ritter does not reveal the source of his information. 
 
 In 347, Plato dies. Ritter says: "To the end of his 
 
@@ -2195,8 +2140,7 @@ L a
 54 
 Letters. He cites a number of ancients who regarded the i 
 whole collection of Plato's letters as authentic, including 
-Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Lucian, Cicero, and Aristo- 
-phanes the grammarian of Alexandria.o? Although Jowett 58 
+Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Lucian, Cicero, and Aristophanes the grammarian of Alexandria.o? Although Jowett 58 
 followed Karsten 99 into the opinion that the entire lot 
 was spurious, Harward says that the increasingly wide use 
 of stylistic criteria soon dissipated the influence of their 
@@ -2385,10 +2329,7 @@ in this way peace and happiness will be introduced (327 d).
 This fitea in with Plato's desires not to be "only a man 
 of words" (328 aec) and, in addition, helps Plato to 
 prove to himself that he does no dishonor to philosophy by 
-inaction (329 a). However, Dionysius does not devote him- 
-
-
-self to philosophy. Moreover, Dion is perceived as a 
+inaction (329 a). However, Dionysius does not devote himself to philosophy. Moreover, Dion is perceived as a 
 
 
 59 
@@ -2489,8 +2430,7 @@ not save Dion from an unjust fate.
 
 To the claim of Dionysius that he was learning 
 philosophy from the one lesson Plato had given him and 
-that he was in fact producing learned treatises of origin- 
-ality and brilliance, Plato responds not only that his 
+that he was in fact producing learned treatises of originality and brilliance, Plato responds not only that his 
 philosophy can't be taught in a few lessons, but that its 
 deepest meanings cannot be taught at all, but must be 
 experienced as a fire which is enkindled in the soul 
@@ -2502,19 +2442,16 @@ after an arduous preliminary regimen in the company of
 
 62 
 
-teachers who have been so inflamed (341 d,e). - 
+teachers who have been so inflamed (341 d,e).
 
-If philosophy cannot be taught as a series of learn- 
-able propositions, how can one expect to learn it in 
+If philosophy cannot be taught as a series of learnable propositions, how can one expect to learn it in 
 writings and disquisitions? To bolster this argument and to 
 derive it from higher knowledge, Plato launches into a 
-short essay on the steps and stages on the way to philo-~ 
-sophical insight. There are, he says, three preliminary 
+short essay on the steps and stages on the way to philosophical insight. There are, he says, three preliminary 
 steps and two later stages through which philosophical 
 knowledge is imparted (342 a), o8 
 
-the "instruments" of this process are names, defin- 
-itions, and images (eidola). Names are notoriously flighty 
+the "instruments" of this process are names, definitions, and images (eidola). Names are notoriously flighty 
 and subject to the winds of change and fashion. Definitions 
 are frequently contradictory and refer to aspects which 
 shift. Images may be drawn and fashioned at will but what 
@@ -2773,8 +2710,7 @@ The conclusion that the Iimaeus is a late dialogue was
 
 
 reached by these scholars by utilizing several criteria, 
-including stylistic interpretations, biographical informa- 
-tion, agreement among some of the ancients, and certain 
+including stylistic interpretations, biographical information, agreement among some of the ancients, and certain 
 
 
 relevant information which Plato set down in his Seventh 
@@ -2795,8 +2731,7 @@ Timaeus.
 It is obviously impossible in these few pages to 
 present a detailed summary of all of the philosophical 
 doctrines which Plato treated in each of the dialogues to 
-be discussed. Therefore, only those themes which specific- 
-ally culminate in the Timaeus will be passed in review. 
+be discussed. Therefore, only those themes which specifically culminate in the Timaeus will be passed in review. 
 
 It 1s assumed that no significant distortion of Plato's 
 philosophy will be made by selecting three themes which 
@@ -2819,8 +2754,7 @@ The first problen, then, is to determine a logical
 point to begin our investigations. The Timaeus itself gives 
 
 
-us the starting point because it begins with a recapitula- 
-tion of certain themes in the Republic. This seems to be a 
+us the starting point because it begins with a recapitulation of certain themes in the Republic. This seems to be a 
 clear indication that the investigation of Plato's later 
 philosophy must include some sort of comparison with the 
 Republic and the doctrines of the so-called middle period. 
@@ -2859,11 +2793,9 @@ the late dialogues, it will be shown that the critique of
 the middle doctrines by the Parmenides and Theatetus had 
 
 
-brought Plato to the recognition of a need for new doctrin- 
-al formulations. Thus, it will not only clarify the doctrine 
+brought Plato to the recognition of a need for new doctrinal formulations. Thus, it will not only clarify the doctrine 
 of the Republic but it will shed light on the Sophist, 
-Statesman, and Philebus if we examine carefully the criti- 
-que made by the Parmenides and Theatetus. In this way, one 
+Statesman, and Philebus if we examine carefully the critique made by the Parmenides and Theatetus. In this way, one 
 May examine the sequence of doctrinal modifications which 
 Plato made as he matured, and one may discuss both the 
 doctrines and the doctrinal advances as one treats each 
@@ -2907,13 +2839,11 @@ Timaeus. For this reason, I prefer to call them themes and ;
 not terms or ideas or doctrines. 
 
 I have also made a methodological choice. It would 
-be possible to select the passages from each of the dialog- 
-ues which discuss eternity, image, and time, and by placing 
+be possible to select the passages from each of the dialogues which discuss eternity, image, and time, and by placing 
 them together, one could discuss each theme separately. But 
 there is another way, which seems more faithful to Plato's 
 own method, and that 18 to pass each dialogue in review, 
-and, in passing, point out those passages which are rele- 
-vant to the themes of eternity, image and time. This latter 
+and, in passing, point out those passages which are relevant to the themes of eternity, image and time. This latter 
 method has been adopted. 
 
 In the chapters which follow the present one, a more 
@@ -2958,8 +2888,7 @@ perfect, so that, instead of attempting to gaze directly
 on the Form of Justice, it will be better to adopt a 
 "shortsighted" method, namely, seeing Justice where it is 
 writ large, in the state (369 a). This will bring about an 
-unfortunate mutilation of pure vision, but it is inescap- 
-able. Moreover, it is a better method than the one adopted 
+unfortunate mutilation of pure vision, but it is inescapable. Moreover, it is a better method than the one adopted 
 by such “story tellers" as Hesiod and Homer who rather tell 
 lies than avoid distortion (377 e). These authors do not 
 realize that "children" do not know the difference between 
@@ -2979,8 +2908,7 @@ us that one encounters difficulty in attempting to reveal
 
 
 74 
-those truths which have been seen by one's excellent eye- 
-sight, to those with less than perfect vision. Images of 
+those truths which have been seen by one's excellent eyesight, to those with less than perfect vision. Images of 
 truth are, for such men, dangerous, and should be avoided. 
 
 Nevertheless, Plato does not stop the process of 
@@ -2998,8 +2926,7 @@ sighted method. He makes the decision to undertake a vision
 of Justice in the state despite his awareness that his 
 description of the state will only imperfectly incarnate 
 Justice in an image, which in this case, is an allegory (%9 
-a). The problem is that allegories only imperfectly imi- 
-tate the Form of Justice, which Plato tells us next in the 
+a). The problem is that allegories only imperfectly imitate the Form of Justice, which Plato tells us next in the 
 famous allegory of the guardians and their education. It 
 is necessary for the guardians to know the Forms, or else 
 their guidance shall be lacking in some perfection, yet 
@@ -3025,10 +2952,8 @@ and the “audacious fiction" (414 b). It is recognized that
 the sights of youth are like dreams, and that their 
 education is an acquaintance with “appearance,” but youth 
 ie in a process of formation in the womb of the earth. 
-Perhaps it might not be possible to so educate the guard- 
-ians in the first generation, but in the next, their sons 
-will probably adopt this view (415 b). Here Plato antici- 
-pates the difficulty that a new set of laws may not be 
+Perhaps it might not be possible to so educate the guardians in the first generation, but in the next, their sons 
+will probably adopt this view (415 b). Here Plato anticipates the difficulty that a new set of laws may not be 
 accepted with open arms by a generation of men, but the 
 need is great; new laws must be found and promulgated. Yet 
 the basis for new laws, i.e., a clear sight of the Forms, 
@@ -3055,8 +2980,7 @@ which we would call the method of gradual elimination.
 By presenting the given activities, which are presumed to 
 
 be known, and by eliminating all the unacceptable ones, 
-Plato arrives at a list of virtues which ought to character- 
-ize the guardians (428 a). (As we shall see, this method 
+Plato arrives at a list of virtues which ought to characterize the guardians (428 a). (As we shall see, this method 
 
 of residues is by no means the same as the method of 
 division in the Sophist). Then, by eliminating lesser 
@@ -3136,18 +3060,14 @@ division of labor in a society, showing that each man who
 fulfills his appointed task is just only insofar as he does 
 not encroach upon the appointed task of another. To do what 
 another ought to do is a double injustice, both to oneself 
-and to the other. The solidarity of the “imaginary common- 
-wealth" (456 d) rests on this Justice, and, in the same way, 
-the soul of the man who tries to cross his line of respon- 
-sibility will be unjust. The relation of these divided 
+and to the other. The solidarity of the “imaginary commonwealth" (456 d) rests on this Justice, and, in the same way, 
+the soul of the man who tries to cross his line of responsibility will be unjust. The relation of these divided 
 responsibilities is injustice. We must assume this to be 
 so, for we are reminded that the allegorical investigation 
 of the Form of Justice is like dreamers feasting on a 
-dream, and that the state here investigated is "“imagin- 
-ary (458 a)." 
+dream, and that the state here investigated is "“imaginary (458 a)." 
 
-Does unity, achieved by the harmony of each indivi- 
-dual (soul or class) performing his one task, really work. 
+Does unity, achieved by the harmony of each individual (soul or class) performing his one task, really work. 
 "The inquiry has yet to be made whether such a community 
 will be found possible...and in what way...(471 c)." 
 
@@ -3169,8 +3089,7 @@ the immutable and the eternal, and only this is rightly
 called knowledge (478 e). this sort of knowledge and this 
 sort alone should characterize the philosopher-king, and 
 all those who deal in opinions about the Justice of this 
-or that or the Beauty of this or that occupy some inter- 
-mediary region which will not fit them for ruling, nor for 
+or that or the Beauty of this or that occupy some intermediary region which will not fit them for ruling, nor for 
 introducing into the atate the least change which will 
 make it a just state. Only knowledge of the eternal and 
 immutable is knowledge. And yet, as Galileo remarked in 
@@ -3326,8 +3245,7 @@ and opinions (510 a). In the intelligible realm, images
 function as hypotheses, suggesting but not confirming 
 the Forms and the ideas. 
 
-Perhaps the most famous of all philosophical allegor- 
-4es is the next image which Socrates presents, the allegory 
+Perhaps the most famous of all philosophical allegories is the next image which Socrates presents, the allegory 
 of the cave (514 a). We are told that the divided line can 
 be seen more concretely in the cave allegory. Going from 
 the lowest to the highest of knowledge, we first have 
@@ -3448,11 +3366,9 @@ can give to this subject.
 
 Plato resorts once again to an image of the soul, 
 but this time it 1s an ideal image, the best possible. 
-The soul is pictured as consisting of one part polycepha- 
-lous beast, one part lion, and one part man (588 c), just 
+The soul is pictured as consisting of one part polycephalous beast, one part lion, and one part man (588 c), just 
 as the state consists of three classes, one of knowledge, 
-one of ambition, and one of money (580 da). Having discover- 
-ed this as a result of the inquiry into the state as the 
+one of ambition, and one of money (580 da). Having discovered this as a result of the inquiry into the state as the 
 image of the justice of the soul, Socrates says now that 
 the ideal city is a pattern laid up in heaven, and “he who 
 desires may behold this, and beholding, govern himself 
@@ -3533,8 +3449,7 @@ they would enjoy in their next mortal period on earth.
 The more interesting feature of this myth is the 
 description of the stars and planets spinning in their 
 relative spheres around the spindle of Necessity; the 
-Fates, daughters of Necessity, may interrupt these revolu- 
-tions momentarily or give them direction. The fates 
+Fates, daughters of Necessity, may interrupt these revolutions momentarily or give them direction. The fates 
 represent the tenses of time, one for the present, one 
 for the past, and one for the future. Here is the circular 
 
@@ -3557,8 +3472,7 @@ us that the number of souls must be a constant, and the
 careers of men are predetermined by their former lives. 
 How could the experience of such a realm elude our conscious 
 thought in the mortal portion of life? We are told that the 
-souls must drink of the "waters of forgetfulness and negli- 
-gence" before they return to a mortal abode (621 a). 
+souls must drink of the "waters of forgetfulness and negligence" before they return to a mortal abode (621 a). 
 
 this is a strange metaphor, especially when coupled 
 with the doctrine of reminiscence, or with the description 
@@ -3602,8 +3516,7 @@ its resolution.
 Summary of the Republic 
 
 We have seen that the Republic presents an attempt to 
-gain insight into the eternal realm through the investiga- 
-tion of Justice as it is in the state, that this is an 
+gain insight into the eternal realm through the investigation of Justice as it is in the state, that this is an 
 allegorical attempt to see the Form of justice in the soul, 
 and in that way to see Justice itself. However, we are told 
 repeatedly that one needs good vision for this, and that not 
@@ -3623,8 +3536,7 @@ on myths which are like the truth but are not the truth.
 They bring us close to the truth but not close enough. 
 The height and distance of the Forms is the reason for this 
 difficulty, and it is only partially diminished by the use 
-of imagery, which is unfortunately always changing, becom- 
-ing, and passing away. We must have the truth as it is, 
+of imagery, which is unfortunately always changing, becoming, and passing away. We must have the truth as it is, 
 yet we cannot, for the realms of eternity and time are too 
 discrete. While time derives from necessity, the Forms 
 derive from eternity, and images constitute an in-between 
@@ -3636,11 +3548,9 @@ Theatetus must be placed midway between the middle and the
 
 
 late dialogues. If it is true that Plato gradually develop= 
-ed his doctrines, one should expect to find in the Parmen- 
-ides some criticism of the Form-theory as it was developed 
+ed his doctrines, one should expect to find in the Parmenides some criticism of the Form-theory as it was developed 
 in the Republic, and some sort of further development of 
-doctrine. In order to present the details of this hypothe- 
-sized development, it is now necessary to examine the 
+doctrine. In order to present the details of this hypothesized development, it is now necessary to examine the 
 
 
 doctrines of the Parmenides which pertain to the themes of 
@@ -3714,8 +3624,7 @@ While these two methods have much in common, they are
 obviously not identical. 
 
 The eight hypotheses which Plato discusses in the 
-Parmenides are not equally relevant to the themes of etern- 
-ity, image and time, so that the short summary of the 
+Parmenides are not equally relevant to the themes of eternity, image and time, so that the short summary of the 
 doctrine of the Parmenides which follows should not be 
 regarded as an attempt to summarize the entire significance 
 of the dialogue. 
@@ -3734,8 +3643,7 @@ assertion of the existence of the One. The basis for this
 assertion of absurdity is the statement that the many 
 would have to be both like and unlike, and that therefore 
 the Like would be Unlike and the Unlike Like, i.e., since 
-there are both like and unlike things, both Like and Un- 
-like would have to be said of them (127 e). 
+there are both like and unlike things, both Like and Unlike would have to be said of them (127 e). 
 
 Socrates asks whether it is possible to assert that 
 there is a Form of Like and a Form of Unlike, and that, 
@@ -3745,8 +3653,7 @@ things will only share in these Forms and will not have to
 be both like and unlike in themselves (129 a). While it 
 would not be difficult to think that things shared in the 
 Forms in this dual way, it would of course be impossible to 
-assert that the idea of Like and the idea of Unlike them- 
-selves shared in a dual way in some higher Form, A thing 
+assert that the idea of Like and the idea of Unlike themselves shared in a dual way in some higher Form, A thing 
 might participate in the One and in the Many and in that 
 way it could share in both of them without being both of 
 them, and thus different from itself. In the same way, 
@@ -3754,8 +3661,7 @@ things could share in both Rest and Motion, Same and
 Different, and other pairs of opposites (129 e). 
 
 Parmenides and Zeno smile in admiration at this 
-view, as if they were amused at the craft of this philo- 
-sophical child named Socrates, who, at the time of this 
+view, as if they were amused at the craft of this philosophical child named Socrates, who, at the time of this 
 dialogue, 1s said to be no more than twenty years old (130). 
 
 
@@ -3780,9 +3686,7 @@ sometimes get disturbed and begin to think that
 there is nothing without an idea; but then again 
 when I have taken this position, I run away, 
 
-because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottonm- 
-
-less pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to 
+because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottonmless pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to 
 
 the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and 
 
@@ -3891,8 +3795,7 @@ of the One and the Many, Rest and Motion, Like and Unlike,
 Generation and Destruction (136 b). 
 
 Notice the characteristics of this method. The 
-existence and the non-existence, Rest and Motion, Genera- 
-tion and Destruction, are to be tested. Both sides of the 
+existence and the non-existence, Rest and Motion, Generation and Destruction, are to be tested. Both sides of the 
 argument are to be followed. Nowhere has the question yet 
 been asked whether there are two sides. It is assumed. As 
 we shall see, it is this assumption of a dualism running 
@@ -3926,8 +3829,7 @@ time is set forth as follows:
 The One cannot be older, or younger, or the same age 
 as itself, because that would imply Likeness, which it was 
 shown not to have (140 a). Therefore it cannot exist in 
-time at all (141 a). “And if the One 1s without participa- 
-tion in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was 
+time at all (141 a). “And if the One 1s without participation in time, it never has become, or was becoming, or was 
 at any former time, or has now become or is becoming, or is 
 or will become, or will have become or will be hereafter." 
 
@@ -3947,25 +3849,20 @@ or will become, or will have become or will be hereafter."
 
 " I think not" (142 a). 
 
-The result of the first hypothesis is clear: start- 
-ing on the assumption of the One as unrelated, it follows 
+The result of the first hypothesis is clear: starting on the assumption of the One as unrelated, it follows 
 that nothing can be said about it, not even that it is 
 One. Assuming the logic to be impeccable, the hypothesis 
 leads to its own contradiction. Such an hypothesis is 
 untenable. Therefore, all the things which we tried to 
 predicate of it, and found ourselves unable to predicate of 
 it, are not predicable of it @f it 18 what we assumed it to 
-be), that is, unrelated. If it is unrelated, it is unspeak- 
-ably other. Therefore, we must seek for other ways to 
+be), that is, unrelated. If it is unrelated, it is unspeakably other. Therefore, we must seek for other ways to 
 speak intelligently about it. 
 
 Here is the first clear attempt to close the gap 
 
 
-between the unreachably eternal and the irrevocably tempor- 
-
-
-al, a gap which 1s now clearly faced and admitted to 
+between the unreachably eternal and the irrevocably temporal, a gap which 1s now clearly faced and admitted to 
 
 
 te 
@@ -4018,8 +3915,7 @@ becoming, 1s becoming, and will be becoming. “And, if we
 are right in all this, then there is an opinion and science 
 and perception of the One" (155 da). 
 
-Two conclusions may be drawn from the second hypo- 
-thesis. First, the One, by hypothesis, is no longer so 
+Two conclusions may be drawn from the second hypothesis. First, the One, by hypothesis, is no longer so 
 separate and so isolated that nothing can be known or said 
 of it, so that it is now said to be in time and becoming, 
 and not in time and becoming. Second, it is, by the same 
@@ -4034,11 +3930,9 @@ the final doctrine of the Parmenides.
 In the first hypothesis, the One was indivisibly One 
 and nothing could be said or known of it. In the second 
 hypothesis, the One is divisible and therefore, everything 
-can be said and known of it. But this is nor more satisfac- 
-tory than before. Previously, we avoided contradictory 
+can be said and known of it. But this is nor more satisfactory than before. Previously, we avoided contradictory 
 predications at the expense of knowledge; now, we have 
-knowledge, but it pays the price of contradictory predica- 
-tions. Since it ia no more helpful to say everything of it 
+knowledge, but it pays the price of contradictory predications. Since it ia no more helpful to say everything of it 
 
 
 than it is to say nothing of it, another way must be found 
@@ -4120,19 +4014,13 @@ be asserted, and we are back to hypothesis I where we can
 neither affirm nor deny anything of the One. However, this 
 philosophical gymnastic has not been unfruitful. We know 
 now that the need to make intelligent statements about 
-the One is not satisfied by assuming that it is a complete- 
-ly separate One. We know that we cannot say that it is 
+the One is not satisfied by assuming that it is a completely separate One. We know that we cannot say that it is 
 completely divided, for then it is really a Two. And we 
 know that we cannot insert the instant between the One and 
 the Two in order to fasten predicates on either end and 
 allow the middle to be the transition, for then the middle 
 ie neither One nor Two. 
-
-I hope it does no violence to the spirit of philoso- 
-phical continuity to say at this juncture that the remain- 
-
-
-der of the Parmenides may be briefly summarized. The 
+I hope it does no violence to the spirit of philosophical continuity to say at this juncture that the remainder of the Parmenides may be briefly summarized. The 
 
 
 Parmenides does not attempt to solve its problem within 
@@ -4163,8 +4051,7 @@ point will be pursued at some length in the Philebus). The
 
 
 sixth hypothesis examines the characteristic of the Other 
-insofar as it is only other. The seventh hypothesis consid- 
-ers the result of assuming the existence of the many 
+insofar as it is only other. The seventh hypothesis considers the result of assuming the existence of the many 
 without assuming the existence of the One. This is said to 
 result in mere opinion, which is inadequate precisely 
 insofar as it sees only the many as many and ignores the 
@@ -4176,14 +4063,12 @@ Summary
 
 I would like to summarize the doctrine of the 
 Parmenides insofar as it pertains to the hypothesis of this 
-study. It is, I think, an examination of the naive assump- 
-tion that the realm of the Forms in its bare unrelated 
+study. It is, I think, an examination of the naive assumption that the realm of the Forms in its bare unrelated 
 purity renders intelligent predication, and therefore, all 
 intelligent discourse, impossible. It asks how and in 
 what way we may both speak of the Forms and speak of 
 appearances without separating their respective realms. 
-It states that the realms are related (in some way-hypo- 
-thesis III) but it never really reveals this way with any 
+It states that the realms are related (in some way-hypothesis III) but it never really reveals this way with any 
 precision or clarity. 
 
 
@@ -4234,8 +4119,7 @@ This dialogue sets itself the problem of examining
 knowledge, and asks itself to answer such questions as 
 
 "do we know," “how do we know," and "are there kinds of 
-knowledge.” Where the Parmeyides focused on the consequen- 
-ces of hypothesizing that the realm of Forms is completely 
+knowledge.” Where the Parmeyides focused on the consequences of hypothesizing that the realm of Forms is completely 
 
 
 separated from the realm of things, the Theatetus inquires 
@@ -4260,10 +4144,7 @@ of the dialogue. It is the business of the following
 comments to focus on the significance of the problem of 
 knowledge and the attendant problem of error to show that 
 the Theatetus constitutes something of an advance over the 
-Parmenides precisely because it takes some of the conclu- 
-
-
-sions of the Parmenides into account. 
+Parmenides precisely because it takes some of the conclusions of the Parmenides into account. 
 
 
 Theatetus suggests that knowledge is perception (151e). 
@@ -4308,8 +4189,7 @@ out altogether" (157 b). All is flux, each is flux.
 Socrates wants to make sure that the point has been firmly 
 made so he asks: “Once more, then, tell me whether you 
 like this notion that nothing is but is always becoming 
-good, or beautiful, or any of the other things we mention- 
-ed" (157 a). 
+good, or beautiful, or any of the other things we mentioned" (157 a). 
 
 The bearing these questions have on the three themes 
 of eternity, image, and time which we are pursuing is, 
@@ -4323,19 +4203,15 @@ ibriefly, this; perception deals with appearance and the
 
 world of appearance is a fluxion in which all things are 
 becoming. Therefore, the forms cannot be located in a 
-completely separate eternal realm which guarantees know- 
-ledge. Yet we seem to know. The question is, are the images 
-which perception furnishes us true because they are nei- 
-ther eternal nor mere appearance? Plato is again posing 
+completely separate eternal realm which guarantees knowledge. Yet we seem to know. The question is, are the images 
+which perception furnishes us true because they are neither eternal nor mere appearance? Plato is again posing 
 
 the problem: how can the visible world participate in the 
 eternal world? In the Theatetus, the question becomes: do 
-the images which perception gives us make possible a know- 
-ledge of the eternal? . 
+the images which perception gives us make possible a knowledge of the eternal? . 
 
 Socrates reminds us that the "men of flux" constitute 
-only one group, which is opposed by another group, consist- 
-ing of Parmenides and Melissus, who hold that “all things 
+only one group, which is opposed by another group, consisting of Parmenides and Melissus, who hold that “all things 
 are a unity which stays still by itself, having no room to 
 move in. How are we to deal with all these combatants? For, 
 little by little, our advance has brought us, without our 
@@ -4380,8 +4256,7 @@ comparison with another, by the mind, when it reflects
 upon the past and present with an eye to the future" (186a). 
 Such reflections upon perception only come, if they come at 
 all, to those who go through a long and troublesome process 
-of education (186 c). For, if one cannot reach the exis- 
-tence of a thing, he cannot reach the truth (186 c). 
+of education (186 c). For, if one cannot reach the existence of a thing, he cannot reach the truth (186 c). 
 Welcome as it seems, this statement only pushes the 
 difficulty further back. If the mind's reflection on 
 itself is like two voices of the mind speaking to each 
@@ -4446,8 +4321,7 @@ the same thing" (196 c).
 
 Socrates reminds Theatetus that the whole conversa~ 
 tion assumes both that we know, and that we do not know, 
-what we say. If we do not assume that we can know, converga- 
-tion is impossible (197 a); If we do not assume that we may 
+what we say. If we do not assume that we can know, convergation is impossible (197 a); If we do not assume that we may 
 not know, all knowledge is infallible. 
 
 Another allegory is introduced to supplement the 
@@ -4483,18 +4357,14 @@ until the letters were combined in just that fashion; it
 4s a one after its parts become parts of it (204 a). Here 
 
 
-is another recapitulation of the arguments of the Parmen- 
-
-
-ides. It is the same with number: a sum is not a sum 
+is another recapitulation of the arguments of the Parmenides. It is the same with number: a sum is not a sum 
 until its component integers are added, and only thereafter 
 is it one sum (204 e). But this 1s the distinction to be 
 made (as it was made in the Parmenides): the whole consists 
 of the parts; not just any parts, considered in themselves, 
 as unrelated ones, but parts as related. In other words, 
 the difficulty is only apparent, and it vanishes as soon 
-as we see that the whole and the parts are not two differ- 
-ent things in isolation but related aspect of a One (205 b). 
+as we see that the whole and the parts are not two different things in isolation but related aspect of a One (205 b). 
 
 To conclude, then; if, on the one hand, the 
 
@@ -4528,8 +4398,7 @@ Perhaps marking off a thing and distinguishing it from all
 others constitutes a good account (208 d). An account will 
 then mean putting the thing's "difference" into words. (209a) 
 But Socrates quickly shows that we must first know the 
-common to distinguish the different, which begs the ques- 
-tion of knowledge. (209 e) Therefore it does not seem true 
+common to distinguish the different, which begs the question of knowledge. (209 e) Therefore it does not seem true 
 to say that knowledge is opinion with an account of 
 difference, unless we already know the common on the basis 
 of which we distinguish the difference. (Although this is 
@@ -4586,8 +4455,7 @@ with itself, and that this internal dialogue consists of
 the attempt to put images and reflection on the past, 
 present, and future in their right order. We have advanced 
 far beyond the naive view that the mind is a static camera 
-whose job it is to escape the transient shadows of percep- 
-tion in a flight to eternal forms. We are now told that it 
+whose job it is to escape the transient shadows of perception in a flight to eternal forms. We are now told that it 
 
 
 1 : 
@@ -4604,21 +4472,18 @@ that the steps and hypotheses of the Theatetus are no
 
 
 longer regarded as inferior but as necessary preliminaries 
-in the “long way” which the mind must take to true know- 
-ledge. 
+in the “long way” which the mind must take to true knowledge. 
 
 Somehow, we have found, not what knowledge is, but 
 what complete knowledge is not. This insight, namely, that 
 somehow what is not, in some way, must be included in what 
 is, will be examined in the next dialogue, the Sophist, 
 which can, from certain points of view, be regarded as a 
-triumphant breakthrough into another whole way of philoso- 
-phizing. 
+triumphant breakthrough into another whole way of philosophizing. 
 
 The Sophist 
 
-We enter now into the series of dialogues unanimous- 
-ly regarded as the late group, in which Plato's evolved 
+We enter now into the series of dialogues unanimously regarded as the late group, in which Plato's evolved 
 reflections are to be found. The Sophist begins with a 
 dramatic introduction which includes the participants of the 
 Theatetus, but now we meet an additional person, an Eleatic 
@@ -4637,9 +4502,7 @@ seemed to the men of flux to presume knowledge, not to
 seek it. (This point will be expanded in the Statesman). 
 
 
-The Stranger does not allude to this hypothetical difficul- 
-ty, and he employs the method without question. This con- 
-firms the hint that we are now to inspect the heritage of 
+The Stranger does not allude to this hypothetical difficulty, and he employs the method without question. This confirms the hint that we are now to inspect the heritage of 
 
 
 the Parmenides, not in the manner of the Theatetus, nor 
@@ -4659,8 +4522,7 @@ an undefined reality.
 The definition of the Angler is reached, and the 
 method of "halving" is satisfactorily put to the test. 
 What is of special interest to us here is the difference 
-between this kind of division, and the method of elimina- 
-tion which Plato had previously used in the Republic. 
+between this kind of division, and the method of elimination which Plato had previously used in the Republic. 
 
 In the sort of dividing which Plato accomplishes here, it 
 4a necessary for the divider to proceed very carefully and 
@@ -4711,8 +4573,7 @@ definition of the Sophist, then, is a case in point: we
 are to investigate this partisuien gentleman, as we 
 investigated the Angler, in order to discover how reality 
 is, and what appearance seems to be; in the language of 
-this study, how the eternal forms are related to the tempor- 
-al world. 
+this study, how the eternal forms are related to the temporal world. 
 
 The Stranger asserts that the Sophist is an imitator, 
 and that sufficient division of the imitative art will 
@@ -4748,8 +4609,7 @@ cannot say it, we are saying it (238 c). This is the dark
 hole into which the Sophist retreats when we try to refute 
 him, for, if we say that an opinion of his is false, we 
 assert that it 4s-not true, and in so doing, we assert 
-that it isenot, and he therby chides us on this contra- 
-diction (239 a). This is precisely what happens if we ask 
+that it isenot, and he therby chides us on this contradiction (239 a). This is precisely what happens if we ask 
 him what an image is. "How can I describe an image except 
 as another made in the likeness of the true" (240 a). But 
 1f it is other than the true, it is other than what is, and 
@@ -4764,8 +4624,7 @@ notebeing is, and being is-not.
 The Stranger then says that the predicament in which 
 they now find themselvea is due to the fact that the former 
 philosophers treated their hearers with disdain, as if 
-dealing with children. They followed their arguments where- 
-ever they led and left the children to wonder at their 
+dealing with children. They followed their arguments whereever they led and left the children to wonder at their 
 meanings, because they spoke in myths, among which he 
 classes the One and the Many (242 e), the myths of strife 
 
@@ -4794,8 +4653,7 @@ than being, i.e., notebeing (245 a).
 The materialists who claim that only the tangible 
 exists are then subjected to a critique. Their opponents 
 are also brought forward, and these are the "friends of the 
-Forms," who disolve tangible realities in a sea of corrup- 
-tion and generation. None of these schools, Plato tells us, 
+Forms," who disolve tangible realities in a sea of corruption and generation. None of these schools, Plato tells us, 
 are able to deal intelligently with the question now before 
 them: the question of notebeing. Having reached this point, 
 Plato can no longer choose from existing alternatives. The 
@@ -4835,9 +4693,7 @@ be no knowledge at all. So there must be motion in knowing.
 "and, Oh Heavens, can we ever be made to believe that 
 motion and life and soul and mind are not present with 
 Being. Can we imagine Being to be devoid of life and mind, 
-and to remain in awful unmeaning and everlasting fix- 
-
-ture" (248 e)? Clearly, they cannot. Therefore, "We must 
+and to remain in awful unmeaning and everlasting fixture" (248 e)? Clearly, they cannot. Therefore, "We must 
 include motion under being, and that which is moved" (249b). 
 
 
@@ -4848,8 +4704,7 @@ As we shall see, this is an important anticipation
 of the Timaeus. And yet, if all things are in motion, there 
 can be no sameness or permanence or relation to the same. 
 The philosopher must be equally deaf to those who say all 
-is in motion and to those who say there is no motion. Some- 
-OWNS must have both, yet somehow we can have neither 
+is in motion and to those who say there is no motion. Somehow, we must have both, yet somehow we can have neither 
 alone. Further, if we have only a third, this third will 
 not be either nor will it be both (250 b). 
 
@@ -4980,8 +4835,7 @@ knows that he imitates genuinely, is not a Sophist, but a
 philosopher. It is the Sophist who imitates fantasies. 
 Summary 
 
-What have we learned from this dialogue, with refer- 
-ence to the themes of eternity, image, and time. Obviously, 
+What have we learned from this dialogue, with reference to the themes of eternity, image, and time. Obviously, 
 the most significant doctrinal advances were made with 
 respect to images, where we learn that their production is 
 both a human and a divine art. But more deeply, it has 
@@ -5019,16 +4873,14 @@ dialectical search for the definition of the Statesman,
 utilizing the method of division developed in the Sophist. 
 But, the Eleatic Stranger now cautions the hearers not to 
 divide arbitrarily and too quickly, but to make sure that 
-the divisions they follow in the argument are real divis- 
-ions into real classes, and not arbitrary divisions for 
+the divisions they follow in the argument are real divisions into real classes, and not arbitrary divisions for 
 which names are invented. 
 
 The general point deserves to be underscored. Plato 
 is reminding us that division which proceeds only in haste 
 to reach a fore-ordained conclusion is sophistic. Such a 
 division ignores the fact, established in the Sophist, that 
-not all classes communicate with each other, and so divis- 
-ion must follow the lines which mark off real classes from 
+not all classes communicate with each other, and so division must follow the lines which mark off real classes from 
 fantasies. "We must not attempt too general a division of 
 the class..." (263 e). "More haste...(means)...less 
 speed" (264 b). It is especially necessary to draw out 
@@ -5130,8 +4982,7 @@ god again beholds it, and seeing its time of trouble, again
 resumes the helm. 
 
 But we are not now in the era of Kronos. It has now 
-been ordained that the universe must take sole responsibil- 
-ity for its course, and, following and imitating the change 
+been ordained that the universe must take sole responsibility for its course, and, following and imitating the change 
 in the universe, all things have to change, and, in 
 
 
@@ -5233,8 +5084,7 @@ skillful handling of both the warp and the woof of being,
 or, as we saw in the Sophist, the correet analysis of 
 being and not-being. It is noteworthy that the Stranger 
 here, as he did in the Sophist, agrees to supply the 
-divisions, or else the argument would have become intermin- 
-able. Here 1s another hint that he who uses the method of 
+divisions, or else the argument would have become interminable. Here 1s another hint that he who uses the method of 
 division must know in advance where he is going, a point 
 which the men of flux advanced. But, instead of confronting 
 
@@ -5250,8 +5100,7 @@ It is quickly ascertained that if the greater is
 greater only by relation to the smaller, and the smaller is 
 smaller only by relation to the greater, there is no way 
 to say what is right in itself (283 e). Therefore, there 
-must be a standard of wieaeuse to which they both approxi- 
-mate in some way. (And so the Forms are reasserted). In the 
+must be a standard of wieaeuse to which they both approximate in some way. (And so the Forms are reasserted). In the 
 same manner, if there were no standard, there would be no 
 way of dividing the unjust from the just man, nor, for 
 that matter, would it be possible to discern the right 
@@ -5304,8 +5153,7 @@ of nature clear for all to look upon (285 e).
 In short, the classes of being have images, but being 
 itself does not. The important political corollary of this 
 becomes evident in the Stranger's description of the 
-unlikelihood of the many ever achieving the art of state- 
-craft, since the true science of statecraft is like the 
+unlikelihood of the many ever achieving the art of statecraft, since the true science of statecraft is like the 
 true science of being: it has no images, and it would be 
 quite out of the question to look for fifty kings at any 
 one time (292 e). 
@@ -5603,10 +5451,7 @@ unanimity with which the scholars agree that the Statesman
 succeeds the Sophist 1s not had in the placement of the 
 
 
-Philebus after the Statesman. It seems now that the Phile- 
-
-
-bus can be read more intelligently by placing it after the 
+Philebus after the Statesman. It seems now that the Philebus can be read more intelligently by placing it after the 
 Statesman but before the Timaeus, but we shall have to see 
 whether this is true after reading the Timaeus. 
 
@@ -5618,8 +5463,7 @@ is summoned here in the Philebus to do service in the
 
 quest for the nature of pleasure and the nature of wisdom. 
 We have seen that Plato regards Unity as the dialectical 
-opposite of infinity, which, for him, means the indetermin- 
-ite vagueness or an unspecific description of an element, 
+opposite of infinity, which, for him, means the indeterminite vagueness or an unspecific description of an element, 
 without some account of its manner of relation to its 
 fellows. In this respect, it is striking to note a brief 
 allegory of the god Theuth, whom the Egyptians describe as 
@@ -5629,8 +5473,7 @@ the author and divider and enumerator of sounds in music
 and grammar (18 ad). As we shall see, the Timaeus will test 
 
 
-the method of division on a cosmic scale in a tale similar- 
-ly attributed to an Egyptian priest. 
+the method of division on a cosmic scale in a tale similarly attributed to an Egyptian priest. 
 In any event, the problem now is not merely to 
 
 
@@ -5641,8 +5484,7 @@ assert the unity and the infinity of number, or pleasure,
 
 
 or wisdom, but to ascertain the kinds of each, and, by 
-implication, the Unity, Likeness, Sameness and the oppo- 
-sites in everything (19 b). Whereas Socrates once preferred 
+implication, the Unity, Likeness, Sameness and the opposites in everything (19 b). Whereas Socrates once preferred 
 to discuss the Forms and to avoid the realm of things, he 
 does not fear to enter into this latter problem now, 
 because, just at this instant, some god appears to have 
@@ -5661,8 +5503,7 @@ pleasure or pain would be unfeeling. Therefore, somehow we
 must have both in a union, which is a kind of third (22 a). 
 But, on this account, neither pleasure nor wisdom can be 
 the good, which was decided (at 19) to be the most perfect. 
-Socrates exempts divine mind from this refutation, admitt- 
-ing only that human minds are excluded from exclusive 
+Socrates exempts divine mind from this refutation, admitting only that human minds are excluded from exclusive 
 posession of the Good (22 c). For, the divine mind may 
 turn out to be the cause of the three, and, in that case, 
 4t will be a fourth. There may even be a fifth, but that 
@@ -5677,8 +5518,7 @@ admitting of degrees, and this is an endless business
 because such measures suggest no way to establish a stable 
 measure. Thus, the class of all such comparatives includes 
 an infinite, i.e., an unlimited number. However, the class 
-of unnumbered things itself is the unity of such compara- 
-tives (25 a). On the other hand, its opposite, the class of 
+of unnumbered things itself is the unity of such comparatives (25 a). On the other hand, its opposite, the class of 
 all numbered things, admits quantity and is therefore 
 finite, or limited, and here too, the class itself is the 
 unity of these (25 b). 
@@ -5754,24 +5594,20 @@ le
 which elements correspond to which elements, but it is 
 clear that mind corresponds to fire, both in us and in the 
 universe, It goes without too much comment that this 
-doctrine goes beyond a simple Heracliteanism or Pythagore- 
-anism or Anaxagoreanism, or Anaximanders3anism. It is, in 
+doctrine goes beyond a simple Heracliteanism or Pythagoreanism or Anaxagoreanism, or Anaximanders3anism. It is, in 
 my view, the seed of the more exact and detailed view 
 
 
 which we shall find in the Timaeus. 
 
 
-In the remainder of the dialogue, there is a delin- 
-eation and cross comparison of the types of pleasure and - 
-pain, including the cognate emotions, and desires. It would 
+In the remainder of the dialogue, there is a delineation and cross comparison of the types of pleasure and pain, including the cognate emotions, and desires. It would 
 be tempting to enter into a detailed commentary on this 
 section of Plato's philosophy to show some of its origins 
 or that certain doctrines of the modern giants of depth 
 psychology are deeply in Plato's debt. However, our purpose 
 here is to trace three themes insofar as Plato treats them 
-explicitly. Perhaps a short summary will not be too defic- 
-ient. 
+explicitly. Perhaps a short summary will not be too deficient. 
 
 Just as there are four classes of elements which 
 enter into the composition of the body and of the universe, 
@@ -5790,8 +5626,7 @@ What is significant for our purposes is the treatment of
 memory and perception. We saw in the Sophist and the 
 Statesman that certain images could be false while others 
 could be true. In the realm of feeling, the feelings 
-attendant upon true or false images will be corresponding- 
-ly true or false. Thus Plato develops the significant 
+attendant upon true or false images will be correspondingly true or false. Thus Plato develops the significant 
 ethical dictum that pleasures (or pains or emotions) 
 though felt, may be false. We meet again the artist in the 
 soul (imagination) which sometimes correctly and sometimes 
@@ -5957,8 +5792,7 @@ evolution, such a treatment will have to synthesize all
 that has gone before, in a way which will not excise any 
 real progress made before it. This means that there will 
 have to be a discussion of the psychology of knowledge as 
-well as a cosmology of being, and that these two preponder- 
-ant interests will have to be united in a way which spells 
+well as a cosmology of being, and that these two preponderant interests will have to be united in a way which spells 
 out their intimate relation. This is exactly what the 
 
 
@@ -6060,21 +5894,17 @@ Socrates opens the dialogue. His discussion of
 "yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"” of some of the doctrines 
 of the Republic, (books II-VI) namely, the description of 
 the farmers, craftsmen, and guardians who make up the 
-"best form of society” (17c). The occupational specializa- 
-tion which alloted one and only one role to each individual 
+"best form of society” (17c). The occupational specialization which alloted one and only one role to each individual 
 citizen because he was best fitted for one and only one 
-role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversa- 
-tion." The statement is made that this brief recapitulation 
+role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversation." The statement is made that this brief recapitulation 
 leaves nothing out and is an exact description of the 
 contents of yesterday's conversation. Thus, one should 
 not conclude that this recapitulation includes the entire 
 contents of the Republic, for this would create a manifest 
 contradiction. The Republic conprises ten books, much of 
-which are not recapitulated here. Quite obviously, some- 
-thing has been left out, and Socrates implies clearly that 
+which are not recapitulated here. Quite obviously, something has been left out, and Socrates implies clearly that 
 he intends to discuss only those doctrines which he has 
-summarized above. One might add, however, that the recapit~- 
-ulation does deal with those doctrines of the Republic 
+summarized above. One might add, however, that the recapitulation does deal with those doctrines of the Republic 
 which are central to the whole dialogue, namely, the 
 
 
@@ -6132,8 +5962,7 @@ Socrates does not usually speak of genuine imitation, for
 this sort of imitation is introduced by the Stranger in the 
 Sophist. Just as the Sophists move about from city to city 
 too often, and do not remain in any one city long enough to: 
-become familiar with it, so Socrates is said to be unfamil- 
-iar with the matters about to be discussed. Plato seems to 
+become familiar with it, so Socrates is said to be unfamiliar with the matters about to be discussed. Plato seems to 
 say here in the gentlest way that he has great respect for 
 his old teacher but that Socrates' viewpoint is not the 
 most fruitful one for his present concern. 
@@ -6181,12 +6010,10 @@ the need for one).
 
 Thus, the story of ancient Athens was not lost only 
 because Solon did not have time to write it but also 
-because of the intervention of a catastrophe which destroy- 
-ed the actors in the drama. Solon says, however, that 
+because of the intervention of a catastrophe which destroyed the actors in the drama. Solon says, however, that 
 when he himself was travelling in Egypt, he was received 
 with great respect, because the Egyptian priests who knew 
-the ancient history of Athens claimed that there is a kin- 
-ship between Athenians and Egyptians, and they even said 
+the ancient history of Athens claimed that there is a kinship between Athenians and Egyptians, and they even said 
 that the name of their own city-god is the Egyptian word 
 for Athena (21e). Solon was of course interested to hear 
 
@@ -6221,12 +6048,10 @@ Theatetus (175) Socrates himself chides Theatetus for his
 youthful impatience. Plato used this form of criticism 
 increasingly in the late dialogues, during which he came 
 to realize that a certain maturity is prerequisite for 
-right philosophy. Now we are told that no amount of indi- 
-vidual or personal maturity is of consequence for the 
+right philosophy. Now we are told that no amount of individual or personal maturity is of consequence for the 
 Greeks, for collectively they are all children. Here is a 
 very definite indication that the sort of knowledge which 
-Timaeus will put forward is not reachable by that hereto- 
-fore most favored of philosophical paths, the doctrine of 
+Timaeus will put forward is not reachable by that heretofore most favored of philosophical paths, the doctrine of 
 individual, personal reminiscence. In short, reflection is 
 only the source of some knowledge, not of all. Taken in 
 conjunction with the stated purpose of the dialogue, that 
@@ -6245,8 +6070,7 @@ probable that one's contemporaries do not know this. This
 is precisely the difference between memory and history, and 
 it constitutes a significant expansion of doctrine beyond 
 the earlier dialogues. In earlier dialogues, myths were 
-presented to perform the function of carrying the individ- 
-ual memory beyond its contemporary confines, but we saw 
+presented to perform the function of carrying the individual memory beyond its contemporary confines, but we saw 
 in the Sophist that these myths (not all myths) were 
 "childish." 
 
@@ -6271,8 +6095,7 @@ Solon, however, does not understand the appellation
 161 
 “children, " and inquires what the priest means when he says 
 that he, Solon, an old man, is a "child." The priest 
-explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to tem- 
-porary deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular 
+explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to temporary deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular 
 orbits, and that, at these times, the deviations bring 
 about floods. These floods wreak havoc on most people but 
 the Egyptians are saved by their irrigation system. + For 
@@ -6340,8 +6163,7 @@ pp. 244 ff.
 
 It 4s interesting to forecast the almost exact 
 thematic parallel of the tale of the Egyptian priest and 
-the tale which Timaeus will deliver. In both, the cosmo- 
-logical origins of the art of healing are described. Plato 
+the tale which Timaeus will deliver. In both, the cosmological origins of the art of healing are described. Plato 
 of course viewed the proper function of statecraft to be 
 the healing of society, as, for example, in his repeated 
 comparisons of the statesman to the physician. 
@@ -6350,8 +6172,7 @@ Critias himself tells Socrates that he is surprised
 to notice how Socrates’ story (the recapitulation of 
 Republic doctrines) and the tale of Atlantis resemble each 
 other in so many details (25e). Critias had expected that 
-it would be difficult to find a basis for their conversa- 
-tion of today, and so he carefully rehearsed the story of 
+it would be difficult to find a basis for their conversation of today, and so he carefully rehearsed the story of 
 Atlantis before he spoke it (26). He assures us that the 
 tale is exactly as he heard it because he says, 
 
@@ -6434,8 +6255,7 @@ Critias will start from the origin of man and carry the
 origins of society will be discovered. Interestingly, 
 no mention is made of the proposed content of the 
 Hermocrates. Once before, Plato hinted at a projected 
-trilogy, and seems not to have completed the third dia- 
-logue. Perhaps, as before, we shall learn so much in the 
+trilogy, and seems not to have completed the third dialogue. Perhaps, as before, we shall learn so much in the 
 two dialogues that the third seems unnecessary.’ Or perhaps 
 Plato wrote the Laws instead. In any case, the point at 
 issue is whether the fitting of the Republic's citizens 
@@ -6480,8 +6300,7 @@ to the general introductory remarks we have just discussed.
 II_ The Role of Image 27c-29d 
 
 Timaeus invokes the blessings of the gods, as custom 
-requires, but says that the other members of the conversa- 
-tion must also call upon their own powers, so that they can 
+requires, but says that the other members of the conversation must also call upon their own powers, so that they can 
 understand Timaeus' thoughts on the proposed theme (27c). 
 
 The first distinction to be made is that between 
@@ -6540,9 +6359,7 @@ looks to that which is always unchanging and uses
 
 a model of that description in fashioning the form 
 
-and quality of his work, all that he thus accom- 
-
-plishes must be good. If he looks to something 
+and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something 
 
 that has come to be and uses a generated model, 
 
@@ -6591,8 +6408,7 @@ is now to be supplanted by a richer and more meaningful
 relation. 
 
 Has this heaven, or universe, always been, or did it 
-begin from some beginning? Timaeus answers his own rhetor- 
-ical question by saying that it must have begun because it 
+begin from some beginning? Timaeus answers his own rhetorical question by saying that it must have begun because it 
 has a body and is apprehensible by sensation together with 
 right opinion, and it was formerly established that those 
 things which are so apprehensible are things which become 
@@ -6634,8 +6450,7 @@ One and the Many is said to be such a myth, made for minds
 incapable of genuine dialectic. 
 
 Now the problem is not that there is a gap in the 
-structure of the universe, but that some kinds of communica- 
-tion are impossible. On the one hand, some truths are 
+structure of the universe, but that some kinds of communication are impossible. On the one hand, some truths are 
 ineffable, on the other hand some people cannot be told 
 the glaring truth because it would momentarily blind them 
 as it did the prisoner of the Cave when he was released 
@@ -6674,8 +6489,7 @@ original meaning.
 
 This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the 
 myths of the origin of the universe were probably held 
-with the fervor of blind conviction by Plato's contemporar- 
-ies, much as they sometimes are by our own contemporaries, 
+with the fervor of blind conviction by Plato's contemporaries, much as they sometimes are by our own contemporaries, 
 so that the attempt to redefine them would be regarded as 
 blasphemy by those whose hold on these myths was invested 
 with the unshakable grasp of an inflexible conservatisn. 
@@ -6757,8 +6571,7 @@ etrictly univocal causality of the best cause, toward some
 
 
 173 
-kind of intermediary causation. In this way, Plato con- 
-tinues to pose the whole problem of some sort of mid-ground 
+kind of intermediary causation. In this way, Plato continues to pose the whole problem of some sort of mid-ground 
 between eternity and the realm of becoming. This is confirm~ 
 ed in what follows next. 
 
@@ -6773,7 +6586,7 @@ nature of the subject (kata physin archen).
 Concerning a likeness (eikonos) then, and its 
 model (paradeigmatos) we must make this 
 distinction; an account (logos) 1s of the same 
-order (suggenes) as the thing it sets forth- 
+order (suggenes) as the thing it sets forth
 an account of that which is abiding and stable 
 and discoverable by the aid of reason will 
 itself be abiding and unchangeable (so far as 
@@ -6813,8 +6626,7 @@ lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable
 
 they must in no wise fall short of this; but 
 those which deal with that which is made in 
-the image of the former and which is a like- 
-ness, must be likely and duly corresponding 
+the image of the former and which is a likeness, must be likely and duly corresponding 
 with their subject: as being 1s to becoming, 
 so ia truth to belief (29b-c, Archer-Hind). 
 
@@ -6824,8 +6636,7 @@ Jowett has:
 
 And being of such a nature the world has been 
 framed by him with a view to that which is 
-apprehended by reason and mind and is unchange- 
-able, and if this be admitted must of necessity 
+apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and if this be admitted must of necessity 
 be a copy of something. Now that the beginning 
 of everything should be according to nature is 
 a great matter. Let us then assume about the 
@@ -6850,11 +6661,9 @@ T.f. Taylor has:
 
 
 And from hence it is perfectly necessary that 
-this world should be the resemblance of some- 
-thing. But to describe its origin according to 
+this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to 
 nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In 
-this manner, then, we must distinguish concern- 
-ing the image and its exemplar. As words are 
+this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are 
 allied to the things of which they are the 
 interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we 
 speak of that which is stable and firm and 
@@ -7019,8 +6828,7 @@ there was no "moment of creation." This follows from
 Cornford's division of the passage into only two realms, 
 which he concludes must therefore be either true or mythical. 
 But the whole division in two is not the only interpretation 
-possible, for it does not follow Plato through his develop- 
-ment. 
+possible, for it does not follow Plato through his development. 
 
 Thus, Cornford is led to take literally the dictum 
 
@@ -7047,8 +6855,7 @@ with difficulty, but cannot be revealed. Cornford precludes
 the interpretation that the difficulties of communication 
 necessitate the mythical figure or that it might be true to 
 say that the maker is ineffably inscrutable and should not 
-be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpreta- 
-tions seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal 
+be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpretations seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal 
 development of the late dialogues. Thus Cornford says that 
 a similar “device” was employed in the Republic, referring 
 probably to the Myth of Er. But in the late dialorues, 
@@ -7200,11 +7007,9 @@ not translate the final portion of the passage in question
 by the phrase “only an image"; he says, simply, that an 
 image is "likely" and "duly corresponding” with its 
 subject. Thus Archer-Hind 1s able to conclude that words 
-stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they repre~- 
-sent as the images do, and that this proportion is a 
+stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent as the images do, and that this proportion is a 
 special case of the more general formula at the end of the 
-passage, which has it that becoming is to being as proba- 
-bility is to truth, This is not mere imagery, for words 
+passage, which has it that becoming is to being as probability is to truth, This is not mere imagery, for words 
 
 
 themselves, in this setting, become images. Later, when 
@@ -7232,8 +7037,7 @@ progression, because he adds that this analogy is precisely
 what one finds at Republic 511e. But there we find, not a 
 division into two parts which are proportional, but 4 
 fourfold division of the powers of the soul where images 
-are the lowest level of intelligence, and not the propor- 
-tional representation of truths of reason. 
+are the lowest level of intelligence, and not the proportional representation of truths of reason. 
 
 Jowett too holds that the images which are only 
 4mitations of eternal things must be only images. Jowett's 
@@ -7249,10 +7053,7 @@ between the doctrine of the two dialogues. This is a
 184 
 
 
-function of two factors; first, Jowett wrote his transla- 
-
-
-tions before the stylometrists ushered in the new era of 
+function of two factors; first, Jowett wrote his translations before the stylometrists ushered in the new era of 
 
 
 Platonic criticism, and second, if one reads the Timaeus 
@@ -7275,8 +7076,7 @@ But a point worth making is partially confirmed by
 Jowett, in that he agrees with Archer-Hind that Plato 
 makes words proportional to their referents, just as 
 images are proportional to their paradigms. Although 
-Cornford's translation of “accounts” is somewhat cumber- 
-some, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating 
+Cornford's translation of “accounts” is somewhat cumbersome, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating 
 the second half of the proportion "what essence is to 
 generation, so truth is to belief,” although Cornford 
 prefers being to essence. 
@@ -7438,8 +7238,7 @@ by thought themselves permanent and unchanging
 to be irrefutable and final, there must be no 
 
 fallingshort of thate-), discourses about that 
-which is itself a likeness likely and correspond- 
-ing to their objects.2! 
+which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding to their objects.2! 
 
 However, he adds the comment that Timaeus' discourse 
 and Timaeus' “warning” about proportionality pertain to 
@@ -7617,13 +7416,12 @@ follows:
 
 Granting these premises, we must see now that our 
 Universe is an image of something. Now in all things 
-4t is most important to start at the natural beginn- 
-ing. Concerning an image, then, and its paradigm, we 
+4t is most important to start at the natural beginning. Concerning an image, then, and its paradigm, we 
 must state the following: as a word is proportional 
 to the reality it describes,-a description of that 
 which is stable and abiding and discoverable by the 
 aid of reason being itself stable and abiding (so 
-far as it is possible for descriptions to be so- 
+far as it is possible for descriptions to be so
 there must be no falling short of that) so, a 
 description which describes an image will be 
 proportional to the image it describes; as reality 
@@ -7632,14 +7430,11 @@ is to becoming, so is truth to rational faith.
 
 192 
 
-This reading, it seems, restores the whole propor- 
-tional tone of the passage, which is a carefully balanced 
-set of proportional propositions, culminating in the state- 
-ment that reality is to becoming what truth is to a rational 
+This reading, it seems, restores the whole proportional tone of the passage, which is a carefully balanced 
+set of proportional propositions, culminating in the statement that reality is to becoming what truth is to a rational 
 faith. : 
 
-Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the partici- 
-pants of the dialogue should accept the account he is 
+Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the participants of the dialogue should accept the account he is 
 about to give as a "probable myth" (eikota mython) (29d) 
 4t need not be understood as “only” a myth but, in 
 contradistinction to the childish myths which are for those 
@@ -7753,8 +7548,7 @@ TIME AND THE UNIVERSE
 
 I The Motive of Creation (29d-30b 
 
-So far, we have been told that the World is a beconm- 
-ing image of an eternal realm. But this is precisely the 
+So far, we have been told that the World is a becoming image of an eternal realm. But this is precisely the 
 problem. How can like be unlike, or how can the maker 
 generate less perfectly than the perfect model. We recall 
 the Sophist (265b) distinguishes divine and human production 
@@ -7772,8 +7566,7 @@ relation of a becoming image to reality."
 
 Cornford states that “Plato denied reality to what is 
 commonly called matter."! The materiality of this universe, 
-however, is not unconnected with the motive for the genera- 
-tion of the Universe by its maker. We shall investigate the 
+however, is not unconnected with the motive for the generation of the Universe by its maker. We shall investigate the 
 two issues simultaneously. Timaeus informs us of this motive 
 
 
@@ -7904,8 +7697,7 @@ there are no specific perfections lacking to it.
 
 What can this Living Being be to whom no perfection 
 is lacking and who serves as the model for each specific 
-perfection. It cannot be any one Form, for on this suppo- 
-sition there might be others (31a). Nor can it be a Form 
+perfection. It cannot be any one Form, for on this supposition there might be others (31a). Nor can it be a Form 
 
 
 of all Forms, for this position involved the difficulties 
@@ -7989,8 +7781,7 @@ generalization of the proportions within lines, planes,
 and spheres. That is, just as the extremities which make 
 up a line are proportional to each other, so the plane 
 and the sphere have proportional elements; but further, 
-the proportion between the line and the plane is proportion- 
-ally the same as the proportion between the plane and the 
+the proportion between the line and the plane is proportionally the same as the proportion between the plane and the 
 sphere. In the same way, the realms of physics and geometry 
 are proportional to each other, as the realm of matter is 
 proportional to the realm of soul, and the realm of soul 
@@ -8068,8 +7859,7 @@ proportional to one another. In this way the unity of the
 Universe was achieved, and the proportionality of its 
 four elements to each other is their boundary. Further, 
 only he who set the elements in proportion could disolve 
-it (32c). All of the elements were used up in the construc- 
-tion of the Universe, and in this way the Universe resembles 
+it (32c). All of the elements were used up in the construction of the Universe, and in this way the Universe resembles 
 its model's perfect unity, for none of the materials were 
 left over and it is therefore, in its way, complete. It 
 4s also, on that basis, simple, that is, one Universe, and 
@@ -8095,7 +7885,7 @@ elements outside it, of which there are none (33).
 But the shape of the body of the Universe is "that 
 which is fitting to its nature" (33b); it 1s spherical. 
 This is an extremely important phrase, since some regard 
-Plato's image of time as circular and therefore interpret - 
+Plato's image of time as circular and therefore interpret  
 the Platonic Universe as closed, and subject only to 
 eternal recurrence, without novelty or growth or process.° 
 Therefore it is necessary to dwell on this phrase, for it 
@@ -8172,8 +7962,7 @@ words must focus on one aspect at a time. Thus Plato
 describes his Universe as a becoming image, to indicate 
 that the unity of its elements is complete and harmonious: 
 but to reason immediately from its spherical shape to its 
-temporal character is an instance of cart-before-the- 
-horsemanship. We must wait until the discussion of the body 
+temporal character is an instance of cart-before-the-horsemanship. We must wait until the discussion of the body 
 of the Universe has been completed, and then for the 
 discussion of the soul of the Universe. Then, and only 
 then, does Plato introduce his doctrine of time and the 
@@ -8275,8 +8064,7 @@ outside of itself, must in some way be related to a soul.
 
 The Soul of the Universe was set in the center, but 
 further "wrapped ita body round with soul on the outside” 
-(340). Here the transposability of the elements of a pro- 
-portion comes into the account. For, at first, it seems 
+(340). Here the transposability of the elements of a proportion comes into the account. For, at first, it seems 
 that the center of the Universe cannot at the same time be 
 the periphery. But, just as the mean term of a proportion 
 can become the extremes by transposition, so the Soul, 
@@ -8365,10 +8153,7 @@ a simple image, which is the best kind of account of the
 Universe because it is proportional to its kind of being, 
 one is not disappointed that Plato describes the Soul of 
 the Universe after the body. One ought to recall in this 
-regard Plato's deep concern that it is, after all, imposs- 
-
-
-ible to reveal the maker of the Universe to all mankind. 
+regard Plato's deep concern that it is, after all, impossible to reveal the maker of the Universe to all mankind. 
 
 
 8 George S. Claghorn, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 
@@ -8386,8 +8171,7 @@ However, the World-Soul is not so simple that its
 description can rest on the characteristics of centrality 
 and periphery. The description of the "parts" of the 
 World-Soul follows next, in a passage which Cornford has 
-described as "one of the most obscure of the whole dia- 
-logue."? Further, he says that the passage "would be 
+described as "one of the most obscure of the whole dialogue."? Further, he says that the passage "would be 
 simply unintelligible to anyone who had not read and 
 understood the Sophist."!9 In a note he adds that A.E. 
 Taylor has precluded this basis for understanding the 
@@ -8447,8 +8231,7 @@ First, it is clear that the Forms have not been
 repudiated by the Timaeus, since the passage begins with a 
 
 
-description of the Forms which recapitulates their treat- 
-ment in the Sophist. The kind of existence which is always 
+description of the Forms which recapitulates their treatment in the Sophist. The kind of existence which is always 
 the same is proper to the Forms, and was proper to the 
 
 
@@ -8526,16 +8309,12 @@ between the kinds of images (eidola), and reached the
 conclusion that some images are false (phantasiai) but 
 some are genuine. Of those that are genuine one must 
 further distinguish those that are of human origin and 
-those that are of divine origin (240a). The Sophist there- 
-fore credits images with some sort of existence. But the 
+those that are of divine origin (240a). The Sophist therefore credits images with some sort of existence. But the 
 Timaeus does not simply describe the Universe as an 
 eidolon, a little Form, so to speak. The Universe is an 
 
 
-eikon, which now comes to mean that it is like the perfec- 
-
-
-tion of the most perfect. cut even this is not the high 
+eikon, which now comes to mean that it is like the perfection of the most perfect. cut even this is not the high 
 point of Plato's analysis, as we shall see. Nevertheless 
 
 it 1s central to the exposition of this passage to notice 
@@ -8583,7 +8362,7 @@ Forms in some things.
 
 This passage, like the passage at 29, is a radical 
 innovation on Plato's part, which takes the doctrine of 
-the Timaeus far beyond the doctrines of its predecessor- 
+the Timaeus far beyond the doctrines of its predecessor 
 dialogues. It is a recapitulation, but the recapitulation 
 serves as a basis for an advance. Where once only the 
 Forms were ultimately real, now there are "kinds" or 
@@ -8601,8 +8380,7 @@ world into the eternal and the becoming has similarly
 
 216 
 undergone a radical growth, wherein it will no longer be 
-possible for Plato to distinguish simply between the eter- 
-nal and the becoming as separated realms, but the relation 
+possible for Plato to distinguish simply between the eternal and the becoming as separated realms, but the relation 
 of the eternal to the becoming will have to be described 
 in a new way. Somehow, the eternal and the becoming will 
 be related in a way which will explain how it is possible 
@@ -8672,14 +8450,11 @@ proportions. !> Plato goes on to construct an intricate
 allegory of the circles of the Same and of the Different; 
 he describes how these circles have been joined in the 
 center of the Soul, and how the revolution of the Same 
-circumscribes the revolution of the Different (the allegor- 
-ical indication that the Same is the "outer" limit of the 
+circumscribes the revolution of the Different (the allegorical indication that the Same is the "outer" limit of the 
 Different). The seven circles of the Soul represent the 
 proportional share which the Soul has in the seven Forms, '4 
-just as the seven tones reflect the seven planetary dis- 
-tances, The point is not merely the number of circles, but 
-the motion of the circles, since planets and music certain- 
-ly move. 
+just as the seven tones reflect the seven planetary distances, The point is not merely the number of circles, but 
+the motion of the circles, since planets and music certainly move. 
 
 Plato tries very hard to make his allegory exact in 
 every detail. He indicates that motions are shared 
@@ -8739,8 +8514,7 @@ Plato's sadness over the outcome of Sicilian politics and
 the contemporary pessinism lies in the world-wide scale 
 
 on which contemporary destruction can be accomplished. One 
-might wish to derive a sense of optimism from the possibil- 
-ity that the Universe will go on even if the planet earth 
+might wish to derive a sense of optimism from the possibility that the Universe will go on even if the planet earth 
 does not harbor any human life. For Plato refers to the 
 life of the World-Soul as it inspires the body of the 
 Universe, and not to the life of man, which, Plato was 
@@ -8795,8 +8569,7 @@ Soul of the Universe is invisible, and is the "best of
 things brought into being by the most excellent of things 
 intelligible and eternal" (37a). Because the Soul has been 
 blended out of the Same, the Different, and the Existent, 
-she is "in contact with anything that has dispersed exis- 
-tence or with anything whose existence is indivisible" (37a) 
+she is "in contact with anything that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible" (37a) 
 In this way the Soul is like anything that is, and it can 
 therefore know anything that is, “either in the sphere of 
 things that become or with regard to things that are always 
@@ -8885,8 +8658,7 @@ called an aesthesis, which, unlike the English word
 
 
 "judgment," extends to feeling and to the appreciation of 
-beauty as well as of truth. This capacity to Know aesthetic- 
-‘ally is of the utmost significance in Plato's Universe, and 
+beauty as well as of truth. This capacity to Know aesthetic‘ally is of the utmost significance in Plato's Universe, and 
 it is especially necessary for a consideration of the next 
 topic to which Plato addresses himself, namely, time. For 
 
@@ -8896,20 +8668,17 @@ truth.
 
 V Time as Image (to 39e) 
 
-Up to this point in his development of the construc- 
-tion of the Universe, Plato has insisted that the Universe 
+Up to this point in his development of the construction of the Universe, Plato has insisted that the Universe 
 embodies in its proportional way the perfection of its 
 model, and yet the model is consistently described as 
-eternal, while the Universe is said to be an eternal becom- 
-ing. The Universe is described throughout the foregoing 
+eternal, while the Universe is said to be an eternal becoming. The Universe is described throughout the foregoing 
 passages as a reality which is as perfect as it can be, and 
 yet Plato nowhere says how a visible and tangible body can 
 be like its eternal indivisible model. Even the existence 
 of the World-Soul and its participation in the whole of the 
 Universe, in its divisible as well as its indivisible aspects 
 that is, in its sameness and in its difference, is not 
-sufficient to confer on the Universe the closest approximna- 
-tion to the perfection of the eternal model, even though 
+sufficient to confer on the Universe the closest approximnation to the perfection of the eternal model, even though 
 Plato usually attributes the highest perfections to Soul. 
 
 
@@ -8959,7 +8728,7 @@ period, especially the Sophist, have consistently lent
 225 
 themselves to an exposition of the difference betweer a 
 mere statue, which may or may not be faithful to the 
-proportions of the original model, and a genuine image, - 
+proportions of the original model, and a genuine image,  
 which is faithful to the proportions of the original model. 
 The agaima is not only faithful to its original model but 
 the model is a loved one whose very visage brings joy to 
@@ -9020,8 +8789,7 @@ Plato has “anticipated,” as the saying goes, the doctrines
 
 
 227 
-of Christianity. One could as well say that the ineffabil- 
-ity which characterizes Plato's maker of the Universe is 
+of Christianity. One could as well say that the ineffability which characterizes Plato's maker of the Universe is 
 due to his acquaintance with Buddhist or Mosaic doctrines 
 of the ineffability of the Divine. 
 
@@ -9060,8 +8828,7 @@ assert or to deny these implications of Plato's words,
 
 228 
 then, seems to represent an attempt to fit Plato's 
-meaning into more contemporary doctrines. One cannot quar- 
-rel with those who find inspiration in Plato's text, but 
+meaning into more contemporary doctrines. One cannot quarrel with those who find inspiration in Plato's text, but 
 this is not the question. The question is, what did Plato 
 mean? And in this context, it seems beside the point to 
 fit Platonism into more recent doctrines of creation, and 
@@ -9198,16 +8965,13 @@ unnecessary, for Plato was neither writing mere allegory
 
 nor Christian Theology. It seems more to the point to show 
 that Plato once before introduced a prior consideration 
-into his account after he has introduced a later considera- 
-tion, as we saw, for example, when he described the World- 
-Soul after the World-body. There, it was to give the reader 
+into his account after he has introduced a later consideration, as we saw, for example, when he described the World-Soul after the World-body. There, it was to give the reader 
 the necessary materials out of which he could fashion the 
 image through which Plato put forward his account of the 
 process. Plato of course attributes to Soul a superior sort 
 of perfection than that which he attributes to body, but 
 not because these parts of the Universe stand in an 
-external hierarchy of items which are spatially and exis- 
-tentially discrete; rather, the proportional unity of the 
+external hierarchy of items which are spatially and existentially discrete; rather, the proportional unity of the 
 entire Universe is his primary desideratum, and he says 
 repeatedly that the Universe is an image, and that we 
 must see it as we see images, in their unity. But one 
@@ -9335,8 +9099,7 @@ suppose that order is the principle according to which the
 many elements of the spatial universe have been united 
 into a One and that Time is the principle according to 
 which the many elements of the temporal Universe have been 
-united into a One, because that would lead to the conclu- 
-8ion that there are two Ones. Two Ones would create the 
+united into a One, because that would lead to the conclusion that there are two Ones. Two Ones would create the 
 third man problem which has been adduced already in the 
 Timaeus to show that the Universe is One and only One, or 
 one One. The Universe is a radical Unity, not simply of 
@@ -9354,9 +9117,7 @@ moving image.
 
 236 
 
-The second aspect of the moving image is the ever- 
-lasting character of its motion. Again, we have been fur- 
-nished with the material to construct an understanding of 
+The second aspect of the moving image is the everlasting character of its motion. Again, we have been furnished with the material to construct an understanding of 
 this characteristic. ‘e have already called attention to 
 Plato's optimism in his use of the word "ceaseless," by 
 which he seems to indicate that the Universe must resemble 
@@ -9434,12 +9195,10 @@ a whole is a sphere, but considered as the proportional
 unity of the many circles and living beings which inhabit 
 it, it 18 a populated sphere. Thus Time is neither the 
 revolution only of the outer periphery nor only the sum of 
-the rotations of the many circles which inhabit the inter- 
-ior of the sphere. Time is the order which the One Universe 
+the rotations of the many circles which inhabit the interior of the sphere. Time is the order which the One Universe 
 enjoys; (correlatively, the order of the Universe is the 
 Time it enjoys). Time encompasses both the Unity and the 
-multiplicity of the Universe insofar as it is the perfec- 
-tion of the Universe which makes it most like its eternal 
+multiplicity of the Universe insofar as it is the perfection of the Universe which makes it most like its eternal 
 model. It would be a serious misreading of this phrase to 
 assert that Plato's Universe is simply a Pythagorean 
 Universe because Time moves in it according to number. 
@@ -9470,8 +9229,7 @@ many, and that Time brings order to the many by moving
 them in accordance with the perfection of which Time is the 
 image. To derive the reality of Time from the number of 
 motions in the Universe would be tantamount to the 
-assertion that Time is a subsidiary perfection of multi- 
-plicity, whereas the passage clearly states that Time 
+assertion that Time is a subsidiary perfection of multiplicity, whereas the passage clearly states that Time 
 brings the Universe into a closer and more perfect relation 
 to its eternal model. 
 
@@ -9502,7 +9260,7 @@ not follow that Plato is cautious out of fear. It is better
 to think that Plato regarded thinking through the doctrine 
 of the Timaeus as a more important work than entering into 
 a polemic with those who could not understand it, especially 
-if we are correct in asserting that the Timacus is not only 
+if we are correct in asserting that the Timaeus is not only 
 a synthesis of doctrine but a preparation for the Critias 
 and the Laws, which were intended to have direct political 
 influence. 
@@ -9533,8 +9291,7 @@ model as closely as possible.
 Plato now speaks of the parts of Time, having already 
 spoken of the Unity of Time. He says that there were no 
 days and nights, or months and years, before the Universe 
-came to be, and that all of these came into being simulta- 
-neously. However, he says 
+came to be, and that all of these came into being simultaneously. However, he says 
 
 All these are parts of Time, and ‘was' and ‘shall be' 
 are forms of Time that have come to be; we are wrong 
@@ -9618,8 +9375,7 @@ capable is the perfection which Time brings as the
 principle of order. We are now informed that becoming 
 proceeds in Time. Thus it is inexact to say “...that what 
 is past is past, what happens now is happening, and again 
-what will happen is what will happen, and that the non- 
-existent is the non-existent" (38b). Plato has affirmed 
+what will happen is what will happen, and that the non-existent is the non-existent" (38b). Plato has affirmed 
 that the ordering of the Universe has been made even more 
 like its model by Time, the moving image of eternity. The 
 theory of the Forms, up to this point, has told us that 
@@ -9707,9 +9463,7 @@ proportional Unity, so that becoming no longer needs to te
 excluded from the perfection of the Universe, but can now 
 enter into it on its own terms. Things which become, become 
 intelligible by Time, because Time introduces order into 
-their motions, whereas ceaseless becoming as such, unorder- 
-ed by Time, has no order at all, and hence no intelligibil- 
-ity. Thus, where once Plato insisted that only the eternal 
+their motions, whereas ceaseless becoming as such, unordered by Time, has no order at all, and hence no intelligibility. Thus, where once Plato insisted that only the eternal 
 is intelligible, now he asserts that Time brings becoming 
 into the realm of the intelligible by introducing order 
 into the realm of the incessantly becoming. 
@@ -9898,16 +9652,14 @@ But if we take separate conclusions, on which the scholars
 agree, and, if we attempt to see them in relation to each 
 other, we shall arrive at a simple and yet, to the best of 
 my knowledge, an uncommon conclusion. If (1) 1t is true 
-that the Republic is a dialogue in which Plato has attempt- 
-ed to see the powers of the soul "writ large,” that is, 
+that the Republic is a dialogue in which Plato has attempted to see the powers of the soul "writ large,” that is, 
 
 if the Republic is a dialogue in which the state is seen 
 
 as a magnification of the soul; and, together with this, 
 
 4f (2) we see that the Timaeus is a dialogue in which the 
-"alive but motionless," society of the Republic is recapit- 
-ulated, and, if we add to this (3) the fact that the 
+"alive but motionless," society of the Republic is recapitulated, and, if we add to this (3) the fact that the 
 Timaeus first develops a doctrine of Time before setting 
 out the details of the best form of society, we may draw a 
 startling conclusion; Plato has made the doctrine of Time 
@@ -9928,8 +9680,7 @@ shifted the basis of his sociology from the eternal to the
 temporal; no longer is it his view that the realms of 
 eternity and becoming are separated by an unbridgeable 
 chasm; now, in the Timaeus, through the gradual process we 
-described in Chapter II, Plato has arrived at the formula- 
-tion of a doctrine in which Time is, so to speak, the 
+described in Chapter II, Plato has arrived at the formulation of a doctrine in which Time is, so to speak, the 
 bridge between these two realms. 
 
 But this image of Time as a bridge falls short of 
@@ -9982,8 +9733,7 @@ to the Critias, since, as we said above, such a view would
 
 
 so linearize Plato's philosophy that we should have to 
-view the Laws as the only source of Plato's mature philo- 
-sophy. One should not ignore the early works of a genius 
+view the Laws as the only source of Plato's mature philosophy. One should not ignore the early works of a genius 
 such as Plato when one reads his later works, since this 
 procedure deprives one of the measure of the man and the 
 gradual maturity which he was able to reveal in his late 
@@ -10008,8 +9758,7 @@ were of such a nature as to discourage and disillusion the
 
 253 
 great man from his life-long hopes to bring about good 
-government, we should expect to see bitterness and pessi- 
-mism in the works written after these experiences. But we 
+government, we should expect to see bitterness and pessimism in the works written after these experiences. But we 
 find no shallow despair in the Seventh Letter or in the 
 
 
@@ -10017,13 +9766,11 @@ Timaeus; rather we confront a dialogue which is written
 
 
 in a style especially designed to appeal to those whose 
-philosophical training was not so arduous nor so disciplin- 
-ed as Plato's own. Plato does not become a disdainful 
+philosophical training was not so arduous nor so disciplined as Plato's own. Plato does not become a disdainful 
 elitist, nor is the Timaeus a children's allegory, 
 
 written by a sour old grandfather, for there is a great 
-deal in it which requires strenuous philosophical reflec- 
-tion and painstaking attention. Yet, even those without 
+deal in it which requires strenuous philosophical reflection and painstaking attention. Yet, even those without 
 philosophical training and exacting logical skill can be 
 
 
@@ -10038,8 +9785,7 @@ Thus it seems pointless to criticise the Timaeus as
 an uneven dialogue which skips about from the level of 
 thought to the level of myth, and, on the basis of such a 
 criticism, to prefer to look to other dialogues for more 
-philosophical meanings because the style of earlier dia- 
-logues 4s more even and their philosophy more exactly 
+philosophical meanings because the style of earlier dialogues 4s more even and their philosophy more exactly 
 stated. This is not unlike preferring to look in the 
 pantry for the broom only because there is a light in the 
 pantry, when, in fact, the broom is in a darker but more 
@@ -10138,8 +9884,7 @@ Plato believes the Universe is eternal, and therefore it
 
 
 256 
-does not actually have a temporal character (Archer- 
-Hind also holds this view). In short, Taylor claims that 
+does not actually have a temporal character (Archer-Hind also holds this view). In short, Taylor claims that 
 Plato described the Universe as if it were gradually 
 brought into being because it would be easier for Plato's 
 readers to comprehend his meaning in this way.° 
@@ -10151,10 +9896,7 @@ the eternal and the becoming, between a false image and a
 genuine image, between a mere myth and a genuine myth. If 
 
 
-the Timaeus were only a myth designed to create the appear- 
-
-
-ance of the truth but not to reveal the actual truth, it 
+the Timaeus were only a myth designed to create the appearance of the truth but not to reveal the actual truth, it 
 would follow that Plato has cast his whole account of the 
 origin of the Universe into the deceptively simple mold of 
 orderly succession. But the discrepancy between the 
@@ -10353,23 +10095,19 @@ might call divine providence are raised and discussed, in
 a context which is explicity temporal. Or again, one could 
 cite quotation after quotation from almost any book of the 
 Laws which would show that Plato was much interested in 
-the relative durations of various things, from constitu- 
-tions to kingdoms and from mountains to men. 
+the relative durations of various things, from constitutions to kingdoms and from mountains to men. 
 
 But these investigations must be left to another 
-time when they can be treated with the exhaustive documen- 
-tation they deserve. It has been our purpose to spell out 
+time when they can be treated with the exhaustive documentation they deserve. It has been our purpose to spell out 
 in detail the reasons for adopting the view that there is 
 a Platonic philosophy of time and that this philosophy is 
 inseparable from Plato's concern for the best possible 
 society. 
 
 Before the final words are written, however, it 
-seems appropriate to state a few opinions which have emerg- 
-ed during the course of this study. While it would be 
+seems appropriate to state a few opinions which have emerged during the course of this study. While it would be 
 impossible to draw final conclusions about the relevance 
-of Plato's philosophy of time to the intellectual pur- 
-suits of the modern world without at the same time presente 
+of Plato's philosophy of time to the intellectual pursuits of the modern world without at the same time presente 
 ing a history of Platonic scholarship for all of the 
 intervening years between Plato's era and our own, it is 
 
@@ -10439,12 +10177,9 @@ an imitation of the Universe.
 If, on the other hand, the Universe is open ard is 
 in some way incomplete and unfinished, it becomes the 
 business of the statesman to model his constitution as far 
-as possible on the pertection of the Universe and there- 
-after to improvise and invent those measures which seem 
+as possible on the pertection of the Universe and thereafter to improvise and invent those measures which seem 
 best under the circumstances. If such a statesman can 
-be found, he will understand that the sources of imperfec- 
-tion are not solely derived from the failure of the citi- 
-zens to model themselves on the eternal forms, but might 
+be found, he will understand that the sources of imperfection are not solely derived from the failure of the citizens to model themselves on the eternal forms, but might 
 result from the very incompletion of the statesman's 
 actions. In other words, it follows from a completed world 
 that its citizens must adjust themselves to its patterns; 
@@ -10504,14 +10239,12 @@ uses the paradigm “open or closed" really uses a spatial
 idea, not a temporal one, and is therefore guilty of a 
 species of philosophical reductionism. The question is not 
 whether the Universe is closed or open but whether there is 
-in the Universe sufficient ground for the gradual attain- 
-ment of perfection. Even this last statement seems to put 
+in the Universe sufficient ground for the gradual attainment of perfection. Even this last statement seems to put 
 perfection at the end of the process, whereas in fact it is 
 possible to say in the Platonic idiom that a thing is as 
 perfect as it can be while it is proceeding at its proper 
 pace of attainment. In this way, one does not need to 
-assert that perfection is attainable only in some other- 
-worldly realm, or that only those things which have 
+assert that perfection is attainable only in some otherworldly realm, or that only those things which have 
 achieved release from the quagmire of time have entered 
 into eternity. On the contrary, those things which have 
 nothing of time in them but share only in the incessant 
@@ -10532,12 +10265,7 @@ eternity. But in Plato's Universe, each person who finds
 his proper pace of achievement may be said to be as eternal 
 as he can be at the moment, or that his perfection consists 
 of the entire process of attainment. It is therefore 
-necessary for the citizens of the Republic to model then- 
-selves entirely upon the eternal forms or be called fail- 
-ures, where the citizens of the realm founded on the philo- 
-
-
-sophy of the Timaeus may be said to posess individuality 
+necessary for the citizens of the Republic to model thenselves entirely upon the eternal forms or be called failures, where the citizens of the realm founded on the philosophy of the Timaeus may be said to posess individuality 
 
 
 insofar as they attain perfection to the extent that it is 
@@ -10547,8 +10275,7 @@ Greeks is found wanting. In conversation with philosophers,
 ‘one frequently hears that there were no genuine individuals 
 in the Greek world, since genuine individuality would 
 scandalize the Greek notion of an ordered and predictable 
-world. We must clarify the statement that there is individ- 
-uality in the Greek world; a more accurate statement would 
+world. We must clarify the statement that there is individuality in the Greek world; a more accurate statement would 
 
 
 read that there is a genuine basis of individuality in the 
@@ -10653,8 +10380,7 @@ yet have the requisite insight for profound subjects. This
 is again true in the Theatetus wherein Socrates is now 
 
 
-the old and wise man, as opposed to the young and malle- 
-able Theatetus. In view of the fact that the Timaeus casts 
+the old and wise man, as opposed to the young and malleable Theatetus. In view of the fact that the Timaeus casts 
 the whole middle doctrine of individual reminiscence into 
 & more generalized sociological frame of reference, it 
 should be pointed out that Plato has not abandoned his 
@@ -10671,8 +10397,7 @@ citizen not only ages, but he matures and grows wise. It
 
 270 
 is this very maturity of insight which Plato himself 
-experienced with his own advancing years, and it is there- 
-fore unsurprising that we find in the later dialogues a 
+experienced with his own advancing years, and it is therefore unsurprising that we find in the later dialogues a 
 doctrine in to which the perfection of reason is attained 
 by those individuals who have participated more fully in 
 time than those younger philosophers whose maturity is yet 
@@ -10681,8 +10406,7 @@ unreached.
 To put the matter somewhat more technically, Plato 
 has so closely related cosmogenesis and anthropogenesis 
 by reason of their mutual participation in time that it 
-is also possible to relate the ontogenesis of the individ- 
-ual citizen to the same basis in time. While it was always 
+is also possible to relate the ontogenesis of the individual citizen to the same basis in time. While it was always 
 possible to say with Plato that the older man is probably 
 the wiser man, it 1s possible, after a careful reading of 
 the later dialogues, to assert that the older man ought to 
@@ -10921,7 +10645,7 @@ New York: Doubleday & Co., 1917.
 276 
 
 
-Taylor, A.&. Commentary on Plato's Timacus. Oxford: 
+Taylor, A.&. Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. Oxford: 
 Clarendon Press, 192%.