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| author | p <grr@lo2.org> | 2025-01-24 17:05:56 -0500 |
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| committer | p <grr@lo2.org> | 2025-01-24 17:05:56 -0500 |
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thesis ch5
| -rw-r--r-- | plato_time.otx | 1073 |
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diff --git a/plato_time.otx b/plato_time.otx index 3dcbb84..e438664 100644 --- a/plato_time.otx +++ b/plato_time.otx @@ -5483,13 +5483,12 @@ eternity to the best society. \secc The Motive of Creation (29d--30b) -So far, we have been told that the World is a becoming image of an eternal realm. But this is precisely the +So far, we have been told that the World is a becoming +image of an eternal realm. But this is precisely the problem. How can like be unlike, or how can the maker generate less perfectly than the perfect model. We recall -the Sophist (265b) distinguishes divine and human production -and that the Philebus has told us that the cause is the - - +the \ul{Sophist} (265b) distinguishes divine and human production +and that the \ul{Philebus} has told us that the cause is the maker. But these distinctions only seem to introduce new problems. How can there be eternal becoming; would the cause of such an eternal becoming have to be a perpetually @@ -5500,66 +5499,41 @@ for the general issue which underlies them is "what is the relation of a becoming image to reality." Cornford states that "Plato denied reality to what is -commonly called matter."! The materiality of this universe, -however, is not unconnected with the motive for the generation of the Universe by its maker. We shall investigate the +commonly called matter."\pnote{3.1} The materiality of this universe, +however, is not unconnected with the motive for the generation +of the Universe by its maker. We shall investigate the two issues simultaneously. Timaeus informs us of this motive - - when he tells us that the father of this Universe is good, - - -1 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 31. - - - and hence, not jealous of his perfection, so that "he desired that all things should come as near as possible to -being like himself" (29e).° The father therefore: - -took over all that was visible-not at rest-but in +being like himself" (29e).\pnote{3.2} The father therefore: +\Q{took over all that was visible-not at rest-but in discordant and unordered motioneand brought it - from disorder into order, since he judged that +order was in every way better. (30a)} -order was in every way better (70a). -But the moat striking is: - -That this is the supremely valid principle of +\noindent But the moat striking is: +\Q{That this is the supremely valid principle of becoming and of the order of the world, we - shall be most surely right to accept from men - -of understanding (296). +of understanding. (29a)} Here the first part of the problem of an eternal becoming is stated. Plato has established that the model of the Universe must clearly be the eternal, and that the maker of the Universe introduced order, and that this -order is the most valid basis of becoming. Yet, the +order is the \e{most} valid basis of becoming. Yet, the following statement creates the problem, for it asserts; "Now it was not nor can it ever be permitted that the work of the supremely good should be anything but that -which is the best" (30b). Here is the antithesis clearly +which is the \e{best}" (30b). Here is the antithesis clearly stated: The Universe resembles an eternal model, yet it is a becoming Universe, and becoming, heretofore, could not - - be described in superlatives. Becoming is as perfect as it - - can be after it is ordered and endowed with intelligence. - -2 one is tempted to restore the hiatus which Cornford -habitually tries to remove as "intolerable." Then the -passage would read, "he desired that all things should -come as near as possible to being, like himself." - - - - Plato leaves the problem unresolved at this juncture. He says only that the Universe was framed as perfectly as possible. It is thus a living being with reason and soul. @@ -5570,20 +5544,13 @@ and has not yet been resolved. this is no oversight: Plato means to hold this question in readiness until the doctrine he is developing can supply the answer. -thus it is important to notice that the demiurge - - -fashions the Universe to the end and by nature toward - - +Thus it is important to notice that the demiurge +fashions the Universe \e{to the end} and \e{by nature toward} perfection, which seems to mean that its present state is incomplete, and yet the Universe is ordered and given -intellizence so that it might be as perfect as possible. +intelligence so that it might be as perfect as possible. Later (in 48a and 52d) we shall have occasion to point - -out the relative omnipotence of the demiurge. At this point, - - +out the \e{relative} omnipotence of the demiurge. At this point, we have not yet been told how it is possible to place the eternal and the realm of becoming in a harmony without flaws. The relation of the eternal model and the becoming @@ -5591,24 +5558,13 @@ Universe remains problematic. Cornford states that it "...is not easy for us to understand" the relative and not absolute omnipotence of - - the demiurge. For it is clear that the demiurge has not - - -created ex nihilo, but has ordered the discordant motions +created \e{ex nihilo,} but has ordered the discordant motions only in so far as it was possible. Cornford concludes that the set of discordant motions, the chaos, the material - - which the demiurge orders, is an eternally present - - - - - material, and so the demiurge cannot be simply equated -with the God of the Christians.> Cornford wants to help +with the God of the Christians.\pnote{3.3} Cornford wants to help Plato avoid the "impossibly absolute divinity" who, being absolute, could not involve himself in earthly affairs. But this seems unnecessary, since the demiurge is in no @@ -5618,7 +5574,7 @@ description that he becomes, not only not the God of the Christians, but not even the demiurgic divinity which Plato describes. -II The Model of the Universe (30c-3ib +\secc The Model of the Universe (30c--31b) In the next paragraph Timaeus speaks of the model after which the demiurge fashioned this Universe. He says @@ -5632,47 +5588,31 @@ there are no specific perfections lacking to it. What can this Living Being be to whom no perfection is lacking and who serves as the model for each specific -perfection. It cannot be any one Form, for on this supposition there might be others (31a). Nor can it be a Form - - +perfection. It cannot be any one Form, for on this supposition +there might be others (31a). Nor can it be a Form of all Forms, for this position involved the difficulties - - -3 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 37. - - - - -mentioned in the Parmenides. Is it The Form of The Good, +mentioned in the \ul{Parmenides}. Is it The Form of The Good, or perhaps the Demiurge Himself? None of these answers satiafy. If it were the Good, Plato could easily have said -so, as he did in the Republic. Nor does the demiurge regard +so, as he did in the \ul{Republic}. Nor does the demiurge regard his own perfection as a model; he is said to regard a model, but he is not described as looking to himself. It is hard to see the grounds for Taylor's assertion that the -demiurge fashions by "an overflow of his goodness. "4 +demiurge fashions by "an overflow of his goodness."\pnote{3.4} Plato himself "recapitulates" the third man argument - - -of the Parmenides to the effect that the model which - - +of the \ul{Parmenides} to the effect that the model which embraces all the intelligible things there are cannot be +one of a pair (the simplest number), -one of a pair (the simplest number) -for then there would have to be yet another Living +\Q{for then there would have to be yet another Living Creature embracing those two, and they would be parts of it; and thus our world would be more truly described as likeness, not of them, but of -that other which would embrace them (31a). +that other which would embrace them. (31a)} The Universe must be one, like its model. Here again the - - -Timaeus marches out boldly beyond the doctrines of its - - +\ul{Timaeus} marches out boldly beyond the doctrines of its predecessors, for that One after which the Universe is modelled is not the sort of One which is put into the mouth of Parmenides in the dialogue which hears his name, @@ -5680,62 +5620,35 @@ but a new sort of One which is now to be described. Or rather, Timaeus will now present a mythical account of that One of which the Universe is the image. -III The Body of the Universe 1b-32c - +\secc The Body of the Universe (31b--32c) But Plato does not launch immediately into a - - -+ tp1a., p. 78. - - - - - description of the One. Instead, he takes the lesson of - - -the Philebus to heart and proceeds to reveal how the - - +the \ul{Philebus} to heart and proceeds to reveal how the Universe is composed of four primary elements, first the traditional fire and earth, and then the third which unites them, "for two cannot be satisfactorily united -without a third" (31b). +without a third." (31b) Here Taliaferro''s brilliant analysis of Plato's Pythagoreanism is apropos. He shows how the necessity of - - -proportion between lines, planes, and spheres, is a - - -generalization of the proportions within lines, planes, - - +proportion \e{between} lines, planes, and spheres, is a +generalization of the proportions \e{within} lines, planes, and spheres. That is, just as the extremities which make up a line are proportional to each other, so the plane and the sphere have proportional elements; but further, -the proportion between the line and the plane is proportionally the same as the proportion between the plane and the +the proportion between the line and the plane is proportionally +the same as the proportion between the plane and the sphere. In the same way, the realms of physics and geometry are proportional to each other, as the realm of matter is proportional to the realm of soul, and the realm of soul with the realm of being. Plato seems to be suggesting that there is a general proportionality between being and -becoming. ° +becoming.\pnote{3.5} Yet this is abstract, and Plato wants to present the tale with all the richness of which a myth is capable. - - Although a radical unity of realms has been introduced, - - -5 T.T. Taylor, The Timaeus and Critias of Plato, -pp. 29 ff. - - - the structured, leveled unity of these realms must be spelled out, for the Universe shares in the intelligibility of 4ts model, which comprehends all the things within it @@ -5744,26 +5657,16 @@ into his drama of creation. There is a difference between @& metaphysical dramatist, who writes drama with metaphysical overtones and suggestions, and the dramatic metaphysician, who writes metaphysics with dramatic overtones. Plato seems - - -to be one of the latter sort, since his Timaeus portrays - - +to be one of the latter sort, since his \ul{Timaeus} portrays the metaphysical origins of the Universe, in such a fashion - that Timaeus' account manages to create dramatic suspense. -Since the Universe is visible, it must be bodily, +Since the Universe is visible, it must be bodily, and that which is bodily must have come to be. But, the - -Philebus informed us that the visible must have fire to be - - +\ul{Philebus} informed us that the visible must have fire to be visible and earth to be tangible, and, since no two can be united without a third, fire and earth cannot be united -without a third. Here in the Timaeus, the third must unite - - +without a third. Here in the \ul{Timaeus}, the third must unite fire and earth in the best way possible, which is in the manner of a geometric proportion (31c). This is the best because "in that way all will necessarily come to play @@ -5773,12 +5676,7 @@ relation of proportional elements to each other; 2 is to 4 as 4 is to 8. By transposition, 4 is to 2 as 8 is to 4, and in this way the mean, 4, comes to be the outside term and therefore it seems to be the outer boundary of the - - proportion. This is the arithmetical way of allegorizing - - - the doctrine that proportion is what unifies, just as the side of the plane forms the outer boundary of its area, There is no need to dwell on the obvious Pythagorean style @@ -5794,7 +5692,8 @@ proportional to one another. In this way the unity of the Universe was achieved, and the proportionality of its four elements to each other is their boundary. Further, only he who set the elements in proportion could disolve -it (32c). All of the elements were used up in the construction of the Universe, and in this way the Universe resembles +it (32c). All of the elements were used up in the construction +of the Universe, and in this way the Universe resembles its model's perfect unity, for none of the materials were left over and it is therefore, in its way, complete. It 4s also, on that basis, simple, that is, one Universe, and @@ -5804,14 +5703,7 @@ are no materials left over which could attack the Universe, it-.ia free from old age and sickness, which come about by the introduction of materials from without. This at first seems to mean that the Universe resembles the eternity of - - its model in that those elements which might bring about - - - - - age and sickness to the eternal would have to be outside ite definition, and so, the Universe, in its fashion, similarly cannot age or succumb to sickness for this would require @@ -5822,7 +5714,7 @@ which is fitting to its nature" (33b); it is spherical. This is an extremely important phrase, since some regard Plato's image of time as circular and therefore interpret the Platonic Universe as closed, and subject only to -eternal recurrence, without novelty or growth or process.° +eternal recurrence, without novelty or growth or process.\pnote{3.6} Therefore it is necessary to dwell on this phrase, for it says precisely and unambiguously that the spherical shape of the body of the Universe is proper to its nature. The @@ -5836,19 +5728,7 @@ which is a becoming image, is as perfect as it can be, and therefore allegorically spherical. This latter view cannot be stressed too strongly, because it is common to regard the Platonic Universe as nonetemporal, or as imperfect - - because it is only spherically temporal. Plato, on the - - -eS aS ST TS ES - - -6 E.g., Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the — -Infinite Universe (New York: Harper rothers, 1 ° - - - contrary, tells us clearly that the perfection of the model is the paradigm for the perfection of the Universe, which is a becoming image, so that it is appropriate to @@ -5874,30 +5754,22 @@ resemble the eternity of the model. In so far as the body of the Universe is spherical, to that extent does it resemble the unity of the model. One must call to mind here the impossibility of describing each and every - - characteristic of the Universe at the same time and by the - - - same set of words. Plato, like every other writer, cannot speak simultaneously of every aspect of his vision; it -takes time to describe every feature of what one describes. +takes \e{time} to describe every feature of what one describes. The function of an image in this context becomes somewhat more evident, and the truism that a picture is worth a thousand words is not irrelevant to this characteristic of written description. For an image, a picture, can put -forward thousands of details ina simple simultaneous +forward thousands of details in a simple \e{simultaneous} unity, whereas the description of the picture in written - - -words must focus on one aspect at a time. Thus Plato - - +words must focus on one aspect \e{at a time.} Thus Plato describes his Universe as a becoming image, to indicate that the unity of its elements is complete and harmonious: but to reason immediately from its spherical shape to its -temporal character is an instance of cart-before-the-horsemanship. We must wait until the discussion of the body +temporal character is an instance of cart-before-the-horsemanship. +We must wait until the discussion of the body of the Universe has been completed, and then for the discussion of the soul of the Universe. Then, and only then, does Plato introduce his doctrine of time and the @@ -5910,14 +5782,7 @@ have that shape which comprehends all shapes within itself. The sphere is the most perfect shape because it "comprehends in itself all the figures there are" (33b). The shape of the Universe is proportional to its model: as the model is the - - most perfect model, the sphere is the most perfect shape. - - - - - To accomplish his stated purpose, Plato describes how the Universe, as an image, is proportional to its model. In so doing, Plato continues to follow his own injunction; as @@ -5936,7 +5801,7 @@ time. Similarly, one cannot pass immediately from Plato's aphenteal Universe to Plato's philosophy of time. The motion of the sphere, which he is about to reveal, is basic, but -even thie will not be sufficient for the explication of +even thie will \e{not} be sufficient for the explication of Plato's time-doctrine. The spherical Universe has no organs for sight or food, and is therefore not dependent on anything else. It has the sort of metion which, above @@ -5946,31 +5811,17 @@ up; nor from left to right, nor right to left; nor does it go from forward to backward, nor from backward to forward; the maker took these six motions away from it in the process of ordering its discorcant wanderings. It - - revolves uniformly within its own limits (34a). - - In his description of the body of the Universe, it -is important to see that the divisions of the Philebus and - - +is important to see that the divisions of the \ul{Philebus} and the arrangement of the elements in their proportions are -recapitulated here in the Timaeus. Otherwise, one fails to +recapitulated here in the \ul{Timaeus}. Otherwise, one fails to notice that the relation of fire, air, earth, and water, in - - -the Timaeus is a subtle transfiguration of the Pythagorean - - +the \ul{Timaeus} is a subtle transfiguration of the Pythagorean number four, and also a substitution of proportion for the -Amity which the elements had when ordered by the Nous of - - -Anaxagoras, which, as Socrates complained in the Phaedo, - - +Amity which the elements had when ordered by the \e{Nous} of +Anaxagoras, which, as Socrates complained in the \ul{Phaedo}, Anaxagoras introduces early in his work but soon proceeds to ignore. Here Plato carries the theme of proportional unity into the relation of the elements themselves, It is @@ -5983,23 +5834,18 @@ see, the world soul is similarly the best possible, for, not only is it too a resemblance of the model but it is the deeper source of the proportional perfection of the Universe. -IV The Soul of the Universe + +\secc The Soul of the Universe The plan of the god who makes the Universe into the best image of the best model could not exclude soul from his activity, so that the excellent body of the Universe, which is spherical, and therefore not dependent on anything - - outside of itself, must in some way be related to a soul. - - -208. - - The Soul of the Universe was set in the center, but -further "wrapped ita body round with soul on the outside" -(340). Here the transposability of the elements of a proportion comes into the account. For, at first, it seems +further "wrapped its body round with soul on the outside" +(340). Here the transposability of the elements of a proportion +comes into the account. For, at first, it seems that the center of the Universe cannot at the same time be the periphery. But, just as the mean term of a proportion can become the extremes by transposition, so the Soul, @@ -6024,33 +5870,22 @@ for that would be an insufferable perversion of right order. Already, "There is in us too much of the casual and the random which shows itself in our speech..." (34c). The priority of Soul in perfection is not absolute and total; - - - there are still too many obvious wanderings and deviations from the orderly to assert that the Soul is prior in every -way.! Plato is all too aware that the Universe cannot be +way.\pnote{3.7} Plato is all too aware that the Universe cannot be empirically described as exhibiting the perfections of Soul. It seems likely that Plato described the body of the Universe before describing the Soul in order to follow out - - -his initial premise that the Timaeus will reveal the plan - - +his initial premise that the \ul{Timaeus} will reveal the plan of the Universe in an image, so that, by first establishing the visible shape of the Universe, he will then be able to make use of the shape he attributed to it to fashion images -of the Soul. This was the procedure of the Republic, for +of the Soul. This was the procedure of the \ul{Republic}, for there, it was explicitly agreed that the best plan for the investigation of the Soul would be to see it writ large in the State. So here, it seems that Plato is saying that we shall come to understand the Soul of the Universe writ - - -large in its body. Throughout the Timaeus the details of - - +large in its body. Throughout the \ul{Timaeus} the details of the image are described before the image itself, but this is only an apparent reversal of the order in which the Universe was fashioned. It does not seem wise to interpret @@ -6059,15 +5894,8 @@ If one understands from the outset that the best description of the Universe must be proportional "te its reality, then the details of the allegorical level of explanation are not inconsistent with the details of the reality of the - - -7 E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational -(Boston: Beacon Press, 19 . - - - Universe. Only on the supposition that Plato is following -@ linear plan of description would it follow that details +a linear plan of description would it follow that details are out of place. But if one accepts Plato's approach through image, then one remembers that the exigencies of written description create the appearance of a linear @@ -6077,7 +5905,7 @@ unity, does not serialize or linearize the elements of the account. Plato's Universe does not consist of a series of elements which must therefore be described one at a time. One could more easily attempt to fashion a length of rope -from grains of sana.° Thus, if one starts from an expectae +from grains of sand.\pnote{3.8} Thus, if one starts from an expectae tion that the description of the Universe must be a linear account, one should conclude that Plato's description of the World-Soul snould have preceeded his account of the @@ -6088,14 +5916,8 @@ a simple image, which is the best kind of account of the Universe because it is proportional to its kind of being, one is not disappointed that Plato describes the Soul of the Universe after the body. One ought to recall in this -regard Plato's deep concern that it is, after all, impossible to reveal the maker of the Universe to all mankind. - - -8 George S. Claghorn, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's -'Timaeus' (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. Bf. - - -ett. +regard Plato's deep concern that it is, after all, impossible +to reveal the maker of the Universe to all mankind. He attempts, by means of his imagery, to communicate to as Many as possible. In this way, the recipient of his account has been presented with the shape of the body of the @@ -6106,44 +5928,28 @@ However, the World-Soul is not so simple that its description can rest on the characteristics of centrality and periphery. The description of the "parts" of the World-Soul follows next, in a passage which Cornford has -described as "one of the most obscure of the whole dialogue."? Further, he says that the passage "would be +described as "one of the most obscure of the whole dialogue."\pnote{3.9} +Further, he says that the passage "would be simply unintelligible to anyone who had not read and -understood the Sophist."!9 In a note he adds that A.E. +understood the \ul{Sophist}."\pnote{3.10} In a note he adds that A.E. Taylor has precluded this basis for understanding the World-Soul because A.E. Taylor denies a knowledge of the -Sophist to Timaeus.!! +\ul{Sophist} to Timaeus.\pnote{3.11} -By his reference to the Sophist, Cornford points +By his reference to the \ul{Sophist}, Cornford points out that the "ingredients" of the Soul will be the Forms which Plato there said communicated with each other, namely, Unity, Sameness, and Difference. Particularly, Difference has the character of not-being, yet these Forms communicate with each other. In the following passage from - - -the Timaeus, Plato describes how the World-Soul comes to be - - -9 Cornford, op, cit., p. 59. - - -10 Inaa., p. 61. - - - -! A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 128. - - - +the \ul{Timaeus}, Plato describes how the World-Soul comes to be formed, and how the communication of these Forms is accomplished in the World-Soul. - -The things of which he composed soul and the manner +\Q{The things of which he composed soul and the manner of its composition were as follows: Between the indivisible existence that is ever in the same state, and the divisible existence that becomes - in bodies, he compounded a third form of existence composed of both. Again, in the case of Sameness and that of Difference, he also on the same @@ -6153,41 +5959,26 @@ kind that is divisible in bodies. Then, taking the three, he blended them all into a unity, forcing the nature of difference, hard as it was to mingle, into union with sameness, and mixing -them together with existence (25a-b). - +them together with existence. (35a--b)} This passage bears extensive comment, for several of its points are crucial to Plato's development of his philosophy of time. First, it is clear that the Forms have not been - - -repudiated by the Timaeus, since the passage begins with a - - -description of the Forms which recapitulates their treatment in the Sophist. The kind of existence which is always +repudiated by the \ul{Timaeus}, since the passage begins with a +description of the Forms which recapitulates their treatment +in the \ul{Sophist}. The kind of existence which is always the same is proper to the Forms, and was proper to the - - -Forms as early as the Phaedo and the Republic. But in the - - -Sophist, the Different was introduced, based on Plato's +Forms as early as the \ul{Phaedo} and the \ul{Republic}. But in the +\ul{Sophist}, the Different was introduced, based on Plato's recognition that it is necessary to say what is-not in order to say what is. In short, the entire doctrine of -not-being of the Sophist has reappeared in the Timaeus. -But, just as the initial recapitulation of the Republic at -the beginning of the Timaeus (28a) does not rest with a - - +not-being of the \ul{Sophist} has reappeared in the \ul{Timaeus}. +But, just as the initial recapitulation of the \ul{Republic} at +the beginning of the \ul{Timaeus} (28a) does not rest with a simple repetition but proceeds further, so here the - - -recapitulation of the Sophist doctrine of not-being, on - - - +recapitulation of the \ul{Sophist} doctrine of not-being, on the level of the Forms, i.e., Difference, will not end Plato's discussion. He means to go beyond this point. Or, to put the matter differently, Plato will now investigate @@ -6203,101 +5994,64 @@ existence, between them, an intermediate existence, proper to the Soul of the Universe. Further, these three "kinds" are further divided and then further recombined, so that there is a whole hierarchy of "kinds" of existence. -Cornford's diagram is instructive on this point, !@ - - -First Mixture Final Mixture - - -Indivisible existence -Divisible existence Intermediate existence - - -Indivisible sameness - - -Divisible sameness Intermediate sameness Soul - - -Indivisible difference -Divisible difference Intermediate difference - +Cornford's diagram is instructive on this point.\pnote{3.12} + +\table{c|c}{ +First Mixture & Final Mixture \crll +Indivisible existence\nl +Divisible existence & +Intermediate existence \crl +Indivisible sameness\nl +Divisible sameness & Intermediate sameness \nl Soul \crl +Indivisible difference\nl +Divisible difference & Intermediate difference} Note that it is no longer possible to assert that - - there is only one "kind" of existence which deserves the - - -le Cornford, loc. cit. "Kinds" is a peculiar -expression which is repeated here only to assure an -accurate representation of Cornford's view. - - - -name, the sort reserved for the Forms in the Republic, +name, the sort reserved for the Forms in the \ul{Republic}, where all else is mere shadows. In this connection, it -should be recalled that the Sophist distinguished sharply -between the kinds of images (eidola), and reached the - - -conclusion that some images are false (phantasiai) but +should be recalled that the \ul{Sophist} distinguished sharply +between the kinds of images (\e{eidola}), and reached the +conclusion that some images are false (\e{phantasiai}) but some are genuine. Of those that are genuine one must further distinguish those that are of human origin and -those that are of divine origin (240a). The Sophist therefore credits images with some sort of existence. But the -Timaeus does not simply describe the Universe as an -eidolon, a little Form, so to speak. The Universe is an - - -eikon, which now comes to mean that it is like the perfection of the most perfect. cut even this is not the high +those that are of divine origin (240a). The \ul{Sophist} therefore +credits images with some sort of existence. But the +\ul{Timaeus} does not simply describe the Universe as an +\e{eidolon,} a little Form, so to speak. The Universe is an +\e{eikon,} which now comes to mean that it is like the perfection +of the most perfect. But even this is not the high point of Plato's analysis, as we shall see. Nevertheless - it is central to the exposition of this passage to notice -that the doctrine of the Sophist, which makes it necessary +that the doctrine of the \ul{Sophist}, which makes it necessary to somehow include not-being in the realm of Forms, is now recapitulated, but, in addition, it is not only the reality of the Forms but the reality of the whole Universe which must now be explained. And in this connection, Plato has shifted from a description which accords some sort of being -to images, to a description of the whole Universe as an - - -image, and that the transition from eidolon to eikon is - - +to images, to a description of the whole Universe \e{as} an +image, and that the transition from \e{eidolon} to \e{eikon} is intrinsic to this development of doctrine. -Thus, between the two orders of existence with which -we were formerly acquainted in the Sophist, namely, the - +Thus, between the two orders of existence with which +we were formerly acquainted in the \ul{Sophist}, namely, the eternal and the becoming, Plato has now inserted a third. - - - This is a further development of his doctrine of proportion, of which we saw the first usage in this dialogue in the composition of the body of the Universe. The sort of -mixture which the Philebus prefigures is now developed in +mixture which the \ul{Philebus} prefigures is now developed in Plato's attempt to construct the entire Cosmos on this - - -basis. But, in the Philebus, the precise details of the - - +basis. But, in the \ul{Philebus}, the precise details of the manner in which this mixture was to be accomplished were left somewhat less clear than they are now painted, for - - -the Philebus insisted that the cause of the mixture was in - - +the \ul{Philebus} insisted that the cause of the mixture was in fact the god, but the god was not described as the maker of the whole Universe; he was there only the mixer of the Forms in some things. This passage, like the passage at 29, is a radical innovation on Plato's part, which takes the doctrine of -the Timaeus far beyond the doctrines of its predecessor +the \ul{Timaeus} far beyond the doctrines of its predecessor dialogues. It is a recapitulation, but the recapitulation serves as a basis for an advance. Where once only the Forms were ultimately real, now there are "kinds" or @@ -6308,14 +6062,10 @@ Unity. The significance of this proportional unity is the basis of the succeeding passages, where we notice that the basis of knowledge itself has undergone a radical growth. And, in addition, the basis of the former division of the - - world into the eternal and the becoming has similarly - - - undergone a radical growth, wherein it will no longer be -possible for Plato to distinguish simply between the eternal and the becoming as separated realms, but the relation +possible for Plato to distinguish simply between the eternal +and the becoming as separated realms, but the relation of the eternal to the becoming will have to be described in a new way. Somehow, the eternal and the becoming will be related in a way which will explain how it is possible @@ -6332,7 +6082,7 @@ becoming; it is a proportional unity of the Same and the Different. But, from basis to doctrine is not an immediate step. -The lesson of the Philebus and the Statesman, which was +The lesson of the \ul{Philebus} and the \ul{Statesman}, which was the caution not to divide too quickly, but to proceed by following the right divisions according to the way things are, is not foreign to the author of these lessons. Before @@ -6342,12 +6092,7 @@ the World-Soul into its precise portions. Of course, we should not expect that Plato's passages on the motions of the planets will be adequate - - from the point of view of contemporary astronomy, so that - - - a detailed commentary on the exact motions of the planets will be of interest only to those whose taste runs to collecting the opinions of the ancients and constructing a @@ -6374,62 +6119,39 @@ basic string lengths. Plato tells us that the harmony of the musical scale is only one level (or sort, or kind) of harmony, and that the Soul of the World is itself an intermediate between the ultimate Forms and the body of - - the Universe. The fundamental truth is the assertion of - - - proportionality and the harmony of the elements of the -proportions. !> Plato goes on to construct an intricate +proportions.\pnote{3.13} Plato goes on to construct an intricate allegory of the circles of the Same and of the Different; he describes how these circles have been joined in the center of the Soul, and how the revolution of the Same -circumscribes the revolution of the Different (the allegorical indication that the Same is the "outer" limit of the +circumscribes the revolution of the Different (the allegorical +indication that the Same is the "outer" limit of the Different). The seven circles of the Soul represent the -proportional share which the Soul has in the seven Forms, '4 -just as the seven tones reflect the seven planetary distances, The point is not merely the number of circles, but +proportional share which the Soul has in the seven Forms,\pnote{3.14} +just as the seven tones reflect the seven planetary distances. +The point is not merely the number of circles, but the motion of the circles, since planets and music certainly move. Plato tries very hard to make his allegory exact in every detail. He indicates that motions are shared proportionately by the seven planets, which means, (as -A.E. Taylor has seen 13) that Plato anticipated our own +A.E. Taylor has seen\pnote{3.15}) that Plato anticipated our own contemporary relativity theory of motion. (Heisenberg -makes the same point 16), It 48 anticlimactic to note that +makes the same point\pnote{3.16}), It is anticlimactic to note that Plato knew the solar system to be heliocentric, although - - this is not universally agreed upon. - -13 T.T. Taylor, op, cit., Introduction. -es According to T.T. Taylor, loc, cit. - - -15 A.E,Taylor, Commentary, Appendix. - - -16 Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, ch. 4. See -also MacKinnon, "Time in Contemporary Physics," pp. 428-457. - - - - Plato next relates the seven motions of the Soul to the seven dimensions of the body, which is fashioned later than Soul, although it was described earlier. He says in summary; --e-the soul, being everywhere interwoven from the - +\Q{...the soul, being everywhere interwoven from the center to the outermost heaven, enveloping heaven - all around on the outside, revolving within its - own limits, made a divine beginning of ceaseless - -and intelligent life for all time (36e). +and intelligent life for all time. (36e)} It is unnecessary to point out in this age of possible thermonuclear holocaust that Plato's optimism is @@ -6437,32 +6159,20 @@ derived from the perfection of the Universe which is the image of the perfection of the model, and not from the sort of empirical observation which has created pessimism in many quarters. However, one should note that Plato's - - Sicilian adventures did result in a sadness which Plato - - -describes in his Seventh Letter. The difference between - - +describes in his \ul{Seventh Letter}. The difference between Plato's sadness over the outcome of Sicilian politics and the contemporary pessinism lies in the world-wide scale - on which contemporary destruction can be accomplished. One -might wish to derive a sense of optimism from the possibility that the Universe will go on even if the planet earth +might wish to derive a sense of optimism from the possibility +that the Universe will go on even if the planet earth does not harbor any human life. For Plato refers to the life of the World-Soul as it inspires the body of the Universe, and not to the life of man, which, Plato was -aware, is all too short. In the Myth of Er, the Republic +aware, is all too short. In the Myth of Er, the \ul{Republic} describes the life of man as a span of one hundred years, and the cycle of good life as a span of ten thousand years. - - -Here in the Timaeus intelligen life is "ceaseless." - - - - +Here in the \ul{Timaeus} intelligent life is "ceaseless." But the discourse concerning the World-Soul was not written only to illustrate that Plato was master of the @@ -6472,13 +6182,13 @@ derive the proportions of any body from the numbers 1, 2, sum to the perfect number 10; instead, he leaves the end of the proportions open, so that the scale of tones or the planetary differences might be further calculated, if one -wished. '7 Here one could agree with A.E. Taylor that Plato -has given a "provisional" tone to his dialogue, 8 but, at +wished.\pnote{3.17} Here one could agree with A.E. Taylor that Plato +has given a "provisional" tone to his dialogue,\pnote{3.18} but, at the same time, one would have to disagree that Timaeus does nothing more than recite fifth-century Pythagoreanism, for Plato's Universe is not strictly Pythagorean. There seem to be several reasons for this, not the least of which is -Plato's use of Pythagorean numerology in a description of a +Plato's \e{use} of Pythagorean numerology in a description of a Universe which has far more complexity, and, at the same time, far more simplicity than the Universe of Pythagoras. This is most evident in the Pythagorean insistence that the @@ -6486,25 +6196,15 @@ Forms (numbers) are the ultimately real, and the World of appearance is less real. In what follows, Plato will reveal that there is a kind of knowledge proper to the World-Soul which transcends a knowledge of number, by including it in - - -&@ more comprehensive knowledge. - - -'T Dodds, op. cit. - - -18 A.E. Taylor, Commentary, p. 113. - - - +a more comprehensive knowledge. Thus, the body of the Universe is visible, but the Soul of the Universe is invisible, and is the "best of things brought into being by the most excellent of things intelligible and eternal" (37a). Because the Soul has been blended out of the Same, the Different, and the Existent, -she is "in contact with anything that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible" (37a) +she is "in contact with anything that has dispersed existence +or with anything whose existence is indivisible" (37a) In this way the Soul is like anything that is, and it can therefore know anything that is, "either in the sphere of things that become or with regard to things that are always @@ -6520,57 +6220,34 @@ the Soul is intermediate, it is a third "level" of existence. Yet, one courts danger by the simple enumeration of the number of forms of existence for one misses the whole emphasis which Plato has put on proportionality throughout -the Timaeus. The Soul could not know either realm if it - - +the \ul{Timaeus}. The Soul could not know either realm if it were simply in between the eternal and the becoming; the point is that the Soul is in a proportional unity with the eternal and the becoming, and so, it is part of each and each is part of it. Plato tells us in the following - - passage that both the circle of the same and the circle - - -ke) - - - - - of the different transport their respective judgments into - - the Soul: -Now whenever discourse that is alike true, whether - +\Q{Now whenever discourse that is alike true, whether it takes place concerning that which is different - or that which is the same, being carried on without - speech or sound within the thing that is self-moved, - is about that which is sensible, and the circle of the different, moving aright, carriea its message through all its soul-then there arise judgments - and beliefs that are sure and true. But whenever - discourse is concerned only with the rational, - and the circle of the same, running smoothly, - declares it, the result must be rational - -understanding and knowledge (37b, c). +understanding and knowledge. (37b, c)} Several features of this passage bear comment. First, it states that belief arises from the circle of the Different, (which includes the realm of the many, the dispersed, and the sensible objects of perception) and that beliefs must be sure and true if they arise from the -proper revolution of the circle of the Different. Second, +\e{proper} revolution of the circle of the Different. Second, it describes this sort of judgment as intrinsic to the World-Soul, and not an inferior sort of knowledge. For the Same and the Different constitute Soul; no longer is Soul @@ -6582,45 +6259,36 @@ proportionality. This is not to say that rational knowledge alone is not better; rather, it asserts that belief and opinion are not bad or impossible. Both judgments are necessary to what Soul is, and both sorts of knowledge arise - - when Soul does what Soul does; namely, generate the motions - - - of the Universe. Lastly, the judgment by the Soul is -called an aesthesis, which, unlike the English word - - +called an \e{aesthesis}, which, unlike the English word "judgment," extends to feeling and to the appreciation of -beauty as well as of truth. This capacity to Know aesthetic'ally is of the utmost significance in Plato's Universe, and +beauty as well as of truth. This capacity to Know aesthetically +is of the utmost significance in Plato's Universe, and it is especially necessary for a consideration of the next topic to which Plato addresses himself, namely, time. For - if time is a Form then reason alone will comprehend it. But if time is an image, then its beauty is as important as its truth. -V Time as Image (to 39e) +\secc Time as Image (to 39e) -Up to this point in his development of the construction of the Universe, Plato has insisted that the Universe +Up to this point in his development of the construction +of the Universe, Plato has insisted that the Universe embodies in its proportional way the perfection of its model, and yet the model is consistently described as -eternal, while the Universe is said to be an eternal becoming. The Universe is described throughout the foregoing +eternal, while the Universe is said to be an eternal becoming. +The Universe is described throughout the foregoing passages as a reality which is as perfect as it can be, and yet Plato nowhere says how a visible and tangible body can be like its eternal indivisible model. Even the existence of the World-Soul and its participation in the whole of the Universe, in its divisible as well as its indivisible aspects that is, in its sameness and in its difference, is not -sufficient to confer on the Universe the closest approximnation to the perfection of the eternal model, even though +sufficient to confer on the Universe the closest approximnation +to the perfection of the eternal model, even though Plato usually attributes the highest perfections to Soul. - - In the following passage, Plato finally makes explicit the - - - way in which the Universe of becoming most resembles the eternity of its model. To all the perfection which he has attributed to the Universe, including intelligence, @@ -6629,50 +6297,38 @@ which enables the Universe to resemble its eternal model to the fullest extent possible, the ultimate perfection of which the Universe is capable. Plato writes: -When the father who had begotten it saw it set in - +\Q{When the father who had begotten it saw it set in motion and alive, a shrine brought into being for - the everlasting gods, he rejoiced and being well - pleased he took thought to make it yet more like - -its pattern (37c). +its pattern. (37c)} When the Universe was set "in motion and made alive," the requirements which Socrates had laid down in the beginning of the dialogue were met. However, Plato does not end his sentence on this condition; he adds that the Universe was alive and in motion, and, in addition, it was -a shrine (agalma). This peculiar word has caused the -commentators no small difficulty.'9 Its meaning is not +a shrine (\e{agalma}). This peculiar word has caused the +commentators no small difficulty.\pnote{19} Its meaning is not fixed and precise, since it may mean a statue or it may mean a thing of joy. But the connotation of the word suggests that either the statue or the thing of joy are made by the lover who beholds in the statue an image of -his loved one, which makes the agalma both a statue and +his loved one, which makes the \e{agalma} both a statue and a thing of joy. One recalls that the dialogues of the late - - -period, especially the Sophist, have consistently lent - - -49 aly, Taylor, Cornford, Archer-Hind, Bury. - - - -themselves to an exposition of the difference betweer a +period, especially the \ul{Sophist}, have consistently lent +themselves to an exposition of the difference between a mere statue, which may or may not be faithful to the proportions of the original model, and a genuine image, which is faithful to the proportions of the original model. -The agaima is not only faithful to its original model but +The \e{agaima} is not only faithful to its original model but the model is a loved one whose very visage brings joy to the heart of the beholder. Heretofore, the Universe was -described as an image, (eikon) but in this passage it is -described as agalma, an image which brings joy to the +described as an image, (\e{eikon}) but in this passage it is +described as \e{agalma}, an image which brings joy to the heart of the beholder. -But the Sophist distinguished between human and +But the \ul{Sophist} distinguished between human and divine images. One can understand that a human craftsman might take delight in an image of his loved one, but when the maker of the Universe takes delight in the image of @@ -6689,9 +6345,6 @@ is the model of the Universe. Or, going beyond the surface of the allegory, one might conclude that the One Living Being who is the maker of the Universe takes delight in Himself in the image of Himself which is called the - - - Universe, since Plato clearly says that the maker rejoiced when he beheld it. But it is first necessary to state that Plato does not offer these interpretations himself, and we @@ -6715,34 +6368,26 @@ as it were, to our own era, nevertheless we ought to attempt to plumb Plato's meaning, so far as we can. To assert that this is impossible is to abandon all historical scholarship; to assert that this poses no difficulty at all -is naivyete in the extreme. Thus, despite the agreement +is \e{naivete} in the extreme. Thus, despite the agreement which Augustine and many other philosophers felt when confronting this passage, we ought not to conclude that - - Plato has "anticipated," as the saying goes, the doctrines - - - -of Christianity. One could as well say that the ineffability which characterizes Plato's maker of the Universe is +of Christianity. One could as well say that the ineffability +which characterizes Plato's maker of the Universe is due to his acquaintance with Buddhist or Mosaic doctrines of the ineffability of the Divine. One must rest at Plato's statement that the Universe -is an agalma, and that the maker rejoiced when he saw that -it was alive and in motion. In the Phaedrus (at 252d) -there is a similar usage of agalma, in which the lover -chooses his love (eros) as if the love were a shrine - - -(agalma). There is another use in the Laws (931a) where - - +is an \e{agalma}, and that the maker rejoiced when he saw that +it was alive and in motion. In the \bt{Phaedrus} (at 252d) +there is a similar usage of \e{agalma}, in which the lover +chooses his love (\e{eros}) as if the love were a shrine +(\e{agalma}). There is another use in the Laws (931a) where parents who receive proper veneration from their children -are regarded as instances of agalma. +are regarded as instances of \e{agalma}. However, one must recall that Plato has said all -through the Timaeus that the Universe was fashioned by the +through the \ul{Timaeus} that the Universe was fashioned by the demiurge, who in turn looks to the perfection of the eternal model, and not to himself as the locus of the eternal model, so that the simple equation of the eternal @@ -6752,32 +6397,28 @@ projection to interpret this division of the model from the demiurge as a justification for the claim that Plato distinguished the Father from the Creator. From such an interpretation one could reach out to the conclusion that, -for Plato, Summun Bonum est diffusivum Sui, but this +for Plato, \e{Summun Bonum est diffusivum Sui,} but this stretches interpretation far beyond Plato's stated words. The attempt on the part of some commentators to - - assert or to deny these implications of Plato's words, - - - then, seems to represent an attempt to fit Plato's -meaning into more contemporary doctrines. One cannot quarrel with those who find inspiration in Plato's text, but +meaning into more contemporary doctrines. One cannot quarrel +with those who find inspiration in Plato's text, but this is not the question. The question is, what did Plato mean? And in this context, it seems beside the point to fit Platonism into more recent doctrines of creation, and rather more to the point to relate the details of Plato's intricate allegory to what is clearly demonstrable and attributable to Plato as a fourthecentury genius, and not -@ twentieth-century commentator on twentieth-century +a twentieth-century commentator on twentieth-century investigations. The great controversy which Plato's demiurge has created will not be settled in these pages. The point under discussion is the distinction between the Universe as a shrine and the Universe as an image, and the -fact that Plato described the Universe as an image (eikon) +fact that Plato described the Universe as an image (\e{eikon}) throughout the preceding passages, but now refers to it as -a shrine (agalma). +a shrine (\e{agalma}). But a relatively full view of this shift of emphasis must include stylistic as well as theological considerations. @@ -6786,78 +6427,48 @@ doctrine of time as a special sort of image, and, in order to avoid calling both the Universe and time by the same name, Plato has elevated the Universe to the status of & shrine-image so that he can refer to time as another - - -sort of image. Recall that the beginning of the Timaeus - - +sort of image. Recall that the beginning of the \ul{Timaeus} confronts the reader with the need to avoid blasphemy, and - - yet the equally insistent need not to demean the Universe - - - or to rob it of any due measure of perfection. Thus the Universe as a shrine becomes the locus of divine function, and as we shall see, the Universe as temporal becomes the -manner of divine function: respectively the place where +\e{manner} of divine function: respectively the place where the demiurge acts and the way in which he acts. There is a further note which should be added. For a shrine may be occasionally empty of the presence of the god to whom it is dedicated, or it may be filled with his presence. And it is precisely this distinction which bears on the following passage. For the Universe has so far been endowed -with body and Soul, but the maker sought to make 1t yet -more like its eternal model, not only a shrine in space +with body and Soul, but the maker sought to make it \e{yet +more} like its eternal model, not only a shrine in space but in some way an eternal shrine, as much like its model as it can be. -(Just )2° as that pattern is the Living Being that - +\Q{(Just)\pnote{3.20} as that pattern is the Living Being that is forever existent, so he sought to make this - Universe also like it, so far as it might be, in - that respect. Now the nature of the Living Being - was eternal, and this character it was impossible - to confer in full completeness on the generated - -thing (374d). +thing. (37d)} Here Plato speaks the paradox which has run through the previous discussion of the Universe as an eternal becoming. He states openly that the model is the Living Being who is eternal but the Universe is a generated thing - - which therefore cannot be eternal in the same way. It is - - this difference between the model and the Universe which - - -20 Cornford has "So." - - - must be reconciled in order to describe the Universe as a thing which is as much like its model as possible. And to accomplish this, Plato says: -But he took thought to make, as it were, a moving - -likeness (eikona) of eternity; and at the same - +\Q{But he took thought to make, as it were, a moving +likeness (\e{eikona}) of eternity; and at the same time that he ordered heaven, he made, of eternity - that abides in unity, an everlasting likeness - moving according to number-that to which we have - -given the name Time (37d). +given the name Time. (37d)} In this passage, the themes of eternity, image, and time culminate in a synthesis, of which there are several @@ -6866,47 +6477,37 @@ brought order to the original chaos, which Plato has already described, is said in this passage to be the same act as the act of making time. Second, notice that time as an image is made, not of chaos but of eternity. Third, -note that Time is a moving image and an everlasting image. +note that Time is a moving image \e{and} an everlasting image. Fourth, note that Time is said to move according to number, Fifth, note that we have given it the name of Time. I shall discuss each of these aspects in turn. -1. The activity of the demiurge.--The Universe has been -described throughout the Timaeus as made by an act of the - - +\begitems\style n +* \Be{The activity of the demiurge}---The Universe has been +described throughout the \ul{Timaeus} as made by an act of the demiurge, whose activity brings order out of the discordant motions which confront him. This feature of the allegory has elicited much comment, and some of the commentators would like to conclude that the demiurge does not create -ex nihilo because Plato clearly says that the demiurge - - -was confronted by a chaos of discordant motions. ©! Others - - -21 Cornford, op. cit. - - - +\e{ex nihilo} because Plato clearly says that the demiurge +was confronted by a chaos of discordant motions.\pnote{3.21} Others would like to conclude that it is merely a detail of the allegory which does not jibe with the details of literal experience, so that one can dismiss the chaos as only a mythical element but not a real thing. Both views seem - - -unnecessary, for Plato was neither writing mere allegory - - +unnecessary, for Plato was neither writing \e{mere} allegory nor Christian Theology. It seems more to the point to show that Plato once before introduced a prior consideration -into his account after he has introduced a later consideration, as we saw, for example, when he described the World-Soul after the World-body. There, it was to give the reader +into his account after he has introduced a later consideration, +as we saw, for example, when he described the World-Soul +after the World-body. There, it was to give the reader the necessary materials out of which he could fashion the image through which Plato put forward his account of the process. Plato of course attributes to Soul a superior sort of perfection than that which he attributes to body, but not because these parts of the Universe stand in an -external hierarchy of items which are spatially and existentially discrete; rather, the proportional unity of the +external hierarchy of items which are spatially and existentially +discrete; rather, the proportional unity of the entire Universe is his primary desideratum, and he says repeatedly that the Universe is an image, and that we must see it as we see images, in their unity. But one @@ -6917,18 +6518,13 @@ juxtaposition of parts, whereas the Universe is the most excellent unity of things that have become. So here, the doctrine of Time, the aspect of the - - Universe by which it most resembles its eternal model, has - - - been introduced last in the account of the perfected Universe, and we are told that the making of Time is -accomplished by the demiurge in the same act as the order~ -ing of the original chaos. Plato has again introduced the +accomplished by the demiurge \e{in the same act} as the ordering +of the original chaos. Plato has again introduced the most difficult aspect of the doctrine he is fashioning, -after the materials have been- provided for the reader to +after the materials have been provided for the reader to see the doctrine in its unity. Logically, since the act of ordering the Universe is the same as the act of making Time, one might expect that these two aspects of the act of @@ -6946,15 +6542,11 @@ to follow Plato's meaning as exactly as he states it. Thus the function of image as an explanation of the relation between time and eternity is not less than logical; on the contrary, the image provides the basis to transcend the -linear appearance of philosophical logic and to reach into +linear \e{appearance} of philosophical logic and to reach into the heart of Plato's doctrine of the Unity of the Universe. - -2. Time is said to be made as an image of eternity.--At +* \Be{Time is said to be made as an image of eternity}---At first, this seems to mean that the demiurge fashioned the - - - Universe out of the material of an original chaos, but fashioned Time out of the material of eternity. This is not only a philosophical difficulty but also a function of @@ -6971,28 +6563,24 @@ made of. But the answer stares us in the face. Plato has said that the Universe is a Unity of the four elements of fire, earth, air, and water, which has Soul indivisibly in each and every one of its parts. One cannot then expect the -image, which the Universe is, to be made of any one of these +image, which the Universe is, to be \e{made of} any one of these so-called ingredients; the Universe is an image precisely -because it is a Unity. Just as the Universe is a Unity, so -4s it an image, and one can as reasonably ask of what is +because it is a \e{Unity.} Just as the Universe is a Unity, so +is it an image, and one can as reasonably ask of what is unity made as one can ask of what is an image made. The Universe, as image, is like the Soul of the Universe; it is indivisible from its existence. Thus, insofar as Time is an image, it is not compounded out of the elements of chaos or out of the perfection of eternity. Time as image is Plato's way of describing, "as it were," the temporal - - --unity of the Universe. The phrase "made of" seems - - - +unity of the Universe. The phrase "made of" seems ambiguous only because in English, the preposition "of" is sometimes used to indicate apposition, sometimes to indicate the genitive, as in derivation. The "of" here is appositive. -3. Time is said to be a moving image, and an everlasting -one.--We have already been given the ingredients of this + +* \Be{Time is said to be a moving image, and an everlasting +one}---We have already been given the ingredients of this aspect of the Universe from which we may construct an image. For the motions of the circles of the planets have been described as due to the ordering perfection of the Soul of @@ -7013,12 +6601,7 @@ uniform motion of the entire sphere itself, considered apart from the subsidiary motion of the interior circles, or whether it is one of the lesser motions of one or some of these circles, or whether it is all of these motions - - in some sort of unity. But we have been given the material - - - from which to reach this conclusion, for we have been told that the making of Time is the same act as the making of order. Thus, Time is the proportional unity of all the @@ -7034,26 +6617,23 @@ suppose that order is the principle according to which the many elements of the spatial universe have been united into a One and that Time is the principle according to which the many elements of the temporal Universe have been -united into a One, because that would lead to the conclusion that there are two Ones. Two Ones would create the +united into a One, because that would lead to the conclusion +that there are two Ones. Two Ones would create the third man problem which has been adduced already in the -Timaeus to show that the Universe is One and only One, or +\ul{Timaeus} to show that the Universe is One and only One, or one One. The Universe is a radical Unity, not simply of spaces and Times, but, one ought to say, of Time-space. - At the same time, however, one must assert that the Unity of the Universe is not a simply homogeneity without parts, for that would be the destruction and not the construction of a Universe. Plato's Universe is neither atomistic nor pantheistic; it is a unity of proportional realities, a - - moving image. - - - -The second aspect of the moving image is the everlasting character of its motion. Again, we have been furnished with the material to construct an understanding of -this characteristic. 'e have already called attention to +The second aspect of the moving image is the everlasting +character of its motion. Again, we have been furnished +with the material to construct an understanding of +this characteristic. We have already called attention to Plato's optimism in his use of the word "ceaseless," by which he seems to indicate that the Universe must resemble eternity by being indestructible. This feature of the @@ -7076,19 +6656,14 @@ were as eternal as its model it would be identical with its model and there would then be no difference between the model and the reality. But this cannot be, for the Universe, being visible, must have been generated, and must therefore - - --have been fashioned on a model. Secondly, throughout his - - - +have been fashioned on a model. Secondly, throughout his philosophy, Plato repeatedly uses the phrase "as far as possible" without giving a doctrine of possibility which would explain the meaning of the phrase. Both the need for a model and the limit of possibility are related to the doctrine of not-being. The meaning of this doctrine of not-being for the realm of the Forms, was first revealed in -the Sophist, where it becomes the Different. The Universe +the \ul{Sophist}, where it becomes the Different. The Universe is both the same as and different from its model, so that it is like its model and yet it is-not like its model. Having said that the Universe is a Unity of the Same and @@ -7109,12 +6684,7 @@ persuade necessity, not force it. Or, to put the matter in another way, insofar as the perfection of the Universe depends on the activity of the - - rational demiurge, it is perfect; but insofar as the - - - Universe depends on the reluctance of necessity to be persuaded by the demiurge, it lacks perfection. Thus the everlasting image, which we call Time, is subject to the @@ -7123,38 +6693,32 @@ Plato from the charge of naive optimism, for the perfection of the Universe is its everlasting character, but this is not the same as asserting that the Universe is absolutely perfect; even Time must confront necessity. -4, Time 18 said to move according to number.--Again, we + +* \Be{Time ie said to move according to number.}---Again, we have been furnished with the material to understand this assertion. We know already that the Universe considered as a whole is a sphere, but considered as the proportional unity of the many circles and living beings which inhabit it, it 18 a populated sphere. Thus Time is neither the revolution only of the outer periphery nor only the sum of -the rotations of the many circles which inhabit the interior of the sphere. Time is the order which the One Universe +the rotations of the many circles which inhabit the interior +of the sphere. Time is the order which the One Universe enjoys; (correlatively, the order of the Universe is the Time it enjoys). Time encompasses both the Unity and the -multiplicity of the Universe insofar as it is the perfection of the Universe which makes it most like its eternal +multiplicity of the Universe insofar as it is the perfection +of the Universe which makes it most like its eternal model. It would be a serious misreading of this phrase to assert that Plato's Universe is simply a Pythagorean Universe because Time moves in it according to number. Such a view focuses on the plurality of motions within the Universe but ignores the proportional Unity which these - - motions have in the Universe. This is not to say that - - - Plato's Universe is non-Pythagorean. On the contrary, there is a great deal of Pythagorean wisdom in this dialogue, and one should not forget that Timaeus, the principle speaker of the dialogue, is represented as a Pythagorean. But it is a long way from the assertion that there are Pythagorean - - -elements and themes in Plato's Timaeus to the assertion - - +elements and themes in Plato's \ul{Timaeus} to the assertion that the whole dialogue is only a Pythagorean tale. Time moves, no doubt. Time orders the Universe. And the many motions which the Universe includes are not excluded from @@ -7164,24 +6728,19 @@ many, and that Time brings order to the many by moving them in accordance with the perfection of which Time is the image. To derive the reality of Time from the number of motions in the Universe would be tantamount to the -assertion that Time is a subsidiary perfection of multiplicity, whereas the passage clearly states that Time +assertion that Time is a subsidiary perfection of multiplicity, +whereas the passage clearly states that Time brings the Universe into a closer and more perfect relation to its eternal model. -5. We have given it the name Time.--Once before, Plato +* \Be{We have given it the name Time}---Once before, Plato expressed a desire to use the right name for the Universe, and he said there that we ought to give the name to it which is most appropriate and acceptable to it (24b). It - is inetructive to recall that the difficulty of finding the right name would remind Plato of Cratylus, his first teacher, as it calls up for us the dialogue which bears - - -_his name. But one should also recall that the difficulty - - - +his name. But one should also recall that the difficulty of finding the right name for the Universe, and for Time, are related to Plato's concern to avoid blasphemy. For we must remember that the majority of simple Athenians had @@ -7189,16 +6748,17 @@ deities and names for those aspects of the Universe which they regarded as mysterious. Thus the name of Time could very well have precipitated controversial discussions in Plato's Athens which could swell to the dimensions which -they had reached with Socrates. The Phaedo would convince +they had reached with Socrates. The \ul{Phaedo} would convince anyone that Plato was not afraid of death, and so it does not follow that Plato is cautious out of fear. It is better to think that Plato regarded thinking through the doctrine -of the Timaeus as a more important work than entering into +of the \ul{Timaeus} as a more important work than entering into a polemic with those who could not understand it, especially -if we are correct in asserting that the Timaeus is not only -a synthesis of doctrine but a preparation for the Critias -and the Laws, which were intended to have direct political +if we are correct in asserting that the \ul{Timaeus} is not only +a synthesis of doctrine but a preparation for the \ul{Critias} +and the \ul{Laws}, which were intended to have direct political influence. +\enditems These five aspects of Plato's doctrine of Time, then, show that Plato has come to relate eternity, image, and @@ -7209,14 +6769,9 @@ discussed is sufficient to establish our hypothesis, for Plato has not completed his discussion of Time. Before we can conclude that Plato's image of Time is the high synthesis we claim it to be, we ought to have the entirety - - of Plato's doctrine of Time before us. - - - -Before adding, the final details, perhaps a small +Before adding the final details, perhaps a small summing up is in order. Plato has said that the Universe is a shrine, and that its deepest perfection is its temporality, which is the way it is ordered. Time is a @@ -7226,39 +6781,29 @@ model as closely as possible. Plato now speaks of the parts of Time, having already spoken of the Unity of Time. He says that there were no days and nights, or months and years, before the Universe -came to be, and that all of these came into being simultaneously. However, he says +came to be, and that all of these came into being simultaneously. +However, he says -All these are parts of Time, and 'was' and 'shall be' +\Q{All these are parts of Time, and \sq{was} and \sq{shall be} are forms of Time that have come to be; we are wrong to transfer them unthinkingly to eternal being. We -say that it was and is and shall be but '1is' alone -really belongs to it and describes it truly; 'was' -and 'shall be' are properly used of becoming which -proceeds in Time, for they are motions (37e). +say that it was and is and shall be but \sq{is} alone +really belongs to it and describes it truly; \sq{was} +and \sq{shall be} are properly used of becoming which +proceeds in Time, for they are motions. (37e)} There is much that is important in this passage, but the central point which concerns our exposition of Time is the phrase "becoming which proceeds in Time." By this small phrase, Plato indicates that there is a distinction to be -made between becoming and Time, and that these two worda +made between becoming and Time, and that these two words do not indicate the same reality. It is important to notice that the familiar antithesis between eternity and time is not identical with the antithesis of eternity and becoming. For it is clearly said that becoming proceeds in Time. We must attempt to see how Plato relates Time, Becoming, and - - eternity in a meaningful way. Plato does not put them in - - -_@ simple juxtaposition, for there are clearly three of - - -é -" - - - +a simple juxtaposition, for there are clearly three of them, and their relation to each other is not a simple opposition. We have seen that Time introduces the perfect order which characterizes the Universe, and we have been @@ -7267,23 +6812,15 @@ statements to be reconciled so that the Universe may continue to have the perfection which it has been said to have. The key to this problem is given in the following: -But that which is forever in the same state - +\Q{But that which is forever in the same state immovably cannot be becoming older or younger - by lapse of time nor can it ever become s0; - neither can it now have been nor will it be - in the future; and in general nothing belongs - to it of all that Becoming attaches to the - moving things of sense; but these have come - into being as forms of Time, which images - -eternity and revolves according to number (38a). +eternity and revolves according to number. (38a)} The important consideration here is the phrase "moving things of sense," for it specifies the realm of @@ -7298,19 +6835,13 @@ because the constant changes in the visible realm made knowledge impossible. This early conviction of Plato led to the theory of Forms, which are eternal and therefore sufficiently stable for intellectual comprehension. But - - now, the greatest perfection of which the Universe is - - capable is the perfection which Time brings as the - - - principle of order. We are now informed that becoming -proceeds in Time. Thus it is inexact to say "...that what -is past is past, what happens now is happening, and again -what will happen is what will happen, and that the non-existent is the non-existent" (38b). Plato has affirmed +proceeds \e{in} Time. Thus it is inexact to say "...that what +is past \e{is} past, what happens now \e{is} happening, and again +what will happen \e{is} what will happen, and that the non-existent +\e{is} the non-existent" (38b). Plato has affirmed that the ordering of the Universe has been made even more like its model by Time, the moving image of eternity. The theory of the Forms, up to this point, has told us that @@ -7324,37 +6855,21 @@ even perfects the Forms because Time helps things share in the intimacy of eternity's own nature. By Time, things share in the divine ordering of the Universe. -Time came into being together with the Heaven in - +\Q{Time came into being together with the Heaven in order that, as they were brought together, so - they might be dissolved together, if ever their - dissolution should come to pass: and it is made - after the pattern of the everenduring nature, in - order that it may be as like that pattern as - possible: for the pattern is a thing that has - being for all eternity, whereas the Heaven has - been and is and shall be perpetually throughout - -all time (38b, c). +all time. (38b--c)} Thus Time embraces all. By it, becoming most "becomes" Being. It has been generated like the forms of Time but it - - transcends them, because it has been made to increase the - - great intimacy which becoming has been brought to have - - - with Being. This could be paraphrased in several ways. One could @@ -7364,7 +6879,7 @@ with respect to each other. One could say that Time is the consummation of the contact which becoming and being have with each other. One could speak in Hegelian language and say that Time is the Mediation of Becoming, by which -becoming "becomes"being. But out of profound admiration for +becoming "becomes" being. But out of profound admiration for Plato's greatness as a stylist, Plato's imagery should be retained. But the truth must be understood as well as seen. "Time, the moving image of eternity," is spoken in the @@ -7383,13 +6898,8 @@ and Plato answers that, since the World-Soul is responsible both for the order and the motion of the numbered Universe, Time lives in the Soul of the Universe. Time accomplishes the ceaseless transcendence of becoming, for, by Time, - - things which only became, now "become" being. - - - It is important to state that Time does not so completely accomplish its transfiguration of mere becoming that nothing any longer becomes; the unification which Time @@ -7398,7 +6908,9 @@ proportional Unity, so that becoming no longer needs to te excluded from the perfection of the Universe, but can now enter into it on its own terms. Things which become, become intelligible by Time, because Time introduces order into -their motions, whereas ceaseless becoming as such, unordered by Time, has no order at all, and hence no intelligibility. Thus, where once Plato insisted that only the eternal +their motions, whereas ceaseless becoming as such, unordered +by Time, has no order at all, and hence no intelligibility. +Thus, where once Plato insisted that only the eternal is intelligible, now he asserts that Time brings becoming into the realm of the intelligible by introducing order into the realm of the incessantly becoming. @@ -7408,32 +6920,15 @@ Plato's image of Time is circular, derives in part from his description of the Universe as a sphere which revolves uniformly, and in part from the following passage: -In virtue then of this plan and intent of the god - +\Q{In virtue then of this plan and intent of the god for the birth of Time, in order that Time might - be brought into being, Sun, Moon, and five other - -stars-wanderers as they are called 22 were made - +stars-wanderers as they are called\pnote{3.22} were made to define and preserve the numbers of Time. - Having made a body for each of them, the god set - -them in orbits 23 in which the revolution of the - - -Different was movingein seven orbits seven -bodies (38c). - - -22 They do not really wander; see Laws 822a. - - -Cornford has "circuits." - - - +them in orbits\pnote{3.23} in which the revolution of the +Different was moving in seven orbits seven +bodies. (38c)} It is not necessary to follow Plato into the detailed descriptions which he gives for the motions of @@ -7453,51 +6948,33 @@ called the planets and the stars. "Thus for these reasons day and night came into being, the period of the single and most intelligent revolution" (39c). And again: -In this way then, and for these ends were brought - +\Q{In this way then, and for these ends were brought into being all those stars that have turnings on - their journey through the Heaven: in order that - this world may be as like as possible to the - perfect and intelligible Living Being in respect - -of imitating its ever-enduring nature (39e). +of imitating its ever-enduring nature. (39e)} The planets, then, are living beings who follow out prescribed courses according to number, But the perfection of the Universe which Time introduces is not merely the month or the year or the day or the night; these are the numbers of Time, just as was ard shall be are the forms - - of Time. Time, the reality, is the order of the Universe in - - - motion. Time is neither motion nor the result of motion (indeed, quite the reverse is true; motion is the result of the order which the demiurge elicits from chaos). Nor is Time becoming, for becoming proceeds in Time. In short, Time is the Life of the Universe, which was foreshadowed -in the Sophist, where the Stranger Bays: +in the \ul{Sophist}, where the Stranger Bays: -And, Oh Heavens, can we ever be made to believe +\Q{And, Oh Heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and lite and soul and mind are not present with sNeing. Can we imagine Being to be - - devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful -unmeaning and everlasting fixture (249a)? - - - - - -CHAPTER VI -TIME AND SOCIETY +unmeaning and everlasting fixture? (249a)} +\sec Time and Society While it has not escaped the attention of the scholars whose interest leads them to the Timaeus that its |