<html><head><meta name="color-scheme" content="light dark"></head><body><pre style="word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap;">From 9c0214b92acd6816b93ee4edca995257914630ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: phoebe jenkins &lt;pjenkins@tula-health.com&gt;
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 23:48:18 -0400
Subject: confuse myself around some weird invisible characters

---
 essays/dissociation_physics.tex | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'essays/dissociation_physics.tex')

diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index 5255df0..5badaf1 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -8,23 +8,58 @@ Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and even phil
 
 Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified with closing one's eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights which do not occur when one can feel that one's eyes are closed. 
 
-Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of open eyes be $T_1$, and of closed eyes be $T_2$. Now anything that can be seen with closed eyes---from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct sunlight---can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be $V_1$, and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be $V_2$: If there are sights seen only with closed eyes, they will be $V_3$; we want disjoint classes. We are interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the $i$th row and $j$th column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of regularities in our present world. 
+Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of open eyes be $T_1$, and of closed eyes be $T_2$. Now anything that can be seen with closed eyes---from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct sunlight---can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be $V_1$, and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be $V_2$: If there are sights seen only with closed eyes, they will be $V_3$; we want disjoint classes. We are interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the $i$\textsuperscript{th} row and $j$\textsuperscript{th} column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of regularities in our present world. 
 
-\begin{equation}\begin{pmatrix}	p &amp; p\\	f &amp; p \end{pmatrix}\end{equation}
+\begin{equation}
+    \begin{pmatrix}
+        p &amp; p \\
+        f &amp; p
+    \end{pmatrix}
+\end{equation}
 
 So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the present world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is excluded, meaning that at the moment, a $V_1$, is defined as lasting from the time the eyes open until the time they next close. 
 
 We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a $2\times2$ array, there are 16 ways it can be filled with $p$'s and $f$'s. That is, there are 16 imaginable states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the present state (\ref{physpresent}) to another state such as \ref{physafter}.
 
-\vskip 1em{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering	\parbox{1.5in}{		\begin{equation}\label{physpresent}\begin{pmatrix}	p &amp; p \\	f &amp; p\end{pmatrix}		\end{equation}}\parbox{1.5in}{\begin{equation}\label{physafter}\begin{pmatrix}	p &amp; f \\	p &amp; p\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}\par}\par}\vskip 1em
+\vskip 1em{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering
+ \parbox{1.5in}{
+    \begin{equation}
+        \label{physpresent}
+        \begin{pmatrix}
+            p &amp; p \\
+            f &amp; p
+        \end{pmatrix}
+    \end{equation}}
+    \parbox{1.5in}{\begin{equation}
+        \label{physafter}
+        \begin{pmatrix}
+            p &amp; f \\
+            p &amp; p
+        \end{pmatrix}
+    \end{equation}}\par}
+    \par}
+\vskip 1em
 
 However, we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only $f$'s, which amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of $f$'s leaves one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are changes in the place of the one $f$; the change to the state having only $p$'s; and finally 
 
-\vskip 1em{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering	\parbox{0.75in}{\raggedleft $\begin{pmatrix} p &amp; p \\ f &amp; p \end{pmatrix}$}		\parbox{0.5in}{\centering \huge $\rightarrow$ }		\parbox{0.75in}{$\begin{pmatrix} f &amp; p \\ p &amp; f \end{pmatrix}$}}}\vskip 1em
+\vskip 1em{
+\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{
+    \centering
+    \parbox{0.75in}{\raggedleft
+    $\begin{pmatrix}
+        p &amp; p \\
+        f &amp; p 
+    \end{pmatrix}$}
+    \parbox{0.5in}{\centering\huge$\rightarrow$}
+    \parbox{0.75in}{$\begin{pmatrix}
+        f &amp; p \\
+        p &amp; f \end{pmatrix}$}
+}}
+\vskip 1em
 
 In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are $[T_j]$ and $[V_j]$. The number of classes in a partition, m for touch and n for sight, is its detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition $[T_j]\times [V_j]$ is written $m\times n$. This detailedness virtually determines the $(mn)^2$ imaginable states, although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a conposition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a general rule for rewriting states. A $2\times2$ rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from \ref{physegcwa} to \ref{physegcwb}.
 
-\vskip 1em			{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering\parbox{1.25in}{\raggedleft\begin{equation}\label{physegcwa}\begin{pmatrix}a &amp; b \\ c &amp; d\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}\parbox{1.25in}{\begin{equation}\label{physegcwb}\begin{pmatrix}c &amp; a \\ d &amp; b\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}}}	\vskip 1em
+\vskip 1em   {\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering\parbox{1.25in}{\raggedleft\begin{equation}\label{physegcwa}\begin{pmatrix}a &amp; b \\ c &amp; d\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}\parbox{1.25in}{\begin{equation}\label{physegcwb}\begin{pmatrix}c &amp; a \\ d &amp; b\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}}} \vskip 1em
 
 But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change changes, and states having only $f$'s. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}changes, changes to states with rows or columns of $f$'s. Of the remaining changes, some merely forbid, replacing $p$'s with $f$'s. The rest of the changes are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
 
@@ -32,7 +67,7 @@ As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave the fo
 
 If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will (observable as electrochemical impulses along efferent neurons). If a change occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a formerly forbidden concurrence, is it $T$ or $V$ that conflicts with the command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes close anyway? 
 
-Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole change series occurs. Let $p$'s be black dots and $f$'s be white dots, and imagine a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect everything---everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomalies are really outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if theasserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even harder part is making it happen. 
+Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole change series occurs. Let $p$'s be black dots and $f$'s be white dots, and imagine a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect everything---everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomalies are really outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if the asserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even harder part is making it happen. 
 
 \visbreak
 
@@ -40,7 +75,7 @@ However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet satisfactory, We
 
 These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an effort to see the table which he knows is there. 
 
-Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give hima quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Tell the subject that he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem simultaneous. 
+Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give him a quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Tell the subject that he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem simultaneous. 
 
 This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle resonance is today. 
 
-- 
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