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diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0eda09e --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +\chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} + + +We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my +"immediate experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist +even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, +then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask +whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be +yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in +order for the phrase "a realm beyond my experience" to have any meaning. +Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap +between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion +\speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that +is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural +language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a +statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the +natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. +Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, +and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses +about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. +An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so +doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics +of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a +substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a +statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must +be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is +our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my +experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a +substantive assertion. + +The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we +are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our +argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, +and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. +The only possible pproach for this paper is an internal critique of common +sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to +aspects of themselves. + +As an example of the application of our initial result to specific +questions of belief, consider the question of whether the Empire State +Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is +even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced +Empire State Building does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the +realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the Empire State +Building continues to exist when I am not Jooking at it depends on the very +assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we +found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the Empire State +Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be +considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a +definitional trick. + +We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, +which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in +the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has +traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian +atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing +aboui nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the +natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that +belief-assertions are not substantive. + +Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my +experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts. (We +understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my +experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal +formulation.) Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the Empire +State Building exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the +Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture +that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a +distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called +perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may +close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of +"reality," two different types of experiences can be distinguished, +non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act +consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a +non-mental experience. The "attitude" which is involved is not a +proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only +introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving +psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the +belief-assertion. + +The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as +the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that +although the problem originally seems to center on "nonexperience," it +turns out to center on "language." Philosophical problems exist only if there +is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in +belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the +existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that +the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which +refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond +experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic +expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark +parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to +nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word "table" is supposed to denote an +object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. +Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as +follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that +we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to +entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? In other +words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of +all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is +true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is +whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more +immediately than in the case of "nonexperience," that this question is +caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is +there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and +nonexperiences? Is there an expression, "Empire State Building," which is +related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and +which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire +State Building or not? ) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask +whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the +distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help +here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the +natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of +the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this +container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There +is no way to "go back before the natural language." As we mentioned +before, the aphorism that "saying a thing is so doesn't make it so" is an +example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. + +in summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, +made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is +too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fall on the question +of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional +trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question +simply collapses. + diff --git a/essays/flyntian_modality.tex b/essays/flyntian_modality.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a153ec1 --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/flyntian_modality.tex @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +\chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality} + +\begin{enumerate} + +\item \textsc{ Stop all \enquote{gross believing,} such as belief in other minds, causality, and the phantom entities of science (atoms, electrons, \etc).} + +\item \textsc{Stop thinking in propositional language.} + +\item \textsc{Stop all scientific hypothesizing. Do not consider your "sightings" of the empire state building as confirmations that it is there when you are not looking at it --- or for that matter, as confirmations that it is there when you \emph{are} looking at it.} + +\item \textsc{Stop organizing visual experiences and tactile experiences into object-gestalts. Stop organizing so-called "different spatial orientations or different touched surfaces of objects" into object-gestalts. That is, stop having perceptions of objects.} + +\item \textsc{Stop believing in past and future time. That is, live out of time. Stop feeling longing, dread, or regret.} + +\item \textsc{Stop believing that you can move your body.} + +\item \textsc{Stop believing that these instructions have any objective meaning.} + +\item \textsc{You are now free to walk through walls (if you can find them).} +\end{enumerate} + diff --git a/essays/introduction.tex b/essays/introduction.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..130b2ce --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/introduction.tex @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +\chapter{Introduction} + + +This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It +summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole +range of questions which I have developed. The first essay, +\essaytitle{On Social Recognition}, noted that the official social philosophy of practically every +regime in the world says that the individual has a duty to serve society to the +best of his abilities. Social recognition is supposed to be the reward which +indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that +the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, +political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual +undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution +(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the'individual has +a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social +philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain +the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond +this, he will undertake the most important tasks posed by society for his +own private gratification. He will not attempt to benefit society, or to gain +the recognition which would necessarily result if society were to utilize his +achievements. + +The second essay, \essaytitle{Creep}, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; +carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and +playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of +certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually +needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be +desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality +problems. + +I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. +Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have +pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and +demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still +consider it "necessary" to believe in God; but the Soviet government has +managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which +beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled +\essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and +\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. +The question of whether a given belief is valid +depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my "immediate +experience." Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I +am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be +a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase 'a realm +beyond my experience' could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of +descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a +realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it +cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs +depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, +an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or +meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that +the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I +imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this +mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The +attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to +the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs +are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt +beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are +nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. + +The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth +as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to +have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that +an activity may perfectly weil employ false statements and still have +objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that +are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary +phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of +contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental +reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and +phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It +must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to +pre-scientific trrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more +than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you +to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, +explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get +you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material +for rational purposes. + +The other initial subject of investigation I chose was art. The art which +claims to have cognitive value is already demolished by my philosophical +results. However, art at its most distinctive does not need to claim cognitive +value; its value is claimed to be entertainmental or amusemental. What about +art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which +are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each +individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely +subjective. (Call these experiences "brend.") The difference between brend +and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and +turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to +overlook their brend, and they do so because of the same factors which +perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization +of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning +which causes one to venerate "great art" is also a conditioning to dismiss +one's own brend. If one can become aware of one's brend without the +distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's brend is +superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality +which completely transcends art. + +Thus, I reject art as an intellectual or cultural modality. In rejecting +truth, I advocated in its place intellectual activities which have an objective +value independent of truth. In rejecting art, I do not propose that it be +replaced with any objective activity at all. Rather, I advocate that the +individual become aware of his just-likings for what they are, and allow them +to come out. If I succeed in getting the individual to recognize his own +just-likings, then I will have given him infinitely more than any artist ever +can. + +We are not finished with art, however. Ever since art began to +disintegrate as an institution, modern art has become more and more of a +repository for activities which represent pure waste, but which counterfeit +innovation and objective value. A two-way process is involved here. On the +one hand, the modern artist, faced with the increasing gratuitousness of his +profession, desperately incorporates superficial references to science in his +products in the hope of intimidating his audience. On the other hand, art +itself has become an institution which invests waste with legitimacy and even +prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game. +What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into +little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write +down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call +the result a "modern poem," people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas +they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly +mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in +their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial +amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets. + +Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between +the products which result from this attempt to "save" art, and activities in +the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse +activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art +products which are claimed to be "scientific" and therefore objectively +valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked +about art products. +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be +worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to "carry" it? + +\item Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific +discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the +field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, +why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it +only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to +perform "Swan Lake" in order to do antigravity experiments? +\end{enumerate} +To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to +isolate the active principle---not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo. + +Both of these sets of questions make the same point, from somewhat +different perspectives. Given an individual with a product to offer, does he +actively seek out the lady art reporters, the public relations contracts, the +museum officials, or does he actively dissociate himself from them? Does he +seek artistic legitimation of his product, or does he reject it? The objective +activities which I have developed stand on their own feet. They are not art, +and to construe them as art would make it impossible to comprehend them. + +A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. +Until now, this modality has involved the construction of ideas such that the +very possibility of thinking these ideas is a significant phenomenon. In other +words, the modality has consisted of the invention of mental abilities. The +ideas involve physical language, that is, language which occurs in beliefs +about the physical world. Such language is philosophically meaningless, but +it has connotations provided by the psychological trick involved in believing. +The connotations are what are utilized; factual truth is irrelevant. Then, the +ideas cannot be reduced to the mechanical manipulation of marks or +counters---unlike ordinary mathematics. Also, logical truth, which happens to +be discredited by my philosophical results, is irrelevant to the ideas. + +But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it +must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something +which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful +independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. + +We can now consider the following principle. "spontaneously and +without any prompting to sweep human culture aside and to carry out +elaborate, completely self-justifying activities." Relative to the social context +of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to +respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary +antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, +it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. +In the light of The Flaws Underlying Beliefs and the brend theory, however, +the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted +correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The +activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be +standardized. + +The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism}, +\essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. +\essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very +possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an +activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional +gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena +with the thinking of contradictions. It led to \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed +Memories}, which in turn led to \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}. +With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications +outside itself. + +\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963} +uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental +reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories}, and this led +in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}. + +The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} +was intended to exploit the realization that humans are the most +advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model +of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, +the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically +impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I +have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely +accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension +of normal beliefs to produce its effects. + +\essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in +Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies} (1966). In +this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as +formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two +subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its +potential applications in conjunction with science. +\essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical +possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses. +\essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences +of the logically impossible which +we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us +to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the +logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to +obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are +"admissible." The theory investigates the implications of admitting some +contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of +many-valued numbers is also presented. + +The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to +\essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose +significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay +defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it +impossibie for physicists to "construct the object from experience." Finally, +\essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of +false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I +favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not +generated a series of applications as the other activities have. + +To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They +are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities +having objective value, together with cach individual's brend. Consider the +individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the +significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the +business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of +the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded +the wrong things, as I argued in \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}. But in addition, the +institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual +modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to +prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which +I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official +intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot +be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the +beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is +presumably not inherent in my intelectual modality; but under present +social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. + diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7abca34 --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +\chapter{Philosophical Reflections I} + +\begin{enumerate} % TODO letters, sub numbers +\item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these +intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why +are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find +in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating +concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of +this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to +concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a +transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not +these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the +mindless animals? + +Such questions tempt one to engage in a sort of philosophical +anthropology, using in part the method of introspection. Beliefs could be +explained as arising in an attempt to deal with experienced frustrations by +denying them in thought. The origin of Christian Science and magic would +thereby be explained. Further, we could postulate a primal anxiety-reaction +to raw experience. This anxiety would be lessened by mythologies and +explanatory beliefs. The frustration and the anxiety-reaction would be +primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. + +Going even farther, we could suppose that a being which could +apprehend the whole universe through direct experience would have no need +of beliefs. Beliefs would be a rickety method of coping with the limited +range of our perception, a method by which our imperfect brains cope with +the world. There would be an analogy with the physicist's use of phantom +models to make experimental observations easier to comprehend. + +However, there are two overwhelming objections to this philosophical +anthropology. First, it purports to study the human mind as a derivative +phenomenon, to study it from a God-like perspective. The philosophical +anthropology thus consists of beliefs which are subject to the same +objections as any other beliefs. It is on a par with any other beliefs; it has no +privileged position. Specifically, it is in competition not only with my +philosophy but with other accounts of the mind-reality relation, such as +behaviorism, Platonism, and Thomism. And my philosophy provides me with +no basis to defend my philosophical anthropology against their philosophical +anthropologies. My philosophy doesn't even provide me with a basis to +defend my philosophical anthropology against its own negation. + +In short, the paradoxes which my philosophy uncovers must remain +unexplained and unresolved. + +The other objection to my philosophical anthropology is that its +implications are unnecessarily conservative. An explanation of why people +do something wrong can become an assertion that it is necessary to do wrong +and finally a justification for doing wrong. But just because I tend, for +example, to construe my perceptions as confirmations of propositions about +phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this +way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical +anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. + +\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective "anthropology" +of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. +Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I +have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between +beliefs and non-credulous mental activity. + +Is my fear of jumping out of the window a belief? Strictly speaking, +no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require +propositional thought. + +Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations +(relative to my field of vision) as "the same object" a belief? Apparently, +but this is very ambiguous. + +Is my identification of tactile and visual "pencil-perceptions" as aspects +of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through +different senses) a belief? Yes. + +It is possible to subjectively classify bodily movements according to +whether they are intentional, because drunken awkwardness, adolescent +awkwardness, and movements under ESB are clearly unintentional. Then +does intentional movement of my hand require a belief that I can move my +hand? Definitely not, although in rare cases some belief will accompany or +precede the movement of my hand. But believing itself will not get the hand +moved! + +Is there any belief involved in identifying my leg, but not the leg of the +table at which I am sitting, as part of my body? Maybe---another ambiguous +case. + +Are my emotions of longing and dread beliefs in future time? Is my +emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these +temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) + +How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if +my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily---the +object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. + +\gap + +\item At one point Alten claimed that his dialectical approach does not +take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other +evidence. Our "immediate experience" is mediated; it is a derived +phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our +subjective standpoint. + +\begin{enumerate} + +\item But Alten does not seriously defend the claim that he does not +distinguish between immediate and non-immediate. The claim that there is +no distinction would be regarded as demented in every human culture. Every +culture supposes that I may be tricked or cheated: there is a realm, the +non-immediate or non-experienced, which provides an arena for surreptitious +hostility to me. Every culture supposes that it is easier for me to tell what I +am thinking than what you are thinking. Every culture supposes that I will +hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is +simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he +apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction +between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only +way of confirming a model, but to construct a model of the relation between +the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. + +\item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative +phenomenon, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the +pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness +and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is +the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy +exposes. "I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I +cannot now perceive it." +\end{enumerate} + +\item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain +self-vitiating "nodes" in the logic of common sense. These nodes include the +concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often +find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from +cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they +are self-vitiating nodes in the logic of common sense. As a result, I have +concluded that it is probably futile to debate the abstract validity of my +analysis of these nodes. It does indeed appear as if I am debating over an +abstract joke, and it is not apparent why I would attribute such great +importance to a joke. + +\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} represents my +present approach. The advantage of this approach is that it makes +unmistakable the reason why I attribute so much importance to these +philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few +isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only +significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation +of why the life---world is subject to being undermined. + +When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of +trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day +scientific common sense. Walking through walls is understood as it would be +pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside +the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go +directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive +orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or +have "object perceptions," and thus wouldn't know whether one was +walking through a wail or not. + +At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my +genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of +non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a +hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental +incompetance or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify +this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. + +\item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are +now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing +over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does +not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two +circumstances in conflict. The "fact" that we are talking is one of the two +circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other +circumstance being the self-vitiating "nodes" I have mentioned. To repeat +over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. + +Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking +suggests, we do not "see" language. (That is, we do not experience an +objective relation between words and things.) The language we "see" is a +shell whose "transcendental reference" is provided by self-deception. + +\item Does the theory of amcons show that the contradiction exposed in +\essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical +force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary +motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of +contradictory qualities. (But "He left an hour ago" begins to be a borderline +case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which +violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to +classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first +with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to +do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as +if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter +sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. +\end{enumerate} diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45fb9a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex @@ -0,0 +1,1210 @@ +\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)} +\subsection*{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)} + +This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be +an inquiry as to which beliefs are "true," or right. The right beliefs are +tentatively defined to be the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding. +Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by +their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as +corresponding to non-tautologous propositions. + +Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or +supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is +also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the +notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the +natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in +philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is +continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which +philosophers have dealt with it. + +All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are +normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be heipful to +examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here +beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this +monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain +approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold +beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. + +it is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that +they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on +their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, +quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some +non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has +to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. +Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy +non-cognitive needs. + +To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as "I +could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so," or "Even if so-and-so is +true I don't want to know it." These remarks manifest the needs with which +we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level +of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit +and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing +subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to +recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of +beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical +validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in +the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are +alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have +not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions +being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. + +A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for +non-cognitive reasons follows. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. "I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God." "If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it." + +\item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. + +\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons. + +\item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. + +\item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one +who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the +inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. +Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called "theologizing," in recognition of +the archetypal activity in this category. + +When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are +instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive +motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific +method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he +believed in the "real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a +common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who +discovers it bit by bit." The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a +commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he +must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. +The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry +begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows +that science is an instance of theologizing. If scientists cannot welcome a +demonstration that their "metaphysical" presuppositions are invalid, then +their interest in science cannot be cognitive. + +The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the +non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the +non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not +be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed +area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two +contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be +satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test +or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other +hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a +single alternative is welcome. + +\item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested +in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To +academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had +made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians +circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as +scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. + +\item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is +provided by the person who holds a fearful belief which is widely considered +to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the +motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would +welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect +that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a +demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no +comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it +seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. +\end{enumerate} + +This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, +limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or +self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The +examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge +whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to +our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this +monograph. + +\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2-7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used +unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without +change.)} + +\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems} +\subsection*{Chapter 2 : Preliminary Concepts} + +In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of +philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing +language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might +tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, +formulations of them (for example, \formulation{Other persons have minds} as +representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem +will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be +driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or +false). + +To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right +into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next +chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and +simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain +concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution +they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has +to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly +philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which +doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the +truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the +others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. + +The first concept is a new one, that of "explication". Explication of a +familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding +a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is +wanted that the expression "mean". To explain: I will be discussing +philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their +"meaning" needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to +use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which +the "meanings", uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as +replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, +which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses +are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be +replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to +the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be +concerned with the suggestion of clear uses, of the expressions of which the +uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the +expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of +acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of +which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents +(and non-referents), then the new: expressions must clearly have referents. +Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents +in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, +especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. +(I will not say here just how I use "connotation". What the connotations of +an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a +supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are +supposed to be like.) "Finding", or constructing, an expression (with its use) +supposed to be acceptable to oneself as.a replacement, of the kind described, +for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be "explicating" the +expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to +be the "explicandum", and the suggested replacement, the "explication". +Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is +inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the +same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. + +I should mention that my use of "explication" is different from that of +Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very +problematic "definition". For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher +of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, +suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of +"work"); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, +clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. + +Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an +expression is suggested, as an explication for "thing having a mind" (if +supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the +things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other +"overt" behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this +expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for "thing +having a mind", since "thing having a mind" presumably has the connotations +for the reader "that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, +higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt +behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by +the thing having it", and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: +the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the +proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causual +connection between having a mind and the other things, because the +expression 'thing having a mind' itself, and not the supposed effects of +having a mind, is what is under discussion. + +As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating +expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are +for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be +slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be +otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of +finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical +problems. + +Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed +name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the +connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases +when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with +philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly +be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the +explications for "thing having a mind" mentioned above. + +The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be +discussing the "truth" of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two +chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a +good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify +the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for "true statement". +(Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the +explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) + +Well, what is a "statement"? How do what are usually said to be +"statements" state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language +you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What +does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just +about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their +arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that +when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy +ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important +connotations of "true statement", and, more generally, of "statement", as +traditionally and commonly used, is that a "statement" is an "assertion +which has truth value" (is true or false) (or "has content", as it is sometimes +said, rather misleadingly). That is, the "verbal" part of a statement is +supposed to be related in a certain way to something "non-verbal", or at +least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a +statement is supposed to be "true" or not because of something having to do +with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is +related. (The exceptions are the "statements" of formalist logic and +mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus +irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are +interested in.) Thus, if "true statement" is to be explicated, "assertion having +truth value" and "is true" (and "has content" in a misleading use) have to be +explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication +for "true statement" deserves the connotations which were suggested with +"assertion having truth value" and "is true". One important conclusion from +these observations is that although "sentences" (the bodies of sound or +bodes of marks such as "The man talks") are often said to be "statements", +would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate "statement" by simply +identifying it with "sentence" (in my sense); something must be said about +such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same +reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify "statement" +with "sentence", the latter being explicated in terms of the ("formal") rules +for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no +reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. + +In explicating "true statement" I will use the most elegant approach, one +relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having +truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way +to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to +make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to "apply" \term{table} to +the thing. It is supposed that \term{table} has been "interpreted", that is, that it is +"determinate" to which, of all things, applications of \term{table} are (to be said +to be) "true". (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is +"determinate" which, of all things (events), are "occurrences of the word +"table", are expressions "equivalent to" "table".) The word "determinate" is +the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit +myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for 'apply', one +can "apply" the word to the thing by pointing out "first" the word and +"then" the thing. 'point out' is restricted to refer to "ostension", pointing +out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to "directing +attention to things not in one's presence" as well. The assertion is 'true', of +course, if and only if the thing to which 'table' is applied is one of the things +to which it is determinate that the application of 'table' is (to be said to be) +"true", otherwise "false". It should be clear that such a pointing out of a +"first" thing and a "second", the first being an interpreted expression, is an +assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further +suggest 'interpreted expression' as an explication for 'name'; with respect to +this explication, the things to which equivalent names ("occurances of a +name") may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, +other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the +concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple +assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is +how a name has referents; I have not said, for example, whether the relation +between name and referents is an "objective, metaphysical entity", which +would be getting into philosophy proper. + +The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that +what one wants to say are "statements", namely sentences used in the +context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the "simple" +kind; thus an explication for 'true statement' can be found. To do so, first +let us say that the "complex name" gotten by replacing a sentence's "main +verb" with the corresponding participle is the "associated name" of the +sentence. For example, the associated name of 'Boston is in Massachusetts' is +'Boston being in Massachusetts'. In the case of a sentence with coordinate +clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main +verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. Example: sentence: \said{The +table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one +man while the other man talked}; main verb: 'will have been' or 'had been +pushed'. Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, +but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be +invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to +make a statement, is to so to speak "assert" its associated name; this +"asserted name" being "true" if and only if it has a referent. However, one +doesn't assert names; names just have referents---it is statements that one +makes, "asserts", and that are "true" or "false". How, then, do we explicate +this "asserting" of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple +kind, which is the application of 'having a referent' to the name. In other +words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a +statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and +puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying +'having a referent' to it. For example, the sentence 'Boston is in +Massachusetts' should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the +application of 'having a referent' to 'Boston being in Massachusetts'. + +Now this approach may seem "unnatural" or incomplete to the reader +for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is +replaced by a statement "about" it (or to be precise its associated name). +Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to +describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a +statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even +more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of +interpreting "simple names" (Fries' Class 1 words), but not so natural to +speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of +course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from +simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus +referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which +they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex +names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex +names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such +words as 'the'; in making statements, these names have to be in the context +of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be +clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these +relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything +about what the "meaning" (intension), as opposed to the referents (and +non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension +unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for +my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells +the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is +true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly +philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous +word 'determinate', because I haven't said anything about how names get +referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how +one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards +explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with +formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if +language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in +some form must have the central role in it.) + +"Statements", then, can be regarded as assertions of the 'simple' kind +which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have +described. I could thus explicate 'true statement' as referring to those true +"simple" assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this +would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of 'true +statement' having to do with the method of apptying the first member to the +second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to +do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more +elegant to explicate 'true statement' as referring to all true assertions of the +"simple" kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of +the two explications the reader prefers. + +So much for the preliminaries. + +\subsection*{Chapter 3 : "Experience"} + +I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step +in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical +language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This +terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing +my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on +precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I +think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern +philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are +relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. + +First, consider the term 'non-experience'. Although the concept of a +non-experience is intrinsically far more "difficult" than the concept of +"experience" which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, +presupposed in all "natural languages" and throughout philosophy, is so +taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should +have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of non-experiences are +perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of +it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the +future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects +from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily +understood; referental relationships (the relationships between names and +their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the +second chapter); unperceivable "things" (microscopic objects (of course, +viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), +essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, +normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge. (To +simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am +speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing +the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.) +Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that +there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one +can not know whether there are any---this is not a non-belief but a complex +belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the +mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is +presumably a connotation of 'other minds' for the reader, as explained in the +second chapter. + +In the history of philosophy, the concept of non-experience comes first. +Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about +non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a perception, or +experience of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that +one knows about non-experiences by perceiving, having experiences of, some +of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes +(assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by +having a "visual-table-experience". The theory goes on to say that these +perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in +one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now +there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, +saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they +are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a +table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem "mental". +The theory that they are in the mind is a belief. This point leads directly to +the second source of confusion. Does the English word 'table', as ordinarily +used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity +external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's +perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between +the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to +the reader, then he probably uses 'table', 'perceived table', and +'table-experience' as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, +is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not +perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this +confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being +used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the +perceptions. + +Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are +experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term +'experience' is important here because with it philosophers finally made a +start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionabiy +knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are +experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional +philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not +know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective +table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, +has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences +not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one +unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that there +is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like. +One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would +be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, "thinking" that one doesn't have +one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be +shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest +idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the +reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably +known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some +philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say +cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity (for example, some +philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds). In +speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a +lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by +appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hyprocrisy +which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One +does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective +tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other +persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's +table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as +will be shown). + +I have explained the current use of the term 'experience'. Now I want +to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, +will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing +'non-experience' I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of +the term, in the case of 'experience' I am going to suggest a new use for the +term.) As I explained, the concept of non-experience preceded that of +experience, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the +former. What I am interested in, however, is not 'experience' as it implies. +'perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind', but as it refers to that +which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not +something one believes exists. I am going to use 'experience' to refer, as it +already does, to that immediate "world", but without the implication that +experience is perception of non-experience, and in the mind: the same +referents but without the old connotations. In other words, in my use +'experience' is completely neutral with respect to relationships to +non-experiences, is not an antonym for 'non-experience' as conventionally +used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a +leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy +between 'experience' as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences +or in particular the realm where they could be, and 'experience' without +these connotations. + +Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be +obvious that although my term 'experience' was introduced last, it is +intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the +terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I +discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I +have used the perspective of the Western philsophical tradition to explain my +term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, +especially, the theory of knowing about non-experiences. Even if the reader's +conceptual background does not involve the concept of non-experience, and +especially the modern Western theory of knowing about non-experiences, he +ought to be able to understand, and realize the "orimacy" of, my term +'experience'. The term should be supra-cultural. + +I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term 'experience'. +As I have said, it is "intrinsically" the simplest term, but I can not define it +by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including +the traditional term 'experience', the antonym of 'non-experience', is based +on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, +in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for +different philosophers according as their metaphysics (or, as is sometimes +(incorrectly) said, "ontologies") differ. Even such a sentence as "The table is +black" implies the formulation \formulation{Material objects are real} (to the materialist), +or \formulation{So-called objects are ideas in the mind} (to the idealist), or \formulation{Substances +and attributes are real}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to +explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, +ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I +use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of +\term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example +when I say that the connotation of relatedness to non-experience is to be +dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is +not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied +philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, +to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or +other natural language, but by having referents. + +As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my +\term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything +about non-experiences, since in English there is always the implication that +there could be non-experiences. The term is a radical innovation; one of the +most important in this book. The fact that although it is the "simplest" and +least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain +using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the +philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my +\term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as +an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences. (It's good that this +isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be +no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this +realm would have to be a non-experience.) If he is lucky he will just find the +book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from +the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is +past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may +already realize what I'm going to say. + +\subsection*{Chapter 4 : The Linguistic Solution} + +Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the +book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the +problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the +language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present +the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my +work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, +and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a +philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will +not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to +explore all its implications; that will come later. + +However, in the hope that it will make the main "argument" of this +chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous +version of it, which should give the "intuitive insight" behind the main +argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is +true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified +from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without +appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot +know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a +contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be +right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if +they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The "necessity", but +inconsistency, of skepticism "shows" my conclusion in an intuitively +understandable way. + +To get on to the definitive version of my "argument". I will say that +one name "depends" on another if and only if it has the logical relation to +that other that \name{black table} has to \name{table}: a referent of the former is +necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names +mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any +statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity depends on +'non-experience', since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For +example, \name{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the +formulation \formulation{Other persons have minds}, certainly depends on +\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-experience} will be true of the +associated name of any formulation of a belief. + +In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of +non-experience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of +\term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions +\term{non-experience} and \term{experience} (traditional). What I did not go on to +show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, +one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What +follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the +reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's +experience (used in my, "neutral", sense unless I say otherwise). Could there +be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was +awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to +non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of +non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in +the last chapter. (Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) +justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it +without appealing to other beliefs). If there could be, if such awareness were +just an experience, the distinctness of experience from experience +(traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience +(traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have +them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into +experience. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience +which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there +is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience +(traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in +one's experience---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness +which is "understanding the concepts" of non-experience and the rest as +they are supposed to be understood. And for "understanding" +\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its +referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an +experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and +non-referents) of "non-experience", which to name an experience +(traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands +'non-experience' --- and "non-experience" --- and \triquote{non-experience}; but here +one is, using "non-experience" and \triquote{non-experience} to say so (which +certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible +for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the +concept of non-experience, it collapses. + +(A final point for the expert. This +tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does +not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot +name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences +about names, which show contradictions --- that one must not assume that +one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say +so (does assume it) --- with explicit stratification.) + +My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now +what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about +experience (traditional), non-experience, and the rest, because I have spoken +as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used 'experience' +(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest. Thus, even though what I have +said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is +a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves 'experience' +(traditional), 'non-experience', and the rest, it shows that one who "accepts" +the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent +desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no +explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the +expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, +remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are +completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to +experiences (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a +formulation of a belief does have a good explication for the reader, then it is +not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to experiences.) Now there is +an important point about method which should be brought out. If all +"non-experiential language", "belief language", is inconsistent, how can I +show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer +is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into +contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I +want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we +have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as 'all formulations of +beliefs are false'. + +Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about +belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is +right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since +the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a +belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable +explication which was true; in short, the belief would have a true +formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a +formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point +answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of +belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not +to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one +who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that +it could have an acceptable explication for him, could not turn out to be an +expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some +way. Now there is another important point about "method" to be made. +The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one +can "know", be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. +The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of +the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. +(Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the +way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like +being aware with respect to a table, "that in my language, this is to be said to +be a "table"".) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how +a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its +referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this +belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be +discussed here. + +The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of 'Yes, +but...' thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their +formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of +linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if +embarrassing) curiosity. (Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how +well the reader understands that.) And there does remain a lot to be said +about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in +them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its +formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose +rejection as wrong would conflict with experience, or which it would be +impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these +matters. + + +\clearpage + + +2/22/1963 + + +Tony Conrad and Henry Flynt demonstrate +against Lincoln Center, February 22, + + +1963 +(photo by Jack Smith) + +\clearpage + + +\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems} + + +\subsection*{Chapter 5 : Beliefs as Mental Acts} + + +In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by +discussing believing itself, as a ("conscious") mental act. Although I will be +talking about mental acts and experience, it must be clear that this part of +the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will +not try to talk about "perception" or the like, in a mere attempt to justify +"common-sense" beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally +relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I +discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. + +I should say immediately that 'belief', in its traditional use as supposed +to refer to "mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of +non-experience", has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. +This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one +does or does not "have beliefs", in the sense important to those having +beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for "belief" in the +use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of +the last part. Now when I speak of a "belief" I will be speaking of an +experience, what might be said to be "an act of consciously believing, of +consciously having a belief", of what is "in one's head" when one says that +one "believes a certain thing". Further, I will, for convenience in +distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief "that others have minds", for example, +or in general of belief "that there are non-experiences" (with quotation +marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be +"about non-experiences". (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely +about experiences; I will not be trying to talk "about the realm of +non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it".) I expect that it is already +fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has +any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his +"beliefs" (believing) than with the explication of 'act of consciously +believing', although I will need to make a few comments about that too. +What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, +use of a word ('belief') salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, +rather than rejecting the word altogether. + +There is a further point about terminology. The reader should +remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory "that +perceptions are in the mind", one can make a distinction between mental +and non-mental experiences, between, for example, visualizing a table with +one's eyes closed, and a "seen" table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am +going to say that visualizations and the like are "imagined-experiences". For +example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an +"imagined-visual-table-experience". The reader should not suppose that by +"imagined" I mean that the experiences are "hallucinations", are "unreal". I +use "imagined" because saying 'mental-table-experience" is too much like +saying "table in the mind" and because just using 'visualization' leaves no way +of speaking of mental experiences which are not visualizations. Speaking of +an "imagined-table-experience" seems to be the best way of saying that it is +a mental experience, and then distinguishing it from other mental +experiences by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining "of +a (non-mental) table-experience" (better thought of as meaning an imagining +like a (non-mental) table-experience). In other words, an +imagined-x-experience (to generalize) is a "valid" experience, all right, but it +is not a non-mental x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a +(non-mental) x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an "imagined-imagined-experience" is impossible by definition; or is no different from an +imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this +terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the +conventional method of distinguishing different mental experiences by +saying that they are imaginings "of one or another non-mental experiences". + +I can at last ask what one does when one believes "that there is a table, +not perceived by oneself, behind one now", or anything else. Well, in the +first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an +imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization +of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed +statement, such as \lexpression{There is a table behind me}. This is not all one does, +however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said +to be a "belief" (a point about the explication of my 'belief'). The +additional, "essential" component of a belief is a self-deceiving "attitude" +toward the experience. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe +that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief +about the experience because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in +other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental +action. Now the claim that the attitude is "self-deceiving" is not, could not +be, at all like the claim "that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to +correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false". The +question of "what is going on in the realm of non-experience" does not arise +here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an experience; it is that the attitude, +the experience not itself a belief but part of the experience of believing, is +"consciously, deliberately" self-deceiving, is a "self-deception experience". I +don't have to "prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what +is going on in the realm of non-experience"; when I have described the +attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good +explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is "self-deceiving". + +I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one +is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as +mentioned above. The attitude is "peripheral", is a matter of the way one is +atttentive. Saying that the attitude is "conscious, deliberate", is a little +strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am +trying to say is that it is not an "objective" or "subconscious" self-deception +such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This +is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the +inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental experiences; +with respect to English the attitude is a "vague, elusive" thing, very difficult +to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by +saying that it is the attitude "that such and such" (the reader must not think +I mean the belief "that such and such"). If the experience to which the +attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-x-experience, then the +self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the imagined-x-experience is a +(non-mental) x-experience". As an example, consider the belief "that there is +a table behind one". If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic +expression, it will be on an imagined-experience such as an +imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself +(to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving +attitude "that the imagined-experience is a table or oneself with one's back +to a table". Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-x-experience is +a (non-mental) x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly +an imagined-experience but "corresponds to a non-experience". This is not +inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes "that +one's imagined-x-experience is an x-experience"; secondly, when one is asked +the question, one stops believing "that there is a table behind one" and starts +believing "that one's imagined-experience corresponds in a certain way to a +non-experience", a different matter (different belief). + +lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression +(which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), +the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude "that the expression has a +referent". With respect to the belief "that there is a table behind one", one's +attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \expression{There is a table +behind me}, pretty much regarded as 'There being a table behind me', and +one would have the self-deceiving attitude "that this name has a referent". +Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of +beliefs. + +\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse +the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the +version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving +language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an +imagined-x-experience which is "regarded" as an x-experience, whereas in +the version involving language, the attention is on something which is +"regarded" as having as referent "something" (the attitude is vague here). +For the latter version, the idea is "that the reality is at one remove", and +correspondingly, one whose "language" consists of formulations of beliefs +doesn't desire to have as experiences, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, +referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make +believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-x-experience in +the version of the belief not involving language, has something which +functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language +one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one +has the attitude that the imagined-x-experience is an x-experience in the +version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the +thing believed in is a mere imagined-experience, so in the version involving +"language" one takes note of an 'expression' not having a referent, since a +referent could only be a (mere) experience. One who expects an expression, +which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does +so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the +belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires +with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the +way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for +awareness of the referent to be part of one's experience corresponds to the +attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it +not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's +experience corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. +Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which +it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving +language consists of being attentive to an imagined-experience and having the +attitude that it is not an imagined-experience, discredits that belief. + +Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather +unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of +"attitudes", then let him consider the following summary: there must be +something more to a mental act than just taking note of an experience for it +to be a "belief"; this something is "peripheral and elusive", so that I am +calling the something an "attitude", the most appropriate way in English to +speak of it; the attitude, an experience not itself a belief but part of the +experience which is the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is +"self-deceiving", is a "(conscious) self-deception experience", because when +aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just +about has to be a ("conscious") self-deception experience to transform mere +taking note of an experience into something remotely deserving to be said to +be a "belief". The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be +"self-deceiving" is to be made without trying to think "about the relation of +the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience", to do which would be +to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which +would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is +to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more +than to say that the attitude is "self-deceiving". + +In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention +some things often associated with believing but not "essential" to it. First, +one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the +one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and +believes "that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing +table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so +believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in +believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be 'evidence +for, confirmation of, one's belief" (more will be said about confirmation +shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic +expression 'x', one may give attention to a referent of +'imagined-x(-experience)', an "imagined-referent" of 'x'; or to +imagined-y-experiences such that y-experiences are supposed, said, to be +"analogous to the referent of 'x'". In the latter case the y-experiences will be +mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be +to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is +visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of +'There being a table behind one'. An example of imagined-y-experiences +(such that y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be +"analogous to referents", in believing, is the visualizations associated with +beliefs "about entities wholly other than, transcending, experience, such as +Being". + +Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical "justifications", +"arguments", for them, "defenses" of them. I will not bother to explicate +the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong +with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would +show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language +and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested +before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the +justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive +justification, the kind invoiving the citing of experience supposed to be +evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical +assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them +inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has +four legs; therefore ("it is more probable that") any other table has four +legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it +superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, +argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can +show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a Sesser, +weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to +believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, +then one already had the belief "implicitly" (it was a conjunct of a belief +one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. + +I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions +my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, +I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my +position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, +and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it +is ironic that 'disbeliever', without qualification, has been used by believers +as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some +belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny "the +existence of non-experience", to "cause non-experiences to vanish", so to +speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental +experiences, "perceived objects". My position is not skepticism of any kind, +is not, for example, the belief "that there is a realm where there could either +be or not be certain entities not experiences, but our means of knowing are +inadequate for finding which is the case." My position is not a mere +"decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs". The philosopher who denies +"the existence of non-experiences", or denies any belief, or who is skeptical +of any belief, or who merely "decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs", +has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. + +What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of +beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In +the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions +dependent on 'non-experience', and pointed out that those who expect them +to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting +the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have +described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the +self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. +To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right +philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief +one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). + +\subsection*{Chapter 6 : Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs} + +In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any +given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter +I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just +what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the +entire "history of world thought", the fantastic proliferation of activities at +least partly "systems of knowledge" which constitute it, Platonism, +psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, +phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, +comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each +with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, +associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not +hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how "non-experiential +language", and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not +always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and +belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter +of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an +anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are +difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has +to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind +what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are +incomplete and confused. + +What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a +few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of "knowledge"; +have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are +thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so +"basic" (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as +too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if +they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. +The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have +these beliefs, that not having them is not "inconsistent" with one's +experience; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea +of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and +of not having it. + +Consider beliefs to the effect "that the world is ordered", beliefs +formulated in "natural laws", beliefs "about substance", and the like. +Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's "perceived +world" is not "chaotic", is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting +beliefs "that the world is ordered" I do not say that his "perceived world" is +("subjectively") chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The +non-strange character of one's "perceived world" is associated with beliefs +"about substance" and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not "the +world being ordered"; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's +"perceived world" is not part of what is "essential" in these beliefs. + +Rejection of "spatio-temporal" beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. +After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from +oneself? Of course one can "watch oneself wave one's hand" (in a non-strict +sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a +formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can "watch oneself wave +one's hand" (in the non-strict sense) does not imply "that there are spatially +distant, and past and future events"; and although experiences such as a +visual---"moving"---hand experience are associated with spatio-temporal +beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. + +Rejection of beliefs "about the objectivity of linguistic referring" may +seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a "table", +doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that +things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the +slightest intention of saying that it is a "non-table"? The reader should +observe that I do not deny this. These experiences are associated with beliefs +"about the objectivity of referring", but they are not "objective referring"; +and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. + +Rejection of the belief "that other humans (better, things) than oneself +have minds" my seem to lead to a problem. After all, "perceived other +humans" talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in +rejecting the belief "that others have minds" I do not deny that "perceived +other humans" talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is +associated with the belief "that others have minds", but it is not "other +humans having minds"; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not +part of what is essential in believing "that others have minds", points I +anticipated in the second chapter. + +Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of +temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form "If \x, then \y\ +will follow in the future", especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is +something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the +switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear +"that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge". They say, +for example, "that one had better know that one must drink water to live, +and drink water, or one won't live". Now "one's throwing the switch and the +light's coming on" (in a non-strict sense) is like the experiences associated +with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does +not imply "that there are past or future events", and taking note of it is not +part of what is essential in the belief "that if one throws the switch, then the +light will come on". As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe "about +the necessity of such knowledge for survival", it is just more beliefs of the +same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt +dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows +how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. +Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to "save" +beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. + +By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their +formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most +suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with +non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the +beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in +defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he +continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the +experiences associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do +so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to +deny that he has the experiences. Now I am not denying that he has the +experiences. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the +reader that he doesn't have experiences he has, but to point out to him the +self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary +of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs +after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to experiences. It +sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief +language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language +to refer to experiences, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's +usually because one has beliefs. + +The point that the language which one may use to describe experiences +is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all +English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a +result, those who want to talk about experiences (my use) and still use +English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly +associated experiences, and this seems to be happening more and more; often +among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have +always been used that way, except by a few "metaphysicians". I have had to +so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being +the introduction of my use of "experience" in the third chapter. Thus, some +of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't +for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the +book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third +chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to +experiences, language with which they are very strongly associated and +which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by +announcing when the language is used for that purpose. + +It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocricy I +was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be +understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented +my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This +does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They +are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, +which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think +of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not +be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually +get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by +suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than +beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English +in this book is of course (!) that readers are too "unmotivated" (lazy!) to +learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having +unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. + +\subsection*{Chapter 7 : Summary} + +The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I +am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore +beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he +will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to +construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a +formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or +the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of +them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is +supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This +statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in +connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that +my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible +argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to "remain +unconvinced" of the rightness of my position, or to "doubt, question" it, or +to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can "question" (not +believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief +to be "skeptical" of my position in the sense of believing "that although the +position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is +objectively wrong".) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to +reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less +credulous. If one "questions my position" then one is misconstruing it as a +belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to +decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or +the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to +understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it +is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be +wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the +matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my +position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. + +Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without +beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for +example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. +Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to +be "true or false", to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you +to believe something, for example, to believe "that there is a table behind +you". Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to +continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, "visualizing +yourself with your back to a table"), you are going to have to have the +attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, +deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going +to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. + +As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, +intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to +realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The +important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true +statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the +expressions in them being construed as referring to the experiences +associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when +you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my +language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to +do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the +complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to +be flawless to unquestionably discredit "non-experiential language"); if you +don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just +ignore the book, and "justify" your doing so on the basis of what I have said +about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not +therefore valueless. + +So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having +beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete +transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter +position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, +"obvious"? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic +proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the "profound" philosophical +problems (for example, "Could an omnipotent god do the literally +impossible?", "Are statements about what I did in the past while alone +capable of intersubjective verification?") arising from them? And again, one +begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is +wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be "Why +bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving +myself". Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. +And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one +"naturally" tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so +(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, +since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts +which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. + diff --git a/essays/some_objections.tex b/essays/some_objections.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1954d9e --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/some_objections.tex @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +\chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy} + + +\textbf{A.} The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in +educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the +philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The +Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply +that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that +other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a +philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language. (See +Philosophical Investigations, \S 420.) Statements which imply that other +people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were +intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because +they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are +irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage. (\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.) + +For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, +and the Empire State Building (when I am not looking at it) are all things +which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt "in a real +case." (\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's +memoir.) The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in +God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. + + +In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason +why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read +that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they +would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as +Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt "in a real case." +Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet +Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the +latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as +inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have +today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay \essaytitle{The +Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that +the Empire State Building exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief +that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no +different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It Is +perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is +totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also +possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be +absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per +cent certainty that the Empire State Building exists; the point is that we +need not believe in the Empire State Building at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying +Beliefs} shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural +sciences, involve outright self-deception. + +These discoveries have consequences far more important than the +technical issues involved. It is by no means trivial that I do not have to pray, +or to fast, or to accept the moral dictates of the clergy, or to give money to +the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human +cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In +analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring +the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to +doubt in a real case, as in my essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking +Through Walls.} I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of +intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these +consequences. + +A reply to the Wittgensteinian attitude which is technically adequate +can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical +maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not +necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical +connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in +the aphorism that "the meaning is the use" (as an explication of the natural +language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive +linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic +than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted. + +Wittgenstein held that philosophical or metaphysical controversies +literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not +arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing +Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver +is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the +paradoxes uncovered by "bad" philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary +language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary +language because they uncover paradoxes is ordinary language propositions. +Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in +ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then +Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to +see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as +inadmissible. + +Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the \textsc{Empire +State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The +Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic +because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no +behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to +this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use +ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The +philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as +improper because it leads to problems. The reason why "the proper use of +ordinary language never leads to paradoxes" is that Wittgenstein has defined +proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not +resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. +Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and +language, a gratuitous definition to the effect that certain portions of the +natural language which embarrass him are inadmissible, a gratuitous ban on +certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him. His purpose is +to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious +inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish +intellectual dishonesty. + +\gap + +\textbf{B.} In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which +cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality +are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if +there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there +are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus +there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which +leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the +middle of the argument by a play on the words \enquote{subject} and \enquote{object.} + +When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the +attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within +experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it +would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be +"proved" that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, +etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be +trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be +my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its +otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it +would be trivial. We ask how I know that the Empire State Building exists +when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate +experience, then objective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The +dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the +gap between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself, yet they do not +want to conclude that appearances exhaust reality. + +There are two special assumptions which are smuggled into supposedly +assumptionless transcendental arguments. First, there is the belief that there +is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they +describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, +there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective +basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is +controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with +crossed fingers.) + +Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are +addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have +conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step +such as the following, for example. We can have "real knowledge" of +particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive +words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. +This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the +alternative that we don't have this "real knowledge." + +In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that +transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring +the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, +transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the +empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing +fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many +transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific +psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes +as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental +arguments are supposed to prove. + diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b45f201 --- /dev/null +++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +\chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} + + +We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to +believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. +Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a +blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. +Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also +observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so +that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will +not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question +then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that +people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as +soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract +and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. +Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot +afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs +which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. + +Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs +as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and +decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be +punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional +preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between +fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be +self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional +formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation +whatever? + +It is apparent that fearful beliefs suggest many topics for speculation. +This essay, however, will concentrate exclusively on one topic, which is by +far the most important. Given that people once held the belief about +blasphemy, and that I do not, then I have succeeded in dispensing with a +fearful belief. Two beliefs which are exactly analogous to the one about +blasphemy are the belief that if I jump out of a tenth story window I will be +hurt, and the belief that if I attempt to walk through a wall I will bruise +myself. Given that I am able to dispense with the belief about blasphemy, it +follows that, in effect, I am able to walk through walls relative to medieval +people. That is, my ability to blaspheme without being struck by lightning +would be as unimaginable to them as the ability to walk through walls is +today. The topic of this essay is whether it is possible to transfer my +achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs. + +\visbreak + +I am told that \enquote{if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will +be hurt.} Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not +convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the +"evidence" implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to +see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both +blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the +action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in +order to prove that I can get away with it? Actually, I do not blaspheme; I +simply do not perform the action at all. Yet I do not have any belief +whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose +that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, +shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? +Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of +having to accept the dare that "you have to do it to prove you don't believe +it's dangerous"? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? +The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief +should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. + +The exhortation continues to the effect that if I did utter blasphemy I +really would be struck by lightning. I still do not find this compelling. But +suppose that I do see someone utter a blasphemy and get struck by lightning. +Surely this must convert me. But with due apologies to the faithful, I must +report that it does not. There is no reason why it should make me believe. I +do not believe that blaspheming will cause me to be struck by lightning, and +the evocation of frightful images---or for that matter, something that I +see---would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an +immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by +lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by +lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold +the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I tive is so +profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one +"sighting."} + +In general, the so-called evidence doesn't work. There is a swindle +somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful +belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the +whole conglomeration of "evidence" somehow overwhelmed medieval +people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away +with something that they could not get away with. + +It is not that I stand up in a society of the faithful and suddenly +blaspheme. It is rather that the whole medieval cognitive orientation had +been completely reoriented by the time it was transmitted to me. Or in other +words, the medieval cognitive orientation was restructured throughout +during the modern era. In the process, the compelling conglomeration of +evidence was disintegrated. Isolated from their niches in the old orientation, +the bits of evidence no longer worked. Each bit missed the target. I do not +have a head-on confrontation with the medieval impossibility of +blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I +structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. + +The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I +have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that "if I try to walk +through the wall I will fail and will bruise myself" is also discardable. I am +sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. +But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a +fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring +the entire situation, of restructuring evidence, so that the conglomeration of +evidence is disintegrated into isolated bits which are separately powerless. +Only then can one slip by the impossibility. I cannot exercise my freedom to +walk through walls until the whole cognitive orientation of the modern era is +restructured throughout. + +The project of restructuring the modern cognitive orientation is a vast +one. The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. In this connection it +is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic of science as Carnap +rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition meaningful if it had any +empirically verifiable proposition as an implication. But consider an +appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions in good standing, and +conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite number of propositions about +single events (what Carnap called protocol-sentences). Only a very small +number of the latter propositions are indeed subject to verification. If we +sever them from the entire conjunction, what remains is as effectively +blocked from verification as the propositions which Carnap rejected as +meaningless. This criticism of science is not a mere technical exercise. A +scientific proposition is a fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially +testable meanings with an infinite number of untestable meanings and +inveigles us to accept the whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the +very beginning of \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this +quite clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it. For us, +however, it is essential to be assured that science can be dismantled just as +the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme. + +We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to +overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of +the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive +"objects" is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for +this correlation is "the contribution of intermodal organization to the +object Gestalt."} + +From a different traditon, the critique of scientific fact and of +measurable time which is suggested in Luk\'{a}cs' \booktitle{Reification and the +Consciousness of the Proletariat} might be of value if it were developed.\footnote{Lulkacs also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist +society---that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to +subsistence was unconditional. He implied that scientific quantification and +facticity are closely connected with the work discipline required by the +capitalist mode of production; and that like the price system, they constitute +a false objectivity which we accept because the social economic institutions +deprive us of subsistence if we fail to submit to them. Quite aside from the +historical unlikelihood of a communist society, this suggestion might be +pursued as a thought experiment to obtain a more detailed characterization +of the hypothetical post-scientific outlook.} + +Finally, I may mention that most of my own writings are offered as +fragmentary beginnings in the project of dismantling the modern cognitive +orientation. + +Someday we will realize that we were always free to walk through +walls. But we could not exercise this freedom because we structured the +whole situation, and the evidence, in an enslaving way. + |