From b0a065a5d9f3c2fba471825c3ee4e8cd4bada240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: phoebe jenkins <pjenkins@tula-health.com>
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 01:28:41 -0400
Subject: fixes to philosophical reflections

---
 essays/philosophical_reflections.tex | 40 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'essays/philosophical_reflections.tex')

diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
index 41bf1ce..5e0eedf 100644
--- a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
 
-\begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide]
+\begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these 
 intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why 
 are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this
 way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical 
 anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. 
 
-\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" 
+\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective \enquote{anthropology} 
 of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
 Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I 
 have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between 
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require
 propositional thought. 
 
 Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations 
-(relative to my field of vision) as "the same object" a belief? Apparently, 
+(relative to my field of vision) as \enquote{the same object} a belief? Apparently, 
 but this is very ambiguous. 
 
-Is my identification of tactile and visual "pencil-perceptions" as aspects 
+Is my identification of tactile and visual \enquote{pencil-perceptions} as aspects 
 of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through 
 different senses) a belief? Yes. 
 
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it.
 
 \gap
 
-\item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
+\item At one point Alten\editornote{A classmate of Flynt's at Harvard.} claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
 take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other 
-evidence. Our "immediate experience" is mediated; it is a derived 
+evidence. Our \enquote{immediate experience} is mediated; it is a derived 
 phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our 
 subjective standpoint. 
 
@@ -119,12 +119,12 @@ phenomenon, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the
 pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness 
 and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is
 the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy 
-exposes. "I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I 
-cannot now perceive it." 
+exposes. \enquote{\emph{I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I 
+cannot now perceive it.}} 
 \end{enumerate}
 
 \item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain 
-self-vitiating "nodes" in the logic of common sense. These nodes include the 
+self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} il the logic of common sense. These nodes include the 
 concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often 
 find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from 
 cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ unmistakable the reason why I attribute so much importance to these
 philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few 
 isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only 
 significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation 
-of why the life---world is subject to being undermined. 
+of why the life-world is subject to being undermined. 
 
 When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of 
 trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day 
@@ -149,35 +149,35 @@ pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside
 the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go 
 directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive 
 orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or 
-have "object perceptions," and thus wouldn't know whether one was 
-walking through a wail or not. 
+have \enquote{object perceptions,} and thus wouldn't know whether one was 
+walking through a wall or not. 
 
 At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my 
 genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of 
 non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a 
 hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental 
-incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
+incompetence or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
 this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. 
 
 \item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are 
 now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing 
 over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does 
 not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two 
-circumstances in conflict. The "fact" that we are talking is one of the two 
+circumstances in conflict. The \enquote{fact} that we are talking is one of the two 
 circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other 
-circumstance being the self-vitiating "nodes" I have mentioned. To repeat 
+circumstance being the self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} I have mentioned. To repeat 
 over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. 
 
 Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking 
-suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an 
-objective relation between words and things.) The language we "see" is a 
-shell whose "transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. 
+suggests, we do not \enquote{see} language. (That is, we do not experience an 
+objective relation between words and things.) The language we \enquote{see} is a 
+shell whose \enquote{transcendental reference} is provided by self-deception. 
 
-\item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in 
+\item Does the theory of amcons\editornote{"Admissable contradictions", defined in \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissable Contradictions} in this volume.} show that the contradiction exposed in 
 \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical 
 force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary 
 motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of 
-contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline 
+contradictory qualities. (But \enquote{\emph{He left an hour ago}} begins to be a borderline 
 case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which 
 violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to 
 classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3

