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Diffstat (limited to 'essays')
| -rw-r--r-- | essays/introduction.tex | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/essays/introduction.tex b/essays/introduction.tex index cdabc4b..9890bda 100644 --- a/essays/introduction.tex +++ b/essays/introduction.tex @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution -(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the'individual has +(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the individual has a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond @@ -38,18 +38,18 @@ beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. The question of whe\-ther a given belief is valid depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate -experience.} Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I +experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be -a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase 'a realm -beyond my experience' could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of +a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase \enquote{a realm +beyond my experience} could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that -the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I -imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this +the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it, I +imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs |