From 488959552c345ba7686f499707f17756a6bb75b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: phoebe jenkins <pjenkins@tula-health.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 22:54:46 -0400
Subject: clean up some probably misguided ideas about document splitting

---
 essays/philosophy_proper.tex | 18 ++++--------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'essays/philosophy_proper.tex')

diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index dc037c5..e122d29 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,17 +1,6 @@
+\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
 
-
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-\Chp{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
-
-\Ssc{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
+\subsection{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
 
@@ -47,7 +36,8 @@ The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitiv
 
 \signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without change.)}
 
-\clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}\SUBSEC{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
+\clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
+\subsection{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or false). 
 
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