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| author | p <grr@lo2.org> | 2025-01-24 12:47:18 -0500 |
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thesis ch4
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diff --git a/plato_time.otx b/plato_time.otx index 444b634..3dcbb84 100644 --- a/plato_time.otx +++ b/plato_time.otx @@ -4242,61 +4242,48 @@ the doctrines of eternity, image, and time. \sec The Timaeus -I The Introductory Conversation (17a-27b) - +\secc The Introductory Conversation (17a--27b) We have seen in the foregoing two chapters that the -Timaeus-Critias-Laws is the last group of writings to which +\bt{Timaeus-Critias-Laws} is the last group of writings to which Plato devoted his attention. The argument was divided into two logically interrelated parts: first, tradition, stylistic researches, biography, and autobiography led to -the conclusion of the second chapter that the Timaeus was +the conclusion of the second chapter that the \ul{Timaeus} was actually written late; second, the gradual modification and development of the doctrine of the middle period, as -exemplified by the Republic, was traced through the -Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus - - +exemplified by the \ul{Republic}, was traced through the +\ul{Parmenides}, \ul{Theatetus}, \ul{Sophist}, \ul{Statesman}, and \ul{Philebus} in the third chapter. We shall now investigate how the -Timaeus synthesizes the themes of eternity, image, and +\ul{Timaeus} synthesizes the themes of eternity, image, and time in a new and more unified way. Because of the sheer bulk of commentary we shall -make on the doctrines of the Timaeus, the reader will find +make on the doctrines of the \ul{Timaeus}, the reader will find two chapters devoted to this last Aiatoeue: The present chapter deals with the introductory remarks to the dialogue and to the introductory remarks which Timaeus delivers as a prelude to his rather extended monologue. The next chapter examines the relations of eternity, image, and time -in the light of the purposes which the introductory pore - - -tions of the dialogue reveal. The introductory remarks - - -> - - - -"found in the Timaeus set the foundations, not only for -Plato's later philosophy of time but also for the function-~ -al significance this philosophy has in relation to Plato's +in the light of the purposes which the introductory portions +of the dialogue reveal. The introductory remarks +found in the \ul{Timaeus} set the foundations, not only for +Plato's later philosophy of time but also for the functional +significance this philosophy has in relation to Plato's view of the best possible society. -The first hint that the Timaeus will interest itself +The first hint that the \ul{Timaeus} will interest itself in temporal questions comes in the list of persons who are scheduled to hold the dialectical conversation. We know that Critias was the name shared by Plato's grandfather and his greategrandfather, His grandfather was a poet in his own right and a collector of constitutions, and his -greategrandfather was associated with Solon. | We note that +greategrandfather was associated with Solon.\pnote{2.1} We note that Hermocrates, a general famous for his defense of Athens and for his attempt to establish a just regime in Syracuse, is -also scheduled to speak. We note the presence of Socrates, +also scheduled to speak.\pnote{2.2} We note the presence of Socrates, who has spoken relatively little in the late group of -dialogues, but who reappeared in the Philebus. And finally, - - +dialogues, but who reappeared in the \ul{Philebus}. And finally, we note Timaeus of Locri, an Italian city well-governed by Pythagoreans. @@ -4304,95 +4291,71 @@ Here is a strange assembly; Critias is a very old man of considerable political experience in Athens; Timaeus is a Pythagorean Stranger who is in Athens for the festival of Athena; Hermocrates is an Athenian general distinguished - - in the Peloponnesian War; and we note that Socrates is now - - -' AVE. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 2. - - -2 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 2. - - - described as a very old man. One might almost conclude from this cast alone that questions about the morality of ancient Athenian politics will be discussed. Socrates opens the dialogue. His discussion of -"yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"" of some of the doctrines -of the Republic, (books II-VI) namely, the description of +"yesterday" ia a "recapitulation"\pnote{2.3} of some of the doctrines +of the \ul{Republic}, (books II--VI) namely, the description of the farmers, craftsmen, and guardians who make up the -"best form of society" (17c). The occupational specialization which alloted one and only one role to each individual +"best form of society" (17c). The occupational specialization +which alloted one and only one role to each individual citizen because he was best fitted for one and only one -role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversation." The statement is made that this brief recapitulation +role, is restated as a reminder of "yesterday's conversation." +The statement is made that this brief recapitulation leaves nothing out and is an exact description of the contents of yesterday's conversation. Thus, one should not conclude that this recapitulation includes the entire -contents of the Republic, for this would create a manifest -contradiction. The Republic conprises ten books, much of -which are not recapitulated here. Quite obviously, something has been left out, and Socrates implies clearly that +contents of the \ul{Republic}, for this would create a manifest +contradiction. The \ul{Republic} conprises ten books, much of +which are not recapitulated here. Quite obviously, something +\e{has} been left out, and Socrates implies clearly that he intends to discuss only those doctrines which he has -summarized above. One might add, however, that the recapitulation does deal with those doctrines of the Republic +summarized above. One might add, however, that the recapitulation +does deal with those doctrines of the \ul{Republic} which are central to the whole dialogue, namely, the - - occupational specialization of three classes of citizens, - - -3 Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den -Dialogen Platos, p. rey - - - -'who do not mix the functions of the others into their own +who do not mix the functions of the others into their own allotted lives, just as the Forms on which their respective perfections are based do not mix or combine. Socrates says that the description of these citizens -(of the Republic) makes him feel like "a man who has been +(of the \ul{Republic}) makes him feel like "a man who has been looking at some noble creatures in a painting, or perhaps at real animals, alive but motionless, and conceives a desire to watch them in motion and actively exercising -the powers promised by their form" (19b,c). +the powers promised by their form" (19 b,c). Two features of this statement are particularly remarkable. First, we notice Socrates' apparent indecision as to whether he is looking at a painting (a mere copy) or -at real animals who are motionless ( a genuine image but +at real animals who are motionless (a genuine image but motionless). Second, it is unusual to see Socrates admit his inability to extract the doctrine he seeks through his accustomed midwifery. These aspects of the introductory - - -conversation hint that the Timaeus will attempt to go - - +conversation hint that the \ul{Timaeus} will attempt to go beyond earlier Socratic positions. Socrates goes on at some length to spell out his precise inability, and he connects it explicitly with the firmness of his aged opinions about the poets (19d), -although he stated in the Theatetus that he had no opinions - - +although he stated in the \ul{Theatetus} that he had no opinions of his own. He says that he does not mean to imply that he -has @ lowly opinion of the poets in general (which he had -in the Republic) but he feels now that the good imitator -(there are none such in the Republic) should be familiar - - - +has a lowly opinion of the poets in general (which he had +in the \ul{Republic}) but he feels now that the good imitator +(there are none such in the \ul{Republic}) should be familiar with the surroundings which he is going to imitate (19e). On the surface, this statement pertains to the history of ancient Athens; allegorically, it says that Socrates' viewpoint is not the one to be followed in this dialogue. Socrates does not usually speak of genuine imitation, for this sort of imitation is introduced by the Stranger in the -Sophist. Just as the Sophists move about from city to city +\ul{Sophist}. Just as the \ul{Sophist}s move about from city to city too often, and do not remain in any one city long enough to: -become familiar with it, so Socrates is said to be unfamiliar with the matters about to be discussed. Plato seems to +become familiar with it, so Socrates is said to be unfamiliar +with the matters about to be discussed. Plato seems to say here in the gentlest way that he has great respect for his old teacher but that Socrates' viewpoint is not the most fruitful one for his present concern. @@ -4403,10 +4366,7 @@ to discuss the constitution of the society which Socrates would like to see in motion. Timaeus is better suited by reason of his philosophical training, and, in addition, he has the necessary qualifications for statesmanship which - - -were described in the Statesman. - +were described in the \ul{Statesman}. Hermocrates sets the foundation for the discourse by telling us that Critias remembers a story which bears @@ -4414,12 +4374,7 @@ directly on the trend of their discussion. It is a story of ancient Athens and the way she conducted herself in ancient times. It is said to be true on no less authority than Solon's own words, since Solon himself is said to - - have told the story to Critias' grandfather. The story had - - - been forgotten through lapse of time and the destruction of human lives by a catastrophe (20e). @@ -4429,7 +4384,7 @@ aside because, after he had returned from Egypt, there were too many troubles in the city (21c). (If it is true that Plato himself traveled in Egypt, this statement might be interpreted as Plato's own excuse for not writing the -Timaeus sooner because of the difficulties he himself +\ul{Timaeus} sooner because of the difficulties he himself experienced on his own return to Athens. The awe with which the origins of Athens would be regarded by its citizens would confront a writer of new legends about @@ -4440,18 +4395,15 @@ the need for one). Thus, the story of ancient Athens was not lost only because Solon did not have time to write it but also -because of the intervention of a catastrophe which destroyed the actors in the drama. Solon says, however, that +because of the intervention of a catastrophe which destroyed +the actors in the drama. Solon says, however, that when he himself was travelling in Egypt, he was received with great respect, because the Egyptian priests who knew -the ancient history of Athens claimed that there is a kinship between Athenians and Egyptians, and they even said +the ancient history of Athens claimed that there is a kinship +between Athenians and Egyptians, and they even said that the name of their own city-god is the Egyptian word for Athena (21e). Solon was of course interested to hear - - about Athenian antiquity, and recounted for the Egyptians - - - the venerable legends with which he was familiar. But the Egyptian priest sighs with benigh patience, @@ -4459,39 +4411,28 @@ and says, "Ah Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children; in Greece there is no such thing as an old man" (22b). This would be an interesting remark no matter what - - -the chronology of the Timaeus, but, since the Timaeus is so - - +the chronology of the \ul{Timaeus}, but, since the \ul{Timaeus} is so late in the series of late dialogues, the remark becomes crucial. Several times in the preceding dialogues, the childishness of certain opinions is mentioned, and the rigours of dialectical discipline are extolled as the only -remedy. In the Parmenides, Socrates' youth is blamed for +remedy. In the \ul{Parmenides}, Socrates' youth is blamed for the naivete of the early form-doctrine (130) and in the - - -Theatetus (175) Socrates himself chides Theatetus for his - - +\ul{Theatetus} (175) Socrates himself chides \ul{Theatetus} for his youthful impatience. Plato used this form of criticism increasingly in the late dialogues, during which he came to realize that a certain maturity is prerequisite for -right philosophy. Now we are told that no amount of individual or personal maturity is of consequence for the +right philosophy. Now we are told that no amount of individual +or personal maturity is of consequence for the Greeks, for collectively they are all children. Here is a very definite indication that the sort of knowledge which -Timaeus will put forward is not reachable by that heretofore most favored of philosophical paths, the doctrine of +Timaeus will put forward is not reachable by that heretofore +most favored of philosophical paths, the doctrine of individual, personal reminiscence. In short, reflection is only the source of some knowledge, not of all. Taken in conjunction with the stated purpose of the dialogue, that is, the conditions of the best society, it delivers a - - -- fatal blow to the Socratic procedure of questioning - - - +fatal blow to the Socratic procedure of questioning contemporaries. There are some things about which contemporaries have no knowledge, and it is necessary to know these things in order to describe the best society. @@ -4500,8 +4441,9 @@ probable that one's contemporaries do not know this. This is precisely the difference between memory and history, and it constitutes a significant expansion of doctrine beyond the earlier dialogues. In earlier dialogues, myths were -presented to perform the function of carrying the individual memory beyond its contemporary confines, but we saw -in the Sophist that these myths (not all myths) were +presented to perform the function of carrying the individual +memory beyond its contemporary confines, but we saw +in the \ul{Sophist} that these myths (not all myths) were "childish." In short, more than the maturity of the individual @@ -4509,32 +4451,29 @@ person is required for true knowledge of the best society; the best society requires its citizens to have a knowledge of its origins; allegorically, this translates into the need for a society to know its ultimate origins, and it is -this interpretation which makes the Timaeus' relation of +this interpretation which makes the \ul{Timaeus}' relation of cosmology and sociology intelligible. In the process of -tracing the historical antiquity of Athens, the Timaeus +tracing the historical antiquity of Athens, the \ul{Timaeus} will discern the origins of the whole cosmos. As history includes memory, so cosmology includes sociology: this is the import of Timaeus' tale. And in both aspects of the proportion, the cardinal issue is the "amount" of time involved. - Solon, however, does not understand the appellation - - - -"children, " and inquires what the priest means when he says +"children," and inquires what the priest means when he says that he, Solon, an old man, is a "child." The priest -explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to temporary deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular +explains that there are periodic catastrophes due to temporary +deviations of the celestial bodies from their regular orbits, and that, at these times, the deviations bring about floods. These floods wreak havoc on most people but -the Egyptians are saved by their irrigation system. + For +the Egyptians are saved by their irrigation system.\pnote{2.4} For this reason, the Egyptians have been able to maintain a continuous record which covers a period of 8,000 years, but the Athenians were destroyed in one of these periodic catastrophes, and therefore have no continuous records. Thus they had to begin afresh, like children, to trace -their origins (22b-23d). +their origins (22b--23d). Solon is astonished, and asks for a more complete account of ancient Athens. The Egyptian priest responds @@ -4546,16 +4485,8 @@ Solon's stories are nothing more than nursery tales since they recount only one deluge, when in fact there have been several. Furthermore, the priest says that the Athenians were once counted among the bravest of people in - - the era just before the last catastrophe, and that present - - -4 Cornford, op, cit., appendix, p. 365. - - - -'Athenians are descended from their seed. (24) +Athenians are descended from their seed. (24) The priest describes the Egyptian caste system of priests, craftemen, and soldiers, in which system each @@ -4577,96 +4508,65 @@ had been defeated, and suggests that the invaders came from an island which has now vanished beneath the sea. Frutiger is not alone in the opinion that no such island ever existed, and concludes that it must be credited to -Plato's imagination. It is nevertheless fascinating to +Plato's imagination.\pnote{2.5} It is nevertheless fascinating to follow Cornford into the opinion that the island of - - Atlantis was the staging area for invaders who crossed the - - -> Pp, Frutiger, Les Myths de Platon (Paris: 1930), -pp. 244 ff. - - - -'Atlantic, perhaps from America. © +Atlantic, perhaps from America.\note{2.6} It 4s interesting to forecast the almost exact thematic parallel of the tale of the Egyptian priest and -the tale which Timaeus will deliver. In both, the cosmological origins of the art of healing are described. Plato +the tale which Timaeus will deliver. In both, the cosmological +origins of the art of healing are described. Plato of course viewed the proper function of statecraft to be the healing of society, as, for example, in his repeated comparisons of the statesman to the physician. Critias himself tells Socrates that he is surprised to notice how Socrates' story (the recapitulation of -Republic doctrines) and the tale of Atlantis resemble each +\ul{Republic} doctrines) and the tale of Atlantis resemble each other in so many details (25e). Critias had expected that -it would be difficult to find a basis for their conversation of today, and so he carefully rehearsed the story of +it would be difficult to find a basis for their conversation +of today, and so he carefully rehearsed the story of Atlantis before he spoke it (26). He assures us that the tale is exactly as he heard it because he says, -How true is the saying that what we learn in - +\Q{How true is the saying that what we learn in childhood has a wonderful hold on the memory. - I doubt if I could recall everything I heard - yesterday, but I should be surprised if I - have lost any detail of this story told me - -80 long ago (26b). +so long ago. (26b)} In addition to guaranteeing the accuracy of the tale, this remark of Critias tells us something else of equal 4mportance, for it reminds us that his tale is introduced - - only as a basis of today's conversation, and as the raw - - material for the discourse of Timaeus. Critias himself says +he has only approached the main points when he says: - -6 Cornford, op, cit., p. 14. - - - -'he has only approached the main points when he says: - - -We will transfer the state you (Socrates) described +\Q{We will transfer the state you (Socrates) described yesterday and its citizens from the region of theory to concrete fact; we will take the city of Athens and say that your imaginary citizens are those actual ancestors of ours of whom the priest spoke. They will fit perfectly and there will be - no inconsistency in declaring them to be the real -men of ancient times (26d). - +men of ancient times. (26d)} Thus it seems to be Plato's purpose to see beyond -the recapitulation of Republic doctrines which Socrates -made in the beginning of the Timaeus, and this is confirmed - - +the recapitulation of \ul{Republic} doctrines which Socrates +made in the beginning of the \ul{Timaeus}, and this is confirmed by the statement that Critias' story will serve only as - - material for today's discourse. For, if Critias' story - - were not only the basis but was in fact the perfect match between Socrates imaginary realm and the ancient city of Athens, the dialogue could end here, with the conclusion -that the Republic once existed. The doctrine of the -Timaeus, however, concerns not only what the best society +that the \ul{Republic} once existed. The doctrine of the +\ul{Timaeus}, however, concerns not only what the best society ought to be and what it was, but what is the origin of the best society and what is ita basis. -Socrates agrees that fitting the Republic citizens +Socrates agrees that fitting the \ul{Republic} citizens into ancient Athenian society is a proper basis for today's discourse, and goes so far as to say that if this is not the basis, there can be no other (26e). @@ -4675,21 +4575,17 @@ The plan of the projected trilogy is now revealed; Timaeus, who knows more of astronomy than anyone else present, will begin with the birth of the world and carry the account forward until he reaches the birth of man. - - Critias will start from the origin of man and carry the - - - -'account to the birth of Athens. In this way, the actual +account to the birth of Athens. In this way, the actual origins of society will be discovered. Interestingly, no mention is made of the proposed content of the -Hermocrates. Once before, Plato hinted at a projected -trilogy, and seems not to have completed the third dialogue. Perhaps, as before, we shall learn so much in the -two dialogues that the third seems unnecessary.' Or perhaps -Plato wrote the Laws instead. In any case, the point at -issue is whether the fitting of the Republic's citizens -into the ancient Athenian polis suffices to describe the +\bt{Hermocrates}. Once before, Plato hinted at a projected +trilogy, and seems not to have completed the third dialogue. +Perhaps, as before, we shall learn so much in the +two dialogues that the third seems unnecessary.\pnote{2.7} Or perhaps +Plato wrote the \ul{Laws} instead.\pnote{2.8} In any case, the point at +issue is whether the fitting of the \ul{Republic}'s citizens +into the ancient Athenian \e{polis} suffices to describe the origins and bases of the best society. It is agreed that Timaeus will account for the origin of man from his astronomical beginnings, and that this is necessary as a @@ -4698,58 +4594,33 @@ of society. One cannot therefore follow Taylor into the opinion that this introductory conversation is actually only an -introduction to the Critias.? By extending this logic, the -Parmenides and Theatetus are only introductions to the - - -Sophist, and the Sophist only an introduction to the - - -7 Q. Lauer, 8.J., The Being of Non-Being in Plato's -Sophist (unpublished manuscript; New York: Fordham -University). - -8 Cornford, op, cit., p. 8. - - -9 A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 440. - - - - - -'Statesman, etc. Such a linearization of Plato's philosophy - - +introduction to the \ul{Critias}.\pnote{2.9} By extending this logic, the +\ul{Parmenides} and \ul{Theatetus} are only introductions to the +\ul{Sophist}, and the \ul{Sophist} only an introduction to the +\ul{Statesman}, etc. Such a linearization of Plato's philosophy leaves everything behind in which case we should read only -the Laws and dismiss all else as preliminary introduction. +the \ul{Laws} and dismiss all else as preliminary introduction. In the next section, we shall confront Timaeus' own introduction, and as we shall see, he connects his remarks to the general introductory remarks we have just discussed. -II_ The Role of Image 27c-29d + +\secc The Role of Image (27c--29d) Timaeus invokes the blessings of the gods, as custom -requires, but says that the other members of the conversation must also call upon their own powers, so that they can +requires, but says that the other members of the conversation +must also call upon their own powers, so that they can understand Timaeus' thoughts on the proposed theme (27c). The first distinction to be made is that between - -what is always re&l and has no becoming and what - +\Q{what is always re&l and has no becoming and what it is which is always becoming and is never real. - That which is apprehensible by thought with a - rational account is the thing which is always - unchangeably real; whereas that which is the - object of belief together with unreasoning - sensation is the thing that becomes and passes - -away, but never has real being (28a). +away, but never has real being. (28a)} At first, this seems to be the familiar dichotomy between the eternal and the temporal, but it 4s not. In @@ -4757,46 +4628,27 @@ dividing the line of knowledge here, Plato deliberately accentuates the "top" and the "bottom," but leaves out the other intermediary divisions which he has established. In the Cave, opinion and false images were placed in between - - -the Forms and mere sensation; in the Theatetus, right - - -opinion was established; in the Sophist, genuine images; -and in the Philebus, the need to mix the Forms and the - - +the Forms and mere sensation; in the \ul{Theatetus}, right +opinion was established; in the \ul{Sophist}, genuine images; +and in the \bt{Philebus}, the need to mix the Forms and the four levels of knowledge. Thus the meaning of the sentences - - -Le - - - - - which open this section of discourse are illuminated by a summary of the doctrines of some of the preceding dialogues. This is confirmed by Timaeus' next sentence. He says, -Again all that becomes must needs become by the - +\Q{Again all that becomes must needs become by the agency of some cause, for without a cause nothing - can come to be. Now whenever the maker of anything looks to that which is always unchanging and uses - a model of that description in fashioning the form - -and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something - +and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes +must be good. If he looks to something that has come to be and uses a generated model, - -4t will not be good (28b). +4t will not be good. (28b)} Here is a recapitulation of the preliminary doctrine -of the good painter of the Sophist, where those imitations +of the good painter of the \ul{Sophist}, where those imitations which faithfully represent the proportions of the original are good images, but those which distort the original are mere fantasies (234, 235). The main point here is that in @@ -4804,83 +4656,62 @@ the early dialogues, an imitation would necessarily falsify; in the late dialogues, an imitation must be carefully made in order to preserve the proportions of its model, and if it does so, it may properly be called good. This is -especially true in the Philebus, where the cause of the +especially true in the \ul{Philebus}, where the cause of the mixture of elements is responsible for the quality of the mixture (27a). Here, Timaeus says that if the maker is to -use & generated model (a copy of the original) he will be +use a generated model (a copy of the original) he will be copying a copy, whereas he should copy the original, and by preserving its proportion, imitate genuinely. -This much could have been said in the Philebus, and +This much could have been said in the \ul{Philebus}, and was in fact said in other words. But now this doctrine must - - be generalized and tested on a cosmological scale. Therefore, - - --Timaeus uses the phrase, "concerning the whole 'heaven' or - - - -'world' (not heaven and world)..." (27b), parenthetically +Timaeus uses the phrase, "concerning the \e{whole} \sq{heaven} or +\sq{world} (not heaven \e{and} world)..." (27b), parenthetically adding that the name can be chosen to suit heaven itself. It - - -is interesting to observe that the term heaven (ouranos) is - - +is interesting to observe that the term heaven (\e{ouranos}) is now taken to be synonymous with the whole cosmos, whereas formerly, a strict division was made between heaven and - the visible world. This foreshadows the entire theme of the dialogue, in which the former gap between heaven and earth is now to be supplanted by a richer and more meaningful relation. Has this heaven, or universe, always been, or did it -begin from some beginning? Timaeus answers his own rhetorical question by saying that it must have begun because it +begin from some beginning? Timaeus answers his own rhetorical +question by saying that it must have begun because it has a body and is apprehensible by sensation together with right opinion, and it was formerly established that those things which are so apprehensible are things which become - - -and are generated. This refers to the Theatetus where it - - +and are generated. This refers to the \ul{Theatetus} where it was established that sensation and true opinion do have a measure of the truth but are not the sources of that truth, -and to the Sophist, where it was established that images, if +and to the \ul{Sophist}, where it was established that images, if genuine, have a measure of truth because they are not absolutely not-being but have a reality ot their own. The -doctrine of the Philebus is brought into the account in the - - +doctrine of the \ul{Philebus} is brought into the account in the next line where we read "But again that which becomes, we Say, must necessarily become by the agency of some cause" (28c). Next comes the often quoted statement "The maker and - - -'father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and - - - +father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind" (28c). This statement is absolutely central to the exposition of the remainder of the dialogue. It asserts that the gap between the eternal and the temporal realms is not only a cosmological but a sociological one. It is -not an impossible task to find the father of the universe; -it is hard. But it is impossible to declare him to all -mankind. For this reason, as it was said in the Statesman, +\e{not} an impossible task to find the father of the universe; +it is \e{hard.} But it is impossible to declare him to all +mankind. For this reason, as it was said in the \ul{Statesman}, some authors make myths and childish stories when they confront this impossibility of declaration, and even the One and the Many is said to be such a myth, made for minds incapable of genuine dialectic. Now the problem is not that there is a gap in the -structure of the universe, but that some kinds of communication are impossible. On the one hand, some truths are +structure of the universe, but that some kinds of communication +are impossible. On the one hand, some truths are ineffable, on the other hand some people cannot be told the glaring truth because it would momentarily blind them as it did the prisoner of the Cave when he was released @@ -4893,13 +4724,8 @@ and stories which the people feed themselves on; they hold on to these myths with rigid conviction, and the innovator in this area must beware lest he invite the hemlock with which Socrates was sentenced to death. Plato has already - - -aid several times that these myths are for children, but, - - - -'evidently, he has underestimated his own age. This relates +said several times that these myths are for children, but, +evidently, he has underestimated his own age. This relates directly to the whole purpose of the dialogue, which is to replace what Plato regards as dangerous fantasies about the ultimate origins of the universe, with a more rational @@ -4919,18 +4745,14 @@ original meaning. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the myths of the origin of the universe were probably held -with the fervor of blind conviction by Plato's contemporaries, much as they sometimes are by our own contemporaries, +with the fervor of blind conviction by Plato's contemporaries, +much as they sometimes are by our own contemporaries, so that the attempt to redefine them would be regarded as blasphemy by those whose hold on these myths was invested with the unshakable grasp of an inflexible conservatisn. This seems to be his meaning when Timaeus says that the maker of the universe clearly looked to the eternal for - - his model, and that the contrary supposition "...cannot be - - - spoken without blasphemy..." (29). Plato is caught between two extreme difficulties: on @@ -4954,19 +4776,7 @@ concern for the prisoners of the cave who would be blinded by the pure truth but left in the dark by anything less. The efficacy of the act of communication involves taking the audience's view into account, and Plato was far from - - -ignorant on this point. !° - - -10 or, vig. Gioscia, "A Perspective for Role Theory," - - -The American Catholic Sociological Review, XXII, 2 -Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 143 ff. - - - +ignorant on this point.\pnote{2.10} This accounts for the strangely popular grounds on which the argument (whether the model of the universe is @@ -4995,28 +4805,22 @@ sense, the world is the best result of the best cause, but in another sense, it is only the best of things that have become, and becoming is not the best sort of being. In short, there has already been a slight movement from the - - etrictly univocal causality of the best cause, toward some - - - -kind of intermediary causation. In this way, Plato continues to pose the whole problem of some sort of mid-ground -between eternity and the realm of becoming. This is confirm~ -ed in what follows next. +kind of intermediary causation. In this way, Plato continues +to pose the whole problem of some sort of mid-ground +between eternity and the realm of becoming. This is confirmed +in what follows next. Timaeus says, - - -Again, these things being so, our world must -necessarily be a likeness (eikona) of something. +\Q{Again, these things being so, our world must +necessarily be a likeness (\e{eikona}) of something. Now in every matter it is of great moment to start at the right point in accordance with the -nature of the subject (kata physin archen). -Concerning a likeness (eikonos) then, and its -model (paradeigmatos) we must make this -distinction; an account (logos) is of the same -order (suggenes) as the thing it sets forth +nature of the subject (\e{kata physin archen}). +Concerning a likeness (\e{eikonos}) then, and its +model (\e{paradeigmatos}) we must make this +distinction; an account (\e{logos}) is of the same +order (\e{suggenes}) as the thing it sets forth an account of that which is abiding and stable and discoverable by the aid of reason will itself be abiding and unchangeable (so far as @@ -5024,22 +4828,19 @@ it is possible and it lies in the nature of the account to be incontrovertible and irrefutable, there must be no falling short of that); while an account of what is made in the -image (eikonos) of that other, but is only a -likeness (eikona) will itself be but likely -(eikotas) standing to accounts of the former +image (\e{eikonos}) of that other, but is only a +likeness (\e{eikona}) will itself be but likely +(\e{eikotas}) standing to accounts of the former in a proportion: as reality is to becoming so -is truth to belief (29b-c, Cornford). - +is truth to belief. (29b--c, Cornford)} Since this passage is absolutely central to the -whole exposition of Plato's philosophy of time, imaze, and +whole exposition of Plato's philosophy of time, image, and eternity, it may be well to compare other translations of this paragraph. Archer-Hind has it: - - -Granting this, it must needs be that this universe +\Q{Granting this, it must needs be that this universe is a likeness of something. Now it is all important to make our beginning according to nature: and this affirmation must be laid down with regard to a @@ -5049,24 +4850,19 @@ therefore of that which is abiding and sure and discoverable by the aid of reason the words too Must be abiding and unchanging and so far as it lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable - - - - - they must in no wise fall short of this; but those which deal with that which is made in -the image of the former and which is a likeness, must be likely and duly corresponding +the image of the former and which is a likeness, +must be likely and duly corresponding with their subject: as being is to becoming, -so ia truth to belief (29b-c, Archer-Hind). - +so ia truth to belief. (29b-c, Archer-Hind)} Jowett has: - -And being of such a nature the world has been +\Q{And being of such a nature the world has been framed by him with a view to that which is -apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and if this be admitted must of necessity +apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, +and if this be admitted must of necessity be a copy of something. Now that the beginning of everything should be according to nature is a great matter. Let us then assume about the @@ -5074,31 +4870,27 @@ copy and original that the words are akin to the matter which they describe, and that when they relate to the lasting and the permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting - and unfailing, and as far as is in the nature of words irrefutable and immovable, and nothing less than this. But the words which are the expression of the immitation of the eternal things, which is an image only, need only be likely and analogous to the former words. - What essence is to generation, that truth is +to belief. (29b--c, Jowett)} -to belief (29b, c, Jowett). - +T.T. Taylor has: -T.f. Taylor has: - - -And from hence it is perfectly necessary that -this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to +\Q{And from hence it is perfectly necessary that +this world should be the resemblance of something. +But to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In -this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are +this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning +the image and its exemplar. As words are allied to the things of which they are the interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we speak of that which is stable and firm and intellectually apparent, that our reasons - should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as much as possible irreprehensible, with every perfection of a similar kind. But that, when we @@ -5107,14 +4899,11 @@ speak concerning the image of that which is arguments, which have the same analogue to the former as a resemblance to its exemplar. And, indeed, as essence is to generation, so is truth -to faith (29bec, .T. Taylor). - - +to faith. (29b--c, T.T. Taylor)} R.G. Bury has: - -Again if these premises be granted, it is wholly +\Q{Again if these premises be granted, it is wholly necessary that this Cosmos should be a Copy of something. Now in regard to every matter it is most important to begin at the natural beginning. @@ -5130,36 +4919,23 @@ wise fall short thereof; whereas the accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of that Model, and is itself a likeness, will be analogous thereto and posess liklihood; for as Being is to -Becoming, so is Truth to Belief (29b-c, Bury). - +Becoming, so is Truth to Belief. (29b--c, Bury)} These five translations and the commentaries on the passage will be reviewed in order. First, Cornford holds that the chief point established in this prelude is that the visible world, of which an account is to be given, is - - -a changing image or likeness (eikon) of an eternal model, - - +a changing image or likeness (\e{eikon}) of an eternal model, and reasons that it is not a realm of being but of becoming. He says, therefore, that we must not expect anything more than a "likely" account, because only that which is stable can produce a stable account, and becoming is not stable. "There can never be a final statement of exact truth about -this changing object."!! Having taken this view, Cornford +this changing object."\pnote{2.11} Having taken this view, Cornford goes on to comment on the distinction of being and becoming. It 18 to be noticed that he delivers his comment as a - - derivative of his view that the account of becoming is - - -1 Cornford, op, cit., p. 24. - - - -only likely because it is unstable. +\e{only} likely because it is unstable. Cornford comments that the opening sentence of the preceding passage divides the world into two veulne: the @@ -5168,17 +4944,13 @@ sensation, which is always imprecise and in flux. We have seen however that this two-fold division is not a dichotomy, but rather an emphasis on the extremes of a four-fold division. We differ, therefore, with Cornford's conclusion -that the use of the word "becoming" (genesis) by Plato is +that the use of the word "becoming" (\e{genesis}) by Plato is "ambiguous" by which he indicates that it has only two meanings, one which means that a thing comes into existence, acd the other which means that a thing is in the process of change. There are many more senses in which the word "becoming" can be understood, as Plato showed in the - - -Parmenides (151e-152e). For example, one may say "is - - +\ul{Parmenides} (151e--152e). For example, one may say "is becoming," "was becoming," "becoming older," "becoming younger," "will be becoming," etc. On the basis of his simple division into two meanings, Cornford adopts the @@ -5189,105 +4961,72 @@ Christian theory of creation to Plato via Whitehead's theory of time. The point here is the fact that Cornford has assumed Plato to have spoken a simple dichotomy, the familiar dichotomy between the realm of Forms and the reaim -of becoming. Thus, for example, he says that the Sophist +of becoming. Thus, for example, he says that the \ul{Sophist} similarly divided the kinds of production in two (265b) - - - -'whereas it is clear that there are several kinds of +whereas it is clear that there are several kinds of production stated theres human and divine, fantasy ad image, proportional and non-proportional. This is especially -important, because the Sophist divides genuine production +important, because the \ul{Sophist} divides genuine production into human production and divine production, but omits speaking of false divine production whereesa it does speak of false human production. It is precisely this problen, i.e., how can a divine product be lacking in any divine perfection, which Plato is now examining. But it is not a mere repetition; it is now the starting point for Plato's -expanded doctrine. Just as the Sophist investigated the +expanded doctrine. Just as the \ul{Sophist} investigated the relation between not-being and divine production in the - - realm of things, so now the Timaceus is investigating the - - relation between not-being and the divine production of - the entire cosmos. One need not suppose that the familiar doctrine of the split between the realm of Forms and the -realm of things has remained unmodified between the Republic - - -and the Timaeus. One need not assume that there is no - - -difference between the Sophist doctrine and the Republic +realm of things has remained unmodified between the \ul{Republic} +and the \ul{Timaeus}. One need not assume that there is no +difference between the \ul{Sophist} doctrine and the \ul{Republic} doctrine with respect to the reality of not-being. Yet Cornford introduces the Sophist's division (which he sees -as a dichotomy) into the Timaeus, which he similarly - - +as a dichotomy) into the \ul{Timaeus}, which he similarly dichotomizes. + Cornford notes that the distinction to be made is not simply between being and becoming, but between eternal - - -being and that which is always becoming. It seems better - - -= - - - +being and that which is \e{always} becoming. It seems better to state that Plato is here distinguishing that which is - - -only becoming and always becoming, from another sort of +\e{only becoming and always becoming,} from another sort of becoming, which it is the business of this dialogue to - - discuss. Therefore, while it is perfectly true to Plato to say that, clearly, the world has become, it does not follow -to say that the world is only becoming, for, on that +to say that the world is \e{only becoming,} for, on that supposition, how could it be the best of things that have become? Consistently, then, Cornford concludes that the -maker of the universe is merely mythical and that therefore +maker of the universe is \e{merely} mythical and that therefore there was no "moment of creation." This follows from -Cornford's division of the passage into only two realms, -which he concludes must therefore be either true or mythical. +Cornford's division of the passage into \e{only} two realms, +which he concludes must therefore be \e{either} true \e{or} mythical. But the whole division in two is not the only interpretation possible, for it does not follow Plato through his development. Thus, Cornford is led to take literally the dictum - - -of the Seventh Letter that there neither was nor is nor - - +of the \ul{Seventh Letter} that there neither was nor is nor shall be a doctrine of Plato's on the subject, and that -Plato is only revealing a mythical figure of the maker of +Plato is \e{only} revealing a mythical figure of the maker of universe, but not the real exact truth. Cornford's view makes it impossible to conclude that the difficulty of revealing the maker to all mankind is not a sociological aifficulty inherent in the crass and hollow mentality of most men, nor the impossibility of an ineffable truth, but Plato's refusal to speak out what he knows perfectly well. - - fhis seems to be only one interpretation of the passage - - - which states clearly that the maker can be found, admittedly with difficulty, but cannot be revealed. Cornford precludes the interpretation that the difficulties of communication necessitate the mythical figure or that it might be true to say that the maker is ineffably inscrutable and should not -be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpretations seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal +be spoken for fear of blasphemy, both of which interpretations +seem more plausible in the light of the doctrinal development of the late dialogues. Thus Cornford says that -a similar "device" was employed in the Republic, referring +a similar "device" was employed in the \ul{Republic}, referring probably to the Myth of Er. But in the late dialorues, Plato repeatedly criticises these myths as childish. Yet Cornford's interpretation of myth is responsible for his @@ -5298,95 +5037,56 @@ It will be the business of our concluding chapter to show why Cornford's interpretation narrowly construes Timaeus' mythical language. Suffice it at this point to indicate what that conclusion will be. Plato does not -stop at a merely mythical account in the Timaeus. True, - - -there is another myth of "creation" in the Timaeus, but - - +stop at a \e{merely} mythical account in the \ul{Timaeus}. True, +there is another myth of "creation" in the \ul{Timaeus}, but 4t is not all that is to be found there. In addition to the mythical, Plato is, as usual, revealing what he feels - - -to be the truth, so that he who sees what the myth means - - -has seen more than the myth. In this way, the Timaeus can be - - +to be the truth, so that he who sees what the myth \e{means} +has seen more than the myth. In this way, the \bt{Timaeus} can be read either as myth and myth alone, or it can also be interpreted as a new doctrine in which Plato points - - -,clearly beyond mere myth. This view is clearest in the - - - -ending of the passage cited, where Plato says that we must | +clearly beyond \e{mere} myth. This view is clearest in the +ending of the passage cited, where Plato says that we must see, not mere myth, but a likely myth, just as in the -Theatetus we must have, not only opinion, but right opinion, - - -or in the Sophist and opening passages of the Timaeus, we - - +\ul{Theatetus} we must have, not only opinion, but right opinion, +or in the \ul{Sophist} and opening passages of the \ul{Timaeus}, we must see, not mere images, but moving images, which faithfully reproduce the proportions of the original model. Thus, Cornford can say, -In the application here it is argued that, since - +\Q{In the application here it is argued that, since the world is in fact good, its maker must have - copied a model that is eternal. The world then is - -a@ copy, an image, of the real. It is not, indeed, - +a copy, an image, of the real. It is not, indeed, like an artist's painting, at a third remove from +reality but on the other hand it is not wholly +real.\pnote{2.12}} -tettaty but on the other hand it is not wholly - -real,! -Notice that Cornford does not distinguish, as the Sophist +Notice that Cornford does not distinguish, as the \ul{Sophist} does (at 266d) between a good painter's faithful copy, and -@ poor painter's unfaithful distortion. Cornford implies +a poor painter's unfaithful distortion. Cornford implies that images are separated from the ultimate reality. Cornford seems to ignow the distinction between a genuine image and a mere copy in this case. He says, "The cosmology -of the Timaeus is poetry, an image that may come nearer the -truth than some other cosmologies."13 He seems to mean -mere poetry, as opposed to genuine poetry. This does not +of the \ul{Timaeus} is poetry, an image that \e{may} come nearer the +truth than some other cosmologies."\pnote{2.13} He seems to mean +\e{mere} poetry, as opposed to genuine poetry. This does not help us to understand Timaeus' statement that he will give the best possible account, which seems to mean genuine - - poetry. - -But what does the statement that the Timaeus is - - -12 Ipaa., p. 28. -'S tIpid., p. 30. - - - +But what does the statement that the \ul{Timaeus} is poetry mean for Cornford, It means that - -eeeinexactness and inconsistency are inherent in - +\Q{...inexactness and inconsistency are inherent in the nature of the subject; they cannot be removed - by a stripping off the veil of allegory. An allegory, like a cypher, has a key; the Pilgrim's - Progress can be retranslated into the terms of - Bunyan's theology. But there is no key to poetry +or myth.\pnote{2.14}} -or myth.!4 -. Certainly there is poetry, and myth, and imagery. +Certainly there is poetry, and myth, and imagery. But these must not be seen in the youthful light of the myths which Plato himself calls childish; they must be seen as the best possible account to reveal this doctrine @@ -5396,39 +5096,30 @@ since, in such a view, things are either perfectly true or they are only images. But for Plato, this simple dichotomy has long outlived its utility, and the doctrine of not-being, and the mixture of being and not-being is, -in the Timaeus, a further effort on Plato's part to +in the \ul{Timaeus}, a further effort on Plato's part to clarify his thought on these matters. Archer-Hind comments that the eternal model of the universe and its creation in time represents Plato's use of allegory, and that there can be -no question whatsoever of the beginning of the - +\Q{no question whatsoever of the beginning of the universe in time. The creation in time is simply - part of the figurative representation; in Plato's - highly poetical and allegorical exposition, a - - logical analysis is represented as taking place in time, and to reach his true meaning we must +strip off the veil of allegory.\pnote{2.15}} - -14 Ipta., pp. 31-2. - - -strip off the veil of allegory.1!5 -Here 4s the source of Cornford's statement that it is +\noindent Here is the source of Cornford's statement that it is impossible to "strip off the veil of allegory." Later in his commentary, Archer-Hind writes that although Plato is talking about "absolute thought thinking itself" Plato has put this idea into the figure of a gradually unfolding -process. My view is that it is not necessary to strip off +process. My view is that it is \e{not} necessary to strip off the veil of allegory to see Plato's meaning, for the allegory does not conceal but enhances the doctrine. For -those who see only the allegory, it affords a pretty image +those who see \e{only} the allegory, it affords a pretty image of the truth. But for those who see the doctrine, the image 4s an added richness, which does not cloud the doctrine, but actually helps it to radiate of itself, and to shine @@ -5437,67 +5128,51 @@ not translate the final portion of the passage in question by the phrase "only an image"; he says, simply, that an image is "likely" and "duly corresponding" with its subject. Thus Archer-Hind is able to conclude that words -stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent as the images do, and that this proportion is a +stand in the same relation to the Forms, which they represent +as the images do, and that this proportion is a special case of the more general formula at the end of the -passage, which has it that becoming is to being as probability is to truth, This is not mere imagery, for words - - +passage, which has it that becoming is to being as probability +is to truth, This is not \e{mere} imagery, for words themselves, in this setting, become images. Later, when - - -15 R.D. Archer-Hind, Commentary on the Timaeus -London: The Macmillan Company, 1000), p. 00, n. 14. - - - the whole cosmos is termed an image, Cornford's diminution of imagery will suffer because he has not allowed anything less than pure being to be called being, and so, whatever is less than pure must be somehow less than real. Thus Archer-Hind has escaped the claws of this argument by interpreting Plato's text to mean that words and images -must correspond to that which they represent, 36 that a -moving cosmos described without the use of a moving image +must correspond to that which they represent, so that a +moving \e{cosmos} described without the use of a moving image would violate the canons Plato sets down for faithful representation. However, Archer=-Hind seems not to follow his own conviction that the later dialogues show a constant progression, because he adds that this analogy is precisely -what one finds at Republic 511e. But there we find, not a +what one finds at \ul{Republic} 511e. But there we find, not a division into two parts which are proportional, but 4 fourfold division of the powers of the soul where images -are the lowest level of intelligence, and not the proportional representation of truths of reason. +are the lowest level of intelligence, and not the proportional +representation of truths of reason. -Jowett too holds that the images which are only -4mitations of eternal things must be only images. Jowett's +Jowett too holds that the images which are \e{only} +imitations of eternal things must be \e{only} images. Jowett's well-known Kantian bias is clearly evident here, since those kinds of knowledge which give anything less than the inscrutable nature of the Forms cannot be satisfactorily -called true knowledge, but only images and copies. The -fact that Jowett places the Timaeus next after the Republic +called true knowledge, but \e{only} images and copies. The +fact that Jowett places the \ul{Timaeus} next after the \ul{Republic} is in part based on his claim that there is little differeme between the doctrine of the two dialogues. This is a - - - - - -function of two factors; first, Jowett wrote his translations before the stylometrists ushered in the new era of - - -Platonic criticism, and second, if one reads the Timaeus -with the expectation that its doctrine will ot differ +function of two factors; first, Jowett wrote his translations +before the stylometrists ushered in the new era of +Platonic criticism, and second, if one reads the \ul{Timaeus} +with the expectation that its doctrine will not differ materially from the doctrine of the middle period, and then translates the text with that view in mind, it is not only consistent but logically necessary to write "only an image." But if one follows the majority of scholars who -placed the Timaeus in the late period, then one may see in - - -the Timaeus certain doctrinal reformulations, so that it - - +placed the \ul{Timaeus} in the late period, then one may see in +the \ul{Timaeus} certain doctrinal reformulations, so that it is not necessary to expect Plato to speak in the same epistemological voice which the later dialogues clearly modulate. @@ -5506,116 +5181,76 @@ But a point worth making is partially confirmed by Jowett, in that he agrees with Archer-Hind that Plato makes words proportional to their referents, just as images are proportional to their paradigms. Although -Cornford's translation of "accounts" is somewhat cumbersome, Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating +Cornford's translation of "accounts" is somewhat cumbersome, +Jowett, however, agrees with Cornford in translating the second half of the proportion "what essence is to generation, so truth is to belief," although Cornford prefers being to essence. -The little=-consulted work of T.T. Taylor is also -instructive with regard to the passage in question. [f.T. -Taylor translates paradeigmatos not as paradigm, nor as +The little-consulted work of T.T. Taylor is also +instructive with regard to the passage in question. T.T. +Taylor translates \e{paradeigmatos} not as paradigm, nor as model, but as exemplar. This translation could lead to the - - game difficulty into which Cornford was led, since the - - - - - word exemplar has inescapably transcendental connotations, creating the impression that there is a spatial separation between the world of exemplars and the world of images, and this in turn would lead to the diminution of the role of images and the arguments based upon them. And so, T.T. Taylor says that in the discussion of images, "we should -employ only probable arguments," thereby separating what +employ \e{only} probable arguments," thereby separating what Plato is trying to put together in a new way. However, T.T. Taylor says, -The faith which Plato now assumes appears to be +\Q{The faith which Plato now assumes appears to be different from that of which he speaks in the -sixth book of the Republic, in the section of +sixth book of the \ul{Republic}, in the section of aline; for that is irrational knowledge, whence also it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged according to sense. But the present faith is rational, although it is mingled with irrational knowledges, employing sense and conjecture; aud -hence is filled with much that is unstable.! +hence is filled with much that is unstable.\pnote{2.16}} + He goes on to say that for Plato there are four kinds of truth, and that some must be conjoined with sensibles. This opinion is noteworthy since it was written in 1804, -@ full half-century before the scholars decided to resort +a full half-century before the scholars decided to resort to language tables to sort the dialogues into their chronological context. Here is a scholar who sees that +Plato's reference is to the \e{four} truths, not of the \ul{Republic}, +but of the \ul{Philebus}, where the Good is said to impart +purity to the mixture.\pnote{2.17} - -Plato's reference is to the four truths, not of the Republic, - - -but of the Philebus, where the Good is said to impart - - - -purity to the mixture. - - -16 T.T. Taylor, The Timaeus and Critias of Plato -(Washington: Pantheon Books Inc., 1952), p. 112. - - -'7 Ip4a., p. 17. - - - -Bury does not relate the four truths of the Timaeus -to the four divisions of the Philebus, but, instead, -dichotomizes being and becoming, '8 Thus in the last few +Bury does not relate the four truths of the \ul{Timaeus} +to the four divisions of the \bt{Philebus}, but, instead, +dichotomizes being and becoming.\pnote{2.18} Thus in the last few lines of his translation, he says that, on the one hand, . statements which copy the eternal must be, -in so far as it is possible and fitting for +\Q{in so far as it is possible and fitting for statements to be, irrefutable and invincible, they must in no wise fall short thereof, whereas the accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of that model, and is itself a likeness, will be -analogous thereto and posess likelihood; -Although Bury does not insert an "only" in this passage, +analogous thereto and posess likelihood;} + +\noindent Although Bury does not insert an "only" in this passage, the feeling tone is indicated in his tra*slation by his use of "whereas," which makes it seem that he has shifted the field and is now speaking of the opposite side of the dichotomy. His translation makes it seem that the universe 4s only a copy of a copy, and therefore probably lese than true. This seems to go against the aim of the passage, - - which is to account for the use of imagery, which, in - - -earlier dialogues (Republic, Phaedo) were unworthy vehicles - - -of the truth, but in later dialogues (Sophist, Statesman) +earlier dialogues (\ul{Republic}, \ul{Phaedo}) were unworthy vehicles +of the truth, but in later dialogues (\ul{Sophist}, \ul{Statesman}) are not only worthy but somehow necessary to describe the not-being integral to every real thing. It is A.E. Taylor's view that the Platonic theory - - -of creation in the Timaeus is a perfectly Christian vision, - - +of creation in the \ul{Timaeus} is a perfectly Christian vision, and that, futhermore, Plato's view is best understood by - - applying to it the fundamentals of Whitehead's theory of - - -18 Bury, "Plato and History," p. 5. - - - - - -time, as set out in the "Concept of Nature." There are +time, as set out in the \et{Concept of Nature.} There are here actually two "heresies," as Cornford says. The first ig the assertion that Plato's theory of creation is assimilable to the Christian notion: the second is that @@ -5623,11 +5258,12 @@ Whitehead's theory is both Christian and Platonic. It might seem that these theological disputes are not to the point, but, unfortunately, Taylor has introduced them in explanation of the passage which is under discussion. + Taylor first determines that Plato has said that the world clearly must have had an eternal model but that the world itself is mutable. Then he says, "This is virtually what Whitehead means when he says in his own -terminology that objects are 'angredient'"!9 in events. +terminology that objects are \sq{ingredient}"\pnote{2.19} in events. From this he draws the inference that Plato insists on a provisional character of representation because the senses only perceive roughly, and because it takes a long time for @@ -5638,245 +5274,150 @@ speculations derive from A.E. Taylor and hardly at all from Plato. It might be true to assert that Plato held the senses not to be "infinitely acute" but this is a long way from the claim that Plato offers a provisional +account \e{because} the senses are so dull and because they +can only report what they perceive at a given time\pnote{2.20} - -account because the senses are so dull and because they - - -19 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 73. - - - - - -can only report what they perceive at a given time, °° - - -AE, Taylor nevertheless does not insert the "only" which +A.E. Taylor nevertheless does not insert the "only" which others want. His translation reads: - -We must lay it down that discourses are akin in - +\Q{We must lay it down that discourses are akin in character to that which they expound, discourses - about the permanent and stable and apprehensible - by thought themselves permanent and unchanging - (so far as it is possible and proper for discourses - to be irrefutable and final, there must be no - -fallingshort of thate-), discourses about that -which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding to their objects.2! +falling short of that---), discourses about that +which is itself a likeness likely and corresponding +to their objects.\pnote{2.21}} However, he adds the comment that Timaeus' discourse and Timaeus' "warning" about proportionality pertain to the whole cosmology. - -It is not given as a finally true account of - +\Q{It is not given as a finally true account of anything but simply (only?) as the account which, - so far as Timaeus can see, best "saves," i.e., - does full justice to all the "appearances" so far +as they are known to him.\pnote{2.22}} -as they are known to him.22 -So, although A.E. Taylor does not insert "only" in his +\noindent So, although A.E. Taylor does not insert "only" in his translation, he asks that the passage be interpreted as a warning that the account is simply the best one which Timaeus can devise to save the appearances. This follows - - -upon Taylor's assumption that the Timaeus is a dialogue in - - +upon Taylor's assumption that the \ul{Timaeus} is a dialogue in which we should expect to find "nothing more" than the doctrine of a fifth-century Pythagorean, a "provisional - - tale," the "best approximation" Timaeus could manage. This - - -20 tpi. -21 Ipid., p. 74. -22 tpid. - - - - - interpretation makes it impossible for Taylor to accept the Timaeus as a dialogue which contains anything of the -"later Platonic theory. "2 +"later Platonic theory."\pnote{2.23} Rather than enter into a detailed discussion of this Taylorian "heresy," as Cornford calls it, and rather than give the details of a long and involved series of quotations from the Ancients, it seems more appropriate to state Cornford's view of A.E. Taylor's unique and solitary -opinion that the Timaeus is only Plato's eclectic and +opinion that the \ul{Timaeus} is \e{only} Plato's eclectic and rather artificial combination of Empedoclean biology on to the stock of Pythagorean mathematics and astronomy. Cornford says, in summary, -It is hard to understand how anyone acquainted - +\Q{It is hard to understand how anyone acquainted with the literature and art of the classical - period can imagine that the greatest philosopher - of that period, at the height of his powers, - could have wasted his time on so frivolous and - -futile an exercise in pastiche.@ - +futile an exercise in pastiche.\pnote{2.24}} In addition, Cornford feels that "There is more of Plato -in The Adventures of Ideas than there is of Whitehead in - - -the Timaeus."29 - +in \bt{The Adventures of Ideas} than there is of Whitehead in +the \ul{Timaeus}."\pnote{2.25} Except for Bury's, the most recent translation of the -passages under discussion (29b=c) is Cornford's, which has +passages under discussion (29b--c) is Cornford's, which has the additional merit of supplying a detailed commentary, - - familiar at once with the sources and the conclusions of - - -23 Ipid., p. 19. - - -24 Cornford, op. cit., pe. x. - - -25 Ibid., pp. 11=12, - - - Platonic scholars. Yet Cornford's translation contains the - - -assumption that the doctrine of the Timaeus cannot go - - +assumption that the doctrine of the \ul{Timaeus} cannot go beyond the dialogues of the late period which precede it. -Yet Cornford himself places the Timeaeus after the Philebus - - -on doctrinal grounds; he feels that the Timaeus generalizes - - -the divisions of the Philebus into the far more general - - -topic of cosmology. But he fails to see that the Timaeus -does not merely apply the Philebus' doctrine to cosmology; - - -the Timaeus seeks a broader generalization of insight, - - +Yet Cornford himself places the Timeaeus after the \ul{Philebus} +on doctrinal grounds; he feels that the \ul{Timaeus} generalizes +the divisions of the \ul{Philebus} into the far more general +topic of cosmology. But he fails to see that the \ul{Timaeus} +does not merely \e{apply} the \ul{Philebus}' doctrine to cosmology; +the \ul{Timaeus} seeks a broader generalization of insight, proportional to the broader range of inquiry. Thus, in the passage in question, one should not conclude with Cornford -that Timaeus is apologizing for the use of image because +that \ul{Timaeus} is apologizing for the use of image because of Plato's repudiation of images in the middle period. There is an explanation which is much more simple; the - - -Timaeus says quite simply that the image by which the - - +\ul{Timaeus} says quite simply that the image by which the universe is to be described is proportional to its model. The simplest view is that Plato now introduces an image into his most mature doctrine, and one can plausibly draw the inference that Plato's mature doctrine contains a rejwassesment of the value of an image. To force Plato to hold fast to his earlier repudiation of the value of images -is to preclude the need for the whole Timaeus, which, +is to preclude the need for the whole \ul{Timaeus}, which, nevertheless, Plato wrote in his last years. Thus, the simplest interpretation of 29b-c seems best. We must accept Plato's statement that the Universe - - -is an image, and we ought not inflict our interpretations - - - +\e{is} an image, and we ought not inflict our interpretations of the earlier Platonic Philosophy on the philosophy Plato - - -writes in the Timaeus. This interpretation saves us the - - +writes in the \ul{Timaeus}. This interpretation saves us the trouble of inserting cumbersome deviations from Plato's simple language. It seems too circuitous to assert that, -although Plato says the Universe is an image, what he -really means is that the Universe is not an image but only -allegorically described as if it were an image. It seems +although Plato says the Universe \e{is} an image, what he +really means is that the Universe is \e{not} an image but \e{only} +allegorically described \e{as if} it were an image. It seems simpler and more correct to say, with Plato, that our -Universe is an image. +Universe \e{is} an image. Now the problem becomes more philosophical, for we must inquire of the succeeding passages about the reality of an image, what an image is and why an image is, and, - - -with Plato and the whole Timaeus, when an image is. This - - +with Plato and the whole \ul{Timaeus}, \e{when} an image is. This inquiry, as we shall see, is not to be separated from the - - -main theme of the trilogy of which the Timaeus is the first - - +main theme of the trilogy of which the \ul{Timaeus} is the first dialogue; what are the conditions of the best form of society. -It would seem then, that the sense of 29b-c is as +It would seem then, that the sense of 29b--c is as follows: - -Granting these premises, we must see now that our +\Q{Granting these premises, we must see now that our Universe is an image of something. Now in all things -4t is most important to start at the natural beginning. Concerning an image, then, and its paradigm, we +it is most important to start at the natural beginning. +Concerning an image, then, and its paradigm, we must state the following: as a word is proportional -to the reality it describes,-a description of that +to the reality it describes, a description of that which is stable and abiding and discoverable by the aid of reason being itself stable and abiding (so -far as it is possible for descriptions to be so -there must be no falling short of that) so, a +far as it is possible for descriptions to be so---there +must be no falling short of that) so, a description which describes an image will be proportional to the image it describes; as reality -is to becoming, so is truth to rational faith. - - - +is to becoming, so is truth to rational faith.} -This reading, it seems, restores the whole proportional tone of the passage, which is a carefully balanced -set of proportional propositions, culminating in the statement that reality is to becoming what truth is to a rational -faith. : +This reading, it seems, restores the whole proportional +tone of the passage, which is a carefully balanced +set of proportional propositions, culminating in the statement +that reality is to becoming what truth is to a rational +faith. -Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the participants of the dialogue should accept the account he is -about to give as a "probable myth" (eikota mython) (29d) +Thus, when Timaeus tells Socrates that the participants +of the dialogue should accept the account he is +about to give as a "probable myth" (\e{eikota mython}) (29d) 4t need not be understood as "only" a myth but, in contradistinction to the childish myths which are for those who can see no further, the myth which Timaeus is about to tell is a likely or probable myth. This follows out the theme established in the former passage. Just as the image -which our world is, is not merely an image, so the myth of -Timaeus is not merely a myth. As the image is proportional +which our world is, is not \e{merely} an image, so the myth of +Timaeus is not merely a \e{myth}. As the image is proportional to its model, so the myth will be proportional to its model. The myth is a description of the Universe, and the -Universe is an image. And since the image is faithful to -the proportions of the original, as the Sophist stated it +Universe \e{is} an image. And since the image is faithful to +the proportions of the original, as the \ul{Sophist} stated it must be to have its measure of truth, so the myth will be proportional to the image, so that it can have its measure of truth. For some images are fantasies, and some myths are @@ -5885,55 +5426,33 @@ which describes it is faithful to the proportions of the image, its model. As reality is to becoming, so image is to myth. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the reality and hence the reliability of images and myths - - - - - -depends on the account given to images in the Sophist +depends on the account given to images in the \ul{Sophist} which goes beyond the sterile purity of the isolated Forms - - -of the Parmenides, which were there described as due to the - - +of the \ul{Parmenides}, which were there described as due to the naivete of the youthful Socrates. In this connection, it - - must equally be stressed that Plato is not vindicating any - - -and all myths. He explicitly says only faithful images - -(in the Sophist) and only probable myths (in the Timaeus). +and all myths. He explicitly says only \e{faithful} images +(in the \ul{Sophist}) and only probable myths (in the \ul{Timaeus}). But this is new. For Plato had written myths in each of the dialogues in the late period, and the famous myth of Er of -the Republic is easily remembered. In the Sophist even - +the \ul{Republic} is easily remembered. In the \ul{Sophist} even some views of the One and the Many are called childish -myths. And in the Seventh Letter, Plato tells us that there - - +myths. And in the \ul{Seventh Letter}, Plato tells us that there neither was nor is nor shall there ever be a doctrine of Plato's on the subject of the ultimate Forms. In view of -29bec this paradoxical statement becomes intelligible. It +29b--c this paradoxical statement becomes intelligible. It means that there cannot be a doctrine of the ultimate Forms -in isolation. Since the Universe is an image, the account +in \e{isolation}. Since the Universe is an image, the account of its ultimate Forms must be proportional to its reality. thus the account of the origins of the Universe, which is a locus of the Forms and the powers which they promise, must -be mythical; not merely mythical, but genuinely mythical. +be mythical; not \e{merely} mythical, but \e{genuinely} mythical. It is Plato's sense of the inneffable and his poetic genius to see beyond every exact and fixed statement. The need not to blaspheme and yet the need to communicate can only be united in a properly proportional account of the subject. One must, and yet one dares not, speak the Name of the - - Ultimate Form. One may find the father of this universe - - -_ 194 but it is impossible to reveal him to all mankind. This speaks the double necessity not to lie and not to distort, and this double necessity is met by the true myth, which @@ -5941,19 +5460,13 @@ functions to reveal yet hide, to speak yet remain silent. Thus, while the myth speaks Plato's doctrine, in a sense, 4t does not constitute a doctrine. It is precisely this notespeaking which constitutes the connecting theme between - - -the Timaeus and the Sophist, but, at the same time, it is - - +the \ul{Timaeus} and the \ul{Sophist}, but, at the same time, it is the generalization of this theme to a cosmic level, united to the investigation of time and eternity insofar as they -relate to the best society, which constitutes the Timaeus +relate to the best society, which constitutes the \ul{Timaeus} as a culmination of the themes of eternity, image, and time, as they were gradually developed in the later dialogues. -Granted that the Timaeus is poetry, it is not only poetry; - - +Granted that the \ul{Timaeus} is poetry, it is not \e{only} poetry; it is, above all, Plato's philosophical poetry. So far, then, we have been told about the role which @@ -5964,19 +5477,11 @@ an image as accurately as it can be described. It remains for Plato to tell us what an image 1s, how the Universe is an image, and, most especially, how the description of the Universe as an image explains the relation of time and - - eternity to the best society. +\sec Time and the Universe - - - -CHAPTER V -TIME AND THE UNIVERSE - - -I The Motive of Creation (29d-30b +\secc The Motive of Creation (29d--30b) So far, we have been told that the World is a becoming image of an eternal realm. But this is precisely the problem. How can like be unlike, or how can the maker |