From 0a8175b85fb964bf1e06f31b794c8f08f72c3054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: phoebe jenkins <pjenkins@tula-health.com>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 00:56:25 -0400
Subject: rev to flaws & final fixes of intro

---
 essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

(limited to 'essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex')

diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
index 79f8b7a..857efe1 100644
--- a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
+++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 \chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
 
 We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my 
-"immediate experience." Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist 
+\enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist 
 even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, 
 then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask 
 whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be 
 yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in 
-order for the phrase "a realm beyond my experience" to have any meaning. 
+order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. 
 Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap 
 between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion 
 \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we
 are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our 
 argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, 
 and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. 
-The only possible pproach for this paper is an internal critique of common 
+The only possible approach for this paper is an internal critique of common 
 sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to 
 aspects of themselves. 
 
@@ -53,25 +53,25 @@ which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in
 the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has 
 traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian 
 atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing 
-aboui nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the 
+about nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the 
 natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that 
 belief-assertions are not substantive. 
 
 Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my 
-experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts. (We 
+experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts.\footnote{We 
 understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my 
 experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal 
-formulation.) Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire 
+formulation.} Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire 
 State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the 
 \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture 
 that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a 
 distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called 
 perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may 
 close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of 
-"reality," two different types of experiences can be distinguished, 
+\enquote{reality,} two different types of experiences can be distinguished, 
 non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act 
 consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a 
-non-mental experience. The "attitude" which is involved is not a 
+non-mental experience. The \enquote{attitude} which is involved is not a 
 proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only 
 introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving 
 psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the 
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ belief-assertion.
 
 The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as 
 the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that 
-although the problem originally seems to center on "nonexperience," it 
-turns out to center on "language." Philosophical problems exist only if there 
+although the problem originally seems to center on \enquote{nonexperience,} it 
+turns out to center on \enquote{language.} Philosophical problems exist only if there 
 is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in 
 belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the 
 existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that 
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond
 experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic 
 expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark 
 parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to 
-nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word "table" is supposed to denote an 
+nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word \enquote{table} is supposed to denote an 
 object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. 
 Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as 
 follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that 
@@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of
 all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is 
 true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is 
 whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more 
-immediately than in the case of "nonexperience," that this question is 
+immediately than in the case of \enquote{nonexperience,} that this question is 
 caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is 
 there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and 
-nonexperiences? Is there an expression, "\textsc{Empire State Building,}" which is 
+nonexperiences? Is there an expression, \enquote{\textsc{Empire State Building,}} which is 
 related to an object outside one's experience, the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and 
 which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the \textsc{Empire 
 State Building} or not?) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask 
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the
 natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of 
 the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this 
 container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There 
-is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned 
-before, the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an 
+is no way to \enquote{go back before the natural language.} As we mentioned 
+before, the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so} is an 
 example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
 
 In summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, 
-- 
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