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diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef48678 --- /dev/null +++ b/blueprint.tex @@ -0,0 +1,8888 @@ +\documentclass[10pt,twoside]{memoir} + +\usepackage{salitter} +\usletterlayout + +\usepackage{mwe} +\usepackage{csquotes} +\usepackage{bbold} +\usepackage{stix} + +\coelfont + +\newcommand{\speech}[1]{ + \textquote{\emph{#1}}} + +\newcommand{\essaytitle}[1]{ + \emph{#1}} + +\begin{document} + +\graphicspath{{img/}} +\pagestyle{ruled} + +{ +\thispagestyle{empty} +\img{creep.png} + +Henry Flynt presents "Creep" lecture in Adam Hovre upper common room, Harvard +University, May 15, 1962 + + +(photo by Tony Conrad) +\clearpage +} + +\tableofcontents* + +\mainmatter + +\chapter{Introduction} + + +This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It +summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole +range of questions which I have developed. The first essay, +\essaytitle{On Social Recognition}, noted that the official social philosophy of practically every +regime in the world says that the individual has a duty to serve society to the +best of his abilities. Social recognition is supposed to be the reward which +indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that +the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, +political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual +undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution +(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the'individual has +a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social +philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain +the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond +this, he will undertake the most important tasks posed by society for his +own private gratification. He will not attempt to benefit society, or to gain +the recognition which would necessarily result if society were to utilize his +achievements. + +The second essay, \essaytitle{Creep}, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; +carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and +playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of +certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually +needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be +desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality +problems. + +I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. +Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have +pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and +demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still +consider it "necessary" to believe in God; but the Soviet government has +managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which +beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled +\essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and +\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. +The question of whether a given belief is valid +depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate +experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I +am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be +a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase 'a realm +beyond my experience' could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of +descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a +realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it +cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs +depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, +an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or +meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that +the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I +imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this +mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental! picture. The +attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to +the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that al! beliefs +are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt +beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are +nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. + +The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth +as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to +have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that +an activity may perfectly weil employ false statements and still have +objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that +are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary +phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of +contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental +reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and +phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It +must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to +pre-scientific trrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more +than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you +to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, +explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get +you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material +for rational purposes. + +The other initial subject of investigation I chose was art. The art which +claims to have cognitive value is already demolished by my philosophical +results. However, art at its most distinctive does not need to claim cognitive +value; its value is claimed to be entertainmental or amusemental. What about +art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which +are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each +individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely +subjective. (Call these experiences "brend.") The difference between brend +and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and +turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to +overlook their brend, and they do so because of the same factors which +perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization +of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning +which causes one to venerate "great art" is also a conditioning to dismiss +one's own brend. If one can become aware of one's brend without the +distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's brend is +superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality +which completely transcends art. + +Thus, I reject art as an intellectual or cultural modality. In rejecting +truth, I advocated in its place intellectual activities which have an objective +value independent of truth. In rejecting art, I do not propose that it be +replaced with any objective activity at all. Rather, I advocate that the +individual become aware of his just-likings for what they are, and allow them +to come out. If I succeed in getting the individual to recognize his own +just-likings, then I will have given him infinitely more than any artist ever +can. + +We are not finished with art, however. Ever since art began to +disintegrate as an institution, modern art has become more and more of a +repository for activities which represent pure waste, but which counterfeit +innovation and objective value. A two-way process is involved here. On the +one hand, the modern artist, faced with the increasing gratuitousness of his +profession, desperately incorporates superficial references to science in his +products in the hope of intimidating his audience. On the other hand, art +itself has become an institution which invests waste with legitimacy and even +prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game. +What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into +little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write +down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call +the result a "modern poem," people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas +they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly +mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in +their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial +amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets. + +Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between +the products which result from this attempt to "save" art, and activities in +the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse +activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art +products which are claimed to be "scientific" and therefore objectively +valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked +about art products. +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be +worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to "carry" it? + +\item Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific +discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the +field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, +why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it +only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to +perform "Swan Lake" in order to do antigravity experiments? +\end{enumerate} +To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to +isolate the active principle---not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo. + +Both of these sets of questions make the same point, from somewhat +different perspectives. Given an individual with a product to offer, does he +actively seek out the lady art reporters, the public relations contracts, the +museum officials, or does he actively dissociate himself from them? Does he +seek artistic legitimation of his product, or does he reject it? The objective +activities which I have developed stand on their own feet. They are not art, +and to construe them as art would make it impossible to comprehend them. + +A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. +Until now, this modality has involved the construction of ideas such that the +very possibility of thinking these ideas is a significant phenomenon. In other +words, the modality has consisted of the invention of mental abilities. The +ideas involve physical language, that is, language which occurs in beliefs +about the physical world. Such language is philosophically meaningless, but +it has connotations provided by the psychological trick involved in believing. +The connotations are what are utilized; factual truth is irrelevant. Then, the +ideas cannot be reduced to the mechanical manipulation of marks or +counters---unlike ordinary mathematics. Also, logical truth, which happens to +be discredited by my philosophical results, is irrelevant to the ideas. + +But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it +must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something +which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful +independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. + +We can now consider the following principle. "spontaneously and +without any prompting to sweep human culture aside and to carry out +elaborate, completely self-justifying activities." Relative to the social context +of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to +respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary +antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, +it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. +In the light of The Flaws Underlying Beliefs and the brend theory, however, +the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted +correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The +activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be +standardized. + +The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism}, +\essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. +\essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very +possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an +activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional +gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena +with the thinking of contradictions. It led to \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed +Memories}, which in turn led to \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}. +With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications +outside itself. + +\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963} +uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental +reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories}, and this led +in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}. + +The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} +was intended to exploit the realization that humans are the most +advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model +of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, +the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically +impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I +have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely +accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension +of normal beliefs to produce its effects. + +\essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in +Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies} (1966). In +this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as +formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two +subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its +potential applications in conjunction with science. +\essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical +possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses. +\essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences +of the logically impossible which +we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us +to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the +logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to +obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are +"admissible." The theory investigates the implications of admitting some +contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of +many-valued numbers is also presented. + +The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to +\essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose +significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay +defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it +impossibie for physicists to "construct the object from experience." Finally, +\essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of +false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I +favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not +generated a series of applications as the other activities have. + +To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They +are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities +having objective value, together with cach individual's brend. Consider the +individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the +significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the +business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of +the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded +the wrong things, as I argued in \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}. But in addition, the +institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual +modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to +prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which +I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official +intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot +be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the +beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is +presumably not inherent in my intelectual modality; but under present +social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. + + +\part{PHILOSOPHY} + + +\chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} + + +We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my +"immediate experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist +even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, +then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask +whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be +yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in +order for the phrase "a realm beyond my experience" to have any meaning. +Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap +between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion +\speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that +is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natura! +language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a +statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the +natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. +Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, +and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses +about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. +An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so +doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics +of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a +substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a +statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must +be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is +our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my +experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a +substantive assertion. + +The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we +are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our +argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, +and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. +The only possible pproach for this paper is an internal critique of common +sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to +aspects of themselves. + +As an example of the application of our initial result to specific +questions of belief, consider the question of whether the Empire State +Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is +even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced +Empire State Building does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the +realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the Empire State +Building continues to exist when I am not Jooking at it depends on the very +assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we +found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the Empire State +Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be +considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a +definitional trick. + +We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, +which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in +the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has +traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian +atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing +aboui nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the +natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that +belief-assertions are not substantive. + +Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my +experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts. (We +understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my +experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal +formulation.) Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the Empire +State Building exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the +Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture +that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a +distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called +perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may +close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of +"reality," two different types of experiences can be distinguished, +non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act +consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a +non-mental experience. The "attitude" which is involved is not a +proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only +introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving +psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the +belief-assertion. + +The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as +the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that +although the problem originally seems to center on "nonexperience," it +turns out to center on "language." Philosophical problems exist only if there +is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in +belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the +existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that +the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which +refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond +experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic +expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark +parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to +nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word 'table' is supposed to denote an +object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. +Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as +follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that +we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to +entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? !n other +words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of +all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is +true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is +whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more +immediately than in the case of 'nonexperience,' that this question is +caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is +there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and +nonexperiences? Is there an expression, 'Empire State Building,' which is +related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and +which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire +State Building or not? ) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask +whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the +distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help +here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the +natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of +the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this +container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There +is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned +before, the aphorism that 'saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an +example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. + +in summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, +made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is +too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fal! on the question +of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional +trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question +simply collapses. + +\chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} + + +We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to +believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. +Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a +blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. +Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also +observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so +that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving wil! +not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question +then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that +people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as +soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract +and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. +Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot +afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs +which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. + +Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs +as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and +decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be +punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional +preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between +fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be +self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional +formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation +whatever? + +It is apparent that fearful beliefs suggest many topics for speculation. +This essay, however, will concentrate exclusively on one topic, which is by +far the most important. Given that people once held the belief about +blasphemy, and that I do not, then I have succeeded in dispensing with a +fearful belief. Two beliefs which are exactly analogous to the one about +blasphemy are the belief that if I jump out of a tenth story window I will be +hurt, and the belief that if I attempt to walk through a wali I wil! bruise +myself. Given that I am able to dispense with the belief about blasphemy, it +follows that, in effect, I am able to walk through walls relative to medieval +people. That is, my ability to blaspheme without being struck by lightning +would be as unimaginable to them as the ability to walk through walls is +today. The topic of this essay is whether it is possible to transfer my +achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs. + +\visbreak + +I am told that \enquote{if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will +be hurt.} Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not +convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the +"evidence" implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to +see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both +blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the +action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in +order to prove that I can get away with it? Actually, I do not blaspheme; I +simply do not perform the action at all. Yet I do not have any belief +whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose +that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, +shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? +Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of +having to accept the dare that "you have to do it to prove you don't believe +it's dangerous'? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? +The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief +should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. + +The exhortation continues to the effect that if I did utter blasphemy I +really would be struck by lightning. I stil! do not find this compelling. But +suppose that I do see someone utter a blasphemy and get struck by lightning. +Surely this must convert me. But with due apologies to the faithful, I must +report that it does not. There is no reason why it should make me believe. I +do not believe that blaspheming will cause me to be struck by lightning, and +the evocation of frightful images---or for that matter, something that I +see---would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an +immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by +lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by +lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold +the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I tive is so +profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one +"sighting."} + +In general, the so-called evidence doesn't work. There is a swindle +somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful +belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the +whole conglomeration of "evidence" somehow overwhelmed medieval +people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away +with something that they could not get away with. + +It is not that I stand up in a society of the faithful and suddenly +blaspheme. It is rather that the whole medieva! cognitive orientation had +been completely reoriented by the time it was transmitted to me. Or in other +words, the medieval cognitive orientation was restructured throughout +during the modern era. In the process, the compelling conglomeration of +evidence was disintegrated. Isolated from their niches in the old orientation, +the bits of evidence no longer worked. Each bit missed the target. I do not +have a head-on confrontation with the medieval impossibility of +blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I +structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. + +The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I +have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that 'if I try to walk +through the wall I wil! fail and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am +sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. +But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a +fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring +the entire situation, of restructuring evidence, so that the conglomeration of +evidence is disintegrated into isolated bits which are separately powerless. +Only then can one slip by the impossibility. I cannot exercise my freedom to +walk through walls until the whole cognitive orientation of the modern era is +restructured throughout. + +The project of restructuring the modern cognitive orientation is a vast +one. The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. In this connection it +is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic of science as Carnap +rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition meaningful if it had any +empirically verifiable proposition as an implication. But consider an +appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions in good standing, and +conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite number of propositions about +single events (what Carnap called protocol-sentences). Only a very small +number of the latter propositions are indeed subject to verification. If we +sever them from the entire conjunction, what remains is as effectively +blocked from verification as the propositions which Carnap rejected as +meaningless. This criticism of science is not a mere technical exercise. A +scientific proposition is a fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially +testable meanings with an infinite number of untestable meanings and +inveigles us to accept the whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the +very beginning of \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this +quite clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it. For us, +however, it is essential to be assured that science can be dismantled just as +the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme. + +We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to +overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of +the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive +"objects" is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for +this correlation is "the contribution of intermodal organization to the +object Gestalt."} + +From a different traditon, the critique of scientific fact and of +measurable time which is suggested in Luk\'{a}cs' \booktitle{Reification and the +Consciousness of the Proletariat} might be of value if it were developed.\footnote{Lulkacs also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist +society---that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to +subsistence was unconditional. He implied that scientific quantification and +facticity are closely connected with the work discipline required by the +capitalist mode of production; and that like the price system, they constitute +a false objectivity which we accept because the social economic institutions +deprive us of subsistence if we fail to submit to them. Quite aside from the +historical unlikelihood of a communist society, this suggestion might be +pursued as a thought experiment to obtain a more detailed characterization +of the hypothetical post-scientific outlook.} + +Finally, I may mention that most of my own writings are offered as +fragmentary beginnings in the project of dismantling the modern cognitive +orientation. + +Someday we will realize that we were always free to walk through +walls. But we could not exercise this freedom because we structured the +whole situation, and the evidence, in an enslaving way. + +\chapter{Philosophical Reflections I} + +\begin{enumerate} % TODO letters, sub numbers +\item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these +intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why +are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find +in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating +concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of +this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to +concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a +transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not +these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the +mindless animals? + +Such questions tempt one to engage in a sort of philosophical +anthropology, using in part the method of introspection. Beliefs could be +explained as arising in an attempt to deal with experienced frustrations by +denying them in thought. The origin of Christian Science and magic would +thereby be explained. Further, we could postulate a primal anxiety-reaction +to raw experience. This anxiety would be lessened by mythologies and +explanatory beliefs. The frustration and the anxiety-reaction would be +primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. + +Going even farther, we could suppose that a being which could +apprehend the whole universe through direct experience would have no need +of beliefs. Beliefs would be a rickety method of coping with the limited +range of our perception, a method by which our imperfect brains cope with +the world. There would be an analogy with the physicist's use of phantom +models to make experimental observations easier to comprehend. + +However, there are two overwhelming objections to this philosophical +anthropology. First, it purports to study the human mind as a derivative +phenomenon, to study it from a God-like perspective. The philosophical +anthropology thus consists of beliefs which are subject to the same +objections as any other beliefs. It is on a par with any other beliefs; it has no +privileged position. Specifically, it is in competition not only with my +philosophy but with other accounts of the mind-reality relation, such as +behaviorism, Platonism, and Thomism. And my philosophy provides me with +no basis to defend my philosophical! anthropology against their philosophical +anthropologies. My philosophy doesn't even provide me with a basis to +defend my philosophical anthropology against its own negation. + +In short, the paradoxes which my philosophy uncovers must remain +unexplained and unresolved. + +The other objection to my philosophical anthropology is that its +implications are unnecessarily conservative. An explanation of why people +do something wrong can become an assertion that it is necessary to do wrong +and finally a justification for doing wrong. But just because I tend, for +example, to construe my perceptions as confirmations of propositions about +phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this +way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical +anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. + + +\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" +of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. +Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I +have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between +beliefs and non-credulous mental activity. + +Is my fear of jumping out of the window a belief? Strictly speaking, +no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require +propositional thought. + +Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations +(relative to my field of vision) as "the same object" a belief? Apparently, +but this is very ambiguous. + +Is my identification of tactile and visual "pencil-perceptions" as aspects +of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through +different senses) a belief? Yes. + +It is possible to subjectively classify bodily movements according to +whether they are intentional, because drunken awkwardness, adolescent +awkwardness, and movements under ESB are clearly unintentional. Then +does intentional movement of my hand require a belief that I can move my +hand? Definitely not, although in rare cases some belief will accompany or +precede the movement of my hand. But believing itself will not get the hand +moved! + +Is there any belief involved in identifying my leg, but not the leg of the +table at which I am sitting, as part of my body? Maybe---another ambiguous +case. + +Are my emotions of longing and dread beliefs in future time? Is my +emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these +temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) + +How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if +my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily--- the +object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. + +\plainbreak{2} + +\item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not +take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other +evidence. Our "immediate experience" is mediated; it is a derived +phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our +subjective standpoint. + +\begin{enumerate} + +\item But Alten does not seriously defend the claim that he does not +distinguish between immediate and non-immediate. The claim that there is +no distinction would be regarded as demented in every human culture. Every +culture supposes that I may be tricked or cheated: there is a realm, the +non-immediate or non-experienced, which provides an arena for surreptitious +hostility to me. Every culture supposes that it is easier for me to tell what I +am thinking than what you are thinking. Every culture supposes that I will +hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is +simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he +apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction +between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only +way of confirming a model, but to construct a mode! of the relation between +the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. + +\item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative +phenomenon, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the +pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness +and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is +the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy +exposes. "I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I +cannot now perceive it." +\end{enumerate} + +\item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain +self-vitiating "nodes" in the logic of common sense. These nodes include the +concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often +find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from +cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they +are self-vitiating nodes in the logic of common sense. As a result, I have +concluded that it is probably futile to debate the abstract validity of my +analysis of these nodes. It does indeed appear as if I am debating over an +abstract joke, and it is not apparent why I would attribute such great +importance to a joke. + +\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} represents my +present approach. The advantage of this approach is that it makes +unmistakable the reason why ! attribute so much importance to these +philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few +isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only +significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation +of why the life---world is subject to being undermined. + +When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of +trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day +scientific common sense. Walking through walls is understood as it would be +pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside +the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go +directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive +orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or +have "object perceptions," and thus wouldn't know whether one was +walking through a wail or not. + +At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my +genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of +non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a +hair's-breadth of difference between the state ! propose and mental +incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify +this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. + +\item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are +now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing +over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does +not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two +circumstances in conflict. The "fact" that we are talking is one of the two +circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other +circumstance being the self-vitiating "nodes" I have mentioned. To repeat +over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. + +Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking +suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an +objective relation between words and things.) The !anguage we "see" is a +shell whose 'transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. + +\item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in +\essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical +force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary +motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of +contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline +case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which +violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to +classify.) The contradiction in "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs" has to do first +with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to +do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as +if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter +sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. + + +{ +5/15/1962 + + +Comments from the audience +(photo by Tony Conrad) + + +"Creep" lecture, May 15, 1962 +} + +\clearpage + +{ +5/15/1962 + + +Comments from the audience +(photo by Tony Conrad) + + +"Creep" lecture, May 15, 1962 +} + +\clearpage + + +\chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality} + + +1. STOP ALL "GROSS BELIEVING," SUCH AS BELIEF IN OTHER +MINDS, CAUSALITY, AND THE PHANTOM ENTITIES OF SCIENCE +(ATOMS, ELECTRONS, ETC.). + + +2. STOP THINKING IN PROPOSITIONAL LANGUAGE. + + +3. STOP ALL SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESIZING. DO NOT CONSIDER +YOUR "SIGHTINGS" OF THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING AS +CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS THERE WHEN YOU ARE NOT LOOKING +AT !T-OR FOR THAT MATTER, AS CONFIRMATIONS THAT IT IS +THERE WHEN YOU ARE LOOKING AT IT. + + +4. STOP ORGANIZING VISUAL EXPERIENCES AND TACTILE +EXPERIENCES INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. STOP ORGANIZING +SO-CALLED "DIFFERENT SPATIAL ORIENTATIONS OR DIFFERENT +TOUCHED SURFACES OF OBJECTS" INTO OBJECT-GESTALTS. THAT +IS, STOP HAVING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTS. + + +5. STOP BELIEVING IN PAST AND FUTURE TIME. THAT 15, LIVE +OUT OF TIME. STOP FEELING LONGING, DREAD, OR REGRET. + + +6. STOP BELIEVING THAT YOU CAN MOVE YOUR BODY. + + +7. STOP BELIEVING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ANY +OBJECTIVE MEANING. + + +8. YOU ARE NOW FREE TO WALK THROUGH WALLS (IF YOU CAN +FIND THEM). + + +25 + + +6. Some Objections to My Philosophy + + +A. The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in +euucated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the +philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The +Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply +that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that +other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a +philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See +Philosophical Investigations, $420.) Statements which imply that other +people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were +intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because +they subject the statements to criticism by logical! standards which are +irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (§ § 402, 412, 119, 116.) + +For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, +and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things +which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real +case.' (§303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's +memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in +God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. + + +Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs + + +In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any +given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter +I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just +what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the +entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at +least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, +psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, +phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, +comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each +with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, +associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not + + +26 + + +ee eR eT A ee OE eT Ee a + + +hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential +language', and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not +always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and +belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter +of fact is unquestionably does involve betiefs, is not for example an +anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of- knowledge are +difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has +to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind +what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are +incomplete and confused. + +What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a +few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of 'knowledge'; +have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are +thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so +"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity} that they are either just assumed, as +too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if +they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. +The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have +these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's +experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea +of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and +of not having it. + +Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered', beliefs +formulated in 'natural laws", beliefs "about substance', and the like. +Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived +world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting +beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is +("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The +non-strange character of one's 'perceived world" is associated with beliefs +"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the +world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's +"perceived world" is not part of what is 'essential' in these beliefs. + +Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. +After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from +oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict +sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a +formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave +one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply 'that there are spatially +distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a +visual - "moving" - hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal +beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. + + +27 + + +Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring' may +seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", +doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that +things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the +slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should +observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs +"about the objectivity of referring', but they are not "objective referring'; +and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. + +Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself +have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other +humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in +rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived +other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is +associated with the belief 'that others have minds', but it is not "other +humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not +part of what is essentia! in believing "that others have minds", points I +anticipated in the second chapter. + +Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of +temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form 'If x, then y +will follow in the future', especially if y is something one wants, and x is +something one can do. {After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the +switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear +"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge'. They say, +for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, +and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the +light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated +with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does +not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not +part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the +light will come on'. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about +the necessity of such knowledge for survivai", it is just more beliefs of the +same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt +dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows +how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. +Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" +beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. + +By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their +formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most +suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with +non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the +beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in + + +28 + + +ee ee ee eR + + +defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he +continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the +experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do +so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to +deny that he has the experiences. Now {I am not denying that he has the +experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the +reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the +self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary +of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs +after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It +sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief +language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language +to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's +usually because one has beliefs. + +The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences +is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all +English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a +result, those who want to talk about experiences {my use) and still use +English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly +associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often +among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have +always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to +so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being +the introduction of my use of 'experience' in the third chapter. Thus, some +of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't +for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the +book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third +chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to +experiences, languag2 with which they are very strongly associated and +which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by +announcing when the language is used for that purpose. + +It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I +was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be +understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented +my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This +does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They +are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, +which is not having beliefs {and realizing, for any belief one happens to think +of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not +be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope f will eventually +get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by + + +29 + + +suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than +beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English +in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to +learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having +unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. + + +Chapter 7 : Summary + + +The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I +am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore +beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he +will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to +construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a +formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or +the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of +them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is +supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This +statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in +connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that +my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible +argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain +unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to 'doubt, question" it, or +to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not +believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief +to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the +position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is +objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to +reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less +credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a +belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to +decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or +the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well! take one a long time to +understand my position, but if one is taking a jong time to decide whether it +is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be +wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the +matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my +position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. + +Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without +beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for + + +30 + + +example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. +Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to +be "true or false', to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you +to believe something, for example, to believe 'that there is a table behind +you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to +continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing +yourself with your back to a table'), you are going to have to have the +attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, +deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you do do? ) You are going +to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. + +As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, +intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to +realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The +important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true +statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the +expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences +associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when +you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my +language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to +do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the +complete realization of what the right position is on you {it doesn't have to +be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language'); if you +don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just +ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said +about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not +therefore valueless. + +So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having +beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete +transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter +position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, +"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic +proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical +problems (for example, 'Could an omnipotent god do the literally +impossible? ', 'Are statements about what I did in the past while alone +capable of intersubjective verification? ') arising from them? And again, one +begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is +wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be 'Why +bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving +myself'. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. +And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one +"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so + + +31 + + +(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, +since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts +which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. + +In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason +why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read +that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they +would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as +Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt "in a real case." +Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet +Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the +latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as +inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have +today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay "The +Flaws Underlying Beliefs" shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that +the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief +that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no +different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It Is +perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is +totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also +possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be +absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per +cent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we +need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. "The Flaws Underlying +Beliefs" shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural +sciences, involve outright self-deception. + +These discoveries have consequences far more important than the +technical issues involved. It is by no means trivial that I do not have to pray, +or to fast, or to accept the moral dictates of the clergy, or to give money to +the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human +cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In +analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring +the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to +doubt in a real case, as in my essay "Philosophical Aspects of Walking +Through Walls." I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of +intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these +consequences. + +A reply to the Wittgensteinian attitude which is technically adequate +can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical +maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not +necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical +connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in + + +32 + + +the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural +language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive +linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic +than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted. + +Wittgenstein held that philosophical or metaphysical controversies +literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not +arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing +Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver +is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the +paradoxes uncovered by "bad" philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary +language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary +language because they uncover paradoxes is ordinary language propositions. +Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in +ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then +Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to +see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as +inadmissible. + +Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the Empire +State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The +Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic +because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no +behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to +this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use +ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The +philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as +improper because it leads to problems. The reason why "the proper use of +ordinary language never leads to paradoxes" is that Wittgenstein has defined +proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not +resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. +Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and +language, a gratuitous definition to the effect that certain portions of the +natural language which embarrass him are inadmissible, a gratuitous ban on +certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him. His purpose is +to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious +inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish +intellectual dishonesty. + + +B. In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which +cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality +are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if + + +33 + + +there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there +are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus +there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which +leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the +middle of the argument by a play on the words "subject" and "object." + +When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the +attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within +experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it +would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be +"proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, +etc. from immediate experience, then ail these phenomena would be +trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be +my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its +otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it +would be trivial. We ask how I know that the Empire State Building exists +when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate +experience, then objective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The +dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the +gap between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself, yet they do not +want to conclude that appearances exhaust reality. + +There are two special assumptions which are smuggled into supposedly +assumptionless transcendental arguments. First, there is the belief that there +is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they +describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, +there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective +basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is +controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with + + +crossed fingers.) +Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are + + +addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have +conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step +such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of +particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive +words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. +This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the +alternative that we don't have this "real knowledge." + +In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that +transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring +the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, +transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the +empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing + + +34 + + +fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many +transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific +psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes +as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental +arguments are supposed to prove. + + +35 + + +7. Philosophy Proper ("Version 3," 1961) +Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973) + + +This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be +an inquiry as to which beliefs are 'true,' or right. The right beliefs are +tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. +Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by +their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as +corresponding to non-tautologous propositions. + +Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or +supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is +also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the +notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the +natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in +philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is +continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which +philosophers have dealt with it. + +All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are +normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be heipful to +examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here +beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this +monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain +approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold +beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. + +it is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that +they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on +their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, +quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some +non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has +to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. +Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy +non-cognitive needs. + +To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "! +could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is +true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which + + +36 + + +we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level +of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit +and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing +subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to +recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of +beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical +validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in +the denial! of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are +alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have +not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self- deceptions +being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. + +A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for +non-cognitive reasons follows. + +1. Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to +live if 1 didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to +know it." + +2. One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews +to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. + +3. The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in +Catholicism for esthetic reasons. + +4, Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their +efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. + +5. A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one +who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the +inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. +Such a circumscribed inquiry wil! be called 'theologizing," in recognition of +the archetypal activity in this category. + +When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are +instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive +motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific +method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he +believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a +common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who +discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a +commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he +must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. +The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry +begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows +that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a +demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then +their interest in science cannot be cognitive. + + +37 + + +The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the +non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the +non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not +be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed +area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two +contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be +satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test +or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other +hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a +single alternative is welcome. + +6. Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested +in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To +academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had +made vatid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians +circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as +scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. + +7. The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is +provided by the person who holds a fearful! belief which is widely considered +to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the +motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would +welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect +that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a +demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no +comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it +seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. + +This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, +limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self- deception, or +self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The +examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge +whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to +our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this +monograph. + + +(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used +unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without +change.) + + +38 + + +Part I : The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems +Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts + + +In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of +philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing +language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might +tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, +formulations of them (for example, 'Other persons have minds' as +representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem +will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be +driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or +false). + +To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right +into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next +chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and +simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain +concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution +they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has +to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly +philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which +doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the +truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the +others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. + +The first concept is a new one, that of 'explication'. Explication of a +familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding +a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is +wanted that the expression 'mean'. To explain: I will be discussing +philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their +"meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to +use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which +the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as +replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, +which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses +are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be +replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to +the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that ! will be +concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the +uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the +expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of +acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions {expressions of + + +39 + + +which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents +(and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. +Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents +in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, +especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. +(1 will not say here just how I use 'connotation'. What the connotations of +an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a +supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are +supposed to be like.) 'Finding', or constructing, an expression (with its use) +supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, +for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the +expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced wil! be said to +be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the 'explication'. +Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is +inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the +same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. + +I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of +Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very +problematic 'definition'. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher +of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, +suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of +"work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, +clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. + +Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an +expression is suggested, as an explication for 'thing having a mind' (if +supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the +things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other +"overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this +expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for 'thing +having a mind', since 'thing having a mind' presumably has the connotations +for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, +higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt +behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by +the thing having it", and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: +the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the +proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causual +connection between having a mind and the other things, because the +expression 'thing having a mind' itself, and not the supposed effects of +having a mind, is what is under discussion. + +As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating +expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are + + +40 + + +for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be +slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be +otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of +finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical +problems. + +Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed +name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the +connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases +when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with +philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly +be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the +explications for 'thing having a mind' mentioned above. + +The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be +discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two +chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a +good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify +the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for 'true statement'. +(Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the +explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) + +Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be +"statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language +you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What +does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just +about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their +arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that +when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy +ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important +connotations of 'true statement', and, more generally, of 'statement', as +traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion +which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content', as it is sometimes +said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbai" part of a statement is +supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at +least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a +statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do +with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is +related. {The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and +mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus +irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are +interested in.) Thus, if 'true statement' is to be explicated, 'assertion having +truth value' and 'is true' (and 'has content' in a misleading use) have to be +explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication + + +41 + + +for 'true statement' deserves the connotations which were suggested with +'assertion having truth value' and 'is true'. One important conclusion from +these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or +bodes of marks such as 'The man talks') are often said to be "statements", +would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate 'statement' by simply +identifying it with 'sentence' (in my sense); something must be said about +such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same +reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify 'statement' +with 'sentence', the latter being explicated in terms of the ('formal') rules +for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no +reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. + +In explicating 'true statement' I wil! use the most elegant approach, one +relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having +truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way +to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to +make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" 'table' to +the thing. It is supposed that 'table' has been "interpreted", that is, that it is +"determinate" to which, of ail things, applications of 'table' are (to be said +to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is +'determinate' which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word +'table", are expressions "equivalent to" 'table'.) The word 'determinate' is +the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit +myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one +can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and +"then" the thing. 'point out' is restricted to refer to "ostension", pointing +out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to "directing +attention to things not in one's presence" as well. The assertion is 'true', of +course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things +to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) +"true", otherwise "false". It should be clear that such a pointing out of a +"first" thing and a "second", the first being an interpreted expression, is an +assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further +suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to +this explication, the things to which equivalent names ("occurances of a +name") may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, +other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the +concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple +assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is +how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation +between name and referents is an 'objective, metaphysical entity", which +would be getting into philosophy proper. + + +42 + + +The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that +what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the +context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" +kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first +let us say that the "complex name" gotten by replacing a sentence's "main +verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the +sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is +'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate +clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main +verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: 'The +table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one +man while the other man talked'; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been +pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, +but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be +invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to +make <a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this +"asserted name' being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one +doesn't assert names; names just have referents—-it is statements that one + + +makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate +this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple +kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. tn other +words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a +statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and +puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying +'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in +Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the +application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. + +Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader +for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is +replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). +Well, all 1 can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to +describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a +statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even +more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of +interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to +speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of +course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from +simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus +referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which +they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex +names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex + + +43 + + +names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such +words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context +of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be +clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these +relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything +about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents {and +non-referents), of a name is. {I might say that a thing can't have an intension +unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for +my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells +the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is +true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly +philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous +word 'determinate', because I haven't said anything about how names get +referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how +one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards +explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with +formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if +language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in +some form must have the central role in it.) + +"Statements", then, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind +which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have +described. I could thus explicate 'true statement' as referring to those true +"simple" assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this +would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of 'true +statement' having to do with the method of apptying the first member to the +second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to +do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more +elegant to explicate 'true statement' as referring to all true assertions of the +"simple" kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of +the two explications the reader prefers. + +So much for the preliminaries. + + +Chapter 3 : "Experience" + + +1 will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step +in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical +language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This +terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing +my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on + + +44 + + +precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I +think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern +philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are +relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. + +First, consider the term 'non-experience'. Although the concept of a +non-experience is intrinsically far more "difficult" than the concept of +"experience" which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, +presupposed in all "natural languages" and throughout philosophy, is so +taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should +have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are +perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of +it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the +future (future events); the past; space {or better, the distantness of objects +from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily +understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and +their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the +second chapter); unperceivable "things" (microscopic objects (of course, +viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), +essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, +normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To +simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am +speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing +the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.) +Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that +there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one +can not know whether there are any---this is not a non-belief but a complex +belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the +mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is +presumably a connotation of 'other minds' for the reader, as explained in the +second chapter. + +In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. +Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about +non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or +experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that +one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some +of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes +(assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by +having a "visual-table-experience'. The theory goes on to say that these +perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in +one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now +there are two sources of confusion in ail this for the naive reader. First, + + +45 + + +saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they +are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a +table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". +The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to +the second source of confusion. Does the English word 'table', as ordinarily +used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity +external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's +perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between +the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to +the reader, then he probably uses 'table', 'perceived table', and +'table-experience' as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, +is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not +perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this +confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being +used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the +perceptions. + +Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are +experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term +'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a +start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy +knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are +experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A_ traditional +philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not +know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective +table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, +has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences +not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one +unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there +is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like. +One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would +be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, "thinking" that one doesn't have +one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be +shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest +idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the +reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably +known {I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some +philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say +cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some +philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In +speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a +lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by + + +46 + + +appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy +which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One +does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences {nor are the objective +tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other +persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's +table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as +will be shown). + +I have explained the current use of the term 'experience'. Now I want +to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, +will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing +'non-experience' I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of +the term, in the case of 'experience' I am going to suggest a new use for the +term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of +experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the +former. What I am interested in, however, is not 'experience' as it implies. +'perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind', but as it refers to that +which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not +something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it +already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that +experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same +referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use +'experiei.ce' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to +non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally +used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a +leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy +between 'experience' as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences +or in particular the realm where they could be, and 'experience' without +these connotations. + +Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be +obvious that although my term 'experience' was introduced last, it is +intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the +terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I +discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I +have used the perspective of the Western philsophical tradition to explain my +term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, +especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader's +conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and +especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he +ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term +'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. + +I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. + + +47 + + +As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it +by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including +the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based +on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, +in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for +different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes +(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as 'The table is +black' implies the formulation 'Material objects are real' (to the materialist), +or 'So-called objects are ideas in the mind' (to the idealist), or 'Substances +and attributes are real', and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to +explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, +ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I +use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of +'experience', about its referents, there is about my English, for example +when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be +dropped from 'experience'. There can be this new term, the philosopher is +not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied +philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, +to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or +other natural language, but by having referents. + +As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my +'experience' because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything +about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that +there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the +most important in this book. The fact that although it is the 'simplest' and +least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain +using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the +philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my +'experience' he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as +an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this +isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be +no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this +realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the +book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from +the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is +past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may +already realize what I'm going to say. + + +48 + + +Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution + + +Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the +book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the +problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the +language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present +the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my +work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, +and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a +philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will +not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to +explore all its implications; that will come later. + +However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this +chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous +version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight' behind the main +argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is +true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified +from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without +appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot +know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a +contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be +right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if +they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but +inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively +understandable way. : + +To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that +one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to +that other that 'black table' has to 'table': a referent of the former is +necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names +mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any +statement, or formulation, of a _ belief of necessity depends on +'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For +example, 'Other persons having minds', the associated name of the +formulation 'Other persons have minds', certainly depends on +'non-experience'. Thus, anything true of 'non-experience' will be true of the +associated name of any formulation of a belief. + +In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of +non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of +'non-experience'), showed the connotations of the expressions +'non-experience' and 'experience' (traditional). What ! did not go on to + + +49 + + +show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, +one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What +follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the +reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's +experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there +be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was +awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to +non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of +non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in +the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) +justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it +without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were +just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience +(traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience +(traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have +them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into +experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience +which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there +is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience +(traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in +one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness +which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as +they are supposed to be understood. And for 'understanding' +'non-experience' {and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its +referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an +experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and +non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an_ experience +{traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands +'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and "non-experience"; but here +one is, using "non-experience" and "non-experience" to say so (which +certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible +for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the +concept of non-experience, it collapses. (A final point for the expert. This +tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does +not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot +name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences +about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that +one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say +so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) : +My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now +what is important is that it has done so precisely because ! have talked about + + +50 + + +experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken +as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' +(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have +said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is +a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' +(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" +the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent +desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no +explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the +expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, +remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are +completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to +experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a +formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is +not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is +an important point about method which should be brought out. If all +"non-experiential language', 'belief language", is inconsistent, how can I +show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer +is that 1 don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into +contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I +want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as 1 said we would, we +have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of +beliefs are false'. + +Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about +belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is +right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since +the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a +belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable +explication which was true; in short, the belief would have a true +formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a +formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point +answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of +belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not +to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one +who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that +it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an +expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some +way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. +The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one +can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. +The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of + + +51 + + +the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. +(Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the +way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like +being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to + + +be a "table".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how +a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its +referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this +belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be +discussed here. + +The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes, +but...' thoughts. !f he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their +formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of +linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if +embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but 1 am concerned with how +well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said +about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in +them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its +formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose +rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be +impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these +matters. + + +52 + + +2/22/1963 + + +Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate + + +1963 +(photo by Jack Smith} + + +53 + + +against Lincoln Center, February 22, + + +Part 11 : Completion of the Treatment of +Properly Philosophical Problems + + +Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts + + +In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by +discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be +talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of +the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will +not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify +"common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally +relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I +discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. ; + +i should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed +to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of +non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. +This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one +does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having +beliefs, that beliefs {in my sense) will not do as referents for 'belief' in the +use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of +the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an +experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of +consciously having a belief', of what is "in one's head" when one says that +one "believes a certain thing'. Further, I will, for convenience in +distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief 'that others have minds', for example, +or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation +marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be +"about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely +about experiences; I! will not be trying to talk "about the realm of +non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already +fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has +any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his +"beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously +believing', although {I will need to make a few comments about that too. +What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, +use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, +rather than rejecting the word altogether. + +There is a further point about terminology. The reader should +remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that +perceptions are in the mind', one can make a distinction between mental +and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with + + +54 + + +one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now ! am +going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For +example, a _ visualization of a table will be said to be an +"imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by +'imagined' I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I +use 'imagined' because saying 'mental-table-experience' is too much like +saying 'table in the mind' and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way +of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of +an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is +a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental +experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of +a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining +like a (non-mental) table-experience). in other words, an +imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it +is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a +(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined- +imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an +imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this +terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the +conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by +saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". + +I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, +not perceived by oneself, behind one now', or anything else. Well, in the +first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an +imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization +of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed +statement, such as 'There is a table behind me'. This is not all one does, +however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said +to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The +additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" +toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe +that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief +about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in +other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental +action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not +be, at all like the claim 'that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to +correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The +question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise +here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, +the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is +"consciously, deliberately' self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I + + +55 + + +don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what +is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the +attitude and the reader is aware of it, he wil! presumably find it a good +explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". + +I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one +is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as +mentioned above. The attitude is 'peripheral', is a matter of the way one is +atttentive. Saying that the attitude is 'conscious, deliberate', is a little +strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brain washing; what I am +trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception +such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This +is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the +inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; +with respect to English the attitude is a 'vague, elusive" thing, very difficult +to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by +saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think +I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the +attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the +self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a +(non-menta!) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief 'that there is +a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic +expression, it will be on an _ imagined-experience such as an +imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself +(to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving +attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back +to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is +a (non-menta!) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly +an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not +inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that +one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked +the question, one stops believing 'that there is a table behind one" and starts +believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a +non-experience", a different matter (different belief). + +lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression +(which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), +the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a +referent'. With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's +attention in believing would be primarily on the expression 'There is a table +behind me', pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and +one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent'. +Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of + + +56 + + +beliefs. + +(This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse +the reader it can be skipped.) I will now describe the relation between the +version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving +language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an +imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in +the version involving language, the attention is on something which is +"regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). +For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove', and +correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs +doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, +referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make +believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in +the version of the belief not involving language, has something which +functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language +one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one +has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the +version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the +thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving +"Yanguage" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a +referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, +which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does +so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the +belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires +with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the +way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for +awareness of the referent to be part of one's experience corresponds to the +attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it +not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's +experience corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. +Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which +it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving +language consists of being attentive to an imagined-experience and having the +attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief. + +Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather +unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of +"attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be +something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it +to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive', so that I am +calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to +speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the + + +57 + + +experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is +"self-deceiving', is a "(conscious) self-deception experience', because when +aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just +about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere +taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to +be a 'belief'. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be +"self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of +the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be +to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which +would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is +to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more +than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving". + +In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention +some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, +one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the +one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and +believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing +table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so +believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in +believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence +for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation +shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic +expression 'x', one may give attention to a_ referent of +'imagined-x{-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to +imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be +"analogous to the referent of 'x". In the latter case the y-experiences will be +mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be +to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is +visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of +'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-y-experiences +(such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be +"analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with +beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as +Being'. + +Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", +"arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate +the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong +with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would +show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language +and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested +before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the + + +58 + + +t +i +$ +} +} +ig + + +justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive +justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be +evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical +assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them +inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has +four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that') any other table has four +legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it +superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, +argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can +show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, +weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to +believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, +then one already had the belief 'implicitly' (it was a conjunct of a belief +one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. + +f will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions +my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, +I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my +position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, +and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it +is ironic that 'disbeliever', without qualification, has been used by believers +as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some +belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the +existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to +speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental +experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, +is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either +be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are +inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere +"decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies +"the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical +of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", +has some of the very beliefs 1 am concerned to discredit. + +What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of +beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In +the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions +dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect them +to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting +the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have +described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the +self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. +To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right + + +59 + + +d realizing, for any belief +sn't involve having + + +it is not having beliefs (an + + +philosophical position is: +it is wrong (which doe + + +one happens to think of, that +beliefs)). + + +60 + + +ESTHETICS + + +8. Down With Art + + +1; +ART or BREND? by Henry Flynt + + +1. Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession +is to say that it is somehow scientific. L7-Monte Young, Milton Babbitt, and +Stockhausen are exponents of this sort of justification. + +The flaw which reiates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value +and is an outstanding scientific law. Is the work of art such a law? The +experiment which shows that the speed of light is independent of the motion +of its source is a measurement of a phenomenon crucial to the confirmation of +a scientific hypothesis; it is an outstanding scientific experiment. Is the work +of art such a measurement? The invention of the vacuum tube was an +outstanding technological advance. Is the work of art such a technological +advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations +and an outstanding mathematical theory. ts the work of art such an +analysis? + +The motives behind the "scientific" justification of art are utterly sinister. +Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an +academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a_ pedantic +pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his "scientific music', intends +nothing less than the suppression of the culture of 'lower classes" and +"ower races." + +It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to +the "scientific" justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in +artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters +all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the +audience than all the works that "obey" the laws. + +2. The artist o: entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other +people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to +win public acceptance for it, to advertise and promote it, to sell it, to force it +on people. If the public doesn't accept it at first, he is disappointed. He +doesn't drop it, but repeatedly urges the product on them. + +People have every reason, then, to ask the artist: Is your product good for + + +63 + + +me even if I don't like or enjoy it? This question really lays art open. One of +the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to +defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of +art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but +they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one +artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is 'Do +you like it?" Once the "scientific" justification of art is discredited, the +artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no +reason why you should "consume" it. + +There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political +dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be +transcended. Even so, subjectivity of value remains a feature which +distinguishes art and entertainment from other activities. Thus art is +historically a leisure activity. + +3. But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which +one person produces for the liking, the enjoyment of another. The value of +the object is supposed to be that you just like it. It supposedly has a value +which is entirely subjective and entirely within you, is a part of you. Yet---the +object can exist without you, is completely outside you, is not you or your +valuing, and has no inherent connection with you or your valuing. The +product is not personal to you. + +Such is the contradiction in much art and entertainment. it is unfortunate +that it has to be stated so abstractly, but the discussion is about something +so personal that there can be no interpersonal examples of it. Perhaps it will +help to say that in appreciating or consuming art, you are always aware that +it is not you, your valuing---yet your liking it, your valuing it is usually the +only thing that can justify it. + +In art and entertainment, objects are produced having no inherent +connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find +their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would +have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as +your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's +product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to "be oneself' for +other people, to "express oneself" for them. +4. There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and +entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of t +these experiences, by comparing and contrasting them with art. I have +coined the term "brend" for these experiences. + +Consider all of your doings, what you already do. Exclude the gratifying of +physiological needs, physically harmful activities, and competitive activites. +Concentrate on spontaneous self-amusement or play. That is, concentrate on + + +64 + + +everything you do just because you like it, because you just like it as you do +it. + +Actually, these doings should be referred to as your just-likings. In saying +that somebody likes an art exhibit, it is appropriate to distinguish the art +exhibit from his liking of it. But in the case of your just-likings, it is not +appropriate to distinguish the objects valued from your valuings, and the +single term that covers both should be used. When you write with a pencil, +you are rarely attentive to the fact that the pencil! was produced by +somebody other than yourself. You can use something produced by +somebody else without thinking about it. In your just-likings, you never +notice that things are not produced by you. The essence of a just-liking is +that in it, you are not aware that the object you value is less personal to you +than your very valuing. + +These just-likings are your "brend." Some of your dreams are brend; and +some children's play is brend (but formal children's games aren't). In a sense, +though, the attempt to give interpersonal examples of brend is futile, +because the end result is neutral things or actions, cut off from the valuing +which gives them their only significance; and because the end result suggests +that brend is a deliberate activity like carrying out orders. The only examples +for you are your just-likings, and you have to guess them by directly +applying the abstract definition. + +Even though brend is defined exclusively in terms of what you like, it is not +necessarily solitary. The definition simply recognizes that valuing is an act of +individuals; that to counterpose the likes of the community to the likes of +the individuals who make it up is an ideological deception. + +5. It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are +pseudo-brend; that your brend is the total originality beyond art; that your +brend is the absolute self-expression and the absolute enjoyment beyond art. +Can brend, then, replace art, can it expand to fill the space now occupied by +art and entertainment? To ask this question is to ask when utopia will +arrive, when the barrier between work and leisure will be broken down, +when work will be abolished. Rather than holding out utopian promises, it is +better to give whoever can grasp it the realization that the experience +beyond art already occurs in his life---but is totally suppressed by the general +repressiveness of society. + + +Note: The avant-garde artist may 'raise a final question. Can't art or +entertainment compensate for its impersonality by having sheer newness as a + + +65 + + +value? Can't the very foreignness of the impersonal object be entertaining? +Doesn't this happen with Mock Risk Games, for example? The answer is +that entertainmenta! newness is also subjective. What is entertainingly +strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, oF irrelevant to +another. The only difference between foreignness and other entertainment +values is that brend does not have more foreignness than conventional +entertainment does. + +As for objective newness, or the objective value of Mock Risk Games, these +issues are so difficult that I have been unable to reach final conclusions +about them. + + +66 + + +2. + + +Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, +Mass., dated 11/8/62 + + +One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and +decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others +were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and +"radical new theory" of "pure recreation" for their enjoyment but before he +let them in for this highly secret and "revolutionary theory' they should +follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclasm. From those +that balked he removed the label "avant-garde" and attached the label +traditionalist' or if they were already labeled "traditionalist" he added one +more star. If they accepted they got a "hip" rating with gold cluster and if +they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their +own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose +designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf. +Now about this hip radical new theory of pure recreation.---Well---alor! its +simply what people do anyway but don't realize it but it seems that what +people "do anyway and don't realize it" will not be fully appreciated until +"what people do in the name of art" is eliminated. If art can be relegated to +obscurity, if some one can get John Coltrane to stop blowing, if someone +can smash up all the old Art tatum records as well as all the existing pianos, +if someone can get all that stuff out of those museums, If someone can only +burn down all those concert halls, movie houses, small galleries as well as +rooms in private houses that contain signs of art, If someone can do in all the +cathedrals and monuments bridges etc, If someone can get rid of the sun, +moon, stars, ocean, desert trees birds, bushes mountains, rivers, joy, sadness +inspiration or any other natural phenomenon that reminds us of the ugly +scourge art that has preoccupied and plagued man since he can remember +then yes then at last Henry Flynt, sorry! + +sites tere tase + + +> Henry Flynt + + +v +er + + +. +TaySs + + +will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee +[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved] + + +67 + + +3. + + +letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62 + + +Dear Henry, + +perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not +important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most +admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage & +Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding "new" ideas has +not shown too much more than that it has become established as a +traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be +avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to +react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of +when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can +somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty +with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have +only had a few good ones. {I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't +seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand +way---but what I mean by "new ideas" is not only what you might call! +"Concept Art" but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms +more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt +these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants +"experience" one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a +position difficult if not impossible to accept with large "idea" ambitions. So +one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and +duration outside the art---jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a +form of art history. + +I don't think entertainment solves the problem presented by avant gard art +since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is +now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with +"just liked" things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art +(some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or +memory or however}. As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and +when avoiding "given" structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and +decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. {f I need concentration, +which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. + +One accepts language, one accepts logic. + +Best regards, + +Bob Morris + + +68 + + +> +i +fe +Ff + + +4, + + +FROM "CULTURE" TO VERAMUSEMENT +Boston-New York +PRESS RELEASE: for March-April, 1963 + + +Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate +against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at +the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the +slogans DEMOLISH SERIOUS CULTURE! /DESTROY ART! ; DEMOLISH +ART MUSEUMS! / NO MORE ART! ; DEMOLISH CONCERT HALLS! / +DEMOLISH LINCOLN CENTER! ; and handing out announcements of +Flynt's lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give +encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around +and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum +official came out and imperiously told the pickets that he was going to +straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could +not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that +the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picket who had obtained police +permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the +police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. !t was found that +the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. +People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the +viciousness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the +permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of +the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration +increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much +greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people +indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then +went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected +requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on +Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the +fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, +they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were +there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more +announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. +Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places. + +On Thursday evening, February 28, at Walter DeMaria's loft, Henry Flynt +gave a long lecture expositing the doctrine the Wednesday demonstrations +were based on. On entering the lecture room, the visitor found himself +stepping in the face of a Mona Lisa print placed as the doormat. To one side + + +69 + + +was an exhibition of demonstration photos and so forth. Behind the lecturer +was 2 large picture of Viadimir Mayakovsky, while on either side were the +signs used in the demonstrations, together with one saying +VERAMUSEMENT---NOT CULTURE. About 20 people came to the lecture. +The lecturer showed first the suffering caused by Serious-Cultural snobbery, +by its attempts to force individuals in line with things supposed to have +objective validity, but actually representing only alien subjective tastes +sanctioned by tradition. He then showed that artistic categories have +disintegrated, and that their retention has become obscurantist. (He showed +that the purpose of didactic art is better served by documentaries.) Finally, +in the most intellectually sophisticated part of the lecture, he showed the +superiority of each individual's veramusement (partially defined on the +lecture announcement) to institutionalized amusement activities (which +impose foreign tastes on the individual) and indeed to all "culture" the +lecture was concerned with. After the lecture, Flynt told how his doctrine +was anticipated by little known ideas of Mayakovsky, Dziga Vertov, and +their group, as related in Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs and elsewhere. He +touched on the Wednesday demonstrations. He spoke of George Maciunas' +FLUXUS, with which all this is connected. Several people at the lecture +congratulated Flynt on the clarity of the presentation and logicality of the +arguments. Photos were taken. + + +5. +Statement of November 1963 + + +Back in March 1963, I sent the tirst FCTB PRESS RELEASE, about FCTB's +February picketing and lecture, to all the communications media, including +the New Yorker. It is so good that the New Yorker wanted to use it, but +they didn't want to give FCTB any free publicity; so they finally published +an inept parody of it, in the October 12, 1963 issue, pp. 49-51. They +changed my last name to Mackie, changed February 27 to September 25, the +Museum of Modern Art to a church, changed our slogans to particularly +idiotic ones {although they got in 'NO MORE ART/CULTURE?' later on), +and added incidents; but the general outlines, and the phrases lifted verbatim +from the FCTB RELEASE, make the relationship clear.---Henry Fiynt + + +70 + + +pee + + +Henry, 3/6/63 + + +Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the +lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I +didn't send them. Don't know if I can make it any clearer...actually I keep +thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have +to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating +Veramusement, stating clearly wnat it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, +of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which +cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external +activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or "intersect" one or +another or several activities. You have discredited activities---like art, +competitive games---as pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing +arguments which are external to "experiencing" these activities (e.g. chess is +bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which +doesn't fit you)...weil it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace +any cultural form because it has no external "edges" but rather by definition +can occur anywhere anytime anyplace (By the way I want to say here that +its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable---but I can't at the +moment really say why.) It seems that you have these two things going: +Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, +entertainment, that have to do with society and I don't think that the +exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George +Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don't shudder at that word, but I can see +you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind +of double aspect of the personality (which he called the "me" and the "I" +..can't remember his book, something like Mind, Self, and Society). + +I thought you presented the lecture very weil, but towards the end I was +getting too tired to listen very carefully and I am sorry because this was the +newest writing. I would like very much to read this part, i.e. that which dealt +with the evolution of work, automation and the liberation from +drudgery---send me a copy if you can. + +Best regards, + +Bob Morris + + +71 + + +Henry 3/12/1963 + + +(anti-art? } +Jgfz Cage "Folk Music" Communism ____...----.----- +(communism) +I've been along this road too. +Yes I certainly do see the harmfullness of serious culture. My favorite movies +are plain documentaries. + + +"Veramusement" +questions: the way you set it up it sound like veramusement is IT. Some + + +kind of Absolute good state or activity. --ie) ATHLETICS are out. +-now my brother is a healthy athelete--he enjoys nothing so much as +swimming or playing tennis all! day (he likes to use his body--and he likes the +form--competition) + +Is this "wrong" + +Should he stop.-- + + +or wouldn't your "creep theory" which lets each person be himself and +relish in himself--by extention from this--shouldn't the atheletic person be + + +alowed to be himself? --too. +I think you were opening up the world to the people at the lecture-- + + +making them move free-- +sd "ready to be themselves + + +I think you were right in not giving examples! + + +however + +your absolute--statements and 'come on"--and blend with the communist +ideas--(My mind was pretty tired by then and I didn't follow how the +veramusement--was tied to communism)--this IT kind of taik.--can only shoo +people off-and let them wait for the next revision or explication. + +people off--and let them wait for the next revision or explication. + + +Walter DeMaria + + +72 + + +8. + + +Dear Henry, March 18, 1963 + + +As I said before, my main reactions to yr lecture & ideas is that I'm for +Henry Flynt but not for his ideas. I think the spirit you show in carrying on +yr crusade is admirable and exciting. However, I am not against art and think +that any artist who would say that he is or think that he is would be +masochistic enough to need psychiatric care. Since you make no claims to +being an artist this does not refer to you. However, I do call myself a poet +and do think of myself as one. I like art, culture, etc. and do not yet feel +that I am being screwed by it. Until I do, I will not need to turn to anti-art +movements. + +All best wishes. + +Yours, + +Diane Wakoski + + +"Dear Mr. Flynt...Since I may be depending on o-ganized culture for my +loot & livelihood I can wish you only a limited success in your movement... +Cornelius Cardew" [froma postcard of June 7, 1963] + + +73 + + +2/22/1963 + + +Jack Smith and Henry Flynt demonstrate against the +February 22, 1963 + + +(photo by Tony Conrad) + + +74 + + +Museum of Modern Art, + + +PARA—SCIENCE + + +> 9, The Perception-Dissociation of Physics + + +From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and +touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the +objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the +touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too +limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of +moderate temperatures. + +Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would +cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along +the humen sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch +dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our +discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light retlection and +emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and +inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch +registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and +so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our +discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations +or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an +experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical +subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the +discussion. + +Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and +even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with +experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved +is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to +experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with +experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics. + +Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human +physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist +after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, +we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of +touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest +expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal +organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" +includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smel!.) Suppose there is + + +77 + + +a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same +as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation +between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does +not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person +with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). +Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified +with closing one's eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights +which do not occur when one can feel that one's eyes are closed. + +Let T indicate tactile and V indicate visual. Let the tactiie sensation of +open eyes be T, and of closed eyes be To. Now anything that can be seen +with closed eyes--from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced +by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct +sunlight--can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a +subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be V1, +and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be V>: If there are sights seen +only with closed eyes, they will be V3; we want disjoint classes. We are +interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our +definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no +intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, +our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm +will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There +remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us +denote them by the ordered pairs (T,, Vj), (17, V9), (To, V4), (Tp, V9). In +reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us +designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following +notation. Consider a rectangular array of "places" such that the place in the +ith row and jth column corresponds to (T;, Vj), and assign a p or f (as +appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of +regularities in our present world. ¢ 3 + + +fp + + +So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the présent +world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other +permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is +excluded, meaning that at the moment, a Vv, is defined as lasting from the +time the eyes open until the time they next close. + +We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate +more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a 2x2 array, there are +16 ways it can be filled with p's and f's. That is, there are 16 imaginable +states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the + + +present state'p p\to another state such ap fI\ However, +tp pp/ + +we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is +excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only f's, which +amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of f's leaves +one sight or touch completely forbidden {a person becomes blind to +open-eye sights); such an "impairment" is of little interest. Of the remaining +changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: +closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the +changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are +changes in the place of the one f ; the change to the state having only p's; + + +and finally / +PP) > fp + + +\f p pf + + +In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint +classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are [Tj] and [Vj]. The +number of classes in a partition, m for touch and n for sight, is its +detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition [T;] X [V;] is written +m x n. This detailedness virtually determines the (mn)? imaginable states, +although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one +change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is +important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a +conposition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state +lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a genera! rule for rewriting +states. A 2X2 rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, fromja b +to/ca\. cd + +ce + + +But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new +rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change +changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about 'impairing' +changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining +changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes +are the most perception-dissociating ones. + +As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave +the forbidden concurrence permitted; or else they merely leave permitted +successions forbidden--for example, in order to open your eyes in the dark +you might have to open them in the light and then turn the light off. These +secondary changes are of secondary interest. + +If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of +investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and + + +79 + + +s + + +apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation +concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will +(observable as electrochemica! impulses along efferent neurons). If a change +occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a +formerly forbidden concurrence, is it T or V that conflicts with the +command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight +to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes +close anyway? + +Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to +our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he +may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that +the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an +extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole +change series occurs. Let p's be black dots and f's be white dots, and imagine +a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from +time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the +extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary +English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between +scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the +same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the +anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect +everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each +sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference +point in the "world." The question of "whether the anomaties are really +outside or only in the mind" comes to have less and less scientific meaning. +If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as +a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have +had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be + + +either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if the , + + +asserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the +states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of +observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the +changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things +shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our +interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the +investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and +what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what +has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the +same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even +harder part is making it happen. + + +* * * + + +80 + + +However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet +satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the +subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his +perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely +chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say "I see a book +in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.' These assumptions may not be +justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, 'I don't even +know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know +whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is +visual." In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books +never looied like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the +changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are +defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that +everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may +literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this +compensation may become habitual and "pre-conscious." In this case, if the +physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a +temporary psychological malfunction. + +These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are +actually learned, "unconscious" interpretations of raw data which by +themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast +number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the +subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is +confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old +familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an +effort to see the table which he knows is there. + +Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The +subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in +some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give hima +quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which +photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is +tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We +expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; +but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Teli the subject that +he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be +given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the +experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of +subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of +modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem +simultaneous. + +This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may + + +81 + + +not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick +eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to +our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier +scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is +possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch +correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might +become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle +resonance is today. + +Time is inescapably involved in our discussion; so we must decide what +happens to time as a distinct physical category, and as a sense, in +perception-dissociation. Here, we will simply distinguish three sorts of time. +First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to +discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time. +There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge +are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't +automatically introduced in the other. !f the ratio of the repetitions of the +two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into +equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real +line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman). +One effect of perception-dissociation relating to this sort of time would be +to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile +clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished +manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, +our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. +"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional +futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The +empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the +perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of +futurity. + + +We now come to some considerations which will help us develop the +state descriptions, and which also show that from one point of view, the +states are actually necessary for the operational definition of physical +language. Let parallel but separated sheets of clear plastic and colored plastic +be mounted in lighting conditions so that the subject can't see the clear +plastic. He touches the clear plastic, but from what he sees, he believes he is +touching the colored plastic. The lighting is then changed and his error is +exposed. In some sense, the sight-touch concurrence identifying an object +was a mere coincidence. Next, we produce another colored sheet for the + + +82 + + +subject to touch, and we are able to convince him that this time the +object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence. + +The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which +resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. +To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the +concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. +The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight +and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the +physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its +immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot +be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. +Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of +the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our +experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying +concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being +fooled. + +We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in +testing object-identifying concurrences, that doesn't immediately rely on +other object-identifying concurrences, the very concurrences which are +suspect. It is as if the physicist proposed to prove that clicks come from a +certain metronome by manipulating a detecting device that outputs its data +as sounds. But suppose the physicist proves that the clicks come from the +metronome by showing (1) that the metronome has to be stopped or +removed to stop the clicks, and (2) that the clicks stop if the metronome is +stopped or removed. The physicist proves that the object-identifying +concurrence is not a coincidence by demonstrating that certain related +concurrences are forbidden. We suggest that the physicist ultimately handles +touch-sight concurrences in just this way. The operational basis of the +physicist's activity comes down to our states. (But note that the physicist +has tests, which do not rely directly on his hearing, to determine whether the +clicks come from the metronome! ) One way to develop our states, then, +may be to develop substates which express the differences between those +object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that +aren't--the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment. + + +83 + + +2/22/1963 + + +Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstra +February 22, 1963 +(foto by Tony Conrad) + + +te against the Metropolitan Museum of Art, + + +84 + + +10. 1966 Mathematical Studies + + +QO. Introduction + + +Pure mathematics is the one activity which is intrinsically formalistic. It +is the one activity which brings out the practical value of formal +manipulations. Abstract games fit in perfectly with the tradition and +rationale of pure mathematics; whereas they would not be appropriate in +any other discipline. Pure mathematics is the one activity which can +appropriately develop through innovations of a formalistic character. + +Precisely because pure mathematics does not have to be immediately +practical, there is no intrinsic reason why it should adhere to the normal +concept of logical truth. No harm is done if the mathematician chooses to +play a game which is indeterminate by normal logical standards. All that +matters is that the mathematician clearly specify the rules of his game, and +that he not make claims for his results which are inconsistent with his rules. + +Actually, my pure philosophical writings discredit the concept of +logical truth by showing that there are flaws inherent in all non-trivial +language. Thus, no mathematics has the logical validity which was once +claimed for mathematics. From the ultimate philosophical standpoint, all +mathematics is as "indeterminate" as the mathematics in this monograph. +All the more reason, then, not to limit mathematics to the normal concept +of logical truth. + +Once it is realized that mathematics is intrinsically formalistic, and need +not adhere to the norma! concept of logical truth, why hold back from +exploring the possibilities which are available? There is every reason to +search out the possibilities and present them. Such is the purpose of this +monograph. + +The ultimate test of the non-triviality of pure mathematics is whether it +has practical applications. I believe that the approaches presented on a very +abstract level in this monograph will turn out to have such applications. In +order to be applied, the principles which are presented here have to be +developed intensively on a level which is compatible with applications. The +results will be found in my two subsequent essays, 'Subjective Propositional +Vibration" and "The Logic of Admissible Contradictions." + + +85 + + +1. Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories +1.1 Post-Formalist Mathematics + +Over the last hundred years, a philosophy of pure mathematics has +grown up which I prefer to call "formalism." As Willard Quine says in the +fourth section of his essay "Carnap and Logical Truth,' formalism was +inspired by a series of developments which began with non-Euclidian +geometry. Quine himself is opposed to formalism, but the formalists have +found encouragement in Quine's own book, Mathematical Logic. The best +presentation of the formalist position can be found in Rudolph Carnap's The +Logical Syntax of Language. As a motivation to the reader, and +as a heuristic aid, I will relate my study to these two standard books. (It will +heip if the reader is thoroughly familiar with them.) it is not important +whether Carnap, or Quine, or formalism--or my interpretation of them--is +"correct," for this essay is neither history nor philosophy. I am using history +as a bridge, to give the reader access to some extreme mathematical +innovations. + +The formalist position goes as follows. Pure mathematics is the +manipulation of the meaningless and arbitrary, but typographically +well-defined ink-shapes on paper 'w,' 'x,' 'y,' 'z,' %,? "7 *),° fy and 'e.' +These shapes are manipulated according to arbitrary but well-detined +mechanical rules. Actually, the rules mimic the structure of primitive +systems such as Euclid's geometry. There are formation rules, mechanical +definitions of which concatenations of shapes are "sentences." One sentence +is '{((x) (xex}) I (x) (xex)).' There are transformation rules, rules for the +mechanical derivation of sentences from other sentences. The best known +trasformation rule is the rule that may be concluded from yand"™y> w" ; +where '>' is the truth-furctional conditional. For later convenience, I will +say that y and "y D yw are "impliors," and that y is the "implicand." +Some sentences are designated as "axioms." A 'proof' is a series of +sentences such that each is an axiom or an implicand of preceding sentences. +The last sentence in a proof is a "theorem." + +This account is ultrasimplified and non-rigorous, but it is adequate for +my purposes. (The reader may have noticed a terminological issue here. For +Quine, an implication is merely a logically true conditional. The rules which +are used to go from some statements to others, and to assemble proofs, are +rules of inference. The relevant rule of inference is the modus ponens; wW is +tie ponential of pand "yD W7. What I am doing is to use a terminology of +implication to talk about rules of inference and ponentials. The reason is +that the use of Quine's terminology would result in extremely awkward +formulations. What I will be doing is sufficiently transparent that it can be +translated into Quine's terminology if necessary. My results will be + + +86 + + +unaffected.) The decisive feature of the arbitrary game called "mathematics" +is as follows. A sentence-series can be mechanically checked to determine +whether it is a proof. But there is no mechanical method for deciding +whether a sentence is a theorem. Theorems, or rather their proofs, have to be +puzzled out, to be discovered. in this feature lies the dynamism, the +excitement of traditional mathematics. Traditional mathematical ability is +the ability to make inferential discoveries. + + +A variety of branches of mathematics can be specialized out from the +basic system. Depending on the choices of axioms, systems can be +constructed which are internally consistent, but conflict with each other. A +system can be "interpreted," or given a meaning within the language of a +science such as physics. So interpreted, it may have scientific value, or it may +not. But as pure mathematics, all the systems have the same arbitrary status. + +By "formalist mathematics' I will mean the present mathematical +systems which are presented along the above lines. Actually, as many authors +have observed, the success of the non-Euclidian "tmaginary' geometries +made recognition of the game-like character of mathematics inevitable. +Formalism is potentially the greatest break with tradition in the history of +mathematics. In the Foreward to The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap +brilliantly points out that mathematical innovation is still hindered by the +Widespread opinion that deviations from mathematical tradition must be +justified--that is, proved to be "correct" and to be a faithful rendering of +"the true logic." According to Carnap, we are free to choose the rules of a +mathematical system arbitrarily. The striving after correctness must cease, so +that mathematics will no longer be hindered. 'Before us lies the boundless +ocean of unlimited possibilities." In other words, Carnap, the most reputable +of academicians, says you can do anything in mathematics. Do not worry +whether whether your arbitrary game corresponds to truth, tradition, or +reality: it is still legitimate mathematics. Despite this wonderful Principle of +Tolerance in mathematics, Carnap never ventured beyond the old +ink-on-paper, axiomatic-deductive structures. I, however, have taken Carnap +at his word. The result is my "post-formalist mathematics." I want to stress +that my innovations have been legitimized in advance by one of the most +reputable academic figures of the twentieth century. + +Early in 1961, I constructed some systems which went beyond +formalist mathematics in two respects. 1. My sentential elements are +physically different from the little ink-shapes on paper used in all formalist +systems. My sentences are physically different from concatenations of +ink-shapes. My transformation rules have nothing to do with operations on +ink-shapes. 2. My systems do not necessarily follow the axiomatic-deductive, +sentence-implication-axiom-proof-theorem structure. Both of these + + +87 + + +possibilities, by the way, are mentioned by Carnap in "Languages as + +Calculi." A "post-formalist system," then, is a formalist system which differs + +physically from an_ ink-on-paper system, or which lacks the + +axiomatic-deductive structure. + +As a basis for the analysis of post-formalist systems, a list of structural +properties of formalist systems is desirable. Here is such a list. By +"Implication" I will mean simple, direct implication, unless I say otherwise. + +1. Asentence can be repeated at will. + +2. The rule of implication refers to elements of sentences: sentences +are structurally composite. + +A sentence can imply itself. + +4. The repeat of an implior can imply the repeat of an implicand: an + +implication can be repeated. + +Different impliors can imply different implicands. + +6. Given two or three sentences, it is possible to recognize + +mechanically whether one or two directly imply the third. + +No axiom is implied by other, different axioms. + +8. The definition of 'proof' is the standard definition, in terms of +implication, given early in this essay. + +9. Given the axioms and some other sentence, it is not possible to +recognize mechanically whether the sentence is a theorem, +Compound indirect implication is a puzzle. + +Now for the first post-formalist system. + + +wo + + +a + + +~ + + +"TY Hlusions" + + +A "sentence" is the following page (with the figure on it) so long as the +apparent, perceived ratio of the length of the vertical line to that +of the horizontal line (the statement's "associated ratio") does not +change. (Two sentences are the "same" if end only if their +associated ratios are the same.) + +A sentence Y is "implied by" a sentence X if and only if Y is the same as X, +or else Y is, of all the sentences one ever sees, the sentence having +the associated ratio next smaller than that of X. + +Take as the axiom the first sentence one sees. + +Explanation: The figure is an optical illusion such that the vertical line +normally appears longer than the horizontal line, even though their +lengths are equal. One can correct one's perception, come to see +the vertical line as shorter relative to the horizontal line, decrease +the associated ratio, by measuring the lines with a ruler to convince +oneself that the vertical line is not longer than the other, and then + + +88 + + +trying to see the lines as equal in length; constructing similar +figures with a variety of real (measured) ratios and practicing +judging these ratios; and so forth. + + +"IIlusions" has Properties 1, 3-5, and 7-8. Purely to clarify this fact, the +following sequence of integers is presented as a model of the order in which +associated ratios might appear in reality. (The sequence is otherwise totally +inadequate as a model of "Iilusions.") 4 2 1; 4 2;5421;43 1. The +implication structure would then be + + +4<> +s—-TXp>s SZ Lo ZN +4<> 4 oo yD der 1 + + +The axiom would be 4, and 5 could not appear in a proof. "IIlusions" has +Property 1 on the basis that one can contro! the associated ratio. Turning to +Property 4, it is normally the case that when an implication is repeated, a +given occurrence of one of the sentences involved is unique to a specific +occurrence of the implication. In "Illusions," however, if two equal +sentences are next smaller than X, the occurrence of X does not uniquely +belong to either of the two occurrences of the implication. Compare 'the', + + +e + + +89 + + +where the occurrence of 't' is not unique to either occurrence of 'the'. +Subject to this explanation, "lilusions" has Property 4. "Illusions" has +Property 8, but it goes without saying thut the type of implication is not +modus ponens. Properties 3, 5, and 7 need no comment. As for Property 2, +the rule of implication refers to a property of sentences, rather than to +elements of sentences. The interesting feature of "IIlusions" is that it +reverses the situation defined by Properties 6 and 9. Compound indirect +implication is about the same as simple implication. The only difference is +the difference between being smaller and being next smalier. And there is +only one axiom (per person). + +Simple direct implication, however, is subjective and illusive. It +essentially involves changing one's perceptions of an illusion. The change of +associated ratios is subjective, elusive, and certainly not numerically +measurable. Then, the order in which one sees sentences won't always be +their order in the implications and proofs. And even though one is exposed +to all the sentences, one may have difficulty distinguishing and remembering +them in consciousness. If I see the normal illusion, then manage to get +myself to see the lines as being of equal length, I know I have seen a +theorem. What is difficult is grasping the steps in between, the simple direct +implications. If the brain contains a permanent impression of every sensation +it has received, then the implications objectively exist; but they may not be +thinkable without neurological techniques for getting at the impressions. In +any case, "proof" is well-defined in some sense--but proofs may not be +thinkable. "I!lusions" is, after all, not so much shakier in this respect than +even simple arithmetic, which contains undecidable sentences and +indefinable terms. + +In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap distinguishes pure syntax +and descriptive syntax; and says that pure syntax should be independent of +notation, and that every system should be isomorphic to some ink-on-paper +system. In so doing, Carnap violates his ov'n Principle of Tolerance. Consider +the following trivial formalist system. + + +"Order" + + +A"sentence" is a member of a finite set of integers. + +Sentence Y is "implied by" sentence X it and only if Y=X, or else of all the +sentences, Y is the one next smaller than X. + +Take as the axiom the largest sentence. + + +js the pure syntax of "Iilusions' insomorphic to "Order"? The preceding +paragraph proved that it is not. The implication structure of "Order" is + + +90 + + +mechanical to the point of idiocy, while the implication structure of +"Illusions" is, as I pointed out, elusive. The figure + + +Axlom 6 eles gt abe eae eek Theorem + + +where loops indicate multiple occurances of the same sentence, could +adequately represent a proof in "Order," but could not remotely represent +one in "Illusions." The essence of 'Illusions' is that it is coupled to the +reader's subjectivity. For an ink-on-paper system even to be comparable to +"IIlusions," the subjectivity would have to be moved out of the reader and +onto the paper. This is utterly impossible. + +Here is the next system. + + +"I nnperseqs" + + +Explanation: Consider the rainbow halo which appears to surround a small +bright light when one looks at it through fogged glass (such as +eyeglasses which have been breathed on). The halo consists of +concentric circular bands of color. As the fog evaporates, the halo +uniformly contracts toward the light. The halo has a vague outer +ring, which contracts as the halo does. Of concern here is what +happens on one contracting radius of the halo, and specifically +what happens on the segment of that radius lying in the vague +outer ring: the outer segment. + +A "sentence" {or halopoint) is the changing halo color at a fixed point, in +space, in the halo; until the halo contracts past the point. + +Several sentences "imply" another sentence if and only if, at some instant, +the several sentences are on an outer segment, and the other +sentence is the inner endpoint of that outer segment. + +An "axiom" is a sentence which is in the initial vague outer ring (before it +contracts), and which is not an inner endpoint. + +An "innperseq" is a sequence of sequences of sentences on one radius +satisfying the following conditions. 1. The members of the first +sequence are axioms, 2. For each of the other sequences, the first +member is implied by the non-first members of the preceding +sequence; and the remaining inembers (if any) are axioms or first +members of preceding sequences. 3. All first members, of +sequences other than the last two, appear as non-first members. 4. +No sentence appears as a non-first member more than once. 5. The +last sequence has one member. + +In the diagram on the following page, different positions of the vague outer + + +91 + + +Successive bands represent the vague outer ring at successive times as it fades in toward the small bright light. + + +ring at different times are suggested by different shadings. The +outer segment moves "down the page." The figure is by no means +an innperseq, but is supposed to help explain the definition. +Innperseqs Diagram +"Sentences" at + + +I time: a1 8 a3 aq ap ag a7 b +44,89 > bh + + +timeg: a9 a3 a4 a5 ag a7 be +ag —— eee ( + + +eS +SS Sos +Saas +SSS + + +WS + + +U4 yy (VY) Mi Wy i +Mey ae +AAA AL ELH i wae aan Se tl +peeling tatatsegZee 4,45 + +EL DAMA ATLL + +Lita, YAP + +VALE RELAY AL + +LAA B68 94622 + +VP AO + +WAL ALLL + +RINE, SALA ALIIY + +LAA 6 LAs + +eines: Yihks + + +PT I SSS . m + +ar ee oe —— timeg: ag a7 bede +Feo, Weak rds gis +ROBES I) Ronee SSS times: ayb ede f +KT g . +Snes eaiiens Pa PASE, SS a + +PPT PS SL RISE Os a7,c +f +CER I PRR +FS re pa oon a +ST RS EXER WS gat en gs +SAE VE er + + +"Axioms" ay a9 a3 a4 a5 ag a7 + + +Innperseq +(a3,49,a4) +(b, a3) + +(c, a5, aq) +(d, b, ag) +(e,c,a7) +(f,e, d) + +(g) + + +small bright light + + +92 + + +In "Innperseqs," a conventional proof would be redundant unless al! +the statements were on the same radius. And even if the weakest axiom were +chosen (the initial outer endpoint), this axiom would imply the initial inner +endpoint, and from there the theorem could be reached immediately. In +other words, to use the standard definition of "proof" in "Innperseqs" +would result in an uninteresting derivation structure. Thus, a more +interesting derivation structure is defined, the "innperseq." The interest of +an "innperseq" is to be as elaborate as the many restrictions in its definition +will allow. Proofs are either disregarded in "Innperseqs"; or else they are +identified with innpersegs, and lack Property 8. "Innperseqs" makes the +break with the proof-theorem structure of formalist mathematics. + +Turning to simple implication, an implicand can have many impliors; +and there is an infinity of axioms, specified by a general condition. The +system has Property 1 in the sense that a sentence can exist at different +times and be a member of different implications. It has Property 4 in the +sense that the sentences in a specific implication can exist at different times, +and the implication holds as long as the sentences exist. It has Property 3 in +that an inner endpoint implies itself. The system also has Properties 5 and 7; +and lacks Property 2. But, as before, Properties 6 and 9 are another matter. +Given several sentences, it is certainly possible to tell mechanically whether +one is implied by the others. But when are you given sentences? If one can +think the sentences, then relating them is easy--but it is difficult to think the +sentences in the first place, even though they objectively exist. The diagram +suggests what to look for, but the actual thinking, the actual sentences are +another matter. As for Property 9, when "theorems" are identified with last +members of innperseqs, I hesitate to say whether a derivation of a given +sentence can be constructed mechanically. If a sentence is nearer the center +than the axioms are, an innperseq can be constructed for it. Or can it? The +answer is contingent. "Innperseqs" is indeterminate because of the difficulty +of thinking the sentences, a difficulty which is defined into the system. It is +the mathematician's capabilities at a particular instant which delimit the +indeterminacies. Precisely because of the difficulty of thinking sentences, I +will give several subvariants of the system. + + +Indeterminacy + + +A "totally determinate innperseq" is an innperseq in which one thinks all the +sentences. + +An "implior-indeterminate innperseq" is an innperseq in which one thinks +only each implicand and the outer segment it terminates. + +A "sententially indeterminate innperseq" is an innperseq in which one thinks + + +93 + + +only the outer segment, and its inner endpoint, as it progresses +inward. + + +Let us return to the matter of pure and descriptive syntax. The interest +of "Illusions" and "Innperseqs" is precisely that their abstract structure +cannot be separated from their physical and psychological character, and +thus that they are not isomorphic to any conventional ink-on-paper system. I +am trying to break through to unheard of, and hopefully significant, modes +of implication; to define implication structures (and derivation structures) +beyond the reach of past mathematics. + + +1.2 Constructed Memory Systems + +In order to understand this section, it is necessary to be thoroughly +familiar with "Studies in Constructed Memories," the essay following this +one. {I have not combined the two essays because their approaches are too +different.) I will define post-formalist systems in constructed memories, +beginning with a system in an M*-Memory. + + +"Dream Amalgams" + + +A "sentence" is a possible method, an Ag. with respect to an M*-Memory. +I + + +The sentence A, "implies" the sentence A, if and only if the agth + + +M*-assertion is actually thought; and either A, = Ag.» or else there is +q p + + +cross-method contact of a mental state in Mag with a state in Pa + +The axioms must be chosen from sentences which satisfy two conditions. +The mental states in the sentences must have cross-method contact +with mental states in other sentences. And the M*-assertions +corresponding to the sentences must not be thought. + +Explanation: As "Studies in Constructed Memories" says, there can be +cross-method contact of states, because a normal dream can +combine totally different episodes in the dreamer's life into an +amalgam. + +"Dream Amalgams" has Properties 1-5. For the first time, sentences are +structurally composite, with mental states being the relevant sentential +elements. Implication has an unusual character. The traditional type of +implication, modus ponens, is "directed," because the conditional is +directed. Even if "yDwW" is true "YDy" may not be. Now implication is also +directed in 'Dream Amalgams," but for a very different reason. + + +94 + + +Cross-method contact, unlike the conditional, has a symmetric character. +What prevents implication from being necessarily symmetrical is that the +implicand's M*-assertion actually has to be thought, while the implior's +M*-assertion does not. Thus, implication is both subjective and mechanical, +it is subjective, in that it is a matter of volition which method is remembered +to have actually: been used. It is mechanical, in that when one is +remembering, one is automatically aware of the cross-method contacts of +states in Ag . The conditions on the axioms ensure that they will have + + +implications without losing Property 7. + + +As for compound implication in "Dream Amalgams," the organism +with the M*-Memory can't be aware of it at all; because it can't be aware +that at different times it remembered different methods to be the one +actually used. (In fact, the organism cannot be aware that the system has +Property 5, for the same reason.) On the other hand, to an outside observer +of the M*-Memory, indirect implication is not only thinkable but +mechanical. It is not superfluous because cross-method contact of mental +states is not necessarily transitive. The outside observer can decide whether a +sentence is a theorem by the following mechanical procedure. Check +whether the sentence's M*-assertion has acually been thought; if so, check ail +sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; if not, check all the +sentences which imply the sentences which imply it to see if any are axioms; +etc. The number of possible methods is given as finite, so the procedure is +certain to terminate. Again, an unprecedented mode of implication has been +defined. + +When a post-formalist system is defined in a constructed memory, the +discussion and analysis of the system become a consequence of constructed +memory theory and an extension of it. Constructed memory theory, which +is quite unusual but still more or less employs deductive inference, is used to +study post-formalist modes of inference which are anything but deductive. + +To aid in understanding the next system, which involves infalls in a +D-Memory, here is an + + +mn + + +"Exercise to be Read Aloud" +(Read according to a timer, reading the first word at O' O", and prolonging +and spacing words so that each sentence ends at the time in parentheses after +it. Do not pause netween sentences.) + + +(event) Ail men are mortal. (17°) + +(Sentence; =eventy) The first utterance tasted 17" and ended at 17"; and +lasted 15" and ended 1" ago. (59") + +(Sp=event3) The second utterance lasted 42" and ended at 59": and +lasted 50" and ended 2" ago. (1' 31") + + +95 + + +(S3=eventy) The third utterance lasted 32" and ended at 1' 31"; and +lasted 40" and ended 1" ago. (2' 16") + +Since '32' in $3 is greater than '2' in S9, S9 must say that S4 (=eventg) + +ended 30" after Sy began, or something equally unclear. The duration of Sy + +is greater than the distance into the past to which it refers. This situation is + +not a real infall, but it should give the reader some intuitive notion of an + +infall. + + +"Infails" + + +A "sentence" is a D-sentence, in a D-Memory such that event) + 4 is the first +thinking of the jth D-sentence, for all j. + +Two sentences "imply" another if and only if all three are the same; or else +the three are adjacent {and can be written Sit: S;, Si-1 ), and are such +that 6 5 = xj44-Xj raat Sy is the implicand. (The function of Sj+4 is to +give the duration 6,= +1 -%; of Sj. Sj states that event;, the first +dae' of s? "4, ended ata aitence: Zj inte the past, where zj is smaller +than s $s own vduretian The diagram indicates the relations.) + + +G2: evenby obi: event 3 +occurred in [X5-40° x5 I occurred in ia, Xa + + +shia and in IN-25-Y5) N-z.; and inI N- "Ared ya Needl oP 2 + + +event itd + + +events 42 +xs 544] t +Bi ese *y+4 A542 + + +"evenby ended 25 ago" "evenly 44 inI + + +In this variety of D-Memory, the organism continuously thinks successive +D-sentences, which are all different, just as the reader of the above exercise +continuously reads successive and different sentences. Thus, the possibility +of repeating a sentence depends on the possibility of thinking it while one is +thinking another sentence--a possibility which may be far-fetched, but which + + +96 + + +is not explicitly excluded by the definition of a "D-Memory." If the +possibility is granted, then "Infalls" has Properties 1-5. Direct implication is +completely mechanical; it is subjective only in that the involuntary +determination of the z; and other aspects of the memory is a 'subjective' +process of the organism. Compound implication is also mechanical to an +outside observer of the memory, but if the organism itself is to be aware of +it, it has to perform fantastic feats of multiple thinking. + +"Dream Amaigams" and "Infalls" are systems constructed with +imaginary elements, systems whose "notation" is drawn from an imaginary +object or system. Such systems have no descriptive syntax. Imaginary objects +were introduced into mathematics, or at least into geometry, by Nicholas +Lobachevski, and now I am using them as a notation. For these systems to +be nonisomorphic to any ink-on-paper systems, the mathematician must be +the organism with the M*-Memory or the D-*Memory. But this means that +in this case, the mathematics which is nonisomorphic to any ink-on-paper +system can be performed only in an imaginary mind. + +Now for a different approach. Carnap said that we are free to choose +the rules of a system arbitrarily. Let us take Carnap literally. I want to +construct more systems in constructed memories--so why not construct the +system by a procedure which ensures that constructed memories are +involved, but which is otherwise arbitrary? Why not suspend the striving +after "interesting" systems, that last vestige of the striving after +"correctness," and see what happens? Why not construct the rules of a +system by a chance procedure? + +To construct a system, we have to fill in the blanks in the following rule +schema in such a way that grammatically correct sentences result. + + +Rule Schema + +A"sentence" isa(n)_ + +Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences +the third. + + +I now spread the pages of 'Studies in Constructed Memories" on the floor. +With eyes closed, I hold a penny over them and drop it. I open my eyes and +copy down the expressions the penny covers. By repeating this routine, I +obtain a haphazard series of expressions concerning constructed memories. It +is with this series that I will fill in the blanks in the rule schema. In the next +stage, I fill the first (second, third) blank with the ceries of expressions +preceding the-first (second, third) period in the entire series. + + +"Haphazard System" + +A "sentence" is a the duration D-sentences A (@") conclude these +"*-Reflection," or the future Assumption voluntarily force of +conviction for conclusion the Situation or by ongoing that this +system? be given telling between the Situation 1. + +Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences is/ was +contained not have to the acceptance that a certain and malleable +study what an event involves material specifically mathematics: +construct accompanies the rest, extra-linguistically image organism +can fantasy not remembering ® *-Memory, the future interval defined +in dream the third. + +An "axiom" is a sentence that internally D-sentences, just as the + + +"}*-Memory" sentences Ay is A,.. +1 2 + + +In the final stage, I cancel the smallest number of words I have to in +order to make the rules grammatical. + + +"Fantasied Amnesia" + +A "sentence" is a duration or the future force of conviction for the Situation +or this system given Situation 1. + +Two sentences "imply" a third if and only if the two sentences have the +acceptance that a certain and malleable study extra-linguistically can +fantasy not remembering the future interval defined in the third. + +An "axiom" is a sentence that internally just sentences ay: + +It becomes clear in thinking about "Fantasied Amnesia' that its +metametamathematics is dual. Describing the construction of the rules, the +metamathematics, by a systematic performance, is one thing. Taking the +finished metamathematics at face value, independently of its origin, and +studying it in the usual manner, is another. Let us take "Fantasied Amnesia" +at face value. As one becomes used to its rules, they become somewhat more +meaningful. I will say that an "interpretation" of a haphazard system is an +explanation of its rules that makes some sense out of what may seem +senseless. 'Interpreting' is somewhat like finding the conditions for the +existence of a constructed memory which seemingly cannot exist. The first +rule of "Fantasied Amnesia" is a disjunction of three substantives. The + +"Situation" referred to in the second substantive expression is either + +Situation 1 or else an unspecified situation. The third substantive expression + +apparently means 'this system, assuming Situation 1,' and refers to + +"Eantasied Amnesia" itself. The definition of 'sentence' is thus meaningful, + +but very bizarre. The second rule speaks of "the acceptance" as if it were a + +written assent. The rule then speaks of a "malleable study" as "fantasying" + + +98 + + +something. This construction is quite weird, but let us try to accept it. The +third rule speaks of a sentence that "sentences" (in the legal sense) a possible +method. So much for the meaning of the rules. + + +Turning to the nine properties of formalist systems, the reference to +"the future interval' in the implication rule of "Fantasied Amnesia" +indicates that the system has Property 2; and the system can perfectly well +have Property 8. It does not have Property 6 in any known sense. Certainly +it does have Property 9. it just might have Property. 1. But as for the other +four properties, it seems out of the question to decide whether "Fantasied +Amnesia' has them. For whatever it is worth, "Fantasied Amnesia' is on +balance incomparable to formalist systems. + +My transformation rule schema has the form of a biconditional, in +which the right clause is the operative one. If a transformation rule were to +vary, in such a way that it could be replaced by a constant rule whose right +clause was the disjunction of the various right clauses for the variable rule, +then the latter would vary "trivially." 1 will say that a system whose +transformation rule can vary non-trivially is a "heterodeterminate" system. +Since 1 have constructed a haphazard metamathematics, why not a +heterodeterminate metamathematics? Consider a mathematician with an +M-Memory, such that each Ag. is the consistent use of a different + + +transformation rule, a different definition of "imply," for the mathematics +in which the mathematician is discovering theorems. The consistent use of a +transformation rule is after all a method--a method for finding the +commitments premisses make, and for basing conclusions in premisses. When +the mathematician goes to remember which rule of inference he has actually +been using, he "chooses" which of the possible methods is remembered to +have actually been used. This situation amounts to a heterodeterminate +system. tn fact, the metamathematics cannot even be written out this time; I +can only describe it metametamathematically in terms of an imaginary +memory. + +We are now in the realm of mathematical systems which cannot be +written out, but can only be described metametamathematically. I will +present a final system of this sort. It is entitled "System Such That No One +Knows What's Going On." One just has to guess whether this system exists, +and if it does what it is like. The preceding remark is the +metametamathematical description, or definition, of the system. + + +99 + + +1.3 Epilogue + +Ever since Carnap's Principle of Tolerance opened the floodgates to +arbitrariness in mathematics, we have been faced with the prospect of a +mathematics which is indistinguishable from art-for-art's-sake, or +amusement-for-amusement's-sake. But there is one characteristic which saves +mathematics from this fate. Mathematics originated by abstraction from +primitive technology, and is indispensable to science and technology--in +short, mathematics has scientific applications. The experience of group +theory has proved, I hope once and for all, the bankruptcy of that narrow +practicality which would limit mathematics to what can currently be applied +in science. But now that mathematics is wide open, and anything goes, we +should be aware more than ever that scientific applicability is the only +objective value that mathematics has. I would not have set down constructed +memory theory and the post-formalist systems if I did not believe that they +could be applied. When and how they will be is another matter. + +And what about the "validity" of formalism? The rise of the formalist +position is certainly understandable. The formalists had a commendable, +rationalistic desire to eliminate the metaphysical! problems associated with +mathematics. Moreover, formalism helped stimulate the development of the +logic needed in computer technology (and also to stimulate this paper). In +spite of the productiveness of the formalist position, however, it now seems +beyond dispute that formalism has failed to achieve its original goals. (My +pure philosophical writings are the last word on this issue.) Perhaps the main +lesson to be learned from the history of formalism is that an idea does not +have to be "true" to be productive. + + +Note +Early versions of "tllusions" and "Innperseqs" appeared in my essay +"Concept Art," published in An Anthology, ed. La Monte Young, New +York, 1963. An early, July 1961 version of "System Such That No One +Knows What's Going On" appeared in dimension 14, Ann Arbor, 1963, +published by the University of Michigan College of Architecture and Design. + + +100 + + +2. Studies in Constructed Memories + + +2.1 Introduction + + +The memory of a conscious organism is a phenomenon in which +interrelations of mind, language, and the rest of reality are especially evident. +In these studies, I will define some conscious memory-systems, and +investigate them. The investigation will be mathematical. In fact, the nearest +precedent for it is perhaps the geometry of Nicholas Lobachevski. +Non-Euclidian geometry had many founders, but Lobachevski in particular +spoke of his system as an 'imaginary geometry." Lobachevski's system was, +so to speak, the physical geometry of an "imaginary," or constructed, space. +By analogy, my investigation could be called a psychological algebra of +constructed minds. It is too early to characterize the investigation more +exactly. Let us just remember Rudoiph Carnap's Principle of Tolerance in +mathematics: the mathematician is free to construct his system in any way +he chooses. + +I will begin by introducing a repertory of concepts informally, +becoming more formal as I go along. Consider ongoing actions, which by +definition extend through past, present, and future. For example, "1! am +making the trip from New York to chicago." Consider also past actions +which have probable consequences in the present. "I have been heating this +water' (entailing that it isn't frozen now). I will be concerned with such +actions as these. + +Our language provides for the following assertion: "I am off to the +country today; I could have been off to the beach; I could not possibly have +been going to the center of the sun". We distinguish an actual action from a +possible action; and distinguish both from an action which is materially +impossible. People insist that there are things they could do, even though +they don't choose to do them (as opposed to things they couldn't do). What +distinguishes these possible actions from impossible ones? Rather than +trying to analyze such everyday notions in terms of the logic of +counterfactual conditionals, or of modalities, or of probability, I choose to +take the notions at their face value. My concern is not to philosophize, but +to assemble concepts with which to define an interesting memory system. + +What is the introspective psychological difference between a thought +that has the force of a memory, and a thought that has the force of a +fantasied past, a merely possible past? I am not asking how I know that a +verbalized memory is true; I! am asking what quality a naive thought has that +marks it as a memory. Let Alternative E be that I went to an East Side +restaurant yesterday, and Alternative W be that I went to a West Side one. +By the "thought of E" I mean mainly the visualization of going into the East + + +101 + + +Side restaurant. My thought of E has the force of memory. It actually +happened. W is something I could have done. I can imagine I did do W. There +is nothing present which indicates whether I did E or W. Yet W merely has +the force of possibility, of fantasy. How do the two thoughts differ? Is the +thought of E involuntarily more vivid? Is there perhaps an "attitude of +assertion" involuntarily present in the thought of E? + +Consider the memory that I was almost run down by a truck yesterday: +! could have been run down, but wasn't. In such a case, the possibility that I +could have been run down would be more vivid than the actuality that I +wasn't. (Is it not insanity, when a person is overwhelmed by the fear of a +merely possible past event? ) My hold on sanity here would be the awareness +that I am alive and well today. + +In dreams, do we not wholeheartedly "remember" that a misfortune +has befallen us, and begin to adjust emotionally to it? Then we awake, and +wholeheartedly remember that the misfortune has not befallen us. The +thought that had the force of memory in the dream ceases to have that force +as we awake. We remember the dream, and conclude that it was a fantasy. +Even more characteristic of dreams, do I not to al! intents and purposes go +to far places and carry out all sorts of actions in a dream, only to awaken in +bed? We say that the dream falsifies my present environment, my +sensations, my actions, memories, the past, my whole world, in a totally +convincing way. Can a hypnotist produce artificial dreams, that is, can he +control their content? Can the hypnotist give his subject one false memory +one moment, and replace it with a contradictory memory the next +moment? + +I will now = specify a_ situation involving possible actions and +remembering. + +Situation 7. "! could have been accomplishing G by doing Aa, or by + + +doing Aayy ..., or by doing A, ; but I have actually been accomplishing G by +n +doing Aas" Here the ongoing actions Age i= 1, ..., 9, a; * a, if ixh, are + + +the possible methods of accomplishing G. (The subscripts are supposed to +indicate that the methods are distinct and countable, but not ordered.) The +possible methods cannot be combined, let us assume. + +In such a situation, perhaps the thought that I have been doing Aa, + + +3 by the + +. . us - > n + +presence of the "attitude of assertion'. Since the possible methods are + +ongoing actions, the thought that I have been doing A,. has logical or +i + + +would be distinguished from similar thoughts about Aan! wy A + + +probabie consequences I can check against the present. +Now Aa, is actual and Aao is not, so that Aa, simply cannot have + + +102 + + +material contact with ay' An actual liquid in Aay could not require a +a, could have +1 + +with A, would be verbal and gratuitous. Therefore, in order to be possible +methods, Aan' . + + +not require a jar in Aas to contain it. If it did, Aan couldn't be actualized + + +possible jar in Pao to contain it. The only "connection" A +.., A, must be materially separable. A liquid in Aan must +n + + +while Aj, remained only a possibility. + + +Enough concepts are now at hand for the studies to begin in earnest. + + +2.2 M- Memories +Definition. Given the sentences 'I have actually been doing A,.', where +i + + +the A,. are non-combinable possible methods as in Situation 1, an +"M-Memory" is a memory of a conscious organism such that the organism +can think precisely one of the sentences at a time, and any of the sentences +has the force of memory. + +This definition refers to language, mind, and the rest of reality in their +interrelations, but the crucial reference is to a property of certain sentences. +I have chosen this formulation precisely because of what I want to +investigate. I want to find the minimal, elegant, extra-linguistic conditions, +whatever they may be, for the existence of an M-Memory (which is defined +by a linguistic property). I can say at once that the conditions must enable +the organism to think the sentences at will, and they must provide that the +memory is consistent with the organism's present awareness. + +Definition. The "*P-Memory" of a conscious organism is its conscious +memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of its life. I +want to distinguish here the "personal" memory from the preconscious. + +Definition. An "L-Memory" is a linguistic P-Memory having no +extra-linguistic component. Of course, the linguistic component has +extra-linguistic mental associations which give it "meaning"--otherwise the +memory wouldn't be conscious. But these associations lack the force of a +mental reliving of the past independent of language. An L-Memory amounts +to extra-linguistic amnesia. + +Assumption 1.1. With respect to normal human memory, when I forget +whether I did x, I can't voluntarily give either the thought that I did x, or +the thought that I didn't do x, the force of memory. I know that I either did +or didn't do x, but I can create no conviction for either alternative. (An +introspective observation.) + +Conclusion 1.2. An L-Memory is not sufficient for an M-Memory, even +in the trivial case that the Aa. are beyond perception (as internal bodily + + +103 + + +processes are). True, there would be no present perceptions to check the +sentences '! have actually been doing A,." against. True, the L-Memory +i + + +precludes any extra-linguistic memory-"feelings" which would conflict with +the sentences. But the L-Memory is otherwise normal. And Assumption 1.1 +indicates that normally, either precisely one of a number of mutually +exclusive possibilities has the force of memory; or else the organism can give +none of them the force of memory. + +Assumption 1.3.1 cannot, from within a natural dream, choose to swith +to another dream. {An introspective observation. A "natural" dream is a +dream involuntarily produced internally during sleep.) + +Conclusion 1.4. An M-Memory could not be produced by natural +dreaming. It is true that in one dream one sentence could have the force of +memory, and in another dream a different sentence could. But an M-Memory +is such that the organism can choose one sentence-memory one moment and +another the next. See Assumption 1.3. + +Assumption 1.5. Returning to the example of the restaurants, I find +that months after the event, my thought of E no longer has the force of +memory. All I remember now is that I used to remember that I did E. I +remember that I did E indirectly, by remembering that I remembered that ! +did E. (My memory that I did E is becoming an L-Memory.) The assumption +is that a memory of one's remembering can indicate, if not imply, that the +event originally remembered occurred. + +Conclusion 1.6. The following are adequate conditions for the existence +of an M-Memory. 1. The sentences are the organism's only memory of which +method he has been using. 2. When the organism thinks 'I have actually been +doing A,.'. then (he artificially dreams that) he has been doing Ag,-and is +now doing it. 3. When the dream ends, he does not remember that he +remembered that "he has been doing A,.," That is, he does not remember +the dream; and he does not remember that he thought the sentence. These +conditions would permit the existence of an M-Memory or else a memory +indistinguishable to all intents and purposes from an M-Memory. + +What I have in mind in Conclusion 1.6 is dreams which are produced +artificially but otherwise have all the remarkable qualities of natural dreams. +There would have to be a state of affairs such that the sentence would +instantly start the dream going. + +So much for the conditions for the existence of an M-Memory. +Consider now what it is like as a mental experience to have an M-Memory. +What present or ongoing awareness accompanies an M-Memory? Conclusion +1.6.2 already told what the remembering is like. For the rest, I will +informally sketch some conclusions. The organism can extra-linguistically +image the Aa: The organism can think 'l could have been doing Aa; When + + +104 + + +not remembering, the organism doesn't have to do any Ag., or he can do any + + +one of them. The organism must not do anything which would liquidate a +possble method, render the action no longer possible for him. + +Assumption 2.1. A normal dream can combine two totally different +past episodes in my life into a fused episode, or amalgam; so that I "relive" it +without doubts as.a single episode, and yet remain vaguely aware that +different episodes are present in it. Dreams have the capacity not only to +falsify my world, but to make the impossible believable. (An introspective +observation.) + +Conclusion 2.2. The conditions for the existence of an M-Memory +further permit material contact between the possible methods, the very +contact which is out of the question in a normal Situation 1. The dream is so +flexible that the organism can dream that an (actual) fiquid is/was contained +by a jar in a possible method. See Assumption 2.1. Thus, the A,, do not have +to be separable to be possible methods. + +I will now introduce further concepts pertaining to the mind. + +Definition. A "mental state" is a mental "stage" or "space" or "mood" +in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried on. + + +Some human mental states are stupor, general anxiety, empathy with +another person, dizziness, general euphoria, clearheadedness (the normal +state in which work is performed), and dreaming. In all but the last state, +some simple visualization routine could be carried out voluntarily. Even ina +dream, I can have visualizations, although here I can't have them at will. The +states are not defined by the imaging or activities carried on while in them, +but are "spaces" in which such imaging or activities are carried on. + +By definition. + +Conclusion 3.2. An M-Memory has to occur within the time which the +possible methods require, the time required to accomplich G. By definition. + +Definition. An "M*-Memory" is an M-Memory satisfying these +conditions. 1. Agi: for the entire time it requires, involves the voluntary + + +assuming of mental states. i = 1, ..., n. 2. The material contact between the +possible methods, the cross-method contact, is specifically some sort of +contact between states. + +Conclusion 3.3. For an M*-Memory, to remember is to choose the +mental state in which the remembering is required to occur (by the +memory). After ail, for any M-Memory, to remember is to choose all the + + +A,.-required things you are doing while you remember. +i +By now, the character of this investigation should be clearer. I seek to + + +stretch our concepts, rather that to find the "true" ones. The investigation +may appear similar to the old discipline of philosophical psychology, but its + + +105 + + +thrust is rather toward the modern axiomatic systems. The reasoning is +loose, but not arbitrary. And the investigation will become increasingly +mathematical. + + +2.3 D-Memories + + +Definition. A "D-Memory" is a memory such that measured past time + + +appears in it only in the following sentences: "Event; occurred in the interval + + +of time which is xX] long and ended at Xj AF, and is Yj long and ended 2; + + +ago," where Xj, +and 'AF' means "after a fixed beginning time." XQ = 'O; XjPX5A and at any + + +Yje and zj are positive numbers of time units (such as hours) + + +one fixed time, the intervals IZj. zjtyjl nowhere overlap. Vit ZS%- For an + + +integer m, the mth sentence acquires the force of memory, is added to the +memory, at the fixed time x,,.j =1, ..., f(t), where the number of sentences +f(t) is written as a function of time AF. Then f(t) = m when x,,<t<x,, 44. +The sentences have the force of memory involuntarily. The organism does +not make them up at will. ; : : + +Let me explain what the D-Memory involves. Event; is assigned to an +abnormal "interval," a dual interval defined in two unrelated ways. The +intervals defined by the Yj and z; are tied to the present instant rather than to +a fixed time, and could be written IN-2;-Yj, N-zjl, where 'N' means "the time +of the present instant relative to the fixed beginning time." + +Conclusion 4. The intervals IN-2)-Yj, N-Z;I nowhere overlap. Proof: By +definition, the intervals IZj, zi+y;I nowhere overlap. If j #k, IZj, Ztyillz,, +Zz. +y¥pl = 0. This fact implies that e.g. ZjZjtVjZKS ZK +YK- Then +N-2-¥_SN-2<N-2)-9; <N-Zj. Then IN-2p-y,, N-z, 1 N-2jy 7, N-z)I = ¢. At +any one time, the organism can think of all the sliding intervals, and they +partly cover the time up to now without overlapping. + +Suppose you find the deck of n cards + + +event j +Zz i oa" +(jj = 1, .., n and z, is a positive number of days), and you have no + + +J +information to date them other than what they themselves say. If you + + +believe the cards, your mental experience will be a little like having a +D-Memory. Then, the definition does not require that Yj = Xt Again, it is + + +106 + + +not that two concepts of "length" are involved, but that the "interval" is +abnormal. Of course this is ali inconsistent, but I want to study the +conditions under which a mind will accept inconsistency. + +Assumption 5.1. With respect to normal human memory, it is possible +to forget what day it is, even though one remembers a past date. (An +empirical observation.) + +Assumption 5.2. This assumption is based on the fact that the sign +'CLOSED FOR VACATION. BACK IN TWO WEEKS' was in the window of +a nearby store for at least a month this summer; and the fact that a +filmmaker wrote in a newspaper, "When an actor asks me when the film will +be finished, I say 'In two months," and two months later I give the same +answer, and I'm always right.' Even in normal circumstances, humans can +maintain a dual and outright inconsistent awareness of measured time. [n +general, inconsistency is a normal aspect of human thinking and even has +practical value. + +Imagine a child who has been told to date events by saying, for +example, x happened two days ago, and a day later saying again, x happened +two days ago--and who has not been told that this is inconsistent. What +conditions are required for the acceptance of this dating system? It is +precisely because of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 that a certain answer cannot +be given to this question. The human mind is so flexible and malleable that +there is no telling how much inconsistency it can absorb. I can only study +what flaws might lead the child to reject the system. The child might "fee!" +that an event recedes into the past, something the memory doesn't express. +An event might be placed by the memory no later than another, and yet +"feel" more recent than the other. I speculate that if anything will discredit +the system, it will be its conflict with naive, "felt," extra-linguistic memory. + +Conclusion 5.3. The above dating system would be acceptable to an +organism with an L—Memory. + +Conclusion 5.4. The existence of an L-Memory is an adequate condition +for the existence of a D-Memory. With extra-linguistic amnesia, the +structure of the language would be the structure of the past in any case. The +past would have no form independent of language. Anyway, time is gone for +good, leaving nothing that can be checked directly. Without an +extra-linguistic memory to fall back on, and considering Assumptions 5.1 +and 5.2, the dual temporal memory shouldn't be too much to absorb. + +As I said, the real difficulty with this line of investigation is putting +limits on anything so flexible as the mind's capacity to absorb inconsistency. + +Now the thinking of a sentence in a D-Memory itself takes time. Let +'tS; be the minimum number of time units it takes to think the jth + + +D-sentence. This function, abbreviated '8y), is the duration function of the + + +107 + + +D-sentences. + +Conclusion 6.1. If 5j>Z), the memory of the interval defined by Yj and +Zj places the end of the interval after the beginning of the memory of it, or +does something else equally unclear. If bj>yjtzj. the entire interval is placed +after the beginning of the memory of it. When 5;>z;, let us say that the end +of the remembered interval falis within the interval for the memory of it, or +that the situation is an "infall." (Compare 'The light went out a half-second +ago'.) 5 + +Conclusion 6.2. If 6}>xj4,-xj, then Sj, is added to the preconscious +before s can be thought once. The earliest interval during which the jth +sentence can be thought "passes over" the (j+k)th interval. Let us say that +the situation is a "passover." (Something of the sort is true of humans, +whose brains contain permanent impressions of far more sensations than can +be thought, remembered in consciousness.) + +Conclusion 6.3. If there are passovers in a D-Memory, the organism +cannot both think the sentences during the earliest intervals possible and be +aware of the passovers. Proof: The only way the organism can be aware of 6 +(S}) is for event j+h (h a positive integer) to be the thinking of Sj. If the +thinking of Sj takes piace as the (j+1)th event, then the organism gets two +values for 5(S)), namely 4h Xj and Yj+1- Assume that only Xj4I%y is +allowed as a measure of 5(Sj). Since 5(S)) = X44%j, there is no passover. If +the thinking of S; takes place as the (j+2)th event, then xj4.9-x j44 = 5(S)) +could be greater than xj1%- But since Sj goes into the preconscious at x;, +S: is not actually thought in the earliest interval during which it could be +thought. See the diagram. + + +So 4 St Sz+d Sz+2 + + +event+ I sven? ~ Pee even bs +2 I +aoa ee aaa ee SS + + +a "je "542 + + +Conclusion 6.4. Let there be an infall in the case where event) is the +thinking of Sj- 5(S) = X45 and 5(Sj)>z;. Si+1 gives 5(S)), so that the +organism can be aware of it. It is greater than z;. Thus, the organism can be + + +aware of the infall. However, the infall will certainly be no more difficult to +accept than the other features of the D-Memory. And the thinking of Sj has + + +108 + + +to be one of the events for the organism to be aware of the infall. + + +2.7 &-Memories +I will conclude these studies with two complex constructions. +Definition. A "&-Memory" is a memory which includes an M*-Memory +and a D-Memory, with the following conditions. 1. The goal G, for the +M*-Memory, is to move from one point to another. 2. For the D-Memory, + + +"event," becomes a numerical term, the decrease in the organism's distance + + +from the destination point during the temporal interval. "A 3-inch move + + +toward the destination" is the sort of thing that 'event;' here refers to. 3. + + +The number of Aa, equals the number of D-sentences factorial. The number +of D-sentences, of course, increases. + +Consider the consecutive thinking of each D-sentence precisely once, in +minimum time, while the number of sentences remains constant. Such a +"D-paragraph" is a permutation of the D-sentences. Let H™ be a +D-paragraph when the number of sentances equals the integer m. There are +m! SA" s. When f(t) = m = 3, one of the sixH" sis sais}, thought in +minimum time. Assume that the duration A of a D-paragraph depends only +on the number of D-sentences and the bi. We can write + + +The permutations of the D-sentences, as well as the D-paragraphs, can be +indexed with the a;, just as the possible methods are. + +Definition. A "b*-Memory" is a ®-Memory in which the order of the +sentences in the ajth Ti" has the meaning of 'I have actually been doing Aa. + + +assigned to it. The order is the indication that A,. has actually been used; it +i +is the ajth M*-assertion. '! have actually been doing A,.' is merely an English +i + + +translation, and does not appear in the ®*- Memory. + +Conclusion 7. Given a $*-Memory, if one D-sentence is forgotten, not +only will there be a gap in the awareness of when what events occurred; it +will be forgotten which method has actually been used. + +This conclusion points toward a study in which deformations of the +memory language are related to deformations of general consciousness. + +Definition. A "*-Reflection," or reflection in the present of a +@*-Memory, is a collection of assertions about the future, derived from a + + +&*-Memory, as follows. 1. There are the sentences 'Event; will occur in the + + +109 + + +interval of time which is xxi long, and begins at twice the present time + + +AF, minus Xj AF; and which is y; long and begins zj from now'. If event; was +a 3-inch move toward the destination in the ®*-Memory, the sentence in the +®*-Reflection says that a 3-inch move will be made in the future temporal +interval. 2. The ajth permutation of the sentences defined in (1) is an + + +assertion which has the meaning of 'I will do A,.'; and the organism can +i +think precisely one permutation at a time. The A,_, Xj Vir Bye and the rest are +. . - I . . . +defined as before (so that in particular the permutations can be indexed with +the aj). + +Conclusion 8. Given that the @*-Memory's temporal! intervals x54, xj! +are reflected as I2N-x;, 2N-x; 41, the reflection preserves the intervals' +absolute distances from the present. Proof: The least distance of X74, xj +from N is N-x;; the greatest distance is N-Xi 4. Adding the least distance, and +then the greatest distance, to N, gives I2N-x;, 2N-xj 41. + +I will end with two problems. If a ©*-Memory exists, under what +conditions will a ®*-Reflection be a precognition? Under what conditions +will every assertion be prescience or foreknowledge? By a "precognition" I +don't mean a prediction about the future implied by deterministic laws; I +mean a direct "memory" of the future unconnected with general principles. + +Finally, what would a precognitive ®*-Reflection be like as a mental +experience? What present or ongoing awareness would accompany a +precognitive ®*-Reflection? + + +110 + + +THE NEW MODALITY + + +SE eS +ESE BORO A SILGS +Sie DLS + +Baie es + + +) +: +: +: +; + + +11. Representation of the Memory of an Energy Cube Organism +1966 VERSION + + +The energy cube organism is a conscious organism which is nothing but +energy confined to a cubical space. It rests on a rectangular energy slab, in a +stationary, colorless liquid, separated from the slab by a thin film of liquid. +It has been on the slab for an indefinitely long time. There are in fact two +infinite bodies of the liquid, alternating with two infinite empty spaces; the +four volumes are outlined by two intersecting planes which just miss being +perpendicular. The slab is poised, at a slant, on the faces of the upper body +of liquid, near where they meet. There are no other objects in the bodies of +liquid. The slab, liquid, and spaces are the energy cube organism's entire +cosmology. (See the illustration.) + + +Pay +'€ += +£ +GS += +£ +Pag +® +Oe aa eae +Sek Vn a ee a a , of +\ / : +liquid / +\ / Lo +/ +vee: fof} ae +\y oy 'i \/ empty space +yy +empty space /\ / +voy \ +/ / + +; . i \ +/ aa / \ +liquid +/ Be eee ee +i -7~ ae + +te pe + + +Ajluljul 02 spuarxa + + +ILLUSTRATION + + +113 + + +The energy cube organism can continuously change position, +continuously and instantly moving the liquid from its path into its wake so +as to make no current in the liquid. For almost as long as it has been on the +slab, the organism has devoted itself to crossing the slab, from the slab's edge +on one face of the liquid to its edge on the other. + +The energy cube organism has a conscious memory (by which I mean +strictly a memory of what it did and what happened to it, the past events of +its existence). The memory consists of symbols which are given "meaning" +by their extra-linguistic mental! associations--in human terms, it consists of +language. The complete memory contains tens of thousands of partial +memories, which the organism can only have one at a time. Going through +the partials--which it does as if they were the phonemes of one long +word--constitutes its one complete memory. Each partial is a memory of the +difference in the organism's minimum distances from the destination edge, at +the beginning, and at the end, of some interval of time. Call the difference its +"progress." The total of time intervals in all the partials completely covers +the interval from the earliest remembered event to the most recent +remembered event. As time passes, more partials are added to the complete +memory. The production of partial memories is an involuntary process of +the organism. + +The memory is temporally dual. The interval for each partial is an +interval of fixed time, defined by its duration, and the distance from the +fixed time when the energy cube organism appeared on the slab up to the +interval's end. But it is also a sliding interval, defined by its duration, and a +constant distance from the present instant back to the interval's end. When +partials are added to the memory, each of the former intervals exactly covers +the tire not already covered, up to the absolute time when the partial is +added. But the latter intervals, while they never overlap, can have gaps +between them. The intervals generally are of different durations. The energy +cube organism lacks any independent extra-linguistic memory, any mental +reliving of the past, which could conflict with the dual temporal memory. +There is no form to the past other than that of the memory's language. (See +the graph.) + +The order of the partials in the complete memory is a linguistic +phenomenon which indicates the method the organism has been using to +move itself--and thus the order (with its extra-linguistic associations) is the +memory of the method. A single method" is everything to be done by the +energy cube organism to move itself, throughout the entire time it takes to +reach the destination edge. There are different possible methods, and each +could get the organism across; but the methods cannot be combined in any +way. Every order of all partials signifies a different possible method. These + + +114 + + +ao) +14 +2 +oS +- +— +c + +Qa +£ +2 +£ += +- +© +@ +£ +- +@ +2 +2 +° +nn +O +o + + +a +®D +ao) +oo +ros) +_ +2 +© +> +< +@ +~ += +nn +a] +£ +rw) + + +used to show intervals, 1st temporal memory omenrasmemiia +used to show "intervals," 2nd temporal memory ............ +used to show tracks of "intervals," 2nd memory + +usedtoshowrelationships eae ae + + +4th partial + + +I +I + + +I + +3rd partial +, 2nd partial +: : + +I I +I I + + +n +l i +I +I I + + +absolute times, covered by intervals +{absolute times covered by) intervals, +Ist temporal memory + + +GRAPH showing a possible relationship +in the dual temporal memory + + +115 + + +possible methods are in no special order. When a partial is added to the +memory, the number of possible methods is increased by a factor equal to +the new number of partials. + + +Now the complete memory is obtained by going through the partials--in +any order! Any order gives the memory. This feature, which can be +precisely characterized in terms of the memory language, is perhaps the most +remarkable feature of the whole cosmology. An approach to this feature in +human terms is to say that when the organism goes through the partials, (it +dreams that) it has been using the method indicated--and is presently using +it. It (does not remember the dream, and) does not remember going through +the partials. It has no other memory of which method it has been using. + +The organism moves itself by mental exertion, teleports itself. The +"possible methods" are mental routines. These routines draw on the +following standard mental resources. The organism can assume at will many +"mental states." By 'mental state' I refer to a mental "stage" or "space" or +"mood" in which visualizing, remembering, and all imaging can be carried +on. Some human mental states are general euphoria, stupor, general anxiety, +dreaming, dizziness, empathy with another person, and clearheadedness, the +normal state in which work is performed. These states are not defined by +specific imagings, but are "spaces" in which imaging is carried on. The +organism changes its state by changing from one form of energy to another, +gravity, magnetism, electric energy, radiated heat, or light. In these states, +the organism has an unlimited capacity to image; in human terms, to +visualize. There are visualized regions of colored liquids. Call them "fluid +colors." There are visualized glowing surfaces, and there are black regions or +"holes." There are visualized "covers," "lattices," and "shells," which are all +formed from transparent planes, spherical surfaces and the like. Call them +"orojected surfaces." The fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. There are +"channels," which are strung-out series of fluid colors. There are +"reservoirs," which are clusters of fluid colors. A channel can be closed or +Open. Two channels can cross each other. There are pairs of channels such +that earlier members of each channel flow into later members of the +other--calied "screw-connected" channels. Fluid colors often occur on or +within projected surfaces. Projected surfaces can be growing or held. A +visualization can be at the forefront of attention, or in the back of the mind. +That is, states have depth, and visualizations can be at different depths. The +state as a whole can be "frozen" or "melted." A human approach is to say +that a "frozen" state is set or fixed; while a "melted" state is fluid--the state +itself flows. A state can be projected into "superstate," gaining an abnormal +amount of mental! energy and becoming superdizziness or superanxiety, for +instance. + + +116 + + +Most interesting, states in different possible methods can have contact +with each other. A human approach is to say that dreams are so flexible that +the organism can dream that an actual! state is/was in contact with a state in +a possible method. One sort of cross-method contact is for states to be +'Snterfrozen" --more easily frozen because they are somehow mixed. They +can also be "intermelted." + +I will describe a method, as the organism would be conscious of it in +remembering. For concreteness, I will refer to the different states with the +names of human states rather than with letters. Channels are generated in a +frozen stupor, and become fixed at the forefront of attention of euphoria +intermelted with a possible state. The screw-crossed channels erode crevices +in a held lattice, which breaks into growing sheets (a variety of covers). The +sheets are stacked, and held in a frozen dream thawed at intervals for +reshuffling of the stack. The dream becomes melted, and proceeds in a +trajectory which shears, and closes, open channels. If no violation of the +channels cross-mars the melt, the stack meshes with the sharp-open channels. +The dream becomes interfrozen, and mixed clear-headed states compress the +closed channels which were not fixed at the dream's surface. A fused +exterior double-flash (a certain maximally 'glowing surface") is +expand-enveloped by euphoria, which becomes dizziness; and oblique +lattices are projected from the paralinear deviation of guided open channels +in it. Growing shells are dreamed into violet sound-slices (certain synesthetic +"fluid colors') by the needed jumped drag (a generic state}, a crossfrozen +dream. Channels in a growing anxiety enspiral concentric shells having +intermixed reservoirs between them, during cyclic intersection of the anxiety +in superstate. And on and on. Time is here the time it takes to carry out the +successive steps of the routine. + +The energy cube organism language, the symbols constituting the +partials, are themselves mental entities. A partial is a rectangular plane +glowing surface, which has two stationary plane reservoirs on it, and has a +triangular hole in it. As a mental entity, in other words, a partial is a +visualization like those which are part of the methods. The perimeter of the +triangular hole equals the organism's progress in the corresponding time +interval. Absence of the hole indicates zero progress. + +The fluid colors in each of the reservoirs on each partial memory are +primary colors, and are mixed together. Speaking as accurately as possible in +human terms, in each reservoir there is precisely one point of "maximum +mixture" of the primary colors. The primary colors are mentally mixed in +any way until the right amount of mixture is reached. There is a scale of +measurement for amounts of mixture of the colors. There is a scale for +vertical distances on the surface--for how far one point is below another. The + + +difference in amounts of mixture at the two points of maximum mixture +corresponds to the lengti; of the first temporal interval; and the difference +between the>maximum possible amount of mixture and the lesser of the two +amounts of maximum mixture on the surface corresponds to the distance +from the fixed beginning time to the interval's and. The vertical distance +between the two points of maximum mixture corresponds to the length of +the second temporal interval; and the vertical distance from the middle of +the surface to the point nearer it corresponds to the constant distance from +the present instant back to the interval's enc. The middle of the surface +represents the present, and the upper half represents the future; the +reservoirs are all in the lower half. For each partial it is necessary to +determine (1) the number of units of duration per unit difference in +amounts of mixture; and (2) the number of units of duration per unit +difference in vertical distances. The average glow per unit area of each +glowing surface (excepting the hole) is correlated with a pair of numbers +constituting this information. + +Finally, turning all the partial memories upside down--and reflecting the +first temporal memory in the present instant, so that the intervals' absolute +distances from the present are preserved--gives the precognition of the +organism's future course of action, tells what progress will be made when +and by which method. + + +The Representation + +This essay accompanies a representation of the energy cube organism's +memory--hence its title. The way to picture the memory, naturally, is to +make something that looks like the partials. I have represented the partials +by rectangular sheets of paper of different translucencies with mixtures of +inks of primary colors on them and holes cut in them; together in an +envelope, which bears the injunction not to have more than one sheet out at +a time. Three of the tens of thousands of partials are represented. + + +118 + + +ORIGINAL 1961 VERSION + + +Foreward + +I have refrained from editing the Original Version except where +absolutely necessary. It is full of inconsistencies and inadequate +explanations, but I have flagged only two major ones, by placing them +between the signs X and lX Part of the fourth paragraph is flagged because a +sequence of units is not analogous to a sequence of inflected words; it is +rather more like permutations of letters which form words ('rat', 'tar', 'art'). +Most of the seventh paragraph is flagged because I promise to define intervals +by their lengths and ends, but instead give their beginnings and ends. + +In the fourth paragraph, there are two different versions of the +correspondence between possible methods and sequences of units, and of +why any sequence is acceptable. Passages belonging exclusively to the +"multiplex" version are set off by the sign #. Passages which belong +exclusively to the "style" version and which should be deleted if the +"multiplex" version is used are placed between slashes. The "style" version is +the main version. In the fifth paragraph, a notion appears which is +interesting, but unconvincingly explained. It is not clear whether this notion +relates only to the "multiplex" version, or whether it would relate to the +"style" version if the word 'multiplex' were omitted. The passages suggesting +this notion are placed in brackets. + + +1. Energy cube organisms are conscious organisms which are cubical +spaces containing only energy. The particular energy cube organism of +concern here has, for an indefinitely long time, been in a body of liquid, +"resting on' a rectangular energy slab also in the body of liquid; the +organism's "bottom" face is separated from the slab by only a very thin film +of the liquid. The "universe" the organism and slab are in is made up of four +infinite triangular right prisms, prismatic spaces, as defined geometrically by +two intersecting planes almost perpendicular to each other. The prismatic +spaces defined by the vertical obtuse dihedral angles are empty. The other +spaces, defined by the vertical acute dihedral! angles, are infinite bodies of a +stationary, colorless lfiquid--the "upper" body of liquid being what the +organism and slab are in. The two opposite shorter edges of the slab are at +the faces of the body of liquid, the planes, near their intersection; the slab is +"slanted," so that the edges are at slightly different distances from the line +of intersection. The organism and slab are the only "objects" in the bodies +of liquid. (See the illustration.) The organism can move (the energy cube can + + +119 + + +continuously change position) without creating currents in the liquid. For +almost as 'ong as it has been in the liquid, the organism has devoted all its +"intelligence," all its "energies," to moving across the slab, from one of the +shorter edges to (any point on) the other. + +Z The organism's conscious, distinct memory is entirely concerned +with, is entirely cf, its efforts to cross the slab. (1 am using 'memory' +narrowly to refer to an organism's memory of its past. I am counting its +"general information," for example Knowing a language, not as part of its +memory but as imagings not memories. Thinking the sequence 1, 2, 1, 2 is +not in itself remembering.) The total memory consists of a large number of +units (tens of thousands), of which the organism can be attentive to precisely +one at a time. 'Total recall," the total memory, involves considering, having, +all units in any succession, which the organism can do very rapidly. Now +from one point of view, the memory consists of its content; from another, it +consists of symbols, just as human memories often consist of language. In +describing the memory, I will go from considering primarily the content, +what the memory is of; to considering the specific character of the units, +specific symbolism used in the memory, and specific content. Each unit is +first a memory of the amount of progress made toward the destination edge +in a particular interval of time. The amount of progress is the difference +between the minimum distance of the organism from the destination edge at +the beginning of the interval, and the minimum distance at the end of the +interval. The total of intervals, in the total of units, cover the "absolute" +interval of time from the earliest to the most recent remembered event; as +time passes, more units are added to the memory. + +3. Now the memory is temporally dual: the interval of time for each +unit is first, an interval of 'absolute' time; defined by its duration, and the +"absolute" time of its end (stated with respect to an "absolute event" such +as the appearance of the organism on the slab); and secondly, an interval +defined by its duration, and how far from the present instant its end is. It is +like remembering that so much progress was made during one year which +ended at January 1, 1000 A.D.; as well as remembering that it was made +during one year which ended 1,000 years ago. In the second temporal +memory, the absolute time of the end of the interval to which the progress is +assigned changes according as the absolute time of the present instant +changes. For example, it is like remembering "that so much progress was +made during one year ending 1,000 years ago," and, 100 years later, +remembering--'that so much progress was made during one year ending +1,000 years ago"; and in general, always remembering "that so much +progress was made during one year ending 1,000 years ago.' Both temporal +memories are in their own ways "natural," the first being anchored at an + + +120 + + +"absolute beginning," the second at the present instant. When a unit is added +to the memory, the interval of time of the first temporal memory is added at +the end, exactly covers the time not already covered, up to the absolute time +when the unit is added; so that the total of intervals of the first temporal +memory exactly cover, without overlap, the absolute total time. In contrast, +although the intervals of the second temporal memory do not overlap at any +time, there can be gaps between them; so that when a unit is added to the +memory, the interval for the second temporal memory may be placed +between existing intervals and not have to cover an absolute time which they +have left behind, that is, not have to be placed farther back than all of them. +Intervals of both temporal memories are of different sizes, a "natural +complexity." (See the graph.) Incidentally, the condition for coincidence of +the two temporal intervals of a unit is: if the two intervals are of the same +duration, they will coincide at the absolute time which is the sum of the +absolute time of the end of the first interval, and the distance from the +present instant of the end of the second interval. The two temporal +memories complement each other; aside from this comment I will not be +concerned to "explain" the duality with respect to when the amounts of +progress were made, whether when they were "really" made stayed the same +and changed, or whether the memory is inconsistent about it, or what. + +4. I will now turn to the aspect of the memory concerned with the +method the organism has used to move itself. # Methodologically, the +memory is a multiplex symbol.# A "single method" is everything to be done +by the organism, to move itself, throughout the total time it takes to reach +the destination edge; so that the organism could not use two different +"single methods," must, after it chooses its method, continue with it alone +throughout. The organism has available different (single) methods, has +different methods it could try. The different sequences, of all units, are +assigned to the different (single) methods available to the organism to signify +them; are symbols for them. (Thus, the number of available methods +increases as units are added to the memory.) /Now ail this only approximates +what is the case, because contrary to what I may have implied, which +method is used is not a matter of "fact" as are the temporal intervals and +amounts of progress. As I have said, having all units in any succession +constitutes the total memory, total recall ('factually")--different sequences +of all units are each the total memory, total recall, << but, as language, the +total memory in different styles (like words in different orders in a highly +inflected language); and the matter of method (which might better be said to +be "manner") corresponds to the matter of style, rather than factual +content, of language. Different styles exclude each other, but not what is +said in each other's being true. Thus it is that the number of available + + +121 + + +methods can increase; and that any sequence of all units can constitute the +total memory, total recall ("factually"), although different sequences signify +different methods used./ #As an indicator of the method used, the whole +memory is a multiplex symbol. Names for each of the methods are combined +in a single symbol, the totality of units. In remembering, the organism +separates any single name by going through ail the units in succession, and +that name is the complete reading of the multiplex symbol, the complete +information about the method used. I will not be concerned to "explain" +the matter of the increasing number of available methods; or the matter of +any sequence of all units' constituting the complete reading, the total +memory, total recall, but different sequences' signifying different methods +used.# + +5. I will give just an indication of what the available methods [and +their relations through the multiplex memory] are like. Throughout this +description, there has been the difficulty that English lacks a vocabulary +appropriate for describing the "universe" I am concerned with, but the +difficulty is particularly great here, in the case of the methods [and their +relations through the multiplex memory]; so that I will just have to +approximate a vocabulary with present English as best as I can. The +methods, instruments of autokinesis, are all mental, teleportation, resu!t in +teleportation. The "consciousnesses" available to the organism to be +combined into methods are infinitely many. It has available many states of +mind (as humans have non-consciousness, autohypnotic trance, dizziness, +dreaming, clear-headed calculation, and so forth), corresponding to different +forms its energy can assume. To give this description more content I will +differentiate its states of mind by referring to them with the names of the +human states of mind (rather than just with letters). It has available an +indefinite variety of contents, as humans have particular imagings, in its +conscious states of mind. I will outline the principal contents. There are +"visualized" fluid regions of color (like colored liquids), first-order contents. +There are 'visualized' radient surfaces, and non-radient surfaces or regions +("holes"}, the intermediate contents. The second-order contents are +"projective" constructs of imaged geometric surfaces, "covers," "lattices," +and "shells." Fluid colors can be stationary or flowing. They can occur in +certain series, "channels"; and in certain arrays, "reservoirs." A channel can +be "closed" or "open"; two channels can be "crossed," or +"screw-connected" (earlier members of each channel flowing into later +members of the other). First-order contents (fluid colors) often occur on or +within second-order ones (projective surfaces). Second-order contents can be +"held" or "growing." States of mind have depth, 'deeper' being 'farther from +the forefront of attention'; and contents can be at different depths. A state + + +122 + + +of mind as a unity can be "frozen," which is more than just unchanging (in +particular having its contents stationary or held). It can be projected into +"superstate," remaining a state of mind but being superenergized. [Most +interesting, states of mind, in different methods signified by different +symbols combined in the multiplex methodological memory, can have +contact with each other, for example be "interfrozen."I] A partial description +of a method will give an idea of the complexity of the methods. Channels are +generated by a frozen non-conscious state, and become fixed in the surface +layer of an [inter] melted trance. The screw-crossed channels erode crevices +in a held shell, which breaks into growing sheets (certain covers). The sheets +are stacked, and held in a frozen dream thawed at intervals for reshuffling. +The dream becomes melted, and proceeds in a trajectory which shears, and +closes, open channels. If no violation of the channels cross-mars the melt, the +stack meshes with the sharp-open channels. The dream becomes [inter] +frozen, and mixed calculation states compress the closed channels which +were not surface-fixed in it. A fused exterior double-flash {a certain +maximally radient surface) is expand-enveloped by a trance, which becomes +dizziness; and oblique lattices are projected from the paralinear deviation of +guided open channels in it. Growing shells are dreamed into violet +sound-slices (certain fluid colors) by the needed jumped drag (a certain +consciousness), a [cross] frozen dream. Channels in a growing trance enspiral +concentric shells having intermixed reservoirs between them, during cyclic +intersection of the trance in superstate. I will not say more about the +available methods, because in a sense the memory does not: a sequence of +units is a marker arbitrarily assigned to a method to signify it, like an +arbitrary letter, say 'q', assigned to a certain table to signify it; it no more +gives characteristics of the method than 'q' does of the table. In fact, the +available methods and sequences do not have any particular order; one +cannot speak of the "first" method, the "second," or the like. + + +6. I will now concentrate on the character of the memory as a mental +entity, and the rest of the symbolism used in it and specific content. A unit +is a rectangular plane ("visualized") radient surface (! --the terminology is +that introduced in the last paragraph), which has two stationary plane +reservoirs {! ) on it, and has a triangular hole (! ) in it. The triangular hole is +a simple symboi not yet explained: its perimeter equals the amount of the +organism's progress, the difference in its minimum distances from the +destination edge, in the interval the unit is concerned with. Absence of the +hole indicates zero perimeter and no progress. + +7. As for the symbols for the temporal interval. The colors in each of +the two reservoirs on each unit are primary, and are mixed together. +Speaking as accurately as possible in English, in each reservoir there is + + +123 + + +precisely one point of "maximum mixture' of the primary colors. (The rest +of the reservoirs are not significant: the primary colors are mentally mixed in +any way to get the right amount of mixture, as pigments are mixed on a +palette.) X_ For the first temporal memory, these points are two points on a +scale of amounts of color mixture. For the second memory, the points are +two points on a scale of vertical distances from the imaginary horizontal! line +which bisects the rectangular surface, divides it into lower and upper halves. +The units are marked in their lower halves only; because for the second +memory the imaginary dividing line represents the present instant, distances +below it represent distances into the past, and distances above it distances +into the future (lower and upper edges representing equal distances from the +present). Now a scale is required so that it can be told what temporal +intervals the interval on the amount of mixture scale and the interval on the +distance scale represent. The parts of the scale which may vary from unit to +unit and have to be specified in each unit are the "absolute" time +corresponding to the maximum possible color mixture, the number of units +of absolute duration per unit difference in amounts of mixture, and the +number of units of absolute duration per unit difference in distances from +the imaginary dividing line. The markers arbitrarily assigned to the triples of +information giving these parts of the scale are average radiences per unit +areas of the units (excepting the holes). —X + +8. A final aspect of interest. Not too surprisingly, the transformation +which is inverting all units gives, if one considers not the first temporal +memory but its reflection in the present instant, the organism's precognized +course of action in the future, specifically, what progress will be made when. + + +The Representation + +With this background, it is not surprising that the method of +representation I have chosen is visual representation of the units, the +"visualizations." Units are represented by rectangular sheets of paper of +different translucencies with mixtures of inks of primary colors on them and +holes cut in them, together in an envelope. Only one sheet should be out of +the envelope at a time. A sheet should be viewed while placed before a white +light in front of a black background, so that the light illuminates the whole +sheet as evenly as possible without being seen through the hole, only the +black being seen at the hole. The ultimate in fidelity would be to learn to +visualize these sheets as they look when viewed properly; then one could +have the memory as nearly as possible as the organism does. I have +represented eleven of the tens of thousands of units in the total memory. + + +Concept Art +Copyright 1961 by Henry A.Flynt, Jr. + + +Concept art is first of all an art of which the material is concepts, as the +material of e.g. music is sound. Since concepts are closely bound up with +language, concept art is a kind of art of which the material is language. That +is, unlike e.g. a work of music, in which the music proper (as opposed to +notation, analysis, etc.) is just sound, concept art proper will involve +language. From the philosophy of language, we learn that a concept may as +well be thought of as the intension of a name; this is the relation between +concepts and language.* The notion of a concept is a vestige of the notion of +a platonic form (the thing which e.g. all tables have in common: tableness), +which notion is replaced by the notion of a name objectively, metaphysically +related to its intension (so that all tables now have in common their +objective relation to table). Now the claim that there can be an objective +relation between a name and its intension is wrong, and (the word) concept, +as commonly used now, can be discredited (see my book, Philosophy +Proper). If, however, it is enough for one that there be a subjective relation +between a name and its intension, namely the unhesitant decision as to the +way one wants to use the name, the unhesitant decisions to affirm the names +of some things but not others, then concept is valid language, and concept +art has a philosophically valid basis. + +Now what is artistic, aesthetic, about a work which is a body of +concepts? This question can best be answered by telling where concept art +came from; I developed it in an attempt to straighten out certain traditional +activities generally regarded as aesthetic. The first of these is structure art, +music, visual art, etc., in which the important thing is "structure." My +definitive discussion of structure art is in my unpublished essay Structure +Art and Pure Mathematics; here I will just summarize that discussion. Much +structure art is a vestige of the time when e.g. music was believed to be +knowledge, a science, which had important things to say in astronomy etc. +Contemporary structure artists, on the other hand, tend to claim the kind of +cognitive value for their art that conventional contemporary mathematicians + + +* The extension of the word 'table' is all existing tables; the intension of +'table' is all possible instances of a table. + + +125 + + +claim for mathematics. Modern examples of structure art are the fugue and +total serial music. These examples illustrate the important division of +structure art into two kinds according to how the structure is appreciated. In +the case of a fugue, one is aware of its structure in listening to it; one +imposes relationships, a categorization (hopefully that intended by the +composer)on the sounds while listening to them, that is, has an (associated) +artistic structure experience. In the case of total serial music, the structure is +such that this cannot be done; one just has to read an analysis of the +music, definition of the relationships. Now there are two things wrong with +structure art. First, its cognitive pretensions are utterly wrong. Secondly, by +trying to be music or whatever (which has nothing to do with knowledge), +and knowledge represented by structure, structure art both fails, is +completely boring, as music, and doesn't begin to explore the aesthetic +possibilities structure can have when freed from trying to be music or +whatever.The first step in straightening out e.g. structure music is to stop +calling it music, and start saying that the sound is used only to carry the +structure and that the real point is the structure--and then you will see how +limited, impoverished, the structure is. Incidentally, anyone who says that +works of structure music do occasionally have musical value just doesn't +know how good real music (the Goli Dance of the Baoule; Cans on Windows +by La Monte Young; the contemporary American hit song Sweets for My +Sweets, by the Drifters) can get. When you make the change, then since +structures are concepts, you have concept art. Incidentally, there is another, +less important kind of art which when straightened out becomes concept art: +art involving play with the concepts of the art such as, in music, the score, +performer-vs. listener, playing a work. The second criticism of structure art +applies, with the necessary changes, to this art. + +The second main antecedent of structure art is mathematics. This is the +result of my revolution in mathematics, presented in my 1966 Mathematical +Studies; here I will only summarize. The revolution occured first because for +reasons of taste I wanted to deemphasize discovery in mathematics, +mathematics as discovering theorems and proofs. I wasn't good at such +discovery, and it bored me. The first way I thought of to de-emphasize +discovery came not later than Summer, 1960; it was that since the value of +pure mathematics is now regarded as aesthetic rather than cognitive, why not +try to make up aesthetic theorems, without considering whether they are +true. The second way, which came at about the same time, was to find, as a +philosopher, that the conventional claim that theorems and proofs are +discovered is wrong, for the same reason I have already given that 'concept' +can be discredited. The third way, which came in the fall-winter of 1960, +was to work in unexplored regions of formalist mathematics. The resulting + + +126 + + +mathematics still had statements, theorems, proofs, but the latter weren't +discovered in the way they traditionally were. Now exploration of the wider +possibilities of mathematics as revolutionized by me tends to lead beyond +what it makes sense to call mathematics; the category of mathematics, a +vestige of Platonism, is an unnatural, bad one. My work in mathematics leads +to the new category of concept art, of which straightened out traditional +mathematics (mathematics as discovery) is an untypical, smal! but +intensively developed part. + +I can now return to the question of why concept art is art. Why isn't it an +absolutely new, or at least a non-artistic, non-aesthetic activity? The answer +is that the antecedents of concept art are commonly regarded as artistic, +aesthetic activities; on a deeper level, interesting concepts, concepts +enjoyable in themselves, especially as they occur in mathematics, are +commonly said to have beauty. By calling my activity art, therefore, I am +simply recognizing this common usage, and the origin of the activity in +structure art and mathematics. However: it is confusing to call things as +irrelevant as the emotional enjoyment of (rea!) music, and the intellectual +enjoyment of concepts, the same kind of enjoyment. Since concept art +includes almost everything ever said to be music, at least, which is not music +for the emotions, perhaps it would be better to restrict art to apply to art for +the emotions, and recognize my activity as an independent, new activity, +irrelevant to art (and knowledge). + + +Concept Art Version of Mathematics System 3/26/61 (6/19/61) + +An element is the adjacent area (with the figure in it) so long as the +apparent, perceived, ratio of the length of the vertical line to that of the +horizontal line (the element's associated ratio) does not change. + +A selection sequence is a sequence of elements of which the first is the one +having the greatest associated ratio, and each of the others has the associated +ratio next smaller than that of the preceding one. (To decrease the ratio, +come to see the vertical line as shorter, relative to the horizontal line, one +might try measuring the lines with a ruler to convince oneself that the +vertical one is not longer than the other, and then trying to see the lines as +equal in length; constructing similar figures with a variety of real (measured) +ratios and practicing judging these ratios; and so forth.) + +[Observe that the order of elements in a selection sequence may not be the +order in which one sees them. ] + + +127 + + +Implications--Concept Art Version of Colored Sheet Music No.1 3/14/61 +(10/11/61) + +[This is a mathematical system without general concepts of statement, +implication, axiom, and proof. Instead, you make the object, and stipulate +by ostension that it is an axiom, theorem, or whatever. My thesis is that +since there is no objective relation between name and intension, all +mathematics is this arbitrary. Originally, the successive statements, or sheets, +were to be played on an optical audiorecorder. I + +The axiom: a sheet of cheap, thin white typewriter paper + +The axiom implies statement 2: soak the axiom in inflammable liquid which +does not leave solid residue when burned; then burn it on horizontal +rectangular white fireproof surface--statement 2 is ashes (on surface) +Statement 2 implies s.3: make black and white photograph of s.2 in white +light (image of ashes' rectangle with respect to white surface (that is, of the +region (of surface, with the ashes on it) with bounding edges parallel to the +edges of the surface and intersecting the four points in the ashes nearest the +four edges of the surface) must exactly cover the film); develop film-- s. 3 is +the negative + +$.2 and s.3 imply s.4: melt s.3 and cool in mold to form plastic doubly +convex lens with small curvature; take color photograph of ashes' rectangle +in yellow light using this lens; develop film-- s. 4 is color negative + +$.2 and s.4 imply s.5: repeat last step with s.4 (instead of 3), using red +light-- s. 5 is second color negative + +S.2 and s.5 imply s.6: repeat last step with s.5, using blue light-- s. 6 is third +color negative + +$.2 and s.6 imply s.7: make lens from s.6 mixed with the ashes which have +been being photographed; make black and white photograph, in white fight, +of that part of the white surface where the ashes' rectangle was; develop film + + +128 + + +- s.7 is second black and white negative + +S.2, s.6, and s.7 imply the theorem: melt, mold, and cool lens used in last +step to form negative, and make lens from s.7; using negative and lens in an +enlarger, make two prints, an enlargement and a reduction--enlargement and +reduction together constitute the theorem. + + +Concept Art: Innpersegs (May - July 1961) + +A "halpoint" iff whatever is at any point in space, in the fading rainbow halo +which appears to surround a small bright light when one looks at it through +glasses fogged by having been breathed on, for as long as the point is in the + + +halo. +An "init'point" iff a halpoint in the initial vague outer ring of its halo. + + +An "inn'perseq" iff a sequence of sequences of halpoints such that all the +halpoints are on one (initial) radius of a halo; the members of the first +sequence are initpoints; for each of the other sequences, the first member (a +consequent) is got from the non-first members of the preceding sequence +{the antecedents) by being the inner endpoint of the radial segment in the +vague outer ring when they are on the segment, and the other members (if +any) are initpoints or first members of preceding sequences; all first members +of sequences other than the last [two] appear as non-first members, and +halpoints appear only once as non-first members; and the last sequence has +one member. + + +Indeterminacy + +A ftotaliy determinate innperseq' iff an innperseq: in which one is aware of +(specifies) all halpoints. + +An fantecedentally indeterminate innperseq' iff an innperseq in which one is +aware of (specifies) only each consequent and the radial seqment beyond it. +A 'thalpointally indeterminate innperseq' iff an innperseq'in which one is +aware of (specifies) only the radial segment in the vague outer ring, and its +inner endpoint, as it progresses inward. + +Innpersegs Diagram + +In the diagram, different positions of the vague outer ring at different times +are suggested by different shadings. The radia! segment in the vague outer +ring moves down the page. The figure is by no means an innperseq, but is +supposed to help explain the definition. + + +129 + + +Successive bands represent the vague outer ring at successive times as it fades in toward the small bright tight. + + +INNPERSEOQS DIAGRAM ; +Halpoints at + + +! time): ay a9 a3 aq a5 ag a7 b +4.49 + p +if time: a9 43 aq a5 ag a7 be + + +a3 — Se + + +SSS +Se + + +wa + + +SSS SS + + +TSO 3 +V3 + + +KS SS + + +time3: a4 @5agaz7 DC d + + +24,45 > d + + +WSS SSS +BWBABWVAAs +WIS SAR SRS SSS ORS SS OSS SS SS + + +A +Y + + +a +NY + + +timeg: ag a7 bede + + +ag,h ——>e + + +CR +=e +iy +be +i + + +PaaS + + +s760%, +é ue +mone + + +times: a7bc def + + +a7,€ oe f + + +timeg: cdefg + + +de—>g +SO ESOS Pee Oe +ROSES EE +SQ +SSE REARS ES Initpoint a9 a9 aq ae apa +SERA ic cama Nae "te Sat a +RENEURE SEAEELES +SSR RRA +ALENRAS QCaRBen +WRALECE ACRES +AAEALET RANECAN +TaN +SOR RSS Sei +WARERENTE aN lnnperseq +SOS eo +WR B (43,49, a] +WO aes +WS N AQ (c,a5,a4) +(d,b, ag) +(e, C, a7) +\\ (f, e, d) +x (g)- + + +small bright light + + +130 + + +13. Exhibit of a Working Model of a Perception-Dissociator + + +STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES + + +To construct a model of a machine a thousand years before the machine +itself is technologically feasible--to model a technological breakthrough a +thousand years before it occurs + + +(Analogies: constructing a model of an atomic power plant in ancient +Rome; chess-playing-machine hoaxes of 19th-century Europe as +models of computers; Soviet Cosmos Hall at Expo 67 as model +of anti-gravity machine) + +To construct the mode! almost entirely from the visitors coming to see it, so + +that each visitor regards the others as the model! + + +What the hypothetical perception-dissociator will do that is not +possible now: + + +Physically alter the world (relative to you): sound disappears; sights and +touches are dissociated; other people unconsciously signal you. +Physically, "psychoelectronically" induce conditioned reflexes in your +nervous system. Physically break ddwn your sense of time. + + +[INVITATION] + + +Because of your interest in technology and science, you are invited to visit +EXHIBIT OF AWORKING MODEL OFA +PERCEPTION-DISSOCIATOR +Sponsored by (legitimate sponsor) Open continuously from (date) +to {date) At (lunar colony or space station) + +"The perception-dissociator is a machine which is the product of a +technology far superior to that of humans. With it, a conscious organism can +drastically transform its psychophysical relation to objects and to other +conscious organisms... The exhibit spotlights the technical interest of the +perception-dissociator, giving the visitor a working model of the machine +which he can use to 'transform' himself." —from the Guidebook + + +it isn't possible for this exhibit to be open or public, because of the nature of +the model. You have been invited in the belief that you will be a cooperative +visitor. Come alone. Don't discuss the exhibit at all before you see it; and +don't discuss it afterwards except with other ex-visitors. Come prepared to + + +131 + + +spend several hours without a break. There will be absolutely no risk or +danger to you if you follow instructions. + + +TO THE DIRECTOR + + +Exhibit requires two adjacent rooms, on moon or other low-gravity +location, so that humans can easily jump over each other and fall without +being hurt. First room, the anteroom, has "normal" entrance door leading in +from "normal" human world. Is filled with chairs or school desks. At far +corner from normal door is two-step lock, built in anteroom, connecting +rooms. Normai door on hinges leads from anteroom into first step of lock. +Sliding panel door leads into second step; and smooth curtain with slit in +middle leads into the exhibit hali. Another sliding door leads from lock's +first step directly back out to normal human world, bypassing anteroom. +Shelf required in first lock to check watches and shoes. + +Exhibit hall large and empty with very high ceiling (Fuller dome? ). I +Room must be strongly lighted, so that objects in front of closed eyes will +cast highly visible shadows on eyelids. Room's inner surfaces must be +sound-absorbing, and moderate noise must be played into room to mask +accidental sounds; thus humans will cease to notice sound. Floor must be of +hard rubber or other material that will not splinter, and will not be too hard +to fall and crawl on. + +Exhibit open continuously for days. Invite people who will seriously +try to play along--preferably engineers; and invite many of them, because +is better to have many in exhibit. Sample invitation enclosed. Attendants +working in shifts must be at two posts throughout. Try to keep surprising +features of exhibit secret from those who have not been through it. + +Procedure. Visitor arrives and enters anteroom. Entrance attendant +gives him a Guidebook and sends him to sit down and start reading. Then +visitor goes to lock. Lock attendant must try hard to see that no more than + + +normal +Entrance + + +Anteroom + + +Exhibit Hal! + + +chairs or +chooldesks + + +: + + +Exit + + +@: attendant + + +132 + + +one visitor is in lock at a time. If lock is empty of visitors, attendant lets +entering visitor into first step, checks his watch and shoes, and sends him +alone into second step and on to exhibit room. When visitor comes out of +exhibit hall for any reason, he must be gotten into first step, and then +attendant sends him out the exit. When a visitor comes out, he just goes out +and doesn't go back in. + + +133 + + +EXHIBIT OF A WORKING MODEL OF A PERCEPTION—DISSOCIATOR +(CONCEIVED BY HENRY FLYNT) + + +GUIDEBOOK + + +READ THIS GUIDEBOOK AS DIRECTED-STRAIGHT THROUGH OR AS +OTHERWISE DIRECTED. DON'T LEAF AROUND. + + +READ PAGES 2-3 BEFORE YOU GO IN TO SEE THE EXHIBIT. + + +134 + + +Introduction. The perception-dissociator is a machine which is the +product of a technology far superior to that of humans. With it, a conscious +organism can drastically transform its psychophysical relation to objects and +to other conscious organisms. When the organism has transformed itself, +sound disappears, time is immeasurable; and the relation between seeing and +touching becomes a random one. That is, the organism never knows whether +it will be able to touch or fee! what it sees, and never knows whether it will +be able to see what it touches or what touches it. The world ceases to be a +collection of objects (relative to the physically altered organism). Further, +the machine induces a pattern of communication in the organism's nervous +system, an involuntary pattern of responses to certain events, to help the +organism cope with the invisible tactile phenomena. A dimension is added of +involuntarily relating to other organisms as unconscious signalling devices. +The transformation induced by the machine is permanent unless the +organism subsequently uses the machine to undo it. + + +The perception-dissociator is not conscious or alive in any human sense. +The components of the machine that the user is aware of are: (1) Optical +phenomena that are seen--"sights." (2) Solid or massive phenomena that are +felt cutaneously--"touches." If the user tries to touch a sight, he may not be +able to feel anything there. If he looks for a component that touches him, he +may not be able to see it. + + +(Keep reading) + + +135 + + +In other words, from the beginning the machine has properties that the +entire world comes to have to the transformed organism. + + +The exhibit spotlights the technical interest of the +perception-dissociator, giving the visitor a working model of the machine +which he can use to "transform" himself. Nothing is said about the purpose +of the perception-dissociator in the society that can make one. The model is +sophisticated enough that it can run independently of the visitor's will, and +can affect him. In fact, the visitor may be hurt if he doesn't follow the +instructions for using the machine. + + +When you have absorbed the above, go to the entrance and be admitted +to the exhibit. You must check your shoes, and your watch (if you have +one), with the attendant. As you enter, turn this page and begin reading Page +4. + + +136 + + +DO NOT TALK OR MAKE ANY OTHER UNCALLED-FOR NOISE. + + +Be prepared for the touch of pulling your feet out from under you +from behind. Don't resist; just fall forward, break your fali with your arms +(and retrieve this Guidebook). The floor is not hard and the gravity is weak, +so the fall should leave you absolutely unhurt. + + +AVOID ALL TOUCHES (EXCEPT FLOOR AND YOUSELF) UNLESS +DIRECTED OTHERWISE. (You have been directed not to resist having your +feet pulled out from under you.) INEFFECT, IF YOU BUMP INTOASOLID +OBJECT OR STEP ON ONE, DRAW BACK. REMEMBER THAT YOU +AVOID TOUCHES BY YOUR TACTILE SENSES ALONE. Whether your +eyes are open or closed makes no difference. It is not necessary to avoid +sights unless you touch something. + + +There may be the touch of being pushed forward at your shoulder +blades. Don't resist; just move forward. + + +As for the sights in this model, it happens that they will be humanoid. +All the human appearances other than you in the exhibit hall are sights from +the machine. This is just the way the model is; don't give it a thought. Sights +may appear or disappear (for example, at the curtain) while you are looking. + + +I am referring to the components of the model with the names of the +components of the perception-dissociator. + + +As soon as you understand the above and are prepared to remember +and follow the instructions, go immediately to Page 6. + + +137 + + +(81% {(sy0ua)I ) s It all uvk (d, + + +Ss +? ay u3/4e9s8 uk[syv<ds,A<I + + +ux Alt > (8, fS2kv) taydu + + +vas] Sid6> \solu +89183 $7] $3 +ca +*S;v \S> ne +§1V s Si\> tiiad I +S24 83 - fl s_ 3A ($482) +(ae, +S23 83 S<Vv 3 + + +u [s3<} ( {ual $V + + +S v<]S_v< +2 1 + + +u_{s,I +Soe ful u/s +ty toJus I Sus s 8) > 3 + + +138 + + +You will now begin the first phase of perception- dissociation by the +machine. Throughout this phase, you walk erect. + + +Instructions for operating the machine and for protecting yourself from +it will be given both in English and in an abbreviated symbolism. It is +important to master the symbolism, because later instructions car.'t be +expressed without it. + + +uemeans you + +S, $4, Sp, $3 mean different sights from the machine + +t, ty, tg, tg mean different touches from the machine + +aAmeans a's eyes are Open or a opens its eyes + +av means a's eyes are shut or a shuts its eyes + +a=b means a blows on b's hand + +aDb means a pushes b, typically from behind +{a holds Guidebook under arm or elsewhere) + +albImeans a jumps over b, crossing completely above b (weak gravity +should make this easy) + +a'b means a rapidly waves both hands in front of and near b's eyes so that +moving shadows are cast on b's eyes (a "shadows" b) + +a means a pulls b's ankles back and up and immediately lets them go, so +that b falls forward (a "tackles" b) + +afb means a jumps and falls on b, or a steps on b + +a.J means a rapidly moves aside + +{} parentheses around the symbol for an action mean the action will +probably happen + +A line of action symbols constitutes an instruction. The order of symbols + +indicates the order of events. !f one symbol is right above another, the + +actions are simultaneous. + + +YOU MAY ALWAYS TURN BACK TO THESE EXPLANATIONS !F +YOU FORGET THEM. + + +{Keep reading) + + +Instructions 1-3 apply WHEN YOUR EYES ARE OPEN. + + +1. If you see a sight close its eyes, a heavy touch from the machine +may be falling toward you. You must instantly jump aside. s4A S4V ud +uA (th) + + +YOU MUST FOLLOW THIS AND SUCCEEDING INSTRUCTIONS AS +LONG AS YOU STAY IN THE EXHIBIT. STAY WITH EACH +INSTRUCTION UNTIL YOU HAVE IT THOROUGHLY IN MEMORY; +AND CHECK OUT THE SYMBOLIC VERSION SO YOU LEARN TO +READ THE SYMBOLS. + + +2. tf a sight in front of you jumps over you, a touch may be about to +tackle you. You must instantly jump to one side. + + +uA Sia] ul +(t> + + +3. If a sight waves its hands in front of your open eyes, a touch may +be about to shove from behind. Jump to one side. + + +as (120) ut +IF THERE ARE ANY SIGHTS, TRY STANDING AROUND AND +FOLLOWING THESE INSTRUCTIONS FOR A SHORT WHILE. + + +4. if you close your eyes, you must keep them closed until a touch +tackles you, a touch shoves you, or you can't keep your mind on the exhibit +(which you should also consider to be an effect of the machine). Then you +immediately open your eyes. + + +cls {A horizontal line between +ag Clu eK laa symbols means "or." +With it, instr. can be combined. + + +y inattentive + + +THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU WHAT TO DO +WHEN YOUR EYES ARE CLOSED. LEARN THEM WELL. + + +5. !f you feel a breath blowing on one of your hands, a touch may be +falling on you. You must instantly jump to the side away from the breath. + + +UV (efi) u (Tern page and convinue) + + +6. If your closed eyes are shadowed, a touch may be about to tackle +you. You must instantly jump aside. + + +Saco : +Uv + ul +(¢ a>) + + +7. If you sense a massive touch going above your head, another touch +may be about to shove you from behind. Jump aside. + + +orm +C, fui + + +Ae ee u-4 +UY (€,4u) + + +8. If you have any time left over from following other instructions, +close your eyes and go around with your hands in front of you, shoving +touches whenever you fee! them. + + +uy ud + + +NOW TRY INSTR. 8, REMEMBERING AND FOLLOWING THE +OTHER INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT CLOSED EYES (INSTR. 4-7). WHEN +YOU HAVE TO OPEN YOUR EYES AGAIN, AS PER INSTR. 4, CHECK +ANYTHING YOU FORGOT: AND THEN GO TO THE SUCCEEDING +INSTRUCTIONS. NOW-CLOSE YOUR EYES. + +THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY WHEN YOUR EYES +ARE OPEN. + + +9. If you see a sight falling toward or about to step on another sight +whose eyes are open, run until you face the sight on the ground and close +your eyes. BEFORE YOU FOLLOW THIS INSTRUCTION YOU MUST +HAVE MASTERED THE PRECEEDING INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT +CLOSED EYES. + + +/ +/ + + +f +uy S24 (si /Sz) UY + + +(Keep going) + + +141 + + +10. If you see a sight about to tackle another whose eyes are open, run +until you face the sight about to be tackled and jump over both sights. If the +sight about to be tackled has closed eyes, you must immediately shadow + + +them. +S2/ (s, \e>) u SS +S2V (s.(S) uP Sz + + +11. If you see a sight about to push another with open eyes from +behind, you must shadow the sight about to be pushed. But if the sight +about to be pushed has closed eyes, you must immediately jump over both +sights. + + +UA + + +A s,a ($12) U oe S2 +S2V¥0 (6,252) u [s, S21 + + +You must now put ali the instructions into practice until you have +learned them thoroughly by doing as they say. In other words, carry out +Instr. 8, and the other instructions as they apply. + + +If you can't practice the instructions because you still have not seen a +sight or felt a touch, skip directly to Page 18. + + +Learning the instructions in practice should take a good while. When + + +you have mastered them, the first phase is over. Turn to Page 10 and begin +the second phase. + + +142 + + +You are now in the second phase of transforming yourself with the +perception-dissociator. Throughout this phase, you must stoop or crouch +somewhat. That is, you must keep yourself below the height of your neck +when you stand straight-- except when you jump over a sight. The symbol is +uz u rad means that you crouch and close your eyes. Now crouch. + + +The numbered instructions for this phase are so similar to those in the +preceeding phase that they will be given in symbols only. Changes are noted +parenthetically. You may turn back if you forget symbols. + + +4. SA SV 4] 2. oa Tal. ud +uZA (E(u) 2 4% (ec) + + +t=Hu 'Chan @e. component Blows on you) +Z, us A (t,Ju) ul \ cee of shadowing you. + + +Jee. +4. u2dv CIty yn +uv mabtentive + + +Seo Uu +3 t.=4 yl 6 2 V u +5. ou 4" (Cy fu 4S (¢ &) +7, uy py. "AE a 4° Be +(€271u) + + +The big change comes next. + + +(Keep going) + + +143 + + +9 u3r SA (Sie) uv and abo + + +uar S2V (s,/S2) Us S2 +4 + + +That is, if you see a sight falling or stepping on another sight with closed +eyes, you must immediately blow on the sight on the ground. This is an + + +addition. +40. +* S.Vv (S: >) u eax Oz +44 > +a, S24 (2.152) us Se + + +3. +* sv ($48) ule +(Change: you blow on Sz) + + +So far there have been only three changes in the instructions. Memorize +them. Then go on to Instr. 12, which is new, and carry it out along with the +other eleven instructions. + + +AS SOON AS YOU HAVE PUT ANY CHANGED INSTRUCTION (3, +9, OR 11) INTO PRACTICE, THE SECOND PHASE IS OVER. TURN TO +PAGE 12 AND THE THIRD PHASE. + + +If you can't practice the instructions because all the components have +vanished, skip to Page 18. + + +12. Adding to Instruction 8, if you have time left over from following +other instructions, you may also keep your eyes open and jump over, blow +on, or shadow sights. + + +u fs] + + +usa 4Uros +ux9 + + +Throughout the third phase, you must squat or move on your hands +and knees. That is, you must always keep yourself below the height of your +waist when you stand straight--unless you are able to jump over a sight from +your low position. The symbol is ut. Now get down. + +Instr. 1-7 from the last phase apply here without change. They are thus + + +stated in the most abbreviated form. + + +Sv 7 +" Ct) TE ae +Uu 4" S rol ul . I ul uy A +(clip : us 4 inattentive +t,= u C,=u +(t;u) (t, fa) +Seo W ut =f +ee) +Jot 'u +(tga u) + + +The biggest change comes next. + +8. If you have any time left over, close your eyes and go around with +your hands in front of you. If you encounter touches standing higher than +you, tackle them. If you encounter touches as near the ground as you, shove +them. You must be sensitive and judge heights with eyes closed. + + +phy LoD +2 Cao UIT + + +C> MEANS ** (FE STANDS HIGH RELATIVE TO You +tc MEANS jFE IGNEAR GROUND RELATIVE TO You + + +9 No change. +Ga S2N (5,2) uv +- -$2V (S12) uz % + + +10. The previous Instr. 10 applies if sy is near the ground, that is, it +applies unless sz is too high for you to jump or shadow it. + + +SAS (s, 3) ulS,5;] +rag Cs are +(Keep going) + + +145 + + +44. uta S2a ( S, 1s.) U= S2 +The second half of the previous Instr. 11 is dropped. + + +Except for the instruction to tackle touches, the changes are simply +limitations to make the instructions feasible for u > They should be easy +to remember. + + +You will next go on to Instr. 12, and carry it out along with the other +instructions. As soon as you encounter an actual! situation where you cannot +act because u+., the third phase will be over. AT THAT POINT YOU +MUST TURN TO PAGE 14 AND THE FOURTH PHASE. + + +If you can't carry out the instructions because all the components have +vanished, the third phase is over. Turn to Page 14 and the fourth phase. + + +12. Adding to Instr. 8, if you have time left over, you may also keep +your eyes open and blow on sights. You may also shadow or jump over +sights unless they are too high. + + +You are in the tourth phase of perception-dissociation. Throughout this +phase, you must crawl on your stomach (keep below knee height). The +symbol is u +.. Now get on the floor. + +You can no longer be tackled, nor can you jump. Thus, the numbered +instructions are greatly limited, and they will be restated fully. + +THE FIRST TWO INSTRUCTIONS APPLY WHEN YOUR EYES ARE + + +OPEN. +1. If you see a sight close its eyes, a touch may be falling or stepping +on you, and you must immediately scramble aside. + + +SA SV mal +ugar (Tia) + + +THE NEXT THREE INSTRUCTIONS TELL YOU WHAT TO DO +WHEN YOUR EYES ARE CLOSED. +3. When to reopen your eyes. + + +j Cou +udu ene UA +4+ u mMattentlive + + +4. if your closed eyes are shadowed, a touch may be falling or +stepping on you. Scramble aside. + + +e. 4 Aa 'a' Al sf +UZ V (tru) +6. PM +7 Av. E> ui b> +4 cs ute + + +TRY INSTR. 6, REMEMBERING AND FOLLOWING INSTR. 3-5. +WHEN YOU HAVE TO REOPEN YOUR EYES AS PER INSTR. 3, CHECK +ON ANYTHING YOU FORGOT. THEN GO TO PAGE 15. NOW--CLOSE +YOUR EYES. + + +The rest of the instructions apply when your eyes are open. + + +ya —224 (6152) uv' +4 $2VvE (1/2) Ur Sz + + +\f $9's eyes are closed, you must shadow them unless they are too high. + + +& y AA Sag (S13s2) us S, + + +You blow on $9'S hand unless it is too high. + + +9. Adding to Instr. 6, if you have time left over from following +instructions, you may also shadow or blow on sights if they aren't too high. + + +U a A sc Uso S +u =S +You must now put these nine instructions into practice unti] you have + + +learned them thoroughly in practice; and even continue after that until you +have difficulty keeping your mind on the exhibit. + + +IF YOU CAN'T PRACTICE THE INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE ALL +THE COMPONENTS HAVE VANISHED, SKIP TO PAGE 18. + + +Otherwise, stay with this phase until you have difficulty keeping your +mind on it. Then turn to Page 16 and the final phase of +perception-dissociation. + + +You are now in the final phase of transforming yourself with the +perception-dissociator. When you finish transforming yourself, you will have +lost track of time, and will have ceased to notice sound. You will be dealing +with sights and touches as unrelated phenomena; and you will be responding +by reflex action to unconscious signals from "other people." + +For this last phase, you will turn to Page 5. You will go through the +symbols there in any order you like as if they were one long instruction, +carrying out that instruction. You are to "use" each symbol once. There +have been enough precedents in the interpretation of the symbols that you +should now be able to interpret any combination of them. Continue to +follow the previous numbered instructions as they apply, depending on +whether you are 1, 3/4, 1/2, or 1/4. (But forget the instructions for time left +over; you won't have any extra time.) REMEMBER THE INSTRUCTIONS +ABOUT WHEN TO REOPEN YOUR EYES IF YOU CLOSE THEM. + + +When you are through, you will be transformed. NOW TURN TO +PAGE 5 AND BEGIN. + + +149 + + +If you have found these words and are reading them in desperation +because you are completely confused; or because you have lost interest in +the exhibit; or because you have finished; then you are transformed. + + +If you want to use the model to simulate the reversal of your +transformation before you leave the exhibit, do the following. Spend 50 +seconds erect, with open eyes, walking up to sights and pushing +them--assuming that you will find touches where you see sights. Count the +seconds "one-thousand-and-one," "one-thousand-and-two," etc. + + +Then you will close your eyes. If you are blown on or pushed before +250 seconds have passed, you will open your eyes and--assuming that you +will find a sight where you were touched--you wil! shadow it. Otherwise you +will open your eyes when the 250 seconds have passed. Now close your eyes +and do as instructed. + + +It is now suggested that you leave the exhibit. Go out through the +curtain. + + +150 + + +Stay in the exhibit and follow every instruction that is relevant, unti! +you become thirsty. + + +if you begin to encounter components, return to the page you were on +before you turned to this one. + + +lf you still don't encounter components, the mode! must be broken. +Leave the exhibit by the same passage through which you entered. + + +151 + + +2/22/1963 + + +Henry Flynt and Tony Conrad demonstrate against the Metropolitan Museum of Art, +February 22, 1963 + + +(foto by Jack Smith} + + +152 + + +14. Mock Risk Games + + +Suppose you stand in front of a swinging door with a nail sticking out of it +pointing at your face; and suppose you are prepared to jump back if the +door suddenly opens in your face. You are deliberately taking a risk on the +assumption that you can protect yourself. Let us call such a situation a "risk +game." Then a mock risk game is a risk game such that the misfortune which +you risk is contrary to the course of nature, a freak misfortune; and thus +your preparation to evade it is correspondingly superficial. + +If the direction of gravity reverses and you fall on the ceiling, that is a +freak misfortune. If you don't want to risk this misfortune, then you will +anchor yourself to the floor in some way. But if you stand free so that you +can fall, and yet try to prepare so that if you do fall, you will fall in such a +way that you won't be hurt, then that is a mock risk game. if technicians +could actually effect or simulate gravity reversal in the room, then the risk +game would be a real one. But I am not concerned with real risk games. I am +interested in dealing with gravity reversal in an everyday environment, where +everything tells you it can't possibly happen. Your 'preparation' for the fall +is thus superficial, because you still have the involuntary conviction that it +can't possibly happen. + +Mock risk games constitute a new area of human behavior, because they +aren't something people have done before, you don't know what they will be +like until you try them, and it took a very special effort to devise them. +They have a tremendous advantage over other activities of comparable +significance, because they can be produced in the privacy of your own room +without special equipment. Let us explore this new psychological effect; and +let us not ask what use it has until we are more familiar with it. + +Instructions for a variety of mock risk games follow. (I have played +each game many times in developing it, to ensure that the experience of +playing it will be compelling.) For each game, there is a physical action to be +performed in a physical setting. Then there is a list of freak misfortunes +which you risk by performing the action, and which you must be prepared +to evade. The point is not to hallucinate the misfortunes, or even to fear +them, but rather to be prepared to evade them. First you work with each +misfortune separately. For example, you walk across a room, prepared to +react self-protectingly if you are suddenly upside down, resting on the top of + + +153 + + +your head on the floor. In preparing for this risk, you should clear the path +of objects that might hurt you if you fell on them; you should wear clothes +suitable for falling; and you should try standing on your head, taking your +hands off the floor and falling, to get a feeling for how to fail without +getting hurt. After you have mastered the preparation for each misfortune +separately, you perform the action prepared to evade the first misfortune +and the second (but not both at once). You must prepare to determine +instantly which of the two misfortunes befalls you, and to react +appropriately. After you have mastered pairs of misfortunes, you go on to +triples of misfortunes, and so forth. + +The principal games are for a large room with no animals or distracting +sounds present. + +A. Walk across the lighted room from one corner to the diagonally +opposite one, breathing normally, with your eyes open. + +1. You are suddenly upside down, resting on the top of your head on the +floor. You must get down without breaking your neck. + +2. Although the floor looks unbroken and solid, beyond a certain point +nothing is there. !f you step onto that area, you will take a fatal fall. Thus, as +you walk, you must not shift your weight to your forward foot until you are +sure it will hold. Put the ball of the forward foot down before the heel. + +3. Something happens to the cohesive forces in your neck so that if your +head tips in any direction, it will come right off your body, killing you +immediately. Otherwise everything remains normal. Thus, as you walk, you +must "balance" your head on your neck. When you reach the other side of +the room, your neck will be restored to normal. (Prepare beforehand by +walking with a book balanced on your head.) + +4. Invisible conical weights fall around you with their points down, each +whistling as it falls. You must evade them by ear in order not to be stabbed. +Walk softly and fast. + +5. The room is suddenly filled with water. You have to contro! your lungs +and swim to the top. Wear clothes suitable for swimming. + +A. Play game A while on a long walk on an uncrowded street. The floor +is replaced by the sidewalk. The fifth misfortune becomes for space suddenly +to be filled with water to a height of fifteen feet above the street. + +B. Lie on your back on a pallet in the dimly lit room, hands at your + +sides, with a pillow on your face so that it is slightly difficult to breathe, for +thirty seconds at a time. +1. The pillow suddenly hardens and becomes hundreds of pounds heavier. !t +remains suspended on your face for a split second and then "falls," bears +down with full weight. You must jerk your head out from under it in that +split second. + + +154 + + +2. The pillow adheres to your skin with a force greater than your skin's +cohesion, and begins to rise. You must rise with it in such a way that your +skin is not torn. + +C. Lie on your back on the pallet in the dimly lit room. + +1. Gravity suddenly disappears completely, so that nothing is held down by +it; and the ceiling becomes red-hot. You must avoid drifting up against the +ceiling. + +2. The surface you are lying on becomes a vast lighted open plane. From the +distance, giant steel spheres come rolling in your direction. You must evade +them. + +3. Your body is split in half just above the waist by an indefinitely long, +rather high, foot-thick wall. Your legs and lower torso are on one side, and +your upper torso, arms, and head are on the other side. Matter normally +exchanged between the two halves of your body continues to be exchanged +through the. wall by telekinesis. It is as if you are a foot longer above the +waist. In order to reunite your body, you must first roll over and get up, +bent way forward. There are depressions in the wall on the same side as your +feet. You have to climb the wall, putting your feet in the depressions and +balancing yourself. You will be reunited when you reach the top and your +waist passes above the wall. + +D. Sit in a plain, small, straight chair, on the edge of the seat, hands +hanging at the sides of the seat, feet together in front of the chair, in the +lighted room, for about thirty seconds at a time. + +1. The chair is suddenly out from under you and sitting on you with Its legs +straddling your lap and legs. You have to get your weight over your feet so +you won't take a hard fall. + +2. The direction of gravity reverses and the chair remains anchored to the +floor. You have to grab the seat and hold on in order not to fall on the +ceiling. + +3. You are suddenly in a contra-terrene universe, in which the atmosphere is +unbreathable and prolonged contact with either the atmosphere or the +ground will disintegrate you. The seat and back of the chair become a +penetrable hyperspatial sheet between the alien universe and your own. As +soon as you feel the alien atmosphere, you must jerk your feet off the +ground and deliberately sink or p!unge through the seat and back of the chair +in the best way that you can. You will end up on the floor under the chair in +your universe. + +4. You are suddenly in dark empty space in a three-dimensional lattice of +gleaming wires. Segments of the lattice alternately burst into flame and cool +off. You adhere to the chair as if it were part of you. With your hands +holding onto the seat, you can move yourself and the chair forward by + + +155 + + +from blundering into a radiation beam, you have to communicate +pre-verbally to the other mind by every means from vocal cries to +pantomine, and get your-body/his-mind out of range of the radiation. When +the body is out, you will both be restored to normal. (The first thing to +anticipate is the basic shift in viewpoint by which you will be looking at +your own body from the other's position. There is no point in tensing your +muscles in preparatiton for the misfortune, because if it occurs, you will be +working with a strange set of muscles anyway. The next thing to prepare to +do is to spot the radiation beams; and then to yell, gesture, or +whatever--anything to get the "other" to avoid the radiation. Note finally +that neither player prepares for the possibility that he will be surrounded by +radiation. Each player prepares for the same role in an asymmetrical pas de +deux.) + +Asymmetry: The two of you play a given duo game, but each prepares +to evade a different misfortune. + +AB. Stay awake with eyes closed for an agreed upon time between one +and fifteen minutes. Use a timer with an alarm. + +1. Each suddenly has the other's entire present consciousness in addition to +his own, from perceptions to memories, ideologies, ambitions, and +everything else--threatening both with psychological shock. + +The couple must take up positions such that their sensory perceptions + +are as nearly identical as possible. Beforehand, each must discuss with the +other the aspects of the other's attitude to the world which each must fears +having impused on his consciousness. During the game, each must think +about these aspects and try to prepare for them. +2. Each suddenly relives the other's most intense past feelings of depression +and suicidal impulses. In other words, if five years ago the other attempted +suicide because he failed out of college, you suddenly have the consciousness +that "you" have just failed out of college, are totally worthless, and should +destroy yourself. Presumably the other has since learned to live with his past +disasters, but you do not have the defenses he has built up. You are +overwhelmed with a despair which the other felt in the past, and which is +incongruous with the rest of your consciousness. In summary, both of you +risk shock and suicidal impulses. Beforehand, of course, each must tell the +other of his worst past suicidal or depressed episode; and discuss anything +else that may minimize the risk of shock. + + +158 + + +Intrusions in Duo Games + +As before, distractions and modulations can be openly studied by +consent of the players. As for bogies, it is possible in duo games for one +player to create a bogy without warning, in effect acting as a saboteur. As +soon as a game is sabotaged, though, confidence is lost, and each player just +watches out for the other's bogies. Here are some sample intrusions. + + +DISTRACTION BOGY MODULATION + + +shout in other's each +face take +2, talk and Jaugh stamp hard 2a +get out of step Ly different + + +} + + +ALB cough gasp + + +talk and laugh silently pass palm back I +& forth in front of +other's face + + +15. The Dream Reality + + +A. Memo on the Dream Project + + +Original aim: To recreate the effect of e.g. Pran Nath's singing--transcendent +inner escape--in direct life rather than art. I needed material which could +function as an alien civilization (since the source of Pran Nath's expression is +an alien civilization relative to me); yet which was encultured in me and not +an affectation or pretense. I decided to use dreams as the material, assuming +that my dreams would take me to alien worlds. But mostly they did not. +Mostly my dreams consist of long periods of tawdry, familiar life interrupted +occasionally by senseless, unmotivated anomalies. In contrast, my original +aim required alluring, psychically gratifying material. + + +The emphasis shifted to redefining reality so that dreams were on the same +level as waking life; so that they were apprehended as what they seem to be: +literal reality {and not memory, precognition, or symbolism). The project +was still arcane, but in a drastically different way. I was getting into an +alternate reality which was extremely bizarre but not psychically gratifying. +It was boringly frightful and sometimes obscene. I became concerned with +analytical study of the natural order of the dream world, a para-scientific +investigation. As I grappled with the rational arguments against treating +dreams as literal reality, the project became a difficult analytical exercise in +the philosophy of science. The original sensuous-esthetic purpose was lost. + + +Now I would like to return to the original aim, but how to do it? Obtain +other people's dreams--see if they are more suitable? Work only with my +very rare dreams which do take me to alien worlds? Try to alter the content +of my raw dreams? Attempt to affect content of dreams by experiment in +which many people sleep in same room and try to communicate in their +sleep? The most uncertain approach to a solution: set up a transformation +on my banal dreams, so that to the first-order activity of raw dreaming is +added a second-order activity. The transformation procedure to somehow +combine conscious ideational direction--coding of the banal dreams--with +alteration of my experience, my esthesia, my lived experience. + + +160 + + +B. Dreams and Reality--An Experimental Essay + + +Excerpts from my dream diary which are referred-to in the essay that +follows. +12/11/1973 + +I notice a state between waking and dreaming: a waking dream. I have +been asleep; I wake up; I close my eyes to sleep again. While not yet asleep, I +experience isolated objects before me as in a dream, but with no +background, only a dark void. !n this case, there are two pocket combs, both +with teeth broken. In the waking world, I threw away one of my two pocket +combs because I broke it; the other comb is still in good condition. + + +12/30/1973 + +I am chased by the police for one block west on West Market Street in +Greensboro. I reach the intersection with Eugene Street, and in the north +direction there is a steep hill rather than the street. The surface of the hill is +bare ground and grass. I run up the hill, sensing that if ! can get over the hill +I will find Friendly Road and the general neighborhood of my mother's +houses on the other side. The police start shooting. If I can get a few yards +farther on the top of the hill I will be past the line of fire. I take a headlong +dive and awaken in the middle of the dive to find myself diving forward on +my mattress in the front room of my apartment. The action is carried on +continuously through waking up and through the associated change of +setting. + + +1/12/1974 + +Just before ! go to sleep for the night, I am lying in bed drowsy. I think +of being, and suddenly am, at the south edge of the Courant Institute plaza, +which is several feet above the sidewalk. The edge of the plaza and the drop +are all I see. It is night; and there is only a void where the peripheral +environment should be. (Comment: It is of great theoretical importance that +while most of the internal reality cues were present in this experience, some, +like the peripheral environment, were not. In my dream experiences, all +reality cues are present.) The drop expands to twenty or thirty feet, and I +start to fall off. Fright jolts me completely awake. I have had something like +a waking nightmare and have awakened from being awake. I thought of the +scene, was suddenly in it (except for peripheral reality cues), lost control and +became endangered by it, and then snapped back to my bedroom. + + +1/1-/1974 +One or two nights after 1/12/74 I was lying in bed just before going to + + +161 + + +sleep. I could see women standing on a sidewalk. The scene was real, but I +was not in it; I was a disembodied spectator. Also, the peripheral +environment was absent. The reality was between that of a waking +visualization and that of the Courant Institute incident of 1/12/74. +Comment: The differences between this experience and a _ waking +visualization are that the latter is less vivid than seeing and is accompanied +by waking reality cues such as cues of bodily location. + + +1/16/1974 + +1. I am in an apartment vaguely like the first place in which I lived, at +1025 Madison Avenue in Greensboro. I am a spy. I am teen-aged and short; +and I am in the apartment with several enemy men, who are middle-aged and +adult-sized. My code sheets look like the sheets of Yiddish I have been +copying out in waking life. Eventually the men discover me in the front +room with the code sheets on a fold-up desk. They chase me out the front +door and onto the west side of the lawn, and shoot me with a needle gun. At +that moment my consciousness jumps from my body and becomes that of a +disembodied spectator watching from an eastward location, as if I were +watching a film. + +2. I am living in a dormitory in a rural setting with other males. At one +point I walking barefoot in weeds outside the dormitory, and Supt. Toro +tells me I am walking in poison ivy. My feet begin to show the rash, but I +recognize that I am in a dream and think that the rash will not carry over to +the waking state. I then begin to will away the rash in the dream, and I +succeed, + + +1/20/1974 + +For some reason the dream associates Simone Forti with flute-like +music. It is shortly before midnight. In the dream I believe that Simone lives +in a loft on the east side of Wooster Street. The blocks in SOHO are very +small. If I walk through the streets and whistle, she will hear me. I start to +whistle but can only whistle a single high note. I half awaken but continue +whistling, or trying to; the dream action continues into waking. But I cannot +change pitch or whistle clearly because my mouth is taped. As I realize this, I +awaken fully. +Comments: I tape my mouth at night so I will sleep with my mouth closed. I +experimented at trying to whistle with the tape on while fully awake. The +breath just hisses against the tape. The pitch of the hiss can be varied. + + +2/1/1974 + +1. I try to assist a man in counterfeiting ten dollar bills by taking half +of a ten, scotch taping it to half of a one, and then coloring over the one +until it looks like the other half of the ten. The method fails because I bring +old crumpled tens rather than new tens, and the one doilar bills are new. + + +Comments: There are no natural anomalies in this dream at ali. What is +anomalous is that this counterfeiting method seems perfectly sensible, and I +only begin to question it when we try to fit the crumpled half-bill to the +crisp half-bill. Why am I so foolish in this dream? I retain my identity as +Henry Flynt, and yet my outlook, my sense of what is rational, is so +different that it is that of a different person. More generally, the person I am +in my dreams is much more limited in certain ways that I am in waking life. +My waking preoccupations are totally absent from my dreams. Instead there +is bland material about my early life which could apply to any child or +teen-ager. Thus, I must warn readers who know me only from this diary not +to try to make the image of me here fit my waking life. + + +2/3/1974 + +3. I have had several dreams that I am taking the last courses of my +student career. (In waking life I have completed all course work.) I am +usually failing them. Tonight I dream that I have gone all semester without +studying (in a course in English? ). Now I am in the final exam and sinking. I +will have to repeat these courses. Subsequently, I am sitting in a school +office (of a professor or psychologist? ), giving him a long list (of words, a +foreign vocabulary? ). {I mention this episode because I remember that while +I retained my nominal identity as Henry Flynt, I had the mind of a different +person. I experienced another person's existence instead of mine. Professor +Nell also appeared somewhere in this dream; as he has in several school +dreams I have had recently. + + +2/3/1974 (This is the date I recorded, but it seems that it would have to be +later.) + +} get up in the morning and decide to have a self-indulgent breakfast +because of the unpleasantness of working on my income tax the day before. +So I put two slices of pizza in the oven, and also eat two bakery sweets, +possibly éclairs. Then I think that a Mexican TV dinner would have been +better all around, but it is too late; I have to eat what I am already preparing. +Subsequently, I go with John Alten to a Shoreham Cafeteria at Houston and +Mercer Streets. The cafeteria chain is a good one, but this cafeteria is dark +and extremely dingy upstairs where the serving line is. John coinplains that +there is no ventilation and that he is suffocating, and he stalks out. + + +163 + + +Comment: When I awoke, my first thought was that the pizza in the oven +would be burning. {I assumed that I had arisen, put the pizza in the oven, +and gone back to sleep.) But then I realized that the breakfast was a dream. I +got up and prepared the Mexican dinner which I had decided was best in the +dream, but I also ate one éclair. + + +7/8/1974 + +I am caught out in a theft of money, and I feel that the rest of my life +will be ruined. Comments: The quality of the episode depended on my +strong belief in the reality of the social future and in my ability to form +accurate expectations about it. When I awakened, the whole misadventure +vanished. + + +End of excerpts from my dream diary. / + + +".. It is correct to say that the objective world is a synthesis of private views +or perceptions... But ... inasmuch as it is the common objective world that +renders ... general knowledge possible, it will be this world that the scientist +will identify with the world of reality. Henceforth the private views, though +just as real, will be treated as its perspectives. ... the common objective +world, whether such a thing exists or is a mere convenient fiction, is +indispensable to science ... ." + +A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought (New York, Dover, 1950), +pp. 176-7 + + +A. We wish to postulate that dreams are exactly what they seem to be +while we are dreaming, namely, literal reality. Naively, we want to get closer +to literal empiricism than natural science is. But science has worked out a +very comfortable world-view on the assumption that both dreams and +semi-conscious quasi-dreams are mere subjective phenomena of individual +consciousness. If we wish to carry through the postulate that dreams are +literal reality, then we will have to adopt a cognitive model quite different +from that of natural science. It is of crucial importance that we are not +interested in superstition. We do not wish to adopt a cognitive model which +would simply be defeated in competition with science. We wish to be at least +as rationa!, as empirical, and as cognitively parsimonious as science is. We +want our cognitive model to be compelling, and not to be a plaything which +is easily taken up and easily discarded. + +The question is whether there can be a rational empiricism which +differs from science in placing dreamed episodes on the same level as waking + + +164 + + +episodes, but which stops short of the "nihilistic empiricism' of my +philosophical essay entitled "The Flaws Underlying Beliefs." (In effect, the +latter essay rejects other minds, causality, persistent objective entities, past +time, the possibility of objective categories and significant language, and so +forth, ending up with ungraded immediate experience.) + +As an example of our problem, the waking scientific outlook assumes +that a typewriter continues to exist even when we turn our backs on it +(persistence of objective entities). In many of our dreams we make the same +sort of assumption. In other words, in some of our dreams the natural order +is not noticeably different from that of the waking world; and in many +dreams our conscious world-view has much in common with waking +common sense or scientific pragmatism. On 2/3/1974 I had a dream in which +a typewriter was featured. I certainly assumed that the typewriter continued +to exist when my back was turned to it. On 7/8/1974 I dreamed that ! was +caught out in a theft of money, and I felt my life would be ruined because of +it. I certainly assumed the reality of the social future, and my ability to form +accurate expectations about it. These examples illustrate that we are not +nihilistic empiricists in our dreams. The question is whether acceptance of +the pragmatic outlook which we have in dreams is consistent with not +regarding the dream-world as a subjective phenomenon of individual +consciousness. Can we accept dreams as "literal reality"; or must we reject +the very concept of "reality" on order to defend the placing of the dream +world on the same level as the waking world? + +In summary, the question is whether we can place dreams on the same +fevel as the waking world while stopping short of nihilistic empiricism. A +further difficulty in accomplishing this aim is that neurological science might +succeed in gaining complete experimental control of dreams. Scientists might +become able to produce dreams at will and to monitor them. The whole +phenomenon of dreaming would then tend to be totally assimilated to the +outlook of scientists. Their decision to treat dreams as subjective phenomena +of individual consciousness would be greatly supported by these +developments. Would we have to go all the way to nihilistic empiricism in +order to have a basis for rejecting the neurologists' accomplishments? + +Still another difficulty is presented for us by semi-conscious +quasi-dreams such as the ones described in my diary. Semi-conscious +quasi-dreams exhibit some reality cues, but lack other important internal +reality cues. Science handles these experiences easily, by dismissing them +along with dreams as subjective phenomena of individual consciousness. +Suppose we accept that the semi-conscious quasi-dreams are illusory reality. +But tf they can be illusory reality, how can we exclude the possibility that +dreams might be aiso? !f, on the other hand, we accept the quasi-dreams as + + +165 + + +literal reality, what about the missing reality cues? Can we justify different +treatment for dreams and quasi-dreams by saying that all reality cues have to +be present before an experience is accepted as non-illusory? If we propose +to do so, the question then becomes whether we should accept the weight +which common sense places on reality cues. + + +Why do we wish to stop short of nihilistic empiricism? Because we do +wish to assert that dreams can be remembered; that they can be described in +permanent records; that they can be compared and studied rationally. We do +wa..t to cite the past as evidence; we do want to distinguish between actual +dream experience and waking fabrications, waking lies about what we have +dreamed; and we do want to describe what we experience in intersubjective +language. " + +As easy way out which would offend nobody would be to treat dreams +as simulations of alternate universes. But this approach is a cowardly evasion +for several reasons. It excludes the phenomenon of the semi-conscious +quasi-dream, which poses the problem of internal reality cues in the sharpest +way. Further, we cannot give up the notion that our project is nearer to +literal empiricism than natural science is. We cannot accept the notion that +we must dismiss some of our experiences as mere illusions, but not all of +them. We do not see dreams as simulations of anything. Some of the most +interesting observations I have made about connections between adjacent +dreamed and waking episodes in my own experience are noticeable only +because I take both dreamed and waking experience literally. + + +B. Before we continue our attempt to resolve our methodological +problem, we will provide more detail on topics which we have mentioned in +passing. We begin with the purported empiricism of natural science. The +philosopher Hume postulated that experience was the only raw material of +reality or cognition. However, he did not content himself with ungraded +experience. He insisted on draping the experiential raw material on an +intellectual framework in such a way that experience was used to simulate +the inherited conception of. reality, a conception which we will call +Aristotelian realism. Similarly for the purported empiricism of natural +science. In fact, the working scientist learns to think of the framework or +model as primary, and of experiences and verification procedures as ancillary +to it. The quotation by d'Abro which heads this essay concedes as much. + +What we are investigating is whether experiences can be draped on a +different intellectual framework in which dreamed and waking life come out +as equally real. Some examples of alternate verification conventions follow. +1. Accept intersubjective confirmation of my experience of the dream world +which occurs within the dream as confirmation of the reality of the dream + + +166 + + +world. + +2. Accept intersubjective confirmation of the past of the dream world which +occurs in the dream itself as confirmation of the reality of the dreamed past. +3. Recognize that there is no infallible way to tell whether other people are +lying about their dreamed expefience or their waking experience. + +4. Develop sophisticated interrogation techniques as a limited test of +whether people are telling the truth about their dreams. + + +5. Accept that a certain category of anomalies occurs in dreams only when +several people have reported experiences in that category. + +The principal characteristic of the approach which these conventions +represent is that each dream is treated as a separate world. There is no +attempt to arrive at an account, for a given "objective" time period, which is +consistent with more than one dream or with both dreamed and waking +periods. Thus, many parallel worlds could be confirmed as real. As our +discussion proceeds, we will move away from this approach, probably out of +a sense that it is pointless to maintain a strong notion of reality and yet to +forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. + +C. Something that I have learned from a study of my dream records is +that while dreams are not chaotic, while they can be compared and +classified, it is not possibie to apply the method of natural science to them in +the sense of discerning a consistent, impersonal natural order in the dream +world. It is not that the natural order is different in dreams from what it is in +the waking world; it is that the dream worlds are incommensurate with the +discernment of a natural order in the scientific sense. Here are some specific +observations which relate to this whole question. + +1. Some dreams are not noticeably anomalous. The laws of science are not +violated in them. This observation is important in giving us a normal base for +our investigation. Dreams are not all crazy and chaotic. + +2. In some dreams, it is impossible to abstract an impersonal natural order +from personal experiences and anecdotes. There are no impersonal events. +There is no nature whose order can be defined impersonally. The dreams are +full of personal magic which cannot be generalized to a characteristic of an +impersonal natural order. + +3. As a special case of (2), in some dreams, we jump back in time and move +discontinuously in time and space. Chronological personal magic. + +4. In dreams, the distinction between myself and other people is blurred in +many different ways. Also, ! sometimes become a_ disembodied +consciousness. + +5. As a generalization of (4), sometimes it becomes impossible to distinguish +objects from our sensing and perceiving function. The mediating sensory +function becomes obtrusively anomalous. Stable object gestalts cannot be + + +167 + + +identified. + +6. Sometimes we experience the logically impossible in dreams. My father +was both dead and buried, and alive and walking around, in one dream. + +7. The possibility of identifying causal relationships is sometimes lacking in +dreams. /t is not just that actions have unexpected effects. It is that events +are strung together like beads on a string. There is no sense of willful acting +on the world or manipulation of the world which can be objectified as a +causal relation between impersonal! events. + +The possibility arises of using dreams as philosophical experiments in +worlds in which one or more of the preconditions for application of the +scientific method is absent. (But in the one case in which Alten and I tried +this, we reached opposite conclusions. Alten said that dreams in which one +can jump around in time proved that the irreversibility of time is the basis +for distinguishing between time and space; I said that the dreams proved that +time and space can be distinguished even when the irreversibility of time is +lacking.) + +Observation (2) above can lead us to an insight about the waking world. +Perhaps science insists on the elimination of personal anecdotes from the +natural order which it recognizes because the scientist wants results which +can be transferred from one life to another and which will give one person +power over another. At any rate, science excludes anecdotal anomalies which +cannot be made somehow into "objective" events. As an example, I may be +walking down the street and suddenly find myself on the other side of the +street with no awareness of any act of crossing the street. + +What dreams provide us with is worlds in which anecdotal anomalies +cannot be relegated to limbo as they are in waking science. They are so +prominent in dreams that we can become accustomed to identifying them +there. We may then learn to recognize analogous anomalies in the waking +world, where we had overlooked them before because of our scientific +indoctrination. + +Of course, we run the risk that superstitious people will misuse our +theory to justify their folly. But the difference between our theory and +superstition is clear. When the superstitious person says that he +communicates with spirits, he either lies outright; or alse he misinterprets his +experiences--embedding them in an extraneous pre-scientific belief system, +or treating them as controversions of scientific propositions. We, on the +other hand, maintain more literally than science does that the only raw +material of cognition is experience. We differ from science in draping +experiences on a different organizational framework. The "reality" we arrive +at is incommensurate with science; it does not falsify any scientific +proposition. As for science and superstition, we headed this essay with the + + +168 + + +quotation by d'Abro to emphasize that the scientist himself is superstitious: +he is determined to believe in the common objective world, even though it is +a fiction, because it is necessa~y to science. The superstitious person wants +you to believe that his communication with spirits is intersubjectively +consequential. Thus our theory, which tends toward the attitude that +nothing is intersubjectively consequential, offers him even less comfort than +science does. + +D. We next turn to semi-conscious quasi-dreams. Referring to my +experience on the morning of 1/12/1974, I describe the experience by saying +that I was on the Courant Institute plaza. But I cannot conclude that I was +on the Courant Institute plaza. The reason is that important internal reality +cues are missing in the experience. For one thing, the peripheral environment +is missing; in its place is a void. Referring to my experience on 1/1-/1974, +still other cues are missing. I am awake, and the scene is unstable and +momentary. The slightest attention shift will cause the scene to vanish. + +When we recognize that we have disallowed falling asleep, awaking, and +anomalous phenomena in dreams as evidence of unreality, a careful analysis +yields only two types of reality cues. + +1. Presence of the peripheral environment. + +2. "Single consciousness." This cue is missing when we see a +three-dimensional scene and move about in it, and yet have a background +awareness that we are awake in bed; and lose the scene through a mere shift +of attention. Its absence is even more marked if the scene is a momentary +one between two waking periods. + +Let us recall our earlier discussion of the empiricism of science. Science +does not content itself with ungraded experience. it drapes experience on an +intellectual framework in such a way as to simulate Aristotelian realism. It +feeds experience into a maze of verification procedures in order to confirm a +model which is not explicit in ungraded experience. It short, science grades +experience as to its reality on the basis of standards which are +"intellectually" supplied. Internal reality cues are thus characteristics of +experience which are given special weight by the grading procedure. The +immediate problem for us is that ordinary descriptive language implicitly +recognizes these reality cues; one would never say without qualification that +one was on the Courant Institute plaza if the peripheral environment was +missing and if one was also aware of being awake in bed at the time. (In +contrast, it is fair to use ordinary descriptive language with respect to +dreamed episodes when our consciousness is singulary, that is, when +everything seems real and unqualified.) - + +For purposes of further comparison !«may mention an experience I +have had on rare occasions while lying on my back in bed fully awake. It is + + +169 + + +as if colored spheres whosé centers are located a few feet or yards in front of +my chest expand until they press against me, one after the other. I use the +phrase "as if' because reality cues are missing in this experience, and thus I +cannot use the language of stable object gestalts without qualification in +describing it. The colors are not vivid as real colors are. They are like +visualized colors. The spheres pass through each other, and through me--with +only a moderate sensation of pressure. I can turn the experience off by +getting out of bed. The point, again, is that it is inherent in ordinary +language not to use unqualified object descriptions in these circumstances. +Yet the only language I have for such sensory configurations is the language +of stable object gestalts-this is particularly obvious in the example of the +Courant Institute plaza. (Is "ringing in the ears' in the same class of +phenomena? } + +An insight that is crucial in elucidating this problem is that when I +describe episodes, the descriptions implicitly convey not only sensations but +beliefs, as when I speak of a typewriter in a dream on the assumption that it +persisted while I was not looking at it. The peculiar quality of a quasi-dream +comes about not only because it is an anomaly in my sensations but because +it is an anomaly in the scientific-pragmatic cognitive model which underlies +ordinary language. If I discard this cognitive model and then report the +event, it will not be the same event: the beliefs implicit in ordinary language +helped give the event its quality. As a further example, now that I have +recognized experiences such as that of 1/12/1974, I am willing to entertain +the possibility that they are the basis for claims by superstitious persons to +have projected astrally. But to use the phrase "astral projection" is to embed +the experiences in a_ pre-scientific belief system extraneous to the +experiences themselves. !f we learn to report such experiences by using +idioms like "ringing in the ears" and blocking any comparison with notions +of objective reality or intersubjective import, we will have flattened out +experience and will have moved in the direction of ungraded experience and +nihilistic empiricism. + +E. We next take up connections between adjacent dreamed and waking +periods. As a preliminary, we reject conventional notions that dreams are +fabricated from memories of waking reality; or that dreams are precognitions +of waking reality; or that dreams are mental phenomena which symbolize +waking reality. We reject these notions because they conflict with the placing +of the dream world on the same level as the waking world. + +Connections between dream and waking periods are important in this +study because we may wish to create such connections deliberately, and even +to attribute causal significance to them. Initially, we define the concept of +dream control: it is to conduct one's waking life so that it is supportive of + + +170 + + +one's dreamed life in some sense. We also define controlled dreaming: it is to +manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep {or during sleep) so as to +influence the content of that person's dreams. (An example would be to give +somebody a psychoactive sleeping pill.) + +A careful analysis of connections between dream and waking periods +yields the following classification of such connections. + +1. I walk around the kitchen in a dream, then awaken and walk around the +kitchen. Voluntary continued action. + +2. Given a_ project with causally separate components, voluntarily +assembled, I can carry out the project entirely while awake, entirely in +dreams, or partly while awake and partly in dreams. + +3. I walk around the kitchen while awake, then sleep. I may then walk +around the kitchen in a dream. Also, I draw a glass of water while awake. I +may have the glass of water to use in the dream. We could postulate that +such connections are not mere coincidences, if they occur. However, we +certainly cannot produce such connections at will. We call these connections +echoes of waking actions in dreams. Note the case in which I taped my +mouth shut before sleeping, and could not whistle in the subsequent dream. +4. We next have connections from dreamed to waking periods which can be +postulated to have causal significance. First, misfortune or danger in dreams +is regularly followed by immediate awaking. Secondly, I! have had +experiences in which a headlong dive or an attempt to whistle continued +from dream to waking, right through waking up. These experiences are +causally continuous actions. However, I cannot bring them about at will. + +5. We can manipulate a person "from outside" before sleep (or during sleep) +so as to influence the content of that person's dreams. The dream is not an +echo of the waking action; the causal relationship is manipulative. Examples +are to give someone a psychoactive sleeping drug or to create a special +environment for sleep. The case in which I taped my mouth shut before +sleeping was a remarkable borderline case between an echo and a +manipulation. + +in conclusion, dream control is any of the connections described in +(1)-(4). Controlled dreaming is (5). We have analyzed these concepts +meticulously because we want to exclude all attempts at magic, all +superstition from the project of placing dreamed and waking life on the same +level. There must be no rain dancing, no false causality, in this project. + +F. Until now, we have analyzed our experience episode by episode. We +could make this approach into a principle by assuming that each episode is a +separate and complete world, which has its reality confirmed internally. In +particular, the notion of objective location in space and time would be +maintained if it appeared in a dream and was intersubjectively confirmed in + + +171 + + +the dream, but the notion would be purely internal to each episode. The +objection to these assumptions, as we mentioned at the end of (B), is that +they propose to maintain the notion of objective location, and yet they +forego the notion of the consistency of all portions of reality. if we adopt +these assumptions and then compare all the reports of our dreamed and +waking periods, we may find that we have experienced different events +attributed to the same location--and indeed, that is exactly what we do +experience. + +One of the main discoveries of this essay has been that dreamed and +waking periods are more symmetrical than our scientific-pragmatic +indoctrination would have us suppose. The reality of the dream world is +intersubjectively confirmed--within the dream. Anecdotal anomalies can be +found in waking periods as well as in dreams. Entities which resemble +common object gestalts but which lack some of the reality cues of object +gestalts can be encountered whicle we are fully awake. Now we can +recognize a further symmetry between dreamed and waking life. A dreamed +misfortune is usually "lost" when we awaken, and its disappearance is taken +as evidence of the unreality of the dream (the nightmare). But we can also +"lose" a waking misfortune by going to sleep and dreaming. Further, just as +a waking misfortune can persist from one waking period to another, a +dreamed misfortune can persist from one dream to another (recurrent +nightmares). Thus, we conclude that in regard to the consistency of episodes +with each other, there is no basis for preferring any one episode, dreamed or +waking, as the standard by which the reality of other episodes will be judged. +Of course, rather than maintaining the reality of each episode as a separate +world, we can block all attributions of events to objective locations. This +approach would alter the quality of the events and bring us closer to +nihilistic empiricism. + +A further problem arises if we take the dream reports of other people as +reports of reality. Suppose I am awake in my apartment at 3 AM on +2/6/1974, but that someone dreams at that time that I am out of my +apartment. Multiple existences which I do not even experience are now being +attributed to me. (My own episodes also pose a problem of whether +"multiple existences" are being attributed to me, but that problem concerns +events I experience myself.) What we should recognize is that the problem of +"multiple existences" is not as unique to our investigation as may at first +appear. Natural science has an analogous problem in disposing of the notion +of other minds. The notion of the existence of many minds, none of which +can experience any other, is difficult to assimilate to the cognitive model of +science. On the other hand, to deny the existence of any mind, as +behaviorists do, is to repudiate the scientist's observations of his own mental + + +172 + + +life. And if the scientist's observations of his own mental life are repudiated, +then there is no good reason not to repudiate the scientist's observations of +his budily sensations and of external phenomena also; that is, to repudiate +the very possibility of scientific observation. Further, when behaviorists try +to convince people that they have no awareness, whom (or what) are they +trying to convince? And what is the behaviorist explanation of the origin of +the fiction of consciousness? Who benefits from perpetuating this fiction, +and how does he benefit? + +We must emphasize that the above critique is not applicable to every +philosophical outlook. It applies specifically to science-- because the scientist +wants to have the benefits of two incompatible conceptual frameworks. +Some of the common sense about other minds is necessary in the operational +preliminaries to formal science; and the scientist's role as observer is +indispensable to formal science. Yet the conceptual framework of science is +essentially physicalistic, and can allow only for external objects. What this +difficulty reveals is that the cognitive model of science has stabilized and +prevailed even though it has blatent discrepancies in its foundations. The +foremost discrepancy, of course, is that the scientist is willing to have his +enterprise rest on a fiction, that of the common objective world. Thus, the +example of science suggests an additional way of dealing with the problems +which arise for our theory: we can allow discrepancies to persist unresolved. + +There is an interesting observation to be made about one's own dreams +in connection with multiple existences. I have found that the person I am in +my dreams is significantly different from the waking identity I take for +granted, as in my dream of 2/1/1974. As for the problem of other people's +dreams, one way of handling them would be simply to reject the existence of +other people's dream worlds and of their consciousnesses, and to limit one's +consideration to one's own dreams. But perhaps the most productive way to +handle the problem would be to construe it as one involving language in the +way that the problems concerning quasi-dreams did. Our descriptive language +is a language of stable object gestalts, of scientific-pragmatic reality. If we +accept reports of other people's dreams in language which blocks any +implications concerning objective reality, then our perceptual interpretations +will be different and the quality of the events will be fundamentally +different. The experience-world will be flatter. But maybe this is a +revolutionary advance. Maybe reports of our appearances in other people's +dreams, in language which blocks any implications about reality, are what we +should strive for. And if ve cease to be stable object gestalts for others, +maybe our stable object gestalts will not even appear in their dreams. + + +Note on how to remember dreams + +The trick in remembering a dream is to fix in your mind one incident or +theme in the dream immediately upon awaking from it. You will then be +able to remember the whole dream well enough to write a description of it +the next day, and you will probably find that for weeks afterwards you can + + +add to the description and correct it. + + +174 + + +SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY + + +ey + + +16. On Social Recognition + + +The most important tasks which the individual can undertake arise not +from personal considerations but from the general conditions of society. The +standards of accomplishment for these tasks are implicit in the tasks, and are +objective in the sense that they can be applied without reference to public +opinion. For example, given that humans express themselves in statements +which are supposedly true or false, there arises a fundamental philosophical +"problem of knowledge." Then, the fact that societies are organized in +different ways at different times and places poses fundamental problems of +"political" thought and action. Sometimes the most important task posed by +the conditions of society is to invent a whole new activity. The origination +of experimental science in Europe in the seventeenth century is an example. +For lack of a better term, these tasks will be referred to as 'fundamental! +tasks." + +The fact that a fundamental task is posed by the general conditions of +society does not mean that public opinion will be aware of the task, or that +the ruling class will commission someone to undertake it. It may well be that +the first person to perceive the problem is the person who solves it; and +public opinion may not catch up with him for decades or centuries. + +The person who devotes himself to a fundamental task is, more often +than not, persecuted or ignored by society. Society puts up an immense +resistance to solutions of fundamenta! problems, even when, as in the cases +of Galois and Mendel, those solutions are politically innocuous. There is no +evidence that this state of affairs is limited to some particular organization of +society. Further, there are cases in which an objectively valid result is +known, and yet apparently society can never adopt the result institutionally. +Art is objectively inferior to brend, as I have shown, and yet all indications +are that art will always be a major institution. The persecution of individuals +who undertake fundamental tasks is an instance of a general human social +irrationality which runs throughout history, from human sacrifice in ancient +times to present-day war between communist countries. The conclusion is +that for an individual to commit himself to a fundamental task tends to +preclude social approval for his activities. + +Quite apart from the fundamental tasks which are posed by general +social conditions, the ruling class needs a continual supply of new talent at + + +177 + + +al! levels of society. At the lower levels, this supply is assured by the +necessity of selling one's labor power in order to eat. At the higher levels of +accomplishment, the ruling class assures itself of a continual supply of new +talent by offering publicity or fame--social recognition--as a reward for +accomplishing the tasks specified by the ruling class. Famous men such as +Einstein are held up to children as examples of the proper relationship +between the talented individual and society; and an internationa! institution, +the Nobel Prize, exists to implement this system of supplying talent. +According to the doctrine, the individual has a duty to benefit society, to +choose a task posed by the ruling class as his occupation. (His publicly +known occupation is supposed to correspond to his real goals.) If he +performs successfully, he will receive publicity as an indication that he is +indeed benefiting society. + +Our analysis of fame is the opposite of that of Ben Vautier. Vautier +asserts that the desire for personal publicity is an instinctive drive of human +beings, and that the accumulation of publicity is a genuinely selfish act like +the accumulation of food. In fact, Vautier goes so far as to make no +distinction between what Gypsy Rose Lee and Lenin, for example, did to +gain fame; and he assumes that a pacifist, for example, would welcome +military honors equally as much as he would a peace award. We assert, on +the contrary, that the desire for publicity is not instinctive; it is inculcated in +the young so that the ruling class may have a continual supply of new talent +to serve its purposes. The desire for publicity, far more than the desire for +money, is establishment-serving more than self-serving. (We suggest that the +principal reason why Vautier seeks publicity is not instinct, but economics. +Vautier has no inherited source of income, and has never been trained for a +profession. For him, the alternative to the art/publicity racket would be +common labor. !f he had the opportunity for a life of leisure, he might feel +differently about publicity.) + +The issues which are raised here are extremely important for the person +who perceives a fundamental task, because his sanity may depend on +whether he understands the rationality of his motives for undertaking the +task. He will already have been inculcated with the establishment's concepts +of service and recognition, concepts which are epitomized in the image of +Einstein's career. What we suggest is that it is vital to disabuse oneself of +these concepts. To repeat, fundamental tasks are posed by the general +conditions of society. Yet the individual who undertakes such a task will +probably be persecuted or ignored. Given these circumstances, the doctrine +that the individual has a duty to benefit society is a hypocritical fraud, an +obscenity. For the individual to commit himself to a fundamental task tends +to preclude social recognition for his activities; or, to reverse the remark, + + +178 + + +social recognition is not a reward to accomplishment of a fundamental task +(just as military honors are not a reward to pacifism). Thus, it is not rational +for the individual to undertake a fundamental task in order to gain fame. + +The motive for undertaking a fundamental task should be genuine +selfishness. (We will continue our argument that the striving for fame is not +genuinely selfish below.) The individual who perceives a fundamental task +should undertake it for his private gratification. The task is of primary +importance to society. By accomplishing it, the individual gains the privilege +of knowing something which is socially important, but which society cannot +deal with honestly. The individual should undertake the task in order to +utilize his real abilities, to develop his potentiality for its own sake. The +undertaking of a significant task which utilizes one's real abilities is the true +source of happiness. To perceive a fundamental task and not to undertake it +is to be stunted: one loses one's self-respect and becomes progressively +demoralized. (Another rational motive for undertaking a fundamental task is +to transform the social environment by methods which do not depend on +society's approval or comprehension.) + +We do not mean to suggest that the individual who undertakes a +fundamental task should conceal his results. Even though such tasks may +seem individualistic, they require cooperative, social activity for their +accomplishment. A proposed solution to a fundamental problem can hardly +develop without being scrutinized from a variety of perspectives. It is +essential to have qualified critics, and it is unfortunate that they are so rare. +Solutions to fundamental problems are social consumption goods (their +consumption is not exclusionary), so that critics or collaborators have as +much opportunity to benefit from them as their originators do. As an +example, most of my writings are really collaborations with Tony Conrad. I +often find that I do not understand my own position until I know how it +appears to him. When communication of results is essentially a form of +collaboration, it is very different from the attempt to gain publicity or fame. + +It is precisely in the context of the generalized social irrationality which +runs throughout history that the attempt to gain fame must be seen as +foolishly un-selfish. What difference can it possibly make whether the masses +venerate one's name a hundred years after one's death? The adulation of the +masses after one is dead is of no conceivable value to oneself. It is society +which indoctrinates one to worry about one's reputation after one is dead, in +order to condition one to serve the interests of the ruling class. + +Then, what does it mean to the individual who solves a fundamental +problem to have his name publicized in the mass media, to be a celebrity +among people who cannot possibly understand what he has done? Even +more important, we must recognize that publicity carries a definte risk for + + +179 + + +the individual committed to a fundamental task. The solution of such a +problem must usually be expressed in categories which are incommensurate +and incompatible with the categories of thought which are common coin at +the time. In order for the solution of a fundamental! problem to be exposed +in the mass media, it has to be translated into media categories and this +usually results in irreparable distortion. In fact, the solution is distorted in +precisely such a manner that it begins to serve the interests of the ruling +class. One encounters an immense pressure which tends to harness one to +goals which have nothing to do with objective value. More precisely, when an +individual who has solved a fundamental problem is publicized in the mass +media, a process of mutual subversion takes place as between the +establishment/media and the individual. In the process, the establishment is +likely to come out far ahead. + +There are two other reasons why it is actually advantageous to the +individual who undertakes a fundamental! task to avoid publicity. Since one's +activity is likely to be treated as a threat by society, one can minimize the +energy required to defend it, and can carry the activity further, if one +receives no publicity. Then, there will unavoidably be false starts made in +developing the solution to a fundamental problem. If one is not operating in +the glare of publicity, it is far easier to abandon these false starts. + +It used to be that when I saw publicity being given to an inferior way of +doing a thing, and I knew a better way, then I reacted with a sense of duty. I +had to appoint myself as a missionary, to enter the public arena and start a +campaign to replace the inferior approach with the better approach. But this +sense of duty must now be called into question. Is it really in my interest to. +thrust myself on the media as a missionary? The truth is that in the context +of generalized social irrationality, it is un-selfish and self-sacrificing to believe +that I must either agree with current fads or else contest them publicly. The +genuinely selfish attitude is *hat it is sufficient for me to know what the +superior approach is. I can ignore the false issues which fill the mass media; I +do not have to participate in public opinion at all. The genuinely selfish +attitude is that "it does not concern me." Genuine selfishness is living one's +life on a level which does not communicate with the level of the mass media +and public opinion. + +If we recognize that it is irrational to undertake a fundamental task in +order to benefit society and gain social approval, then our very choice of +fundamental tasks shouid be affected. The most visible fundamental tasks +are those which the establishment is to some extent aware of, and which if +accomplished would immediately be rewarded with social approval. (In the +natural sciences, there literally may be a race to solve a well-known problem). +But if our motives are genuinely self-serving, and have to do with the + + +180 + + +development of our potentiality for its own sake, then there is no reason to +limit ourselves to widely understood problems. We can undertake to discover +timeless results--permanent answers to questions which will be important +indefinitely--without concerning ourselves with whether society can adopt +the results institutionally. We can pose problems of which neither the +establishment, the media, nor public opinion are aware. We can undertake +tasks which draw on our unique abilities, so that our personal contribution is +indispensable. + +There is a difficulty which we have postponed mentioning. The +individual is always compelled to engage in some socially approved activity +in order to obtain the means of subsistence. We cannot assume that the +individual will have an inherited source of income. In order to pursue a +fundamental task, he will have to pursue a legitimate occupation at the same +time. It may be extremely difficult to lead such a double life, because to do +so requires precisely the self-assurance. that comes from accomplishing the +fundamenta! task. Leading a double life is not a game for the person who is +unsure about his real abilities or his vocation. If the individual is capable of +leading a double life, our suggestion is to obtain the means of subsistence by +the most efficient swindle available. Do not hesitate to practice outward +conformity in order to exploit the establishment for your own purposes. + +There remains the case of the individual who, like Galois, is not +prepared to lead a double life. His problem is one of destitution. However, +he is different from an ordinary pauper. By assumption, he is more talented +than the members of the establishment; he does not belong to the +establishment because he is overqualified for it. Given that he is more +talented than members of the establishment, and that his survival is +threatened, a collateral fundamental task emerges, the task of immediately +transmuting his talent into power to handle the establishment on his own +terms. To perceive this task is a major resuit of this essay. The task cannot be +defined accurately without a perfect understanding of the difference +between fundamental tasks and the serve-society-and-get-famous fraud. We +contend that Galois should have regarded the task of immediately +transmuting his talent into power over the establishment as an inseparable +collateral problem to his mathematical researches. From a common sense +point of view, this collateral task will seem utterly impossible. However, we +are talking about individuals whose vocation is to do the seemingly +impossible. Thus, we conclude by leaving this unsolved fundamental problem +for the reader to ponder. + + +181 + + +17. Creep + + +When Helen Lefkowitz said I was "such a creep" at Interlochen in +1956, her remark epitomized the feeling that females have always had about +me. My attempts to understand why females rejected me and to decide what +to do about it resulted in years of confusion. In 1961-1962, I tried to +develop a theory of the creep problem. This theory took involuntary +celibacy as the defining characteristic of the creep. Every society has its +image of the ideal young adult, even though the symbols of growing up +change from generation to generation. The creep is an involuntary celibate +because he fails to develop the surface traits of adulthood--poise and +sophistication; and because he is shy, unassertive, and lacks self-confidence +in the presence of others. The creep is awkward and has an unstylish +appearance. He seems sexless and childish. He is regarded by the ideal adults +with condescending scorn, amusement, or pity. + +Because he seems weak and inferior in the company of others, and +cannot maintain his self-respect, the creep is pressed into isolation. There, +the creep doesn't have the pressure of other people's presence to make him +feel inferior, to make him feel that he must be like them in order not te be +inferior. The creep can develop the morale required to differ. The creep also +tends to expand his fantasy life, so that it takes the place of the +interpersonal life from which he has been excluded. The important +consequence is that the creep is led to discover a number of positive +personality values which cannot be achieved by the mature, married adult. +During the period when I developed the creep theory, I was spending almost +all of my time alone in my room, thinking and writing. This fact should +make the positive creep values more understandable. + +1. Because of his isolation, the creep has a qualitatively higher sense of +identity. He has a sense of the boundaries of his personality, and a control of +what goes on within those boundaries. In contrast, the mature adult, who +spends all his time with his marriage partner or in groups of people, is a mere +channel into which thoughts flow from outside; he lives in a state of +conformist anonymity. + +2. The creep is emotionally autonomous, independent, or +self-contained. He develops an elaborate world of feelings which remain + + +182 + + +within himself, or which are directed toward inanimate objects. The creep +may cooperate with other people in work situations, but he does not develop +emotional attachments to other people. + +3. Although the creep's intellectual abilities develop with education, +the creep lives in a sexually neutral world and a child's world throughout his +life. He is thus able to play like a child. He retains the child's capacity for +make-believe. He retains the child's lyrical creativity in regard to +self-originated, self-justifying activities. + +4. There is enormous room in the creep's life for the development of +every aspect of the inner world or the inner life. The creep can devote +himself to thought, fantasy, imagination, imaging, variegated mental states, +dreams, internal emotions and feelings towards inanimate objects. The creep +develops his inner world on his own power. His inner life originates with +himself, and is controlled and intellectually consequential. The creep has no +use for meditations whose content is supplied by religious traditions. Nor has +he any use for those drug experiences which adolescents undertake to prove +how grown-up they are, and whose content is supplied by fashion. The +creep's development of his inner life is the summation of all the positive +creep values. + +After describing these values, the creep theory returned to the problem +of the creep's involuntary celibacy. For physical reasons, the creep remains a +captive audience for the opposite sex, but his attempts to gain acceptance by +the opposite sex always end in failure. On the other hand, the creep may +well find the positive creep values so desirable that he will want to intensify +them. The solution is for the creep to seek a medical procedure which will +sexually neutralize him. He can then attain the full creep values, without the +disability of an unresolved physical desire. + +Actually, the existence of the positive creep values proves that the +creep is an authentic non-human who happens to be trapped in human social +biology. The positive creep values imply a specification of a whole +non-human: social biology which would be appropriate to those values. +Finally, the creep theory mentioned that creeps often make good grades in +school, and can thus do clerical work or other work useful to humans. This +fact would be the basis for human acceptance of the creep. + +In the years after I presented the creep theory, a number of +inadequacies became apparent in it. The principal one was that I managed to +cast off the surface traits of the creep, but that when I did my problem +became even more intractable. An entirely different analysis of the problem +was required. + +My problem actually has to do with the enormous discrepancy between +the ways I can relate to males and the ways I can relate to females. The + + +183 + + +essence of the problem has to do with the social values of females, which are +completely different from my own. The principal occupation of my life has +been certain self-originated activities which are embodied in "writings." Now +most males have the same social values that I find in all females. But there +have always been a few males with exceptional values; and my activities have +developed through exchanges of ideas with these males. These exchanges +have come about spontaneously and naturally. In contrast, I have never had +such an exchange of ideas with females, for the following reasons. Females +have nothing to say that applies to my activities. They cannot understand +that such activities are possible. Or they are a part of the "masses" who +oppose and have tried to discourage my activities. + +The great divergence between myself and females comes in the area +where each individual is responsible for what he or she is; the area in which +one must choose oneself and the principles with which one will be identified. +This area is certainly not a matter of intelligence or academic degrees. +Further, the fact that society has denied many opportunities to females at +one time or another is not involved here. (My occupation has no formal +prerequisites, no institutional barriers to entry. One enters it by defining +oneself as being in it. Yet no female has chosen to enter it. Or consider such +figures as Galileo and Galois. By the standards of their contemporaries, these +individuals were engaged in utterly ridiculous, antisocial pursuits. Society +does not give anybody the "opportunity" to engage in such pursuits. Society +tries to prevent everybody from being a Galileo or Galois. To be a Galileo is +really a matter of choosing sides, of choosing to take a certain stand.) + +Let me be specific about my own experiences. When I distributed the +prospectus for The Journal of Indeterminate Mathematical Investigations to +graduate students at the Courant Institute in the fall of 1967, the most +negative reactions came from the females. The mere fact that I wanted to +invent a mathematics outside of academic mathematics was in and of itself +offensive and revolting to them. Since the academic status of these females +was considerably higher than my own, the disagreement could only be +considered one of values. + +The field of art provides an even better example, because there are +many females in this field. In the summer of 1969 I attended a meeting of +the women's group of the Art Workers Coalition in New York. Many of the +women there had seen my Down With Art pamphlet. Ail the females who +have seen this pamphlet have reacted negatively, and it is quite clear what +their attitude is. They believe that they are courageously defending modern +art against a philistine. They consider me to be a crank who needs a "modern +museum art appreciation course." The more they are pressed, the more +proudiy do they defend "Great Art." Now the objective validity of my + + +184 + + +opposition to art is absolutely beyond question. To defend modern art is +precisely what a hopeless mediocrity would consider courageous. Again, it is +clear that the opposition between myself and females is in the area where +one must choose one's values. + +I have found that what I really have to do to make a favorable +impression on females is to conceal or suspend my activities--the most +important part of my life; and to adopt a facade of conformity. Thus, I +perceive females as persons who cannot function in my occupation. I +perceive them as being like an employment agency, like an institution to +which you have to present a conformist facade. Females can he counted on to +represent the most "social, human" point of view, a point of view which, as I +have explained, is distant from my own. {In March 1970, at the Institute for +Advanced Study, the mathematician Dennis Johnson said to me that he +would murder his own mother, and murder ail his friends, if by doing so he +could get the aliens to take him to another star and show him a higher +civilization. My own position is the same as Johnson's.) + +It follows that my perception of sex is totally different from that of +others. The depictions of sex in the mass media are completely at variance +with my own experience. I object to pornography in particular because it is +like deceptive advertising for sex; it creates the impression that the physical +aspect of sex can be separated from human personalities and social +interaction. Actually, if most people can separate sex from personality, it is +because they are so average that their values are the same as everybody else's. +In my case, although I am a captive audience for females for physical +reasons, the disparity between my values and theirs overrides the physical +attraction I feel for them. It is hard enough to present a facade of +conformity in order to deal with an employment agency, but the thought of +having to maintain such a facade in a more intimate relationship is +completely demoralizing. + +What conclusions can be drawn by comparing the creep theory with my +later experience? First, some individuals who are unquestionably creeps as +far as the surface traits are concerned simply may not be led to the deeper +values I described. They may not have the talent to get anything positive out +of their involuntary situation; or their aspirations may be so conformist that +they do not see their involuntary situation as a positive opportunity. Many +creeps are female, but all the evidence indicates that they have the same +values I have attributed to other females--values which are hard to reconcile +with the deeper creep values. + +As for the positive creep values, I may have had them even before I +began to care about whether females accepted me. For me, these values may +have been the cause, not the effect, of surface creepiness. They are closely + + +185 + + +related to the values that underlie my activities. It is not necessary to appear +strangely dressed, childish, unassertive, awkward, and lacking in confidence +in order to achieve the positive creep values. (1 probably emphasized surface +creep traits during my youth in order to dissociate myself from conformist +opinion at a time when I hadn't yet had the chance to make a full +substantive critique of it.) Even sex, in and of itself, might not be +incompatible with the creep inner life; what makes it incompatible is the +female personality and female social values, which in real life cannot be +separated from sex and are the predominant aspect of it. + + +Having cast off the surface traits of the creep, I can now see that +whether I make a favorable impression on females really depends on whether +I conceal my occupation. Celibacy is an effect of my occupation; it does not +have the role of a primary cause that the creep theory attributed to it. +However, it does have consequences of its own. In the context of the entire +situation I have described, it constitutes an absolute dividing line between +myself and humanity. It does seem to be closely related to the deeper creep +values, especially the one of living in a child's world. + +As for the sexual neutralization advocated in the creep theory, to find a +procedure which actually achieves the stated objective without having all +sorts of unacceptable side effects would be an enormous undertaking. It is +not feasible as a minor operation developed for a single person. Further, as +the human species comes to have vast technological capabilities, many +special interest groups will want to tinker with human social biology, each in +a different way, for political reasons. I am no longer interested in petty +tinkering with human biology. As I make it clear in other writings, I am in +favor of building entities which are actially superior to humans, and which +avoid the whole fabric of human biosocial defects, not just one or two of +them. + + +186 + + +2/22/1963 +Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstrate against Lincoln Center, February 22, 1963 +(photo by Tony Conrad) + + +18. The Three Levels of Politics + + +Political activity and its results can occur on three levels. The first level +is the personal one. An individual may vote to re-elect a local politician +because of patronage he has received, for example. On this level the +individual's motivation is narrow, immediate self-interest. Often the action +has a defensive character; the individual is trying to hold on to something he +already possesses. + +The second level may be called the historical level. It is exemplified by +the Civil War in the United States. Certain political movements result in +largescale, irreversible social change. The Civil War set in motion the +industrialization of the United States, as well as abolishing slavery. In 1860, +slavery was viewed by large numbers of Americans as a legitimate institution. +One hundred years later, even American conservatives did not often defend +it. To re-establish a plantation economy in the South today would be out of +the question. These observations prove that on the second level, society +really does change. On this level, political action does make a difference. + +However, there is a further aspect to the Civil War which indicates that +politics does not make the difference people think it makes. According to +the ideology of the abolitionists, the accomplishment of the Civil War would +be to raise the slaves to a position of equality with whites. In fact, nothing of +the sort happened. The real accomplishment of the Civil War was to +transform the United States into an industria! capitalist society (and to +abolish an institution which was incompatible with the capitalists' need for a +free labor market). By the time the Northern businessmen brought +Reconstruction to an end, it was clear that the position of blacks in +American society was where it had always been: at the bottom. The Civil +War changed American society, but is did not make the society any more +utopian. On the contrary, it brought into prominence still another violent +social conflict--the conflict between labor and capital. + +The third level of politics has to do with the utopian aspect of modern +political ideologies, the aspect which calls not only for society to change, but +to change for the better. Typical third-level political goals are the abolition +of war, the abolition of the oligarchic structure of society, and the abolition +of economic institutions which value human lives in terms of money. in all +of human history, society has never changed on this third level. + + +188 + + +The successful Communist revolutionists of the twentieth century (in +the underdeveloped countries) have repeatedly claimed to have accomplished +third-level change in their societies. However, these claims of third-level +change have always turned out to be illusions which cover a recapitulation of +capitalist development. Communist revolutions are typical examples of real +second-level change which is accomplished under the cover of claims of +third-level change, claims which are pure and simple frauds. + +By -introducing the concept of levels of politics, we can resolve the +apparent paradox that society certainly changes, but that it really does not +change. It is important to understand that empirical evidence on the +question of the levels of politics can only be drawn from the past, the +present, and the immediate future (five to ten years). Recent technological +developments have brought into question the very existence of the human +species. In addition, technology is developing much faster than society is. It +is meaningless to discuss the issue of second versus third-level social change +with reference to the more distant future, because there may not be any +human society in the more distant future. + +This essay is concerned with the politics of the third level. The first and +second levels are certainly rea! enough, but we are not the least interested in +them. As we have just said, we make the restriction that any empirical +analysis of the third level must refer to the past, the present, or the +immediate future. Our purpose is to present a substitute for the politics of +the third level. + +There are a number of present-day political tendencies which hold out +the promise of third-level social change. These tendencies are all descended +from the leftist working-class movements of nineteenth century Europe, +most of them by way of the early Soviet regime. The promises of third-level +change held out by these tendencies are nothing but cheap illusions. What is +more, a careful examination of leftist ideologies in relation to the historical +record will show that the promises of third-level change are extremely vague +and without substance. Beneath the surface of vague promises, leftist +ideologies do not even favor third-level change; they are opposed to it. + +One example will serve to demonstrate this contention. In my capacity +as a professional economist, I have become familiar with the official +economic policies--the doctrines of the professional economists--of the +various socialist governments and leftist movements throughout the world. It +should be mentioned that most of the followers of leftism are not familiar +with these technical economic policies; they are aware only of vague, +meaningless promises of future bliss coming from leftist political +speechmakers. When we turn to technical economic realities, we find that +virtually every leftist tendency in the world today accepts economic + + +189 + + +principles which in the parlance of the layman are referred to as +"capitalism." The most important principle is stated by Ernest Mandel: "the +economy continues to be fundamentally a money economy, with the +satisfaction of the bulk of people's needs depending on the number of +currency tokens a person possesses." When it comes to the realities of +technical economics, virtually every leftist in the world accepts this +principle. So far as the third level is concerned, there is no such thing as a +non-capitalist polical tendency, and there is no point in hoping for one. A +similar conclusion holds for virtually every aspect of third-level politics. +Leftists claim that Communism eliminates the causes of war; while at the +same time war breaks out beween China and the Soviet Union. + +We propose to draw a far-reaching conclusion from these +considerations. Returning to the example of first-level politics, it is rational +for the patronage-seeker to be in favor of the election of one focal politican +and against the election of his opponent. This is a matter which is within the +scope of human responsibility, and with respect to which individual action +can make a difference. But it is not rationa! to be either for against +"capitalism," to be either for or against war. As we have seen, "capitalism" +and war are permanent aspects of human society, and no political tendency +genuinely opposes them. {t is meaningless to treat them as if they were +within the scope of human responsibility in the sense that the election of a +local politician is. in other words, the third-level aspects of society are not +partial, limited aspects which can be eliminated by conscious human action +while the bulk of human life is retained. The only way you can meaningfully +be against the third-level aspects of human society is by adopting a different +attitude to the human species as such. + +This attitude is the one you would adopt if you were suddenly thrown +into a society of apes-apes which perpetually preyed within their own +ecological niche. It is clear that if you proposed to be "against" such a +situation, and to do something about it, then politics as it is normally +conceived would be out of the question. To anticipate our later discussion, +the first thing you must do is to protect yourself against society. The way to +do this is to create an invisible enclave for yourself within the Establishment. +Having such an enclave certainly does not imply loyalty to the +Establishment. On the contrary, there is no reason why you should be toyal +to any faction among the apes. You only pretend to be loyal to one faction +or another when it is necessary for self-defense. If there is a change of regime +in the country where you are living, you either leave or join the winning side. +Transfer your invisible enclave to whatever Establishment is available. But all +this is an external, defensive tactic which has nothing to do with the primary +goals of our strategy. + + +190 + + +We will finish our critique of third-level politics, and then continue the +description of the substitute which we propose. In addition to making vague +promises of third-level change, leftism encourages indignation at social +conditions which are beyond anyone's power to affect. Leftism attributes +great ethical merit to such indignation and morally condemns anyone who + + +does not share it. But this attitude is totally irrational and dishonest. In +philosophy and mathematics, it is possible for a proposition to be valid even +though it has no chance of institutional acceptance. But in social, economic, +and political matters, attitudes which have policy implications are nonsense +unless the policies are actually implemented. Institutional acceptance is the +only arena of validation of a social doctrine. It is absurd to attribute ethical +merit to a longing for the impossible. Indignation at a social condition which +is beyond anyone's power to affect is meaningless. (Indeed, to the extent +that such indignation diverts social energy into a dead end, it is +"counter-revolutionary.") To be more radical in social matters than society +can possibly be is not virtuous; it is idiotic. + +Although third-level politics is a fraud, it is the contention of this essay +that there exists a rational substitute for it. Once you perceive that you exist +in a society of apes who attack their own ecological niche, there are rational +goals which you can adopt for your life that correspond to third-level change +even though they have nothing to do with leftism. The preliminary step, as +we have said, is to create an invisible enclave for yourself within. the +Establishment. The remainder of the strategy is in two parts which are in +fact closely related. + +The first part is based on a consideration of the effects which such +figures as Galileo, Galois, Abel, Lobachevski, and Mendel have had on +society. These men devoted themselves to researches which seemed to be +purely abstract, without any relevance to the practical world. Yet, through +long, tortuous chains of events, their researches have had disruptive effects +on society which go far beyond the effects of most political movements. The +reason has to do with the peculiar role which technology has in human +society. Society's attitude in relation to technology is like that of a child +who cannot refrain from playing with matches. We find that +the abstract researches of the men being considered accomplished a dual +result. On the one hand, they represented inner escape, the achievement of a +private utopia now. Of course, the general public will not understand this; +only the few who are capable of participating in such activities will +appreciate the extent to which they can constitute inner escape. On the +other hand, they have had profoundly disruptive effects on society, effects +which still have not run their course. + +Thus, the first part of our strategy is to follow the example of these + + +191 + + +individuals. Of course, we do not stay within the bounds of present-day +academic research, any more than Galileo or Mendel did in their time. What +we have in mind is activities in the intellectual modality represented by the +rest of this book. + +It should be clear that such activities do represent a private utopia, and are at +the same time the seeds of disruptive future technologies which lead directly +to the second part of our strategy. + + +It is important to realize that by speaking of inner escape we do not +mean fashionable drug use, or Eastern religions, or occultism. These +threadbare superstitions are embraced by the cosmopolitan middle +classes--intellectually spineless fools who are always grasping for spiritual +comfort. Superstitious fads are escapism in the worst sense, as they only +serve to further muddle the heads of the fools who embrace them. In +contrast, the inner escape which we propose is origina! and consequential, +leading to an increase in man's manipulative power over the world. It has +nothing to do with irrationality or superstition. + +The second part of our strategy is predicated on the following states of +affairs. First, it is the human species as such which is the obstacle to +third-level political change. Secondly, technology is developing far more +rapidly than society is, and no feature of the natural world need any longer +be taken for granted. Society cannot help but foster technology in the +pursuit of military and economic supremacy, and this includes technology +which can contribute to the making of artificial superhuman beings. Every +fundamental advance in logic, physics, neurophysiology, and +neurocybernetics obviously leads in this direction. Thus, the second part of +the strategy is to participate in the making of artificial superhumans, +possibly by infiltrating the military-scientific establishment and diverting +research in the appropriate direction. + + +Note: This essay provides a specific, practical strategy for the present +environment. It also shows that certain types of opposition to the status quo +are meaningless. Subversion Theory, on the other hand, was a general theory +which was not limited to any one environment, but also which failed to +provide a specific strategy for the present environment. + + +192 + + +SCIENCE (LOGIC) + + +19. The Logic of Admissible Contradictions--work in progress +Chapter [1!. A Provisional Axiomatic Treatment + + +In the first and second chapters, we developed our intuitions +concerning perceptions of the logically impossible in as much detail as we +could. We decided, on intuitive grounds, which contradictions were +admissible and which were not. As we proceeded, it began to appear that the +results suggested by intuition were cases of a few general principles. In this +chapter, we will adopt these principles as postulates. The restatement of our +theory does not render the preceding chapters unnecessary. Only by +beginning with an exhaustive, intuitive discussion of perceptual illusions +could we convey the substance underlying the notations which we call +admissble contradictions, and motivate the unusual collection of postulates +which we will adopt. + +All properties will be thought of as 'parameters,' such as time, +location, color, density, acidity, etc. Different parameters will be represented +by the letters x, y, z, .... Different values of one parameter, say x, will be +represented by x1, X9, .... Each parameter has a domain, the set of all values +it can assume. An ensembie (Xo, Yo: Zo, ...) will stand for the single possible +phenomenon which has x-value xg, y-value yo, etc. Several remarks are in +order. My ensembles are a highly refined version of Rudolph Carnap's +intensions or intension sets (sets of all possible entities having a given +property). The number of parameters, or properties, must be supposed to be +indefinitely large. By giving a possible phenomenon fixed values for every +parameter, I assure that there will be only one such possible phenomenon. In +other words, my intension sets are all singletons. Another point is that if we +specify some of the parameters and specify their ranges, we limit the +phenomena which can be represented by our "ensembles." If our first +parameter is time and its range ts R, and our second parameter is spatial + + +location and its range is R , then we are limited to phenomena which are +point phenomena in space and time. !f we have a parameter for speed of +motion, the motion will have to be infinitesimal. We cannot have a +parameter for weight at all; we can only have one for density. The physicist +encounters similar conceptual problems, and does noi find them +insurmountable. + +Let (x4, y, Z, ...), (x9, y, Z, -..), etc. stand for possible phenomena + + +195 + + +which all differ from each other in respect to parameter x but are identical in +respect to every other parameter y, z, ... . {If the ensembles were intension +sets, they would be disjoint precisely because x takes a different value in +each.) A "simple contradiction family" of ensembles is the family [(x4,y, 2, +aay (x9, y, Z, ...), «J. The family may have any number of ensembles. It +actually represents many families, because y, z, ... are allowed to vary; but +each of these parameters must assume the same value in all ensembles in any +one family. x, on the other hand, takes different values in each ensemble in +any one family, values which may be fixed. A parameter which has the same +value throughout any one family will be referred to as a consistency +parameter. A parameter which has a different value in each ensemble in a +given family will be referred to as a contradiction parameter. +"Contradiction" will be shortened to "con." A simple con family is then a +family with one con parameter. The consistency parameters may be dropped +from the notation, but the reader must remember that they are implicitly +present, and must remember how they function. + +A con parameter, instead of being fixed in every ensemble, may be +restricted to a different subset of its domain in every ensemble. The subsets +must be mutually disjoint for the con family to be well-defined. The con +family then represents many families in another dimension, because it +represents every family which can be formed by choosing a con parameter +value from the first subset, one from the second subset, etc. + +Con families can be defined which have more than one con parameter, +i.e. more than one parameter satisfying all the conditions we put on x. Such +con families are not "simple." Let the cardinality of a con family be +indicated by a number prefixed to "family," and let the number of con +parameters be indicated by a number prefixed to "con." Remembering that +consistency parameters are understood, a 2-con °-family would appear as +(x4, Yq). (x9, y), sei. + +A "contradiction" or "y - object" is not explicitly defined, but it is +notated by putting "y" in front of a con family. The characteristics of y +-objects, or cons, are established by introducing additional postulates in the +theory. + +In this theory, every con is either "admissible" or "not admissible." +"Admissible" will be shortened to "am." The initial amcons of the theory +are introduced by postulate. Essentially, what is postulated is that cons with +a certain con parameter are am. (The cons directly postulated to be am are +on 1-con families.) However, the postulate will specify other requirements for +admissibility besides having the given con parameter. The requisite +cardinality of the con family will be specified. Also, the subsets will be +specified to which the con parameter must be restricted in each ensemble in + + +196 + + +the con. A con must satisfy all postulated requirements before it is admitted +by the postulate. + +The task of the theory is to determine whether the admissibility of the +cons postulated to be am implies the admissibility of any other cons. The +method we have developed for solving such problems will be expressed as a +collection of posiulates for our theory. + +Postulate 1. Given y[(x € A), (x € B}, ...] am, where x ¢ A, xe B, ... are the +restrictions on the con parameter, and given A1CA, By CB, ..., where Ay, By, +.. & @, then gl(x € Ay), (x € By),...] is am. This postulate is obviously +equivalent to the postulate that y[{x € ANC), (xe BNC),...] is am, where C is +a subset of x's domain end the intersections are non-empty. (Proof: Choose +C= A, UB... .) + +Postulate 2. If x and y are simple amcon parameters, then a con with con +parameters x and y is am if it satisfies the postulated requirements +concerning amcons on x and the postulated requirements concerning amcons +on y. + +The effect of all! our assumptions up to now is to make parameters +totally independent. They do not interact with each other at all. + +We will now introduce some specific amcons by postulate. If s is speed, +consideration of the waterfall illusion suggests that we postulate y[(s>O), +{s=O)] to be am. (But with this postulate, we have come a long way from +the literary description of the waterfall illusion! } Note the implicit +requirements that the con family must be a 2-family, and that s must be +selected from [O] in one ensemble and from [s: s>O] in the other ensemble. + +If tis time, t € R, consideration of the phrase "b years ago," which is an +amcon in the natural language, suggests that we postulate y[(t): a-b<t<v-b & +av] to be am, where a is a fixed time expressed in years A.D., bisa fixed +number of years, and v is a variable--the time of the present instant in years +A.D. The implicit requirements are that the con family must have the +cardinality of the continuum, and that every value of t from a-b to v-b must +appear in an ensemble, where v is a variable. Ensembles are thus continually +added to the con family. Note that there is the non-trivial possibility of using +this postulate more than once. We could admit a con for a = 1964, b=, +then admit another for a=1963, b=2, and admit stifl another for a=1963, +b=1; etc. + +Let p be spatial location, p é R2. Let P; be a non-empty, bounded, +connected subset of R2. Restriction subsets will be selected from the P;. +Specifically, let Py APs = ¢. Consideration of a certain dreamed illusion + + +suggests that we admit y[(p € P;), (p € Py)]. The implicit requirements are +obvious. But in this case, there are more requirements in the postulate of + + +197 + + +admissibility. Vay we apply the postulate twice? May we admit first y[(pe +P4), (pe P5)} and then y[(peP3), (pePg)], where P2 and Py are arbitrary +P;'s different from P; and Po? The answer is no. We may admit y [(p € P4), +(p € Po)] for arbitrary Py and Po, Py OP = «3, but having made this "initial +choice," the postulate cannot be reused for arbitrary P3 and Pg. A second +con y[(p € Pa), (p € P4)], PgNP4 = 6, may be postulated to be am only if +P4UP3, PoUP3, PUP, and PoUP4 are not connected. In other words, you +may postulate many cons of the form y[(p é Pi), (p € Pi)] to be am, but +your first choice strongly circumscribes your second choice, etc. + +We will now consider certain results in the logic of amcons which were +established by extensive elucidation of our intuitions. The issue is whether +our present axiomization produces the same results. We will express the +results in our latest notation as far as possible. Two more definitions are +necessary. The parameter @ is the angle of motion of an infinitesimally +moving phenomenon, measured in degrees with respect to some chosen axis. +Then, recalling the set Py, choose Ps and Pa so that Py = P5UPs and +PEOPe=¢. + +The results by which we will judge our axiomization are as follows. + +1: glS, C,UCs] can be inferred to be am. + +Our present notation cannot express this result, because it does not +distinguish between different types of uniform motion throughout a finite +region, i.e. the types M, Cy, Co, Dy, and Do. Instead, we have infinitesimal +motion, which is involved in all the latter types of motion. Questions such as +"whether the admissibility of » [M, S] implies the admissibility of y[C,, S}" +drop out. The reason for the omission in the present theory is our choice of +parameters and domains, which we discussed earlier. Our present version is +thus not exhaustive. However, the deficiency is not intrinsic to our method; +and it does not represent any outright falsification of our intuitions. Thus, +we pass over the deficiency. + +2: [(pe Py, SQ), (pe Po, SqQ)] and other such cons can be inferred to be am. +With our new, powerful approach, this result is trivial. It is guaranteed by +what we said about consistency parameters. + +3: There is no way to infer that y[C1, Cg] is am; and no way to infer that +y[ (45°, SQ>O), (60°,s=s¢)] is am. + +The first part of the result drops out. The second part is trivial with our new +method as long as we do not postulate that cons on @ are am. + +4: p [(pe Po), (p € P5)] can be inferred to be am. + +Yes, by Postulate 1. + +5: v [(s>O, p € Py), (s=O, pe Po)] and y [(s>O, pe Po), (s=O, p € P4)] can + + +198 + + +be inferred to be am. + +Yes, by Postulate 2. These two amcons are distinct. The question of whether +they should be considered equivalent is closely related to the degree to +which con parameters are independent of each other. + +6: There is no way to infer that y [(p € Ps), (pe Pg)] or p[(pe Py), (p € P3) +] is am. Our special requirement in the postulate of admissibility for y [(p € +P+), (p € Po)] guarantees this result. + +The reason for desiring this last result requires some discussion. [In +heuristic terms, we wish to avoid admitting both location in New York in +Greensboro and location in Manhattan and Brooklyn. We also wish to avoid +admitting location in New York in Greensboro and location in New York in +Boston. If we admitted either of these combinations, then the intuitive +rationale of the notions would indicate that we had admitted triple location. +While we have a dreamed illusion which justifies the concept of double +location, we have no intuitive justification whatever for the concept of triple +location. It must be clear that admission of either of the combinations +mentioned would not imply the admissibility of a con on a 3-family with +con parameter p by the postulates of our theory. Our theory is formally safe +from this implication. However, the intuitive meaning of either combination +would make them proxies for the con on the 3-family. + +A closely related consideration is that in the preceding chapter, it +appeared that the admission of y[(p € P;), (pe Po)] and y[(p € Ps), (pe Pe)] +would tend to require the admission of the object y[(p € Po), e [(p € Ps), (p +€ Pg) ]] {a Type 1 chain). Further, it this implication held, then by the same +rationale the admission of y[(p € P4}, (p € Pa)] and y[(s> O, Pg € Py), (s=O, +P=Ppo)1], both of which are am, would require the admission of the object +vl{p € Pa), yl(s> O, pg € Py), (s=O, P=PqQ)]]. We may now say, however, +that the postulates of our theory emphatically do not require us to accept +these implications. If there is an intuitively valid notion underlying the chain +on s and p, it reduces to the amcons introduced in result 5. As for the chain +on p alone, we repeat that simultaneous admission of the two cons +mentioned would tend to justify some triple location concept. However, we +do not have to recognize that concept as being the chain. It seems that our +present approach allows us to forget about chains for now. + +Our conclusion is that the formal approach of this chapter is in good +agreement with our intuitively established results. + + +199 + + +Note on the overall significance of the logic of amcons: + +When traditional logicians said that something was logically impossible, +they meant to imply that it was impossible to imagine or visualize. But this +implication was empirically false. The realm of the logically possible is not +the entire realm of connotative thought; it is just the realm of normal +perceptual routines. When the mind is temporarily freed from normal +perceptual routines--especially in perceptual illusions, but also in dreams and +even in the use of certain "illogical" natural language phrases--it can imagine +and visualize the "logically impossible." Every text on perceptual +psychology mentions this fact, but logicians have never noticed its immense +significance. The logically impossible is not a blank; it is a whole layer of +meaning and concepts which can be superimposed on conventional logic, but +not reduced or assimilated to it. The logician of the future may use a drug or +some other method to free himself from normal perceptual routines for a +sustained period of time, so he can freely think the logically impossible. He +will then perform rigorous deductions and computations in the logic of +amcons. + + +200 + + +20. Subjective Propositional Vibration-work in progress + + +Up until the present, the scientific study of language has treated +language as if it were reducible to the mechanical manipulation of counters +on a board. Scientists have avoided recognizing that language has a mental +aspect, especially an aspect such as the 'understood meaning" of a linguistic +expression. This paper, on the other hand, will present linguistic constructs +which inescapably involve a mental aspect that is objectifiable and can be +subjected to precise analysis in terms of perceptual psychology. These +constructs are not derivable from the models of the existing linguistic +sciences. In fact, the existing linguistic sciences overlook the possibility of +such constructs. + +Consider the ambiguous schema 'ADB&C', expressed in words as 'C and +B if A'. An example is + +Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks. (1) + +In order to get sense out of this utterance, the reader has to supply it with a +comma. That is, in the jargon of logic, he has to supply it with grouping. Let +us make the convention that in order to read the utterance, you must +mentally supply grouping to it, or 'bracket' it. If you construe the schema +as 'AD (B &C)', you will be said to bracket the conjunction. If you construe +the. schema as '(ADB) & C', you will be said to bracket the conditional There +is an immediate syntactical issue. If you are asked to copy (1), do you write +"Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks"; or do you write +"Jack will soon leave, and Bill will laugh if Don speaks" if that is the way +you are reading (1) at the moment? A distinction has to be made between +reading the proposition, which involves bracketing; and viewing the +proposition, which involves reacting to the ink-marks solely as a pattern. +Thus, any statement about an ambiguous grouping proposition must specify +whether the reference is to the proposition as read or as viewed. + +Some additional conventions are necessary. With respect to (1), we +distinguish two possibilities: you are reading it, or you are not looking at it +(or are only viewing it). Thus, a "single reading' of (1) refers to an event +which separates two consecutive periods of not looking at {1) (or only +viewing it). During a single reading, you may switch between bracketing the +conjunction and bracketing the conditional. These switches demarcate a +series of "states" of the reading, which alternately correspond to 'Jack will + + +201 + + +¢ + + +soon leave, and Bill will laugh if Don speaks' or 'Jack will soon leave and Bill +will laugh, if Don speaks'. Note that a state is like a complete proposition. +We stipulate that inasmuch as (1) is read at all, it is the present meaning or +state that counts--if you are asked what the proposition says, whether it is +true, etc. + +Another convention is that the logical status of +(Jack will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks) if and only if (Jack +will soon leave and Bill will laugh if Don speaks) +is not that of a normal tautology, even though the biconditional when +viewed has the form 'A=A'. The two ambiguous cemponents wil! not +necessarily be bracketed the same way in a state. + +We now turn to an example which is more substantial that (1). +Consider +Your mother is a whore and you are now bracketing the conditional! in (2) if +you are now bracketing the conjunction in (2). (2) +If you read this proposition, then depending on how you bracket it, the +reading wil! either be internally false or else wil! call your mother a whore. In +general, ambiguous grouping propositions are constructs in which the mental +aspect plays a fairly explicit role in the language. We have included (2) to +show that the contents of these propositions can provide more complications +than would be suggested by (1). + + +There is another way of bringing out the mental! aspect of language, +however, which is incomparably more powerful than ambiguous grouping. +We will turn to this approach immediately, and will devote the rest of the +paper to it. The cubical frame is asimple reversible perspective figure +which can either be seen oriented upward like Q _ or oriented downward +like ©, . Both positions are implicit in the same ink-on-paper image; it is +the subjective psychological response of the perceiver which differentiates +the positions. The perceiver can deliberately cause the perspective to reverse, +or he can allow the perspective to reverse without resisting. The perspective +can also reverse against his will. Thus, there are three possibilities: deliberate, +indifferent, and involuntary reversal. + +Suppose that each of the positions is assigned a different meaning, and +the figure is used as a notation. We will adopt the following definitions +because they are convenient for our purposes at the moment. + +> (for '3' if it appears to be oriented like Q + +for 'O' (zero) if it appears to be oriented like @! + +We may now write + + +1 +B = 4 (3) +We must further agree that (3), or any proposition containing such + + +202 + + +notation, is to be read to mean just what it seems to mean at any given +instant. [f, at the moment you read the proposition, the cube seems to be +up, then the proposition means 1+3=4; but if the cube seems to be down, +the proposition means 1+O=4. The proposition has an unambiguous +meaning for the reader at any given instant, but the meaning may change in +the next instant due to a subjective psychological change in the reader. The +reader is to accept the proposition for what it is at any instant. The result is +subjectively triggered propositional vibration, or SPV for short. The +distinction between reading and viewing a proposition, which we already +made in the case of ambiguous grouping, is even more important in the case +of SPV. Reading now occurs only when perspective is imputed. In reading +(3) you don't think about the ink graph any more than you think about the +type face. + +in a definition such as that of ' 8 '3° and 'OQ' will be called the +assignments. A single reading is defined as before. During a single reading, (3) +will vibrate some number of times. The series of states of the reading, which +alternately correspond to '1 + 3 = 4' or '1+ O = 4', are demarcated by +these vibrations. The portion of a state which can change when vibration +occurs will be called a partial. It is the partials in a reading that correspond +directly to the assignments in the definition. + +Additional conventions are necessary. Most of the cases we are +concerned with can be covered by two extremely important rules. First, the +ordinary theory of properties which have to do with the form of expressions +as viewed is not applicable when SPV notation is present. Not only is a +biconditional not a tautology just because its components are the same when +viewed; it cannot be considered an ordinary tautology even if the one +component's states have the same truth value, as in the case of '1 + & # +2'. Secondly, and even more important, SPV notation has to be present +explicitly or it is not present at all. SPV is not the idea of an expression with +two meanings, which is commonplace in English; SPV is a double meaning +which comes about by a perceptual experience and thus has very special +properties. Thus, if a quantifier should be used in a proposition containing +SPV notation, the "range" of the "variable" will be that of conventional + + +ser + + +logic. You cannot write ' RS ' for 'x' in the statement matrix 'x += we ' + +We must now elucidate at considerable length the uniqué properties of +SPV. When the reader sees an SPV figure, past perceptual training will cause +him to impute one or the other orientation to it. This phenomenon is not a +mere convention in the sense in which new terminology is a convention. +There are already two clear-cut possibilities. Their reality is entirely mental; +the external. ink-on-paper aspect does not change in any manner whatever. + + +203 + + +The change that can occur is completely and inherently subjective and +mental. By mental effort, the reader can consciously control the orientation. +If he does, involuntary vibrations will occur because of neural noise or +attention lapses. The reader can also refrain from control and accept +whatever appears. In this case, when the figure is used as a notation, +vibrations may occur because of a preference for one meaning over the +other. Thus, a deliberate vibration, an involuntary vibration, and an +indifferent vibration are three distinct possibilities. + +What we have done is to give meanings to the two pre-existing +perceptual possibilities. In order to read a proposition containing an SPV +notation at all, one has to see the ink-on-paper figure, impute perspective to +it, and recall the meaning of that perspective; rather than just seeing the +figure and recalling its meaning. The imputation of perspective, which will +happen anyway because of pre-existing perceptual training, has a function in +the language we are developing analogous to the function of a letter of the +alphabet in ordinary language. The imputation of perspective is an aspect of +the notation, but it is entirely mental. Our language uses not only +graphemes, but "psychemes" or "mentemes". One consequence is that the +time structure of the vibration series has a distinct character; different in +principle from external, mechanical randomization, or even changes which +the reader would produce by pressing a button. Another consequence is that +ambiguous notation in general is not equivalent to SPV. There can be mental +changes of meaning with respect to any ambiguous notation, but in general +there is no psycheme, no mental change of notation. It is the clear-cut, +mental, involuntary change of notation which is the essence of SPV. Without +psychemes, there can be no truly involuntary mental changes of meaning. + + +In order to illustrate the preceding remarks, we will use an SPV +notation defined as follows. +« fis an affirmative, read "definitely," if it appears to be oriented +BH ijlike O + +is a negative, read "not," if it appears to be oriented like fy +The proposition which follows refers to the immediate past, not to all past +time; that is, it refers to the preceding vebration. + +You have i deliberately vibrated (4). (4) + + +This proposition refers to itself, and its truth depends on an aspect of the +reader's subjectivity which accompanies the act of reading. However, the +same can be said for the next proposition. + +The bat is made of wood, and you have just decided that the second + + +word in (5) refers to a flying mammal. (5) + + +204 + + +Further, the same can be said for (2). We must compare (5), (2), and (4) in +order to establish that (4) represents an order of language entirely different +from that represented by (5) and (2). (5) is a grammatical English sentence +as it stands, although an abnormal one. The invariable, all-ink notation 'bat' +has an equivocal referental structure: it may have either of two mutually +exclusive denotations. In reading, the native speaker of English has to choose +one denotation or the other; contexts in which the choice is difficult rarely +occur. (2) is not automatically grammatical, because it lacks a comma. We +have agreed on a conventional process by which the reader mentally supplies +the comma. Thus, the proposition lacks an element and the reader must +supply it by a deliberate act of thought. The comma is not, strictly speaking, +a notation, because it is entirely voluntary. The reader might as well be +supplying a denotation io an equivocal expression: (5) and (2) can be +reduced to the same principle. As for (4), it cannot be mistaken for ordinary +English. It has an equivocal "proto-notation," ' 74] ". You automatically +impute perspective to the proto-notation before you react to it as language. +Thus, a notation with a mental component comes into being involuntarily. +This notation has an unequivocal denotation. However, deliberate, +inditferent, and most important of all, involuntary mental changes in +notation can occur. + +We now suggest that the reader actually read (5), (2), and (4), in that +order. We expect that (5) can be read without noticeable effort, and that a +fixed result will be arrived at {unless the reader switches in an attempt to +find a true state). The reading of (2) involves mentally supplying the comma, +which is easy, and comprehending the logical compound which . results, +which is not as easy. Again, we expect that a fixed result will be arrived at +(unless the reader vacillates between the insult and the internally false state). +In order to read (4), center your sight on the SPV notation, with your +peripheral vision taking in the rest of the sentence. A single reading should +last at least half a minute. If the reader will seriously read (4), we expect that +he will find the reading to be an experience of a totally different order from +the reading of (5) and (2). It is like looking at certain confusing visual +patterns, but with an entire dimension added by the incorporation of the +pattern into language. The essence of the experience, as we have indicated, is +that the original imputation of perspective is involuntary, and that the reader +has to contend with involuntary changes in notation for which his own mind +is responsible. We are relying on this experience to convince the reader +empirically that (4) represents a new order of language to an extent to which +(5) and (2) do not. + +To make our point even clearer, let us introduce an operation, called +"collapsing," which may be applied to propositions containing SPV + + +205 + + +proto-notation. The operation consists in redefining the SPV figure in a given +proposition so that its assignments are the states of the original proposition. +Let us collapse (4). We redefine + +for 'You have deliberately vibrated (4)' if it appears to be oriented +t_* like @J + +for 'You have not deliberately vibrated (4)' if it appears to be oriented + +like + + +(4) now becomes + + +# (4) + + +We emphasize that the reader must actually read (4), for the effect is +indescribable. The reader should learn the assignments with flash cards if +necessary. + +The claim we want to make for (4) is probably that it is the most +clear-cut case yet constructed in which thought becomes an object for itself. +Just looking at a reversible perspective figure which is not a linguistic +utterance--an approach which perceptual psychologists have already +tried--does not yield results which are significant with respect to "thought." +In order to obtain a significant case, the apparent orientation or imputed +perspective must be a proposition; it must be true or false. Then, (5) and (2) +are not highly significant, because the mental act of supplying the missing +element of the proposition is all a matter of your volition; and because the +element supplied is essentially an "understood meaning." We already have an +abundance of understood meanings, but scientists have been able to ignore +them because they are not "objectifiable." In short, reversible perspective by +itself is not "thought"; equivocation by itself has no mental aspect which is +objectifiable. Only in reading (4) do we experience an "objectifiable aspect +of thought." We have invented an instance of thought (as opposed to +perception) which can be accomodated in the ontology of the perceptual +psychologist. + + +206 + + +¥ + + +Henry Flynt, Blueprint for a Higher Civilization +(Milano, Multhipla Edizioni, 1975) +ERRATA + + +p. 4 delete 5/15/1962 +Adams House +p.- 24 delete 5/15/1962 +audience, +ppe 26-32 middle of p. 26 to top of p. 32 +should come after p. 60 +pe 27 line 5 fact it +line 7 of them, which +pe 42 line 4 bodies +"statements", it +pe 53 delete 2/22/1963 +February 27, 1963 +pe 55 line 7 mind', +pe 72 delete third line from bottom +pe 74 delete 2/22/1963 +February 27, 1963 +p. 84 delete 2/22/1963 +February 27, 1963 + + +(photo +pe 86 line 26 transformation +p. 94 line 2 from bottom is true, +p. 96 lines 12-14 all S to have superscript D +line 13 250 +under the figure: given 25 S X5yy +pe 97 line 14 D-Memory +p. 99 lines 13, 14, 15 right-hand +p. 100 line 3 from bottom 1962 +p. 101 line 19 Chicago." +line 25 sun," +p. 102 line 4 from bottom assertion." +pe 104 line 8 switch +line 26 A, ar +i +line 28 A." +; as + + +pe 105 between lines 25, 26 + + +Conclusion 3.1. Conscious remembering occurs in +some mental state. + + +I j 7 *j-a +p. 108 line 20. x.,--x. + + +j-1 j +lines 4, 5 from bottom j+4 + + +p. 109 line 2 2.4 %-Memories +pe 114 line 5 from bottom "A single +pe 120 line 5 26 + + +pe 106 line 7 x + + +Page 1 + + +Henry Flynt, Blueprint for a Higher Civilization Page 2 +(Milano, Multhipla Edizioni, 1975) + + +ERRATA + + +pe. 125 bottom line table. See Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. + + +p. 129 line 1 —s. 7 +line 12 from bottom +fotally determinate innperseq' iff an innpersea +line 10 from bottom +Tantecedentally indeterminate innperseq! iff an innperseq +line 8 from bottom +*halpointally indeterminate innperseq' iff an innperseq + + +pp. 134-151 These pages should have tab pagination identifying +them as pp. 1-18 of the "Guidebook." + + +Also, the Guidebook must start on a right-hand +page. + + +p. 139 line 13 a_lb +p. 141 line 15 NOW--CLOSE +pe 145 in Instr. 1-3. (t SS ) +line 6 from bottom 9. +p. 147 line 3 'a +p. 152 delete 2/22/1963 +Februery 27, 1963 +(photo +p. 158 line 23 most fears +line 24 imposed +p.- 179 bottom line definite +p. 180 line 5 categories, +p. 187 delete 2/22/1963 +February 27, 1963 +p. 195 line 12 admissible +p. 201 line 19 'AD (BEC)', +. line 20 conditional. +p. 202 line 12 than (1). +p. 204 line 7 from bottom vibration +p. 206 lines 4-7 definitions in braces { } + + diff --git a/salitter.sty b/salitter.sty new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5943fa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/salitter.sty @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +% ---- layout - lulu a5 +\newcommand{\afivelayout}[0]{ + \setstocksize{8.52in}{6.08in} + \settrimmedsize{7.27in}{4.53in}{*} + \settrims{0.50in}{0.75in} + \setlrmarginsandblock{0.125in}{0.125in}{*} + \setulmarginsandblock{50pt}{*}{*} + \setheaderspaces{*}{*}{1.618} + \checkandfixthelayout} + +% ---- layout - us letter, on laser printer +\newcommand{\usletterlayout}[0]{ + \setstocksize{8.5in}{5in} + \settrimmedsize{8in}{4.5in}{*} + \settrims{0.25in}{0.25in} + \setlrmarginsandblock{0.125in}{0.125in}{*} + \setulmarginsandblock{50pt}{*}{*} + \setheaderspaces{*}{*}{1.618} + \checkandfixthelayout} + +% ---- layout duct tape + +% some section where we just want to not be indenting paragraphs for a while +% obviously shouldnt be nested +% \newlength{\savelength} +% \newenvironment{noindent}{ +% \setlength{\savelength}{parindent} +% \setlength{\parindent}{0}}{ +% \setlength{\parindent}{savelength}} + +% ---- image shorthand + +% \graphicspath{ {img/} } % a default, which could/should be changed + +\newcommand{\img}[1]{ + \begin{center} + % \includegraphics[width=0.9\textwidth]{1.1.1.png} + \includegraphics[scale=1]{#1} +\end{center}} + +% ---- font (antiqua) + +\newcommand{\antiquafont}[0]{ + \usepackage{baskervald} + \usepackage[T1]{fontenc}} + +% ---- font (coelacanth) + +\newcommand{\coelfont}[0]{ + \usepackage[nf]{coelacanth} + \usepackage[T1]{fontenc} + + \let\oldnormalfont\normalfont + \def\normalfont{\oldnormalfont\mdseries}} + +% ---- font (coelacanth) + +\newcommand{\dayromanfont}[0]{ + \usepackage[nf]{coelacanth} + \usepackage[T1]{fontenc} + + \let\oldnormalfont\normalfont + \def\normalfont{\oldnormalfont\mdseries}} + + +% ---- metadata for a title page + +% ---- semantic punctuation, etc +% quoting a word when speaking of a word itself +\newcommand{\word}[1]{ + \enquote{#1}} + +% ---- odds-and-ends added for aurora + +\newcommand{\textquotetranslate}[3]{\enquote{#1} ({#2} --- #3)} + +% eg, \term with translation +\newcommand{\termtranslate}[2]{\emph{#1} ({#2})} + +% eg, "quotedword" with translation +\newcommand{\wordtranslate}[2]{\enquote{#1} ({#2})} + +% textquote with citation +\newcommand{\citedquote}[2]{\enquote{#1} ({#2})} + +% inclusion of text in original language, w/ citation, w/o translation +\newcommand{\citedoriginal}[3]{(\emph{#1} --- {#2})} + +% the original construct in the text is unclear to me +% \newcommand{\citedoriginal}[3]{({#1} --- \emph{#2} {#3})} + +% ---- random odds-and-ends components +\newcommand{\nofolios}{ + \pagestyle{empty}} + +\newcommand{\etc}{ + \textit{etc.}} + +\newcommand{\eg}{ + \textit{e.g.}} + +% timeforms bits i may use elsewhere... +\newcommand{\speaker}[1]{ + \textsc{#1}} + +\newenvironment{dialogue}{ + % we want opposite indentation for paragraphs: first line of each paragraph not indented, every line after is indented. + \begin{hangparas}{2em}{1} +}{ + \end{hangparas} +} + +\newenvironment{alphaenumerate}{ + \renewcommand{\labelenumi}{\alpha{enumi}} + \begin{enumerate}}{ + \end{enumerate} + \renewcommand{\labelenumi}{\arabic{enumi}}} +% ---- random odds-and-ends components + +\newcommand{\articletitle}[1]{\enquote{#1}} +\newcommand{\booktitle}[1]{\emph{#1}} +\newcommand{\journaltitle}[1]{\emph{#1}} +\newcommand{\conferencetitle}[1]{\textit{#1}} +\newcommand{\symposiumtitle}[1]{\enquote{#1}} +\newcommand{\filmtitle}[1]{\emph{#1}} +\newcommand{\term}[1]{\emph{#1}} + +\newcommand{\ie}[0]{i.e.} +\newcommand{\ibid}[0]{\textit{Ibid.}} +\newcommand{\opcit}[0]{\textit{op. cit.}} +\newcommand{\loccit}[0]{\textit{loc. cit.}} +\newcommand{\etseq}[0]{\textit{et. seq.}} +\newcommand{\etal}[0]{\textit{et. al.}} + +\newcommand{\signoff}[1]{ + {\raggedleft #1 \par}} + +\newcommand{\signoffnote}[1]{ + {\raggedleft \textit{#1} \par}} + +\newcommand{\chapterauthor}[1]{ + {\large \itshape #1 \par }} + +% ---- symbols etc + +% \newcommand{\gl}{\guillemotleft} +% \newcommand{\gr}{\guillemotright} |