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diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex index d78631a..9c93395 100644 --- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex +++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal -organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" +organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1), (T_1, V_2), (T_2, V_1), (T_2, V_2)$. In reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following -notation. Consider a rectangular array of "places" such that the place in the +notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the ith row and jth column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of regularities in our present world. @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only f's, which amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of f's leaves one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to -open-eye sights); such an "impairment" is of little interest. Of the remaining +open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ $\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}$. But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change -changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about "impairing" +changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing} changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes are the most perception-dissociating ones. @@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference -point in the "world." The question of "whether the anomaties are really -outside or only in the mind" comes to have less and less scientific meaning. +point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomaties are really +outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be @@ -198,23 +198,23 @@ However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely -chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say "I see a book -in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil." These assumptions may not be -justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, "I don't even +chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book +in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be +justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is -visual." In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books +visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this -compensation may become habitual and "pre-conscious." In this case, if the +compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a temporary psychological malfunction. These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are -actually learned, "unconscious" interpretations of raw data which by +actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. -"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional +\enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of @@ -286,13 +286,13 @@ object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence. The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the -concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. +concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. -Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of +Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being |