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diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.otx b/essays/philosophy_proper.otx index 9a20767..7c6e385 100644 --- a/essays/philosophy_proper.otx +++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.otx @@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed name is g The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be discussing the \dq{truth} of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for \dq{true statement}. (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) -Well, what is a \term{statement}? How do what are usually said to be \term{statements} state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important connotations of \term{true statement}, and, more generally, of \e{statement}, as traditionally and commonly used, is that a \term{statement} is an \dq{assertion which has truth value} (is true or false) (or \dq{has content}, as it is sometimes said, rather misleadingly). That is, the \dq{verbal} part of a statement is supposed to be related in a certain way to something \dq{non-verbal}, or at least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a statement is supposed to be \dq{true} or not because of something having to do with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is related. (The exceptions are the \dq{statements} of formalist logic and mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are interested in.) Thus, if \dq{\term{true statement}} is to be explicated, \dq{assertion having truth value} and \dq{is true} (and \dq{has content} in a misleading use) have to be explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication for \dq{\term{true statement}} deserves the connotations which were suggested with \dq{assertion having truth value} and \dq{is true}. One important conclusion from these observations is that although \dq{sentences} (the bodies of sound or bodes of marks such as \dq{The man talks}) are often said to be \dq{statements}, would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate \dq{\term{statement}} by simply identifying it with \dq{sentence} (in my sense); something must be said about such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify \dq{\term{statement}}with \dq{sentence}, the latter being explicated in terms of the (\dq{formal}) rules for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. +Well, what is a \term{statement}? How do what are usually said to be \term{statements} state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important connotations of \term{true statement}, and, more generally, of \e{statement}, as traditionally and commonly used, is that a \term{statement} is an \dq{assertion which has truth value} (is true or false) (or \dq{has content}, as it is sometimes said, rather misleadingly). That is, the \dq{verbal} part of a statement is supposed to be related in a certain way to something \dq{non-verbal}, or at least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a statement is supposed to be \dq{true} or not because of something having to do with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is related. (The exceptions are the \dq{statements} of formalist logic and mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are interested in.) Thus, if \dq{\e{\sq{true statement}}} is to be explicated, \dq{assertion having truth value} and \dq{is true} (and \dq{has content} in a misleading use) have to be explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication for \dq{\e{\sq{true statement}}} deserves the connotations which were suggested with \dq{assertion having truth value} and \dq{is true}. One important conclusion from these observations is that although \dq{sentences} (the bodies of sound or bodes of marks such as \dq{The man talks}) are often said to be \dq{statements}, would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate \dq{\e{\sq{statement}}} by simply identifying it with \dq{sentence} (in my sense); something must be said about such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify \dq{\e{\sq{statement}}}with \dq{sentence}, the latter being explicated in terms of the (\dq{formal}) rules for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. -In explicating \dq{\term{true statement}} I will use the most elegant approach, one relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to \dq{apply} \ul{table} to the thing. It is supposed that \ul{table} has been \dq{interpreted}, that is, that it is \dq{\e{determinate}} to which, of all things, applications of \ul{table} are (to be said to be) \dq{true}. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is \dq{determinate} which, of all things (events), are \dq{occurrences of the word \dq{table}}, are expressions \dq{equivalent to} \ul{table}.) The word \dq{\e{determinate}} is the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for \dq{apply}, one can \dq{apply} the word to the thing by pointing out \dq{first} the word and \dq{then} the thing. \dq{point out} is restricted to refer to \term{ostension}, pointing out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to \dq{directing attention to things not in one's presence} as well. The assertion is \dq{true}, of course, if and only if the thing to which \ul{table} is applied is one of the things to which it is determinate that the application of \ul{table} is (to be said to be) \dq{true}, otherwise \dq{false}. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a \dq{first} thing and a \dq{second}, the first being an interpreted expression, is an assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further suggest \dq{\term{interpreted expression}} as an explication for \dq{name}; with respect to this explication, the things to which equivalent names (\dq{occurrences of a name}) may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is \e{how a name has referents}; I have not said, for example, whether the relation between name and referents is an \dq{objective, metaphysical entity}, which would be getting into philosophy proper. +In explicating \dq{\e{\sq{true statement}}} I will use the most elegant approach, one relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to \dq{apply} \ul{table} to the thing. It is supposed that \ul{table} has been \dq{interpreted}, that is, that it is \dq{\e{determinate}} to which, of all things, applications of \ul{table} are (to be said to be) \dq{true}. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is \dq{determinate} which, of all things (events), are \dq{occurrences of the word \dq{table}}, are expressions \dq{equivalent to} \ul{table}.) The word \dq{\e{determinate}} is the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for \dq{apply}, one can \dq{apply} the word to the thing by pointing out \dq{first} the word and \dq{then} the thing. \dq{point out} is restricted to refer to \term{ostension}, pointing out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to \dq{directing attention to things not in one's presence} as well. The assertion is \dq{true}, of course, if and only if the thing to which \ul{table} is applied is one of the things to which it is determinate that the application of \ul{table} is (to be said to be) \dq{true}, otherwise \dq{false}. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a \dq{first} thing and a \dq{second}, the first being an interpreted expression, is an assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further suggest \dq{\e{\sq{interpreted expression}}} as an explication for \dq{name}; with respect to this explication, the things to which equivalent names (\dq{occurrences of a name}) may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is \e{how a name has referents}; I have not said, for example, whether the relation between name and referents is an \dq{objective, metaphysical entity}, which would be getting into philosophy proper. -The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \dq{simple} kind; thus an explication for \dq{\term{true statement}} can be found. To do so, first let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \dq{main verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the sentence. For example, the associated name of \dq{Boston is in Massachusetts} is \dq{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. +The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \dq{simple} kind; thus an explication for \dq{\e{\sq{true statement}}} can be found. To do so, first let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \dq{main verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the sentence. For example, the associated name of \dq{Boston is in Massachusetts} is \dq{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. \vskip 1em @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Example: \vskip 0.5em -Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to make a statement, is to so to speak \dq{assert} its associated name; this \dq{asserted name} being \dq{true} if and only if it has a referent. However, one doesn't \e{assert} names; names just have referents---it is statements that one makes, \dq{asserts}, and that are \dq{true} or \dq{false}. How, then, do we explicate this \dq{\term{asserting}} of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple kind, which is the application of \ul{having a referent} to the name. In other words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying \ul{having a referent} to it. For example, the sentence \dq{Boston is in Massachusetts} should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the application of \ul{having a referent} to \dq{Boston being in Massachusetts}. +Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to make a statement, is to so to speak \dq{assert} its associated name; this \dq{asserted name} being \dq{true} if and only if it has a referent. However, one doesn't \e{assert} names; names just have referents---it is statements that one makes, \dq{asserts}, and that are \dq{true} or \dq{false}. How, then, do we explicate this \dq{\e{\sq{asserting}}} of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple kind, which is the application of \ul{having a referent} to the name. In other words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying \ul{having a referent} to it. For example, the sentence \dq{Boston is in Massachusetts} should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the application of \ul{having a referent} to \dq{Boston being in Massachusetts}. Now this approach may seem \dq{unnatural} or incomplete to the reader for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is replaced by a statement \dq{about} it (or to be precise its associated name). Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of interpreting \dq{simple names} (Fries' \term{Class 1 words}), but not so natural to speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such words as \dq{the}; in making statements, these names have to be in the context of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything about what the \dq{meaning} (intension), as opposed to the referents (and non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous word \dq{determinate}, because I haven't said anything about how names get referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in some form must have the central role in it.) @@ -116,17 +116,17 @@ So much for the preliminaries. I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. -First, consider the term \dq{\term{non-experience}}. Although the concept of a non-experience is intrinsically far more \dq{difficult} than the concept of \dq{\term{experience}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, presupposed in all \dq{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the second chapter); unperceivable \dq{things} (microscopic objects (of course, viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\fnote{To simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is presumably a connotation of \dq{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the second chapter. +First, consider the term \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}}. Although the concept of a non-experience is intrinsically far more \dq{difficult} than the concept of \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, presupposed in all \dq{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the second chapter); unperceivable \dq{things} (microscopic objects (of course, viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\fnote{To simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is presumably a connotation of \dq{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the second chapter. In the history of philosophy, the concept of \term{non-experience} comes first. Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a \term{perception}, or \term{experience} of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that one knows about \term{non-experiences} by perceiving, having experiences of, some of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes (assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by having a \dq{visual-table-experience}. The theory goes on to say that these perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem \dq{mental}. The theory that they are in the mind is a {\bf belief}. This point leads directly to the second source of confusion. Does the English word \dq{table}, as ordinarily used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to the reader, then he probably uses \dq{table}, \dq{perceived table}, and \dq{table-experience} as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the perceptions. -Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term \dq{\term{experience}} is important here because with it philosophers finally made a start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that \stress{there is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like.}One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, \dq{thinking} that one doesn't have one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity.\fnote{For example, some philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds.} In speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as will be shown). +Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} is important here because with it philosophers finally made a start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that \stress{there is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like.}One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, \dq{thinking} that one doesn't have one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity.\fnote{For example, some philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds.} In speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as will be shown). -I have explained the current use of the term \dq{\term{experience}}. Now I want to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing \dq{\term{non-experience}} I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of the term, in the case of \dq{\term{experience}} I am going to suggest a new use for the term.) As I explained, the concept of \term{non-experience} preceded that of \term{experience}, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the former. What I am interested in, however, is not \dq{experience} as it implies. \dq{perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind}, but as it refers to \stress{that which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not something one believes exists}. I am going to use \dq{\term{experience}} to refer, as it already does, to that immediate \dq{world}, but \stress{without the implication that \term{experience} is perception of \term{non-experience}, and in the mind: the same referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use \dq{\term{experience}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to non-experiences, is not an antonym for \dq{\term{non-experience}} as conventionally used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy between \dq{experience} as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences or in particular the realm where they could be, and \dq{\term{experience}} without these connotations. +I have explained the current use of the term \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}}. Now I want to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}} I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of the term, in the case of \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} I am going to suggest a new use for the term.) As I explained, the concept of \term{non-experience} preceded that of \term{experience}, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the former. What I am interested in, however, is not \dq{experience} as it implies. \dq{perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind}, but as it refers to \stress{that which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not something one believes exists}. I am going to use \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} to refer, as it already does, to that immediate \dq{world}, but \stress{without the implication that \term{experience} is perception of \term{non-experience}, and in the mind: the same referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to non-experiences, is not an antonym for \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}} as conventionally used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy between \dq{experience} as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences or in particular the realm where they could be, and \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} without these connotations. -Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be obvious that although my term \dq{\term{experience}} was introduced last, it is intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, especially, the theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences}. Even if the reader's conceptual background does not involve the concept of \term{non-experience,} and especially the modern Western theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences,} he ought to be able to understand, and realize the \dq{primacy} of, my term \dq{\term{experience}}. The term should be supra-cultural. +Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be obvious that although my term \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} was introduced last, it is intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, especially, the theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences}. Even if the reader's conceptual background does not involve the concept of \term{non-experience,} and especially the modern Western theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences,} he ought to be able to understand, and realize the \dq{primacy} of, my term \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}}. The term should be supra-cultural. -I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \dq{experience}. As I have said, it is \dq{intrinsically} the simplest term, but I can not define it by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including the traditional term \dq{experience}, the antonym of \dq{\term{non-experience}}, is based on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for different philosophers according as their metaphysics\fnote{Or, as is sometimes (incorrectly) said, \dq{ontologies}.} differ. Even such a sentence as \dq{The table is black} implies the formulation \dq{\ul{Material objects are real}} (to the materialist), or \dq{\ul{So-called objects are ideas in the mind}} (to the idealist), or \dq{\ul{Substances and attributes are real}}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of \term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example when I say that the connotation of relatedness to \term{non-experience} is to be dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or other natural language, but by having referents. +I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \dq{experience}. As I have said, it is \dq{intrinsically} the simplest term, but I can not define it by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including the traditional term \dq{experience}, the antonym of \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}}, is based on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for different philosophers according as their metaphysics\fnote{Or, as is sometimes (incorrectly) said, \dq{ontologies}.} differ. Even such a sentence as \dq{The table is black} implies the formulation \dq{\ul{Material objects are real}} (to the materialist), or \dq{\ul{So-called objects are ideas in the mind}} (to the idealist), or \dq{\ul{Substances and attributes are real}}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of \term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example when I say that the connotation of relatedness to \term{non-experience} is to be dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or other natural language, but by having referents. As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my \term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything about \term{non-experiences}, since in English there is always the implication that there could be \term{non-experiences}. The term is a radical innovation; one of the most important in this book. The fact that although it is the \dq{simplest} and least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my \term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences.\fnote{It's good that this isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this realm would have to be a non-experience.} If he is lucky he will just find the book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may already realize what I'm going to say. @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the book, I can g However, in the hope that it will make the main \dq{argument} of this chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous version of it, which should give the \dq{intuitive insight} behind the main argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The \dq{necessity}, but inconsistency, of skepticism \dq{shows} my conclusion in an intuitively understandable way. -To get on to the definitive version of my \dq{argument}. I will say that one name \dq{\term{depends}} on another if and only if it has the logical relation to that other that \ul{black table} has to \ul{table}: a referent of the former is necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity \term{depends} on \term{non-experience}, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For example, \dq{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the formulation \dq{Other persons have minds}, certainly \term{depends} on \term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-ex\-per\-ience} will be true of the associated name of any formulation of a belief. +To get on to the definitive version of my \dq{argument}. I will say that one name \dq{\e{\sq{depends}}} on another if and only if it has the logical relation to that other that \ul{black table} has to \ul{table}: a referent of the former is necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity \term{depends} on \term{non-experience}, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For example, \dq{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the formulation \dq{Other persons have minds}, certainly \term{depends} on \term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-ex\-per\-ience} will be true of the associated name of any formulation of a belief. -In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of non-ex\-per\-ience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of \term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions \term{non-experience} and experience (traditional). What I did not go on to show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's \term{experience} (used in my, \dq{neutral}, sense unless I say otherwise). Could there be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in the last chapter.\fnote{Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it without appealing to other beliefs.} If there could be, if such awareness were just an experience, the distinctness of \term{experience} from experience (traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience (traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into \term{experience}. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in one's \term{experience}---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness which is \dq{understanding the concepts} of non-experience and the rest as they are supposed to be understood. And for \dq{understanding}\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and non-referents) of \dq{\term{non-experience}}, which to name an experience (traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands \term{non-experience}---and \dq{\term{non-experience}}---and \dq{\dq{\term{non-experience}}}; but here one is, using \dq{\term{non-experience}} and \dq{\dq{\term{non-experience}}} to say so (which certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the concept of \term{non-experience}, it collapses. +In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of non-ex\-per\-ience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of \term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions \term{non-experience} and experience (traditional). What I did not go on to show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's \term{experience} (used in my, \dq{neutral}, sense unless I say otherwise). Could there be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in the last chapter.\fnote{Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it without appealing to other beliefs.} If there could be, if such awareness were just an experience, the distinctness of \term{experience} from experience (traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience (traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into \term{experience}. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in one's \term{experience}---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness which is \dq{understanding the concepts} of non-experience and the rest as they are supposed to be understood. And for \dq{understanding}\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and non-referents) of \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}}, which to name an experience (traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands \term{non-experience}---and \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}}---and \dq{\sq{\term{non-experience}}}; but here one is, using \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}} and \dq{\sq{\term{non-experience}}} to say so (which certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the concept of \term{non-experience}, it collapses. (A final point for the expert. This tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences about names, which show contradictions---that one must not assume that one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say so (does assume it)---with explicit stratification.) -My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about experience (traditional), \term{non-experience}, and the rest, because I have spoken as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \dq{experience} (traditional), \dq{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \dq{experience} (traditional), \dq{\term{non-experience}}, and the rest, it shows that one who \dq{accepts} the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to \term{experiences} (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a formulation of a belief does have a good \term{explication} for the reader, then it is not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to \term{experiences}.) Now there is an important point about method which should be brought out. If all \dq{non-experiential language}, \dq{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as \dq{all formulations of beliefs are false}. +My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about experience (traditional), \term{non-experience}, and the rest, because I have spoken as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \dq{experience} (traditional), \dq{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \dq{experience} (traditional), \dq{\e{\sq{non-experience}}}, and the rest, it shows that one who \dq{accepts} the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to \term{experiences} (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a formulation of a belief does have a good \term{explication} for the reader, then it is not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to \term{experiences}.) Now there is an important point about method which should be brought out. If all \dq{non-experiential language}, \dq{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as \dq{all formulations of beliefs are false}. Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable \term{explication} which was true; in short, the belief would have a true formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that it could have an acceptable \term{explication} for him, could not turn out to be an expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some way. Now there is another important point about \dq{method} to be made. The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one can \dq{know}, be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. (Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like being aware with respect to a table, \dq{that in my language, this is to be said to be a \dq{table}}.) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be discussed here. @@ -158,11 +158,11 @@ The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \dq{Yes, but\l In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by discussing believing itself, as a (\dq{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be talking about mental acts and \term{experience}, it must be clear that this part of the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will not try to talk about \dq{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify \dq{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. -I should say immediately that \dq{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed to refer to \dq{\term{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of non-experience}}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one does or does not \dq{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \dq{belief} in the use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of the last part. Now when I speak of a \dq{belief} I will be speaking of an \term{experience}, what might be said to be \dq{\e{an act of consciously believing, of consciously having a belief}}, of what is \dq{in one's head} when one says that one \dq{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \dq{that others have minds}, for example, or in general of belief \dq{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be \dq{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely about \term{experiences}; I will not be trying to talk \dq{about the realm of non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his \dq{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \dq{\e{act of consciously believing}}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, use of a word (\dq{\term{belief}}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, rather than rejecting the word altogether. +I should say immediately that \dq{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed to refer to \dq{\e{\sq{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of non-experience}}}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one does or does not \dq{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \dq{belief} in the use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of the last part. Now when I speak of a \dq{belief} I will be speaking of an \term{experience}, what might be said to be \dq{\e{an act of consciously believing, of consciously having a belief}}, of what is \dq{in one's head} when one says that one \dq{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \dq{that others have minds}, for example, or in general of belief \dq{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be \dq{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely about \term{experiences}; I will not be trying to talk \dq{about the realm of non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his \dq{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \dq{\e{act of consciously believing}}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, use of a word (\dq{\e{\sq{belief}}}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, rather than rejecting the word altogether. -There is a further point about terminology. The reader should remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \dq{that perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental and non-mental \term{experiences}, between, for example, visualizing a table with one's eyes closed, and a \dq{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am going to say that visualizations and the like are \dq{\term{imagined-experiences}}. For example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an \dq{\term{imagined-visual-table-experience}}. The reader should not suppose that by \dq{imagined} I mean that the experiences are \dq{hallucinations}, are \dq{unreal}. I use \dq{imagined} because saying \dq{mental-table-experience} is too much like saying \dq{table in the mind} and because just using \dq{visualization} leaves no way of speaking of mental \term{experiences} which are not visualizations. Speaking of an \dq{\term{imagined-table-experience}} seems to be the best way of saying that it is a mental \term{experience}, and then distinguishing it from other mental \term{experiences} by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \dq{of a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining like a (non-mental) table-experience). In other words, an \term{imagined-\x-experience} (to generalize) is a \dq{valid} experience, all right, but it is not a non-mental \x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a (non-mental) \x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \dq{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the conventional method of distinguishing different mental \term{experiences} by saying that they are imaginings \dq{of one or another non-mental \term{experiences}}. +There is a further point about terminology. The reader should remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \dq{that perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental and non-mental \term{experiences}, between, for example, visualizing a table with one's eyes closed, and a \dq{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am going to say that visualizations and the like are \dq{\e{\sq{imagined-experiences}}}. For example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an \dq{\e{\sq{imagined-visual-table-experience}}}. The reader should not suppose that by \dq{imagined} I mean that the experiences are \dq{hallucinations}, are \dq{unreal}. I use \dq{imagined} because saying \dq{mental-table-experience} is too much like saying \dq{table in the mind} and because just using \dq{visualization} leaves no way of speaking of mental \term{experiences} which are not visualizations. Speaking of an \dq{\e{\sq{imagined-table-experience}}} seems to be the best way of saying that it is a mental \term{experience}, and then distinguishing it from other mental \term{experiences} by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \dq{of a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining like a (non-mental) table-experience). In other words, an \term{imagined-\x-experience} (to generalize) is a \dq{valid} experience, all right, but it is not a non-mental \x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a (non-mental) \x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \dq{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the conventional method of distinguishing different mental \term{experiences} by saying that they are imaginings \dq{of one or another non-mental \term{experiences}}. -I can at last ask what one does when one believes \dq{\e{that there is a table, not perceived by oneself, behind one now}}, or anything else. Well, in the first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed statement, such as \dq{\e{There is a table behind me}}. This is not all one does, however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said to be a \dq{belief} (a point about the explication of my \dq{\term{belief}}). The additional, \dq{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \dq{attitude} toward the \term{experience}. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief about the \term{experience} because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental action. Now the claim that the attitude is \dq{self-deceiving} is not, could not be, at all like the claim \dq{\e{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}}. The question of \dq{\e{what is going on in the realm of non-experience}} does not arise here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an \term{experience}; it is that the attitude, the \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} of believing, is \dq{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \dq{self-deception \term{experience}}. I don't have to \dq{\e{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what is going on in the realm of non-experience}}; when I have described the attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \dq{self-deceiving}. +I can at last ask what one does when one believes \dq{\e{that there is a table, not perceived by oneself, behind one now}}, or anything else. Well, in the first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed statement, such as \dq{\e{There is a table behind me}}. This is not all one does, however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said to be a \dq{belief} (a point about the explication of my \dq{\e{\sq{belief}}}). The additional, \dq{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \dq{attitude} toward the \term{experience}. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief about the \term{experience} because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental action. Now the claim that the attitude is \dq{self-deceiving} is not, could not be, at all like the claim \dq{\e{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}}. The question of \dq{\e{what is going on in the realm of non-experience}} does not arise here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an \term{experience}; it is that the attitude, the \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} of believing, is \dq{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \dq{self-deception \term{experience}}. I don't have to \dq{\e{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what is going on in the realm of non-experience}}; when I have described the attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \dq{self-deceiving}. I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as mentioned above. The attitude is \dq{peripheral}, is a matter of the way one is attentive. Saying that the attitude is \dq{conscious, deliberate}, is a little strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am trying to say is that it is not an \dq{objective} or \dq{subconscious} self-deception such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental \term{experiences}; with respect to English the attitude is a \dq{vague, elusive} thing, very difficult to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by saying that it is the attitude \dq{that such and such} (the reader must not think I mean the belief \dq{that such and such}). If the \term{experience} to which the attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-\x-experience, then the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \dq{\stress{that the imagined-\x-experience is a (non-mental) \x-experience}}. As an example, consider the belief \dq{\stress{that there is a table behind one}}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic expression, it will be on an \term{imagined-experience} such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving attitude \dq{\stress{that the \term{imagined-experience} is a table or oneself with one's back to a table}}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-\x-experience is a (non-mental) \x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly an \term{imagined-experience} but \dq{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \dq{\stress{that one's imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience}}; secondly, when one is asked the question, one stops believing \dq{\stress{that there is a table behind one}} and starts believing \dq{\stress{that one's \term{imagined-experience} corresponds in a certain way to a non-experience}}, a different matter (different belief). @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of temporal belief By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the \term{experiences} associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to deny that he has the \term{experiences}. Now I am not denying that he has the \term{experiences}. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the reader that he doesn't have \term{experiences} he has, but to point out to him the self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to \term{experiences}. It sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language to refer to \term{experiences}, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's usually because one has beliefs. -The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a result, those who want to talk about \term{experiences} (my use) and still use English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly associated \term{experiences}, and this seems to be happening more and more; often among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have always been used that way, except by a few \dq{metaphysicians}. I have had to so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being the introduction of my use of \dq{\term{experience}} in the third chapter. Thus, some of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to \term{experiences}, language with which they are very strongly associated and which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by announcing when the language is used for that purpose. +The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a result, those who want to talk about \term{experiences} (my use) and still use English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly associated \term{experiences}, and this seems to be happening more and more; often among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have always been used that way, except by a few \dq{metaphysicians}. I have had to so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being the introduction of my use of \dq{\e{\sq{experience}}} in the third chapter. Thus, some of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to \term{experiences}, language with which they are very strongly associated and which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by announcing when the language is used for that purpose. It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \dq{unmotivated} (lazy!) to learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. |