From 998edec7b390a7e11c38bdb5ca9c02b62a87c09e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: grr <grr@lo2.org>
Date: Sun, 21 Apr 2024 21:02:22 -0400
Subject: this is where i left things at before move, i guess

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+\documentclass[10pt,twoside]{memoir}
+
+\usepackage{salitter}
+\usletterlayout
+
+\usepackage{mwe}
+\usepackage{csquotes}
+\usepackage{bbold}
+\usepackage{stix}
+
+\coelfont
+
+\newcommand{\speech}[1]{
+	\textquote{\emph{#1}}}
+
+\newcommand{\essaytitle}[1]{
+	\emph{#1}}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+\graphicspath{{img/}}
+\pagestyle{ruled}
+
+{
+\thispagestyle{empty}
+\img{creep.png}
+
+Henry Flynt presents "Creep" lecture in Adam Hovre upper common room, Harvard 
+University, May 15, 1962 
+
+
+(photo by Tony Conrad) 
+\clearpage
+}
+
+\tableofcontents*
+
+\mainmatter
+
+\chapter{Introduction}
+
+
+This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It 
+summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole 
+range of questions which I have developed. The first essay, 
+\essaytitle{On Social Recognition}, noted that the official social philosophy of practically every 
+regime in the world says that the individual has a duty to serve society to the 
+best of his abilities. Social recognition is supposed to be the reward which 
+indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that 
+the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, 
+political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual 
+undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution 
+(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the'individual has 
+a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social 
+philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain 
+the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond 
+this, he will undertake the most important tasks posed by society for his 
+own private gratification. He will not attempt to benefit society, or to gain 
+the recognition which would necessarily result if society were to utilize his 
+achievements. 
+
+The second essay, \essaytitle{Creep}, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; 
+carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and 
+playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of 
+certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually 
+needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be 
+desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality 
+problems. 
+
+I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. 
+Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have 
+pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and 
+demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still 
+consider it "necessary" to believe in God; but the Soviet government has 
+managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which 
+beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled 
+\essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and 
+\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. 
+The question of whether a given belief is valid 
+depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate 
+experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I 
+am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be 
+a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase 'a realm 
+beyond my experience' could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of 
+descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a 
+realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it 
+cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs 
+depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, 
+an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or 
+meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that 
+the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I 
+imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this 
+mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental! picture. The 
+attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to 
+the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that al! beliefs 
+are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt 
+beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are 
+nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. 
+
+The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth 
+as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to 
+have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that 
+an activity may perfectly weil employ false statements and still have 
+objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that 
+are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary 
+phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of 
+contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental 
+reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and 
+phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It 
+must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to 
+pre-scientific trrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more 
+than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you 
+to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, 
+explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get 
+you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material 
+for rational purposes. 
+
+The other initial subject of investigation I chose was art. The art which 
+claims to have cognitive value is already demolished by my philosophical 
+results. However, art at its most distinctive does not need to claim cognitive 
+value; its value is claimed to be entertainmental or amusemental. What about 
+art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which 
+are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each 
+individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely 
+subjective. (Call these experiences "brend.") The difference between brend 
+and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and 
+turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to 
+overlook their brend, and they do so because of the same factors which 
+perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization 
+of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning 
+which causes one to venerate "great art" is also a conditioning to dismiss 
+one's own brend. If one can become aware of one's brend without the 
+distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's brend is 
+superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality 
+which completely transcends art. 
+
+Thus, I reject art as an intellectual or cultural modality. In rejecting 
+truth, I advocated in its place intellectual activities which have an objective 
+value independent of truth. In rejecting art, I do not propose that it be 
+replaced with any objective activity at all. Rather, I advocate that the 
+individual become aware of his just-likings for what they are, and allow them 
+to come out. If I succeed in getting the individual to recognize his own 
+just-likings, then I will have given him infinitely more than any artist ever 
+can. 
+
+We are not finished with art, however. Ever since art began to 
+disintegrate as an institution, modern art has become more and more of a 
+repository for activities which represent pure waste, but which counterfeit 
+innovation and objective value. A two-way process is involved here. On the 
+one hand, the modern artist, faced with the increasing gratuitousness of his 
+profession, desperately incorporates superficial references to science in his 
+products in the hope of intimidating his audience. On the other hand, art 
+itself has become an institution which invests waste with legitimacy and even 
+prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game. 
+What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into 
+little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write 
+down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call 
+the result a "modern poem," people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas 
+they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly 
+mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in 
+their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial 
+amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets. 
+
+Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between 
+the products which result from this attempt to "save" art, and activities in 
+the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse 
+activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art 
+products which are claimed to be "scientific" and therefore objectively 
+valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked 
+about art products. 
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be 
+worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to "carry" it? 
+
+\item Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific 
+discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the 
+field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, 
+why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it 
+only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to 
+perform "Swan Lake" in order to do antigravity experiments? 
+\end{enumerate}
+To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to 
+isolate the active principle---not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo. 
+
+Both of these sets of questions make the same point, from somewhat 
+different perspectives. Given an individual with a product to offer, does he 
+actively seek out the lady art reporters, the public relations contracts, the 
+museum officials, or does he actively dissociate himself from them? Does he 
+seek artistic legitimation of his product, or does he reject it? The objective 
+activities which I have developed stand on their own feet. They are not art, 
+and to construe them as art would make it impossible to comprehend them. 
+
+A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. 
+Until now, this modality has involved the construction of ideas such that the 
+very possibility of thinking these ideas is a significant phenomenon. In other 
+words, the modality has consisted of the invention of mental abilities. The 
+ideas involve physical language, that is, language which occurs in beliefs 
+about the physical world. Such language is philosophically meaningless, but 
+it has connotations provided by the psychological trick involved in believing. 
+The connotations are what are utilized; factual truth is irrelevant. Then, the 
+ideas cannot be reduced to the mechanical manipulation of marks or 
+counters---unlike ordinary mathematics. Also, logical truth, which happens to 
+be discredited by my philosophical results, is irrelevant to the ideas. 
+
+But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it 
+must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something 
+which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful 
+independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. 
+
+We can now consider the following principle. "spontaneously and 
+without any prompting to sweep human culture aside and to carry out 
+elaborate, completely self-justifying activities." Relative to the social context 
+of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to 
+respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary 
+antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, 
+it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. 
+In the light of The Flaws Underlying Beliefs and the brend theory, however, 
+the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted 
+correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The 
+activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be 
+standardized. 
+
+The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism},
+\essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. 
+\essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very 
+possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an 
+activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional 
+gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena 
+with the thinking of contradictions. It led to \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed 
+Memories}, which in turn led to \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}.
+With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications 
+outside itself. 
+
+\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963}
+uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental 
+reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories}, and this led 
+in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}.
+
+The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} 
+was intended to exploit the realization that humans are the most 
+advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model 
+of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, 
+the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically 
+impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I 
+have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely 
+accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension 
+of normal beliefs to produce its effects. 
+
+\essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in 
+Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies} (1966). In 
+this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as 
+formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two 
+subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its 
+potential applications in conjunction with science. 
+\essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical 
+possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses.
+\essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences 
+of the logically impossible which 
+we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us 
+to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the 
+logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to 
+obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are 
+"admissible." The theory investigates the implications of admitting some 
+contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of 
+many-valued numbers is also presented. 
+
+The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to 
+\essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose 
+significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay 
+defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it 
+impossibie for physicists to "construct the object from experience." Finally, 
+\essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of 
+false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I 
+favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not 
+generated a series of applications as the other activities have. 
+
+To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They 
+are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities 
+having objective value, together with cach individual's brend. Consider the 
+individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the 
+significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the 
+business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of 
+the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded 
+the wrong things, as I argued in \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}. But in addition, the 
+institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual 
+modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to 
+prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which 
+I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official
+intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot 
+be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the 
+beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is 
+presumably not inherent in my intelectual modality; but under present 
+social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. 
+
+
+\part{PHILOSOPHY}
+
+
+\chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
+
+
+We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my 
+"immediate experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist 
+even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, 
+then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask 
+whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be 
+yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in 
+order for the phrase "a realm beyond my experience" to have any meaning. 
+Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap 
+between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion 
+\speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that 
+is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natura! 
+language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a 
+statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the 
+natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. 
+Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, 
+and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses 
+about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. 
+An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so 
+doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics 
+of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a 
+substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a 
+statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must 
+be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is 
+our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my 
+experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a 
+substantive assertion. 
+
+The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we 
+are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our 
+argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, 
+and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. 
+The only possible pproach for this paper is an internal critique of common 
+sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to 
+aspects of themselves. 
+
+As an example of the application of our initial result to specific 
+questions of belief, consider the question of whether the Empire State 
+Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is 
+even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced 
+Empire State Building does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the 
+realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the Empire State 
+Building continues to exist when I am not Jooking at it depends on the very 
+assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we 
+found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the Empire State 
+Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be 
+considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a 
+definitional trick. 
+
+We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, 
+which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in 
+the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has 
+traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian 
+atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing 
+aboui nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the 
+natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that 
+belief-assertions are not substantive. 
+
+Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my 
+experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts. (We 
+understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my 
+experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal 
+formulation.) Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the Empire 
+State Building exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the 
+Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture 
+that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a 
+distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called 
+perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may 
+close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of 
+"reality," two different types of experiences can be distinguished, 
+non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act 
+consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a 
+non-mental experience. The "attitude" which is involved is not a 
+proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only 
+introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving 
+psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the 
+belief-assertion. 
+
+The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as 
+the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that 
+although the problem originally seems to center on "nonexperience," it 
+turns out to center on "language." Philosophical problems exist only if there 
+is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in 
+belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the 
+existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that 
+the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which 
+refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond 
+experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic 
+expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark 
+parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to 
+nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word 'table' is supposed to denote an 
+object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. 
+Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as 
+follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that 
+we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to 
+entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? !n other 
+words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of 
+all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is 
+true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is 
+whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more 
+immediately than in the case of 'nonexperience,' that this question is 
+caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is 
+there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and 
+nonexperiences? Is there an expression, 'Empire State Building,' which is 
+related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and 
+which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire 
+State Building or not? ) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask 
+whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the 
+distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help 
+here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the 
+natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of 
+the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this 
+container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There 
+is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned 
+before, the aphorism that 'saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an 
+example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
+
+in summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, 
+made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is 
+too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fal! on the question 
+of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional 
+trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question 
+simply collapses. 
+
+\chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
+
+
+We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to 
+believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. 
+Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a 
+blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. 
+Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also 
+observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so 
+that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving wil! 
+not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question 
+then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that 
+people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as 
+soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract 
+and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. 
+Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot 
+afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs 
+which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. 
+
+Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs 
+as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and 
+decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be 
+punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional 
+preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between 
+fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be 
+self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional 
+formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation 
+whatever? 
+
+It is apparent that fearful beliefs suggest many topics for speculation. 
+This essay, however, will concentrate exclusively on one topic, which is by 
+far the most important. Given that people once held the belief about 
+blasphemy, and that I do not, then I have succeeded in dispensing with a 
+fearful belief. Two beliefs which are exactly analogous to the one about 
+blasphemy are the belief that if I jump out of a tenth story window I will be 
+hurt, and the belief that if I attempt to walk through a wali I wil! bruise 
+myself. Given that I am able to dispense with the belief about blasphemy, it 
+follows that, in effect, I am able to walk through walls relative to medieval 
+people. That is, my ability to blaspheme without being struck by lightning 
+would be as unimaginable to them as the ability to walk through walls is 
+today. The topic of this essay is whether it is possible to transfer my 
+achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs. 
+
+\visbreak
+
+I am told that \enquote{if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will 
+be hurt.} Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not 
+convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the 
+"evidence" implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to 
+see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both 
+blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the 
+action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in 
+order to prove that I can get away with it? Actually, I do not blaspheme; I 
+simply do not perform the action at all. Yet I do not have any belief 
+whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose 
+that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, 
+shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? 
+Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of 
+having to accept the dare that "you have to do it to prove you don't believe 
+it's dangerous'? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? 
+The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief 
+should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. 
+
+The exhortation continues to the effect that if I did utter blasphemy I 
+really would be struck by lightning. I stil! do not find this compelling. But 
+suppose that I do see someone utter a blasphemy and get struck by lightning. 
+Surely this must convert me. But with due apologies to the faithful, I must 
+report that it does not. There is no reason why it should make me believe. I 
+do not believe that blaspheming will cause me to be struck by lightning, and 
+the evocation of frightful images---or for that matter, something that I 
+see---would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an 
+immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by 
+lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by 
+lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold 
+the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I tive is so 
+profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one 
+"sighting."}
+
+In general, the so-called evidence doesn't work. There is a swindle 
+somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful 
+belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the 
+whole conglomeration of "evidence" somehow overwhelmed medieval 
+people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away 
+with something that they could not get away with. 
+
+It is not that I stand up in a society of the faithful and suddenly 
+blaspheme. It is rather that the whole medieva! cognitive orientation had 
+been completely reoriented by the time it was transmitted to me. Or in other 
+words, the medieval cognitive orientation was restructured throughout 
+during the modern era. In the process, the compelling conglomeration of 
+evidence was disintegrated. Isolated from their niches in the old orientation, 
+the bits of evidence no longer worked. Each bit missed the target. I do not 
+have a head-on confrontation with the medieval impossibility of 
+blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I 
+structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. 
+
+The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I 
+have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that 'if I try to walk 
+through the wall I wil! fail and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am 
+sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. 
+But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a 
+fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring 
+the entire situation, of restructuring evidence, so that the conglomeration of 
+evidence is disintegrated into isolated bits which are separately powerless. 
+Only then can one slip by the impossibility. I cannot exercise my freedom to 
+walk through walls until the whole cognitive orientation of the modern era is 
+restructured throughout. 
+
+The project of restructuring the modern cognitive orientation is a vast 
+one. The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. In this connection it 
+is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic of science as Carnap 
+rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition meaningful if it had any 
+empirically verifiable proposition as an implication. But consider an 
+appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions in good standing, and 
+conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite number of propositions about 
+single events (what Carnap called protocol-sentences). Only a very small 
+number of the latter propositions are indeed subject to verification. If we 
+sever them from the entire conjunction, what remains is as effectively 
+blocked from verification as the propositions which Carnap rejected as 
+meaningless. This criticism of science is not a mere technical exercise. A 
+scientific proposition is a fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially 
+testable meanings with an infinite number of untestable meanings and 
+inveigles us to accept the whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the 
+very beginning of \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this 
+quite clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it. For us, 
+however, it is essential to be assured that science can be dismantled just as 
+the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme. 
+
+We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to 
+overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of 
+the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive 
+"objects" is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for 
+this correlation is "the contribution of intermodal organization to the 
+object Gestalt."}
+
+From a different traditon, the critique of scientific fact and of 
+measurable time which is suggested in Luk\'{a}cs' \booktitle{Reification and the 
+Consciousness of the Proletariat} might be of value if it were developed.\footnote{Lulkacs also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist 
+society---that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to 
+subsistence was unconditional. He implied that scientific quantification and 
+facticity are closely connected with the work discipline required by the 
+capitalist mode of production; and that like the price system, they constitute 
+a false objectivity which we accept because the social economic institutions 
+deprive us of subsistence if we fail to submit to them. Quite aside from the 
+historical unlikelihood of a communist society, this suggestion might be 
+pursued as a thought experiment to obtain a more detailed characterization 
+of the hypothetical post-scientific outlook.}
+
+Finally, I may mention that most of my own writings are offered as 
+fragmentary beginnings in the project of dismantling the modern cognitive 
+orientation. 
+
+Someday we will realize that we were always free to walk through 
+walls. But we could not exercise this freedom because we structured the 
+whole situation, and the evidence, in an enslaving way. 
+
+\chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
+
+\begin{enumerate} % TODO letters, sub numbers
+\item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these 
+intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why 
+are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find 
+in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating 
+concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of 
+this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to 
+concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a 
+transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not 
+these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the 
+mindless animals? 
+
+Such questions tempt one to engage in a sort of philosophical 
+anthropology, using in part the method of introspection. Beliefs could be 
+explained as arising in an attempt to deal with experienced frustrations by 
+denying them in thought. The origin of Christian Science and magic would 
+thereby be explained. Further, we could postulate a primal anxiety-reaction 
+to raw experience. This anxiety would be lessened by mythologies and 
+explanatory beliefs. The frustration and the anxiety-reaction would be 
+primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
+
+Going even farther, we could suppose that a being which could 
+apprehend the whole universe through direct experience would have no need 
+of beliefs. Beliefs would be a rickety method of coping with the limited 
+range of our perception, a method by which our imperfect brains cope with 
+the world. There would be an analogy with the physicist's use of phantom 
+models to make experimental observations easier to comprehend. 
+
+However, there are two overwhelming objections to this philosophical 
+anthropology. First, it purports to study the human mind as a derivative 
+phenomenon, to study it from a God-like perspective. The philosophical 
+anthropology thus consists of beliefs which are subject to the same 
+objections as any other beliefs. It is on a par with any other beliefs; it has no 
+privileged position. Specifically, it is in competition not only with my 
+philosophy but with other accounts of the mind-reality relation, such as 
+behaviorism, Platonism, and Thomism. And my philosophy provides me with 
+no basis to defend my philosophical! anthropology against their philosophical 
+anthropologies. My philosophy doesn't even provide me with a basis to 
+defend my philosophical anthropology against its own negation. 
+
+In short, the paradoxes which my philosophy uncovers must remain 
+unexplained and unresolved. 
+
+The other objection to my philosophical anthropology is that its 
+implications are unnecessarily conservative. An explanation of why people 
+do something wrong can become an assertion that it is necessary to do wrong 
+and finally a justification for doing wrong. But just because I tend, for 
+example, to construe my perceptions as confirmations of propositions about 
+phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this 
+way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical 
+anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. 
+
+
+\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" 
+of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
+Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I 
+have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between 
+beliefs and non-credulous mental activity. 
+
+Is my fear of jumping out of the window a belief? Strictly speaking, 
+no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require 
+propositional thought. 
+
+Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations 
+(relative to my field of vision) as "the same object" a belief? Apparently, 
+but this is very ambiguous. 
+
+Is my identification of tactile and visual "pencil-perceptions" as aspects 
+of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through 
+different senses) a belief? Yes. 
+
+It is possible to subjectively classify bodily movements according to 
+whether they are intentional, because drunken awkwardness, adolescent 
+awkwardness, and movements under ESB are clearly unintentional. Then 
+does intentional movement of my hand require a belief that I can move my 
+hand? Definitely not, although in rare cases some belief will accompany or 
+precede the movement of my hand. But believing itself will not get the hand 
+moved! 
+
+Is there any belief involved in identifying my leg, but not the leg of the 
+table at which I am sitting, as part of my body? Maybe---another ambiguous 
+case.
+
+Are my emotions of longing and dread beliefs in future time? Is my 
+emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these 
+temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) 
+
+How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if 
+my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily--- the 
+object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. 
+
+\plainbreak{2}
+
+\item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
+take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other 
+evidence. Our "immediate experience" is mediated; it is a derived 
+phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our 
+subjective standpoint. 
+
+\begin{enumerate}
+
+\item But Alten does not seriously defend the claim that he does not 
+distinguish between immediate and non-immediate. The claim that there is 
+no distinction would be regarded as demented in every human culture. Every 
+culture supposes that I may be tricked or cheated: there is a realm, the 
+non-immediate or non-experienced, which provides an arena for surreptitious 
+hostility to me. Every culture supposes that it is easier for me to tell what I 
+am thinking than what you are thinking. Every culture supposes that I will 
+hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is 
+simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he 
+apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction 
+between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only 
+way of confirming a model, but to construct a mode! of the relation between 
+the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. 
+
+\item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative 
+phenomenon, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the 
+pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness 
+and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is 
+the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy 
+exposes. "I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I 
+cannot now perceive it." 
+\end{enumerate}
+
+\item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain 
+self-vitiating "nodes" in the logic of common sense. These nodes include the 
+concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often 
+find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from 
+cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they 
+are self-vitiating nodes in the logic of common sense. As a result, I have 
+concluded that it is probably futile to debate the abstract validity of my 
+analysis of these nodes. It does indeed appear as if I am debating over an 
+abstract joke, and it is not apparent why I would attribute such great 
+importance to a joke. 
+
+\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} represents my 
+present approach. The advantage of this approach is that it makes 
+unmistakable the reason why ! attribute so much importance to these 
+philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few 
+isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only 
+significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation 
+of why the life---world is subject to being undermined. 
+
+When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of 
+trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day 
+scientific common sense. Walking through walls is understood as it would be 
+pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside 
+the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go 
+directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive 
+orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or 
+have "object perceptions," and thus wouldn't know whether one was 
+walking through a wail or not. 
+
+At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my 
+genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of 
+non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a 
+hair's-breadth of difference between the state ! propose and mental 
+incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
+this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. 
+
+\item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are 
+now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing 
+over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does 
+not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two 
+circumstances in conflict. The "fact" that we are talking is one of the two 
+circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other 
+circumstance being the self-vitiating "nodes" I have mentioned. To repeat 
+over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. 
+
+Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking 
+suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an 
+objective relation between words and things.) The !anguage we "see" is a 
+shell whose 'transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. 
+
+\item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in 
+\essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical 
+force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary 
+motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of 
+contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline 
+case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which 
+violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to 
+classify.) The contradiction in "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs" has to do first 
+with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to 
+do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as 
+if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter 
+sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. 
+
+
+{
+5/15/1962 
+
+
+Comments from the audience 
+(photo by Tony Conrad) 
+
+
+"Creep" lecture, May 15, 1962 
+}
+
+\clearpage
+
+{
+5/15/1962 
+
+
+Comments from the audience 
+(photo by Tony Conrad) 
+
+
+"Creep" lecture, May 15, 1962 
+}
+
+\clearpage
+
+
+\chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality}
+
+
+1. STOP ALL "GROSS BELIEVING," SUCH AS BELIEF IN OTHER 
+MINDS, CAUSALITY, AND THE PHANTOM ENTITIES OF SCIENCE 
+(ATOMS, ELECTRONS, ETC.). 
+
+
+2. STOP THINKING IN PROPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE. 
+
+
+3. STOP ALL SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESIZING. DO NOT CONSIDER 
+YOUR "SIGHTINGS" OF THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING AS 
+CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS THERE WHEN YOU ARE NOT LOOKING 
+AT !T-OR FOR THAT MATTER, AS CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS 
+THERE WHEN YOU ARE LOOKING AT IT. 
+
+
+4. STOP ORGANIZING VISUAL EXPERIENCES AND TACTILE 
+EXPERIENCES INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. STOP ORGANIZING 
+SO-CALLED "DIFFERENT SPATIAL ORIENTATIONS OR DIFFERENT 
+TOUCHED SURFACES OF OBJECTS" INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. THAT 
+IS, STOP HAVING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTS. 
+
+
+5. STOP BELIEVING IN PAST AND FUTURE TIME. THAT 15, LIVE 
+OUT OF TIME. STOP FEELING LONGING, DREAD, OR REGRET. 
+
+
+6. STOP BELIEVING THAT YOU CAN MOVE YOUR BODY. 
+
+
+7. STOP BELIEVING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY 
+OBJECTIVE MEANING. 
+
+
+8. YOU ARE NOW FREE TO WALK THROUGH WALLS (IF YOU CAN 
+FIND THEM). 
+
+
+25 
+
+
+6. Some Objections to My Philosophy 
+
+
+A. The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in 
+euucated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the 
+philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The 
+Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply 
+that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that 
+other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a 
+philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See 
+Philosophical Investigations, $420.) Statements which imply that other 
+people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were 
+intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because 
+they subject the statements to criticism by logical! standards which are 
+irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (§ § 402, 412, 119, 116.) 
+
+For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, 
+and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things 
+which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real 
+case.' (§303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's 
+memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in 
+God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. 
+
+
+Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs 
+
+
+In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
+given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
+I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just 
+what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the 
+entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
+least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, 
+psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, 
+phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, 
+comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each 
+with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, 
+associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not 
+
+
+26 
+
+
+ee eR eT A ee OE eT Ee a 
+
+
+hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential 
+language', and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
+always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and 
+belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter 
+of fact is unquestionably does involve betiefs, is not for example an 
+anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of- knowledge are 
+difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has 
+to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind 
+what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are 
+incomplete and confused. 
+
+What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a 
+few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of 'knowledge'; 
+have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are 
+thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so 
+"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity} that they are either just assumed, as 
+too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if 
+they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
+The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
+these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's 
+experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
+of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
+of not having it. 
+
+Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered', beliefs 
+formulated in 'natural laws", beliefs "about substance', and the like. 
+Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived 
+world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
+beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is 
+("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
+non-strange character of one's 'perceived world" is associated with beliefs 
+"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the 
+world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
+"perceived world" is not part of what is 'essential' in these beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
+After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from 
+oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict 
+sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
+formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave 
+one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply 'that there are spatially 
+distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a 
+visual - "moving" - hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal 
+beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
+
+
+27 
+
+
+Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring' may 
+seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", 
+doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
+things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
+slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should 
+observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs 
+"about the objectivity of referring', but they are not "objective referring'; 
+and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
+have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other 
+humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
+rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived 
+other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
+associated with the belief 'that others have minds', but it is not "other 
+humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
+part of what is essentia! in believing "that others have minds", points I 
+anticipated in the second chapter. 
+
+Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of 
+temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form 'If x, then y 
+will follow in the future', especially if y is something one wants, and x is 
+something one can do. {After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the 
+switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear 
+"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge'. They say, 
+for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
+and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the 
+light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated 
+with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
+not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not 
+part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the 
+light will come on'. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about 
+the necessity of such knowledge for survivai", it is just more beliefs of the 
+same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt 
+dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows 
+how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. 
+Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" 
+beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
+
+By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their 
+formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most 
+suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with 
+non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the 
+beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in 
+
+
+28 
+
+
+ee ee ee eR 
+
+
+defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he 
+continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the 
+experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do 
+so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to 
+deny that he has the experiences. Now {I am not denying that he has the 
+experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the 
+reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the 
+self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary 
+of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs 
+after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It 
+sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief 
+language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language 
+to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's 
+usually because one has beliefs. 
+
+The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences 
+is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all 
+English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a 
+result, those who want to talk about experiences {my use) and still use 
+English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
+associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
+among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
+always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to 
+so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
+the introduction of my use of 'experience' in the third chapter. Thus, some 
+of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
+for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
+book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
+chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to 
+experiences, languag2 with which they are very strongly associated and 
+which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
+announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
+
+It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I 
+was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be 
+understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented 
+my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This 
+does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They 
+are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, 
+which is not having beliefs {and realizing, for any belief one happens to think 
+of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not 
+be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope f will eventually 
+get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by 
+
+
+29 
+
+
+suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than 
+beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English 
+in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to 
+learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
+unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
+
+
+Chapter 7 : Summary 
+
+
+The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
+am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
+beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he 
+will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to 
+construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a 
+formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or 
+the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of 
+them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is 
+supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This 
+statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in 
+connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that 
+my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible 
+argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain 
+unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to 'doubt, question" it, or 
+to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not 
+believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief 
+to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the 
+position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is 
+objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
+reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less 
+credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a 
+belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to 
+decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or 
+the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well! take one a long time to 
+understand my position, but if one is taking a jong time to decide whether it 
+is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be 
+wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the 
+matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my 
+position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. 
+
+Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without 
+beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for 
+
+
+30 
+
+
+example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. 
+Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to 
+be "true or false', to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
+to believe something, for example, to believe 'that there is a table behind 
+you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
+continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing 
+yourself with your back to a table'), you are going to have to have the 
+attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, 
+deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you do do? ) You are going 
+to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
+
+As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, 
+intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to 
+realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The 
+important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true 
+statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the 
+expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences 
+associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when 
+you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my 
+language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to 
+do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the 
+complete realization of what the right position is on you {it doesn't have to 
+be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language'); if you 
+don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just 
+ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
+about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not 
+therefore valueless. 
+
+So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having 
+beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete 
+transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter 
+position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, 
+"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
+proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical 
+problems (for example, 'Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
+impossible? ', 'Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
+capable of intersubjective verification? ') arising from them? And again, one 
+begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is 
+wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be 'Why 
+bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving 
+myself'. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
+And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one 
+"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
+
+
+31 
+
+
+(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, 
+since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts 
+which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. 
+
+In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason 
+why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read 
+that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they 
+would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as 
+Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt "in a real case." 
+Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet 
+Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the 
+latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as 
+inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have 
+today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay "The 
+Flaws Underlying Beliefs" shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that 
+the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief 
+that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no 
+different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It Is 
+perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is 
+totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also 
+possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be 
+absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per 
+cent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we 
+need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. "The Flaws Underlying 
+Beliefs" shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural 
+sciences, involve outright self-deception. 
+
+These discoveries have consequences far more important than the 
+technical issues involved. It is by no means trivial that I do not have to pray, 
+or to fast, or to accept the moral dictates of the clergy, or to give money to 
+the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human 
+cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In 
+analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring 
+the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to 
+doubt in a real case, as in my essay "Philosophical Aspects of Walking 
+Through Walls." I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of 
+intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these 
+consequences. 
+
+A reply to the Wittgensteinian attitude which is technically adequate 
+can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical 
+maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not 
+necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical 
+connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in 
+
+
+32 
+
+
+the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural 
+language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive 
+linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic 
+than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted. 
+
+Wittgenstein held that philosophical or metaphysical controversies 
+literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not 
+arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing 
+Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver 
+is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the 
+paradoxes uncovered by "bad" philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary 
+language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary 
+language because they uncover paradoxes is ordinary language propositions. 
+Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in 
+ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then 
+Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to 
+see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as 
+inadmissible. 
+
+Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the Empire 
+State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The 
+Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic 
+because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no 
+behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to 
+this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use 
+ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The 
+philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as 
+improper because it leads to problems. The reason why "the proper use of 
+ordinary language never leads to paradoxes" is that Wittgenstein has defined 
+proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not 
+resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. 
+Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and 
+language, a gratuitous definition to the effect that certain portions of the 
+natural language which embarrass him are inadmissible, a gratuitous ban on 
+certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him. His purpose is 
+to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious 
+inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish 
+intellectual dishonesty. 
+
+
+B. In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which 
+cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality 
+are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if 
+
+
+33 
+
+
+there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there 
+are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus 
+there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which 
+leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the 
+middle of the argument by a play on the words "subject" and "object." 
+
+When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the 
+attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within 
+experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it 
+would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be 
+"proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, 
+etc. from immediate experience, then ail these phenomena would be 
+trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be 
+my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its 
+otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it 
+would be trivial. We ask how I know that the Empire State Building exists 
+when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate 
+experience, then objective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The 
+dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the 
+gap between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself, yet they do not 
+want to conclude that appearances exhaust reality. 
+
+There are two special assumptions which are smuggled into supposedly 
+assumptionless transcendental arguments. First, there is the belief that there 
+is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they 
+describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, 
+there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective 
+basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is 
+controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with 
+
+
+crossed fingers.) 
+Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are 
+
+
+addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have 
+conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step 
+such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of 
+particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive 
+words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. 
+This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the 
+alternative that we don't have this "real knowledge." 
+
+In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that 
+transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring 
+the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, 
+transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the 
+empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing 
+
+
+34 
+
+
+fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many 
+transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific 
+psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes 
+as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental 
+arguments are supposed to prove. 
+
+
+35 
+
+
+7. Philosophy Proper ("Version 3," 1961) 
+Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973) 
+
+
+This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be 
+an inquiry as to which beliefs are 'true,' or right. The right beliefs are 
+tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. 
+Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by 
+their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as 
+corresponding to non-tautologous propositions. 
+
+Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or 
+supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is 
+also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the 
+notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the 
+natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in 
+philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is 
+continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which 
+philosophers have dealt with it. 
+
+All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are 
+normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be heipful to 
+examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here 
+beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this 
+monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain 
+approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold 
+beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
+
+it is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that 
+they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on 
+their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, 
+quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some 
+non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has 
+to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. 
+Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy 
+non-cognitive needs. 
+
+To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "! 
+could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is 
+true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which 
+
+
+36 
+
+
+we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level 
+of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit 
+and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing 
+subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to 
+recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of 
+beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical 
+validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in 
+the denial! of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are 
+alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have 
+not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self- deceptions 
+being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. 
+
+A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for 
+non-cognitive reasons follows. 
+
+1. Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to 
+live if 1 didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to 
+know it." 
+
+2. One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews 
+to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
+
+3. The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in 
+Catholicism for esthetic reasons. 
+
+4, Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their 
+efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
+
+5. A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one 
+who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the 
+inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. 
+Such a circumscribed inquiry wil! be called 'theologizing," in recognition of 
+the archetypal activity in this category. 
+
+When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are 
+instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive 
+motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific 
+method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he 
+believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a 
+common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who 
+discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a 
+commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he 
+must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. 
+The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry 
+begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows 
+that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a 
+demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then 
+their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
+
+
+37 
+
+
+The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the 
+non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the 
+non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not 
+be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed 
+area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two 
+contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be 
+satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test 
+or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other 
+hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a 
+single alternative is welcome. 
+
+6. Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested 
+in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To 
+academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had 
+made vatid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians 
+circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as 
+scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. 
+
+7. The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is 
+provided by the person who holds a fearful! belief which is widely considered 
+to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the 
+motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would 
+welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect 
+that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a 
+demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no 
+comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it 
+seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. 
+
+This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, 
+limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self- deception, or 
+self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The 
+examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge 
+whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to 
+our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this 
+monograph. 
+
+
+(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
+unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without 
+change.) 
+
+
+38 
+
+
+Part I : The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems 
+Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts 
+
+
+In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of 
+philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing 
+language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might 
+tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, 
+formulations of them (for example, 'Other persons have minds' as 
+representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem 
+will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be 
+driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or 
+false). 
+
+To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right 
+into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next 
+chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and 
+simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain 
+concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution 
+they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has 
+to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly 
+philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which 
+doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the 
+truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the 
+others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. 
+
+The first concept is a new one, that of 'explication'. Explication of a 
+familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding 
+a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is 
+wanted that the expression 'mean'. To explain: I will be discussing 
+philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their 
+"meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
+use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which 
+the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as 
+replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, 
+which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses 
+are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be 
+replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to 
+the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that ! will be 
+concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the 
+uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the 
+expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of 
+acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions {expressions of 
+
+
+39 
+
+
+which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents 
+(and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. 
+Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents 
+in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, 
+especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. 
+(1 will not say here just how I use 'connotation'. What the connotations of 
+an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a 
+supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are 
+supposed to be like.) 'Finding', or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
+supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, 
+for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the 
+expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced wil! be said to 
+be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the 'explication'. 
+Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is 
+inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the 
+same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. 
+
+I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of 
+Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very 
+problematic 'definition'. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
+of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, 
+suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of 
+"work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
+clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. 
+
+Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an 
+expression is suggested, as an explication for 'thing having a mind' (if 
+supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the 
+things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other 
+"overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
+expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for 'thing 
+having a mind', since 'thing having a mind' presumably has the connotations 
+for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
+higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt 
+behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by 
+the thing having it", and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
+the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the 
+proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causual 
+connection between having a mind and the other things, because the 
+expression 'thing having a mind' itself, and not the supposed effects of 
+having a mind, is what is under discussion. 
+
+As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating 
+expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are 
+
+
+40 
+
+
+for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be 
+slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be 
+otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of 
+finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical 
+problems. 
+
+Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed 
+name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the 
+connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases 
+when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with 
+philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly 
+be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the 
+explications for 'thing having a mind' mentioned above. 
+
+The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be 
+discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
+chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a 
+good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify 
+the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for 'true statement'. 
+(Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the 
+explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
+
+Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be 
+"statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language 
+you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What 
+does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just 
+about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their 
+arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that 
+when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy 
+ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important 
+connotations of 'true statement', and, more generally, of 'statement', as 
+traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion 
+which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content', as it is sometimes 
+said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbai" part of a statement is 
+supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at 
+least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a 
+statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do 
+with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is 
+related. {The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and 
+mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus 
+irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are 
+interested in.) Thus, if 'true statement' is to be explicated, 'assertion having 
+truth value' and 'is true' (and 'has content' in a misleading use) have to be 
+explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication 
+
+
+41 
+
+
+for 'true statement' deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
+'assertion having truth value' and 'is true'. One important conclusion from 
+these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or 
+bodes of marks such as 'The man talks') are often said to be "statements", 
+would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate 'statement' by simply 
+identifying it with 'sentence' (in my sense); something must be said about 
+such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same 
+reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify 'statement' 
+with 'sentence', the latter being explicated in terms of the ('formal') rules 
+for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no 
+reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. 
+
+In explicating 'true statement' I wil! use the most elegant approach, one 
+relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having 
+truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way 
+to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to 
+make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" 'table' to 
+the thing. It is supposed that 'table' has been "interpreted", that is, that it is 
+"determinate" to which, of ail things, applications of 'table' are (to be said 
+to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
+'determinate' which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word 
+'table", are expressions "equivalent to" 'table'.) The word 'determinate' is 
+the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit 
+myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one 
+can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and 
+"then" the thing. 'point out' is restricted to refer to "ostension", pointing 
+out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to "directing 
+attention to things not in one's presence" as well. The assertion is 'true', of 
+course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things 
+to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) 
+"true", otherwise "false". It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 
+"first" thing and a "second", the first being an interpreted expression, is an 
+assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further 
+suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to 
+this explication, the things to which equivalent names ("occurances of a 
+name") may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, 
+other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the 
+concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple 
+assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is 
+how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
+between name and referents is an 'objective, metaphysical entity", which 
+would be getting into philosophy proper. 
+
+
+42 
+
+
+The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that 
+what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the 
+context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" 
+kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first 
+let us say that the "complex name" gotten by replacing a sentence's "main 
+verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the 
+sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is 
+'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
+clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main 
+verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: 'The 
+table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one 
+man while the other man talked'; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been 
+pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
+but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be 
+invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to 
+make <a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this 
+"asserted name' being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
+doesn't assert names; names just have referents—-it is statements that one 
+
+
+makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate 
+this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
+kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. tn other 
+words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a 
+statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and 
+puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying 
+'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in 
+Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the 
+application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. 
+
+Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader 
+for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is 
+replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). 
+Well, all 1 can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to 
+describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a 
+statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even 
+more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of 
+interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to 
+speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of 
+course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from 
+simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus 
+referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which 
+they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex 
+names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex 
+
+
+43 
+
+
+names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such 
+words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
+of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be 
+clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these 
+relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything 
+about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents {and 
+non-referents), of a name is. {I might say that a thing can't have an intension 
+unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for 
+my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells 
+the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is 
+true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly 
+philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous 
+word 'determinate', because I haven't said anything about how names get 
+referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how 
+one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards 
+explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with 
+formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if 
+language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in 
+some form must have the central role in it.) 
+
+"Statements", then, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind 
+which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have 
+described. I could thus explicate 'true statement' as referring to those true 
+"simple" assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this 
+would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of 'true 
+statement' having to do with the method of apptying the first member to the 
+second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to 
+do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more 
+elegant to explicate 'true statement' as referring to all true assertions of the 
+"simple" kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of 
+the two explications the reader prefers. 
+
+So much for the preliminaries. 
+
+
+Chapter 3 : "Experience" 
+
+
+1 will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step 
+in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical 
+language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This 
+terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing 
+my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on 
+
+
+44 
+
+
+precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I 
+think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern 
+philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are 
+relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
+
+First, consider the term 'non-experience'. Although the concept of a 
+non-experience is intrinsically far more "difficult" than the concept of 
+"experience" which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, 
+presupposed in all "natural languages" and throughout philosophy, is so 
+taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should 
+have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are 
+perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of 
+it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the 
+future (future events); the past; space {or better, the distantness of objects 
+from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily 
+understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and 
+their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the 
+second chapter); unperceivable "things" (microscopic objects (of course, 
+viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), 
+essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, 
+normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To 
+simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am 
+speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing 
+the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.) 
+Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that 
+there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one 
+can not know whether there are any---this is not a non-belief but a complex 
+belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the 
+mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is 
+presumably a connotation of 'other minds' for the reader, as explained in the 
+second chapter. 
+
+In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. 
+Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about 
+non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or 
+experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that 
+one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
+of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes 
+(assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by 
+having a "visual-table-experience'. The theory goes on to say that these 
+perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in 
+one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now 
+there are two sources of confusion in ail this for the naive reader. First, 
+
+
+45 
+
+
+saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they 
+are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a 
+table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". 
+The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to 
+the second source of confusion. Does the English word 'table', as ordinarily 
+used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity 
+external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's 
+perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between 
+the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to 
+the reader, then he probably uses 'table', 'perceived table', and 
+'table-experience' as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, 
+is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not 
+perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this 
+confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being 
+used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the 
+perceptions. 
+
+Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are 
+experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term 
+'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
+start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy 
+knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are 
+experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A_ traditional 
+philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not 
+know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective 
+table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, 
+has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences 
+not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one 
+unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there 
+is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like. 
+One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would 
+be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, "thinking" that one doesn't have 
+one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be 
+shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest 
+idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the 
+reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably 
+known {I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some 
+philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say 
+cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some 
+philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In 
+speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a 
+lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by 
+
+
+46 
+
+
+appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy 
+which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One 
+does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences {nor are the objective 
+tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other 
+persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's 
+table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as 
+will be shown). 
+
+I have explained the current use of the term 'experience'. Now I want 
+to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, 
+will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing 
+'non-experience' I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of 
+the term, in the case of 'experience' I am going to suggest a new use for the 
+term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of 
+experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the 
+former. What I am interested in, however, is not 'experience' as it implies. 
+'perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind', but as it refers to that 
+which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not 
+something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it 
+already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that 
+experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same 
+referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use 
+'experiei.ce' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
+non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally 
+used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a 
+leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy 
+between 'experience' as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences 
+or in particular the realm where they could be, and 'experience' without 
+these connotations. 
+
+Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be 
+obvious that although my term 'experience' was introduced last, it is 
+intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the 
+terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I 
+discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I 
+have used the perspective of the Western philsophical tradition to explain my 
+term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, 
+especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader's 
+conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and 
+especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he 
+ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term 
+'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. 
+
+I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. 
+
+
+47 
+
+
+As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it 
+by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including 
+the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based 
+on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, 
+in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for 
+different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes 
+(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as 'The table is 
+black' implies the formulation 'Material objects are real' (to the materialist), 
+or 'So-called objects are ideas in the mind' (to the idealist), or 'Substances 
+and attributes are real', and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
+explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, 
+ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I 
+use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of 
+'experience', about its referents, there is about my English, for example 
+when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be 
+dropped from 'experience'. There can be this new term, the philosopher is 
+not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied 
+philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, 
+to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or 
+other natural language, but by having referents. 
+
+As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my 
+'experience' because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything 
+about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that 
+there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
+most important in this book. The fact that although it is the 'simplest' and 
+least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain 
+using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the 
+philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my 
+'experience' he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as 
+an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this 
+isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be 
+no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this 
+realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the 
+book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from 
+the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is 
+past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may 
+already realize what I'm going to say. 
+
+
+48 
+
+
+Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution 
+
+
+Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the 
+book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the 
+problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the 
+language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present 
+the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my 
+work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, 
+and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a 
+philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will 
+not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to 
+explore all its implications; that will come later. 
+
+However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this 
+chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous 
+version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight' behind the main 
+argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is 
+true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified 
+from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without 
+appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot 
+know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a 
+contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be 
+right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if 
+they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but 
+inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively 
+understandable way. : 
+
+To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that 
+one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
+that other that 'black table' has to 'table': a referent of the former is 
+necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names 
+mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any 
+statement, or formulation, of a _ belief of necessity depends on 
+'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
+example, 'Other persons having minds', the associated name of the 
+formulation 'Other persons have minds', certainly depends on 
+'non-experience'. Thus, anything true of 'non-experience' will be true of the 
+associated name of any formulation of a belief. 
+
+In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of 
+non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
+'non-experience'), showed the connotations of the expressions 
+'non-experience' and 'experience' (traditional). What ! did not go on to 
+
+
+49 
+
+
+show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, 
+one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What 
+follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the 
+reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's 
+experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there 
+be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was 
+awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to 
+non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of 
+non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in 
+the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) 
+justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it 
+without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were 
+just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience 
+(traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience 
+(traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have 
+them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into 
+experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience 
+which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there 
+is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience 
+(traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in 
+one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
+which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as 
+they are supposed to be understood. And for 'understanding' 
+'non-experience' {and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its 
+referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an 
+experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and 
+non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an_ experience 
+{traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 
+'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and "non-experience"; but here 
+one is, using "non-experience" and "non-experience" to say so (which 
+certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible 
+for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the 
+concept of non-experience, it collapses. (A final point for the expert. This 
+tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does 
+not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot 
+name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences 
+about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that 
+one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say 
+so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) : 
+My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
+what is important is that it has done so precisely because ! have talked about 
+
+
+50 
+
+
+experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken 
+as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' 
+(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
+said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is 
+a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' 
+(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" 
+the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent 
+desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no 
+explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the 
+expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, 
+remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are 
+completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to 
+experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a 
+formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is 
+not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is 
+an important point about method which should be brought out. If all 
+"non-experiential language', 'belief language", is inconsistent, how can I 
+show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer 
+is that 1 don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into 
+contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I 
+want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as 1 said we would, we 
+have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of 
+beliefs are false'. 
+
+Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about 
+belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is 
+right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since 
+the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a 
+belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable 
+explication which was true; in short, the belief would have a true 
+formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a 
+formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point 
+answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of 
+belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not 
+to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one 
+who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that 
+it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an 
+expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some 
+way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. 
+The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one 
+can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
+The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of 
+
+
+51 
+
+
+the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. 
+(Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the 
+way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like 
+being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to 
+
+
+be a "table".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
+a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its 
+referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this 
+belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be 
+discussed here. 
+
+The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes, 
+but...' thoughts. !f he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
+formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of 
+linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if 
+embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but 1 am concerned with how 
+well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said 
+about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in 
+them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its 
+formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose 
+rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be 
+impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these 
+matters. 
+
+
+52 
+
+
+2/22/1963 
+
+
+Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate 
+
+
+1963 
+(photo by Jack Smith} 
+
+
+53 
+
+
+against Lincoln Center, February 22, 
+
+
+Part 11 : Completion of the Treatment of 
+Properly Philosophical Problems 
+
+
+Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts 
+
+
+In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by 
+discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be 
+talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of 
+the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will 
+not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
+"common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
+relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I 
+discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. ; 
+
+i should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed 
+to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
+non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
+This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one 
+does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having 
+beliefs, that beliefs {in my sense) will not do as referents for 'belief' in the 
+use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of 
+the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an 
+experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of 
+consciously having a belief', of what is "in one's head" when one says that 
+one "believes a certain thing'. Further, I will, for convenience in 
+distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief 'that others have minds', for example, 
+or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation 
+marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be 
+"about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
+about experiences; I! will not be trying to talk "about the realm of 
+non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already 
+fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has 
+any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his 
+"beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously 
+believing', although {I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
+What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, 
+use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
+rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
+
+There is a further point about terminology. The reader should 
+remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that 
+perceptions are in the mind', one can make a distinction between mental 
+and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
+
+
+54 
+
+
+one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now ! am 
+going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For 
+example, a _ visualization of a table will be said to be an 
+"imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by 
+'imagined' I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I 
+use 'imagined' because saying 'mental-table-experience' is too much like 
+saying 'table in the mind' and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way 
+of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
+an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
+a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
+experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of 
+a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
+like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). in other words, an 
+imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it 
+is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
+(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined- 
+imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
+imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this 
+terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the 
+conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by 
+saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". 
+
+I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, 
+not perceived by oneself, behind one now', or anything else. Well, in the 
+first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an 
+imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization 
+of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed 
+statement, such as 'There is a table behind me'. This is not all one does, 
+however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said 
+to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The 
+additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" 
+toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe 
+that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief 
+about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
+other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental 
+action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not 
+be, at all like the claim 'that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
+correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The 
+question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise 
+here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, 
+the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is 
+"consciously, deliberately' self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I 
+
+
+55 
+
+
+don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
+is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the 
+attitude and the reader is aware of it, he wil! presumably find it a good 
+explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". 
+
+I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one 
+is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as 
+mentioned above. The attitude is 'peripheral', is a matter of the way one is 
+atttentive. Saying that the attitude is 'conscious, deliberate', is a little 
+strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brain washing; what I am 
+trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception 
+such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This 
+is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the 
+inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; 
+with respect to English the attitude is a 'vague, elusive" thing, very difficult 
+to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by 
+saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think 
+I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the 
+attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the 
+self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a 
+(non-menta!) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief 'that there is 
+a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
+expression, it will be on an _ imagined-experience such as an 
+imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself 
+(to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving 
+attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back 
+to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is 
+a (non-menta!) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
+an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not 
+inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that 
+one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked 
+the question, one stops believing 'that there is a table behind one" and starts 
+believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a 
+non-experience", a different matter (different belief). 
+
+lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression 
+(which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), 
+the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a 
+referent'. With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's 
+attention in believing would be primarily on the expression 'There is a table 
+behind me', pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and 
+one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent'. 
+Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of 
+
+
+56 
+
+
+beliefs. 
+
+(This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse 
+the reader it can be skipped.) I will now describe the relation between the 
+version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving 
+language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an 
+imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in 
+the version involving language, the attention is on something which is 
+"regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). 
+For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove', and 
+correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs 
+doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
+referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make 
+believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in 
+the version of the belief not involving language, has something which 
+functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language 
+one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one 
+has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the 
+version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the 
+thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving 
+"Yanguage" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a 
+referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, 
+which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does 
+so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the 
+belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires 
+with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the 
+way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for 
+awareness of the referent to be part of one's experience corresponds to the 
+attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it 
+not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's 
+experience corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. 
+Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which 
+it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving 
+language consists of being attentive to an imagined-experience and having the 
+attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief. 
+
+Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather 
+unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of 
+"attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
+something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it 
+to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive', so that I am 
+calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to 
+speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the 
+
+
+57 
+
+
+experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
+"self-deceiving', is a "(conscious) self-deception experience', because when 
+aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just 
+about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere 
+taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to 
+be a 'belief'. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
+"self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of 
+the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be 
+to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which 
+would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is 
+to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more 
+than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving". 
+
+In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention 
+some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, 
+one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the 
+one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and 
+believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing 
+table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so 
+believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in 
+believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence 
+for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation 
+shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic 
+expression 'x', one may give attention to a_ referent of 
+'imagined-x{-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to 
+imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
+"analogous to the referent of 'x". In the latter case the y-experiences will be 
+mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be 
+to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is 
+visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 
+'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-y-experiences 
+(such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
+"analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
+beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as 
+Being'. 
+
+Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", 
+"arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate 
+the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong 
+with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would 
+show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language 
+and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested 
+before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the 
+
+
+58 
+
+
+t 
+i 
+$ 
+} 
+} 
+ig 
+
+
+justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive 
+justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be 
+evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical 
+assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them 
+inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has 
+four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that') any other table has four 
+legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it 
+superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, 
+argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can 
+show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, 
+weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to 
+believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, 
+then one already had the belief 'implicitly' (it was a conjunct of a belief 
+one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. 
+
+f will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions 
+my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, 
+I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my 
+position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, 
+and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it 
+is ironic that 'disbeliever', without qualification, has been used by believers 
+as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some 
+belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the 
+existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to 
+speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental 
+experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
+is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either 
+be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are 
+inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere 
+"decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies 
+"the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
+of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", 
+has some of the very beliefs 1 am concerned to discredit. 
+
+What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of 
+beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In 
+the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions 
+dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect them 
+to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting 
+the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have 
+described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the 
+self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. 
+To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right 
+
+
+59 
+
+
+d realizing, for any belief 
+sn't involve having 
+
+
+it is not having beliefs (an 
+
+
+philosophical position is: 
+it is wrong (which doe 
+
+
+one happens to think of, that 
+beliefs)). 
+
+
+60 
+
+
+ESTHETICS 
+
+
+8. Down With Art 
+
+
+1; 
+ART or BREND? by Henry Flynt 
+
+
+1. Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession 
+is to say that it is somehow scientific. L7-Monte Young, Milton Babbitt, and 
+Stockhausen are exponents of this sort of justification. 
+
+The flaw which reiates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value 
+and is an outstanding scientific law. Is the work of art such a law? The 
+experiment which shows that the speed of light is independent of the motion 
+of its source is a measurement of a phenomenon crucial to the confirmation of 
+a scientific hypothesis; it is an outstanding scientific experiment. Is the work 
+of art such a measurement? The invention of the vacuum tube was an 
+outstanding technological advance. Is the work of art such a technological 
+advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations 
+and an outstanding mathematical theory. ts the work of art such an 
+analysis? 
+
+The motives behind the "scientific" justification of art are utterly sinister. 
+Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an 
+academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a_ pedantic 
+pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music', intends 
+nothing less than the suppression of the culture of 'lower classes" and 
+"ower races." 
+
+It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to 
+the "scientific" justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in 
+artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters 
+all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the 
+audience than all the works that "obey" the laws. 
+
+2. The artist o: entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other 
+people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to 
+win public acceptance for it, to advertise and promote it, to sell it, to force it 
+on people. If the public doesn't accept it at first, he is disappointed. He 
+doesn't drop it, but repeatedly urges the product on them. 
+
+People have every reason, then, to ask the artist: Is your product good for 
+
+
+63 
+
+
+me even if I don't like or enjoy it? This question really lays art open. One of 
+the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to 
+defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of 
+art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but 
+they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one 
+artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is 'Do 
+you like it?" Once the "scientific" justification of art is discredited, the 
+artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no 
+reason why you should "consume" it. 
+
+There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political 
+dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be 
+transcended. Even so, subjectivity of value remains a feature which 
+distinguishes art and entertainment from other activities. Thus art is 
+historically a leisure activity. 
+
+3. But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which 
+one person produces for the liking, the enjoyment of another. The value of 
+the object is supposed to be that you just like it. It supposedly has a value 
+which is entirely subjective and entirely within you, is a part of you. Yet---the 
+object can exist without you, is completely outside you, is not you or your 
+valuing, and has no inherent connection with you or your valuing. The 
+product is not personal to you. 
+
+Such is the contradiction in much art and entertainment. it is unfortunate 
+that it has to be stated so abstractly, but the discussion is about something 
+so personal that there can be no interpersonal examples of it. Perhaps it will 
+help to say that in appreciating or consuming art, you are always aware that 
+it is not you, your valuing---yet your liking it, your valuing it is usually the 
+only thing that can justify it. 
+
+In art and entertainment, objects are produced having no inherent 
+connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find 
+their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would 
+have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as 
+your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's 
+product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to "be oneself' for 
+other people, to "express oneself" for them. 
+4. There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and 
+entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of t 
+these experiences, by comparing and contrasting them with art. I have 
+coined the term "brend" for these experiences. 
+
+Consider all of your doings, what you already do. Exclude the gratifying of 
+physiological needs, physically harmful activities, and competitive activites. 
+Concentrate on spontaneous self-amusement or play. That is, concentrate on 
+
+
+64 
+
+
+everything you do just because you like it, because you just like it as you do 
+it. 
+
+Actually, these doings should be referred to as your just-likings. In saying 
+that somebody likes an art exhibit, it is appropriate to distinguish the art 
+exhibit from his liking of it. But in the case of your just-likings, it is not 
+appropriate to distinguish the objects valued from your valuings, and the 
+single term that covers both should be used. When you write with a pencil, 
+you are rarely attentive to the fact that the pencil! was produced by 
+somebody other than yourself. You can use something produced by 
+somebody else without thinking about it. In your just-likings, you never 
+notice that things are not produced by you. The essence of a just-liking is 
+that in it, you are not aware that the object you value is less personal to you 
+than your very valuing. 
+
+These just-likings are your "brend." Some of your dreams are brend; and 
+some children's play is brend (but formal children's games aren't). In a sense, 
+though, the attempt to give interpersonal examples of brend is futile, 
+because the end result is neutral things or actions, cut off from the valuing 
+which gives them their only significance; and because the end result suggests 
+that brend is a deliberate activity like carrying out orders. The only examples 
+for you are your just-likings, and you have to guess them by directly 
+applying the abstract definition. 
+
+Even though brend is defined exclusively in terms of what you like, it is not 
+necessarily solitary. The definition simply recognizes that valuing is an act of 
+individuals; that to counterpose the likes of the community to the likes of 
+the individuals who make it up is an ideological deception. 
+
+5. It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are 
+pseudo-brend; that your brend is the total originality beyond art; that your 
+brend is the absolute self-expression and the absolute enjoyment beyond art. 
+Can brend, then, replace art, can it expand to fill the space now occupied by 
+art and entertainment? To ask this question is to ask when utopia will 
+arrive, when the barrier between work and leisure will be broken down, 
+when work will be abolished. Rather than holding out utopian promises, it is 
+better to give whoever can grasp it the realization that the experience 
+beyond art already occurs in his life---but is totally suppressed by the general 
+repressiveness of society. 
+
+
+Note: The avant-garde artist may 'raise a final question. Can't art or 
+entertainment compensate for its impersonality by having sheer newness as a 
+
+
+65 
+
+
+value? Can't the very foreignness of the impersonal object be entertaining? 
+Doesn't this happen with Mock Risk Games, for example? The answer is 
+that entertainmenta! newness is also subjective. What is entertainingly 
+strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, oF irrelevant to 
+another. The only difference between foreignness and other entertainment 
+values is that brend does not have more foreignness than conventional 
+entertainment does. 
+
+As for objective newness, or the objective value of Mock Risk Games, these 
+issues are so difficult that I have been unable to reach final conclusions 
+about them. 
+
+
+66 
+
+
+2. 
+
+
+Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, 
+Mass., dated 11/8/62 
+
+
+One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and 
+decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others 
+were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and 
+"radical new theory" of "pure recreation" for their enjoyment but before he 
+let them in for this highly secret and "revolutionary theory' they should 
+follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclasm. From those 
+that balked he removed the label "avant-garde" and attached the label 
+traditionalist' or if they were already labeled "traditionalist" he added one 
+more star. If they accepted they got a "hip" rating with gold cluster and if 
+they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their 
+own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose 
+designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf. 
+Now about this hip radical new theory of pure recreation.---Well---alor! its 
+simply what people do anyway but don't realize it but it seems that what 
+people "do anyway and don't realize it" will not be fully appreciated until 
+"what people do in the name of art" is eliminated. If art can be relegated to 
+obscurity, if some one can get John Coltrane to stop blowing, if someone 
+can smash up all the old Art tatum records as well as all the existing pianos, 
+if someone can get all that stuff out of those museums, If someone can only 
+burn down all those concert halls, movie houses, small galleries as well as 
+rooms in private houses that contain signs of art, If someone can do in all the 
+cathedrals and monuments bridges etc, If someone can get rid of the sun, 
+moon, stars, ocean, desert trees birds, bushes mountains, rivers, joy, sadness 
+inspiration or any other natural phenomenon that reminds us of the ugly 
+scourge art that has preoccupied and plagued man since he can remember 
+then yes then at last Henry Flynt, sorry! 
+
+sites tere tase 
+
+
+> Henry Flynt 
+
+
+v 
+er 
+
+
+. 
+TaySs 
+
+
+will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee 
+[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved] 
+
+
+67 
+
+
+3. 
+
+
+letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62 
+
+
+Dear Henry, 
+
+perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not 
+important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most 
+admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage & 
+Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding "new" ideas has 
+not shown too much more than that it has become established as a 
+traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be 
+avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to 
+react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of 
+when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can 
+somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty 
+with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have 
+only had a few good ones. {I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't 
+seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand 
+way---but what I mean by "new ideas" is not only what you might call! 
+"Concept Art" but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms 
+more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt 
+these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants 
+"experience" one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a 
+position difficult if not impossible to accept with large "idea" ambitions. So 
+one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and 
+duration outside the art---jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a 
+form of art history. 
+
+I don't think entertainment solves the problem presented by avant gard art 
+since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is 
+now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with 
+"just liked" things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art 
+(some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or 
+memory or however}. As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and 
+when avoiding "given" structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and 
+decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. {f I need concentration, 
+which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. 
+
+One accepts language, one accepts logic. 
+
+Best regards, 
+
+Bob Morris 
+
+
+68 
+
+
+> 
+i 
+fe 
+Ff 
+
+
+4, 
+
+
+FROM "CULTURE" TO VERAMUSEMENT 
+Boston-New York 
+PRESS RELEASE: for March-April, 1963 
+
+
+Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate 
+against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at 
+the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the 
+slogans DEMOLISH SERIOUS CULTURE! /DESTROY ART! ; DEMOLISH 
+ART MUSEUMS! / NO MORE ART! ; DEMOLISH CONCERT HALLS! / 
+DEMOLISH LINCOLN CENTER! ; and handing out announcements of 
+Flynt's lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give 
+encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around 
+and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum 
+official came out and imperiously told the pickets that he was going to 
+straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could 
+not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that 
+the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picket who had obtained police 
+permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the 
+police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. !t was found that 
+the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. 
+People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the 
+viciousness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the 
+permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of 
+the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration 
+increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much 
+greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people 
+indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then 
+went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected 
+requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on 
+Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the 
+fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, 
+they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were 
+there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more 
+announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. 
+Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places. 
+
+On Thursday evening, February 28, at Walter DeMaria's loft, Henry Flynt 
+gave a long lecture expositing the doctrine the Wednesday demonstrations 
+were based on. On entering the lecture room, the visitor found himself 
+stepping in the face of a Mona Lisa print placed as the doormat. To one side 
+
+
+69 
+
+
+was an exhibition of demonstration photos and so forth. Behind the lecturer 
+was 2 large picture of Viadimir Mayakovsky, while on either side were the 
+signs used in the demonstrations, together with one saying 
+VERAMUSEMENT---NOT CULTURE. About 20 people came to the lecture. 
+The lecturer showed first the suffering caused by Serious-Cultural snobbery, 
+by its attempts to force individuals in line with things supposed to have 
+objective validity, but actually representing only alien subjective tastes 
+sanctioned by tradition. He then showed that artistic categories have 
+disintegrated, and that their retention has become obscurantist. (He showed 
+that the purpose of didactic art is better served by documentaries.) Finally, 
+in the most intellectually sophisticated part of the lecture, he showed the 
+superiority of each individual's veramusement (partially defined on the 
+lecture announcement) to institutionalized amusement activities (which 
+impose foreign tastes on the individual) and indeed to all "culture" the 
+lecture was concerned with. After the lecture, Flynt told how his doctrine 
+was anticipated by little known ideas of Mayakovsky, Dziga Vertov, and 
+their group, as related in Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs and elsewhere. He 
+touched on the Wednesday demonstrations. He spoke of George Maciunas' 
+FLUXUS, with which all this is connected. Several people at the lecture 
+congratulated Flynt on the clarity of the presentation and logicality of the 
+arguments. Photos were taken. 
+
+
+5. 
+Statement of November 1963 
+
+
+Back in March 1963, I sent the tirst FCTB PRESS RELEASE, about FCTB's 
+February picketing and lecture, to all the communications media, including 
+the New Yorker. It is so good that the New Yorker wanted to use it, but 
+they didn't want to give FCTB any free publicity; so they finally published 
+an inept parody of it, in the October 12, 1963 issue, pp. 49-51. They 
+changed my last name to Mackie, changed February 27 to September 25, the 
+Museum of Modern Art to a church, changed our slogans to particularly 
+idiotic ones {although they got in 'NO MORE ART/CULTURE?' later on), 
+and added incidents; but the general outlines, and the phrases lifted verbatim 
+from the FCTB RELEASE, make the relationship clear.---Henry Fiynt 
+
+
+70 
+
+
+pee 
+
+
+Henry, 3/6/63 
+
+
+Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the 
+lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I 
+didn't send them. Don't know if I can make it any clearer...actually I keep 
+thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have 
+to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating 
+Veramusement, stating clearly wnat it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, 
+of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which 
+cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external 
+activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or "intersect" one or 
+another or several activities. You have discredited activities---like art, 
+competitive games---as pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing 
+arguments which are external to "experiencing" these activities (e.g. chess is 
+bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which 
+doesn't fit you)...weil it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace 
+any cultural form because it has no external "edges" but rather by definition 
+can occur anywhere anytime anyplace (By the way I want to say here that 
+its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable---but I can't at the 
+moment really say why.) It seems that you have these two things going: 
+Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, 
+entertainment, that have to do with society and I don't think that the 
+exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George 
+Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don't shudder at that word, but I can see 
+you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind 
+of double aspect of the personality (which he called the "me" and the "I" 
+..can't remember his book, something like Mind, Self, and Society). 
+
+I thought you presented the lecture very weil, but towards the end I was 
+getting too tired to listen very carefully and I am sorry because this was the 
+newest writing. I would like very much to read this part, i.e. that which dealt 
+with the evolution of work, automation and the liberation from 
+drudgery---send me a copy if you can. 
+
+Best regards, 
+
+Bob Morris 
+
+
+71 
+
+
+Henry 3/12/1963 
+
+
+(anti-art? } 
+Jgfz Cage "Folk Music" Communism ____...----.----- 
+(communism) 
+I've been along this road too. 
+Yes I certainly do see the harmfullness of serious culture. My favorite movies 
+are plain documentaries. 
+
+
+"Veramusement" 
+questions: the way you set it up it sound like veramusement is IT. Some 
+
+
+kind of Absolute good state or activity. --ie) ATHLETICS are out. 
+-now my brother is a healthy athelete--he enjoys nothing so much as 
+swimming or playing tennis all! day (he likes to use his body--and he likes the 
+form--competition) 
+
+Is this "wrong" 
+
+Should he stop.-- 
+
+
+or wouldn't your "creep theory" which lets each person be himself and 
+relish in himself--by extention from this--shouldn't the atheletic person be 
+
+
+alowed to be himself? --too. 
+I think you were opening up the world to the people at the lecture-- 
+
+
+making them move free-- 
+sd "ready to be themselves 
+
+
+I think you were right in not giving examples! 
+
+
+however 
+
+your absolute--statements and 'come on"--and blend with the communist 
+ideas--(My mind was pretty tired by then and I didn't follow how the 
+veramusement--was tied to communism)--this IT kind of taik.--can only shoo 
+people off-and let them wait for the next revision or explication. 
+
+people off--and let them wait for the next revision or explication. 
+
+
+Walter DeMaria 
+
+
+72 
+
+
+8. 
+
+
+Dear Henry, March 18, 1963 
+
+
+As I said before, my main reactions to yr lecture & ideas is that I'm for 
+Henry Flynt but not for his ideas. I think the spirit you show in carrying on 
+yr crusade is admirable and exciting. However, I am not against art and think 
+that any artist who would say that he is or think that he is would be 
+masochistic enough to need psychiatric care. Since you make no claims to 
+being an artist this does not refer to you. However, I do call myself a poet 
+and do think of myself as one. I like art, culture, etc. and do not yet feel 
+that I am being screwed by it. Until I do, I will not need to turn to anti-art 
+movements. 
+
+All best wishes. 
+
+Yours, 
+
+Diane Wakoski 
+
+
+"Dear Mr. Flynt...Since I may be depending on o-ganized culture for my 
+loot & livelihood I can wish you only a limited success in your movement... 
+Cornelius Cardew" [froma postcard of June 7, 1963] 
+
+
+73 
+
+
+2/22/1963 
+
+
+Jack Smith and Henry Flynt demonstrate against the 
+February 22, 1963 
+
+
+(photo by Tony Conrad) 
+
+
+74 
+
+
+Museum of Modern Art, 
+
+
+PARA—SCIENCE 
+
+
+> 9, The Perception-Dissociation of Physics 
+
+
+From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and 
+touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the 
+objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the 
+touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too 
+limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of 
+moderate temperatures. 
+
+Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would 
+cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along 
+the humen sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch 
+dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our 
+discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light retlection and 
+emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and 
+inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch 
+registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and 
+so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our 
+discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations 
+or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an 
+experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical 
+subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the 
+discussion. 
+
+Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and 
+even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with 
+experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved 
+is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to 
+experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with 
+experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics. 
+
+Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human 
+physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist 
+after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, 
+we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of 
+touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest 
+expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal 
+organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" 
+includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smel!.) Suppose there is 
+
+
+77 
+
+
+a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same 
+as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation 
+between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does 
+not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person 
+with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). 
+Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified 
+with closing one's eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights 
+which do not occur when one can feel that one's eyes are closed. 
+
+Let T indicate tactile and V indicate visual. Let the tactiie sensation of 
+open eyes be T, and of closed eyes be To. Now anything that can be seen 
+with closed eyes--from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced 
+by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct 
+sunlight--can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a 
+subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be V1, 
+and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be V>: If there are sights seen 
+only with closed eyes, they will be V3; we want disjoint classes. We are 
+interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our 
+definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no 
+intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, 
+our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm 
+will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There 
+remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us 
+denote them by the ordered pairs (T,, Vj), (17, V9), (To, V4), (Tp, V9). In 
+reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us 
+designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following 
+notation. Consider a rectangular array of "places" such that the place in the 
+ith row and jth column corresponds to (T;, Vj), and assign a p or f (as 
+appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of 
+regularities in our present world. ¢ 3 
+
+
+fp 
+
+
+So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the présent 
+world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other 
+permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is 
+excluded, meaning that at the moment, a Vv, is defined as lasting from the 
+time the eyes open until the time they next close. 
+
+We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate 
+more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a 2x2 array, there are 
+16 ways it can be filled with p's and f's. That is, there are 16 imaginable 
+states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the 
+
+
+present state'p p\to another state such ap fI\ However, 
+tp pp/ 
+
+we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is 
+excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only f's, which 
+amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of f's leaves 
+one sight or touch completely forbidden {a person becomes blind to 
+open-eye sights); such an "impairment" is of little interest. Of the remaining 
+changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: 
+closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the 
+changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are 
+changes in the place of the one f ; the change to the state having only p's; 
+
+
+and finally / 
+PP) > fp 
+
+
+\f p pf 
+
+
+In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint 
+classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are [Tj] and [Vj]. The 
+number of classes in a partition, m for touch and n for sight, is its 
+detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition [T;] X [V;] is written 
+m x n. This detailedness virtually determines the (mn)? imaginable states, 
+although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one 
+change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is 
+important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a 
+conposition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state 
+lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a genera! rule for rewriting 
+states. A 2X2 rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, fromja b 
+to/ca\. cd 
+
+ce 
+
+
+But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new 
+rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change 
+changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about 'impairing' 
+changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining 
+changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes 
+are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
+
+As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave 
+the forbidden concurrence permitted; or else they merely leave permitted 
+successions forbidden--for example, in order to open your eyes in the dark 
+you might have to open them in the light and then turn the light off. These 
+secondary changes are of secondary interest. 
+
+If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of 
+investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and 
+
+
+79 
+
+
+s 
+
+
+apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation 
+concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will 
+(observable as electrochemica! impulses along efferent neurons). If a change 
+occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a 
+formerly forbidden concurrence, is it T or V that conflicts with the 
+command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight 
+to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes 
+close anyway? 
+
+Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to 
+our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he 
+may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that 
+the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an 
+extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole 
+change series occurs. Let p's be black dots and f's be white dots, and imagine 
+a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from 
+time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the 
+extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary 
+English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between 
+scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the 
+same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the 
+anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect 
+everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
+sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference 
+point in the "world." The question of "whether the anomaties are really 
+outside or only in the mind" comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
+If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as 
+a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have 
+had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be 
+
+
+either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if the , 
+
+
+asserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the 
+states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of 
+observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the 
+changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things 
+shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our 
+interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the 
+investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and 
+what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what 
+has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the 
+same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even 
+harder part is making it happen. 
+
+
+* * * 
+
+
+80 
+
+
+However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet 
+satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the 
+subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his 
+perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely 
+chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say "I see a book 
+in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.' These assumptions may not be 
+justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, 'I don't even 
+know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know 
+whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is 
+visual." In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
+never looied like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the 
+changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are 
+defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that 
+everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may 
+literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this 
+compensation may become habitual and "pre-conscious." In this case, if the 
+physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a 
+temporary psychological malfunction. 
+
+These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are 
+actually learned, "unconscious" interpretations of raw data which by 
+themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast 
+number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the 
+subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is 
+confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old 
+familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an 
+effort to see the table which he knows is there. 
+
+Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The 
+subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in 
+some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give hima 
+quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which 
+photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is 
+tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We 
+expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; 
+but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Teli the subject that 
+he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be 
+given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the 
+experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of 
+subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of 
+modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem 
+simultaneous. 
+
+This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may 
+
+
+81 
+
+
+not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick 
+eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to 
+our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier 
+scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is 
+possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch 
+correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might 
+become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle 
+resonance is today. 
+
+Time is inescapably involved in our discussion; so we must decide what 
+happens to time as a distinct physical category, and as a sense, in 
+perception-dissociation. Here, we will simply distinguish three sorts of time. 
+First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to 
+discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time. 
+There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge 
+are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't 
+automatically introduced in the other. !f the ratio of the repetitions of the 
+two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into 
+equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real 
+line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman). 
+One effect of perception-dissociation relating to this sort of time would be 
+to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile 
+clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished 
+manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, 
+our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. 
+"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
+futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The 
+empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the 
+perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of 
+futurity. 
+
+
+We now come to some considerations which will help us develop the 
+state descriptions, and which also show that from one point of view, the 
+states are actually necessary for the operational definition of physical 
+language. Let parallel but separated sheets of clear plastic and colored plastic 
+be mounted in lighting conditions so that the subject can't see the clear 
+plastic. He touches the clear plastic, but from what he sees, he believes he is 
+touching the colored plastic. The lighting is then changed and his error is 
+exposed. In some sense, the sight-touch concurrence identifying an object 
+was a mere coincidence. Next, we produce another colored sheet for the 
+
+
+82 
+
+
+subject to touch, and we are able to convince him that this time the 
+object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence. 
+
+The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which 
+resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. 
+To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the 
+concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
+The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight 
+and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the 
+physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its 
+immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot 
+be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. 
+Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of 
+the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our 
+experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying 
+concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being 
+fooled. 
+
+We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in 
+testing object-identifying concurrences, that doesn't immediately rely on 
+other object-identifying concurrences, the very concurrences which are 
+suspect. It is as if the physicist proposed to prove that clicks come from a 
+certain metronome by manipulating a detecting device that outputs its data 
+as sounds. But suppose the physicist proves that the clicks come from the 
+metronome by showing (1) that the metronome has to be stopped or 
+removed to stop the clicks, and (2) that the clicks stop if the metronome is 
+stopped or removed. The physicist proves that the object-identifying 
+concurrence is not a coincidence by demonstrating that certain related 
+concurrences are forbidden. We suggest that the physicist ultimately handles 
+touch-sight concurrences in just this way. The operational basis of the 
+physicist's activity comes down to our states. (But note that the physicist 
+has tests, which do not rely directly on his hearing, to determine whether the 
+clicks come from the metronome! ) One way to develop our states, then, 
+may be to develop substates which express the differences between those 
+object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that 
+aren't--the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment. 
+
+
+83 
+
+
+2/22/1963 
+
+
+Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstra 
+February 22, 1963 
+(foto by Tony Conrad) 
+
+
+te against the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
+
+
+84 
+
+
+10. 1966 Mathematical Studies 
+
+
+QO. Introduction 
+
+
+Pure mathematics is the one activity which is intrinsically formalistic. It 
+is the one activity which brings out the practical value of formal 
+manipulations. Abstract games fit in perfectly with the tradition and 
+rationale of pure mathematics; whereas they would not be appropriate in 
+any other discipline. Pure mathematics is the one activity which can 
+appropriately develop through innovations of a formalistic character. 
+
+Precisely because pure mathematics does not have to be immediately 
+practical, there is no intrinsic reason why it should adhere to the normal 
+concept of logical truth. No harm is done if the mathematician chooses to 
+play a game which is indeterminate by normal logical standards. All that 
+matters is that the mathematician clearly specify the rules of his game, and 
+that he not make claims for his results which are inconsistent with his rules. 
+
+Actually, my pure philosophical writings discredit the concept of 
+logical truth by showing that there are flaws inherent in all non-trivial 
+language. Thus, no mathematics has the logical validity which was once 
+claimed for mathematics. From the ultimate philosophical standpoint, all 
+mathematics is as "indeterminate" as the mathematics in this monograph. 
+All the more reason, then, not to limit mathematics to the normal concept 
+of logical truth. 
+
+Once it is realized that mathematics is intrinsically formalistic, and need 
+not adhere to the norma! concept of logical truth, why hold back from 
+exploring the possibilities which are available? There is every reason to 
+search out the possibilities and present them. Such is the purpose of this 
+monograph. 
+
+The ultimate test of the non-triviality of pure mathematics is whether it 
+has practical applications. I believe that the approaches presented on a very 
+abstract level in this monograph will turn out to have such applications. In 
+order to be applied, the principles which are presented here have to be 
+developed intensively on a level which is compatible with applications. The 
+results will be found in my two subsequent essays, 'Subjective Propositional 
+Vibration" and "The Logic of Admissible Contradictions." 
+
+
+85 
+
+
+1. Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories 
+1.1 Post-Formalist Mathematics 
+
+Over the last hundred years, a philosophy of pure mathematics has 
+grown up which I prefer to call "formalism." As Willard Quine says in the 
+fourth section of his essay "Carnap and Logical Truth,' formalism was 
+inspired by a series of developments which began with non-Euclidian 
+geometry. Quine himself is opposed to formalism, but the formalists have 
+found encouragement in Quine's own book, Mathematical Logic. The best 
+presentation of the formalist position can be found in Rudolph Carnap's The 
+Logical Syntax of Language. As a motivation to the reader, and 
+as a heuristic aid, I will relate my study to these two standard books. (It will 
+heip if the reader is thoroughly familiar with them.) it is not important 
+whether Carnap, or Quine, or formalism--or my interpretation of them--is 
+"correct," for this essay is neither history nor philosophy. I am using history 
+as a bridge, to give the reader access to some extreme mathematical 
+innovations. 
+
+The formalist position goes as follows. Pure mathematics is the 
+manipulation of the meaningless and arbitrary, but typographically 
+well-defined ink-shapes on paper 'w,' 'x,' 'y,' 'z,' %,? "7 *),° fy and 'e.' 
+These shapes are manipulated according to arbitrary but well-detined 
+mechanical rules. Actually, the rules mimic the structure of primitive 
+systems such as Euclid's geometry. There are formation rules, mechanical 
+definitions of which concatenations of shapes are "sentences." One sentence 
+is '{((x) (xex}) I (x) (xex)).' There are transformation rules, rules for the 
+mechanical derivation of sentences from other sentences. The best known 
+trasformation rule is the rule that may be concluded from yand"™y> w" ; 
+where '>' is the truth-furctional conditional. For later convenience, I will 
+say that y and "y D yw are "impliors," and that y is the "implicand." 
+Some sentences are designated as "axioms." A 'proof' is a series of 
+sentences such that each is an axiom or an implicand of preceding sentences. 
+The last sentence in a proof is a "theorem." 
+
+This account is ultrasimplified and non-rigorous, but it is adequate for 
+my purposes. (The reader may have noticed a terminological issue here. For 
+Quine, an implication is merely a logically true conditional. The rules which 
+are used to go from some statements to others, and to assemble proofs, are 
+rules of inference. The relevant rule of inference is the modus ponens; wW is 
+tie ponential of pand "yD W7. What I am doing is to use a terminology of 
+implication to talk about rules of inference and ponentials. The reason is 
+that the use of Quine's terminology would result in extremely awkward 
+formulations. What I will be doing is sufficiently transparent that it can be 
+translated into Quine's terminology if necessary. My results will be 
+
+
+86 
+
+
+unaffected.) The decisive feature of the arbitrary game called "mathematics" 
+is as follows. A sentence-series can be mechanically checked to determine 
+whether it is a proof. But there is no mechanical method for deciding 
+whether a sentence is a theorem. Theorems, or rather their proofs, have to be 
+puzzled out, to be discovered. in this feature lies the dynamism, the 
+excitement of traditional mathematics. Traditional mathematical ability is 
+the ability to make inferential discoveries. 
+
+
+A variety of branches of mathematics can be specialized out from the 
+basic system. Depending on the choices of axioms, systems can be 
+constructed which are internally consistent, but conflict with each other. A 
+system can be "interpreted," or given a meaning within the language of a 
+science such as physics. So interpreted, it may have scientific value, or it may 
+not. But as pure mathematics, all the systems have the same arbitrary status. 
+
+By "formalist mathematics' I will mean the present mathematical 
+systems which are presented along the above lines. Actually, as many authors 
+have observed, the success of the non-Euclidian "tmaginary' geometries 
+made recognition of the game-like character of mathematics inevitable. 
+Formalism is potentially the greatest break with tradition in the history of 
+mathematics. In the Foreward to The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap 
+brilliantly points out that mathematical innovation is still hindered by the 
+Widespread opinion that deviations from mathematical tradition must be 
+justified--that is, proved to be "correct" and to be a faithful rendering of 
+"the true logic." According to Carnap, we are free to choose the rules of a 
+mathematical system arbitrarily. The striving after correctness must cease, so 
+that mathematics will no longer be hindered. 'Before us lies the boundless 
+ocean of unlimited possibilities." In other words, Carnap, the most reputable 
+of academicians, says you can do anything in mathematics. Do not worry 
+whether whether your arbitrary game corresponds to truth, tradition, or 
+reality: it is still legitimate mathematics. Despite this wonderful Principle of 
+Tolerance in mathematics, Carnap never ventured beyond the old 
+ink-on-paper, axiomatic-deductive structures. I, however, have taken Carnap 
+at his word. The result is my "post-formalist mathematics." I want to stress 
+that my innovations have been legitimized in advance by one of the most 
+reputable academic figures of the twentieth century. 
+
+Early in 1961, I constructed some systems which went beyond 
+formalist mathematics in two respects. 1. My sentential elements are 
+physically different from the little ink-shapes on paper used in all formalist 
+systems. My sentences are physically different from concatenations of 
+ink-shapes. My transformation rules have nothing to do with operations on 
+ink-shapes. 2. My systems do not necessarily follow the axiomatic-deductive, 
+sentence-implication-axiom-proof-theorem structure. Both of these 
+
+
+87 
+
+
+possibilities, by the way, are mentioned by Carnap in "Languages as 
+
+Calculi." A "post-formalist system," then, is a formalist system which differs 
+
+physically from  an_ ink-on-paper system, or which lacks the 
+
+axiomatic-deductive structure. 
+
+As a basis for the analysis of post-formalist systems, a list of structural 
+properties of formalist systems is desirable. Here is such a list. By 
+"Implication" I will mean simple, direct implication, unless I say otherwise. 
+
+1. Asentence can be repeated at will. 
+
+2. The rule of implication refers to elements of sentences: sentences 
+are structurally composite. 
+
+A sentence can imply itself. 
+
+4. The repeat of an implior can imply the repeat of an implicand: an 
+
+implication can be repeated. 
+
+Different impliors can imply different implicands. 
+
+6. Given two or three sentences, it is possible to recognize 
+
+mechanically whether one or two directly imply the third. 
+
+No axiom is implied by other, different axioms. 
+
+8. The definition of 'proof' is the standard definition, in terms of 
+implication, given early in this essay. 
+
+9. Given the axioms and some other sentence, it is not possible to 
+recognize mechanically whether the sentence is a theorem, 
+Compound indirect implication is a puzzle. 
+
+Now for the first post-formalist system. 
+
+
+wo 
+
+
+a 
+
+
+~ 
+
+
+"TY Hlusions" 
+
+
+A "sentence" is the following page (with the figure on it) so long as the 
+apparent, perceived ratio of the length of the vertical line to that 
+of the horizontal line (the statement's "associated ratio") does not 
+change. (Two sentences are the "same" if end only if their 
+associated ratios are the same.) 
+
+A sentence Y is "implied by" a sentence X if and only if Y is the same as X, 
+or else Y is, of all the sentences one ever sees, the sentence having 
+the associated ratio next smaller than that of X. 
+
+Take as the axiom the first sentence one sees. 
+
+Explanation: The figure is an optical illusion such that the vertical line 
+normally appears longer than the horizontal line, even though their 
+lengths are equal. One can correct one's perception, come to see 
+the vertical line as shorter relative to the horizontal line, decrease 
+the associated ratio, by measuring the lines with a ruler to convince 
+oneself that the vertical line is not longer than the other, and then 
+
+
+88 
+
+
+trying to see the lines as equal in length; constructing similar 
+figures with a variety of real (measured) ratios and practicing 
+judging these ratios; and so forth. 
+
+
+"IIlusions" has Properties 1, 3-5, and 7-8. Purely to clarify this fact, the 
+following sequence of integers is presented as a model of the order in which 
+associated ratios might appear in reality. (The sequence is otherwise totally 
+inadequate as a model of "Iilusions.") 4 2 1; 4 2;5421;43 1. The 
+implication structure would then be 
+
+
+4<> 
+s—-TXp>s SZ Lo ZN 
+4<> 4 oo yD der 1 
+
+
+The axiom would be 4, and 5 could not appear in a proof. "IIlusions" has 
+Property 1 on the basis that one can contro! the associated ratio. Turning to 
+Property 4, it is normally the case that when an implication is repeated, a 
+given occurrence of one of the sentences involved is unique to a specific 
+occurrence of the implication. In "Illusions," however, if two equal 
+sentences are next smaller than X, the occurrence of X does not uniquely 
+belong to either of the two occurrences of the implication. Compare 'the', 
+
+
+e 
+
+
+89 
+
+
+where the occurrence of 't' is not unique to either occurrence of 'the'. 
+Subject to this explanation, "lilusions" has Property 4. "Illusions" has 
+Property 8, but it goes without saying thut the type of implication is not 
+modus ponens. Properties 3, 5, and 7 need no comment. As for Property 2, 
+the rule of implication refers to a property of sentences, rather than to 
+elements of sentences. The interesting feature of "IIlusions" is that it 
+reverses the situation defined by Properties 6 and 9. Compound indirect 
+implication is about the same as simple implication. The only difference is 
+the difference between being smaller and being next smalier. And there is 
+only one axiom (per person). 
+
+Simple direct implication, however, is subjective and illusive. It 
+essentially involves changing one's perceptions of an illusion. The change of 
+associated ratios is subjective, elusive, and certainly not numerically 
+measurable. Then, the order in which one sees sentences won't always be 
+their order in the implications and proofs. And even though one is exposed 
+to all the sentences, one may have difficulty distinguishing and remembering 
+them in consciousness. If I see the normal illusion, then manage to get 
+myself to see the lines as being of equal length, I know I have seen a 
+theorem. What is difficult is grasping the steps in between, the simple direct 
+implications. If the brain contains a permanent impression of every sensation 
+it has received, then the implications objectively exist; but they may not be 
+thinkable without neurological techniques for getting at the impressions. In 
+any case, "proof" is well-defined in some sense--but proofs may not be 
+thinkable. "I!lusions" is, after all, not so much shakier in this respect than 
+even simple arithmetic, which contains undecidable sentences and 
+indefinable terms. 
+
+In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap distinguishes pure syntax 
+and descriptive syntax; and says that pure syntax should be independent of 
+notation, and that every system should be isomorphic to some ink-on-paper 
+system. In so doing, Carnap violates his ov'n Principle of Tolerance. Consider 
+the following trivial formalist system. 
+
+
+"Order" 
+
+
+A"sentence" is a member of a finite set of integers. 
+
+Sentence Y is "implied by" sentence X it and only if Y=X, or else of all the 
+sentences, Y is the one next smaller than X. 
+
+Take as the axiom the largest sentence. 
+
+
+js the pure syntax of "Iilusions' insomorphic to "Order"? The preceding 
+paragraph proved that it is not. The implication structure of "Order" is 
+
+
+90 
+
+
+mechanical to the point of idiocy, while the implication structure of 
+"Illusions" is, as I pointed out, elusive. The figure 
+
+
+Axlom 6 eles gt abe eae eek Theorem 
+
+
+where loops indicate multiple occurances of the same sentence, could 
+adequately represent a proof in "Order," but could not remotely represent 
+one in "Illusions." The essence of 'Illusions' is that it is coupled to the 
+reader's subjectivity. For an ink-on-paper system even to be comparable to 
+"IIlusions," the subjectivity would have to be moved out of the reader and 
+onto the paper. This is utterly impossible. 
+
+Here is the next system. 
+
+
+"I nnperseqs" 
+
+
+Explanation: Consider the rainbow halo which appears to surround a small 
+bright light when one looks at it through fogged glass (such as 
+eyeglasses which have been breathed on). The halo consists of 
+concentric circular bands of color. As the fog evaporates, the halo 
+uniformly contracts toward the light. The halo has a vague outer 
+ring, which contracts as the halo does. Of concern here is what 
+happens on one contracting radius of the halo, and specifically 
+what happens on the segment of that radius lying in the vague 
+outer ring: the outer segment. 
+
+A "sentence" {or halopoint) is the changing halo color at a fixed point, in 
+space, in the halo; until the halo contracts past the point. 
+
+Several sentences "imply" another sentence if and only if, at some instant, 
+the several sentences are on an outer segment, and the other 
+sentence is the inner endpoint of that outer segment. 
+
+An "axiom" is a sentence which is in the initial vague outer ring (before it 
+contracts), and which is not an inner endpoint. 
+
+An "innperseq" is a sequence of sequences of sentences on one radius 
+satisfying the following conditions. 1. The members of the first 
+sequence are axioms, 2. For each of the other sequences, the first 
+member is implied by the non-first members of the preceding 
+sequence; and the remaining inembers (if any) are axioms or first 
+members of preceding sequences. 3. All first members, of 
+sequences other than the last two, appear as non-first members. 4. 
+No sentence appears as a non-first member more than once. 5. The 
+last sequence has one member. 
+
+In the diagram on the following page, different positions of the vague outer 
+
+
+91 
+
+
+Successive bands represent the vague outer ring at successive times as it fades in toward the small bright light. 
+
+
+ring at different times are suggested by different shadings. The 
+outer segment moves "down the page." The figure is by no means 
+an innperseq, but is supposed to help explain the definition. 
+Innperseqs Diagram 
+"Sentences" at 
+
+
+I time: a1 8 a3 aq ap ag a7 b 
+44,89 > bh 
+
+
+timeg: a9 a3 a4 a5 ag a7 be 
+ag —— eee ( 
+
+
+eS 
+SS Sos 
+Saas 
+SSS 
+
+
+WS 
+
+
+U4 yy (VY) Mi Wy i 
+Mey ae 
+AAA AL ELH i wae aan Se tl 
+peeling tatatsegZee 4,45 
+
+EL DAMA ATLL 
+
+Lita, YAP 
+
+VALE RELAY AL 
+
+LAA B68 94622 
+
+VP AO 
+
+WAL ALLL 
+
+RINE, SALA ALIIY 
+
+LAA 6 LAs 
+
+eines: Yihks 
+
+
+PT I SSS . m 
+
+ar ee oe —— timeg: ag a7 bede 
+Feo, Weak rds gis 
+ROBES I) Ronee SSS times: ayb ede f 
+KT g . 
+Snes eaiiens Pa PASE, SS a 
+
+PPT PS SL RISE Os a7,c +f 
+CER I PRR 
+FS re pa oon a 
+ST RS EXER WS gat en gs 
+SAE VE er 
+
+
+"Axioms" ay a9 a3 a4 a5 ag a7 
+
+
+Innperseq 
+(a3,49,a4) 
+(b, a3) 
+
+(c, a5, aq) 
+(d, b, ag) 
+(e,c,a7) 
+(f,e, d) 
+
+(g) 
+
+
+small bright light 
+
+
+92 
+
+
+In "Innperseqs," a conventional proof would be redundant unless al! 
+the statements were on the same radius. And even if the weakest axiom were 
+chosen (the initial outer endpoint), this axiom would imply the initial inner 
+endpoint, and from there the theorem could be reached immediately. In 
+other words, to use the standard definition of "proof" in "Innperseqs" 
+would result in an uninteresting derivation structure. Thus, a more 
+interesting derivation structure is defined, the "innperseq." The interest of 
+an "innperseq" is to be as elaborate as the many restrictions in its definition 
+will allow. Proofs are either disregarded in "Innperseqs"; or else they are 
+identified with innpersegs, and lack Property 8. "Innperseqs" makes the 
+break with the proof-theorem structure of formalist mathematics. 
+
+Turning to simple implication, an implicand can have many impliors; 
+and there is an infinity of axioms, specified by a general condition. The 
+system has Property 1 in the sense that a sentence can exist at different 
+times and be a member of different implications. It has Property 4 in the 
+sense that the sentences in a specific implication can exist at different times, 
+and the implication holds as long as the sentences exist. It has Property 3 in 
+that an inner endpoint implies itself. The system also has Properties 5 and 7; 
+and lacks Property 2. But, as before, Properties 6 and 9 are another matter. 
+Given several sentences, it is certainly possible to tell mechanically whether 
+one is implied by the others. But when are you given sentences? If one can 
+think the sentences, then relating them is easy--but it is difficult to think the 
+sentences in the first place, even though they objectively exist. The diagram 
+suggests what to look for, but the actual thinking, the actual sentences are 
+another matter. As for Property 9, when "theorems" are identified with last 
+members of innperseqs, I hesitate to say whether a derivation of a given 
+sentence can be constructed mechanically. If a sentence is nearer the center 
+than the axioms are, an innperseq can be constructed for it. Or can it? The 
+answer is contingent. "Innperseqs" is indeterminate because of the difficulty 
+of thinking the sentences, a difficulty which is defined into the system. It is 
+the mathematician's capabilities at a particular instant which delimit the 
+indeterminacies. Precisely because of the difficulty of thinking sentences, I 
+will give several subvariants of the system. 
+
+
+Indeterminacy 
+
+
+A "totally determinate innperseq" is an innperseq in which one thinks all the 
+sentences. 
+
+An "implior-indeterminate innperseq" is an innperseq in which one thinks 
+only each implicand and the outer segment it terminates. 
+
+A "sententially indeterminate innperseq" is an innperseq in which one thinks 
+
+
+93 
+
+
+only the outer segment, and its inner endpoint, as it progresses 
+inward. 
+
+
+Let us return to the matter of pure and descriptive syntax. The interest 
+of "Illusions" and "Innperseqs" is precisely that their abstract structure 
+cannot be separated from their physical and psychological character, and 
+thus that they are not isomorphic to any conventional ink-on-paper system. I 
+am trying to break through to unheard of, and hopefully significant, modes 
+of implication; to define implication structures (and derivation structures) 
+beyond the reach of past mathematics. 
+
+
+1.2 Constructed Memory Systems 
+
+In order to understand this section, it is necessary to be thoroughly 
+familiar with "Studies in Constructed Memories," the essay following this 
+one. {I have not combined the two essays because their approaches are too 
+different.) I will define post-formalist systems in constructed memories, 
+beginning with a system in an M*-Memory. 
+
+
+"Dream Amalgams" 
+
+
+A "sentence" is a possible method, an Ag. with respect to an M*-Memory. 
+I 
+
+
+The sentence A, "implies" the sentence A, if and only if the agth 
+
+
+M*-assertion is actually thought; and either A, = Ag.» or else there is 
+q p 
+
+
+cross-method contact of a mental state in Mag with a state in Pa 
+
+The axioms must be chosen from sentences which satisfy two conditions. 
+The mental states in the sentences must have cross-method contact 
+with mental states in other sentences. And the M*-assertions 
+corresponding to the sentences must not be thought. 
+
+Explanation: As "Studies in Constructed Memories" says, there can be 
+cross-method contact of states, because a normal dream can 
+combine totally different episodes in the dreamer's life into an 
+amalgam. 
+
+"Dream Amalgams" has Properties 1-5. For the first time, sentences are 
+structurally composite, with mental states being the relevant sentential 
+elements. Implication has an unusual character. The traditional type of 
+implication, modus ponens, is "directed," because the conditional is 
+directed. Even if "yDwW" is true "YDy" may not be. Now implication is also 
+directed in 'Dream Amalgams," but for a very different reason. 
+
+
+94 
+
+
+Cross-method contact, unlike the conditional, has a symmetric character. 
+What prevents implication from being necessarily symmetrical is that the 
+implicand's M*-assertion actually has to be thought, while the implior's 
+M*-assertion does not. Thus, implication is both subjective and mechanical, 
+it is subjective, in that it is a matter of volition which method is remembered 
+to have actually: been used. It is mechanical, in that when one is 
+remembering, one is automatically aware of the cross-method contacts of 
+states in Ag . The conditions on the axioms ensure that they will have 
+
+
+implications without losing Property 7. 
+
+
+As for compound implication in "Dream Amalgams," the organism 
+with the M*-Memory can't be aware of it at all; because it can't be aware 
+that at different times it remembered different methods to be the one 
+actually used. (In fact, the organism cannot be aware that the system has 
+Property 5, for the same reason.) On the other hand, to an outside observer 
+of the M*-Memory, indirect implication is not only thinkable but 
+mechanical. It is not superfluous because cross-method contact of mental 
+states is not necessarily transitive. The outside observer can decide whether a 
+sentence is a theorem by the following mechanical procedure. Check 
+whether the sentence's M*-assertion has acually been thought; if so, check ail 
+sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; if not, check all the 
+sentences which imply the sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; 
+etc. The number of possible methods is given as finite, so the procedure is 
+certain to terminate. Again, an unprecedented mode of implication has been 
+defined. 
+
+When a post-formalist system is defined in a constructed memory, the 
+discussion and analysis of the system become a consequence of constructed 
+memory theory and an extension of it. Constructed memory theory, which 
+is quite unusual but still more or less employs deductive inference, is used to 
+study post-formalist modes of inference which are anything but deductive. 
+
+To aid in understanding the next system, which involves infalls in a 
+D-Memory, here is an 
+
+
+mn 
+
+
+"Exercise to be Read Aloud" 
+(Read according to a timer, reading the first word at O' O", and prolonging 
+and spacing words so that each sentence ends at the time in parentheses after 
+it. Do not pause netween sentences.) 
+
+
+(event) Ail men are mortal. (17°) 
+
+(Sentence; =eventy) The first utterance tasted 17" and ended at 17"; and 
+lasted 15" and ended 1" ago. (59") 
+
+(Sp=event3) The second utterance lasted 42" and ended at 59": and 
+lasted 50" and ended 2" ago. (1' 31") 
+
+
+95 
+
+
+(S3=eventy) The third utterance lasted 32" and ended at 1' 31"; and 
+lasted 40" and ended 1" ago. (2' 16") 
+
+Since '32' in $3 is greater than '2' in S9, S9 must say that S4 (=eventg) 
+
+ended 30" after Sy began, or something equally unclear. The duration of Sy 
+
+is greater than the distance into the past to which it refers. This situation is 
+
+not a real infall, but it should give the reader some intuitive notion of an 
+
+infall. 
+
+
+"Infails" 
+
+
+A "sentence" is a D-sentence, in a D-Memory such that event) + 4 is the first 
+thinking of the jth D-sentence, for all j. 
+
+Two sentences "imply" another if and only if all three are the same; or else 
+the three are adjacent {and can be written Sit: S;, Si-1 ), and are such 
+that 6 5 = xj44-Xj raat Sy is the implicand. (The function of Sj+4 is to 
+give the duration 6,= +1 -%; of Sj. Sj states that event;, the first 
+dae' of s? "4, ended ata aitence: Zj inte the past, where zj is smaller 
+than s $s own vduretian The diagram indicates the relations.) 
+
+
+G2: evenby obi: event 3 
+occurred in [X5-40° x5 I occurred in ia, Xa 
+
+
+shia and in IN-25-Y5) N-z.; and inI N- "Ared ya Needl oP 2 
+
+
+event itd 
+
+
+events 42 
+xs 544] t 
+Bi ese *y+4 A542 
+
+
+"evenby ended 25 ago" "evenly 44 inI 
+
+
+In this variety of D-Memory, the organism continuously thinks successive 
+D-sentences, which are all different, just as the reader of the above exercise 
+continuously reads successive and different sentences. Thus, the possibility 
+of repeating a sentence depends on the possibility of thinking it while one is 
+thinking another sentence--a possibility which may be far-fetched, but which 
+
+
+96 
+
+
+is not explicitly excluded by the definition of a "D-Memory." If the 
+possibility is granted, then "Infalls" has Properties 1-5. Direct implication is 
+completely mechanical; it is subjective only in that the involuntary 
+determination of the z; and other aspects of the memory is a 'subjective' 
+process of the organism. Compound implication is also mechanical to an 
+outside observer of the memory, but if the organism itself is to be aware of 
+it, it has to perform fantastic feats of multiple thinking. 
+
+"Dream Amaigams" and "Infalls" are systems constructed with 
+imaginary elements, systems whose "notation" is drawn from an imaginary 
+object or system. Such systems have no descriptive syntax. Imaginary objects 
+were introduced into mathematics, or at least into geometry, by Nicholas 
+Lobachevski, and now I am using them as a notation. For these systems to 
+be nonisomorphic to any ink-on-paper systems, the mathematician must be 
+the organism with the M*-Memory or the D-*Memory. But this means that 
+in this case, the mathematics which is nonisomorphic to any ink-on-paper 
+system can be performed only in an imaginary mind. 
+
+Now for a different approach. Carnap said that we are free to choose 
+the rules of a system arbitrarily. Let us take Carnap literally. I want to 
+construct more systems in constructed memories--so why not construct the 
+system by a procedure which ensures that constructed memories are 
+involved, but which is otherwise arbitrary? Why not suspend the striving 
+after "interesting" systems, that last vestige of the striving after 
+"correctness," and see what happens? Why not construct the rules of a 
+system by a chance procedure? 
+
+To construct a system, we have to fill in the blanks in the following rule 
+schema in such a way that grammatically correct sentences result. 
+
+
+Rule Schema 
+
+A"sentence" isa(n)_ 
+
+Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences 
+the third. 
+
+
+I now spread the pages of 'Studies in Constructed Memories" on the floor. 
+With eyes closed, I hold a penny over them and drop it. I open my eyes and 
+copy down the expressions the penny covers. By repeating this routine, I 
+obtain a haphazard series of expressions concerning constructed memories. It 
+is with this series that I will fill in the blanks in the rule schema. In the next 
+stage, I fill the first (second, third) blank with the ceries of expressions 
+preceding the-first (second, third) period in the entire series. 
+
+
+"Haphazard System" 
+
+A "sentence" is a the duration D-sentences A (@") conclude these 
+"*-Reflection," or the future Assumption voluntarily force of 
+conviction for conclusion the Situation or by ongoing that this 
+system? be given telling between the Situation 1. 
+
+Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences is/ was 
+contained not have to the acceptance that a certain and malleable 
+study what an event involves material specifically mathematics: 
+construct accompanies the rest, extra-linguistically image organism 
+can fantasy not remembering ® *-Memory, the future interval defined 
+in dream the third. 
+
+An "axiom" is a sentence that internally D-sentences, just as the 
+
+
+"}*-Memory" sentences Ay is A,.. 
+1 2 
+
+
+In the final stage, I cancel the smallest number of words I have to in 
+order to make the rules grammatical. 
+
+
+"Fantasied Amnesia" 
+
+A "sentence" is a duration or the future force of conviction for the Situation 
+or this system given Situation 1. 
+
+Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences have the 
+acceptance that a certain and malleable study extra-linguistically can 
+fantasy not remembering the future interval defined in the third. 
+
+An "axiom" is a sentence that internally just sentences ay: 
+
+It becomes clear in thinking about "Fantasied Amnesia' that its 
+metametamathematics is dual. Describing the construction of the rules, the 
+metamathematics, by a systematic performance, is one thing. Taking the 
+finished metamathematics at face value, independently of its origin, and 
+studying it in the usual manner, is another. Let us take "Fantasied Amnesia" 
+at face value. As one becomes used to its rules, they become somewhat more 
+meaningful. I will say that an "interpretation" of a haphazard system is an 
+explanation of its rules that makes some sense out of what may seem 
+senseless. 'Interpreting' is somewhat like finding the conditions for the 
+existence of a constructed memory which seemingly cannot exist. The first 
+rule of "Fantasied Amnesia" is a disjunction of three substantives. The 
+
+"Situation" referred to in the second substantive expression is either 
+
+Situation 1 or else an unspecified situation. The third substantive expression 
+
+apparently means 'this system, assuming Situation 1,' and refers to 
+
+"Eantasied Amnesia" itself. The definition of 'sentence' is thus meaningful, 
+
+but very bizarre. The second rule speaks of "the acceptance" as if it were a 
+
+written assent. The rule then speaks of a "malleable study" as "fantasying" 
+
+
+98 
+
+
+something. This construction is quite weird, but let us try to accept it. The 
+third rule speaks of a sentence that "sentences" (in the legal sense) a possible 
+method. So much for the meaning of the rules. 
+
+
+Turning to the nine properties of formalist systems, the reference to 
+"the future interval' in the implication rule of "Fantasied Amnesia" 
+indicates that the system has Property 2; and the system can perfectly well 
+have Property 8. It does not have Property 6 in any known sense. Certainly 
+it does have Property 9. it just might have Property. 1. But as for the other 
+four properties, it seems out of the question to decide whether "Fantasied 
+Amnesia' has them. For whatever it is worth, "Fantasied Amnesia' is on 
+balance incomparable to formalist systems. 
+
+My transformation rule schema has the form of a biconditional, in 
+which the right clause is the operative one. If a transformation rule were to 
+vary, in such a way that it could be replaced by a constant rule whose right 
+clause was the disjunction of the various right clauses for the variable rule, 
+then the latter would vary "trivially." 1 will say that a system whose 
+transformation rule can vary non-trivially is a "heterodeterminate" system. 
+Since 1 have constructed a haphazard metamathematics, why not a 
+heterodeterminate metamathematics? Consider a mathematician with an 
+M-Memory, such that each Ag. is the consistent use of a different 
+
+
+transformation rule, a different definition of "imply," for the mathematics 
+in which the mathematician is discovering theorems. The consistent use of a 
+transformation rule is after all a method--a method for finding the 
+commitments premisses make, and for basing conclusions in premisses. When 
+the mathematician goes to remember which rule of inference he has actually 
+been using, he "chooses" which of the possible methods is remembered to 
+have actually been used. This situation amounts to a heterodeterminate 
+system. tn fact, the metamathematics cannot even be written out this time; I 
+can only describe it metametamathematically in terms of an imaginary 
+memory. 
+
+We are now in the realm of mathematical systems which cannot be 
+written out, but can only be described metametamathematically. I will 
+present a final system of this sort. It is entitled "System Such That No One 
+Knows What's Going On." One just has to guess whether this system exists, 
+and if it does what it is like. The preceding remark is the 
+metametamathematical description, or definition, of the system. 
+
+
+99 
+
+
+1.3 Epilogue 
+
+Ever since Carnap's Principle of Tolerance opened the floodgates to 
+arbitrariness in mathematics, we have been faced with the prospect of a 
+mathematics which is  indistinguishable from  art-for-art's-sake, or 
+amusement-for-amusement's-sake. But there is one characteristic which saves 
+mathematics from this fate. Mathematics originated by abstraction from 
+primitive technology, and is indispensable to science and technology--in 
+short, mathematics has scientific applications. The experience of group 
+theory has proved, I hope once and for all, the bankruptcy of that narrow 
+practicality which would limit mathematics to what can currently be applied 
+in science. But now that mathematics is wide open, and anything goes, we 
+should be aware more than ever that scientific applicability is the only 
+objective value that mathematics has. I would not have set down constructed 
+memory theory and the post-formalist systems if I did not believe that they 
+could be applied. When and how they will be is another matter. 
+
+And what about the "validity" of formalism? The rise of the formalist 
+position is certainly understandable. The formalists had a commendable, 
+rationalistic desire to eliminate the metaphysical! problems associated with 
+mathematics. Moreover, formalism helped stimulate the development of the 
+logic needed in computer technology (and also to stimulate this paper). In 
+spite of the productiveness of the formalist position, however, it now seems 
+beyond dispute that formalism has failed to achieve its original goals. (My 
+pure philosophical writings are the last word on this issue.) Perhaps the main 
+lesson to be learned from the history of formalism is that an idea does not 
+have to be "true" to be productive. 
+
+
+Note 
+Early versions of "tllusions" and "Innperseqs" appeared in my essay 
+"Concept Art," published in An Anthology, ed. La Monte Young, New 
+York, 1963. An early, July 1961 version of "System Such That No One 
+Knows What's Going On" appeared in dimension 14, Ann Arbor, 1963, 
+published by the University of Michigan College of Architecture and Design. 
+
+
+100 
+
+
+2. Studies in Constructed Memories 
+
+
+2.1 Introduction 
+
+
+The memory of a conscious organism is a phenomenon in which 
+interrelations of mind, language, and the rest of reality are especially evident. 
+In these studies, I will define some conscious memory-systems, and 
+investigate them. The investigation will be mathematical. In fact, the nearest 
+precedent for it is perhaps the geometry of Nicholas Lobachevski. 
+Non-Euclidian geometry had many founders, but Lobachevski in particular 
+spoke of his system as an 'imaginary geometry." Lobachevski's system was, 
+so to speak, the physical geometry of an "imaginary," or constructed, space. 
+By analogy, my investigation could be called a psychological algebra of 
+constructed minds. It is too early to characterize the investigation more 
+exactly. Let us just remember Rudoiph Carnap's Principle of Tolerance in 
+mathematics: the mathematician is free to construct his system in any way 
+he chooses. 
+
+I will begin by introducing a repertory of concepts informally, 
+becoming more formal as I go along. Consider ongoing actions, which by 
+definition extend through past, present, and future. For example, "1! am 
+making the trip from New York to chicago." Consider also past actions 
+which have probable consequences in the present. "I have been heating this 
+water' (entailing that it isn't frozen now). I will be concerned with such 
+actions as these. 
+
+Our language provides for the following assertion: "I am off to the 
+country today; I could have been off to the beach; I could not possibly have 
+been going to the center of the sun". We distinguish an actual action from a 
+possible action; and distinguish both from an action which is materially 
+impossible. People insist that there are things they could do, even though 
+they don't choose to do them (as opposed to things they couldn't do). What 
+distinguishes these possible actions from impossible ones? Rather than 
+trying to analyze such everyday notions in terms of the logic of 
+counterfactual conditionals, or of modalities, or of probability, I choose to 
+take the notions at their face value. My concern is not to philosophize, but 
+to assemble concepts with which to define an interesting memory system. 
+
+What is the introspective psychological difference between a thought 
+that has the force of a memory, and a thought that has the force of a 
+fantasied past, a merely possible past? I am not asking how I know that a 
+verbalized memory is true; I! am asking what quality a naive thought has that 
+marks it as a memory. Let Alternative E be that I went to an East Side 
+restaurant yesterday, and Alternative W be that I went to a West Side one. 
+By the "thought of E" I mean mainly the visualization of going into the East 
+
+
+101 
+
+
+Side restaurant. My thought of E has the force of memory. It actually 
+happened. W is something I could have done. I can imagine I did do W. There 
+is nothing present which indicates whether I did E or W. Yet W merely has 
+the force of possibility, of fantasy. How do the two thoughts differ? Is the 
+thought of E involuntarily more vivid? Is there perhaps an "attitude of 
+assertion" involuntarily present in the thought of E? 
+
+Consider the memory that I was almost run down by a truck yesterday: 
+! could have been run down, but wasn't. In such a case, the possibility that I 
+could have been run down would be more vivid than the actuality that I 
+wasn't. (Is it not insanity, when a person is overwhelmed by the fear of a 
+merely possible past event? ) My hold on sanity here would be the awareness 
+that I am alive and well today. 
+
+In dreams, do we not wholeheartedly "remember" that a misfortune 
+has befallen us, and begin to adjust emotionally to it? Then we awake, and 
+wholeheartedly remember that the misfortune has not befallen us. The 
+thought that had the force of memory in the dream ceases to have that force 
+as we awake. We remember the dream, and conclude that it was a fantasy. 
+Even more characteristic of dreams, do I not to al! intents and purposes go 
+to far places and carry out all sorts of actions in a dream, only to awaken in 
+bed? We say that the dream falsifies my present environment, my 
+sensations, my actions, memories, the past, my whole world, in a totally 
+convincing way. Can a hypnotist produce artificial dreams, that is, can he 
+control their content? Can the hypnotist give his subject one false memory 
+one moment, and replace it with a contradictory memory the next 
+moment? 
+
+I will now = specify a_ situation involving possible actions and 
+remembering. 
+
+Situation 7. "! could have been accomplishing G by doing Aa, or by 
+
+
+doing Aayy ..., or by doing A, ; but I have actually been accomplishing G by 
+n 
+doing Aas" Here the ongoing actions Age i= 1, ..., 9, a; * a, if ixh, are 
+
+
+the possible methods of accomplishing G. (The subscripts are supposed to 
+indicate that the methods are distinct and countable, but not ordered.) The 
+possible methods cannot be combined, let us assume. 
+
+In such a situation, perhaps the thought that I have been doing Aa, 
+
+
+3 by the 
+
+. . us - > n 
+
+presence of the "attitude of assertion'. Since the possible methods are 
+
+ongoing actions, the thought that I have been doing A,. has logical or 
+i 
+
+
+would be distinguished from similar thoughts about Aan! wy A 
+
+
+probabie consequences I can check against the present. 
+Now Aa, is actual and Aao is not, so that Aa, simply cannot have 
+
+
+102 
+
+
+material contact with ay' An actual liquid in Aay could not require a 
+a, could have 
+1 
+
+with A, would be verbal and gratuitous. Therefore, in order to be possible 
+methods, Aan' . 
+
+
+not require a jar in Aas to contain it. If it did, Aan couldn't be actualized 
+
+
+possible jar in Pao to contain it. The only "connection" A 
+.., A, must be materially separable. A liquid in Aan must 
+n 
+
+
+while Aj, remained only a possibility. 
+
+
+Enough concepts are now at hand for the studies to begin in earnest. 
+
+
+2.2 M- Memories 
+Definition. Given the sentences 'I have actually been doing A,.', where 
+i 
+
+
+the A,. are non-combinable possible methods as in Situation 1, an 
+"M-Memory" is a memory of a conscious organism such that the organism 
+can think precisely one of the sentences at a time, and any of the sentences 
+has the force of memory. 
+
+This definition refers to language, mind, and the rest of reality in their 
+interrelations, but the crucial reference is to a property of certain sentences. 
+I have chosen this formulation precisely because of what I want to 
+investigate. I want to find the minimal, elegant, extra-linguistic conditions, 
+whatever they may be, for the existence of an M-Memory (which is defined 
+by a linguistic property). I can say at once that the conditions must enable 
+the organism to think the sentences at will, and they must provide that the 
+memory is consistent with the organism's present awareness. 
+
+Definition. The "*P-Memory" of a conscious organism is its conscious 
+memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of its life. I 
+want to distinguish here the "personal" memory from the preconscious. 
+
+Definition. An "L-Memory" is a linguistic P-Memory having no 
+extra-linguistic component. Of course, the linguistic component has 
+extra-linguistic mental associations which give it "meaning"--otherwise the 
+memory wouldn't be conscious. But these associations lack the force of a 
+mental reliving of the past independent of language. An L-Memory amounts 
+to extra-linguistic amnesia. 
+
+Assumption 1.1. With respect to normal human memory, when I forget 
+whether I did x, I can't voluntarily give either the thought that I did x, or 
+the thought that I didn't do x, the force of memory. I know that I either did 
+or didn't do x, but I can create no conviction for either alternative. (An 
+introspective observation.) 
+
+Conclusion 1.2. An L-Memory is not sufficient for an M-Memory, even 
+in the trivial case that the Aa. are beyond perception (as internal bodily 
+
+
+103 
+
+
+processes are). True, there would be no present perceptions to check the 
+sentences '! have actually been doing A,." against. True, the L-Memory 
+i 
+
+
+precludes any extra-linguistic memory-"feelings" which would conflict with 
+the sentences. But the L-Memory is otherwise normal. And Assumption 1.1 
+indicates that normally, either precisely one of a number of mutually 
+exclusive possibilities has the force of memory; or else the organism can give 
+none of them the force of memory. 
+
+Assumption 1.3.1 cannot, from within a natural dream, choose to swith 
+to another dream. {An introspective observation. A "natural" dream is a 
+dream involuntarily produced internally during sleep.) 
+
+Conclusion 1.4. An M-Memory could not be produced by natural 
+dreaming. It is true that in one dream one sentence could have the force of 
+memory, and in another dream a different sentence could. But an M-Memory 
+is such that the organism can choose one sentence-memory one moment and 
+another the next. See Assumption 1.3. 
+
+Assumption 1.5. Returning to the example of the restaurants, I find 
+that months after the event, my thought of E no longer has the force of 
+memory. All I remember now is that I used to remember that I did E. I 
+remember that I did E indirectly, by remembering that I remembered that ! 
+did E. (My memory that I did E is becoming an L-Memory.) The assumption 
+is that a memory of one's remembering can indicate, if not imply, that the 
+event originally remembered occurred. 
+
+Conclusion 1.6. The following are adequate conditions for the existence 
+of an M-Memory. 1. The sentences are the organism's only memory of which 
+method he has been using. 2. When the organism thinks 'I have actually been 
+doing A,.'. then (he artificially dreams that) he has been doing Ag,-and is 
+now doing it. 3. When the dream ends, he does not remember that he 
+remembered that "he has been doing A,.," That is, he does not remember 
+the dream; and he does not remember that he thought the sentence. These 
+conditions would permit the existence of an M-Memory or else a memory 
+indistinguishable to all intents and purposes from an M-Memory. 
+
+What I have in mind in Conclusion 1.6 is dreams which are produced 
+artificially but otherwise have all the remarkable qualities of natural dreams. 
+There would have to be a state of affairs such that the sentence would 
+instantly start the dream going. 
+
+So much for the conditions for the existence of an M-Memory. 
+Consider now what it is like as a mental experience to have an M-Memory. 
+What present or ongoing awareness accompanies an M-Memory? Conclusion 
+1.6.2 already told what the remembering is like. For the rest, I will 
+informally sketch some conclusions. The organism can extra-linguistically 
+image the Aa: The organism can think 'l could have been doing Aa; When 
+
+
+104 
+
+
+not remembering, the organism doesn't have to do any Ag., or he can do any 
+
+
+one of them. The organism must not do anything which would liquidate a 
+possble method, render the action no longer possible for him. 
+
+Assumption 2.1. A normal dream can combine two totally different 
+past episodes in my life into a fused episode, or amalgam; so that I "relive" it 
+without doubts as.a single episode, and yet remain vaguely aware that 
+different episodes are present in it. Dreams have the capacity not only to 
+falsify my world, but to make the impossible believable. (An introspective 
+observation.) 
+
+Conclusion 2.2. The conditions for the existence of an M-Memory 
+further permit material contact between the possible methods, the very 
+contact which is out of the question in a normal Situation 1. The dream is so 
+flexible that the organism can dream that an (actual) fiquid is/was contained 
+by a jar in a possible method. See Assumption 2.1. Thus, the A,, do not have 
+to be separable to be possible methods. 
+
+I will now introduce further concepts pertaining to the mind. 
+
+Definition. A "mental state" is a mental "stage" or "space" or "mood" 
+in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried on. 
+
+
+Some human mental states are stupor, general anxiety, empathy with 
+another person, dizziness, general euphoria, clearheadedness (the normal 
+state in which work is performed), and dreaming. In all but the last state, 
+some simple visualization routine could be carried out voluntarily. Even ina 
+dream, I can have visualizations, although here I can't have them at will. The 
+states are not defined by the imaging or activities carried on while in them, 
+but are "spaces" in which such imaging or activities are carried on. 
+
+By definition. 
+
+Conclusion 3.2. An M-Memory has to occur within the time which the 
+possible methods require, the time required to accomplich G. By definition. 
+
+Definition. An "M*-Memory" is an M-Memory satisfying these 
+conditions. 1. Agi: for the entire time it requires, involves the voluntary 
+
+
+assuming of mental states. i = 1, ..., n. 2. The material contact between the 
+possible methods, the cross-method contact, is specifically some sort of 
+contact between states. 
+
+Conclusion 3.3. For an M*-Memory, to remember is to choose the 
+mental state in which the remembering is required to occur (by the 
+memory). After ail, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the 
+
+
+A,.-required things you are doing while you remember. 
+i 
+By now, the character of this investigation should be clearer. I seek to 
+
+
+stretch our concepts, rather that to find the "true" ones. The investigation 
+may appear similar to the old discipline of philosophical psychology, but its 
+
+
+105 
+
+
+thrust is rather toward the modern axiomatic systems. The reasoning is 
+loose, but not arbitrary. And the investigation will become increasingly 
+mathematical. 
+
+
+2.3 D-Memories 
+
+
+Definition. A "D-Memory" is a memory such that measured past time 
+
+
+appears in it only in the following sentences: "Event; occurred in the interval 
+
+
+of time which is xX] long and ended at Xj AF, and is Yj long and ended 2; 
+
+
+ago," where Xj, 
+and 'AF' means "after a fixed beginning time." XQ = 'O; XjPX5A and at any 
+
+
+Yje and zj are positive numbers of time units (such as hours) 
+
+
+one fixed time, the intervals IZj. zjtyjl nowhere overlap. Vit ZS%- For an 
+
+
+integer m, the mth sentence acquires the force of memory, is added to the 
+memory, at the fixed time x,,.j =1, ..., f(t), where the number of sentences 
+f(t) is written as a function of time AF. Then f(t) = m when x,,<t<x,, 44. 
+The sentences have the force of memory involuntarily. The organism does 
+not make them up at will. ; : : 
+
+Let me explain what the D-Memory involves. Event; is assigned to an 
+abnormal "interval," a dual interval defined in two unrelated ways. The 
+intervals defined by the Yj and z; are tied to the present instant rather than to 
+a fixed time, and could be written IN-2;-Yj, N-zjl, where 'N' means "the time 
+of the present instant relative to the fixed beginning time." 
+
+Conclusion 4. The intervals IN-2)-Yj, N-Z;I nowhere overlap. Proof: By 
+definition, the intervals IZj, zi+y;I nowhere overlap. If j #k, IZj, Ztyillz,, 
+Zz. +y¥pl = 0. This fact implies that e.g. ZjZjtVjZKS ZK +YK- Then 
+N-2-¥_SN-2<N-2)-9; <N-Zj. Then IN-2p-y,, N-z, 1 N-2jy 7, N-z)I = ¢. At 
+any one time, the organism can think of all the sliding intervals, and they 
+partly cover the time up to now without overlapping. 
+
+Suppose you find the deck of n cards 
+
+
+event j 
+Zz i oa" 
+(jj = 1, .., n and z, is a positive number of days), and you have no 
+
+
+J 
+information to date them other than what they themselves say. If you 
+
+
+believe the cards, your mental experience will be a little like having a 
+D-Memory. Then, the definition does not require that Yj = Xt Again, it is 
+
+
+106 
+
+
+not that two concepts of "length" are involved, but that the "interval" is 
+abnormal. Of course this is ali inconsistent, but I want to study the 
+conditions under which a mind will accept inconsistency. 
+
+Assumption 5.1. With respect to normal human memory, it is possible 
+to forget what day it is, even though one remembers a past date. (An 
+empirical observation.) 
+
+Assumption 5.2. This assumption is based on the fact that the sign 
+'CLOSED FOR VACATION. BACK IN TWO WEEKS' was in the window of 
+a nearby store for at least a month this summer; and the fact that a 
+filmmaker wrote in a newspaper, "When an actor asks me when the film will 
+be finished, I say 'In two months," and two months later I give the same 
+answer, and I'm always right.' Even in normal circumstances, humans can 
+maintain a dual and outright inconsistent awareness of measured time. [n 
+general, inconsistency is a normal aspect of human thinking and even has 
+practical value. 
+
+Imagine a child who has been told to date events by saying, for 
+example, x happened two days ago, and a day later saying again, x happened 
+two days ago--and who has not been told that this is inconsistent. What 
+conditions are required for the acceptance of this dating system? It is 
+precisely because of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 that a certain answer cannot 
+be given to this question. The human mind is so flexible and malleable that 
+there is no telling how much inconsistency it can absorb. I can only study 
+what flaws might lead the child to reject the system. The child might "fee!" 
+that an event recedes into the past, something the memory doesn't express. 
+An event might be placed by the memory no later than another, and yet 
+"feel" more recent than the other. I speculate that if anything will discredit 
+the system, it will be its conflict with naive, "felt," extra-linguistic memory. 
+
+Conclusion 5.3. The above dating system would be acceptable to an 
+organism with an L—Memory. 
+
+Conclusion 5.4. The existence of an L-Memory is an adequate condition 
+for the existence of a D-Memory. With extra-linguistic amnesia, the 
+structure of the language would be the structure of the past in any case. The 
+past would have no form independent of language. Anyway, time is gone for 
+good, leaving nothing that can be checked directly. Without an 
+extra-linguistic memory to fall back on, and considering Assumptions 5.1 
+and 5.2, the dual temporal memory shouldn't be too much to absorb. 
+
+As I said, the real difficulty with this line of investigation is putting 
+limits on anything so flexible as the mind's capacity to absorb inconsistency. 
+
+Now the thinking of a sentence in a D-Memory itself takes time. Let 
+'tS; be the minimum number of time units it takes to think the jth 
+
+
+D-sentence. This function, abbreviated '8y), is the duration function of the 
+
+
+107 
+
+
+D-sentences. 
+
+Conclusion 6.1. If 5j>Z), the memory of the interval defined by Yj and 
+Zj places the end of the interval after the beginning of the memory of it, or 
+does something else equally unclear. If bj>yjtzj. the entire interval is placed 
+after the beginning of the memory of it. When 5;>z;, let us say that the end 
+of the remembered interval falis within the interval for the memory of it, or 
+that the situation is an "infall." (Compare 'The light went out a half-second 
+ago'.) 5 
+
+Conclusion 6.2. If 6}>xj4,-xj, then Sj, is added to the preconscious 
+before s can be thought once. The earliest interval during which the jth 
+sentence can be thought "passes over" the (j+k)th interval. Let us say that 
+the situation is a "passover." (Something of the sort is true of humans, 
+whose brains contain permanent impressions of far more sensations than can 
+be thought, remembered in consciousness.) 
+
+Conclusion 6.3. If there are passovers in a D-Memory, the organism 
+cannot both think the sentences during the earliest intervals possible and be 
+aware of the passovers. Proof: The only way the organism can be aware of 6 
+(S}) is for event j+h (h a positive integer) to be the thinking of Sj. If the 
+thinking of Sj takes piace as the (j+1)th event, then the organism gets two 
+values for 5(S)), namely 4h Xj and Yj+1- Assume that only Xj4I%y is 
+allowed as a measure of 5(Sj). Since 5(S)) = X44%j, there is no passover. If 
+the thinking of S; takes place as the (j+2)th event, then xj4.9-x j44 = 5(S)) 
+could be greater than xj1%- But since Sj goes into the preconscious at x;, 
+S: is not actually thought in the earliest interval during which it could be 
+thought. See the diagram. 
+
+
+So 4 St Sz+d Sz+2 
+
+
+event+ I sven? ~ Pee even bs +2 I 
+aoa ee aaa ee SS 
+
+
+a "je "542 
+
+
+Conclusion 6.4. Let there be an infall in the case where event) is the 
+thinking of Sj- 5(S) = X45 and 5(Sj)>z;. Si+1 gives 5(S)), so that the 
+organism can be aware of it. It is greater than z;. Thus, the organism can be 
+
+
+aware of the infall. However, the infall will certainly be no more difficult to 
+accept than the other features of the D-Memory. And the thinking of Sj has 
+
+
+108 
+
+
+to be one of the events for the organism to be aware of the infall. 
+
+
+2.7 &-Memories 
+I will conclude these studies with two complex constructions. 
+Definition. A "&-Memory" is a memory which includes an M*-Memory 
+and a D-Memory, with the following conditions. 1. The goal G, for the 
+M*-Memory, is to move from one point to another. 2. For the D-Memory, 
+
+
+"event," becomes a numerical term, the decrease in the organism's distance 
+
+
+from the destination point during the temporal interval. "A 3-inch move 
+
+
+toward the destination" is the sort of thing that 'event;' here refers to. 3. 
+
+
+The number of Aa, equals the number of D-sentences factorial. The number 
+of D-sentences, of course, increases. 
+
+Consider the consecutive thinking of each D-sentence precisely once, in 
+minimum time, while the number of sentences remains constant. Such a 
+"D-paragraph" is a permutation of the D-sentences. Let H™ be a 
+D-paragraph when the number of sentances equals the integer m. There are 
+m! SA" s. When f(t) = m = 3, one of the sixH" sis sais}, thought in 
+minimum time. Assume that the duration A of a D-paragraph depends only 
+on the number of D-sentences and the bi. We can write 
+
+
+The permutations of the D-sentences, as well as the D-paragraphs, can be 
+indexed with the a;, just as the possible methods are. 
+
+Definition. A "b*-Memory" is a ®-Memory in which the order of the 
+sentences in the ajth Ti" has the meaning of 'I have actually been doing Aa. 
+
+
+assigned to it. The order is the indication that A,. has actually been used; it 
+i 
+is the ajth M*-assertion. '! have actually been doing A,.' is merely an English 
+i 
+
+
+translation, and does not appear in the ®*- Memory. 
+
+Conclusion 7. Given a $*-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not 
+only will there be a gap in the awareness of when what events occurred; it 
+will be forgotten which method has actually been used. 
+
+This conclusion points toward a study in which deformations of the 
+memory language are related to deformations of general consciousness. 
+
+Definition. A "*-Reflection," or reflection in the present of a 
+@*-Memory, is a collection of assertions about the future, derived from a 
+
+
+&*-Memory, as follows. 1. There are the sentences 'Event; will occur in the 
+
+
+109 
+
+
+interval of time which is xxi long, and begins at twice the present time 
+
+
+AF, minus Xj AF; and which is y; long and begins zj from now'. If event; was 
+a 3-inch move toward the destination in the ®*-Memory, the sentence in the 
+®*-Reflection says that a 3-inch move will be made in the future temporal 
+interval. 2. The ajth permutation of the sentences defined in (1) is an 
+
+
+assertion which has the meaning of 'I will do A,.'; and the organism can 
+i 
+think precisely one permutation at a time. The A,_, Xj Vir Bye and the rest are 
+. . - I . . . 
+defined as before (so that in particular the permutations can be indexed with 
+the aj). 
+
+Conclusion 8. Given that the @*-Memory's temporal! intervals x54, xj! 
+are reflected as I2N-x;, 2N-x; 41, the reflection preserves the intervals' 
+absolute distances from the present. Proof: The least distance of X74, xj 
+from N is N-x;; the greatest distance is N-Xi 4. Adding the least distance, and 
+then the greatest distance, to N, gives I2N-x;, 2N-xj 41. 
+
+I will end with two problems. If a ©*-Memory exists, under what 
+conditions will a ®*-Reflection be a precognition? Under what conditions 
+will every assertion be prescience or foreknowledge? By a "precognition" I 
+don't mean a prediction about the future implied by deterministic laws; I 
+mean a direct "memory" of the future unconnected with general principles. 
+
+Finally, what would a precognitive ®*-Reflection be like as a mental 
+experience? What present or ongoing awareness would accompany a 
+precognitive ®*-Reflection? 
+
+
+110 
+
+
+THE NEW MODALITY 
+
+
+SE eS 
+ESE BORO A SILGS 
+Sie DLS 
+
+Baie es 
+
+
+) 
+: 
+: 
+: 
+; 
+
+
+11. Representation of the Memory of an Energy Cube Organism 
+1966 VERSION 
+
+
+The energy cube organism is a conscious organism which is nothing but 
+energy confined to a cubical space. It rests on a rectangular energy slab, in a 
+stationary, colorless liquid, separated from the slab by a thin film of liquid. 
+It has been on the slab for an indefinitely long time. There are in fact two 
+infinite bodies of the liquid, alternating with two infinite empty spaces; the 
+four volumes are outlined by two intersecting planes which just miss being 
+perpendicular. The slab is poised, at a slant, on the faces of the upper body 
+of liquid, near where they meet. There are no other objects in the bodies of 
+liquid. The slab, liquid, and spaces are the energy cube organism's entire 
+cosmology. (See the illustration.) 
+
+
+Pay 
+'€ 
+= 
+£ 
+GS 
+= 
+£ 
+Pag 
+® 
+Oe aa eae 
+Sek Vn a ee a a , of 
+\ / : 
+liquid / 
+\ / Lo 
+/ 
+vee: fof} ae 
+\y oy 'i \/ empty space 
+yy 
+empty space /\ / 
+voy \ 
+/ / 
+
+; . i \ 
+/ aa / \ 
+liquid 
+/ Be eee ee 
+i -7~ ae 
+
+te pe 
+
+
+Ajluljul 02 spuarxa 
+
+
+ILLUSTRATION 
+
+
+113 
+
+
+The energy cube organism can continuously change position, 
+continuously and instantly moving the liquid from its path into its wake so 
+as to make no current in the liquid. For almost as long as it has been on the 
+slab, the organism has devoted itself to crossing the slab, from the slab's edge 
+on one face of the liquid to its edge on the other. 
+
+The energy cube organism has a conscious memory (by which I mean 
+strictly a memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of 
+its existence). The memory consists of symbols which are given "meaning" 
+by their extra-linguistic mental! associations--in human terms, it consists of 
+language. The complete memory contains tens of thousands of partial 
+memories, which the organism can only have one at a time. Going through 
+the partials--which it does as if they were the phonemes of one long 
+word--constitutes its one complete memory. Each partial is a memory of the 
+difference in the organism's minimum distances from the destination edge, at 
+the beginning, and at the end, of some interval of time. Call the difference its 
+"progress." The total of time intervals in all the partials completely covers 
+the interval from the earliest remembered event to the most recent 
+remembered event. As time passes, more partials are added to the complete 
+memory. The production of partial memories is an involuntary process of 
+the organism. 
+
+The memory is temporally dual. The interval for each partial is an 
+interval of fixed time, defined by its duration, and the distance from the 
+fixed time when the energy cube organism appeared on the slab up to the 
+interval's end. But it is also a sliding interval, defined by its duration, and a 
+constant distance from the present instant back to the interval's end. When 
+partials are added to the memory, each of the former intervals exactly covers 
+the tire not already covered, up to the absolute time when the partial is 
+added. But the latter intervals, while they never overlap, can have gaps 
+between them. The intervals generally are of different durations. The energy 
+cube organism lacks any independent extra-linguistic memory, any mental 
+reliving of the past, which could conflict with the dual temporal memory. 
+There is no form to the past other than that of the memory's language. (See 
+the graph.) 
+
+The order of the partials in the complete memory is a linguistic 
+phenomenon which indicates the method the organism has been using to 
+move itself--and thus the order (with its extra-linguistic associations) is the 
+memory of the method. A single method" is everything to be done by the 
+energy cube organism to move itself, throughout the entire time it takes to 
+reach the destination edge. There are different possible methods, and each 
+could get the organism across; but the methods cannot be combined in any 
+way. Every order of all partials signifies a different possible method. These 
+
+
+114 
+
+
+ao) 
+14 
+2 
+oS 
+- 
+— 
+c 
+
+Qa 
+£ 
+2 
+£ 
+= 
+- 
+© 
+@ 
+£ 
+- 
+@ 
+2 
+2 
+° 
+nn 
+O 
+o 
+
+
+a 
+®D 
+ao) 
+oo 
+ros) 
+_ 
+2 
+© 
+> 
+< 
+@ 
+~ 
+= 
+nn 
+a] 
+£ 
+rw) 
+
+
+used to show intervals, 1st temporal memory omenrasmemiia 
+used to show "intervals," 2nd temporal memory ............ 
+used to show tracks of "intervals," 2nd memory 
+
+usedtoshowrelationships eae ae 
+
+
+4th partial 
+
+
+I 
+I 
+
+
+I 
+
+3rd partial 
+, 2nd partial 
+: : 
+
+I I 
+I I 
+
+
+n 
+l i 
+I 
+I I 
+
+
+absolute times, covered by intervals 
+{absolute times covered by) intervals, 
+Ist temporal memory 
+
+
+GRAPH showing a possible relationship 
+in the dual temporal memory 
+
+
+115 
+
+
+possible methods are in no special order. When a partial is added to the 
+memory, the number of possible methods is increased by a factor equal to 
+the new number of partials. 
+
+
+Now the complete memory is obtained by going through the partials--in 
+any order! Any order gives the memory. This feature, which can be 
+precisely characterized in terms of the memory language, is perhaps the most 
+remarkable feature of the whole cosmology. An approach to this feature in 
+human terms is to say that when the organism goes through the partials, (it 
+dreams that) it has been using the method indicated--and is presently using 
+it. It (does not remember the dream, and) does not remember going through 
+the partials. It has no other memory of which method it has been using. 
+
+The organism moves itself by mental exertion, teleports itself. The 
+"possible methods" are mental routines. These routines draw on the 
+following standard mental resources. The organism can assume at will many 
+"mental states." By 'mental state' I refer to a mental "stage" or "space" or 
+"mood" in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried 
+on. Some human mental states are general euphoria, stupor, general anxiety, 
+dreaming, dizziness, empathy with another person, and clearheadedness, the 
+normal state in which work is performed. These states are not defined by 
+specific imagings, but are "spaces" in which imaging is carried on. The 
+organism changes its state by changing from one form of energy to another, 
+gravity, magnetism, electric energy, radiated heat, or light. In these states, 
+the organism has an unlimited capacity to image; in human terms, to 
+visualize. There are visualized regions of colored liquids. Call them "fluid 
+colors." There are visualized glowing surfaces, and there are black regions or 
+"holes." There are visualized "covers," "lattices," and "shells," which are all 
+formed from transparent planes, spherical surfaces and the like. Call them 
+"orojected surfaces." The fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. There are 
+"channels," which are strung-out series of fluid colors. There are 
+"reservoirs," which are clusters of fluid colors. A channel can be closed or 
+Open. Two channels can cross each other. There are pairs of channels such 
+that earlier members of each channel flow into later members of the 
+other--calied "screw-connected" channels. Fluid colors often occur on or 
+within projected surfaces. Projected surfaces can be growing or held. A 
+visualization can be at the forefront of attention, or in the back of the mind. 
+That is, states have depth, and visualizations can be at different depths. The 
+state as a whole can be "frozen" or "melted." A human approach is to say 
+that a "frozen" state is set or fixed; while a "melted" state is fluid--the state 
+itself flows. A state can be projected into "superstate," gaining an abnormal 
+amount of mental! energy and becoming superdizziness or superanxiety, for 
+instance. 
+
+
+116 
+
+
+Most interesting, states in different possible methods can have contact 
+with each other. A human approach is to say that dreams are so flexible that 
+the organism can dream that an actual! state is/was in contact with a state in 
+a possible method. One sort of cross-method contact is for states to be 
+'Snterfrozen" --more easily frozen because they are somehow mixed. They 
+can also be "intermelted." 
+
+I will describe a method, as the organism would be conscious of it in 
+remembering. For concreteness, I will refer to the different states with the 
+names of human states rather than with letters. Channels are generated in a 
+frozen stupor, and become fixed at the forefront of attention of euphoria 
+intermelted with a possible state. The screw-crossed channels erode crevices 
+in a held lattice, which breaks into growing sheets (a variety of covers). The 
+sheets are stacked, and held in a frozen dream thawed at intervals for 
+reshuffling of the stack. The dream becomes melted, and proceeds in a 
+trajectory which shears, and closes, open channels. If no violation of the 
+channels cross-mars the melt, the stack meshes with the sharp-open channels. 
+The dream becomes interfrozen, and mixed clear-headed states compress the 
+closed channels which were not fixed at the dream's surface. A fused 
+exterior double-flash (a certain maximally 'glowing surface") is 
+expand-enveloped by euphoria, which becomes dizziness; and oblique 
+lattices are projected from the paralinear deviation of guided open channels 
+in it. Growing shells are dreamed into violet sound-slices (certain synesthetic 
+"fluid colors') by the needed jumped drag (a generic state}, a crossfrozen 
+dream. Channels in a growing anxiety enspiral concentric shells having 
+intermixed reservoirs between them, during cyclic intersection of the anxiety 
+in superstate. And on and on. Time is here the time it takes to carry out the 
+successive steps of the routine. 
+
+The energy cube organism language, the symbols constituting the 
+partials, are themselves mental entities. A partial is a rectangular plane 
+glowing surface, which has two stationary plane reservoirs on it, and has a 
+triangular hole in it. As a mental entity, in other words, a partial is a 
+visualization like those which are part of the methods. The perimeter of the 
+triangular hole equals the organism's progress in the corresponding time 
+interval. Absence of the hole indicates zero progress. 
+
+The fluid colors in each of the reservoirs on each partial memory are 
+primary colors, and are mixed together. Speaking as accurately as possible in 
+human terms, in each reservoir there is precisely one point of "maximum 
+mixture" of the primary colors. The primary colors are mentally mixed in 
+any way until the right amount of mixture is reached. There is a scale of 
+measurement for amounts of mixture of the colors. There is a scale for 
+vertical distances on the surface--for how far one point is below another. The 
+
+
+difference in amounts of mixture at the two points of maximum mixture 
+corresponds to the lengti; of the first temporal interval; and the difference 
+between the>maximum possible amount of mixture and the lesser of the two 
+amounts of maximum mixture on the surface corresponds to the distance 
+from the fixed beginning time to the interval's and. The vertical distance 
+between the two points of maximum mixture corresponds to the length of 
+the second temporal interval; and the vertical distance from the middle of 
+the surface to the point nearer it corresponds to the constant distance from 
+the present instant back to the interval's enc. The middle of the surface 
+represents the present, and the upper half represents the future; the 
+reservoirs are all in the lower half. For each partial it is necessary to 
+determine (1) the number of units of duration per unit difference in 
+amounts of mixture; and (2) the number of units of duration per unit 
+difference in vertical distances. The average glow per unit area of each 
+glowing surface (excepting the hole) is correlated with a pair of numbers 
+constituting this information. 
+
+Finally, turning all the partial memories upside down--and reflecting the 
+first temporal memory in the present instant, so that the intervals' absolute 
+distances from the present are preserved--gives the precognition of the 
+organism's future course of action, tells what progress will be made when 
+and by which method. 
+
+
+The Representation 
+
+This essay accompanies a representation of the energy cube organism's 
+memory--hence its title. The way to picture the memory, naturally, is to 
+make something that looks like the partials. I have represented the partials 
+by rectangular sheets of paper of different translucencies with mixtures of 
+inks of primary colors on them and holes cut in them; together in an 
+envelope, which bears the injunction not to have more than one sheet out at 
+a time. Three of the tens of thousands of partials are represented. 
+
+
+118 
+
+
+ORIGINAL 1961 VERSION 
+
+
+Foreward 
+
+I have refrained from editing the Original Version except where 
+absolutely necessary. It is full of inconsistencies and inadequate 
+explanations, but I have flagged only two major ones, by placing them 
+between the signs X and lX Part of the fourth paragraph is flagged because a 
+sequence of units is not analogous to a sequence of inflected words; it is 
+rather more like permutations of letters which form words ('rat', 'tar', 'art'). 
+Most of the seventh paragraph is flagged because I promise to define intervals 
+by their lengths and ends, but instead give their beginnings and ends. 
+
+In the fourth paragraph, there are two different versions of the 
+correspondence between possible methods and sequences of units, and of 
+why any sequence is acceptable. Passages belonging exclusively to the 
+"multiplex" version are set off by the sign #. Passages which belong 
+exclusively to the "style" version and which should be deleted if the 
+"multiplex" version is used are placed between slashes. The "style" version is 
+the main version. In the fifth paragraph, a notion appears which is 
+interesting, but unconvincingly explained. It is not clear whether this notion 
+relates only to the "multiplex" version, or whether it would relate to the 
+"style" version if the word 'multiplex' were omitted. The passages suggesting 
+this notion are placed in brackets. 
+
+
+1. Energy cube organisms are conscious organisms which are cubical 
+spaces containing only energy. The particular energy cube organism of 
+concern here has, for an indefinitely long time, been in a body of liquid, 
+"resting on' a rectangular energy slab also in the body of liquid; the 
+organism's "bottom" face is separated from the slab by only a very thin film 
+of the liquid. The "universe" the organism and slab are in is made up of four 
+infinite triangular right prisms, prismatic spaces, as defined geometrically by 
+two intersecting planes almost perpendicular to each other. The prismatic 
+spaces defined by the vertical obtuse dihedral angles are empty. The other 
+spaces, defined by the vertical acute dihedral! angles, are infinite bodies of a 
+stationary, colorless lfiquid--the "upper" body of liquid being what the 
+organism and slab are in. The two opposite shorter edges of the slab are at 
+the faces of the body of liquid, the planes, near their intersection; the slab is 
+"slanted," so that the edges are at slightly different distances from the line 
+of intersection. The organism and slab are the only "objects" in the bodies 
+of liquid. (See the illustration.) The organism can move (the energy cube can 
+
+
+119 
+
+
+continuously change position) without creating currents in the liquid. For 
+almost as 'ong as it has been in the liquid, the organism has devoted all its 
+"intelligence," all its "energies," to moving across the slab, from one of the 
+shorter edges to (any point on) the other. 
+
+Z The organism's conscious, distinct memory is entirely concerned 
+with, is entirely cf, its efforts to cross the slab. (1 am using 'memory' 
+narrowly to refer to an organism's memory of its past. I am counting its 
+"general information," for example Knowing a language, not as part of its 
+memory but as imagings not memories. Thinking the sequence 1, 2, 1, 2 is 
+not in itself remembering.) The total memory consists of a large number of 
+units (tens of thousands), of which the organism can be attentive to precisely 
+one at a time. 'Total recall," the total memory, involves considering, having, 
+all units in any succession, which the organism can do very rapidly. Now 
+from one point of view, the memory consists of its content; from another, it 
+consists of symbols, just as human memories often consist of language. In 
+describing the memory, I will go from considering primarily the content, 
+what the memory is of; to considering the specific character of the units, 
+specific symbolism used in the memory, and specific content. Each unit is 
+first a memory of the amount of progress made toward the destination edge 
+in a particular interval of time. The amount of progress is the difference 
+between the minimum distance of the organism from the destination edge at 
+the beginning of the interval, and the minimum distance at the end of the 
+interval. The total of intervals, in the total of units, cover the "absolute" 
+interval of time from the earliest to the most recent remembered event; as 
+time passes, more units are added to the memory. 
+
+3. Now the memory is temporally dual: the interval of time for each 
+unit is first, an interval of 'absolute' time; defined by its duration, and the 
+"absolute" time of its end (stated with respect to an "absolute event" such 
+as the appearance of the organism on the slab); and secondly, an interval 
+defined by its duration, and how far from the present instant its end is. It is 
+like remembering that so much progress was made during one year which 
+ended at January 1, 1000 A.D.; as well as remembering that it was made 
+during one year which ended 1,000 years ago. In the second temporal 
+memory, the absolute time of the end of the interval to which the progress is 
+assigned changes according as the absolute time of the present instant 
+changes. For example, it is like remembering "that so much progress was 
+made during one year ending 1,000 years ago," and, 100 years later, 
+remembering--'that so much progress was made during one year ending 
+1,000 years ago"; and in general, always remembering "that so much 
+progress was made during one year ending 1,000 years ago.' Both temporal 
+memories are in their own ways "natural," the first being anchored at an 
+
+
+120 
+
+
+"absolute beginning," the second at the present instant. When a unit is added 
+to the memory, the interval of time of the first temporal memory is added at 
+the end, exactly covers the time not already covered, up to the absolute time 
+when the unit is added; so that the total of intervals of the first temporal 
+memory exactly cover, without overlap, the absolute total time. In contrast, 
+although the intervals of the second temporal memory do not overlap at any 
+time, there can be gaps between them; so that when a unit is added to the 
+memory, the interval for the second temporal memory may be placed 
+between existing intervals and not have to cover an absolute time which they 
+have left behind, that is, not have to be placed farther back than all of them. 
+Intervals of both temporal memories are of different sizes, a "natural 
+complexity." (See the graph.) Incidentally, the condition for coincidence of 
+the two temporal intervals of a unit is: if the two intervals are of the same 
+duration, they will coincide at the absolute time which is the sum of the 
+absolute time of the end of the first interval, and the distance from the 
+present instant of the end of the second interval. The two temporal 
+memories complement each other; aside from this comment I will not be 
+concerned to "explain" the duality with respect to when the amounts of 
+progress were made, whether when they were "really" made stayed the same 
+and changed, or whether the memory is inconsistent about it, or what. 
+
+4. I will now turn to the aspect of the memory concerned with the 
+method the organism has used to move itself. # Methodologically, the 
+memory is a multiplex symbol.# A "single method" is everything to be done 
+by the organism, to move itself, throughout the total time it takes to reach 
+the destination edge; so that the organism could not use two different 
+"single methods," must, after it chooses its method, continue with it alone 
+throughout. The organism has available different (single) methods, has 
+different methods it could try. The different sequences, of all units, are 
+assigned to the different (single) methods available to the organism to signify 
+them; are symbols for them. (Thus, the number of available methods 
+increases as units are added to the memory.) /Now ail this only approximates 
+what is the case, because contrary to what I may have implied, which 
+method is used is not a matter of "fact" as are the temporal intervals and 
+amounts of progress. As I have said, having all units in any succession 
+constitutes the total memory, total recall ('factually")--different sequences 
+of all units are each the total memory, total recall, << but, as language, the 
+total memory in different styles (like words in different orders in a highly 
+inflected language); and the matter of method (which might better be said to 
+be "manner") corresponds to the matter of style, rather than factual 
+content, of language. Different styles exclude each other, but not what is 
+said in each other's being true. Thus it is that the number of available 
+
+
+121 
+
+
+methods can increase; and that any sequence of all units can constitute the 
+total memory, total recall ("factually"), although different sequences signify 
+different methods used./ #As an indicator of the method used, the whole 
+memory is a multiplex symbol. Names for each of the methods are combined 
+in a single symbol, the totality of units. In remembering, the organism 
+separates any single name by going through ail the units in succession, and 
+that name is the complete reading of the multiplex symbol, the complete 
+information about the method used. I will not be concerned to "explain" 
+the matter of the increasing number of available methods; or the matter of 
+any sequence of all units' constituting the complete reading, the total 
+memory, total recall, but different sequences' signifying different methods 
+used.# 
+
+5. I will give just an indication of what the available methods [and 
+their relations through the multiplex memory] are like. Throughout this 
+description, there has been the difficulty that English lacks a vocabulary 
+appropriate for describing the "universe" I am concerned with, but the 
+difficulty is particularly great here, in the case of the methods [and their 
+relations through the multiplex memory]; so that I will just have to 
+approximate a vocabulary with present English as best as I can. The 
+methods, instruments of autokinesis, are all mental, teleportation, resu!t in 
+teleportation. The "consciousnesses" available to the organism to be 
+combined into methods are infinitely many. It has available many states of 
+mind (as humans have non-consciousness, autohypnotic trance, dizziness, 
+dreaming, clear-headed calculation, and so forth), corresponding to different 
+forms its energy can assume. To give this description more content I will 
+differentiate its states of mind by referring to them with the names of the 
+human states of mind (rather than just with letters). It has available an 
+indefinite variety of contents, as humans have particular imagings, in its 
+conscious states of mind. I will outline the principal contents. There are 
+"visualized" fluid regions of color (like colored liquids), first-order contents. 
+There are 'visualized' radient surfaces, and non-radient surfaces or regions 
+("holes"}, the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are 
+"projective" constructs of imaged geometric surfaces, "covers," "lattices," 
+and "shells." Fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. They can occur in 
+certain series, "channels"; and in certain arrays, "reservoirs." A channel can 
+be "closed" or "open"; two channels can be "crossed," or 
+"screw-connected" (earlier members of each channel flowing into later 
+members of the other). First-order contents (fluid colors) often occur on or 
+within second-order ones (projective surfaces). Second-order contents can be 
+"held" or "growing." States of mind have depth, 'deeper' being 'farther from 
+the forefront of attention'; and contents can be at different depths. A state 
+
+
+122 
+
+
+of mind as a unity can be "frozen," which is more than just unchanging (in 
+particular having its contents stationary or held). It can be projected into 
+"superstate," remaining a state of mind but being superenergized. [Most 
+interesting, states of mind, in different methods signified by different 
+symbols combined in the multiplex methodological memory, can have 
+contact with each other, for example be "interfrozen."I] A partial description 
+of a method will give an idea of the complexity of the methods. Channels are 
+generated by a frozen non-conscious state, and become fixed in the surface 
+layer of an [inter] melted trance. The screw-crossed channels erode crevices 
+in a held shell, which breaks into growing sheets (certain covers). The sheets 
+are stacked, and held in a frozen dream thawed at intervals for reshuffling. 
+The dream becomes melted, and proceeds in a trajectory which shears, and 
+closes, open channels. If no violation of the channels cross-mars the melt, the 
+stack meshes with the sharp-open channels. The dream becomes [inter] 
+frozen, and mixed calculation states compress the closed channels which 
+were not surface-fixed in it. A fused exterior double-flash {a certain 
+maximally radient surface) is expand-enveloped by a trance, which becomes 
+dizziness; and oblique lattices are projected from the paralinear deviation of 
+guided open channels in it. Growing shells are dreamed into violet 
+sound-slices (certain fluid colors) by the needed jumped drag (a certain 
+consciousness), a [cross] frozen dream. Channels in a growing trance enspiral 
+concentric shells having intermixed reservoirs between them, during cyclic 
+intersection of the trance in superstate. I will not say more about the 
+available methods, because in a sense the memory does not: a sequence of 
+units is a marker arbitrarily assigned to a method to signify it, like an 
+arbitrary letter, say 'q', assigned to a certain table to signify it; it no more 
+gives characteristics of the method than 'q' does of the table. In fact, the 
+available methods and sequences do not have any particular order; one 
+cannot speak of the "first" method, the "second," or the like. 
+
+
+6. I will now concentrate on the character of the memory as a mental 
+entity, and the rest of the symbolism used in it and specific content. A unit 
+is a rectangular plane ("visualized") radient surface (! --the terminology is 
+that introduced in the last paragraph), which has two stationary plane 
+reservoirs {! ) on it, and has a triangular hole (! ) in it. The triangular hole is 
+a simple symboi not yet explained: its perimeter equals the amount of the 
+organism's progress, the difference in its minimum distances from the 
+destination edge, in the interval the unit is concerned with. Absence of the 
+hole indicates zero perimeter and no progress. 
+
+7. As for the symbols for the temporal interval. The colors in each of 
+the two reservoirs on each unit are primary, and are mixed together. 
+Speaking as accurately as possible in English, in each reservoir there is 
+
+
+123 
+
+
+precisely one point of "maximum mixture' of the primary colors. (The rest 
+of the reservoirs are not significant: the primary colors are mentally mixed in 
+any way to get the right amount of mixture, as pigments are mixed on a 
+palette.) X_ For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a 
+scale of amounts of color mixture. For the second memory, the points are 
+two points on a scale of vertical distances from the imaginary horizontal! line 
+which bisects the rectangular surface, divides it into lower and upper halves. 
+The units are marked in their lower halves only; because for the second 
+memory the imaginary dividing line represents the present instant, distances 
+below it represent distances into the past, and distances above it distances 
+into the future (lower and upper edges representing equal distances from the 
+present). Now a scale is required so that it can be told what temporal 
+intervals the interval on the amount of mixture scale and the interval on the 
+distance scale represent. The parts of the scale which may vary from unit to 
+unit and have to be specified in each unit are the "absolute" time 
+corresponding to the maximum possible color mixture, the number of units 
+of absolute duration per unit difference in amounts of mixture, and the 
+number of units of absolute duration per unit difference in distances from 
+the imaginary dividing line. The markers arbitrarily assigned to the triples of 
+information giving these parts of the scale are average radiences per unit 
+areas of the units (excepting the holes). —X 
+
+8. A final aspect of interest. Not too surprisingly, the transformation 
+which is inverting all units gives, if one considers not the first temporal 
+memory but its reflection in the present instant, the organism's precognized 
+course of action in the future, specifically, what progress will be made when. 
+
+
+The Representation 
+
+With this background, it is not surprising that the method of 
+representation I have chosen is visual representation of the units, the 
+"visualizations." Units are represented by rectangular sheets of paper of 
+different translucencies with mixtures of inks of primary colors on them and 
+holes cut in them, together in an envelope. Only one sheet should be out of 
+the envelope at a time. A sheet should be viewed while placed before a white 
+light in front of a black background, so that the light illuminates the whole 
+sheet as evenly as possible without being seen through the hole, only the 
+black being seen at the hole. The ultimate in fidelity would be to learn to 
+visualize these sheets as they look when viewed properly; then one could 
+have the memory as nearly as possible as the organism does. I have 
+represented eleven of the tens of thousands of units in the total memory. 
+
+
+Concept Art 
+Copyright 1961 by Henry A.Flynt, Jr. 
+
+
+Concept art is first of all an art of which the material is concepts, as the 
+material of e.g. music is sound. Since concepts are closely bound up with 
+language, concept art is a kind of art of which the material is language. That 
+is, unlike e.g. a work of music, in which the music proper (as opposed to 
+notation, analysis, etc.) is just sound, concept art proper will involve 
+language. From the philosophy of language, we learn that a concept may as 
+well be thought of as the intension of a name; this is the relation between 
+concepts and language.* The notion of a concept is a vestige of the notion of 
+a platonic form (the thing which e.g. all tables have in common: tableness), 
+which notion is replaced by the notion of a name objectively, metaphysically 
+related to its intension (so that all tables now have in common their 
+objective relation to table). Now the claim that there can be an objective 
+relation between a name and its intension is wrong, and (the word) concept, 
+as commonly used now, can be discredited (see my book, Philosophy 
+Proper). If, however, it is enough for one that there be a subjective relation 
+between a name and its intension, namely the unhesitant decision as to the 
+way one wants to use the name, the unhesitant decisions to affirm the names 
+of some things but not others, then concept is valid language, and concept 
+art has a philosophically valid basis. 
+
+Now what is artistic, aesthetic, about a work which is a body of 
+concepts? This question can best be answered by telling where concept art 
+came from; I developed it in an attempt to straighten out certain traditional 
+activities generally regarded as aesthetic. The first of these is structure art, 
+music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is "structure." My 
+definitive discussion of structure art is in my unpublished essay Structure 
+Art and Pure Mathematics; here I will just summarize that discussion. Much 
+structure art is a vestige of the time when e.g. music was believed to be 
+knowledge, a science, which had important things to say in astronomy etc. 
+Contemporary structure artists, on the other hand, tend to claim the kind of 
+cognitive value for their art that conventional contemporary mathematicians 
+
+
+* The extension of the word 'table' is all existing tables; the intension of 
+'table' is all possible instances of a table. 
+
+
+125 
+
+
+claim for mathematics. Modern examples of structure art are the fugue and 
+total serial music. These examples illustrate the important division of 
+structure art into two kinds according to how the structure is appreciated. In 
+the case of a fugue, one is aware of its structure in listening to it; one 
+imposes relationships, a categorization (hopefully that intended by the 
+composer)on the sounds while listening to them, that is, has an (associated) 
+artistic structure experience. In the case of total serial music, the structure is 
+such that this cannot be done; one just has to read an analysis of the 
+music, definition of the relationships. Now there are two things wrong with 
+structure art. First, its cognitive pretensions are utterly wrong. Secondly, by 
+trying to be music or whatever (which has nothing to do with knowledge), 
+and knowledge represented by structure, structure art both fails, is 
+completely boring, as music, and doesn't begin to explore the aesthetic 
+possibilities structure can have when freed from trying to be music or 
+whatever.The first step in straightening out e.g. structure music is to stop 
+calling it music, and start saying that the sound is used only to carry the 
+structure and that the real point is the structure--and then you will see how 
+limited, impoverished, the structure is. Incidentally, anyone who says that 
+works of structure music do occasionally have musical value just doesn't 
+know how good real music (the Goli Dance of the Baoule; Cans on Windows 
+by La Monte Young; the contemporary American hit song Sweets for My 
+Sweets, by the Drifters) can get. When you make the change, then since 
+structures are concepts, you have concept art. Incidentally, there is another, 
+less important kind of art which when straightened out becomes concept art: 
+art involving play with the concepts of the art such as, in music, the score, 
+performer-vs. listener, playing a work. The second criticism of structure art 
+applies, with the necessary changes, to this art. 
+
+The second main antecedent of structure art is mathematics. This is the 
+result of my revolution in mathematics, presented in my 1966 Mathematical 
+Studies; here I will only summarize. The revolution occured first because for 
+reasons of taste I wanted to deemphasize discovery in mathematics, 
+mathematics as discovering theorems and proofs. I wasn't good at such 
+discovery, and it bored me. The first way I thought of to de-emphasize 
+discovery came not later than Summer, 1960; it was that since the value of 
+pure mathematics is now regarded as aesthetic rather than cognitive, why not 
+try to make up aesthetic theorems, without considering whether they are 
+true. The second way, which came at about the same time, was to find, as a 
+philosopher, that the conventional claim that theorems and proofs are 
+discovered is wrong, for the same reason I have already given that 'concept' 
+can be discredited. The third way, which came in the fall-winter of 1960, 
+was to work in unexplored regions of formalist mathematics. The resulting 
+
+
+126 
+
+
+mathematics still had statements, theorems, proofs, but the latter weren't 
+discovered in the way they traditionally were. Now exploration of the wider 
+possibilities of mathematics as revolutionized by me tends to lead beyond 
+what it makes sense to call mathematics; the category of mathematics, a 
+vestige of Platonism, is an unnatural, bad one. My work in mathematics leads 
+to the new category of concept art, of which straightened out traditional 
+mathematics (mathematics as discovery) is an untypical, smal! but 
+intensively developed part. 
+
+I can now return to the question of why concept art is art. Why isn't it an 
+absolutely new, or at least a non-artistic, non-aesthetic activity? The answer 
+is that the antecedents of concept art are commonly regarded as artistic, 
+aesthetic activities; on a deeper level, interesting concepts, concepts 
+enjoyable in themselves, especially as they occur in mathematics, are 
+commonly said to have beauty. By calling my activity art, therefore, I am 
+simply recognizing this common usage, and the origin of the activity in 
+structure art and mathematics. However: it is confusing to call things as 
+irrelevant as the emotional enjoyment of (rea!) music, and the intellectual 
+enjoyment of concepts, the same kind of enjoyment. Since concept art 
+includes almost everything ever said to be music, at least, which is not music 
+for the emotions, perhaps it would be better to restrict art to apply to art for 
+the emotions, and recognize my activity as an independent, new activity, 
+irrelevant to art (and knowledge). 
+
+
+Concept Art Version of Mathematics System 3/26/61 (6/19/61) 
+
+An element is the adjacent area (with the figure in it) so long as the 
+apparent, perceived, ratio of the length of the vertical line to that of the 
+horizontal line (the element's associated ratio) does not change. 
+
+A selection sequence is a sequence of elements of which the first is the one 
+having the greatest associated ratio, and each of the others has the associated 
+ratio next smaller than that of the preceding one. (To decrease the ratio, 
+come to see the vertical line as shorter, relative to the horizontal line, one 
+might try measuring the lines with a ruler to convince oneself that the 
+vertical one is not longer than the other, and then trying to see the lines as 
+equal in length; constructing similar figures with a variety of real (measured) 
+ratios and practicing judging these ratios; and so forth.) 
+
+[Observe that the order of elements in a selection sequence may not be the 
+order in which one sees them. ] 
+
+
+127 
+
+
+Implications--Concept Art Version of Colored Sheet Music No.1 3/14/61 
+(10/11/61) 
+
+[This is a mathematical system without general concepts of statement, 
+implication, axiom, and proof. Instead, you make the object, and stipulate 
+by ostension that it is an axiom, theorem, or whatever. My thesis is that 
+since there is no objective relation between name and intension, all 
+mathematics is this arbitrary. Originally, the successive statements, or sheets, 
+were to be played on an optical audiorecorder. I 
+
+The axiom: a sheet of cheap, thin white typewriter paper 
+
+The axiom implies statement 2: soak the axiom in inflammable liquid which 
+does not leave solid residue when burned; then burn it on horizontal 
+rectangular white fireproof surface--statement 2 is ashes (on surface) 
+Statement 2 implies s.3: make black and white photograph of s.2 in white 
+light (image of ashes' rectangle with respect to white surface (that is, of the 
+region (of surface, with the ashes on it) with bounding edges parallel to the 
+edges of the surface and intersecting the four points in the ashes nearest the 
+four edges of the surface) must exactly cover the film); develop film-- s. 3 is 
+the negative 
+
+$.2 and s.3 imply s.4: melt s.3 and cool in mold to form plastic doubly 
+convex lens with small curvature; take color photograph of ashes' rectangle 
+in yellow light using this lens; develop film-- s. 4 is color negative 
+
+$.2 and s.4 imply s.5: repeat last step with s.4 (instead of 3), using red 
+light-- s. 5 is second color negative 
+
+S.2 and s.5 imply s.6: repeat last step with s.5, using blue light-- s. 6 is third 
+color negative 
+
+$.2 and s.6 imply s.7: make lens from s.6 mixed with the ashes which have 
+been being photographed; make black and white photograph, in white fight, 
+of that part of the white surface where the ashes' rectangle was; develop film 
+
+
+128 
+
+
+- s.7 is second black and white negative 
+
+S.2, s.6, and s.7 imply the theorem: melt, mold, and cool lens used in last 
+step to form negative, and make lens from s.7; using negative and lens in an 
+enlarger, make two prints, an enlargement and a reduction--enlargement and 
+reduction together constitute the theorem. 
+
+
+Concept Art: Innpersegs (May - July 1961) 
+
+A "halpoint" iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo 
+which appears to surround a small bright light when one looks at it through 
+glasses fogged by having been breathed on, for as long as the point is in the 
+
+
+halo. 
+An "init'point" iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo. 
+
+
+An "inn'perseq" iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the 
+halpoints are on one (initial) radius of a halo; the members of the first 
+sequence are initpoints; for each of the other sequences, the first member (a 
+consequent) is got from the non-first members of the preceding sequence 
+{the antecedents) by being the inner endpoint of the radial segment in the 
+vague outer ring when they are on the segment, and the other members (if 
+any) are initpoints or first members of preceding sequences; all first members 
+of sequences other than the last [two] appear as non-first members, and 
+halpoints appear only once as non-first members; and the last sequence has 
+one member. 
+
+
+Indeterminacy 
+
+A ftotaliy determinate innperseq' iff an innperseq: in which one is aware of 
+(specifies) all halpoints. 
+
+An fantecedentally indeterminate innperseq' iff an innperseq in which one is 
+aware of (specifies) only each consequent and the radial seqment beyond it. 
+A 'thalpointally indeterminate innperseq' iff an innperseq'in which one is 
+aware of (specifies) only the radial segment in the vague outer ring, and its 
+inner endpoint, as it progresses inward. 
+
+Innpersegs Diagram 
+
+In the diagram, different positions of the vague outer ring at different times 
+are suggested by different shadings. The radia! segment in the vague outer 
+ring moves down the page. The figure is by no means an innperseq, but is 
+supposed to help explain the definition. 
+
+
+129 
+
+
+Successive bands represent the vague outer ring at successive times as it fades in toward the small bright tight. 
+
+
+INNPERSEOQS DIAGRAM ; 
+Halpoints at 
+
+
+! time): ay a9 a3 aq a5 ag a7 b 
+4.49 + p 
+if time: a9 43 aq a5 ag a7 be 
+
+
+a3 — Se 
+
+
+SSS 
+Se 
+
+
+wa 
+
+
+SSS SS 
+
+
+TSO 3 
+V3 
+
+
+KS SS 
+
+
+time3: a4 @5agaz7 DC d 
+
+
+24,45 > d 
+
+
+WSS SSS 
+BWBABWVAAs 
+WIS SAR SRS SSS ORS SS OSS SS SS 
+
+
+A 
+Y 
+
+
+a 
+NY 
+
+
+timeg: ag a7 bede 
+
+
+ag,h ——>e 
+
+
+CR 
+=e 
+iy 
+be 
+i 
+
+
+PaaS 
+
+
+s760%, 
+é ue 
+mone 
+
+
+times: a7bc def 
+
+
+a7,€ oe f 
+
+
+timeg: cdefg 
+
+
+de—>g 
+SO ESOS Pee Oe 
+ROSES EE 
+SQ 
+SSE REARS ES Initpoint a9 a9 aq ae apa 
+SERA ic cama Nae "te Sat a 
+RENEURE SEAEELES 
+SSR RRA 
+ALENRAS QCaRBen 
+WRALECE ACRES 
+AAEALET RANECAN 
+TaN 
+SOR RSS Sei 
+WARERENTE aN lnnperseq 
+SOS eo 
+WR B (43,49, a] 
+WO aes 
+WS N AQ (c,a5,a4) 
+(d,b, ag) 
+(e, C, a7) 
+\\ (f, e, d) 
+x (g)- 
+
+
+small bright light 
+
+
+130 
+
+
+13. Exhibit of a Working Model of a Perception-Dissociator 
+
+
+STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
+
+
+To construct a model of a machine a thousand years before the machine 
+itself is technologically feasible--to model a technological breakthrough a 
+thousand years before it occurs 
+
+
+(Analogies: constructing a model of an atomic power plant in ancient 
+Rome; chess-playing-machine hoaxes of 19th-century Europe as 
+models of computers; Soviet Cosmos Hall at Expo 67 as model 
+of anti-gravity machine) 
+
+To construct the mode! almost entirely from the visitors coming to see it, so 
+
+that each visitor regards the others as the model! 
+
+
+What the hypothetical perception-dissociator will do that is not 
+possible now: 
+
+
+Physically alter the world (relative to you): sound disappears; sights and 
+touches are dissociated; other people unconsciously signal you. 
+Physically, "psychoelectronically" induce conditioned reflexes in your 
+nervous system. Physically break ddwn your sense of time. 
+
+
+[INVITATION] 
+
+
+Because of your interest in technology and science, you are invited to visit 
+EXHIBIT OF AWORKING MODEL OFA 
+PERCEPTION-DISSOCIATOR 
+Sponsored by (legitimate sponsor) Open continuously from (date) 
+to {date) At (lunar colony or space station) 
+
+"The perception-dissociator is a machine which is the product of a 
+technology far superior to that of humans. With it, a conscious organism can 
+drastically transform its psychophysical relation to objects and to other 
+conscious organisms... The exhibit spotlights the technical interest of the 
+perception-dissociator, giving the visitor a working model of the machine 
+which he can use to 'transform' himself." —from the Guidebook 
+
+
+it isn't possible for this exhibit to be open or public, because of the nature of 
+the model. You have been invited in the belief that you will be a cooperative 
+visitor. Come alone. Don't discuss the exhibit at all before you see it; and 
+don't discuss it afterwards except with other ex-visitors. Come prepared to 
+
+
+131 
+
+
+spend several hours without a break. There will be absolutely no risk or 
+danger to you if you follow instructions. 
+
+
+TO THE DIRECTOR 
+
+
+Exhibit requires two adjacent rooms, on moon or other low-gravity 
+location, so that humans can easily jump over each other and fall without 
+being hurt. First room, the anteroom, has "normal" entrance door leading in 
+from "normal" human world. Is filled with chairs or school desks. At far 
+corner from normal door is two-step lock, built in anteroom, connecting 
+rooms. Normai door on hinges leads from anteroom into first step of lock. 
+Sliding panel door leads into second step; and smooth curtain with slit in 
+middle leads into the exhibit hali. Another sliding door leads from lock's 
+first step directly back out to normal human world, bypassing anteroom. 
+Shelf required in first lock to check watches and shoes. 
+
+Exhibit hall large and empty with very high ceiling (Fuller dome? ). I 
+Room must be strongly lighted, so that objects in front of closed eyes will 
+cast highly visible shadows on eyelids. Room's inner surfaces must be 
+sound-absorbing, and moderate noise must be played into room to mask 
+accidental sounds; thus humans will cease to notice sound. Floor must be of 
+hard rubber or other material that will not splinter, and will not be too hard 
+to fall and crawl on. 
+
+Exhibit open continuously for days. Invite people who will seriously 
+try to play along--preferably engineers; and invite many of them, because 
+is better to have many in exhibit. Sample invitation enclosed. Attendants 
+working in shifts must be at two posts throughout. Try to keep surprising 
+features of exhibit secret from those who have not been through it. 
+
+Procedure. Visitor arrives and enters anteroom. Entrance attendant 
+gives him a Guidebook and sends him to sit down and start reading. Then 
+visitor goes to lock. Lock attendant must try hard to see that no more than 
+
+
+normal 
+Entrance 
+
+
+Anteroom 
+
+
+Exhibit Hal! 
+
+
+chairs or 
+chooldesks 
+
+
+: 
+
+
+Exit 
+
+
+@: attendant 
+
+
+132 
+
+
+one visitor is in lock at a time. If lock is empty of visitors, attendant lets 
+entering visitor into first step, checks his watch and shoes, and sends him 
+alone into second step and on to exhibit room. When visitor comes out of 
+exhibit hall for any reason, he must be gotten into first step, and then 
+attendant sends him out the exit. When a visitor comes out, he just goes out 
+and doesn't go back in. 
+
+
+133 
+
+
+EXHIBIT OF A WORKING MODEL OF A PERCEPTION—DISSOCIATOR 
+(CONCEIVED BY HENRY FLYNT) 
+
+
+GUIDEBOOK 
+
+
+READ THIS GUIDEBOOK AS DIRECTED-STRAIGHT THROUGH OR AS 
+OTHERWISE DIRECTED. DON'T LEAF AROUND. 
+
+
+READ PAGES 2-3 BEFORE YOU GO IN TO SEE THE EXHIBIT. 
+
+
+134 
+
+
+Introduction. The perception-dissociator is a machine which is the 
+product of a technology far superior to that of humans. With it, a conscious 
+organism can drastically transform its psychophysical relation to objects and 
+to other conscious organisms. When the organism has transformed itself, 
+sound disappears, time is immeasurable; and the relation between seeing and 
+touching becomes a random one. That is, the organism never knows whether 
+it will be able to touch or fee! what it sees, and never knows whether it will 
+be able to see what it touches or what touches it. The world ceases to be a 
+collection of objects (relative to the physically altered organism). Further, 
+the machine induces a pattern of communication in the organism's nervous 
+system, an involuntary pattern of responses to certain events, to help the 
+organism cope with the invisible tactile phenomena. A dimension is added of 
+involuntarily relating to other organisms as unconscious signalling devices. 
+The transformation induced by the machine is permanent unless the 
+organism subsequently uses the machine to undo it. 
+
+
+The perception-dissociator is not conscious or alive in any human sense. 
+The components of the machine that the user is aware of are: (1) Optical 
+phenomena that are seen--"sights." (2) Solid or massive phenomena that are 
+felt cutaneously--"touches." If the user tries to touch a sight, he may not be 
+able to feel anything there. If he looks for a component that touches him, he 
+may not be able to see it. 
+
+
+(Keep reading) 
+
+
+135 
+
+
+In other words, from the beginning the machine has properties that the 
+entire world comes to have to the transformed organism. 
+
+
+The exhibit spotlights the technical interest of the 
+perception-dissociator, giving the visitor a working model of the machine 
+which he can use to "transform" himself. Nothing is said about the purpose 
+of the perception-dissociator in the society that can make one. The model is 
+sophisticated enough that it can run independently of the visitor's will, and 
+can affect him. In fact, the visitor may be hurt if he doesn't follow the 
+instructions for using the machine. 
+
+
+When you have absorbed the above, go to the entrance and be admitted 
+to the exhibit. You must check your shoes, and your watch (if you have 
+one), with the attendant. As you enter, turn this page and begin reading Page 
+4. 
+
+
+136 
+
+
+DO NOT TALK OR MAKE ANY OTHER UNCALLED-FOR NOISE. 
+
+
+Be prepared for the touch of pulling your feet out from under you 
+from behind. Don't resist; just fall forward, break your fali with your arms 
+(and retrieve this Guidebook). The floor is not hard and the gravity is weak, 
+so the fall should leave you absolutely unhurt. 
+
+
+AVOID ALL TOUCHES (EXCEPT FLOOR AND YOUSELF) UNLESS 
+DIRECTED OTHERWISE. (You have been directed not to resist having your 
+feet pulled out from under you.) INEFFECT, IF YOU BUMP INTOASOLID 
+OBJECT OR STEP ON ONE, DRAW BACK. REMEMBER THAT YOU 
+AVOID TOUCHES BY YOUR TACTILE SENSES ALONE. Whether your 
+eyes are open or closed makes no difference. It is not necessary to avoid 
+sights unless you touch something. 
+
+
+There may be the touch of being pushed forward at your shoulder 
+blades. Don't resist; just move forward. 
+
+
+As for the sights in this model, it happens that they will be humanoid. 
+All the human appearances other than you in the exhibit hall are sights from 
+the machine. This is just the way the model is; don't give it a thought. Sights 
+may appear or disappear (for example, at the curtain) while you are looking. 
+
+
+I am referring to the components of the model with the names of the 
+components of the perception-dissociator. 
+
+
+As soon as you understand the above and are prepared to remember 
+and follow the instructions, go immediately to Page 6. 
+
+
+137 
+
+
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+
+
+S v<]S_v< 
+2 1 
+
+
+u_{s,I 
+Soe ful u/s 
+ty toJus I Sus s 8) > 3 
+
+
+138 
+
+
+You will now begin the first phase of perception- dissociation by the 
+machine. Throughout this phase, you walk erect. 
+
+
+Instructions for operating the machine and for protecting yourself from 
+it will be given both in English and in an abbreviated symbolism. It is 
+important to master the symbolism, because later instructions car.'t be 
+expressed without it. 
+
+
+uemeans you 
+
+S, $4, Sp, $3 mean different sights from the machine 
+
+t, ty, tg, tg mean different touches from the machine 
+
+aAmeans a's eyes are Open or a opens its eyes 
+
+av means a's eyes are shut or a shuts its eyes 
+
+a=b means a blows on b's hand 
+
+aDb means a pushes b, typically from behind 
+{a holds Guidebook under arm or elsewhere) 
+
+albImeans a jumps over b, crossing completely above b (weak gravity 
+should make this easy) 
+
+a'b means a rapidly waves both hands in front of and near b's eyes so that 
+moving shadows are cast on b's eyes (a "shadows" b) 
+
+a means a pulls b's ankles back and up and immediately lets them go, so 
+that b falls forward (a "tackles" b) 
+
+afb means a jumps and falls on b, or a steps on b 
+
+a.J means a rapidly moves aside 
+
+{} parentheses around the symbol for an action mean the action will 
+probably happen 
+
+A line of action symbols constitutes an instruction. The order of symbols 
+
+indicates the order of events. !f one symbol is right above another, the 
+
+actions are simultaneous. 
+
+
+YOU MAY ALWAYS TURN BACK TO THESE EXPLANATIONS !F 
+YOU FORGET THEM. 
+
+
+{Keep reading) 
+
+
+Instructions 1-3 apply WHEN YOUR EYES ARE OPEN. 
+
+
+1. If you see a sight close its eyes, a heavy touch from the machine 
+may be falling toward you. You must instantly jump aside. s4A S4V ud 
+uA (th) 
+
+
+YOU MUST FOLLOW THIS AND SUCCEEDING INSTRUCTIONS AS 
+LONG AS YOU STAY IN THE EXHIBIT. STAY WITH EACH 
+INSTRUCTION UNTIL YOU HAVE IT THOROUGHLY IN MEMORY; 
+AND CHECK OUT THE SYMBOLIC VERSION SO YOU LEARN TO 
+READ THE SYMBOLS. 
+
+
+2. tf a sight in front of you jumps over you, a touch may be about to 
+tackle you. You must instantly jump to one side. 
+
+
+uA Sia] ul 
+(t> 
+
+
+3. If a sight waves its hands in front of your open eyes, a touch may 
+be about to shove from behind. Jump to one side. 
+
+
+as (120) ut 
+IF THERE ARE ANY SIGHTS, TRY STANDING AROUND AND 
+FOLLOWING THESE INSTRUCTIONS FOR A SHORT WHILE. 
+
+
+4. if you close your eyes, you must keep them closed until a touch 
+tackles you, a touch shoves you, or you can't keep your mind on the exhibit 
+(which you should also consider to be an effect of the machine). Then you 
+immediately open your eyes. 
+
+
+cls {A horizontal line between 
+ag Clu eK laa symbols means "or." 
+With it, instr. can be combined. 
+
+
+y inattentive 
+
+
+THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU WHAT TO DO 
+WHEN YOUR EYES ARE CLOSED. LEARN THEM WELL. 
+
+
+5. !f you feel a breath blowing on one of your hands, a touch may be 
+falling on you. You must instantly jump to the side away from the breath. 
+
+
+UV (efi) u (Tern page and convinue) 
+
+
+6. If your closed eyes are shadowed, a touch may be about to tackle 
+you. You must instantly jump aside. 
+
+
+Saco : 
+Uv + ul 
+(¢ a>) 
+
+
+7. If you sense a massive touch going above your head, another touch 
+may be about to shove you from behind. Jump aside. 
+
+
+orm 
+C, fui 
+
+
+Ae ee u-4 
+UY (€,4u) 
+
+
+8. If you have any time left over from following other instructions, 
+close your eyes and go around with your hands in front of you, shoving 
+touches whenever you fee! them. 
+
+
+uy ud 
+
+
+NOW TRY INSTR. 8, REMEMBERING AND FOLLOWING THE 
+OTHER INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT CLOSED EYES (INSTR. 4-7). WHEN 
+YOU HAVE TO OPEN YOUR EYES AGAIN, AS PER INSTR. 4, CHECK 
+ANYTHING YOU FORGOT: AND THEN GO TO THE SUCCEEDING 
+INSTRUCTIONS. NOW-CLOSE YOUR EYES. 
+
+THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY WHEN YOUR EYES 
+ARE OPEN. 
+
+
+9. If you see a sight falling toward or about to step on another sight 
+whose eyes are open, run until you face the sight on the ground and close 
+your eyes. BEFORE YOU FOLLOW THIS INSTRUCTION YOU MUST 
+HAVE MASTERED THE PRECEEDING INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT 
+CLOSED EYES. 
+
+
+/ 
+/ 
+
+
+f 
+uy S24 (si /Sz) UY 
+
+
+(Keep going) 
+
+
+141 
+
+
+10. If you see a sight about to tackle another whose eyes are open, run 
+until you face the sight about to be tackled and jump over both sights. If the 
+sight about to be tackled has closed eyes, you must immediately shadow 
+
+
+them. 
+S2/ (s, \e>) u SS 
+S2V (s.(S) uP Sz 
+
+
+11. If you see a sight about to push another with open eyes from 
+behind, you must shadow the sight about to be pushed. But if the sight 
+about to be pushed has closed eyes, you must immediately jump over both 
+sights. 
+
+
+UA 
+
+
+A s,a ($12) U oe S2 
+S2V¥0 (6,252) u [s, S21 
+
+
+You must now put ali the instructions into practice until you have 
+learned them thoroughly by doing as they say. In other words, carry out 
+Instr. 8, and the other instructions as they apply. 
+
+
+If you can't practice the instructions because you still have not seen a 
+sight or felt a touch, skip directly to Page 18. 
+
+
+Learning the instructions in practice should take a good while. When 
+
+
+you have mastered them, the first phase is over. Turn to Page 10 and begin 
+the second phase. 
+
+
+142 
+
+
+You are now in the second phase of transforming yourself with the 
+perception-dissociator. Throughout this phase, you must stoop or crouch 
+somewhat. That is, you must keep yourself below the height of your neck 
+when you stand straight-- except when you jump over a sight. The symbol is 
+uz u rad means that you crouch and close your eyes. Now crouch. 
+
+
+The numbered instructions for this phase are so similar to those in the 
+preceeding phase that they will be given in symbols only. Changes are noted 
+parenthetically. You may turn back if you forget symbols. 
+
+
+4. SA SV 4] 2. oa Tal. ud 
+uZA (E(u) 2 4% (ec) 
+
+
+t=Hu 'Chan @e. component Blows on you) 
+Z, us A (t,Ju) ul \ cee of shadowing you. 
+
+
+Jee. 
+4. u2dv CIty yn 
+uv mabtentive 
+
+
+Seo Uu 
+3 t.=4 yl 6 2 V u 
+5. ou 4" (Cy fu 4S (¢ &) 
+7, uy py. "AE a 4° Be 
+(€271u) 
+
+
+The big change comes next. 
+
+
+(Keep going) 
+
+
+143 
+
+
+9 u3r SA (Sie) uv and abo 
+
+
+uar S2V (s,/S2) Us S2 
+4 
+
+
+That is, if you see a sight falling or stepping on another sight with closed 
+eyes, you must immediately blow on the sight on the ground. This is an 
+
+
+addition. 
+40. 
+* S.Vv (S: >) u eax Oz 
+44 > 
+a, S24 (2.152) us Se 
+
+
+3. 
+* sv ($48) ule 
+(Change: you blow on Sz) 
+
+
+So far there have been only three changes in the instructions. Memorize 
+them. Then go on to Instr. 12, which is new, and carry it out along with the 
+other eleven instructions. 
+
+
+AS SOON AS YOU HAVE PUT ANY CHANGED INSTRUCTION (3, 
+9, OR 11) INTO PRACTICE, THE SECOND PHASE IS OVER. TURN TO 
+PAGE 12 AND THE THIRD PHASE. 
+
+
+If you can't practice the instructions because all the components have 
+vanished, skip to Page 18. 
+
+
+12. Adding to Instruction 8, if you have time left over from following 
+other instructions, you may also keep your eyes open and jump over, blow 
+on, or shadow sights. 
+
+
+u fs] 
+
+
+usa 4Uros 
+ux9 
+
+
+Throughout the third phase, you must squat or move on your hands 
+and knees. That is, you must always keep yourself below the height of your 
+waist when you stand straight--unless you are able to jump over a sight from 
+your low position. The symbol is ut. Now get down. 
+
+Instr. 1-7 from the last phase apply here without change. They are thus 
+
+
+stated in the most abbreviated form. 
+
+
+Sv 7 
+" Ct) TE ae 
+Uu 4" S rol ul . I ul uy A 
+(clip : us 4 inattentive 
+t,= u C,=u 
+(t;u) (t, fa) 
+Seo W ut =f 
+ee) 
+Jot 'u 
+(tga u) 
+
+
+The biggest change comes next. 
+
+8. If you have any time left over, close your eyes and go around with 
+your hands in front of you. If you encounter touches standing higher than 
+you, tackle them. If you encounter touches as near the ground as you, shove 
+them. You must be sensitive and judge heights with eyes closed. 
+
+
+phy LoD 
+2 Cao UIT 
+
+
+C> MEANS ** (FE STANDS HIGH RELATIVE TO You 
+tc MEANS jFE IGNEAR GROUND RELATIVE TO You 
+
+
+9 No change. 
+Ga S2N (5,2) uv 
+- -$2V (S12) uz % 
+
+
+10. The previous Instr. 10 applies if sy is near the ground, that is, it 
+applies unless sz is too high for you to jump or shadow it. 
+
+
+SAS (s, 3) ulS,5;] 
+rag Cs are 
+(Keep going) 
+
+
+145 
+
+
+44. uta S2a ( S, 1s.) U= S2 
+The second half of the previous Instr. 11 is dropped. 
+
+
+Except for the instruction to tackle touches, the changes are simply 
+limitations to make the instructions feasible for u > They should be easy 
+to remember. 
+
+
+You will next go on to Instr. 12, and carry it out along with the other 
+instructions. As soon as you encounter an actual! situation where you cannot 
+act because u+., the third phase will be over. AT THAT POINT YOU 
+MUST TURN TO PAGE 14 AND THE FOURTH PHASE. 
+
+
+If you can't carry out the instructions because all the components have 
+vanished, the third phase is over. Turn to Page 14 and the fourth phase. 
+
+
+12. Adding to Instr. 8, if you have time left over, you may also keep 
+your eyes open and blow on sights. You may also shadow or jump over 
+sights unless they are too high. 
+
+
+You are in the tourth phase of perception-dissociation. Throughout this 
+phase, you must crawl on your stomach (keep below knee height). The 
+symbol is u +.. Now get on the floor. 
+
+You can no longer be tackled, nor can you jump. Thus, the numbered 
+instructions are greatly limited, and they will be restated fully. 
+
+THE FIRST TWO INSTRUCTIONS APPLY WHEN YOUR EYES ARE 
+
+
+OPEN. 
+1. If you see a sight close its eyes, a touch may be falling or stepping 
+on you, and you must immediately scramble aside. 
+
+
+SA SV mal 
+ugar (Tia) 
+
+
+THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU WHAT TO DO 
+WHEN YOUR EYES ARE CLOSED. 
+3. When to reopen your eyes. 
+
+
+j Cou 
+udu ene UA 
+4+ u mMattentlive 
+
+
+4. if your closed eyes are shadowed, a touch may be falling or 
+stepping on you. Scramble aside. 
+
+
+e. 4 Aa 'a' Al sf 
+UZ V (tru) 
+6. PM 
+7 Av. E> ui b> 
+4 cs ute 
+
+
+TRY INSTR. 6, REMEMBERING AND FOLLOWING INSTR. 3-5. 
+WHEN YOU HAVE TO REOPEN YOUR EYES AS PER INSTR. 3, CHECK 
+ON ANYTHING YOU FORGOT. THEN GO TO PAGE 15. NOW--CLOSE 
+YOUR EYES. 
+
+
+The rest of the instructions apply when your eyes are open. 
+
+
+ya —224 (6152) uv' 
+4 $2VvE (1/2) Ur Sz 
+
+
+\f $9's eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high. 
+
+
+& y AA Sag (S13s2) us S, 
+
+
+You blow on $9'S hand unless it is too high. 
+
+
+9. Adding to Instr. 6, if you have time left over from following 
+instructions, you may also shadow or blow on sights if they aren't too high. 
+
+
+U a A sc Uso S 
+u =S 
+You must now put these nine instructions into practice unti] you have 
+
+
+learned them thoroughly in practice; and even continue after that until you 
+have difficulty keeping your mind on the exhibit. 
+
+
+IF YOU CAN'T PRACTICE THE INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE ALL 
+THE COMPONENTS HAVE VANISHED, SKIP TO PAGE 18. 
+
+
+Otherwise, stay with this phase until you have difficulty keeping your 
+mind on it. Then turn to Page 16 and the final phase of 
+perception-dissociation. 
+
+
+You are now in the final phase of transforming yourself with the 
+perception-dissociator. When you finish transforming yourself, you will have 
+lost track of time, and will have ceased to notice sound. You will be dealing 
+with sights and touches as unrelated phenomena; and you will be responding 
+by reflex action to unconscious signals from "other people." 
+
+For this last phase, you will turn to Page 5. You will go through the 
+symbols there in any order you like as if they were one long instruction, 
+carrying out that instruction. You are to "use" each symbol once. There 
+have been enough precedents in the interpretation of the symbols that you 
+should now be able to interpret any combination of them. Continue to 
+follow the previous numbered instructions as they apply, depending on 
+whether you are 1, 3/4, 1/2, or 1/4. (But forget the instructions for time left 
+over; you won't have any extra time.) REMEMBER THE INSTRUCTIONS 
+ABOUT WHEN TO REOPEN YOUR EYES IF YOU CLOSE THEM. 
+
+
+When you are through, you will be transformed. NOW TURN TO 
+PAGE 5 AND BEGIN. 
+
+
+149 
+
+
+If you have found these words and are reading them in desperation 
+because you are completely confused; or because you have lost interest in 
+the exhibit; or because you have finished; then you are transformed. 
+
+
+If you want to use the model to simulate the reversal of your 
+transformation before you leave the exhibit, do the following. Spend 50 
+seconds erect, with open eyes, walking up to sights and pushing 
+them--assuming that you will find touches where you see sights. Count the 
+seconds "one-thousand-and-one," "one-thousand-and-two," etc. 
+
+
+Then you will close your eyes. If you are blown on or pushed before 
+250 seconds have passed, you will open your eyes and--assuming that you 
+will find a sight where you were touched--you wil! shadow it. Otherwise you 
+will open your eyes when the 250 seconds have passed. Now close your eyes 
+and do as instructed. 
+
+
+It is now suggested that you leave the exhibit. Go out through the 
+curtain. 
+
+
+150 
+
+
+Stay in the exhibit and follow every instruction that is relevant, unti! 
+you become thirsty. 
+
+
+if you begin to encounter components, return to the page you were on 
+before you turned to this one. 
+
+
+lf you still don't encounter components, the mode! must be broken. 
+Leave the exhibit by the same passage through which you entered. 
+
+
+151 
+
+
+2/22/1963 
+
+
+Henry Flynt and Tony Conrad demonstrate against the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
+February 22, 1963 
+
+
+(foto by Jack Smith} 
+
+
+152 
+
+
+14. Mock Risk Games 
+
+
+Suppose you stand in front of a swinging door with a nail sticking out of it 
+pointing at your face; and suppose you are prepared to jump back if the 
+door suddenly opens in your face. You are deliberately taking a risk on the 
+assumption that you can protect yourself. Let us call such a situation a "risk 
+game." Then a mock risk game is a risk game such that the misfortune which 
+you risk is contrary to the course of nature, a freak misfortune; and thus 
+your preparation to evade it is correspondingly superficial. 
+
+If the direction of gravity reverses and you fall on the ceiling, that is a 
+freak misfortune. If you don't want to risk this misfortune, then you will 
+anchor yourself to the floor in some way. But if you stand free so that you 
+can fall, and yet try to prepare so that if you do fall, you will fall in such a 
+way that you won't be hurt, then that is a mock risk game. if technicians 
+could actually effect or simulate gravity reversal in the room, then the risk 
+game would be a real one. But I am not concerned with real risk games. I am 
+interested in dealing with gravity reversal in an everyday environment, where 
+everything tells you it can't possibly happen. Your 'preparation' for the fall 
+is thus superficial, because you still have the involuntary conviction that it 
+can't possibly happen. 
+
+Mock risk games constitute a new area of human behavior, because they 
+aren't something people have done before, you don't know what they will be 
+like until you try them, and it took a very special effort to devise them. 
+They have a tremendous advantage over other activities of comparable 
+significance, because they can be produced in the privacy of your own room 
+without special equipment. Let us explore this new psychological effect; and 
+let us not ask what use it has until we are more familiar with it. 
+
+Instructions for a variety of mock risk games follow. (I have played 
+each game many times in developing it, to ensure that the experience of 
+playing it will be compelling.) For each game, there is a physical action to be 
+performed in a physical setting. Then there is a list of freak misfortunes 
+which you risk by performing the action, and which you must be prepared 
+to evade. The point is not to hallucinate the misfortunes, or even to fear 
+them, but rather to be prepared to evade them. First you work with each 
+misfortune separately. For example, you walk across a room, prepared to 
+react self-protectingly if you are suddenly upside down, resting on the top of 
+
+
+153 
+
+
+your head on the floor. In preparing for this risk, you should clear the path 
+of objects that might hurt you if you fell on them; you should wear clothes 
+suitable for falling; and you should try standing on your head, taking your 
+hands off the floor and falling, to get a feeling for how to fail without 
+getting hurt. After you have mastered the preparation for each misfortune 
+separately, you perform the action prepared to evade the first misfortune 
+and the second (but not both at once). You must prepare to determine 
+instantly which of the two misfortunes befalls you, and to react 
+appropriately. After you have mastered pairs of misfortunes, you go on to 
+triples of misfortunes, and so forth. 
+
+The principal games are for a large room with no animals or distracting 
+sounds present. 
+
+A. Walk across the lighted room from one corner to the diagonally 
+opposite one, breathing normally, with your eyes open. 
+
+1. You are suddenly upside down, resting on the top of your head on the 
+floor. You must get down without breaking your neck. 
+
+2. Although the floor looks unbroken and solid, beyond a certain point 
+nothing is there. !f you step onto that area, you will take a fatal fall. Thus, as 
+you walk, you must not shift your weight to your forward foot until you are 
+sure it will hold. Put the ball of the forward foot down before the heel. 
+
+3. Something happens to the cohesive forces in your neck so that if your 
+head tips in any direction, it will come right off your body, killing you 
+immediately. Otherwise everything remains normal. Thus, as you walk, you 
+must "balance" your head on your neck. When you reach the other side of 
+the room, your neck will be restored to normal. (Prepare beforehand by 
+walking with a book balanced on your head.) 
+
+4. Invisible conical weights fall around you with their points down, each 
+whistling as it falls. You must evade them by ear in order not to be stabbed. 
+Walk softly and fast. 
+
+5. The room is suddenly filled with water. You have to contro! your lungs 
+and swim to the top. Wear clothes suitable for swimming. 
+
+A. Play game A while on a long walk on an uncrowded street. The floor 
+is replaced by the sidewalk. The fifth misfortune becomes for space suddenly 
+to be filled with water to a height of fifteen feet above the street. 
+
+B. Lie on your back on a pallet in the dimly lit room, hands at your 
+
+sides, with a pillow on your face so that it is slightly difficult to breathe, for 
+thirty seconds at a time. 
+1. The pillow suddenly hardens and becomes hundreds of pounds heavier. !t 
+remains suspended on your face for a split second and then "falls," bears 
+down with full weight. You must jerk your head out from under it in that 
+split second. 
+
+
+154 
+
+
+2. The pillow adheres to your skin with a force greater than your skin's 
+cohesion, and begins to rise. You must rise with it in such a way that your 
+skin is not torn. 
+
+C. Lie on your back on the pallet in the dimly lit room. 
+
+1. Gravity suddenly disappears completely, so that nothing is held down by 
+it; and the ceiling becomes red-hot. You must avoid drifting up against the 
+ceiling. 
+
+2. The surface you are lying on becomes a vast lighted open plane. From the 
+distance, giant steel spheres come rolling in your direction. You must evade 
+them. 
+
+3. Your body is split in half just above the waist by an indefinitely long, 
+rather high, foot-thick wall. Your legs and lower torso are on one side, and 
+your upper torso, arms, and head are on the other side. Matter normally 
+exchanged between the two halves of your body continues to be exchanged 
+through the. wall by telekinesis. It is as if you are a foot longer above the 
+waist. In order to reunite your body, you must first roll over and get up, 
+bent way forward. There are depressions in the wall on the same side as your 
+feet. You have to climb the wall, putting your feet in the depressions and 
+balancing yourself. You will be reunited when you reach the top and your 
+waist passes above the wall. 
+
+D. Sit in a plain, small, straight chair, on the edge of the seat, hands 
+hanging at the sides of the seat, feet together in front of the chair, in the 
+lighted room, for about thirty seconds at a time. 
+
+1. The chair is suddenly out from under you and sitting on you with Its legs 
+straddling your lap and legs. You have to get your weight over your feet so 
+you won't take a hard fall. 
+
+2. The direction of gravity reverses and the chair remains anchored to the 
+floor. You have to grab the seat and hold on in order not to fall on the 
+ceiling. 
+
+3. You are suddenly in a contra-terrene universe, in which the atmosphere is 
+unbreathable and prolonged contact with either the atmosphere or the 
+ground will disintegrate you. The seat and back of the chair become a 
+penetrable hyperspatial sheet between the alien universe and your own. As 
+soon as you feel the alien atmosphere, you must jerk your feet off the 
+ground and deliberately sink or p!unge through the seat and back of the chair 
+in the best way that you can. You will end up on the floor under the chair in 
+your universe. 
+
+4. You are suddenly in dark empty space in a three-dimensional lattice of 
+gleaming wires. Segments of the lattice alternately burst into flame and cool 
+off. You adhere to the chair as if it were part of you. With your hands 
+holding onto the seat, you can move yourself and the chair forward by 
+
+
+155 
+
+
+from blundering into a radiation beam, you have to communicate 
+pre-verbally to the other mind by every means from vocal cries to 
+pantomine, and get your-body/his-mind out of range of the radiation. When 
+the body is out, you will both be restored to normal. (The first thing to 
+anticipate is the basic shift in viewpoint by which you will be looking at 
+your own body from the other's position. There is no point in tensing your 
+muscles in preparatiton for the misfortune, because if it occurs, you will be 
+working with a strange set of muscles anyway. The next thing to prepare to 
+do is to spot the radiation beams; and then to yell, gesture, or 
+whatever--anything to get the "other" to avoid the radiation. Note finally 
+that neither player prepares for the possibility that he will be surrounded by 
+radiation. Each player prepares for the same role in an asymmetrical pas de 
+deux.) 
+
+Asymmetry: The two of you play a given duo game, but each prepares 
+to evade a different misfortune. 
+
+AB. Stay awake with eyes closed for an agreed upon time between one 
+and fifteen minutes. Use a timer with an alarm. 
+
+1. Each suddenly has the other's entire present consciousness in addition to 
+his own, from perceptions to memories, ideologies, ambitions, and 
+everything else--threatening both with psychological shock. 
+
+The couple must take up positions such that their sensory perceptions 
+
+are as nearly identical as possible. Beforehand, each must discuss with the 
+other the aspects of the other's attitude to the world which each must fears 
+having impused on his consciousness. During the game, each must think 
+about these aspects and try to prepare for them. 
+2. Each suddenly relives the other's most intense past feelings of depression 
+and suicidal impulses. In other words, if five years ago the other attempted 
+suicide because he failed out of college, you suddenly have the consciousness 
+that "you" have just failed out of college, are totally worthless, and should 
+destroy yourself. Presumably the other has since learned to live with his past 
+disasters, but you do not have the defenses he has built up. You are 
+overwhelmed with a despair which the other felt in the past, and which is 
+incongruous with the rest of your consciousness. In summary, both of you 
+risk shock and suicidal impulses. Beforehand, of course, each must tell the 
+other of his worst past suicidal or depressed episode; and discuss anything 
+else that may minimize the risk of shock. 
+
+
+158 
+
+
+Intrusions in Duo Games 
+
+As before, distractions and modulations can be openly studied by 
+consent of the players. As for bogies, it is possible in duo games for one 
+player to create a bogy without warning, in effect acting as a saboteur. As 
+soon as a game is sabotaged, though, confidence is lost, and each player just 
+watches out for the other's bogies. Here are some sample intrusions. 
+
+
+DISTRACTION BOGY MODULATION 
+
+
+shout in other's each 
+face take 
+2, talk and Jaugh stamp hard 2a 
+get out of step Ly different 
+
+
+} 
+
+
+ALB cough gasp 
+
+
+talk and laugh silently pass palm back I 
+& forth in front of 
+other's face 
+
+
+15. The Dream Reality 
+
+
+A. Memo on the Dream Project 
+
+
+Original aim: To recreate the effect of e.g. Pran Nath's singing--transcendent 
+inner escape--in direct life rather than art. I needed material which could 
+function as an alien civilization (since the source of Pran Nath's expression is 
+an alien civilization relative to me); yet which was encultured in me and not 
+an affectation or pretense. I decided to use dreams as the material, assuming 
+that my dreams would take me to alien worlds. But mostly they did not. 
+Mostly my dreams consist of long periods of tawdry, familiar life interrupted 
+occasionally by senseless, unmotivated anomalies. In contrast, my original 
+aim required alluring, psychically gratifying material. 
+
+
+The emphasis shifted to redefining reality so that dreams were on the same 
+level as waking life; so that they were apprehended as what they seem to be: 
+literal reality {and not memory, precognition, or symbolism). The project 
+was still arcane, but in a drastically different way. I was getting into an 
+alternate reality which was extremely bizarre but not psychically gratifying. 
+It was boringly frightful and sometimes obscene. I became concerned with 
+analytical study of the natural order of the dream world, a para-scientific 
+investigation. As I grappled with the rational arguments against treating 
+dreams as literal reality, the project became a difficult analytical exercise in 
+the philosophy of science. The original sensuous-esthetic purpose was lost. 
+
+
+Now I would like to return to the original aim, but how to do it? Obtain 
+other people's dreams--see if they are more suitable? Work only with my 
+very rare dreams which do take me to alien worlds? Try to alter the content 
+of my raw dreams? Attempt to affect content of dreams by experiment in 
+which many people sleep in same room and try to communicate in their 
+sleep? The most uncertain approach to a solution: set up a transformation 
+on my banal dreams, so that to the first-order activity of raw dreaming is 
+added a second-order activity. The transformation procedure to somehow 
+combine conscious ideational direction--coding of the banal dreams--with 
+alteration of my experience, my esthesia, my lived experience. 
+
+
+160 
+
+
+B. Dreams and Reality--An Experimental Essay 
+
+
+Excerpts from my dream diary which are referred-to in the essay that 
+follows. 
+12/11/1973 
+
+I notice a state between waking and dreaming: a waking dream. I have 
+been asleep; I wake up; I close my eyes to sleep again. While not yet asleep, I 
+experience isolated objects before me as in a dream, but with no 
+background, only a dark void. !n this case, there are two pocket combs, both 
+with teeth broken. In the waking world, I threw away one of my two pocket 
+combs because I broke it; the other comb is still in good condition. 
+
+
+12/30/1973 
+
+I am chased by the police for one block west on West Market Street in 
+Greensboro. I reach the intersection with Eugene Street, and in the north 
+direction there is a steep hill rather than the street. The surface of the hill is 
+bare ground and grass. I run up the hill, sensing that if ! can get over the hill 
+I will find Friendly Road and the general neighborhood of my mother's 
+houses on the other side. The police start shooting. If I can get a few yards 
+farther on the top of the hill I will be past the line of fire. I take a headlong 
+dive and awaken in the middle of the dive to find myself diving forward on 
+my mattress in the front room of my apartment. The action is carried on 
+continuously through waking up and through the associated change of 
+setting. 
+
+
+1/12/1974 
+
+Just before ! go to sleep for the night, I am lying in bed drowsy. I think 
+of being, and suddenly am, at the south edge of the Courant Institute plaza, 
+which is several feet above the sidewalk. The edge of the plaza and the drop 
+are all I see. It is night; and there is only a void where the peripheral 
+environment should be. (Comment: It is of great theoretical importance that 
+while most of the internal reality cues were present in this experience, some, 
+like the peripheral environment, were not. In my dream experiences, all 
+reality cues are present.) The drop expands to twenty or thirty feet, and I 
+start to fall off. Fright jolts me completely awake. I have had something like 
+a waking nightmare and have awakened from being awake. I thought of the 
+scene, was suddenly in it (except for peripheral reality cues), lost control and 
+became endangered by it, and then snapped back to my bedroom. 
+
+
+1/1-/1974 
+One or two nights after 1/12/74 I was lying in bed just before going to 
+
+
+161 
+
+
+sleep. I could see women standing on a sidewalk. The scene was real, but I 
+was not in it; I was a disembodied spectator. Also, the peripheral 
+environment was absent. The reality was between that of a waking 
+visualization and that of the Courant Institute incident of 1/12/74. 
+Comment: The differences between this experience and a _ waking 
+visualization are that the latter is less vivid than seeing and is accompanied 
+by waking reality cues such as cues of bodily location. 
+
+
+1/16/1974 
+
+1. I am in an apartment vaguely like the first place in which I lived, at 
+1025 Madison Avenue in Greensboro. I am a spy. I am teen-aged and short; 
+and I am in the apartment with several enemy men, who are middle-aged and 
+adult-sized. My code sheets look like the sheets of Yiddish I have been 
+copying out in waking life. Eventually the men discover me in the front 
+room with the code sheets on a fold-up desk. They chase me out the front 
+door and onto the west side of the lawn, and shoot me with a needle gun. At 
+that moment my consciousness jumps from my body and becomes that of a 
+disembodied spectator watching from an eastward location, as if I were 
+watching a film. 
+
+2. I am living in a dormitory in a rural setting with other males. At one 
+point I walking barefoot in weeds outside the dormitory, and Supt. Toro 
+tells me I am walking in poison ivy. My feet begin to show the rash, but I 
+recognize that I am in a dream and think that the rash will not carry over to 
+the waking state. I then begin to will away the rash in the dream, and I 
+succeed, 
+
+
+1/20/1974 
+
+For some reason the dream associates Simone Forti with flute-like 
+music. It is shortly before midnight. In the dream I believe that Simone lives 
+in a loft on the east side of Wooster Street. The blocks in SOHO are very 
+small. If I walk through the streets and whistle, she will hear me. I start to 
+whistle but can only whistle a single high note. I half awaken but continue 
+whistling, or trying to; the dream action continues into waking. But I cannot 
+change pitch or whistle clearly because my mouth is taped. As I realize this, I 
+awaken fully. 
+Comments: I tape my mouth at night so I will sleep with my mouth closed. I 
+experimented at trying to whistle with the tape on while fully awake. The 
+breath just hisses against the tape. The pitch of the hiss can be varied. 
+
+
+2/1/1974 
+
+1. I try to assist a man in counterfeiting ten dollar bills by taking half 
+of a ten, scotch taping it to half of a one, and then coloring over the one 
+until it looks like the other half of the ten. The method fails because I bring 
+old crumpled tens rather than new tens, and the one doilar bills are new. 
+
+
+Comments: There are no natural anomalies in this dream at ali. What is 
+anomalous is that this counterfeiting method seems perfectly sensible, and I 
+only begin to question it when we try to fit the crumpled half-bill to the 
+crisp half-bill. Why am I so foolish in this dream? I retain my identity as 
+Henry Flynt, and yet my outlook, my sense of what is rational, is so 
+different that it is that of a different person. More generally, the person I am 
+in my dreams is much more limited in certain ways that I am in waking life. 
+My waking preoccupations are totally absent from my dreams. Instead there 
+is bland material about my early life which could apply to any child or 
+teen-ager. Thus, I must warn readers who know me only from this diary not 
+to try to make the image of me here fit my waking life. 
+
+
+2/3/1974 
+
+3. I have had several dreams that I am taking the last courses of my 
+student career. (In waking life I have completed all course work.) I am 
+usually failing them. Tonight I dream that I have gone all semester without 
+studying (in a course in English? ). Now I am in the final exam and sinking. I 
+will have to repeat these courses. Subsequently, I am sitting in a school 
+office (of a professor or psychologist? ), giving him a long list (of words, a 
+foreign vocabulary? ). {I mention this episode because I remember that while 
+I retained my nominal identity as Henry Flynt, I had the mind of a different 
+person. I experienced another person's existence instead of mine. Professor 
+Nell also appeared somewhere in this dream; as he has in several school 
+dreams I have had recently. 
+
+
+2/3/1974 (This is the date I recorded, but it seems that it would have to be 
+later.) 
+
+} get up in the morning and decide to have a self-indulgent breakfast 
+because of the unpleasantness of working on my income tax the day before. 
+So I put two slices of pizza in the oven, and also eat two bakery sweets, 
+possibly éclairs. Then I think that a Mexican TV dinner would have been 
+better all around, but it is too late; I have to eat what I am already preparing. 
+Subsequently, I go with John Alten to a Shoreham Cafeteria at Houston and 
+Mercer Streets. The cafeteria chain is a good one, but this cafeteria is dark 
+and extremely dingy upstairs where the serving line is. John coinplains that 
+there is no ventilation and that he is suffocating, and he stalks out. 
+
+
+163 
+
+
+Comment: When I awoke, my first thought was that the pizza in the oven 
+would be burning. {I assumed that I had arisen, put the pizza in the oven, 
+and gone back to sleep.) But then I realized that the breakfast was a dream. I 
+got up and prepared the Mexican dinner which I had decided was best in the 
+dream, but I also ate one éclair. 
+
+
+7/8/1974 
+
+I am caught out in a theft of money, and I feel that the rest of my life 
+will be ruined. Comments: The quality of the episode depended on my 
+strong belief in the reality of the social future and in my ability to form 
+accurate expectations about it. When I awakened, the whole misadventure 
+vanished. 
+
+
+End of excerpts from my dream diary. / 
+
+
+".. It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views 
+or perceptions... But ... inasmuch as it is the common objective world that 
+renders ... general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist 
+will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views, though 
+just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. ... the common objective 
+world, whether such a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is 
+indispensable to science ... ." 
+
+A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), 
+pp. 176-7 
+
+
+A. We wish to postulate that dreams are exactly what they seem to be 
+while we are dreaming, namely, literal reality. Naively, we want to get closer 
+to literal empiricism than natural science is. But science has worked out a 
+very comfortable world-view on the assumption that both dreams and 
+semi-conscious quasi-dreams are mere subjective phenomena of individual 
+consciousness. If we wish to carry through the postulate that dreams are 
+literal reality, then we will have to adopt a cognitive model quite different 
+from that of natural science. It is of crucial importance that we are not 
+interested in superstition. We do not wish to adopt a cognitive model which 
+would simply be defeated in competition with science. We wish to be at least 
+as rationa!, as empirical, and as cognitively parsimonious as science is. We 
+want our cognitive model to be compelling, and not to be a plaything which 
+is easily taken up and easily discarded. 
+
+The question is whether there can be a rational empiricism which 
+differs from science in placing dreamed episodes on the same level as waking 
+
+
+164 
+
+
+episodes, but which stops short of the "nihilistic empiricism' of my 
+philosophical essay entitled "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs." (In effect, the 
+latter essay rejects other minds, causality, persistent objective entities, past 
+time, the possibility of objective categories and significant language, and so 
+forth, ending up with ungraded immediate experience.) 
+
+As an example of our problem, the waking scientific outlook assumes 
+that a typewriter continues to exist even when we turn our backs on it 
+(persistence of objective entities). In many of our dreams we make the same 
+sort of assumption. In other words, in some of our dreams the natural order 
+is not noticeably different from that of the waking world; and in many 
+dreams our conscious world-view has much in common with waking 
+common sense or scientific pragmatism. On 2/3/1974 I had a dream in which 
+a typewriter was featured. I certainly assumed that the typewriter continued 
+to exist when my back was turned to it. On 7/8/1974 I dreamed that ! was 
+caught out in a theft of money, and I felt my life would be ruined because of 
+it. I certainly assumed the reality of the social future, and my ability to form 
+accurate expectations about it. These examples illustrate that we are not 
+nihilistic empiricists in our dreams. The question is whether acceptance of 
+the pragmatic outlook which we have in dreams is consistent with not 
+regarding the dream-world as a subjective phenomenon of individual 
+consciousness. Can we accept dreams as "literal reality"; or must we reject 
+the very concept of "reality" on order to defend the placing of the dream 
+world on the same level as the waking world? 
+
+In summary, the question is whether we can place dreams on the same 
+fevel as the waking world while stopping short of nihilistic empiricism. A 
+further difficulty in accomplishing this aim is that neurological science might 
+succeed in gaining complete experimental control of dreams. Scientists might 
+become able to produce dreams at will and to monitor them. The whole 
+phenomenon of dreaming would then tend to be totally assimilated to the 
+outlook of scientists. Their decision to treat dreams as subjective phenomena 
+of individual consciousness would be greatly supported by these 
+developments. Would we have to go all the way to nihilistic empiricism in 
+order to have a basis for rejecting the neurologists' accomplishments? 
+
+Still another difficulty is presented for us by semi-conscious 
+quasi-dreams such as the ones described in my diary. Semi-conscious 
+quasi-dreams exhibit some reality cues, but lack other important internal 
+reality cues. Science handles these experiences easily, by dismissing them 
+along with dreams as subjective phenomena of individual consciousness. 
+Suppose we accept that the semi-conscious quasi-dreams are illusory reality. 
+But tf they can be illusory reality, how can we exclude the possibility that 
+dreams might be aiso? !f, on the other hand, we accept the quasi-dreams as 
+
+
+165 
+
+
+literal reality, what about the missing reality cues? Can we justify different 
+treatment for dreams and quasi-dreams by saying that all reality cues have to 
+be present before an experience is accepted as non-illusory? If we propose 
+to do so, the question then becomes whether we should accept the weight 
+which common sense places on reality cues. 
+
+
+Why do we wish to stop short of nihilistic empiricism? Because we do 
+wish to assert that dreams can be remembered; that they can be described in 
+permanent records; that they can be compared and studied rationally. We do 
+wa..t to cite the past as evidence; we do want to distinguish between actual 
+dream experience and waking fabrications, waking lies about what we have 
+dreamed; and we do want to describe what we experience in intersubjective 
+language. " 
+
+As easy way out which would offend nobody would be to treat dreams 
+as simulations of alternate universes. But this approach is a cowardly evasion 
+for several reasons. It excludes the phenomenon of the semi-conscious 
+quasi-dream, which poses the problem of internal reality cues in the sharpest 
+way. Further, we cannot give up the notion that our project is nearer to 
+literal empiricism than natural science is. We cannot accept the notion that 
+we must dismiss some of our experiences as mere illusions, but not all of 
+them. We do not see dreams as simulations of anything. Some of the most 
+interesting observations I have made about connections between adjacent 
+dreamed and waking episodes in my own experience are noticeable only 
+because I take both dreamed and waking experience literally. 
+
+
+B. Before we continue our attempt to resolve our methodological 
+problem, we will provide more detail on topics which we have mentioned in 
+passing. We begin with the purported empiricism of natural science. The 
+philosopher Hume postulated that experience was the only raw material of 
+reality or cognition. However, he did not content himself with ungraded 
+experience. He insisted on draping the experiential raw material on an 
+intellectual framework in such a way that experience was used to simulate 
+the inherited conception of. reality, a conception which we will call 
+Aristotelian realism. Similarly for the purported empiricism of natural 
+science. In fact, the working scientist learns to think of the framework or 
+model as primary, and of experiences and verification procedures as ancillary 
+to it. The quotation by d'Abro which heads this essay concedes as much. 
+
+What we are investigating is whether experiences can be draped on a 
+different intellectual framework in which dreamed and waking life come out 
+as equally real. Some examples of alternate verification conventions follow. 
+1. Accept intersubjective confirmation of my experience of the dream world 
+which occurs within the dream as confirmation of the reality of the dream 
+
+
+166 
+
+
+world. 
+
+2. Accept intersubjective confirmation of the past of the dream world which 
+occurs in the dream itself as confirmation of the reality of the dreamed past. 
+3. Recognize that there is no infallible way to tell whether other people are 
+lying about their dreamed expefience or their waking experience. 
+
+4. Develop sophisticated interrogation techniques as a limited test of 
+whether people are telling the truth about their dreams. 
+
+
+5. Accept that a certain category of anomalies occurs in dreams only when 
+several people have reported experiences in that category. 
+
+The principal characteristic of the approach which these conventions 
+represent is that each dream is treated as a separate world. There is no 
+attempt to arrive at an account, for a given "objective" time period, which is 
+consistent with more than one dream or with both dreamed and waking 
+periods. Thus, many parallel worlds could be confirmed as real. As our 
+discussion proceeds, we will move away from this approach, probably out of 
+a sense that it is pointless to maintain a strong notion of reality and yet to 
+forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. 
+
+C. Something that I have learned from a study of my dream records is 
+that while dreams are not chaotic, while they can be compared and 
+classified, it is not possibie to apply the method of natural science to them in 
+the sense of discerning a consistent, impersonal natural order in the dream 
+world. It is not that the natural order is different in dreams from what it is in 
+the waking world; it is that the dream worlds are incommensurate with the 
+discernment of a natural order in the scientific sense. Here are some specific 
+observations which relate to this whole question. 
+
+1. Some dreams are not noticeably anomalous. The laws of science are not 
+violated in them. This observation is important in giving us a normal base for 
+our investigation. Dreams are not all crazy and chaotic. 
+
+2. In some dreams, it is impossible to abstract an impersonal natural order 
+from personal experiences and anecdotes. There are no impersonal events. 
+There is no nature whose order can be defined impersonally. The dreams are 
+full of personal magic which cannot be generalized to a characteristic of an 
+impersonal natural order. 
+
+3. As a special case of (2), in some dreams, we jump back in time and move 
+discontinuously in time and space. Chronological personal magic. 
+
+4. In dreams, the distinction between myself and other people is blurred in 
+many different ways. Also, ! sometimes become a_ disembodied 
+consciousness. 
+
+5. As a generalization of (4), sometimes it becomes impossible to distinguish 
+objects from our sensing and perceiving function. The mediating sensory 
+function becomes obtrusively anomalous. Stable object gestalts cannot be 
+
+
+167 
+
+
+identified. 
+
+6. Sometimes we experience the logically impossible in dreams. My father 
+was both dead and buried, and alive and walking around, in one dream. 
+
+7. The possibility of identifying causal relationships is sometimes lacking in 
+dreams. /t is not just that actions have unexpected effects. It is that events 
+are strung together like beads on a string. There is no sense of willful acting 
+on the world or manipulation of the world which can be objectified as a 
+causal relation between impersonal! events. 
+
+The possibility arises of using dreams as philosophical experiments in 
+worlds in which one or more of the preconditions for application of the 
+scientific method is absent. (But in the one case in which Alten and I tried 
+this, we reached opposite conclusions. Alten said that dreams in which one 
+can jump around in time proved that the irreversibility of time is the basis 
+for distinguishing between time and space; I said that the dreams proved that 
+time and space can be distinguished even when the irreversibility of time is 
+lacking.) 
+
+Observation (2) above can lead us to an insight about the waking world. 
+Perhaps science insists on the elimination of personal anecdotes from the 
+natural order which it recognizes because the scientist wants results which 
+can be transferred from one life to another and which will give one person 
+power over another. At any rate, science excludes anecdotal anomalies which 
+cannot be made somehow into "objective" events. As an example, I may be 
+walking down the street and suddenly find myself on the other side of the 
+street with no awareness of any act of crossing the street. 
+
+What dreams provide us with is worlds in which anecdotal anomalies 
+cannot be relegated to limbo as they are in waking science. They are so 
+prominent in dreams that we can become accustomed to identifying them 
+there. We may then learn to recognize analogous anomalies in the waking 
+world, where we had overlooked them before because of our scientific 
+indoctrination. 
+
+Of course, we run the risk that superstitious people will misuse our 
+theory to justify their folly. But the difference between our theory and 
+superstition is clear. When the superstitious person says that he 
+communicates with spirits, he either lies outright; or alse he misinterprets his 
+experiences--embedding them in an extraneous pre-scientific belief system, 
+or treating them as controversions of scientific propositions. We, on the 
+other hand, maintain more literally than science does that the only raw 
+material of cognition is experience. We differ from science in draping 
+experiences on a different organizational framework. The "reality" we arrive 
+at is incommensurate with science; it does not falsify any scientific 
+proposition. As for science and superstition, we headed this essay with the 
+
+
+168 
+
+
+quotation by d'Abro to emphasize that the scientist himself is superstitious: 
+he is determined to believe in the common objective world, even though it is 
+a fiction, because it is necessa~y to science. The superstitious person wants 
+you to believe that his communication with spirits is intersubjectively 
+consequential. Thus our theory, which tends toward the attitude that 
+nothing is intersubjectively consequential, offers him even less comfort than 
+science does. 
+
+D. We next turn to semi-conscious quasi-dreams. Referring to my 
+experience on the morning of 1/12/1974, I describe the experience by saying 
+that I was on the Courant Institute plaza. But I cannot conclude that I was 
+on the Courant Institute plaza. The reason is that important internal reality 
+cues are missing in the experience. For one thing, the peripheral environment 
+is missing; in its place is a void. Referring to my experience on 1/1-/1974, 
+still other cues are missing. I am awake, and the scene is unstable and 
+momentary. The slightest attention shift will cause the scene to vanish. 
+
+When we recognize that we have disallowed falling asleep, awaking, and 
+anomalous phenomena in dreams as evidence of unreality, a careful analysis 
+yields only two types of reality cues. 
+
+1. Presence of the peripheral environment. 
+
+2. "Single consciousness." This cue is missing when we see a 
+three-dimensional scene and move about in it, and yet have a background 
+awareness that we are awake in bed; and lose the scene through a mere shift 
+of attention. Its absence is even more marked if the scene is a momentary 
+one between two waking periods. 
+
+Let us recall our earlier discussion of the empiricism of science. Science 
+does not content itself with ungraded experience. it drapes experience on an 
+intellectual framework in such a way as to simulate Aristotelian realism. It 
+feeds experience into a maze of verification procedures in order to confirm a 
+model which is not explicit in ungraded experience. It short, science grades 
+experience as to its reality on the basis of standards which are 
+"intellectually" supplied. Internal reality cues are thus characteristics of 
+experience which are given special weight by the grading procedure. The 
+immediate problem for us is that ordinary descriptive language implicitly 
+recognizes these reality cues; one would never say without qualification that 
+one was on the Courant Institute plaza if the peripheral environment was 
+missing and if one was also aware of being awake in bed at the time. (In 
+contrast, it is fair to use ordinary descriptive language with respect to 
+dreamed episodes when our consciousness is singulary, that is, when 
+everything seems real and unqualified.) - 
+
+For purposes of further comparison !«may mention an experience I 
+have had on rare occasions while lying on my back in bed fully awake. It is 
+
+
+169 
+
+
+as if colored spheres whosé centers are located a few feet or yards in front of 
+my chest expand until they press against me, one after the other. I use the 
+phrase "as if' because reality cues are missing in this experience, and thus I 
+cannot use the language of stable object gestalts without qualification in 
+describing it. The colors are not vivid as real colors are. They are like 
+visualized colors. The spheres pass through each other, and through me--with 
+only a moderate sensation of pressure. I can turn the experience off by 
+getting out of bed. The point, again, is that it is inherent in ordinary 
+language not to use unqualified object descriptions in these circumstances. 
+Yet the only language I have for such sensory configurations is the language 
+of stable object gestalts-this is particularly obvious in the example of the 
+Courant Institute plaza. (Is "ringing in the ears' in the same class of 
+phenomena? } 
+
+An insight that is crucial in elucidating this problem is that when I 
+describe episodes, the descriptions implicitly convey not only sensations but 
+beliefs, as when I speak of a typewriter in a dream on the assumption that it 
+persisted while I was not looking at it. The peculiar quality of a quasi-dream 
+comes about not only because it is an anomaly in my sensations but because 
+it is an anomaly in the scientific-pragmatic cognitive model which underlies 
+ordinary language. If I discard this cognitive model and then report the 
+event, it will not be the same event: the beliefs implicit in ordinary language 
+helped give the event its quality. As a further example, now that I have 
+recognized experiences such as that of 1/12/1974, I am willing to entertain 
+the possibility that they are the basis for claims by superstitious persons to 
+have projected astrally. But to use the phrase "astral projection" is to embed 
+the experiences in a_ pre-scientific belief system extraneous to the 
+experiences themselves. !f we learn to report such experiences by using 
+idioms like "ringing in the ears" and blocking any comparison with notions 
+of objective reality or intersubjective import, we will have flattened out 
+experience and will have moved in the direction of ungraded experience and 
+nihilistic empiricism. 
+
+E. We next take up connections between adjacent dreamed and waking 
+periods. As a preliminary, we reject conventional notions that dreams are 
+fabricated from memories of waking reality; or that dreams are precognitions 
+of waking reality; or that dreams are mental phenomena which symbolize 
+waking reality. We reject these notions because they conflict with the placing 
+of the dream world on the same level as the waking world. 
+
+Connections between dream and waking periods are important in this 
+study because we may wish to create such connections deliberately, and even 
+to attribute causal significance to them. Initially, we define the concept of 
+dream control: it is to conduct one's waking life so that it is supportive of 
+
+
+170 
+
+
+one's dreamed life in some sense. We also define controlled dreaming: it is to 
+manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep {or during sleep) so as to 
+influence the content of that person's dreams. (An example would be to give 
+somebody a psychoactive sleeping pill.) 
+
+A careful analysis of connections between dream and waking periods 
+yields the following classification of such connections. 
+
+1. I walk around the kitchen in a dream, then awaken and walk around the 
+kitchen. Voluntary continued action. 
+
+2. Given a_ project with causally separate components, voluntarily 
+assembled, I can carry out the project entirely while awake, entirely in 
+dreams, or partly while awake and partly in dreams. 
+
+3. I walk around the kitchen while awake, then sleep. I may then walk 
+around the kitchen in a dream. Also, I draw a glass of water while awake. I 
+may have the glass of water to use in the dream. We could postulate that 
+such connections are not mere coincidences, if they occur. However, we 
+certainly cannot produce such connections at will. We call these connections 
+echoes of waking actions in dreams. Note the case in which I taped my 
+mouth shut before sleeping, and could not whistle in the subsequent dream. 
+4. We next have connections from dreamed to waking periods which can be 
+postulated to have causal significance. First, misfortune or danger in dreams 
+is regularly followed by immediate awaking. Secondly, I! have had 
+experiences in which a headlong dive or an attempt to whistle continued 
+from dream to waking, right through waking up. These experiences are 
+causally continuous actions. However, I cannot bring them about at will. 
+
+5. We can manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep (or during sleep) 
+so as to influence the content of that person's dreams. The dream is not an 
+echo of the waking action; the causal relationship is manipulative. Examples 
+are to give someone a psychoactive sleeping drug or to create a special 
+environment for sleep. The case in which I taped my mouth shut before 
+sleeping was a remarkable borderline case between an echo and a 
+manipulation. 
+
+in conclusion, dream control is any of the connections described in 
+(1)-(4). Controlled dreaming is (5). We have analyzed these concepts 
+meticulously because we want to exclude all attempts at magic, all 
+superstition from the project of placing dreamed and waking life on the same 
+level. There must be no rain dancing, no false causality, in this project. 
+
+F. Until now, we have analyzed our experience episode by episode. We 
+could make this approach into a principle by assuming that each episode is a 
+separate and complete world, which has its reality confirmed internally. In 
+particular, the notion of objective location in space and time would be 
+maintained if it appeared in a dream and was intersubjectively confirmed in 
+
+
+171 
+
+
+the dream, but the notion would be purely internal to each episode. The 
+objection to these assumptions, as we mentioned at the end of (B), is that 
+they propose to maintain the notion of objective location, and yet they 
+forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. if we adopt 
+these assumptions and then compare all the reports of our dreamed and 
+waking periods, we may find that we have experienced different events 
+attributed to the same location--and indeed, that is exactly what we do 
+experience. 
+
+One of the main discoveries of this essay has been that dreamed and 
+waking periods are more symmetrical than our scientific-pragmatic 
+indoctrination would have us suppose. The reality of the dream world is 
+intersubjectively confirmed--within the dream. Anecdotal anomalies can be 
+found in waking periods as well as in dreams. Entities which resemble 
+common object gestalts but which lack some of the reality cues of object 
+gestalts can be encountered whicle we are fully awake. Now we can 
+recognize a further symmetry between dreamed and waking life. A dreamed 
+misfortune is usually "lost" when we awaken, and its disappearance is taken 
+as evidence of the unreality of the dream (the nightmare). But we can also 
+"lose" a waking misfortune by going to sleep and dreaming. Further, just as 
+a waking misfortune can persist from one waking period to another, a 
+dreamed misfortune can persist from one dream to another (recurrent 
+nightmares). Thus, we conclude that in regard to the consistency of episodes 
+with each other, there is no basis for preferring any one episode, dreamed or 
+waking, as the standard by which the reality of other episodes will be judged. 
+Of course, rather than maintaining the reality of each episode as a separate 
+world, we can block all attributions of events to objective locations. This 
+approach would alter the quality of the events and bring us closer to 
+nihilistic empiricism. 
+
+A further problem arises if we take the dream reports of other people as 
+reports of reality. Suppose I am awake in my apartment at 3 AM on 
+2/6/1974, but that someone dreams at that time that I am out of my 
+apartment. Multiple existences which I do not even experience are now being 
+attributed to me. (My own episodes also pose a problem of whether 
+"multiple existences" are being attributed to me, but that problem concerns 
+events I experience myself.) What we should recognize is that the problem of 
+"multiple existences" is not as unique to our investigation as may at first 
+appear. Natural science has an analogous problem in disposing of the notion 
+of other minds. The notion of the existence of many minds, none of which 
+can experience any other, is difficult to assimilate to the cognitive model of 
+science. On the other hand, to deny the existence of any mind, as 
+behaviorists do, is to repudiate the scientist's observations of his own mental 
+
+
+172 
+
+
+life. And if the scientist's observations of his own mental life are repudiated, 
+then there is no good reason not to repudiate the scientist's observations of 
+his budily sensations and of external phenomena also; that is, to repudiate 
+the very possibility of scientific observation. Further, when behaviorists try 
+to convince people that they have no awareness, whom (or what) are they 
+trying to convince? And what is the behaviorist explanation of the origin of 
+the fiction of consciousness? Who benefits from perpetuating this fiction, 
+and how does he benefit? 
+
+We must emphasize that the above critique is not applicable to every 
+philosophical outlook. It applies specifically to science-- because the scientist 
+wants to have the benefits of two incompatible conceptual frameworks. 
+Some of the common sense about other minds is necessary in the operational 
+preliminaries to formal science; and the scientist's role as observer is 
+indispensable to formal science. Yet the conceptual framework of science is 
+essentially physicalistic, and can allow only for external objects. What this 
+difficulty reveals is that the cognitive model of science has stabilized and 
+prevailed even though it has blatent discrepancies in its foundations. The 
+foremost discrepancy, of course, is that the scientist is willing to have his 
+enterprise rest on a fiction, that of the common objective world. Thus, the 
+example of science suggests an additional way of dealing with the problems 
+which arise for our theory: we can allow discrepancies to persist unresolved. 
+
+There is an interesting observation to be made about one's own dreams 
+in connection with multiple existences. I have found that the person I am in 
+my dreams is significantly different from the waking identity I take for 
+granted, as in my dream of 2/1/1974. As for the problem of other people's 
+dreams, one way of handling them would be simply to reject the existence of 
+other people's dream worlds and of their consciousnesses, and to limit one's 
+consideration to one's own dreams. But perhaps the most productive way to 
+handle the problem would be to construe it as one involving language in the 
+way that the problems concerning quasi-dreams did. Our descriptive language 
+is a language of stable object gestalts, of scientific-pragmatic reality. If we 
+accept reports of other people's dreams in language which blocks any 
+implications concerning objective reality, then our perceptual interpretations 
+will be different and the quality of the events will be fundamentally 
+different. The experience-world will be flatter. But maybe this is a 
+revolutionary advance. Maybe reports of our appearances in other people's 
+dreams, in language which blocks any implications about reality, are what we 
+should strive for. And if ve cease to be stable object gestalts for others, 
+maybe our stable object gestalts will not even appear in their dreams. 
+
+
+Note on how to remember dreams 
+
+The trick in remembering a dream is to fix in your mind one incident or 
+theme in the dream immediately upon awaking from it. You will then be 
+able to remember the whole dream well enough to write a description of it 
+the next day, and you will probably find that for weeks afterwards you can 
+
+
+add to the description and correct it. 
+
+
+174 
+
+
+SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
+
+
+ey 
+
+
+16. On Social Recognition 
+
+
+The most important tasks which the individual can undertake arise not 
+from personal considerations but from the general conditions of society. The 
+standards of accomplishment for these tasks are implicit in the tasks, and are 
+objective in the sense that they can be applied without reference to public 
+opinion. For example, given that humans express themselves in statements 
+which are supposedly true or false, there arises a fundamental philosophical 
+"problem of knowledge." Then, the fact that societies are organized in 
+different ways at different times and places poses fundamental problems of 
+"political" thought and action. Sometimes the most important task posed by 
+the conditions of society is to invent a whole new activity. The origination 
+of experimental science in Europe in the seventeenth century is an example. 
+For lack of a better term, these tasks will be referred to as 'fundamental! 
+tasks." 
+
+The fact that a fundamental task is posed by the general conditions of 
+society does not mean that public opinion will be aware of the task, or that 
+the ruling class will commission someone to undertake it. It may well be that 
+the first person to perceive the problem is the person who solves it; and 
+public opinion may not catch up with him for decades or centuries. 
+
+The person who devotes himself to a fundamental task is, more often 
+than not, persecuted or ignored by society. Society puts up an immense 
+resistance to solutions of fundamenta! problems, even when, as in the cases 
+of Galois and Mendel, those solutions are politically innocuous. There is no 
+evidence that this state of affairs is limited to some particular organization of 
+society. Further, there are cases in which an objectively valid result is 
+known, and yet apparently society can never adopt the result institutionally. 
+Art is objectively inferior to brend, as I have shown, and yet all indications 
+are that art will always be a major institution. The persecution of individuals 
+who undertake fundamental tasks is an instance of a general human social 
+irrationality which runs throughout history, from human sacrifice in ancient 
+times to present-day war between communist countries. The conclusion is 
+that for an individual to commit himself to a fundamental task tends to 
+preclude social approval for his activities. 
+
+Quite apart from the fundamental tasks which are posed by general 
+social conditions, the ruling class needs a continual supply of new talent at 
+
+
+177 
+
+
+al! levels of society. At the lower levels, this supply is assured by the 
+necessity of selling one's labor power in order to eat. At the higher levels of 
+accomplishment, the ruling class assures itself of a continual supply of new 
+talent by offering publicity or fame--social recognition--as a reward for 
+accomplishing the tasks specified by the ruling class. Famous men such as 
+Einstein are held up to children as examples of the proper relationship 
+between the talented individual and society; and an internationa! institution, 
+the Nobel Prize, exists to implement this system of supplying talent. 
+According to the doctrine, the individual has a duty to benefit society, to 
+choose a task posed by the ruling class as his occupation. (His publicly 
+known occupation is supposed to correspond to his real goals.) If he 
+performs successfully, he will receive publicity as an indication that he is 
+indeed benefiting society. 
+
+Our analysis of fame is the opposite of that of Ben Vautier. Vautier 
+asserts that the desire for personal publicity is an instinctive drive of human 
+beings, and that the accumulation of publicity is a genuinely selfish act like 
+the accumulation of food. In fact, Vautier goes so far as to make no 
+distinction between what Gypsy Rose Lee and Lenin, for example, did to 
+gain fame; and he assumes that a pacifist, for example, would welcome 
+military honors equally as much as he would a peace award. We assert, on 
+the contrary, that the desire for publicity is not instinctive; it is inculcated in 
+the young so that the ruling class may have a continual supply of new talent 
+to serve its purposes. The desire for publicity, far more than the desire for 
+money, is establishment-serving more than self-serving. (We suggest that the 
+principal reason why Vautier seeks publicity is not instinct, but economics. 
+Vautier has no inherited source of income, and has never been trained for a 
+profession. For him, the alternative to the art/publicity racket would be 
+common labor. !f he had the opportunity for a life of leisure, he might feel 
+differently about publicity.) 
+
+The issues which are raised here are extremely important for the person 
+who perceives a fundamental task, because his sanity may depend on 
+whether he understands the rationality of his motives for undertaking the 
+task. He will already have been inculcated with the establishment's concepts 
+of service and recognition, concepts which are epitomized in the image of 
+Einstein's career. What we suggest is that it is vital to disabuse oneself of 
+these concepts. To repeat, fundamental tasks are posed by the general 
+conditions of society. Yet the individual who undertakes such a task will 
+probably be persecuted or ignored. Given these circumstances, the doctrine 
+that the individual has a duty to benefit society is a hypocritical fraud, an 
+obscenity. For the individual to commit himself to a fundamental task tends 
+to preclude social recognition for his activities; or, to reverse the remark, 
+
+
+178 
+
+
+social recognition is not a reward to accomplishment of a fundamental task 
+(just as military honors are not a reward to pacifism). Thus, it is not rational 
+for the individual to undertake a fundamental task in order to gain fame. 
+
+The motive for undertaking a fundamental task should be genuine 
+selfishness. (We will continue our argument that the striving for fame is not 
+genuinely selfish below.) The individual who perceives a fundamental task 
+should undertake it for his private gratification. The task is of primary 
+importance to society. By accomplishing it, the individual gains the privilege 
+of knowing something which is socially important, but which society cannot 
+deal with honestly. The individual should undertake the task in order to 
+utilize his real abilities, to develop his potentiality for its own sake. The 
+undertaking of a significant task which utilizes one's real abilities is the true 
+source of happiness. To perceive a fundamental task and not to undertake it 
+is to be stunted: one loses one's self-respect and becomes progressively 
+demoralized. (Another rational motive for undertaking a fundamental task is 
+to transform the social environment by methods which do not depend on 
+society's approval or comprehension.) 
+
+We do not mean to suggest that the individual who undertakes a 
+fundamental task should conceal his results. Even though such tasks may 
+seem individualistic, they require cooperative, social activity for their 
+accomplishment. A proposed solution to a fundamental problem can hardly 
+develop without being scrutinized from a variety of perspectives. It is 
+essential to have qualified critics, and it is unfortunate that they are so rare. 
+Solutions to fundamental problems are social consumption goods (their 
+consumption is not exclusionary), so that critics or collaborators have as 
+much opportunity to benefit from them as their originators do. As an 
+example, most of my writings are really collaborations with Tony Conrad. I 
+often find that I do not understand my own position until I know how it 
+appears to him. When communication of results is essentially a form of 
+collaboration, it is very different from the attempt to gain publicity or fame. 
+
+It is precisely in the context of the generalized social irrationality which 
+runs throughout history that the attempt to gain fame must be seen as 
+foolishly un-selfish. What difference can it possibly make whether the masses 
+venerate one's name a hundred years after one's death? The adulation of the 
+masses after one is dead is of no conceivable value to oneself. It is society 
+which indoctrinates one to worry about one's reputation after one is dead, in 
+order to condition one to serve the interests of the ruling class. 
+
+Then, what does it mean to the individual who solves a fundamental 
+problem to have his name publicized in the mass media, to be a celebrity 
+among people who cannot possibly understand what he has done? Even 
+more important, we must recognize that publicity carries a definte risk for 
+
+
+179 
+
+
+the individual committed to a fundamental task. The solution of such a 
+problem must usually be expressed in categories which are incommensurate 
+and incompatible with the categories of thought which are common coin at 
+the time. In order for the solution of a fundamental! problem to be exposed 
+in the mass media, it has to be translated into media categories and this 
+usually results in irreparable distortion. In fact, the solution is distorted in 
+precisely such a manner that it begins to serve the interests of the ruling 
+class. One encounters an immense pressure which tends to harness one to 
+goals which have nothing to do with objective value. More precisely, when an 
+individual who has solved a fundamental problem is publicized in the mass 
+media, a process of mutual subversion takes place as between the 
+establishment/media and the individual. In the process, the establishment is 
+likely to come out far ahead. 
+
+There are two other reasons why it is actually advantageous to the 
+individual who undertakes a fundamental! task to avoid publicity. Since one's 
+activity is likely to be treated as a threat by society, one can minimize the 
+energy required to defend it, and can carry the activity further, if one 
+receives no publicity. Then, there will unavoidably be false starts made in 
+developing the solution to a fundamental problem. If one is not operating in 
+the glare of publicity, it is far easier to abandon these false starts. 
+
+It used to be that when I saw publicity being given to an inferior way of 
+doing a thing, and I knew a better way, then I reacted with a sense of duty. I 
+had to appoint myself as a missionary, to enter the public arena and start a 
+campaign to replace the inferior approach with the better approach. But this 
+sense of duty must now be called into question. Is it really in my interest to. 
+thrust myself on the media as a missionary? The truth is that in the context 
+of generalized social irrationality, it is un-selfish and self-sacrificing to believe 
+that I must either agree with current fads or else contest them publicly. The 
+genuinely selfish attitude is *hat it is sufficient for me to know what the 
+superior approach is. I can ignore the false issues which fill the mass media; I 
+do not have to participate in public opinion at all. The genuinely selfish 
+attitude is that "it does not concern me." Genuine selfishness is living one's 
+life on a level which does not communicate with the level of the mass media 
+and public opinion. 
+
+If we recognize that it is irrational to undertake a fundamental task in 
+order to benefit society and gain social approval, then our very choice of 
+fundamental tasks shouid be affected. The most visible fundamental tasks 
+are those which the establishment is to some extent aware of, and which if 
+accomplished would immediately be rewarded with social approval. (In the 
+natural sciences, there literally may be a race to solve a well-known problem). 
+But if our motives are genuinely self-serving, and have to do with the 
+
+
+180 
+
+
+development of our potentiality for its own sake, then there is no reason to 
+limit ourselves to widely understood problems. We can undertake to discover 
+timeless results--permanent answers to questions which will be important 
+indefinitely--without concerning ourselves with whether society can adopt 
+the results institutionally. We can pose problems of which neither the 
+establishment, the media, nor public opinion are aware. We can undertake 
+tasks which draw on our unique abilities, so that our personal contribution is 
+indispensable. 
+
+There is a difficulty which we have postponed mentioning. The 
+individual is always compelled to engage in some socially approved activity 
+in order to obtain the means of subsistence. We cannot assume that the 
+individual will have an inherited source of income. In order to pursue a 
+fundamental task, he will have to pursue a legitimate occupation at the same 
+time. It may be extremely difficult to lead such a double life, because to do 
+so requires precisely the self-assurance. that comes from accomplishing the 
+fundamenta! task. Leading a double life is not a game for the person who is 
+unsure about his real abilities or his vocation. If the individual is capable of 
+leading a double life, our suggestion is to obtain the means of subsistence by 
+the most efficient swindle available. Do not hesitate to practice outward 
+conformity in order to exploit the establishment for your own purposes. 
+
+There remains the case of the individual who, like Galois, is not 
+prepared to lead a double life. His problem is one of destitution. However, 
+he is different from an ordinary pauper. By assumption, he is more talented 
+than the members of the establishment; he does not belong to the 
+establishment because he is overqualified for it. Given that he is more 
+talented than members of the establishment, and that his survival is 
+threatened, a collateral fundamental task emerges, the task of immediately 
+transmuting his talent into power to handle the establishment on his own 
+terms. To perceive this task is a major resuit of this essay. The task cannot be 
+defined accurately without a perfect understanding of the difference 
+between fundamental tasks and the serve-society-and-get-famous fraud. We 
+contend that Galois should have regarded the task of immediately 
+transmuting his talent into power over the establishment as an inseparable 
+collateral problem to his mathematical researches. From a common sense 
+point of view, this collateral task will seem utterly impossible. However, we 
+are talking about individuals whose vocation is to do the seemingly 
+impossible. Thus, we conclude by leaving this unsolved fundamental problem 
+for the reader to ponder. 
+
+
+181 
+
+
+17. Creep 
+
+
+When Helen Lefkowitz said I was "such a creep" at Interlochen in 
+1956, her remark epitomized the feeling that females have always had about 
+me. My attempts to understand why females rejected me and to decide what 
+to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961-1962, I tried to 
+develop a theory of the creep problem. This theory took involuntary 
+celibacy as the defining characteristic of the creep. Every society has its 
+image of the ideal young adult, even though the symbols of growing up 
+change from generation to generation. The creep is an involuntary celibate 
+because he fails to develop the surface traits of adulthood--poise and 
+sophistication; and because he is shy, unassertive, and lacks self-confidence 
+in the presence of others. The creep is awkward and has an unstylish 
+appearance. He seems sexless and childish. He is regarded by the ideal adults 
+with condescending scorn, amusement, or pity. 
+
+Because he seems weak and inferior in the company of others, and 
+cannot maintain his self-respect, the creep is pressed into isolation. There, 
+the creep doesn't have the pressure of other people's presence to make him 
+feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not te be 
+inferior. The creep can develop the morale required to differ. The creep also 
+tends to expand his fantasy life, so that it takes the place of the 
+interpersonal life from which he has been excluded. The important 
+consequence is that the creep is led to discover a number of positive 
+personality values which cannot be achieved by the mature, married adult. 
+During the period when I developed the creep theory, I was spending almost 
+all of my time alone in my room, thinking and writing. This fact should 
+make the positive creep values more understandable. 
+
+1. Because of his isolation, the creep has a qualitatively higher sense of 
+identity. He has a sense of the boundaries of his personality, and a control of 
+what goes on within those boundaries. In contrast, the mature adult, who 
+spends all his time with his marriage partner or in groups of people, is a mere 
+channel into which thoughts flow from outside; he lives in a state of 
+conformist anonymity. 
+
+2. The creep is emotionally autonomous, independent, or 
+self-contained. He develops an elaborate world of feelings which remain 
+
+
+182 
+
+
+within himself, or which are directed toward inanimate objects. The creep 
+may cooperate with other people in work situations, but he does not develop 
+emotional attachments to other people. 
+
+3. Although the creep's intellectual abilities develop with education, 
+the creep lives in a sexually neutral world and a child's world throughout his 
+life. He is thus able to play like a child. He retains the child's capacity for 
+make-believe. He retains the child's lyrical creativity in regard to 
+self-originated, self-justifying activities. 
+
+4. There is enormous room in the creep's life for the development of 
+every aspect of the inner world or the inner life. The creep can devote 
+himself to thought, fantasy, imagination, imaging, variegated mental states, 
+dreams, internal emotions and feelings towards inanimate objects. The creep 
+develops his inner world on his own power. His inner life originates with 
+himself, and is controlled and intellectually consequential. The creep has no 
+use for meditations whose content is supplied by religious traditions. Nor has 
+he any use for those drug experiences which adolescents undertake to prove 
+how grown-up they are, and whose content is supplied by fashion. The 
+creep's development of his inner life is the summation of all the positive 
+creep values. 
+
+After describing these values, the creep theory returned to the problem 
+of the creep's involuntary celibacy. For physical reasons, the creep remains a 
+captive audience for the opposite sex, but his attempts to gain acceptance by 
+the opposite sex always end in failure. On the other hand, the creep may 
+well find the positive creep values so desirable that he will want to intensify 
+them. The solution is for the creep to seek a medical procedure which will 
+sexually neutralize him. He can then attain the full creep values, without the 
+disability of an unresolved physical desire. 
+
+Actually, the existence of the positive creep values proves that the 
+creep is an authentic non-human who happens to be trapped in human social 
+biology. The positive creep values imply a specification of a whole 
+non-human: social biology which would be appropriate to those values. 
+Finally, the creep theory mentioned that creeps often make good grades in 
+school, and can thus do clerical work or other work useful to humans. This 
+fact would be the basis for human acceptance of the creep. 
+
+In the years after I presented the creep theory, a number of 
+inadequacies became apparent in it. The principal one was that I managed to 
+cast off the surface traits of the creep, but that when I did my problem 
+became even more intractable. An entirely different analysis of the problem 
+was required. 
+
+My problem actually has to do with the enormous discrepancy between 
+the ways I can relate to males and the ways I can relate to females. The 
+
+
+183 
+
+
+essence of the problem has to do with the social values of females, which are 
+completely different from my own. The principal occupation of my life has 
+been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in "writings." Now 
+most males have the same social values that I find in all females. But there 
+have always been a few males with exceptional values; and my activities have 
+developed through exchanges of ideas with these males. These exchanges 
+have come about spontaneously and naturally. In contrast, I have never had 
+such an exchange of ideas with females, for the following reasons. Females 
+have nothing to say that applies to my activities. They cannot understand 
+that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the "masses" who 
+oppose and have tried to discourage my activities. 
+
+The great divergence between myself and females comes in the area 
+where each individual is responsible for what he or she is; the area in which 
+one must choose oneself and the principles with which one will be identified. 
+This area is certainly not a matter of intelligence or academic degrees. 
+Further, the fact that society has denied many opportunities to females at 
+one time or another is not involved here. (My occupation has no formal 
+prerequisites, no institutional barriers to entry. One enters it by defining 
+oneself as being in it. Yet no female has chosen to enter it. Or consider such 
+figures as Galileo and Galois. By the standards of their contemporaries, these 
+individuals were engaged in utterly ridiculous, antisocial pursuits. Society 
+does not give anybody the "opportunity" to engage in such pursuits. Society 
+tries to prevent everybody from being a Galileo or Galois. To be a Galileo is 
+really a matter of choosing sides, of choosing to take a certain stand.) 
+
+Let me be specific about my own experiences. When I distributed the 
+prospectus for The Journal of Indeterminate Mathematical Investigations to 
+graduate students at the Courant Institute in the fall of 1967, the most 
+negative reactions came from the females. The mere fact that I wanted to 
+invent a mathematics outside of academic mathematics was in and of itself 
+offensive and revolting to them. Since the academic status of these females 
+was considerably higher than my own, the disagreement could only be 
+considered one of values. 
+
+The field of art provides an even better example, because there are 
+many females in this field. In the summer of 1969 I attended a meeting of 
+the women's group of the Art Workers Coalition in New York. Many of the 
+women there had seen my Down With Art pamphlet. Ail the females who 
+have seen this pamphlet have reacted negatively, and it is quite clear what 
+their attitude is. They believe that they are courageously defending modern 
+art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a "modern 
+museum art appreciation course." The more they are pressed, the more 
+proudiy do they defend "Great Art." Now the objective validity of my 
+
+
+184 
+
+
+opposition to art is absolutely beyond question. To defend modern art is 
+precisely what a hopeless mediocrity would consider courageous. Again, it is 
+clear that the opposition between myself and females is in the area where 
+one must choose one's values. 
+
+I have found that what I really have to do to make a favorable 
+impression on females is to conceal or suspend my activities--the most 
+important part of my life; and to adopt a facade of conformity. Thus, I 
+perceive females as persons who cannot function in my occupation. I 
+perceive them as being like an employment agency, like an institution to 
+which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can he counted on to 
+represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I 
+have explained, is distant from my own. {In March 1970, at the Institute for 
+Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he 
+would murder his own mother, and murder ail his friends, if by doing so he 
+could get the aliens to take him to another star and show him a higher 
+civilization. My own position is the same as Johnson's.) 
+
+It follows that my perception of sex is totally different from that of 
+others. The depictions of sex in the mass media are completely at variance 
+with my own experience. I object to pornography in particular because it is 
+like deceptive advertising for sex; it creates the impression that the physical 
+aspect of sex can be separated from human personalities and social 
+interaction. Actually, if most people can separate sex from personality, it is 
+because they are so average that their values are the same as everybody else's. 
+In my case, although I am a captive audience for females for physical 
+reasons, the disparity between my values and theirs overrides the physical 
+attraction I feel for them. It is hard enough to present a facade of 
+conformity in order to deal with an employment agency, but the thought of 
+having to maintain such a facade in a more intimate relationship is 
+completely demoralizing. 
+
+What conclusions can be drawn by comparing the creep theory with my 
+later experience? First, some individuals who are unquestionably creeps as 
+far as the surface traits are concerned simply may not be led to the deeper 
+values I described. They may not have the talent to get anything positive out 
+of their involuntary situation; or their aspirations may be so conformist that 
+they do not see their involuntary situation as a positive opportunity. Many 
+creeps are female, but all the evidence indicates that they have the same 
+values I have attributed to other females--values which are hard to reconcile 
+with the deeper creep values. 
+
+As for the positive creep values, I may have had them even before I 
+began to care about whether females accepted me. For me, these values may 
+have been the cause, not the effect, of surface creepiness. They are closely 
+
+
+185 
+
+
+related to the values that underlie my activities. It is not necessary to appear 
+strangely dressed, childish, unassertive, awkward, and lacking in confidence 
+in order to achieve the positive creep values. (1 probably emphasized surface 
+creep traits during my youth in order to dissociate myself from conformist 
+opinion at a time when I hadn't yet had the chance to make a full 
+substantive critique of it.) Even sex, in and of itself, might not be 
+incompatible with the creep inner life; what makes it incompatible is the 
+female personality and female social values, which in real life cannot be 
+separated from sex and are the predominant aspect of it. 
+
+
+Having cast off the surface traits of the creep, I can now see that 
+whether I make a favorable impression on females really depends on whether 
+I conceal my occupation. Celibacy is an effect of my occupation; it does not 
+have the role of a primary cause that the creep theory attributed to it. 
+However, it does have consequences of its own. In the context of the entire 
+situation I have described, it constitutes an absolute dividing line between 
+myself and humanity. It does seem to be closely related to the deeper creep 
+values, especially the one of living in a child's world. 
+
+As for the sexual neutralization advocated in the creep theory, to find a 
+procedure which actually achieves the stated objective without having all 
+sorts of unacceptable side effects would be an enormous undertaking. It is 
+not feasible as a minor operation developed for a single person. Further, as 
+the human species comes to have vast technological capabilities, many 
+special interest groups will want to tinker with human social biology, each in 
+a different way, for political reasons. I am no longer interested in petty 
+tinkering with human biology. As I make it clear in other writings, I am in 
+favor of building entities which are actially superior to humans, and which 
+avoid the whole fabric of human biosocial defects, not just one or two of 
+them. 
+
+
+186 
+
+
+2/22/1963 
+Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstrate against Lincoln Center, February 22, 1963 
+(photo by Tony Conrad) 
+
+
+18. The Three Levels of Politics 
+
+
+Political activity and its results can occur on three levels. The first level 
+is the personal one. An individual may vote to re-elect a local politician 
+because of patronage he has received, for example. On this level the 
+individual's motivation is narrow, immediate self-interest. Often the action 
+has a defensive character; the individual is trying to hold on to something he 
+already possesses. 
+
+The second level may be called the historical level. It is exemplified by 
+the Civil War in the United States. Certain political movements result in 
+largescale, irreversible social change. The Civil War set in motion the 
+industrialization of the United States, as well as abolishing slavery. In 1860, 
+slavery was viewed by large numbers of Americans as a legitimate institution. 
+One hundred years later, even American conservatives did not often defend 
+it. To re-establish a plantation economy in the South today would be out of 
+the question. These observations prove that on the second level, society 
+really does change. On this level, political action does make a difference. 
+
+However, there is a further aspect to the Civil War which indicates that 
+politics does not make the difference people think it makes. According to 
+the ideology of the abolitionists, the accomplishment of the Civil War would 
+be to raise the slaves to a position of equality with whites. In fact, nothing of 
+the sort happened. The real accomplishment of the Civil War was to 
+transform the United States into an industria! capitalist society (and to 
+abolish an institution which was incompatible with the capitalists' need for a 
+free labor market). By the time the Northern businessmen brought 
+Reconstruction to an end, it was clear that the position of blacks in 
+American society was where it had always been: at the bottom. The Civil 
+War changed American society, but is did not make the society any more 
+utopian. On the contrary, it brought into prominence still another violent 
+social conflict--the conflict between labor and capital. 
+
+The third level of politics has to do with the utopian aspect of modern 
+political ideologies, the aspect which calls not only for society to change, but 
+to change for the better. Typical third-level political goals are the abolition 
+of war, the abolition of the oligarchic structure of society, and the abolition 
+of economic institutions which value human lives in terms of money. in all 
+of human history, society has never changed on this third level. 
+
+
+188 
+
+
+The successful Communist revolutionists of the twentieth century (in 
+the underdeveloped countries) have repeatedly claimed to have accomplished 
+third-level change in their societies. However, these claims of third-level 
+change have always turned out to be illusions which cover a recapitulation of 
+capitalist development. Communist revolutions are typical examples of real 
+second-level change which is accomplished under the cover of claims of 
+third-level change, claims which are pure and simple frauds. 
+
+By -introducing the concept of levels of politics, we can resolve the 
+apparent paradox that society certainly changes, but that it really does not 
+change. It is important to understand that empirical evidence on the 
+question of the levels of politics can only be drawn from the past, the 
+present, and the immediate future (five to ten years). Recent technological 
+developments have brought into question the very existence of the human 
+species. In addition, technology is developing much faster than society is. It 
+is meaningless to discuss the issue of second versus third-level social change 
+with reference to the more distant future, because there may not be any 
+human society in the more distant future. 
+
+This essay is concerned with the politics of the third level. The first and 
+second levels are certainly rea! enough, but we are not the least interested in 
+them. As we have just said, we make the restriction that any empirical 
+analysis of the third level must refer to the past, the present, or the 
+immediate future. Our purpose is to present a substitute for the politics of 
+the third level. 
+
+There are a number of present-day political tendencies which hold out 
+the promise of third-level social change. These tendencies are all descended 
+from the leftist working-class movements of nineteenth century Europe, 
+most of them by way of the early Soviet regime. The promises of third-level 
+change held out by these tendencies are nothing but cheap illusions. What is 
+more, a careful examination of leftist ideologies in relation to the historical 
+record will show that the promises of third-level change are extremely vague 
+and without substance. Beneath the surface of vague promises, leftist 
+ideologies do not even favor third-level change; they are opposed to it. 
+
+One example will serve to demonstrate this contention. In my capacity 
+as a professional economist, I have become familiar with the official 
+economic policies--the doctrines of the professional economists--of the 
+various socialist governments and leftist movements throughout the world. It 
+should be mentioned that most of the followers of leftism are not familiar 
+with these technical economic policies; they are aware only of vague, 
+meaningless promises of future bliss coming from leftist political 
+speechmakers. When we turn to technical economic realities, we find that 
+virtually every leftist tendency in the world today accepts economic 
+
+
+189 
+
+
+principles which in the parlance of the layman are referred to as 
+"capitalism." The most important principle is stated by Ernest Mandel: "the 
+economy continues to be fundamentally a money economy, with the 
+satisfaction of the bulk of people's needs depending on the number of 
+currency tokens a person possesses." When it comes to the realities of 
+technical economics, virtually every leftist in the world accepts this 
+principle. So far as the third level is concerned, there is no such thing as a 
+non-capitalist polical tendency, and there is no point in hoping for one. A 
+similar conclusion holds for virtually every aspect of third-level politics. 
+Leftists claim that Communism eliminates the causes of war; while at the 
+same time war breaks out beween China and the Soviet Union. 
+
+We propose to draw a far-reaching conclusion from these 
+considerations. Returning to the example of first-level politics, it is rational 
+for the patronage-seeker to be in favor of the election of one focal politican 
+and against the election of his opponent. This is a matter which is within the 
+scope of human responsibility, and with respect to which individual action 
+can make a difference. But it is not rationa! to be either for against 
+"capitalism," to be either for or against war. As we have seen, "capitalism" 
+and war are permanent aspects of human society, and no political tendency 
+genuinely opposes them. {t is meaningless to treat them as if they were 
+within the scope of human responsibility in the sense that the election of a 
+local politician is. in other words, the third-level aspects of society are not 
+partial, limited aspects which can be eliminated by conscious human action 
+while the bulk of human life is retained. The only way you can meaningfully 
+be against the third-level aspects of human society is by adopting a different 
+attitude to the human species as such. 
+
+This attitude is the one you would adopt if you were suddenly thrown 
+into a society of apes-apes which perpetually preyed within their own 
+ecological niche. It is clear that if you proposed to be "against" such a 
+situation, and to do something about it, then politics as it is normally 
+conceived would be out of the question. To anticipate our later discussion, 
+the first thing you must do is to protect yourself against society. The way to 
+do this is to create an invisible enclave for yourself within the Establishment. 
+Having such an enclave certainly does not imply loyalty to the 
+Establishment. On the contrary, there is no reason why you should be toyal 
+to any faction among the apes. You only pretend to be loyal to one faction 
+or another when it is necessary for self-defense. If there is a change of regime 
+in the country where you are living, you either leave or join the winning side. 
+Transfer your invisible enclave to whatever Establishment is available. But all 
+this is an external, defensive tactic which has nothing to do with the primary 
+goals of our strategy. 
+
+
+190 
+
+
+We will finish our critique of third-level politics, and then continue the 
+description of the substitute which we propose. In addition to making vague 
+promises of third-level change, leftism encourages indignation at social 
+conditions which are beyond anyone's power to affect. Leftism attributes 
+great ethical merit to such indignation and morally condemns anyone who 
+
+
+does not share it. But this attitude is totally irrational and dishonest. In 
+philosophy and mathematics, it is possible for a proposition to be valid even 
+though it has no chance of institutional acceptance. But in social, economic, 
+and political matters, attitudes which have policy implications are nonsense 
+unless the policies are actually implemented. Institutional acceptance is the 
+only arena of validation of a social doctrine. It is absurd to attribute ethical 
+merit to a longing for the impossible. Indignation at a social condition which 
+is beyond anyone's power to affect is meaningless. (Indeed, to the extent 
+that such indignation diverts social energy into a dead end, it is 
+"counter-revolutionary.") To be more radical in social matters than society 
+can possibly be is not virtuous; it is idiotic. 
+
+Although third-level politics is a fraud, it is the contention of this essay 
+that there exists a rational substitute for it. Once you perceive that you exist 
+in a society of apes who attack their own ecological niche, there are rational 
+goals which you can adopt for your life that correspond to third-level change 
+even though they have nothing to do with leftism. The preliminary step, as 
+we have said, is to create an invisible enclave for yourself within. the 
+Establishment. The remainder of the strategy is in two parts which are in 
+fact closely related. 
+
+The first part is based on a consideration of the effects which such 
+figures as Galileo, Galois, Abel, Lobachevski, and Mendel have had on 
+society. These men devoted themselves to researches which seemed to be 
+purely abstract, without any relevance to the practical world. Yet, through 
+long, tortuous chains of events, their researches have had disruptive effects 
+on society which go far beyond the effects of most political movements. The 
+reason has to do with the peculiar role which technology has in human 
+society. Society's attitude in relation to technology is like that of a child 
+who cannot refrain from playing with matches. We find that 
+the abstract researches of the men being considered accomplished a dual 
+result. On the one hand, they represented inner escape, the achievement of a 
+private utopia now. Of course, the general public will not understand this; 
+only the few who are capable of participating in such activities will 
+appreciate the extent to which they can constitute inner escape. On the 
+other hand, they have had profoundly disruptive effects on society, effects 
+which still have not run their course. 
+
+Thus, the first part of our strategy is to follow the example of these 
+
+
+191 
+
+
+individuals. Of course, we do not stay within the bounds of present-day 
+academic research, any more than Galileo or Mendel did in their time. What 
+we have in mind is activities in the intellectual modality represented by the 
+rest of this book. 
+
+It should be clear that such activities do represent a private utopia, and are at 
+the same time the seeds of disruptive future technologies which lead directly 
+to the second part of our strategy. 
+
+
+It is important to realize that by speaking of inner escape we do not 
+mean fashionable drug use, or Eastern religions, or occultism. These 
+threadbare superstitions are embraced by the cosmopolitan middle 
+classes--intellectually spineless fools who are always grasping for spiritual 
+comfort. Superstitious fads are escapism in the worst sense, as they only 
+serve to further muddle the heads of the fools who embrace them. In 
+contrast, the inner escape which we propose is origina! and consequential, 
+leading to an increase in man's manipulative power over the world. It has 
+nothing to do with irrationality or superstition. 
+
+The second part of our strategy is predicated on the following states of 
+affairs. First, it is the human species as such which is the obstacle to 
+third-level political change. Secondly, technology is developing far more 
+rapidly than society is, and no feature of the natural world need any longer 
+be taken for granted. Society cannot help but foster technology in the 
+pursuit of military and economic supremacy, and this includes technology 
+which can contribute to the making of artificial superhuman beings. Every 
+fundamental advance in logic, physics, neurophysiology, and 
+neurocybernetics obviously leads in this direction. Thus, the second part of 
+the strategy is to participate in the making of artificial superhumans, 
+possibly by infiltrating the military-scientific establishment and diverting 
+research in the appropriate direction. 
+
+
+Note: This essay provides a specific, practical strategy for the present 
+environment. It also shows that certain types of opposition to the status quo 
+are meaningless. Subversion Theory, on the other hand, was a general theory 
+which was not limited to any one environment, but also which failed to 
+provide a specific strategy for the present environment. 
+
+
+192 
+
+
+SCIENCE (LOGIC) 
+
+
+19. The Logic of Admissible Contradictions--work in progress 
+Chapter [1!. A Provisional Axiomatic Treatment 
+
+
+In the first and second chapters, we developed our intuitions 
+concerning perceptions of the logically impossible in as much detail as we 
+could. We decided, on intuitive grounds, which contradictions were 
+admissible and which were not. As we proceeded, it began to appear that the 
+results suggested by intuition were cases of a few general principles. In this 
+chapter, we will adopt these principles as postulates. The restatement of our 
+theory does not render the preceding chapters unnecessary. Only by 
+beginning with an exhaustive, intuitive discussion of perceptual illusions 
+could we convey the substance underlying the notations which we call 
+admissble contradictions, and motivate the unusual collection of postulates 
+which we will adopt. 
+
+All properties will be thought of as 'parameters,' such as time, 
+location, color, density, acidity, etc. Different parameters will be represented 
+by the letters x, y, z, .... Different values of one parameter, say x, will be 
+represented by x1, X9, .... Each parameter has a domain, the set of all values 
+it can assume. An ensembie (Xo, Yo: Zo, ...) will stand for the single possible 
+phenomenon which has x-value xg, y-value yo, etc. Several remarks are in 
+order. My ensembles are a highly refined version of Rudolph Carnap's 
+intensions or intension sets (sets of all possible entities having a given 
+property). The number of parameters, or properties, must be supposed to be 
+indefinitely large. By giving a possible phenomenon fixed values for every 
+parameter, I assure that there will be only one such possible phenomenon. In 
+other words, my intension sets are all singletons. Another point is that if we 
+specify some of the parameters and specify their ranges, we limit the 
+phenomena which can be represented by our "ensembles." If our first 
+parameter is time and its range ts R, and our second parameter is spatial 
+
+
+location and its range is R , then we are limited to phenomena which are 
+point phenomena in space and time. !f we have a parameter for speed of 
+motion, the motion will have to be infinitesimal. We cannot have a 
+parameter for weight at all; we can only have one for density. The physicist 
+encounters similar conceptual problems, and does noi find them 
+insurmountable. 
+
+Let (x4, y, Z, ...), (x9, y, Z, -..), etc. stand for possible phenomena 
+
+
+195 
+
+
+which all differ from each other in respect to parameter x but are identical in 
+respect to every other parameter y, z, ... . {If the ensembles were intension 
+sets, they would be disjoint precisely because x takes a different value in 
+each.) A "simple contradiction family" of ensembles is the family [(x4,y, 2, 
+aay (x9, y, Z, ...), «J. The family may have any number of ensembles. It 
+actually represents many families, because y, z, ... are allowed to vary; but 
+each of these parameters must assume the same value in all ensembles in any 
+one family. x, on the other hand, takes different values in each ensemble in 
+any one family, values which may be fixed. A parameter which has the same 
+value throughout any one family will be referred to as a consistency 
+parameter. A parameter which has a different value in each ensemble in a 
+given family will be referred to as a contradiction parameter. 
+"Contradiction" will be shortened to "con." A simple con family is then a 
+family with one con parameter. The consistency parameters may be dropped 
+from the notation, but the reader must remember that they are implicitly 
+present, and must remember how they function. 
+
+A con parameter, instead of being fixed in every ensemble, may be 
+restricted to a different subset of its domain in every ensemble. The subsets 
+must be mutually disjoint for the con family to be well-defined. The con 
+family then represents many families in another dimension, because it 
+represents every family which can be formed by choosing a con parameter 
+value from the first subset, one from the second subset, etc. 
+
+Con families can be defined which have more than one con parameter, 
+i.e. more than one parameter satisfying all the conditions we put on x. Such 
+con families are not "simple." Let the cardinality of a con family be 
+indicated by a number prefixed to "family," and let the number of con 
+parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to "con." Remembering that 
+consistency parameters are understood, a 2-con °-family would appear as 
+(x4, Yq). (x9, y), sei. 
+
+A "contradiction" or "y - object" is not explicitly defined, but it is 
+notated by putting "y" in front of a con family. The characteristics of y 
+-objects, or cons, are established by introducing additional postulates in the 
+theory. 
+
+In this theory, every con is either "admissible" or "not admissible." 
+"Admissible" will be shortened to "am." The initial amcons of the theory 
+are introduced by postulate. Essentially, what is postulated is that cons with 
+a certain con parameter are am. (The cons directly postulated to be am are 
+on 1-con families.) However, the postulate will specify other requirements for 
+admissibility besides having the given con parameter. The requisite 
+cardinality of the con family will be specified. Also, the subsets will be 
+specified to which the con parameter must be restricted in each ensemble in 
+
+
+196 
+
+
+the con. A con must satisfy all postulated requirements before it is admitted 
+by the postulate. 
+
+The task of the theory is to determine whether the admissibility of the 
+cons postulated to be am implies the admissibility of any other cons. The 
+method we have developed for solving such problems will be expressed as a 
+collection of posiulates for our theory. 
+
+Postulate 1. Given y[(x € A), (x € B}, ...] am, where x ¢ A, xe B, ... are the 
+restrictions on the con parameter, and given A1CA, By CB, ..., where Ay, By, 
+.. & @, then gl(x € Ay), (x € By),...] is am. This postulate is obviously 
+equivalent to the postulate that y[{x € ANC), (xe BNC),...] is am, where C is 
+a subset of x's domain end the intersections are non-empty. (Proof: Choose 
+C= A, UB... .) 
+
+Postulate 2. If x and y are simple amcon parameters, then a con with con 
+parameters x and y is am if it satisfies the postulated requirements 
+concerning amcons on x and the postulated requirements concerning amcons 
+on y. 
+
+The effect of all! our assumptions up to now is to make parameters 
+totally independent. They do not interact with each other at all. 
+
+We will now introduce some specific amcons by postulate. If s is speed, 
+consideration of the waterfall illusion suggests that we postulate y[(s>O), 
+{s=O)] to be am. (But with this postulate, we have come a long way from 
+the literary description of the waterfall illusion! } Note the implicit 
+requirements that the con family must be a 2-family, and that s must be 
+selected from [O] in one ensemble and from [s: s>O] in the other ensemble. 
+
+If tis time, t € R, consideration of the phrase "b years ago," which is an 
+amcon in the natural language, suggests that we postulate y[(t): a-b<t<v-b & 
+av] to be am, where a is a fixed time expressed in years A.D., bisa fixed 
+number of years, and v is a variable--the time of the present instant in years 
+A.D. The implicit requirements are that the con family must have the 
+cardinality of the continuum, and that every value of t from a-b to v-b must 
+appear in an ensemble, where v is a variable. Ensembles are thus continually 
+added to the con family. Note that there is the non-trivial possibility of using 
+this postulate more than once. We could admit a con for a = 1964, b=, 
+then admit another for a=1963, b=2, and admit stifl another for a=1963, 
+b=1; etc. 
+
+Let p be spatial location, p é R2. Let P; be a non-empty, bounded, 
+connected subset of R2. Restriction subsets will be selected from the P;. 
+Specifically, let Py APs = ¢. Consideration of a certain dreamed illusion 
+
+
+suggests that we admit y[(p € P;), (p € Py)]. The implicit requirements are 
+obvious. But in this case, there are more requirements in the postulate of 
+
+
+197 
+
+
+admissibility. Vay we apply the postulate twice? May we admit first y[(pe 
+P4), (pe P5)} and then y[(peP3), (pePg)], where P2 and Py are arbitrary 
+P;'s different from P; and Po? The answer is no. We may admit y [(p € P4), 
+(p € Po)] for arbitrary Py and Po, Py OP = «3, but having made this "initial 
+choice," the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary P3 and Pg. A second 
+con y[(p € Pa), (p € P4)], PgNP4 = 6, may be postulated to be am only if 
+P4UP3, PoUP3, PUP, and PoUP4 are not connected. In other words, you 
+may postulate many cons of the form y[(p é Pi), (p € Pi)] to be am, but 
+your first choice strongly circumscribes your second choice, etc. 
+
+We will now consider certain results in the logic of amcons which were 
+established by extensive elucidation of our intuitions. The issue is whether 
+our present axiomization produces the same results. We will express the 
+results in our latest notation as far as possible. Two more definitions are 
+necessary. The parameter @ is the angle of motion of an infinitesimally 
+moving phenomenon, measured in degrees with respect to some chosen axis. 
+Then, recalling the set Py, choose Ps and Pa so that Py = P5UPs and 
+PEOPe=¢. 
+
+The results by which we will judge our axiomization are as follows. 
+
+1: glS, C,UCs] can be inferred to be am. 
+
+Our present notation cannot express this result, because it does not 
+distinguish between different types of uniform motion throughout a finite 
+region, i.e. the types M, Cy, Co, Dy, and Do. Instead, we have infinitesimal 
+motion, which is involved in all the latter types of motion. Questions such as 
+"whether the admissibility of » [M, S] implies the admissibility of y[C,, S}" 
+drop out. The reason for the omission in the present theory is our choice of 
+parameters and domains, which we discussed earlier. Our present version is 
+thus not exhaustive. However, the deficiency is not intrinsic to our method; 
+and it does not represent any outright falsification of our intuitions. Thus, 
+we pass over the deficiency. 
+
+2: [(pe Py, SQ), (pe Po, SqQ)] and other such cons can be inferred to be am. 
+With our new, powerful approach, this result is trivial. It is guaranteed by 
+what we said about consistency parameters. 
+
+3: There is no way to infer that y[C1, Cg] is am; and no way to infer that 
+y[ (45°, SQ>O), (60°,s=s¢)] is am. 
+
+The first part of the result drops out. The second part is trivial with our new 
+method as long as we do not postulate that cons on @ are am. 
+
+4: p [(pe Po), (p € P5)] can be inferred to be am. 
+
+Yes, by Postulate 1. 
+
+5: v [(s>O, p € Py), (s=O, pe Po)] and y [(s>O, pe Po), (s=O, p € P4)] can 
+
+
+198 
+
+
+be inferred to be am. 
+
+Yes, by Postulate 2. These two amcons are distinct. The question of whether 
+they should be considered equivalent is closely related to the degree to 
+which con parameters are independent of each other. 
+
+6: There is no way to infer that y [(p € Ps), (pe Pg)] or p[(pe Py), (p € P3) 
+] is am. Our special requirement in the postulate of admissibility for y [(p € 
+P+), (p € Po)] guarantees this result. 
+
+The reason for desiring this last result requires some discussion. [In 
+heuristic terms, we wish to avoid admitting both location in New York in 
+Greensboro and location in Manhattan and Brooklyn. We also wish to avoid 
+admitting location in New York in Greensboro and location in New York in 
+Boston. If we admitted either of these combinations, then the intuitive 
+rationale of the notions would indicate that we had admitted triple location. 
+While we have a dreamed illusion which justifies the concept of double 
+location, we have no intuitive justification whatever for the concept of triple 
+location. It must be clear that admission of either of the combinations 
+mentioned would not imply the admissibility of a con on a 3-family with 
+con parameter p by the postulates of our theory. Our theory is formally safe 
+from this implication. However, the intuitive meaning of either combination 
+would make them proxies for the con on the 3-family. 
+
+A closely related consideration is that in the preceding chapter, it 
+appeared that the admission of y[(p € P;), (pe Po)] and y[(p € Ps), (pe Pe)] 
+would tend to require the admission of the object y[(p € Po), e [(p € Ps), (p 
+€ Pg) ]] {a Type 1 chain). Further, it this implication held, then by the same 
+rationale the admission of y[(p € P4}, (p € Pa)] and y[(s> O, Pg € Py), (s=O, 
+P=Ppo)1], both of which are am, would require the admission of the object 
+vl{p € Pa), yl(s> O, pg € Py), (s=O, P=PqQ)]]. We may now say, however, 
+that the postulates of our theory emphatically do not require us to accept 
+these implications. If there is an intuitively valid notion underlying the chain 
+on s and p, it reduces to the amcons introduced in result 5. As for the chain 
+on p alone, we repeat that simultaneous admission of the two cons 
+mentioned would tend to justify some triple location concept. However, we 
+do not have to recognize that concept as being the chain. It seems that our 
+present approach allows us to forget about chains for now. 
+
+Our conclusion is that the formal approach of this chapter is in good 
+agreement with our intuitively established results. 
+
+
+199 
+
+
+Note on the overall significance of the logic of amcons: 
+
+When traditional logicians said that something was logically impossible, 
+they meant to imply that it was impossible to imagine or visualize. But this 
+implication was empirically false. The realm of the logically possible is not 
+the entire realm of connotative thought; it is just the realm of normal 
+perceptual routines. When the mind is temporarily freed from normal 
+perceptual routines--especially in perceptual illusions, but also in dreams and 
+even in the use of certain "illogical" natural language phrases--it can imagine 
+and visualize the "logically impossible." Every text on perceptual 
+psychology mentions this fact, but logicians have never noticed its immense 
+significance. The logically impossible is not a blank; it is a whole layer of 
+meaning and concepts which can be superimposed on conventional logic, but 
+not reduced or assimilated to it. The logician of the future may use a drug or 
+some other method to free himself from normal perceptual routines for a 
+sustained period of time, so he can freely think the logically impossible. He 
+will then perform rigorous deductions and computations in the logic of 
+amcons. 
+
+
+200 
+
+
+20. Subjective Propositional Vibration-work in progress 
+
+
+Up until the present, the scientific study of language has treated 
+language as if it were reducible to the mechanical manipulation of counters 
+on a board. Scientists have avoided recognizing that language has a mental 
+aspect, especially an aspect such as the 'understood meaning" of a linguistic 
+expression. This paper, on the other hand, will present linguistic constructs 
+which inescapably involve a mental aspect that is objectifiable and can be 
+subjected to precise analysis in terms of perceptual psychology. These 
+constructs are not derivable from the models of the existing linguistic 
+sciences. In fact, the existing linguistic sciences overlook the possibility of 
+such constructs. 
+
+Consider the ambiguous schema 'ADB&C', expressed in words as 'C and 
+B if A'. An example is 
+
+Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks. (1) 
+
+In order to get sense out of this utterance, the reader has to supply it with a 
+comma. That is, in the jargon of logic, he has to supply it with grouping. Let 
+us make the convention that in order to read the utterance, you must 
+mentally supply grouping to it, or 'bracket' it. If you construe the schema 
+as 'AD (B &C)', you will be said to bracket the conjunction. If you construe 
+the. schema as '(ADB) & C', you will be said to bracket the conditional There 
+is an immediate syntactical issue. If you are asked to copy (1), do you write 
+"Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks"; or do you write 
+"Jack will soon leave, and Bill will laugh if Don speaks" if that is the way 
+you are reading (1) at the moment? A distinction has to be made between 
+reading the proposition, which involves bracketing; and viewing the 
+proposition, which involves reacting to the ink-marks solely as a pattern. 
+Thus, any statement about an ambiguous grouping proposition must specify 
+whether the reference is to the proposition as read or as viewed. 
+
+Some additional conventions are necessary. With respect to (1), we 
+distinguish two possibilities: you are reading it, or you are not looking at it 
+(or are only viewing it). Thus, a "single reading' of (1) refers to an event 
+which separates two consecutive periods of not looking at {1) (or only 
+viewing it). During a single reading, you may switch between bracketing the 
+conjunction and bracketing the conditional. These switches demarcate a 
+series of "states" of the reading, which alternately correspond to 'Jack will 
+
+
+201 
+
+
+¢ 
+
+
+soon leave, and Bill will laugh if Don speaks' or 'Jack will soon leave and Bill 
+will laugh, if Don speaks'. Note that a state is like a complete proposition. 
+We stipulate that inasmuch as (1) is read at all, it is the present meaning or 
+state that counts--if you are asked what the proposition says, whether it is 
+true, etc. 
+
+Another convention is that the logical status of 
+(Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks) if and only if (Jack 
+will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks) 
+is not that of a normal tautology, even though the biconditional when 
+viewed has the form 'A=A'. The two ambiguous cemponents wil! not 
+necessarily be bracketed the same way in a state. 
+
+We now turn to an example which is more substantial that (1). 
+Consider 
+Your mother is a whore and you are now bracketing the conditional! in (2) if 
+you are now bracketing the conjunction in (2). (2) 
+If you read this proposition, then depending on how you bracket it, the 
+reading wil! either be internally false or else wil! call your mother a whore. In 
+general, ambiguous grouping propositions are constructs in which the mental 
+aspect plays a fairly explicit role in the language. We have included (2) to 
+show that the contents of these propositions can provide more complications 
+than would be suggested by (1). 
+
+
+There is another way of bringing out the mental! aspect of language, 
+however, which is incomparably more powerful than ambiguous grouping. 
+We will turn to this approach immediately, and will devote the rest of the 
+paper to it. The cubical frame is asimple reversible perspective figure 
+which can either be seen oriented upward like Q _ or oriented downward 
+like ©, . Both positions are implicit in the same ink-on-paper image; it is 
+the subjective psychological response of the perceiver which differentiates 
+the positions. The perceiver can deliberately cause the perspective to reverse, 
+or he can allow the perspective to reverse without resisting. The perspective 
+can also reverse against his will. Thus, there are three possibilities: deliberate, 
+indifferent, and involuntary reversal. 
+
+Suppose that each of the positions is assigned a different meaning, and 
+the figure is used as a notation. We will adopt the following definitions 
+because they are convenient for our purposes at the moment. 
+
+> (for '3' if it appears to be oriented like Q 
+
+for 'O' (zero) if it appears to be oriented like @! 
+
+We may now write 
+
+
+1 +B = 4 (3) 
+We must further agree that (3), or any proposition containing such 
+
+
+202 
+
+
+notation, is to be read to mean just what it seems to mean at any given 
+instant. [f, at the moment you read the proposition, the cube seems to be 
+up, then the proposition means 1+3=4; but if the cube seems to be down, 
+the proposition means 1+O=4. The proposition has an unambiguous 
+meaning for the reader at any given instant, but the meaning may change in 
+the next instant due to a subjective psychological change in the reader. The 
+reader is to accept the proposition for what it is at any instant. The result is 
+subjectively triggered propositional vibration, or SPV for short. The 
+distinction between reading and viewing a proposition, which we already 
+made in the case of ambiguous grouping, is even more important in the case 
+of SPV. Reading now occurs only when perspective is imputed. In reading 
+(3) you don't think about the ink graph any more than you think about the 
+type face. 
+
+in a definition such as that of ' 8 '3° and 'OQ' will be called the 
+assignments. A single reading is defined as before. During a single reading, (3) 
+will vibrate some number of times. The series of states of the reading, which 
+alternately correspond to '1 + 3 = 4' or '1+ O = 4', are demarcated by 
+these vibrations. The portion of a state which can change when vibration 
+occurs will be called a partial. It is the partials in a reading that correspond 
+directly to the assignments in the definition. 
+
+Additional conventions are necessary. Most of the cases we are 
+concerned with can be covered by two extremely important rules. First, the 
+ordinary theory of properties which have to do with the form of expressions 
+as viewed is not applicable when SPV notation is present. Not only is a 
+biconditional not a tautology just because its components are the same when 
+viewed; it cannot be considered an ordinary tautology even if the one 
+component's states have the same truth value, as in the case of '1 + & # 
+2'. Secondly, and even more important, SPV notation has to be present 
+explicitly or it is not present at all. SPV is not the idea of an expression with 
+two meanings, which is commonplace in English; SPV is a double meaning 
+which comes about by a perceptual experience and thus has very special 
+properties. Thus, if a quantifier should be used in a proposition containing 
+SPV notation, the "range" of the "variable" will be that of conventional 
+
+
+ser 
+
+
+logic. You cannot write ' RS ' for 'x' in the statement matrix 'x 
+= we ' 
+
+We must now elucidate at considerable length the uniqué properties of 
+SPV. When the reader sees an SPV figure, past perceptual training will cause 
+him to impute one or the other orientation to it. This phenomenon is not a 
+mere convention in the sense in which new terminology is a convention. 
+There are already two clear-cut possibilities. Their reality is entirely mental; 
+the external. ink-on-paper aspect does not change in any manner whatever. 
+
+
+203 
+
+
+The change that can occur is completely and inherently subjective and 
+mental. By mental effort, the reader can consciously control the orientation. 
+If he does, involuntary vibrations will occur because of neural noise or 
+attention lapses. The reader can also refrain from control and accept 
+whatever appears. In this case, when the figure is used as a notation, 
+vibrations may occur because of a preference for one meaning over the 
+other. Thus, a deliberate vibration, an involuntary vibration, and an 
+indifferent vibration are three distinct possibilities. 
+
+What we have done is to give meanings to the two pre-existing 
+perceptual possibilities. In order to read a proposition containing an SPV 
+notation at all, one has to see the ink-on-paper figure, impute perspective to 
+it, and recall the meaning of that perspective; rather than just seeing the 
+figure and recalling its meaning. The imputation of perspective, which will 
+happen anyway because of pre-existing perceptual training, has a function in 
+the language we are developing analogous to the function of a letter of the 
+alphabet in ordinary language. The imputation of perspective is an aspect of 
+the notation, but it is entirely mental. Our language uses not only 
+graphemes, but "psychemes" or "mentemes". One consequence is that the 
+time structure of the vibration series has a distinct character; different in 
+principle from external, mechanical randomization, or even changes which 
+the reader would produce by pressing a button. Another consequence is that 
+ambiguous notation in general is not equivalent to SPV. There can be mental 
+changes of meaning with respect to any ambiguous notation, but in general 
+there is no psycheme, no mental change of notation. It is the clear-cut, 
+mental, involuntary change of notation which is the essence of SPV. Without 
+psychemes, there can be no truly involuntary mental changes of meaning. 
+
+
+In order to illustrate the preceding remarks, we will use an SPV 
+notation defined as follows. 
+« fis an affirmative, read "definitely," if it appears to be oriented 
+BH ijlike O 
+
+is a negative, read "not," if it appears to be oriented like fy 
+The proposition which follows refers to the immediate past, not to all past 
+time; that is, it refers to the preceding vebration. 
+
+You have i deliberately vibrated (4). (4) 
+
+
+This proposition refers to itself, and its truth depends on an aspect of the 
+reader's subjectivity which accompanies the act of reading. However, the 
+same can be said for the next proposition. 
+
+The bat is made of wood, and you have just decided that the second 
+
+
+word in (5) refers to a flying mammal. (5) 
+
+
+204 
+
+
+Further, the same can be said for (2). We must compare (5), (2), and (4) in 
+order to establish that (4) represents an order of language entirely different 
+from that represented by (5) and (2). (5) is a grammatical English sentence 
+as it stands, although an abnormal one. The invariable, all-ink notation 'bat' 
+has an equivocal referental structure: it may have either of two mutually 
+exclusive denotations. In reading, the native speaker of English has to choose 
+one denotation or the other; contexts in which the choice is difficult rarely 
+occur. (2) is not automatically grammatical, because it lacks a comma. We 
+have agreed on a conventional process by which the reader mentally supplies 
+the comma. Thus, the proposition lacks an element and the reader must 
+supply it by a deliberate act of thought. The comma is not, strictly speaking, 
+a notation, because it is entirely voluntary. The reader might as well be 
+supplying a denotation io an equivocal expression: (5) and (2) can be 
+reduced to the same principle. As for (4), it cannot be mistaken for ordinary 
+English. It has an equivocal "proto-notation," ' 74] ". You automatically 
+impute perspective to the proto-notation before you react to it as language. 
+Thus, a notation with a mental component comes into being involuntarily. 
+This notation has an unequivocal denotation. However, deliberate, 
+inditferent, and most important of all, involuntary mental changes in 
+notation can occur. 
+
+We now suggest that the reader actually read (5), (2), and (4), in that 
+order. We expect that (5) can be read without noticeable effort, and that a 
+fixed result will be arrived at {unless the reader switches in an attempt to 
+find a true state). The reading of (2) involves mentally supplying the comma, 
+which is easy, and comprehending the logical compound which . results, 
+which is not as easy. Again, we expect that a fixed result will be arrived at 
+(unless the reader vacillates between the insult and the internally false state). 
+In order to read (4), center your sight on the SPV notation, with your 
+peripheral vision taking in the rest of the sentence. A single reading should 
+last at least half a minute. If the reader will seriously read (4), we expect that 
+he will find the reading to be an experience of a totally different order from 
+the reading of (5) and (2). It is like looking at certain confusing visual 
+patterns, but with an entire dimension added by the incorporation of the 
+pattern into language. The essence of the experience, as we have indicated, is 
+that the original imputation of perspective is involuntary, and that the reader 
+has to contend with involuntary changes in notation for which his own mind 
+is responsible. We are relying on this experience to convince the reader 
+empirically that (4) represents a new order of language to an extent to which 
+(5) and (2) do not. 
+
+To make our point even clearer, let us introduce an operation, called 
+"collapsing," which may be applied to propositions containing SPV 
+
+
+205 
+
+
+proto-notation. The operation consists in redefining the SPV figure in a given 
+proposition so that its assignments are the states of the original proposition. 
+Let us collapse (4). We redefine 
+
+for 'You have deliberately vibrated (4)' if it appears to be oriented 
+t_* like @J 
+
+for 'You have not deliberately vibrated (4)' if it appears to be oriented 
+
+like 
+
+
+(4) now becomes 
+
+
+# (4) 
+
+
+We emphasize that the reader must actually read (4), for the effect is 
+indescribable. The reader should learn the assignments with flash cards if 
+necessary. 
+
+The claim we want to make for (4) is probably that it is the most 
+clear-cut case yet constructed in which thought becomes an object for itself. 
+Just looking at a reversible perspective figure which is not a linguistic 
+utterance--an approach which perceptual psychologists have already 
+tried--does not yield results which are significant with respect to "thought." 
+In order to obtain a significant case, the apparent orientation or imputed 
+perspective must be a proposition; it must be true or false. Then, (5) and (2) 
+are not highly significant, because the mental act of supplying the missing 
+element of the proposition is all a matter of your volition; and because the 
+element supplied is essentially an "understood meaning." We already have an 
+abundance of understood meanings, but scientists have been able to ignore 
+them because they are not "objectifiable." In short, reversible perspective by 
+itself is not "thought"; equivocation by itself has no mental aspect which is 
+objectifiable. Only in reading (4) do we experience an "objectifiable aspect 
+of thought." We have invented an instance of thought (as opposed to 
+perception) which can be accomodated in the ontology of the perceptual 
+psychologist. 
+
+
+206 
+
+
+¥ 
+
+
+Henry Flynt, Blueprint for a Higher Civilization 
+(Milano, Multhipla Edizioni, 1975) 
+ERRATA 
+
+
+p. 4 delete 5/15/1962 
+Adams House 
+p.- 24 delete 5/15/1962 
+audience, 
+ppe 26-32 middle of p. 26 to top of p. 32 
+should come after p. 60 
+pe 27 line 5 fact it 
+line 7 of them, which 
+pe 42 line 4 bodies 
+"statements", it 
+pe 53 delete 2/22/1963 
+February 27, 1963 
+pe 55 line 7 mind', 
+pe 72 delete third line from bottom 
+pe 74 delete 2/22/1963 
+February 27, 1963 
+p. 84 delete 2/22/1963 
+February 27, 1963 
+
+
+(photo 
+pe 86 line 26 transformation 
+p. 94 line 2 from bottom is true, 
+p. 96 lines 12-14 all S to have superscript D 
+line 13 250 
+under the figure: given 25 S X5yy 
+pe 97 line 14 D-Memory 
+p. 99 lines 13, 14, 15 right-hand 
+p. 100 line 3 from bottom 1962 
+p. 101 line 19 Chicago." 
+line 25 sun," 
+p. 102 line 4 from bottom assertion." 
+pe 104 line 8 switch 
+line 26 A, ar 
+i 
+line 28 A." 
+; as 
+
+
+pe 105 between lines 25, 26 
+
+
+Conclusion 3.1. Conscious remembering occurs in 
+some mental state. 
+
+
+I j 7 *j-a 
+p. 108 line 20. x.,--x. 
+
+
+j-1 j 
+lines 4, 5 from bottom j+4 
+
+
+p. 109 line 2 2.4 %-Memories 
+pe 114 line 5 from bottom "A single 
+pe 120 line 5 26 
+
+
+pe 106 line 7 x 
+
+
+Page 1 
+
+
+Henry Flynt, Blueprint for a Higher Civilization Page 2 
+(Milano, Multhipla Edizioni, 1975) 
+
+
+ERRATA 
+
+
+pe. 125 bottom line table. See Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. 
+
+
+p. 129 line 1 —s. 7 
+line 12 from bottom 
+fotally determinate innperseq' iff an innpersea 
+line 10 from bottom 
+Tantecedentally indeterminate innperseq! iff an innperseq 
+line 8 from bottom 
+*halpointally indeterminate innperseq' iff an innperseq 
+
+
+pp. 134-151 These pages should have tab pagination identifying 
+them as pp. 1-18 of the "Guidebook." 
+
+
+Also, the Guidebook must start on a right-hand 
+page. 
+
+
+p. 139 line 13 a_lb 
+p. 141 line 15 NOW--CLOSE 
+pe 145 in Instr. 1-3. (t SS ) 
+line 6 from bottom 9. 
+p. 147 line 3 'a 
+p. 152 delete 2/22/1963 
+Februery 27, 1963 
+(photo 
+p. 158 line 23 most fears 
+line 24 imposed 
+p.- 179 bottom line definite 
+p. 180 line 5 categories, 
+p. 187 delete 2/22/1963 
+February 27, 1963 
+p. 195 line 12 admissible 
+p. 201 line 19 'AD (BEC)', 
+. line 20 conditional. 
+p. 202 line 12 than (1). 
+p. 204 line 7 from bottom vibration 
+p. 206 lines 4-7 definitions in braces { } 
+
+
-- 
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