From 8548929f5fcdc5dde833337247b223ce614a8199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: grr <grr@lo2.org>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 20:51:35 -0400
Subject: para-science breakout

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+\chapter{Studies in Constructed Memories}
+
+\section{Introduction}
+
+The memory of a conscious organism is a phenomenon in which 
+interrelations of mind, language, and the rest of reality are especially evident. 
+In these studies, I will define some conscious memory-systems, and 
+investigate them. The investigation will be mathematical. In fact, the nearest 
+precedent for it is perhaps the geometry of Nicholas Lobachevski. 
+Non-Euclidian geometry had many founders, but Lobachevski in particular 
+spoke of his system as an "imaginary geometry." Lobachevski's system was, 
+so to speak, the physical geometry of an "imaginary," or constructed, space. 
+By analogy, my investigation could be called a psychological algebra of 
+constructed minds. It is too early to characterize the investigation more 
+exactly. Let us just remember Rudoiph Carnap's Principle of Tolerance in 
+mathematics: the mathematician is free to construct his system in any way 
+he chooses. 
+
+I will begin by introducing a repertory of concepts informally, 
+becoming more formal as I go along. Consider ongoing actions, which by 
+definition extend through past, present, and future. For example, "I am 
+making the trip from New York to Chicago." Consider also past actions 
+which have probable consequences in the present. "I have been heating this 
+water" (entailing that it isn't frozen now). I will be concerned with such 
+actions as these. 
+
+Our language provides for the following assertion: "I am off to the 
+country today; I could have been off to the beach; I could not possibly have 
+been going to the center of the sun". We distinguish an actual action from a 
+possible action; and distinguish both from an action which is materially 
+impossible. People insist that there are things they could do, even though 
+they don't choose to do them (as opposed to things they couldn't do). What 
+distinguishes these possible actions from impossible ones? Rather than 
+trying to analyze such everyday notions in terms of the logic of 
+counterfactual conditionals, or of modalities, or of probability, I choose to 
+take the notions at their face value. My concern is not to philosophize, but 
+to assemble concepts with which to define an interesting memory system. 
+
+What is the introspective psychological difference between a thought 
+that has the force of a memory, and a thought that has the force of a 
+fantasied past, a merely possible past? I am not asking how I know that a 
+verbalized memory is true; I am asking what quality a naive thought has that 
+marks it as a memory. Let Alternative E be that I went to an East Side 
+restaurant yesterday, and Alternative W be that I went to a West Side one. 
+By the "thought of E" I mean mainly the visualization of going into the East 
+Side restaurant. My thought of E has the force of memory. It actually 
+happened. W is something I could have done. I can imagine I did do W. There 
+is nothing present which indicates whether I did E or W. Yet W merely has 
+the force of possibility, of fantasy. How do the two thoughts differ? Is the 
+thought of E involuntarily more vivid? Is there perhaps an "attitude of 
+assertion" involuntarily present in the thought of E? 
+
+Consider the memory that I was almost run down by a truck yesterday: 
+I could have been run down, but wasn't. In such a case, the possibility that I 
+could have been run down would be more vivid than the actuality that I 
+wasn't. (Is it not insanity, when a person is overwhelmed by the fear of a 
+merely possible past event? ) My hold on sanity here would be the awareness 
+that I am alive and well today. 
+
+In dreams, do we not wholeheartedly "remember" that a misfortune 
+has befallen us, and begin to adjust emotionally to it? Then we awake, and 
+wholeheartedly remember that the misfortune has not befallen us. The 
+thought that had the force of memory in the dream ceases to have that force 
+as we awake. We remember the dream, and conclude that it was a fantasy. 
+Even more characteristic of dreams, do I not to all intents and purposes go 
+to far places and carry out all sorts of actions in a dream, only to awaken in 
+bed? We say that the dream falsifies my present environment, my 
+sensations, my actions, memories, the past, my whole world, in a totally 
+convincing way. Can a hypnotist produce artificial dreams, that is, can he 
+control their content? Can the hypnotist give his subject one false memory 
+one moment, and replace it with a contradictory memory the next 
+moment? 
+
+I will now specify a situation involving possible actions and 
+remembering. 
+
+Situation 1. "I could have been accomplishing G by doing $A_{a_1}$, or by 
+doing $A_{a_2}$, \ldots, or by doing $A_{a_n}$; but I have actually been accomplishing G by 
+doing $A_{a_1}$." Here the ongoing actions $A_{a_i}$, $i=1,...,n$,$a_i\neq a_h if i\neq h$, are 
+the possible methods of accomplishing G. (The subscripts are supposed to 
+indicate that the methods are distinct and countable, but not ordered.) The 
+possible methods cannot be combined, let us assume. 
+
+In such a situation, perhaps the thought that I have been doing $A_{a_1}$
+would be distinguished from similar thoughts about $A_{a_2}, ..., A_{a_n}$ by the
+presence of the "attitude of assertion". Since the possible methods are 
+ongoing actions, the thought that I have been doing $A_{a_i}$ has logical or 
+probabie consequences I can check against the present. 
+
+Now $A_{a_1}$, is actual and $A_{a_2}$ is not, so that $A_{a_1}$, simply cannot have 
+possible jar in $A_{a_3}$ to contain it. The only "connection" $A_{a_1}$ could have
+material contact with $A_{a_2}$. An actual liquid in $A_{a_1}$ could not require a 
+with $A_{a_2}$, would be verbal and gratuitous. Therefore, in order to be possible 
+methods, $A_{a_2}$, ..., $A_{a_n}$ must be materially separable. A liquid in $A_{a_2}$ must
+not require a jar in $A_{a_3}$ to contain it. If it did, $A_{a_2}$ couldn't be actualized 
+while $A_{a_3}$, remained only a possibility. 
+
+Enough concepts are now at hand for the studies to begin in earnest. 
+
+\section{M-Memories}
+
+\newcommand{\definition}{\textbf{Definition.}}
+\newcommand{\assumption}[1]{\textit{Assumption #1.}}
+\newcommand{\conclusion}[1]{\textbf{Conclusion #1.}}
+
+\definition Given the sentences "I have actually been doing $A_{a_i}$", where 
+the $A_{a_i}$ are non-combinable possible methods as in Situation 1, an 
+"M-Memory" is a memory of a conscious organism such that the organism 
+can think precisely one of the sentences at a time, and any of the sentences 
+has the force of memory. 
+
+This definition refers to language, mind, and the rest of reality in their 
+interrelations, but the crucial reference is to a property of certain sentences. 
+I have chosen this formulation precisely because of what I want to 
+investigate. I want to find the minimal, elegant, extra-linguistic conditions, 
+whatever they may be, for the existence of an M-Memory (which is defined 
+by a linguistic property). I can say at once that the conditions must enable 
+the organism to think the sentences at will, and they must provide that the 
+memory is consistent with the organism's present awareness. 
+
+\definition The "P-Memory" of a conscious organism is its conscious 
+memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of its life. I 
+want to distinguish here the "personal" memory from the preconscious. 
+
+\definition An "L-Memory" is a linguistic P-Memory having no 
+extra-linguistic component. Of course, the linguistic component has 
+extra-linguistic mental associations which give it "meaning"--otherwise the 
+memory wouldn't be conscious. But these associations lack the force of a 
+mental reliving of the past independent of language. An L-Memory amounts 
+to extra-linguistic amnesia. 
+
+\assumption{1.1} With respect to normal human memory, when I forget 
+whether I did x, I can't voluntarily give either the thought that I did x, or 
+the thought that I didn't do x, the force of memory. I know that I either did 
+or didn't do x, but I can create no conviction for either alternative. (An 
+introspective observation.) 
+
+\conclusion{1.2} An L-Memory is not sufficient for an M-Memory, even 
+in the trivial case that the $A_{a_i}$ are beyond perception (as internal bodily 
+processes are). True, there would be no present perceptions to check the 
+sentences "I have actually been doing $A_{a_i}$" against. True, the L-Memory 
+precludes any extra-linguistic memory-"feelings" which would conflict with 
+the sentences. But the L-Memory is otherwise normal. And \textit{Assumption 1.1}
+indicates that normally, either precisely one of a number of mutually 
+exclusive possibilities has the force of memory; or else the organism can give 
+none of them the force of memory. 
+
+\assumption{1.3} I cannot, from within a natural dream, choose to swith 
+to another dream. (An introspective observation. A "natural" dream is a 
+dream involuntarily produced internally during sleep.) 
+
+\conclusion{1.4} An M-Memory could not be produced by natural 
+dreaming. It is true that in one dream one sentence could have the force of 
+memory, and in another dream a different sentence could. But an M-Memory 
+is such that the organism can choose one sentence-memory one moment and 
+another the next. See Assumption 1.3. 
+
+\assumption{1.5} Returning to the example of the restaurants, I find 
+that months after the event, my thought of E no longer has the force of 
+memory. All I remember now is that I used to remember that I did E. I 
+remember that I did E indirectly, by remembering that I remembered that I 
+did E. (My memory that I did E is becoming an L-Memory.) The assumption 
+is that a memory of one's remembering can indicate, if not imply, that the 
+event originally remembered occurred. 
+
+\conclusion{1.6} The following are adequate conditions for the existence 
+of an M-Memory. 
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item The sentences are the organism's only memory of which 
+method he has been using. 
+
+\item When the organism thinks "I have actually been doing $A_{a_i}$".
+then (he artificially dreams that) he has been doing $A_{a_i}$ --- and is 
+now doing it. 
+
+\item When the dream ends, he does not remember that he 
+remembered that "he has been doing $A_{a_i}$," That is, he does not remember 
+the dream; and he does not remember that he thought the sentence. These 
+conditions would permit the existence of an M-Memory or else a memory 
+indistinguishable to all intents and purposes from an M-Memory. 
+\end{enumerate}
+
+What I have in mind in \conclusion{1.6} is dreams which are produced 
+artificially but otherwise have all the remarkable qualities of natural dreams. 
+There would have to be a state of affairs such that the sentence would 
+instantly start the dream going. 
+
+So much for the conditions for the existence of an M-Memory. 
+Consider now what it is like as a mental experience to have an M-Memory. 
+What present or ongoing awareness accompanies an M-Memory? 
+\conclusion{1.6.2} already told what the remembering is like. For the rest, I will 
+informally sketch some conclusions. The organism can extra-linguistically 
+image the $A_{a_i}$. The organism can think "I could have been doing $A_{a_i}$." When 
+not remembering, the organism doesn't have to do any $A_{a_i}$, or he can do any 
+one of them. The organism must not do anything which would liquidate a 
+possble method, render the action no longer possible for him. 
+
+\assumption{2.1} A normal dream can combine two totally different 
+past episodes in my life into a fused episode, or amalgam; so that I "relive" it 
+without doubts as.a single episode, and yet remain vaguely aware that 
+different episodes are present in it. Dreams have the capacity not only to 
+falsify my world, but to make the impossible believable. (An introspective 
+observation.) 
+
+\conclusion{2.2} The conditions for the existence of an M-Memory 
+further permit material contact between the possible methods, the very 
+contact which is out of the question in a normal Situation 1. The dream is so 
+flexible that the organism can dream that an (actual) liquid is\slash was contained 
+by a jar in a possible method. See \assumption{2.1} Thus, the $A_{a_i}$ do not have 
+to be separable to be possible methods. 
+
+I will now introduce further concepts pertaining to the mind. 
+
+\definition\ A "mental state" is a mental "stage" or "space" or "mood" 
+in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried on. 
+
+Some human mental states are stupor, general anxiety, empathy with 
+another person, dizziness, general euphoria, clearheadedness (the normal 
+state in which work is performed), and dreaming. In all but the last state, 
+some simple visualization routine could be carried out voluntarily. Even ina 
+dream, I can have visualizations, although here I can't have them at will. The 
+states are not defined by the imaging or activities carried on while in them, 
+but are "spaces" in which such imaging or activities are carried on. 
+
+By definition. 
+
+\conclusion{3.2} An M-Memory has to occur within the time which the 
+possible methods require, the time required to accomplich G. By definition. 
+
+\definition An "M*-Memory" is an M-Memory satisfying these 
+conditions. 
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item $A_{a_i}$, for the entire time it requires, involves the voluntary 
+assuming of mental states. $i=1,...,n$.
+\item The material contact between the 
+possible methods, the cross-method contact, is specifically some sort of 
+contact between states. 
+\end{enumerate}
+
+\conclusion{3.3} For an M*-Memory, to remember is to choose the 
+mental state in which the remembering is required to occur (by the 
+memory). After all, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the 
+$A_{a_i}$-required things you are doing while you remember. 
+
+By now, the character of this investigation should be clearer. I seek to 
+stretch our concepts, rather that to find the "true" ones. The investigation 
+may appear similar to the old discipline of philosophical psychology, but its 
+thrust is rather toward the modern axiomatic systems. The reasoning is 
+loose, but not arbitrary. And the investigation will become increasingly 
+mathematical. 
+
+
+\section{D-Memories}
+
+\definition\ A "D-Memory" is a memory such that measured past time 
+appears in it only in the following sentences: "$Event_j$ occurred in the interval 
+% TODO\<F11><F12> ? whats up with AF
+of time which is $x_j-x_{j-1}$ long and ended at $x_j$ AF, and is Yj long and ended $z_j$
+\ ago," where $x_j$, $y_j$ and $z_j$ are positive numbers of time units (such as hours) 
+and '$AF$' means "after a fixed beginning time." $x_O=O;$ $x_j> x_{j-1}$; and at any 
+one fixed time, the intervals $|z_j, z_j+y_j|$ nowhere overlap. $y_j+z_j\leq x_j$ For an
+integer $m$, the $m$th sentence acquires the force of memory, is added to the 
+memory, at the fixed time $x_m$. $j=1, ..., f(t)$, where the number of sentences 
+$f(t)$ is written as a function of time $AF$. Then $f(t)=m$ when $x_m \leq t \less x_{m+1}$. 
+The sentences have the force of memory involuntarily. The organism does 
+not make them up at will. 
+
+Let me explain what the D-Memory involves. $Event_j$ is assigned to an 
+abnormal "interval," a dual interval defined in two unrelated ways. The 
+intervals defined by the $y_j$ and $z_j$ are tied to the present instant rather than to 
+a fixed time, and could be written $|N-z_j-y_j, N-z_j|$, where '$N$' means "the time 
+of the present instant relative to the fixed beginning time." 
+
+\newcommand{\proof}{\textit{Proof}}
+
+\conclusion{4} The intervals $|N-z_j-y_j, N-z_j|$ nowhere overlap. 
+
+\proof: By definition, the intervals $|z_j, z_j+y_j|$ nowhere overlap. If $j\neq k$,
+$|z_j, z_j+y_j|\cap|z_k, z_k+y_k|=\emptyset$ 
+This fact implies that \eg $z_j\less z_j+y_j\less z_k\less z_k+y_k$.
+Then $N-z_k-y_k\less N-z_k\less N-z_j-y_j\less N-z_j$.
+Then $|N-z_k-y_k, N-z_k|\cap|N-z_j-y_j, N-z_j|=\emptyset$
+At any one time, the organism can think of all the sliding intervals, and they 
+partly cover the time up to now without overlapping. 
+
+Suppose you find the deck of n cards 
+
+{ \centering
+\framebox[1.1\width]{
+	\centering
+	$event_j$ \linebreak
+	$z_j$ ago}}
+
+
+($j=1,...,n$ and $z_j$ is a positive number of days), and you have no 
+information to date them other than what they themselves say. If you 
+believe the cards, your mental experience will be a little like having a 
+D-Memory. Then, the definition does not require that $y_j=x_j-x_{j-1}$. Again, it is 
+not that two concepts of "length" are involved, but that the "interval" is 
+abnormal. Of course this is all inconsistent, but I want to study the 
+conditions under which a mind will accept inconsistency. 
+
+\assumption{5.1} With respect to normal human memory, it is possible 
+to forget what day it is, even though one remembers a past date. (An 
+empirical observation.) 
+
+\assumption{5.2} This assumption is based on the fact that the sign 
+'CLOSED FOR VACATION. BACK IN TWO WEEKS' was in the window of 
+a nearby store for at least a month this summer; and the fact that a 
+filmmaker wrote in a newspaper, "When an actor asks me when the film will 
+be finished, I say 'In two months," and two months later I give the same 
+answer, and I'm always right.' Even in normal circumstances, humans can 
+maintain a dual and outright inconsistent awareness of measured time. [n 
+general, inconsistency is a normal aspect of human thinking and even has 
+practical value. 
+
+Imagine a child who has been told to date events by saying, for 
+example, x happened two days ago, and a day later saying again, x happened 
+two days ago---and who has not been told that this is inconsistent. What 
+conditions are required for the acceptance of this dating system? It is 
+precisely because of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 that a certain answer cannot 
+be given to this question. The human mind is so flexible and malleable that 
+there is no telling how much inconsistency it can absorb. I can only study 
+what flaws might lead the child to reject the system. The child might "feel" 
+that an event recedes into the past, something the memory doesn't express. 
+An event might be placed by the memory no later than another, and yet 
+"feel" more recent than the other. I speculate that if anything will discredit 
+the system, it will be its conflict with naive, "felt," extra-linguistic memory. 
+
+\conclusion{5.3} The above dating system would be acceptable to an 
+organism with an L-Memory. 
+
+\conclusion{5.4} The existence of an L-Memory is an adequate condition 
+for the existence of a D-Memory. With extra-linguistic amnesia, the 
+structure of the language would be the structure of the past in any case. The 
+past would have no form independent of language. Anyway, time is gone for 
+good, leaving nothing that can be checked directly. Without an 
+extra-linguistic memory to fall back on, and considering Assumptions 5.1 
+and 5.2, the dual temporal memory shouldn't be too much to absorb. 
+
+As I said, the real difficulty with this line of investigation is putting 
+limits on anything so flexible as the mind's capacity to absorb inconsistency. 
+
+Now the thinking of a sentence in a D-Memory itself takes time. Let 
+$\delta(S^D_j)$ be the minimum number of time units it takes to think the jth 
+D-sentence. This function, abbreviated '$\delta_j$', is the duration function of the 
+D-sentences. 
+
+\conclusion{6.1} If $\delta_j\greater z_j$, the memory of the interval defined by $y_j$ and 
+$z_j$ places the end of the interval after the beginning of the memory of it, or 
+does something else equally unclear. If $\delta_j\greater y_j+z_j$, the entire interval is placed 
+after the beginning of the memory of it. When $\delta_j\greater z_j$, let us say that the end 
+of the remembered interval falis within the interval for the memory of it, or 
+that the situation is an "\textsc{infall}." (Compare \said{The light went out a half-second 
+ago}.)
+
+\conclusion{6.2} If $\delta_j\greater x_{j+k}-x_j$, then $S^D_{j+k}$ is added to the preconscious 
+before $S^D_j$ can be thought once. The earliest interval during which the jth 
+sentence can be thought "passes over" the (j+k)th interval. Let us say that 
+the situation is a "\textsc{passover}." (Something of the sort is true of humans, 
+whose brains contain permanent impressions of far more sensations than can 
+be thought, remembered in consciousness.) 
+
+\conclusion{6.3} If there are passovers in a D-Memory, the organism 
+cannot both think the sentences during the earliest intervals possible and be 
+aware of the passovers. 
+
+\proof: The only way the organism can be aware of $\delta(S_j)$
+is for $event_{j+h}$ (h a positive integer) to be the thinking of $S_j$. 
+If the thinking of $S_j$ takes piace as the $(j+1)^{th}$ event, then the organism gets two 
+values for $\delta(S_j)$, namely $x_{j+1}-x_j$ and $y_{j+1}$. Assume that only $x_{j+1}-x_j$
+is allowed as a measure of $\delta(S_j)$. Since $\delta(S_j)=x_{j+1}-x_j$, there is no passover. If 
+the thinking of $S_j$ takes place as the $(j+2)^{th}$ event, then $x_{j+2}-x{j+1}=\delta(S_j)$
+could be greater than $x_{j+1}-x_j$. But since $S_j$ goes into the preconscious at $x_j$, 
+$S_j$ is not actually thought in the earliest interval during which it could be 
+thought. See the diagram. 
+
+\img{dmemdiag}
+
+\conclusion{6.4} Let there be an \textsc{infall} in the case where $event_{j+1}$ is the 
+thinking of $S_j$. $\delta(S_j)=x_{j+1}-x_j$ and $\delta(S_j)\greater z_j$. $S_{j+1}$ gives $\delta(S_j)$, 
+so that the organism can be aware of it. 
+It is greater than $z_j$. Thus, the organism can be 
+aware of the \textsc{infall}. However, the \textsc{infall} will certainly be no more difficult to 
+accept than the other features of the D-Memory. And the thinking of $S_j$ has 
+to be one of the events for the organism to be aware of the infall. 
+
+\section{$\Phi$-Memories}
+I will conclude these studies with two complex constructions. 
+
+\definition A "$\Phi$-Memory" is a memory which includes an M*-Memory 
+and a D-Memory, with the following conditions. 
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item The goal G, for the M*-Memory, is to move from one point to another. 
+
+\item For the D-Memory, "$event_j$" becomes a numerical term, the decrease in the organism's distance 
+from the destination point during the temporal interval. \said{A 3-inch move 
+toward the destination} is the sort of thing that "$event_j$' here refers to. 
+
+\item The number of $A_{a_i}$ equals the number of D-sentences factorial. The number 
+of D-sentences, of course, increases. 
+\end{enumerate}
+
+Consider the consecutive thinking of each D-sentence precisely once, in 
+minimum time, while the number of sentences remains constant. Such a 
+"D-paragraph" is a permutation of the D-sentences. Let $\mathparagraph^m$ be a 
+D-paragraph when the number of sentences equals the integer m. There are 
+$m!$ $\mathparagraph^m$s. When $f(t)=m=3$, one of the six $\mathparagraph^3$s is $S^D_3 S^D_1 S^D_2$, 
+thought in 
+minimum time. Assume that the duration $\triangle$ of a D-paragraph depends only 
+on the number of D-sentences and the $\delta_j$. We can write 
+
+$$ \triangle(\mathparagraph^m)=\sum_{j=1}^{m} \delta_j $$
+
+The permutations of the D-sentences, as well as the D-paragraphs, can be 
+indexed with the $a_i$, just as the possible methods are. 
+
+Definition. A "$\Phi*$-Memory" is a $\Phi$-Memory in which the order of the 
+sentences in the $a_i$th $\mathparagraph^m$ has the meaning of \said{I have actually been doing $A_{a_i}$}
+assigned to it. The order is the indication that $A_{a_i}$ has actually been used; it 
+is the $a_j$th M*-assertion. \said{I have actually been doing $A_{a_i}$} is merely an English 
+translation, and does not appear in the $\Phi*$-Memory. 
+
+\conclusion{7} Given a $\Phi*$-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not 
+only will there be a gap in the awareness of when what events occurred; it 
+will be forgotten which method has actually been used. 
+
+This conclusion points toward a study in which deformations of the 
+memory language are related to deformations of general consciousness. 
+
+\definition A "$\Phi*$-Reflection," or reflection in the present of a 
+$\Phi*$-Memory, is a collection of assertions about the future, derived from a 
+$\Phi*$-Memory, as follows. 
+\begin{enumerate}
+	\item There are the sentences "$Event_j$ will occur in the 
+interval of time which is $x_j-x_{j-1}$ long, and begins at twice the present time 
+$AF$, minus $x_j AF$; and which is $y_j$ long and begins $z_j$ from now." If $event_j$ was 
+a 3-inch move toward the destination in the "$\Phi*$-Memory, the sentence in the 
+$\Phi*$-Reflection says that a 3-inch move will be made in the future temporal 
+interval. 
+	\item The $a_i$th permutation of the sentences defined in (1) is an 
+assertion which has the meaning of \said{I will do $A_{a_i}$}; and the organism can 
+think precisely one permutation at a time. The $A_{a_i}$, $x_j$, $y_j$, $z_j$, and the rest are 
+defined as before (so that in particular the permutations can be indexed with 
+the $a_i$). 
+\end{enumerate}
+
+\conclusion{8} Given that the $\Phi*$-Memory's temporal intervals $|x_{j-1}, x_j|$
+are reflected as $|2N-x_j, 2N-x_{j-1}|$, the reflection preserves the intervals' 
+absolute distances from the present. 
+
+\proof: The least distance of $|x_{j-1}, x_j|$
+from $N$ is $N-x_j$; the greatest distance is $N-x_{j-1}$. Adding the least distance, and 
+then the greatest distance, to $N$, gives $|2N-x_j, 2N-x_{j-1}|$.
+
+I will end with two problems. If a $\Phi*$-Memory exists, under what 
+conditions will a $\Phi*$-Reflection be a precognition? Under what conditions 
+will every assertion be prescience or foreknowledge? By a "precognition" I 
+don't mean a prediction about the future implied by deterministic laws; I 
+mean a direct "memory" of the future unconnected with general principles. 
+
+Finally, what would a precognitive $\Phi*$-Reflection be like as a mental 
+experience? What present or ongoing awareness would accompany a 
+precognitive $\Phi*$-Reflection? 
+
-- 
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