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diff --git a/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex b/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2431ef --- /dev/null +++ b/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex @@ -0,0 +1,1161 @@ +\newcommand{\action}[1]{[\textit{#1}]} + +\newcommand{\speaker}[1]{\vskip 0.2em \textsc{#1}: } +\newcommand{\speakermod}[2]{\vskip 0.2em \textsc{#1} \textit{(#2)}: } + +\chapter{Philosophy of Concept Art (1987)} + +{ \centering \itshape +An interview with Henry Flynt \\ +by Christer Hennix \\ +Dec. 6, 1987 \par } + + +\speaker{FLYNT} I'm going to give a summary of how I originated Concept Art +in order to bring it up to the point where it's understandable why I +speak of you (Catherine Christer Hennix) as my only successor in the genre. +Summarizing briefly, I see two things coming together. One of them +was my involvement with the modern music community of the time---Stockhausen, +Cage, LaMonte Young---and the other aspect was that I +had been a mathematics major at Harvard and already knew that I +thought of myself primarily as a philosopher---that my intention had +been when I was very young, when I didn't understand the situation +that I was in---my intention had been to become a philosopher with +nevertheless a specialization in mathematics. Of course, many people +actually did that. + +So, having said that, one of the things that I began to notice about +the modern music of that time was this extremely strong pseudo- +intellectual dimension in Stockhausen---Stockhausen's theoretical +journal \journaltitle{die Reihe}---the impression that they were doing science +actually---for example Stockhausen had a long essay on how the +duration of the notes had to correspond to the twelve pitches of the +chromatic scale \ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} "\ldots\ how time passes\ldots"\footnote{\journaltitle{die Reihe 3}} + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, and what is more, the other rhythms had to correspond to +the overtone structure above those frequencies as fundamentals. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Yes, I'm quite familiar with that. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, I would expect you would be. I remember Bo +Nilson---you will like this---in 1958 at the same time I saw Stockhausen's +score---he went even one step further than Stockhausen because he +used fractional amplitude specifications---so this is even more than +Stockhausen, and so forth and so on. + +Cage took a considerable step further in the sense that in Cage this +kind of play with structure is carried to the point where there is an +extreme dissociation between what the composer sees and what the +performer sees in terms of the structure of the piece and what the +audience knows. They are completely divorced from one another. Cage +would compose a piece on a graph in which the time that a note begins +is on one axis and the length of the note is on another axis. What he +would do was to superimpose that on some picture like from a star +catalogue--- + + +\speaker{HENNIX} \opustitle{Atlas Eclipticalis}--- + + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yeah, well, that's the particular piece. I'm making up a +composite of his compositional techniques but the result is that when you +break up a sequential event in that way, it's not like a pitch-time graph +where there's an intuitive recognition of the way the process unfolds. +He would have one structure for beginnings and another structure for +durations. Well at any rate, already in Cage's music there was a kind of +ritual aspect to performing classical music. I mean in Cage's piece, +which is actually all silence---the only thing the pianist does is open and +close the lid of the piano or something like that. + +Then LaMonte Young comes along. His word pieces were the first +that I ever saw, composed in mid-1960. I saw them in December +1960.\footnote{Other composers have earlier dates, but for me, +Young crystallized the genre. [H.F., note added]} +It was a very different kind of structural game. It was no longer like +twelve-tone organization and so forth but rather it was like playing +with paradoxes---it was nearer to making a paradox than making some +kind of complicated network. + +And I felt that matters had reached the point where there was +some kind of inauthenticity here because the point of the work of art +had become some kind of structural or conceptual play, and yet it was +being realized under the guise of music so that the audience had no +chance of really seeing what was supposed to be the point of the +piece---the audience was actually prevented from seeing. Certainly +Cage's methods had exactly that effect. The audience receives an +experience which simply sounds like chaos but in fact what they are +hearing is not chaos but a hidden structure which is so hidden that it +cannot be reconstructed from the performed sound. It's so hidden that +it can't be reconstructed but nevertheless Cage knows what it is. So I +felt that the confusion between whether they were doing music or +whether they were doing something else had reached a point where I +found that disturbing or unacceptable. + +At the same time at that period there was a great fascination in sort +of taking the Stockhausen attitude and looking back at the history of +music from that point of view. Stockhausen's analysis in \journaltitle{die Reihe 2} of +Webern's \opustitle{String Quartet [Op. 28]} tried to show that Webern was +composing total serial music and not just twelve tone music. That was +the attitude, they were rewriting the history of music, trying to show +that all previous important figures were essentially preoccupied with +structure, that they had been complete structuralists. + + +\speaker{HENNIX} Really? I thought it was only Webern that was given that +treatment. + + +\speaker{FLYNT} Well, they were digging up all these composers from the +Middle Ages, the isorhythmic motet and everything like that---they +were sort of dredging that up because that was the previous +period---the medieval scores in the form of a circle and the use of insertion +syncopation,\footnote{My term for the rhythmic feature common to Magister Zacharias' \opustitle{Sumite Karissimi} and \opustitle{Klavierst\"{u}uck XI}. See Willi Apel, \booktitle{The Notation of Polyphonic Music} (4th ed.), p. 432 for \opustitle{Sumite Karissimi}. [H.F., note added]} +it appears with the red notes ina medieval score and then +it reappears in Stockhausen's \opustitle{Klavierst\"{u}ck XI}. They were just jumping, +they were dismissing what we would call the baroque, classical and +romantic periods periods as completely worthless. In other words, the +last music before Stockhausen was in the 14th century, this is the way +the history of music was being rewritten. And LaMonte was getting +into Leonin and Perotin and all that kind of stuff. Well, anyway, that's +quite an excursion. +At any rate there is in music, there is this preoccupation with---it +may be a kind of quasi-Pythagoreanism, I don't know\ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} The way I looked at it was that they saw in Webern, first of +all the harmony was going away. And they saw in Webern a way of +determining the note more and more precisely, in terms of all of its +parameters, pitch, duration, timbre and all that. What was left was that +timbre was not serialized yet. And that, as far I see it, was what the +Darmstadt school did---they added--- + +\speaker{FLYNT} Stockhausen's \opustitle{Kontra-Punkte}--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} Yeah. And they all considered Webern the god of the new +music--- + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} ---and also a little bit Messiaen--- + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. + +\speaker{HENNIX} It was Webern and Messaien that determined the entire +fifties in Darmstadt. In other words, they were saying that Cage was no +good. He was just looking in \booktitle{I Ching}---it was a random thing. And you +cannot recover the structure, it's hidden, as you said. The problem was +that Stockhausen, when he played his \opustitle{Klavierst\"{u}ck XI}, you couldnt +recover the structure either. It was so complex now. So the complexity +of the serialist music became exactly the complexity of Cage. Cage +looked his numbers up in random number tables; the others were +sitting calculating rows of numbers. But in addition to that they also +had to fake it. Because---you find that yourself when you do serial +music---the music moves too slowly. So you change the numbers to get +the music up a little bit. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. We're taking longer on this than I meant to\ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} But I wanted to say this. The completely deterministic com- +position technique and the completely random, aleatoric technique, +gave exactly the same results. And that was the complete breakdown of +the Darmstadt school. That's when they started to improvise in Darm- +stadt. Not before that was there improvisation in Darmstadt. + +\speaker{FLYNT} When they first tried to serialize duration, they tried to pick a +fundamental unit and use multiples of it; in other words, that's not the +way you serialize pitch. You don't take one cycle per second and then +use two cycles per second, up to twelve. That's not what you do. But +that's what they did with duration. And that's what produced the +Boulez pieces that move so slowly. In other words if you treat rhythm as +multiples of like a whole note then it was moving too slowly for them. + +But Cage was for them what was wrong with America or something. +I mean, the center of what Stockhausen was doing was the +concept of scientificity. In other words at that time I fantasized the +composer appearing as performer, on the stage in a lab coat carrying a +slide rule---there were no electronic calculators at that time, it would +have to have been a slide rule---but that seemed completely approp- +riate. In other words, a composition was a laboratory experiment. I +mean they viewed Cage as a typical American---coming in a vacuum--- +American superficiality---a vacuum with no scientificity. But Cage was +actually not using a random number table, he was flipping coins, he +was using the \booktitle{I Ching}. Yet it was not even that---what Cage was doing +was much more whimsical than using a random number book. He +would just copy a leaf---in the \opustitle{Concert for Piano and Orchestra} he just +put the staff over a leaf and then the main points defining the shape of +the leaf he just copied them on and he ended up with a circle or not a +circle, but a group of notes in cyclic shape, and so the pianist was +supposed to play around the circle. This was completely whimsical +actually and yes, I remember very well these debates that they had, the +one and the other\footnote{Serial vs. chance.}---I didn't have any idea that I was going to spend +this much time competing with the music critic of the \journaltitle{New York Times} +about who remembers the 1950s the best. + +At any rate\ldots\ There is of course a larger tradition in art which has +a kind of quasi-scientific involvement in structure that does go very +much to the Renaissance, for example. Althought I was not so conscious +of that---I looked that up much later. But it was certainly there. + +So, on the one hand concept art came from the idea of lifting +structure off and makinga separate art form out of it. The structure or +conceptual aspect, and making a separate art form out of it. The other +thing that was coming---the development of my philosophical thinking +---I have to explain first that the version of mathematics that I received +at Harvard in the 1950s in which Quine was the head of the department +and editor of the \journaltitle{Journal of Symbolic Logic} and so forth and the +hottest thing in philosophy was considered to be Quine's debate with +Carnap. And I was a schoolmate of Kripke, Solovay, Goodman \etc\ +\etc, \etc. I'm just mentioning that to locate the period of time. Actually +my conversations with them were insignificant as far as the philosophy +of mathematics was concerned, there was no discussion between me +and them on any of that but it will locate the time frame that I'm talking +about.* + +\footnote{I'm being too diffident. I had quite significant discussions with Kripke and Goodman in 1961. [H.F,, note added]} + +But observing what was going on at that time, I picked up the idea +that the most plausible explanation of what mathematics is, is that it is +an activity analogous to chess, or in other words that chess captures the +characteristic features of mathematics, even though, as I have told you +privately many times, everybody knew who Brouwer was and what the +intutionist school was, but nobody studied it, and from my point of +view looking at it and knowing what it was, I felt no inclination to +pursue it further. + +The reason why this chess game explanation of mathematics +seemed so plausible---you know, at the end of the nineteenth century +they found themselves with three geometries---this is not Henry Flynt +saying this, this is the canard, the story in the text books. There were +three geometries; one of them fit the real world. They thought it was +Euclidean, but it might not be. It might be one of the others like elliptic, +for example; nevertheless, all three were consistent. Now what was the +epistemological status of the two out of the three geometries that were +true without having any correspondence to the real world, while one of +them did have a correspondence to the real world and was also true? +But what of the other two---the ones that were called true even thought +they had nothing to with the world? You know presumably Hilbert +wrote \essaytitle{Foundations of Geometry} as the original answer to that +question. + +Although---I can't pursue this here, it is much too technical---this +is now an open question for me. It has never been an open question in +the past. I just accepted what I was told---that Hilbert solved this by +seeing that a system of mathematics that has no relation to the real +world---in what does its truth consist? Its consistency as an uninterpreted +calculus as they would say---axioms, proofs, formation rules, +transformation rules. Certainly it was clear in the early twentieth +century that the concept of an abstract space was established. This was +what geometry was about. Geometry did not attempt---in Kant's time it +was assumed that when you were talking about geometry you were +talking about the geometry of the real world. That's the only geometry +that there was. The idea that there was a different agenda for geometry +other than the real world---how Kant could have moved geometry into +the constitutive subject and said that it was congenital to the mind---Euclidean geometry. +In hindsight that seems to be one of the biggest +mistakes he made, tremendously embarrassing, because by the mid-twentieth +century it was completely taken for granted that the job of the +mathematician was to study structures which do not have any reality. +And that from time to time you will give an interpretation to one or the +other of these structures, like a physical interpretation, and then it may +be found to be true or false in reality or not. Meanwhile, you have +another sense of the word "interpretation" which has to do with relative +consistency proofs by something having a model. + +This is now a completely open question for me, what they thought +they were doing. In other words what Hilbert thought that he was +doing---he interpreted one or another non-Euclidean geometry---what +was the interpretation that he used? It was a denumerable domain of +algebraic numbers.\footnote{Foundations of Geometry, pp. 27--30} + +\speaker{HENNIX} I think his ideas go back to Klein's models---which are +Euclidean in the center of the circle and then at the periphery they have +turned non-Euclidean (in the complex plane). + +\speaker{FLYNT} You had to have an explanation of how mathematics could be +true in any sense whatsoever even though any claim of a connection +with the real world had been completely severed, and it was being +pursued in some kind of vacuum. What does mathematics mean in that +case? And the answer that Hilbert gave was that it does not have to +mean anything. + +That's the answer. So it's a chess game. And the only difference +between mathematics and a chess game is that there are additional +complications created in mathematics by the fact that it deals with +infinitary games. By the way, I completely overlooked that aspect at +that time. You know, I can only see it now, kind of like two superimposed +pictures, because I see what I know now and compare it with what I knew then. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Yeah, the same for myself. I didn't know that this idea of +Hilbert's was forced by Frege until later. Frege was the one who said +that either the parallel axiom is true, or it's not. Which way do you want +it? And so he caused the big stir in the foundations of geometry in the +end of the nineteenth century and that's why he became enemies with +Hilbert. They were life enemies. + +\speaker{FLYNT} The reason I see it like two superimposed transparencies--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} But even today this debate with Frege---you have to go to a +single volume in Frege's posthumous writings---it is not mentioned in +any textbook---no lecture mentions it, and, so far, nobody has +explained it properly.\footnote{\booktitle{Nachgelassene Schriften und Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel}, vol. 2, Felix Meiner, Hamburg: 1976. (Gottlob Frege, The Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, University of Chicago Press: 1980)} + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, yes, yes. You're talking about an obscure origin of something +and what I'm talking about is a kind of consensus that had grown +up, since everybody agreed that mathematics should study unreal structures. + +\speaker{HENNIX} But that consensus was forced on us, that that was what we +were supposed to do. + +\speaker{FLYNT} The problem then---I thought mathematics was like chess. +What I understand now is that even a good formalist would not agree +with that. A good formalist would say that when you have a finite game +like chess, the problems of validity and soundness become transparent +or intuitively ascertainable, therefore a finite game is too trivial to be a +proxy for mathematics. At that time I did not understand that distinction. +I've read in many books since then that mathematics is the science +of infinity---that is the way mathematics is defined now in half of the +books that I look at. But at that point I did not understand. I thought +the finite game was already, I mistakenly thought, a complex enough +problem to stand for mathematics. Or that the reliability of a finite +game was sufficiently complicated to stand for mathematics so I basically +focused just on a finite game. + +\speaker{HENNIX} By the way, this was exactly the late Wittgenstein's view of +the philosophy of mathematics---it's not a complete misunderstanding, +that is to say, other people thought of it that way too. + +\speaker{FLYNT} The question then arose of even the soundness, the reliability, +the consistency of a finite game---this then is the problem for example +whether it is possible to follow a very simple rule correctly or not. The +other thing that was feeding into everything that was going on was that +Wittgenstein's \essaytitle{Remarks on The Foundations of Mathematics} was in +the Harvard Bookstore when I walked in as a freshman my very first +day there---so in other words I was looking at Wittgenstein's Remarks +on The Foundations of Mathematics from 1957--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} Ten years before me--- + +\speaker{FLYNT} ---but very cursorily. Because I had a philosophical +agenda---I passed over this material in a very cursory way because I had a +philosophical agenda. I was not involved in the distinction between a +finite and an infinite structure. I was not involved in that. + +\speaker{HENNIX} You thought there was no such distinction? + +\speaker{FLYNT} Well no, I thought that---it didn't seem that there was very +much point in worrying about that when there were much more +extreme problems to be worried about. But Wittgenstein wrote a lot +about the possibility of following very simple rules. And I assumed that +if there were epistemological questions for mathematics that this game +interpretation---this chess interpretation---had displaced the question +of the soundness and reliability of the mathematics to the possibility of +understanding a very simple rule like writing the series "plus 2". + +And having gathered that this was the way that I should picture +mathematics---I mean we understood very well that there were other +pictures of mathematics, but we thought they were philosophically +obsolete. In other words the person who believed that mathematics was +a description of a real supra-terrestrial structure, and certainly there +were people like that--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} Still today. + +\speaker{FLYNT} ---we thought that this was a philosophy that had been +exposed as superstitious by Positivism and possibly even by Ockham +several centuries earlier. So it was not that we didn't know about that. I +drew a personal conclusion that that position could not be defended by +any arguments that are acceptable by modern standards. What I really +meant was by Carnap's standards. That's what modern standards +meant to me. + +In my philosophy I was not concerned with the specifics of +mathematics; I was concerned with the problem of how I knowa world +beyond my immediate sensations. That was actually the question that I +began with---the question of propositions of material fact, like "it is raining" +or "the \textsc{Empire State Building} is at Fifth Avenue and 34th Street." + +I had read a very simplified exposition---it was actually some +lectures that Carnap gave in England in the 1930s on what Positivism +was.\footnote{R. Carnap, \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} (1935).} +They were very simple lectures and very different from his actual +published books with all this supposed apparatus and symbols and so +forth but a very simple exposition of what it is for a proposition to be +meaningful---that it must be empirically testable and so forth and so on +and the solution of questions of metaphysics that make assertions that +are not testable are therefore meaningless---the possibility of solving +questions of what is real by declaring if there is no way of deciding them +they are therefore meaningless. That seemed to me to be, at the time, a +stunning contribution. Because I come out of a background---I was in +high school reading Kant and so forth and so on. And Carnap's +solution was much more attractive to me than trying to participate with +Kant, to experience his question and try to take one side or the other +when he already said it's not really answerable; I solve it by simply +having faith or something like that, which is what he said about the +famous God freedom and immortality---I found it immensely attractive +when Carnap came along and said that there is no way of answering +these questions; therefore, words are being used nonsensically. + +I went through a process of thinking about that without ever +having seen Carnap's \booktitle{The Logical Structural of The World}. When I +was in Israel Scheffler's philosophy of science class, I tried to write a +text which in effect gave my own empiricist constructions of what it +means to say that A causes B and so forth, to give empiricist constructive +definitions of those---which is, I suppose, in the spirit of Carnap's +program, even though I hadn't actually seen what he had written, and if +I had it would have confused me---no, I wouldn't say "confused"; I +would say it would have discredited him completely. I wouldn't say +"confused" because that's too modest. + +\speaker{HENNIX} No, I wouldn't think "confused," I would think it would +have upset you\ldots + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, I wouldn't say "confused." I would say he had been +discredited. + +I very quickly passed to the position that the propositions of +natural science were meaningless metaphysics. + +\speaker{HENNIX} On what basis? Can you pin that down? A little bit, only. + +\speaker{FLYNT} This is something I want to compress---it says a little bit about +this in \booktitle{Blueprint for a Higher Civilization}\footnote{H. Flynt, Blueprint for a Higher Civilization (Milan, 1975). Recently reissued and an expanded and corrected edition by \textsc{Salitter Workings}}---like +the proposition, "this key is made of iron" or something like that, I comment on that in the +essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. + +\speaker{HENNIX} I didn't recall the example actually. + +\speakermod{FLYNT}{reading} "The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. +In this connection it is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic +of science as Carnap rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition +meaningful if it had any empirically verifiable proposition as an +implication. But consider an appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions +in good standing, and conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite +number of propositions about single events (what Carnap called +protocol-sentences). Only a very small number of the latter propositions +are indeed subject to verification. If we sever them from the entire +conjunction, what remains is as effectively blocked from verification as +the propositions which Carnap rejected as meaningless. This criticism +of science is not a mere technical exercise. A scientific proposition is a +fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially-testable meanings with +an infinite number of untestable meanings and inveigles us to accept the +whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the very beginning of +\booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this quite +clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it." + +The only point that I'm trying to make here is that I began to move +very quickly when I was still very young towards a position of extreme +disillusionment and cognitive extremism. I moved very quickly. This +was not a slow process. I just immediately took Carnap's critique of +metaphysics, decided that it applied directly to natural science---you +dismiss natural science as meaningless. The problem: is there an object +that is beyond my experience, is there a glass which is beyond what they +would call the "scopic" glass, the "tactile" glass \action{gestures toward the +glass from which he has been drinking}---is there a glass other than +those glasses---when you first think about it, that question seems to +have exactly the status of the propositions about God, freedom, and +immortality that Kant said are unanswerable and that Carnap said are +meaningless. However, there is one additional step for people who are +interested in the history of philosophy. Kant, in the second edition of +\booktitle{Critique of Pure Reason}, added this notorious refutation of idealism to +prove the existence of the real world independent of my sense +impressions---you may not know about this---this was the basis of +Husserl's phenomenology---Husserl's phenomenology was invented in +this passage and it also tremendously preoccupied Heidigger. It was +one of the sources which causes Heidigger to say that the essence of +Being is Time. Kant said that essentially it is the passage of time which +proves that there must be an external world. This is notorious in the +history of philosophy. Because on the one hand it is so deeply +influential for later thinkers; and on the other hand, for example, +Schopenhauer said it was a complete disgrace---it was such an obvious sophistry +that it was just disgusting---that it had the effect of ruining the +\booktitle{Critique of Pure Reason}. + +Actually this refutation of idealism is distributed throughout the +\booktitle{Critique of Pure Reason}, it's not in any one place---a foot note here, +a preface there, another passage somewhere else. In one of the footnotes +Kant makes the same point. In order to ask the question whether +there is a glass beyond my sense impression of it---I cannot ask that +question\ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} Oh you mean the \term{ding an sich} question. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Well that's what Kant would have been talking about but I +don't want to fit that narrowly into Kant's controlling the terms of the +discussion. I'm trying to ask it as someone who has embraced +Logical Positivism and is now turning around to question Logical +Positivism---you see the point that I was just making there---when +you say that this key is made of iron, which is Carnap's favorite +example---and then a protocol sentence, for example +"if I hold a magnet near this key, the key will be attracted to the magnet"---it +is not clear where Carnap stands on +the question whether only my sense impressions are real---just talking +about this situation---only my sense impressions are real---or is there +supposed to be a substantial key? + +By the way, I don't know Carnap's work that well. I passed over +these people in a very offhand way, so much so that many times I've +talked to people and they've concluded in their own mind that I dont +really know philosophy because I seem to have just glanced at these +people---picked up one or two points---the reason for that is that I was +moving so quickly to my own terminus---I only needed to see the +slightest symptom from these people to know that they were spending +all their time worrying about something that it was a waste of time to +worry about since it could only be a secondary issue. Here is Carnap +with this key made of iron---while I'm trying to ask is there a key other +than the scopic key, the tactile key \emph{now}---since the past and the future +are beyond immediate experience. I mean they cannot be cited as +evidence---or whether they are evidence or not, is the same problem. +Should I believe in the past and the future even though they are not +immediates? Should I believe in the glass, even though what I +presumably have is a scopic glass---at this very moment, a visual glass +apparition, from that should I conclude a glass? + +The first reaction to that question for somebody who is coming +from Kant and Carnap and who does not mind how extreme his +answer is---that's the key thing. In other words, if I came to a +conclusion that was completely untenable as far as social circumstances---that +didn't bother me at all. At first the question whether there is a real glass +beyond the apparition would seem to be an unanswerable +question---one of Kant's metaphysical questions---but then you think---that if you +know what the question means, then there must be a realm beyond +experience, because otherwise it is unclear how the question could be +understandable. + +From my point of view---if you want to make an issue out of +semantics---this is the profound issue. What the mathematical philosophers +and philosophers of mathematics were doing, talking about +semantics, interpreting geometry as an algebra and algebra as a +geometry---really for the purposes of relative-consistency proofs or +because they found they could solve problems by using a machinery +developed in another branch of mathematics by seeing these structural +similarities---but to confuse that with what I thought the bona fide +semantic question is: how would I understand the question whether +there is a substantial glass other than the scopic glass---you know the +conclusion---I can't tell you the exact breakdown---but I am talking +now about the 1961 manuscript, \essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}\footnote{Published in \booktitle{Blueprint for a Higher Civilization}. This book.} +---I may have +already come to the conclusion at that time---that the question itself +forces a yes answer. This does not mean that a proof of the existence of +the external world has been given. It meant that the proposition of the +existence of the external world would verify itself even if it were false! + +\speaker{HENNIX} I find this extremely interesting and rewarding, what you are +saying now, because I never heard you say it this way before. I just want +to ask you one question before you go on: namely, I see something for +the first time which I hadn't seen before---but before you go on I just +want to ask you one leading question: the simple existential statement, +"there is a glass on the table." You include that also in what will be +doubtable here. In other words not just "there is a glass on the table" +but "there exists a glass," the existential statement. I guess I wasn't very +clear now. + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, the thing is, the approach that I'm taking doesn't break it +down the way that you're talking about. Let me tell you. You may not +be \emph{sympatico} with empiricism. When you are trying to deal with +philosophy at all---you have to make some allowance for the +fact---you have to understand that the philosopher may be carving up +problems in a way that is temperamentally alien to you. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Yeah\ldots + +\speaker{FLYNT} You have to understand that. This is why somebody like +Carnap would read Hegel and say it's not saying anything. Actually, +Hegel is saying something. In fact, you might go so far as to make a case +that Hegel is actually rebutting Carnap, becaue if you understand what +Hegel is doing you realize even more than one would realize anyway +that Carnap has an untenable position---that he's sort of---that he +wants what he cannot have. He has made a set of rules that does not +allow him to have the thing that he demands to have. Hegel would have +seen that immediately. Carnap thinks that the problem of a logic of +consistency is an easy problem and a solved problem. In effect, Hegel +was saying there is something very misleading in thinking that that is a +solved problem. I'm trying to give you a sense of misunderstandings +between philosophers that are the results of temperamental incompatibilities. + + +\speaker{HENNIX} What you are giving me is a two-step way to skepticism. You +ask a certain question---is there something beyond this perception of +the glass? And you say the answer "yes" is forced on me, but then you +realize this was a meaningless question. + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, it's the other way around. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Oh, okay, but here's where you have to explain in detail +because here's where I miss you. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Let me go through the series of steps again. The series of steps +was\ldots\ I'll have to doit all at the same time. You have to understand---I +don't think that you even understand what an empiricist is. It's a +peculiar attitude. And one of the reasons why you have very little +training in this attitude is because people who claim to be +empiricists---it's always a fraud. All people who appear in public and say they are +empiricists, they are all lying all of the time. The reason that they're +lying is that they have this doctrine of the construction of the world +from sense impressions. That is their doctrine. But they do not stay with +that doctrine. And the reason why they do not stay with that doctrine is +because in addition to having the doctrine of the construction of the +world from sense impressions, they also want to have things like +science--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} Ethics\ldots + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, not ethics---one of the characteristics of the twentieth- +century philosopher was the appearance of the tough-guy philosopher +who rejects all of ethics as meaningless, which Carnap certainly did and +people who are close to him like A.J. Ayer---no, they did not want +ethics. But they wanted science. And the problem with wanting the +construction of the world from sense impressions on the one hand and +wanting science on the other is that the two finally have nothing to do +with each other at all---and when they said that the two were the same +thing as Carnap did---he was lying---I made a hero out of Carnap---I +derived some kind of positive impulse from him or something like that +without---I never actually read---my serious reading of Carnap was like +three or four pages of excerpts in a paperback popularization. I owned, +I had in my library Carnap's so-called real books, like +\booktitle{Logical Foundations of Probability} and \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} and all the rest of them +and I never read them.\footnote{Again I'm being too diffident. I thoroughly studied portions of the +Carnap books I owned---beginning with \booktitle{The Logical Structure of Language}, +which I bought while in high school [H.F., note added].} +And in hindsight that was good, because I took +his slogan seriously and assumed that he meant what he said and drew +the necessary consequences of it. If I had actually read his books I +would have been thrust into this massive hypocrisy, and I must say +stupidity, because the man did not realize that his answers were not +adequate, did not realize how preposterous his constructions of the +world were--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} I would say vulgar. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, yes. And\ldots\ what is even worse about empiricism is, in the +case of somebody like Mach, not only does he want to have his sense +impressions and does he want to have his science, but he wants to have +science explain sense impressions! And nevertheless it was supposed to +be the sense impressions that were primary, not the science. Mach is +seriously telling you, I will tell you why you see a blue book---because +the frequency of blue light is---and then he gives some uncountable +number, I mean some number that is pragmatically infinite, or something +like that. And how do you know that blue light is exactly +$3.2794835\mathrm{e}{15}$ and not one more or less---? Well, +certainly not by just looking, I'll guarantee you that! You have to go +into a laboratory with a few million dollars' worth of equipment or +something. But that's what it is to see that the book is blue. + +I'm trying to give you the sense of what it would be to be an +authentic empiricist. You ask does a glass exist; an authentic empiricist +would have to say that he already has a problem with that---that he has +to regard that as an undefined question or statement. It's undefined, +because if you are asking me if at this moment I quote unquote +have---interesting word there, "have"---that is what our ordinary +language gives us as the idiom for this. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Or "suffer!" + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, "have" or "suffer," that's right. I have or I suffer a scopic +glass or visual glass apparition---then that is identically true. That is +identically true. If you express any surprise at that, we have a problem +here. I have a scopic glass. If I say I have an apparitional glass, would +that be okay?---I mean from this point of view the sense impression is +not open to dispute. It's meaningless to dispute it. It's an impression, an +apparition---the sense impression is that for which seeming and being +are identical. For the empiricist the phase of the world or range of the +world for which seeming and being are identical is the sense impression. +If that seems strange to you then maybe I can make it less strange by +pointing out to you to make this as clear as possible---for the empiricist +to say that I have an apparitional glass is to say nothing about Reality +with a capital R at all! This is the so-called subjective psychological +moment---although an empiricist would never say that---the reason an +empiricist would never say that is that even to call it subjective is +already much too strong because that implies that you can guarantee +an objectivity to compare it to. And a bona fide empiricist would not +agree that my sense impression is subjective---subjective in comparison +to \emph{what}? + +\speaker{HENNIX} So an empiricist would be a person who would not doubt +whether he had a toothache or not. In other words, if he had a +toothache\ldots + +\speaker{FLYNT} You would regard it as being a mistake to do what? I'm not +sure about the word "toothache"---if you mean that he would not +doubt whether he had a toothache sensation. Whether there is an +organic---in the language of medicine---whether there is an organic +substrate for the toothache impression---this in a medical sense is a +question of what is called hysteria or something like that\ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} Suppose I have a toothache. But now I'm an empiricist so I +say I'm doubting this impression. I probably don't have a toothache. + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, no\ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} I have to accept the toothache? + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, you don't have--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} The glass you said was---I couldn't doubt the perception of +the glass. You said that was beyond doubt, in some sense, for the +empiricist. + +\speaker{FLYNT} It would be some kind of logical mistake to think that there +was anything there to be doubted. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Okay. And the same with the toothache. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, yes. I mean the point is not so much that we have come +into an area in which the empiricist is prepared to have faith---that +would be completely missing the point. No faith is required---that's the +point. The point is that it would be some kind of logical error. Once you +understand what a sense impression is, the terminology of doubt does +not apply to that level. + +\speaker{HENNIX} I see. Just that was my question. + +\speaker{FLYNT} The terminology of doubt does not apply to apparitions. It +doesn't make sense to doubt subjective apparitions. The empiricist is +already nervous when you ask does a glass exist. If you are asking +whether I have a "scopic" glass, it's identically true. Wait, wait. There +are already problems there. I'll come back to them. But when you +say---it sounds like what you're asking me is whether the fact that I see a +glass is sufficient to prove an objective glass---that sounds like \ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} No, no, that's not what--- + +\speaker{FLYNT} Well, ok. Most people when they say: +"do you concede that there is a glass on the table---I'm sitting here looking at it," what they +mean is: "do you concede that from your visual glass apparition you should conclude an objective glass, a substantial glass?" I'm taking it for +granted that you know enough about philosophy to have a sense of the +full weight those two words "substantial" and "objective" have in +philosophy. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Yes. + +\speaker{FLYNT} That at great length is my reaction to your question about +doubting "there is a glass on the table" versus doubting "there exists a glass." +A bona fide empiricist would say, "Why are you asking me this?" +The scopic glass is simply here for me. As far as concluding that an +objective glass exists from the existence of that apparition---the traditional +problem of concluding whether the apparition is a symptom of +some transcendent world---I think the word "transcendent" is sometimes +used in that sense in philosophy---the world beyond any sense +impression--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} This is why I used the example of the pain---because it +would be senseless for me to claim that \emph{I} can have \emph{your} toothache! + +\speaker{FLYNT} Now just a minute. An empiricist---what you're really getting +at what you're sort of squeezing out of me here---I'm glad to have it +squeezed out of me---I have no embarrassment about this---is that with +empiricism either you must be prepared immediately to depart +absolutely from the conventional world view, or else you will just plunge +yourself into a quicksand of hypocrisy. When you're asking me, can l +have your toothache\ldots\ A good empiricist would say, +\textquote{I have not established so-called other people except the other-people apparitions +that occur for me from time to time in waking life \emph{as they do in my +dreams!} And are you now going to ask me can I have the toothache of a +person who appears to me in a dream?} Then the spotlight would be +turned on you---what kind of an issue are you trying to make there? +What do you believe is the reality status of the furniture in my dreams? +For the empiricist, nothing remotely like that question has arisen yet, +because I haven't got outside of my own quote unquote head yet. + +Maybe you're just squeezing more and more. Either the empiricist +must be a "madman" or else he must be insincere. I took the alternative +of the madman. This is important not for me but for the general public +to be told---something which the general public has never been +told---and I know why they have never been told---maybe it is necessary to +complete this point. The point is that empiricism was contrived to +paper over a kind of---I mean there was sort of this +epistemological---Science epistemologically was resting on some sort of very shaky +foundation---they saw that. They brought in this empiricism in the +hope that it would solve a problem, that it would substantiate science +while at the same time it would cut away the common-sense notion of +causality as being unnecessary to science. Empiricism was going to give +you a more sophisticated science that did not need the traditional +metaphysical or common-sense notion of causality. It told you how to +get along without that, but at the same time it validated everything that +the scientist needed. And, at the same time, empiricism was supposed to +be---in the case of Neurath---he wanted to make some kind of unification +of empiricism with Marxism and make it like a complete demythified view of society. + +\speaker{HENNIX} There was even an attempt to bring ethics into it. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Well, in Neurath's case, yes. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Schlick too, I think---Schlick, I recall, did something in +ethics.\bootnote{\booktitle{Fragen der Ethik}, Vienna, 1930.} + +\speaker{FLYNT} I was talking about why empiricism is not portrayed honestly +in the general picture that exists of philosophy---the public picture of +philosophy---it was brought in to solve the problem of what is a base +for science---namely, sense impressions are going to be taken as +elemental. Science is going to arise from sense impressions by construction. +Nevertheless it is required that both scientific knowledge and the +common-sense social world be produced by this approach--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} Neurath, you mean. + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, no. Well, Carnap did not deny the existence of other +people. All of the positivists\ldots + +\speaker{HENNIX} Rather, he had nothing to say about it. + +\speaker{FLYNT} I didn't say ethics---I said the common-sense social world. I +wasn't talking about anything ethical\ldots + + +\speaker{HENNIX} The existence of tables and cars and--- + +\speaker{FLYNT} Well, what I'm saying is that the existence of other people is on +the same level as the existence of tables and automobiles. And what is +even worse than that is that the ones who were scientists in fact wanted +to see perception itself as the product of the abstract and quantified +sequence that the biophysicist or the psychophysicist sees---the light, +the lens, the retina, the optic nerve, the visual cortex, and so forth and +so on---they wanted to have that as prior to the sense impression but at +the same time they wanted to have all that constructed up from the +sense impressions. Why would this remain in place? Because it was a +more palatable---it's just like why would formalism remain in place? +Everybody learns that formalism died with Godel's incompleteness +theorems---it certainly didn't die for me; it isn't even clear what the +incompleteness theorems are supposed to have done or not to have +done---the fact remains that if you don't explain mathematics as an +uninterpreted calculus, then for us there was nothing left but +superstition. Those are the choices that you are given. If you don't explain that +science is constructed up froma ground of sense impressions, then how +do you want it to be constructed, down from God? You see, we don't +take that \emph{seriously} anymore. + +As a matter of fact Hume wrote two philosophical works and in +the first work\footnote{\booktitle{Treatise on Human Nature}} +there is the notorious passage in which he himself +understands what it means to be a genuine empiricist.\footnote{Book I, Part IV, VII "Conclusion"} +He says, \textquote{I feel that I am an outcast from the human race,} and so forth in this famous +passage---he says, +"I do not know if the glass continues to exist after I've looked away from it." +That line in Hume should have told you +whatever you wanted to know about the existence of the glass. You +should be able to ascertain the appropriate answer to your question. +Hume says: "I do not know if the glass exists when I look away from it." + +Hume's second book\footnote{\booktitle{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}}, +when he was trying to vindicate himself, +when he had dropped the whole business of being a madman, it was +much nearer to what empiricism means today: an attempt to construct +science from a more meager inventory of elements, namely sense +impressions. And that is where Hume presents his doctrine that science +does not need and should not invoke metaphysical causation, that it +should replace the old-fashioned causation with some sort of construction +which is more flat or more network-like. + +Well, at any rate, I'm going into this long thing---this is why it's +never dealt with in public in a sincere way---the only time it was was by +the guy who invented it, Hume, in the book that he wrote when he was +twenty-three years old. That's the only honest version of it and everything +after that is a fraud. + +The way it goes is this: I ask the question whether there is a +substantial glass, an objective glass, a material glass, something that is +over and above the visual glass of the moment. When first considered +this seems to be a question which I have no method of answering. That +would seem to place it like a Kantian metaphysical question which +doesn't have a provable solution, though interestingly enough Kant +thought that the existence of the external world in general could be +proved but only in the second edition. And in that second edition in +those little passages, Kant did really get into the existence of this +individual thing like a unicornand how that would or would not fit into +the general proof of the existence of the world and also the question of +how dreams would affect the validity of the proof. He touches on all of +those in a way which is just awful. It's a disgraceful performance. But he +had the issue there, actually. + +Well, your first reaction is, "I have no way of answering this." Your +second reaction is, that \emph{if I understand the question}, then there must be +an external world. So it would seem that I have actually proved the +external world---that's what Kant actually said. Or he came very near +to saying something like that. The third step is the realization that the +statement would validate itself not only if it's true---but if it's false it +validates itself equally well! + +\speaker{HENNIX} Given this method of understanding the question. And the +method remained unspecified so far---as far as I know nobody has been +able to do very well at specifying it. + +\speaker{FLYNT} What? Do you mean if somebody asks whether there is an +external world---my last remark is a comment about semantics---the +genuine semantic issue, as I said, and it's very different from the sort of +thing that Tarski is going on about which I think is just ridiculous. + +Maybe I'd better stop and tell you why I think it's ridiculous. It's +because I'm now talking about things which are exactly the fundamen- +tal issues. If Tarski thinks that he can talk about the theory of chess +before the question of whether the universe exists or not has been +answered---they are deliberately creating specialized problems which in +their minds do have answers and then they are proceeding to answer +them. The larger question of whether the work has any meaning at +all---it's like somebody spending his whole life working on the King's +Indian defense in chess or something like that, and thinking that +somehow that makes it unnecessary to answer such questions as does +the chess board exist or is it only apparitional? If it's only apparitional +then there is no guarantee of the continuity of the position of the pieces +in the absence of moves. What happens is that people treat those basic +questions as if they are so basic that it's sort of preposterous to make an +issue of them. Kripke said very clearly in his book on Wittgenstein that +once the question, "Does language exist?" has been asked, not to give +an affirmative answer is "insane and intolerable."\footnote{S. Kripke, +\booktitle{Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language}, p.60} +It's the same reaction as there is to solipsism---that solipsism is the philosophy of the +man in the lunatic asylum. + +The thing that may come before all the discussion so far is the +question of \emph{what is my position on being classified as insane} is the +beginning This of philosophy for me. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Well, this is the classical beginning of philosophy. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Because if you're not willing to face up to being classified as +insane---if you want to avoid that confrontation---you can't be a +philosopher. That confrontation is at the center of bona fide philosophy. + +\speaker{HENNIX} Or was\ldots + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. At any rate, I had reached this point in something like +1961. I had not yet done \essaytitlte{The "Is There Language?" Trap}. But I had reached +the point of saying that to claim the existence of a world beyond +experience is untenable. However I understood very well that it begins +to create problems for me to say, \textquote{I have a visual glass apparition,} +because there is a lot of structure in that sentence. And it's not clear +what is supporting that structure after the world has been cut away. +Even the use of the idioms like "have" and "suffer." The use of the word +"I"---after the objective world has been cut away it's unclear what is the +basis for all of that. And this is the point I had reached in 1961 and this is +the point when I did \essaytitle{Concept Art}. + +On the one hand you have an art which is about structure and +conceptual things. On the other hand this art is not going to \emph{affirm} +traditional doctrines of structuredness and conceptualization. It is +deliberately in every case going to violate them. It is going to express the +fact that there has been a philosophical discovery made. I would have +said chess is not a sound game. It's not well founded. It can't be. The +whole problem of Wittgenstein's famous question---what is the meaning +of a rule? My answer would be it doesn't have one. When you look +at it from the standpoint of Hume when he says I have become a +monster, I am outside the human race---the standpoint of the person +who chooses insanity as opposed to intellectual dishonesty! + +The person who chooses being a madman---even chess doesn't +work. The whole question of its consistency. The point of Concept Art +is on the one hand to transmit the tradition from the isorhythmic motet +and the five Platonic solids, in Leonardo---and on the other it's to blow +it up because each work of concept art must be a counter-example to +that tradition. And at the same time to say that it is art means---when I +passed to \essaytitle{Concept Art} I left behind many things that traditionally +would have been considered crucial features of art, like sentiment, for +example. Let me just leave it at that. + +When the Renaissance people did study geometry and art, they +developed perspective to paint people, not to paint abstractions. And +you know I have to admit quite bluntly, my Concept Art was already +the product of the acceptance of an abstract art. And now, many years +later I can see that that was an historical juncture, to consider it +tolerable that art should break with sentiment and with the representation +of people. It's like moving toward an Islamic view of art. And then +saying, now however, in the future, instead of Mosque decoration we +will do a piece that has the visual, sensuous delectation, but it's completely +abstract. But whereas Islamic art was trying to express the +\emph{truth} of a certain theorem in group theory, Concept Art must express +that you can't have that---that that theorem fails. Now I'm formulating +an unsolved problem---I never did a concept piece the purpose of which +was to rebut the symmetry involved in a visual pattern, with that as the +opponent to be hit. I mean I very well could and perhaps should. + +All of my pieces were uninterpreted calculi. Because I accepted +that that was the only way of explaining what mathematics is: that it +consists of a body of truth about a world that does \emph{not} exist, and +explicitly so. And that all of the traditional explanations of mathematical +content are now seen to be anachronistic superstitions. They are just +indefensible in the modern world. Put those two things together and +mathematics becomes a chess game, an uninterpreted calculus. + +All of my Concept pieces are using the terminology of Carnap's +\booktitle{Logical Syntax of Language}---the formation rule, the transformation +rule---but in each case they wish to express the violation, the failure of +some traditional organizing principle of these uninterpreted calculi, +For instance there is one where, among other things, the very notation +itself has an undisplaced active interaction with the subjectivity of the +quote unquote reader.\footnote{dated 6/19/61---later titled "Illusions."} +And that determines the structure of the derivation, the proof. +It was pointed out to me many years later that it's not +just that you don't get this in schoolbook mathematics---this is what +they are most concerned to exclude. + +I had another one, in which there was no general transformation +rule.\footnote{\essaytitle{Transformations}, retitled \essaytitle{Implications} in the second edition.} +There were only completely nominalistic transformation rules, +In other words, for each step you are told, for that step only and for this +moment only, what the transformation rule is. And by the time you are +ready to take the next step, that rule is forgotten and inoperative. + +\speaker{HENNIX} This is the \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism}? + +\speaker{FLYNT} No, no. \essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} was not Concept Art at +all. No, no. It was a different genre. That one was the piece called +\essaytitle{Transformations}. + +\essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator} in my +own classification are not Concept Art. Only the pieces labeled +"Concept Art" are Concept Art. And I only did four of them until 1987. +Three of them are in \booktitle{An Anthology}, and the fourth was published in +\journaltitle{dimension 14} (1963). \essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} and the +\essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator} were in other genres. I drew these distinctions of genre +rather narrowly, actually. + +This is the one \action{pointing to 6/19/61 in \booktitle{An Anthology}} where there +is, in an uninterpreted calculus, interaction between notation and the +subjectivity of the quote unquote reader. + +This is \essaytitle{Transformations.} You are just taking these objects, you +are burning them, melting them, doing all sorts of things to them. The +point of this is that each step in the proof---you have to think of it as a +proof---you see it has the tree structure of a proof. This is my nominalistic +transformation rules, because each rule is stipulated only at that +step, and then it is thrown away. The point that I was trying to express +was that's what they do in all of it---even in chess, when you move the +pawn to King's Bishop 3, you think that you are conforming to a +general rule written in Heaven. But in fact there isn't any general rule, +and when you move the pawn to Bishop 3, you're just making up what +you are doing right at that moment, and there isn't any general rule. + +\speaker{HENNIX} You would label this ad hoc? + +\speaker{FLYNT} That's right. That would be perhaps a better word for it. All +transformation rules and probably even all formation rules are ad hoc, +yes, yes. + +I said "nominalistic" because they are only there individually. +They do not add up to any general--- + +\speaker{HENNIX} System of rules? + +\speaker{FLYNT} No---not that---they do not add up to any generality, to a +general rule that covers all cases of a certain class. + +What is inadequate about this---and I realized very quickly that +it's inadequate---is that this does not actually give some profound +reason in concrete practice for questioning chess. That's what the +inadequacy of the original Concept Art pieces is. That they don't really +give you some kind of operative situation where you can see that +following the chess rules is failing. I don't provide that. I only provide +something that's ritualistic. Saying this is how you would behave if you +realized that following any rule is ad hoc. + +A conventional mathematician would say, you have not proved +that the world that this is designed for is the world that I have to live in. +\textsc{That}'s the inadequacy. He would say that I am only ritualizing the +world of impoverishment or disorganization. I'm not showing that +that's the world that people in general have to live in because it's in +force. That's the difference between then and now. The reason that I +want meta-technology would be to give a situation where somebody +can actually see that you \textsc{Can't} play a game of chess---or that you want +to play one and that I, by putting it in the appropriate context, make it +clear that the general rules on which playing it depends are not in fact +available. + +But to show that in a serious way. From the prevailing point of +view I would be talking about contriving a miracle. In other words, to +actually substantiate any of these---what is interesting is not so much +\essaytitle{Transformations}---but it would be some situation that would substantiate +that the conventional view is actually unavailable. And to do +that you have to violate what are considered today to be the soundest +laws of science. I'd need a miracle to manifest that I'm right, so to +speak. So by the time I get to meta-technology I'm in the job of +constructing miracles, I mean constructing situations that are +absolutely physically impossible (or in some cases logically impossible) by +currently accepted scientific and commonsense views of what is the real +world. + +\essaytitle{Innperseqs} is the one that is visually sensuously the best. You are +making a rainbow halo that you can get by breathing on your glasses +and looking at a point light---you get a rainbow halo around the light. +Eventually I will set it up so that you don't need glasses or anything so +that the whole business of seeing the rainbow halo is moved out and +does not require any special preparation by the spectator. The rainbow +halo is the sensuous delectation. The derivation, the proof, the +specification of propositions, is something that you do as the halo is fading. +You have to quickly specify---I never analyzed exactly what was going +on there but it was as if---you have a notation which is externally +changing, and therefore the quote unquote reading of a mathematical +system has to be a process that is taking place in experienced time. + +By acts of attention you have to choose sentences, to choose +implications---it's a display. You are given an external display which is +changing out there, not in your head. And you have to place a structure +on it by specified rules. + +You know another point that can be made is, that \essaytitle{Innperseqs} is +philosophically inconsistent with \essaytitle{Transformations}---that these pieces +are mocking each other. + +At the time that I did this, I did not have the kind of maturity that I +would have today to put it together in a strong way. These were +gestures. And they are not even uniform ona question like whether a +rule exists or not. Well actually, frequently I'm too hard on myself. I +think that in the essay \essaytitle{Concept Art} I do say something like, objective +language doesn't exist, but I'm still free to work with what you think the +text says---I can use that in \emph{art}: this is \emph{art}! + +There are three ways that the art part comes in. One is the visual +display, the delectation. The second way the art part comes in is---well, +if LaMonte Young's Word Pieces are art, then this is art too. But the +third thing is that this does not claim to have objective truth. It is a +construction for the world-hallucination or the world-apparition or +even a construction for the private world-apparition. + +\speaker{HENNIX} You are actually extending the world by new constructions. + +\speaker{FLYNT} But it's the world-apparition. In a sense if I believed that these +rules were objectively established, then it would almost indicate that I +had not learned the lesson of the very piece which sits beside it on the +page!\footnote{\essaytitle{Innperseqs} versus \essaytitle{{Transformations,} second edition.} +And what am I doing talking about a page and a text? So the +answer is that I have abandoned the provision of truth as the purpose of +this activity and I have moved to the provision of experiences where the +possibility of these experiences is a surprise. + +\speaker{HENNIX} And you don't have to be an empiricist to be surprised. + +\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. Yes. But the truth claim that you would have from a +Kripke or a Goodman has been dropped. The meaning of the text is the +meaning that the reader associates to it. And the thing is, that in +conventional intellectual work that's an unacceptable answer, because +usually you are trying to get independent of the reader's +distortion---that's the whole hope---that you can make something that is +independent of the reader's distortion of it. This is a different game. This is not +classical mathematics; it's not classical science. It's like giving a +Rorschach blot. Then I don't mind if you have a unique subjective reaction. +If my purpose is to make Rorschach blots, then I do not object, I have +not failed, if you have a unique personal reaction. + +These pieces are designed for the individual reaction rather than in +spite of it. + +The only other Concept Art piece---in \journaltitle{dimension 14}---\enquote{one just +has to guess whether this piece exists and if it does what its definition +is.} That was the piece. And that was a response to Cage's dissociation +of what the composer sees, the performer sees, the audience sees. +Starting from that, going through all the games that LaMonte had +played with the idea of performance, where we were performing pieces +first and composing them second, maybe many months later. So finally +with the Concept Art piece, even whether the piece exists is completely +indeterminate, but I meant for people to try to take that seriously. I was +having a joke with the person who thinks that concepts form an +objective world, which the individual who cognizes only discovers bit +by bit. In effect, 1am giving him this: thank you for believing that there +is a piece here---I'm leaving it to you to find it. I wash my hands of that +Problem---\emph{you} find it! + +Well, there's a natural pause that comes here because I think that +I've summarized perhaps fairly thoroughly where I was when I did the +work published in 1963. The entire subsequent career of the label +Concept Art, its misapplication to Word Pieces and all the rest of it, we +have not begun with. After that, we can go on to the discussion of your +visual pieces of the 70s and how they resume the genre of Concept Art. + |