path: root/essays/dissociation_physics.tex

\chapter{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}

\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Para-Science}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}}

From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of moderate temperatures. 

Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along the human sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light reflection and emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the discussion. 

Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics. 

Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified with closing one's eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights which do not occur when one can feel that one's eyes are closed. 

Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of open eyes be $T_1$, and of closed eyes be $T_2$. Now anything that can be seen with closed eyes---from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct sunlight---can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be $V_1$, and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be $V_2$: If there are sights seen only with closed eyes, they will be $V_3$; we want disjoint classes. We are interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the $i$\textsuperscript{th} row and $j$\textsuperscript{th} column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of regularities in our present world. 

\vskip 0.25em
\begin{equation}
    \begin{pmatrix}
        p & p \\
        f & p
    \end{pmatrix}
\end{equation}
\vskip 0.25em

\slop{So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the present world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is excluded, meaning that at the moment, a $V_1$, is defined as lasting from the time the eyes open until the time they next close.}

We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a $2\times2$ array, there are 16 ways it can be filled with $p$'s and $f$'s. That is, there are 16 imaginable states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the present state (\ref{physpresent}) to another state (such as \ref{physafter}).

{\Huge i need to align theses}

\vskip 1em
{\parbox[c][2in][c]{1.5in}{
    \raggedleft
    \begin{equation}
        \label{physpresent}
        \begin{matrix}
            p & p \\
            f & p
        \end{matrix}
    \end{equation}}
    \parbox[c][2in][c]{1.5in}{\begin{equation}
        \label{physafter}
        \left(\begin{matrix}
            p & f \\
            p & p
        \end{matrix}\right)
    \end{equation}}}
\vskip 1em

However, we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only $f$'s, which amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of $f$'s leaves one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are changes in the place of the one $f$; the change to the state having only $p$'s; and finally 

\vskip 1em{
\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{
    \centering
    \parbox{0.75in}{\raggedleft
    $\begin{pmatrix}
        p & p \\
        f & p 
    \end{pmatrix}$}
    \parbox{0.5in}{\centering\huge$\rightarrow$}
    \parbox{0.75in}{$\begin{pmatrix}
        f & p \\
        p & f \end{pmatrix}$}
}}
\vskip 1em

In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are $[T_j]$ and $[V_j]$. The number of classes in a partition, m for touch and n for sight, is its detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition $[T_j]\times [V_j]$ is written $m\times n$. This detailedness virtually determines the $(mn)^2$ imaginable states, although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a composition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state lasts for a finite :waittime. (A function would be a general rule for rewriting states. A $2\times2$ rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from \ref{physegcwa} to \ref{physegcwb}.

\begin{wraptext}
    \begin{equation}\begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}\end{equation}
    \label{physegcwa}
\end{wraptext}

\begin{wraptext}
     \label{physegcwb}
    \begin{equation}
    \left(\begin{matrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{matrix}\right)
    \end{equation}
\end{wraptext}

But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change changes, and states having only $f$'s. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}changes, changes to states with rows or columns of $f$'s. Of the remaining changes, some merely forbid, replacing $p$'s with $f$'s. The rest of the changes are the most perception-dissociating ones. 

As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave the forbidden concurrence permitted; or else they merely leave permitted successions forbidden---for example, in order to open your eyes in the dark you might have to open them in the light and then turn the light off. These secondary changes are of secondary interest. 

If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will (observable as electrochemical impulses along efferent neurons). If a change occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a formerly forbidden concurrence, is it $T$ or $V$ that conflicts with the command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes close anyway? 

Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole change series occurs. Let $p$'s be black dots and $f$'s be white dots, and imagine a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect everything---everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomalies are really outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if the asserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even harder part is making it happen. 

\visbreak

However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a temporary psychological malfunction. 

These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an effort to see the table which he knows is there. 

Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give him a quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Tell the subject that he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem simultaneous. 

This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle resonance is today. 

Time is inescapably involved in our discussion; so we must decide what happens to time as a distinct physical category, and as a sense, in perception-dissociation. Here, we will simply distinguish three sorts of time. First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time. There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't automatically introduced in the other. If the ratio of the repetitions of the two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman). One effect of perception-dissociation relating to this sort of time would be to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. \enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The empirical importance of Alten's idea is that it raises the question of what the perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of futurity. 

\visbreak

We now come to some considerations which will help us develop the state descriptions, and which also show that from one point of view, the states are actually necessary for the operational definition of physical language. Let parallel but separated sheets of clear plastic and colored plastic be mounted in lighting conditions so that the subject can't see the clear plastic. He touches the clear plastic, but from what he sees, he believes he is touching the colored plastic. The lighting is then changed and his error is exposed. In some sense, the sight-touch concurrence identifying an object was a mere coincidence. Next, we produce another colored sheet for the subject to touch, and we are able to convince him that this time the object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence. 

The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to tell us how to avoid being fooled. 

We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in testing object-identifying concurrences, that doesn't immediately rely on other object-identifying concurrences, the very concurrences which are suspect. It is as if the physicist proposed to prove that clicks come from a certain metronome by manipulating a detecting device that outputs its data as sounds. But suppose the physicist proves that the clicks come from the metronome by showing (1) that the metronome has to be stopped or removed to stop the clicks, and (2) that the clicks stop if the metronome is stopped or removed. The physicist proves that the object-identifying concurrence is not a coincidence by demonstrating that certain related concurrences are forbidden. We suggest that the physicist ultimately handles touch-sight concurrences in just this way. The operational basis of the physicist's activity comes down to our states. (But note that the physicist has tests, which do not rely directly on his hearing, to determine whether the clicks come from the metronome!) One way to develop our states, then, may be to develop substates which express the differences between those object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that aren't---the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment.