fixes in appendix and images

1 files changed, 144 insertions, 152 deletions

diff --git a/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex b/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex
index f2431ef..1c8c71b 100644
--- a/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex
+++ b/extra/philosophy_of_concept_art.tex
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 \newcommand{\action}[1]{[\textit{#1}]}
 
-\newcommand{\speaker}[1]{\vskip 0.2em \textsc{#1}: }
-\newcommand{\speakermod}[2]{\vskip 0.2em \textsc{#1} \textit{(#2)}: }
+\newcommand{\spk}[1]{\vskip 0.4em \textsc{#1}: }
+\newcommand{\spkmod}[2]{\vskip 0.4em \textsc{#1} \textit{(#2)}: }
 
 \chapter{Philosophy of Concept Art (1987)}
 
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ by Christer Hennix \\
 Dec. 6, 1987 \par }
 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} I'm going to give a summary of how I originated Concept Art 
+\spk{Flynt} I'm going to give a summary of how I originated Concept Art 
 in order to bring it up to the point where it's understandable why I 
 speak of you (Catherine Christer Hennix) as my only successor in the genre. 
 Summarizing briefly, I see two things coming together. One of them 
@@ -30,16 +30,16 @@ intellectual dimension in Stockhausen---Stockhausen's theoretical
 journal \journaltitle{die Reihe}---the impression that they were doing science 
 actually---for example Stockhausen had a long essay on how the 
 duration of the notes had to correspond to the twelve pitches of the 
-chromatic scale \ldots
+chromatic scale\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} "\ldots\ how time passes\ldots"\footnote{\journaltitle{die Reihe 3}}
+\spk{Hennix} \enquote{\ldots\ \textit{how time passes}\ldots}\footnote{\journaltitle{die Reihe 3}}
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, and what is more, the other rhythms had to correspond to 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes, and what is more, the other rhythms had to correspond to 
 the overtone structure above those frequencies as fundamentals. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Yes, I'm quite familiar with that. 
+\spk{Hennix} Yes, I'm quite familiar with that. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, I would expect you would be. I remember Bo 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes, I would expect you would be. I remember Bo 
 Nilson---you will like this---in 1958 at the same time I saw Stockhausen's 
 score---he went even one step further than Stockhausen because he 
 used fractional amplitude specifications---so this is even more than 
@@ -55,11 +55,9 @@ is on one axis and the length of the note is on another axis. What he
 would do was to superimpose that on some picture like from a star 
 catalogue--- 
 
+\spk{Hennix} \opustitle{Atlas Eclipticalis}--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} \opustitle{Atlas Eclipticalis}--- 
-
-
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yeah, well, that's the particular piece. I'm making up a 
+\spk{Flynt} Yeah, well, that's the particular piece. I'm making up a 
 composite of his compositional techniques but the result is that when you 
 break up a sequential event in that way, it's not like a pitch-time graph 
 where there's an intuitive recognition of the way the process unfolds. 
@@ -102,12 +100,10 @@ the attitude, they were rewriting the history of music, trying to show
 that all previous important figures were essentially preoccupied with 
 structure, that they had been complete structuralists. 
 
-
-\speaker{HENNIX} Really? I thought it was only Webern that was given that 
+\spk{Hennix} Really? I thought it was only Webern that was given that 
 treatment. 
 
-
-\speaker{FLYNT} Well, they were digging up all these composers from the 
+\spk{Flynt} Well, they were digging up all these composers from the 
 Middle Ages, the isorhythmic motet and everything like that---they 
 were sort of dredging that up because that was the previous 
 period---the medieval scores in the form of a circle and the use of insertion 
@@ -123,25 +119,25 @@ quite an excursion.
 At any rate there is in music, there is this preoccupation with---it 
 may be a kind of quasi-Pythagoreanism, I don't know\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} The way I looked at it was that they saw in Webern, first of 
+\spk{Hennix} The way I looked at it was that they saw in Webern, first of 
 all the harmony was going away. And they saw in Webern a way of 
 determining the note more and more precisely, in terms of all of its 
 parameters, pitch, duration, timbre and all that. What was left was that 
 timbre was not serialized yet. And that, as far I see it, was what the 
 Darmstadt school did---they added--- 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Stockhausen's \opustitle{Kontra-Punkte}--- 
+\spk{Flynt} Stockhausen's \opustitle{Kontra-Punkte}--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Yeah. And they all considered Webern the god of the new 
+\spk{Hennix} Yeah. And they all considered Webern the god of the new 
 music--- 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes--- 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} ---and also a little bit Messiaen--- 
+\spk{Hennix} ---and also a little bit Messiaen--- 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} It was Webern and Messaien that determined the entire 
+\spk{Hennix} It was Webern and Messaien that determined the entire 
 fifties in Darmstadt. In other words, they were saying that Cage was no 
 good. He was just looking in \booktitle{I Ching}---it was a random thing. And you 
 cannot recover the structure, it's hidden, as you said. The problem was 
@@ -154,15 +150,13 @@ had to fake it. Because---you find that yourself when you do serial
 music---the music moves too slowly. So you change the numbers to get 
 the music up a little bit. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. We're taking longer on this than I meant to\ldots
+\spk{Flynt} Yes. We're taking longer on this than I meant to\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} But I wanted to say this. The completely deterministic com- 
-position technique and the completely random, aleatoric technique, 
+\spk{Hennix} But I wanted to say this. The completely deterministic composition technique and the completely random, aleatoric technique, 
 gave exactly the same results. And that was the complete breakdown of 
-the Darmstadt school. That's when they started to improvise in Darm- 
-stadt. Not before that was there improvisation in Darmstadt. 
+the Darmstadt school. That's when they started to improvise in Darmstadt. Not before that was there improvisation in Darmstadt. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} When they first tried to serialize duration, they tried to pick a 
+\spk{Flynt} When they first tried to serialize duration, they tried to pick a 
 fundamental unit and use multiples of it; in other words, that's not the 
 way you serialize pitch. You don't take one cycle per second and then 
 use two cycles per second, up to twelve. That's not what you do. But 
@@ -210,9 +204,7 @@ Carnap. And I was a schoolmate of Kripke, Solovay, Goodman \etc\
 my conversations with them were insignificant as far as the philosophy 
 of mathematics was concerned, there was no discussion between me 
 and them on any of that but it will locate the time frame that I'm talking 
-about.* 
-
-\footnote{I'm being too diffident. I had quite significant discussions with Kripke and Goodman in 1961. [H.F,, note added]}
+about.\footnote{I'm being too diffident. I had quite significant discussions with Kripke and Goodman in 1961. [H.F,, note added]}
 
 But observing what was going on at that time, I picked up the idea 
 that the most plausible explanation of what mathematics is, is that it is 
@@ -259,7 +251,7 @@ mathematician was to study structures which do not have any reality.
 And that from time to time you will give an interpretation to one or the 
 other of these structures, like a physical interpretation, and then it may 
 be found to be true or false in reality or not. Meanwhile, you have 
-another sense of the word "interpretation" which has to do with relative 
+another sense of the word \enquote{interpretation} which has to do with relative 
 consistency proofs by something having a model. 
 
 This is now a completely open question for me, what they thought 
@@ -268,11 +260,11 @@ doing---he interpreted one or another non-Euclidean geometry---what
 was the interpretation that he used? It was a denumerable domain of 
 algebraic numbers.\footnote{Foundations of Geometry, pp. 27--30}
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} I think his ideas go back to Klein's models---which are 
+\spk{Hennix} I think his ideas go back to Klein's models---which are 
 Euclidean in the center of the circle and then at the periphery they have 
 turned non-Euclidean (in the complex plane). 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} You had to have an explanation of how mathematics could be 
+\spk{Flynt} You had to have an explanation of how mathematics could be 
 true in any sense whatsoever even though any claim of a connection 
 with the real world had been completely severed, and it was being 
 pursued in some kind of vacuum. What does mathematics mean in that 
@@ -286,28 +278,28 @@ infinitary games. By the way, I completely overlooked that aspect at
 that time. You know, I can only see it now, kind of like two superimposed 
 pictures, because I see what I know now and compare it with what I knew then. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Yeah, the same for myself. I didn't know that this idea of 
+\spk{Hennix} Yeah, the same for myself. I didn't know that this idea of 
 Hilbert's was forced by Frege until later. Frege was the one who said 
 that either the parallel axiom is true, or it's not. Which way do you want 
 it? And so he caused the big stir in the foundations of geometry in the 
 end of the nineteenth century and that's why he became enemies with 
 Hilbert. They were life enemies. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} The reason I see it like two superimposed transparencies--- 
+\spk{Flynt} The reason I see it like two superimposed transparencies--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} But even today this debate with Frege---you have to go to a 
+\spk{Hennix} But even today this debate with Frege---you have to go to a 
 single volume in Frege's posthumous writings---it is not mentioned in 
 any textbook---no lecture mentions it, and, so far, nobody has 
 explained it properly.\footnote{\booktitle{Nachgelassene Schriften und Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel}, vol. 2, Felix Meiner, Hamburg: 1976. (Gottlob Frege, The Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, University of Chicago Press: 1980)}
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, yes, yes. You're talking about an obscure origin of something 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes, yes, yes. You're talking about an obscure origin of something 
 and what I'm talking about is a kind of consensus that had grown 
 up, since everybody agreed that mathematics should study unreal structures. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} But that consensus was forced on us, that that was what we 
+\spk{Hennix} But that consensus was forced on us, that that was what we 
 were supposed to do. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} The problem then---I thought mathematics was like chess. 
+\spk{Flynt} The problem then---I thought mathematics was like chess. 
 What I understand now is that even a good formalist would not agree 
 with that. A good formalist would say that when you have a finite game 
 like chess, the problems of validity and soundness become transparent 
@@ -321,11 +313,11 @@ problem to stand for mathematics. Or that the reliability of a finite
 game was sufficiently complicated to stand for mathematics so I basically 
 focused just on a finite game. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} By the way, this was exactly the late Wittgenstein's view of 
+\spk{Hennix} By the way, this was exactly the late Wittgenstein's view of 
 the philosophy of mathematics---it's not a complete misunderstanding, 
 that is to say, other people thought of it that way too. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} The question then arose of even the soundness, the reliability, 
+\spk{Flynt} The question then arose of even the soundness, the reliability, 
 the consistency of a finite game---this then is the problem for example 
 whether it is possible to follow a very simple rule correctly or not. The 
 other thing that was feeding into everything that was going on was that 
@@ -334,23 +326,23 @@ the Harvard Bookstore when I walked in as a freshman my very first
 day there---so in other words I was looking at Wittgenstein's Remarks 
 on The Foundations of Mathematics from 1957--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Ten years before me--- 
+\spk{Hennix} Ten years before me--- 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} ---but very cursorily. Because I had a philosophical 
+\spk{Flynt} ---but very cursorily. Because I had a philosophical 
 agenda---I passed over this material in a very cursory way because I had a 
 philosophical agenda. I was not involved in the distinction between a 
 finite and an infinite structure. I was not involved in that. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} You thought there was no such distinction? 
+\spk{Hennix} You thought there was no such distinction? 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Well no, I thought that---it didn't seem that there was very 
+\spk{Flynt} Well no, I thought that---it didn't seem that there was very 
 much point in worrying about that when there were much more 
 extreme problems to be worried about. But Wittgenstein wrote a lot 
 about the possibility of following very simple rules. And I assumed that 
 if there were epistemological questions for mathematics that this game 
 interpretation---this chess interpretation---had displaced the question 
 of the soundness and reliability of the mathematics to the possibility of 
-understanding a very simple rule like writing the series "plus 2". 
+understanding a very simple rule like writing the series \enquote{plus 2}. 
 
 And having gathered that this was the way that I should picture 
 mathematics---I mean we understood very well that there were other 
@@ -359,9 +351,9 @@ obsolete. In other words the person who believed that mathematics was
 a description of a real supra-terrestrial structure, and certainly there 
 were people like that--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Still today. 
+\spk{Hennix} Still today. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} ---we thought that this was a philosophy that had been 
+\spk{Flynt} ---we thought that this was a philosophy that had been 
 exposed as superstitious by Positivism and possibly even by Ockham 
 several centuries earlier. So it was not that we didn't know about that. I 
 drew a personal conclusion that that position could not be defended by 
@@ -372,8 +364,8 @@ meant to me.
 In my philosophy I was not concerned with the specifics of 
 mathematics; I was concerned with the problem of how I knowa world 
 beyond my immediate sensations. That was actually the question that I 
-began with---the question of propositions of material fact, like "it is raining" 
-or "the \textsc{Empire State Building} is at Fifth Avenue and 34th Street." 
+began with---the question of propositions of material fact, like \enquote{it is raining} 
+or \enquote{the \textsc{Empire State Building} is at Fifth Avenue and 34th Street.} 
 
 I had read a very simplified exposition---it was actually some 
 lectures that Carnap gave in England in the 1930s on what Positivism 
@@ -403,29 +395,29 @@ text which in effect gave my own empiricist constructions of what it
 means to say that A causes B and so forth, to give empiricist constructive 
 definitions of those---which is, I suppose, in the spirit of Carnap's 
 program, even though I hadn't actually seen what he had written, and if 
-I had it would have confused me---no, I wouldn't say "confused"; I 
+I had it would have confused me---no, I wouldn't say \enquote{confused}; I 
 would say it would have discredited him completely. I wouldn't say 
-"confused" because that's too modest. 
+\enquote{confused} because that's too modest. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} No, I wouldn't think "confused," I would think it would 
+\spk{Hennix} No, I wouldn't think \enquote{confused,} I would think it would 
 have upset you\ldots
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, I wouldn't say "confused." I would say he had been 
+\spk{Flynt} No, I wouldn't say \enquote{confused.} I would say he had been 
 discredited. 
 
 I very quickly passed to the position that the propositions of 
 natural science were meaningless metaphysics. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} On what basis? Can you pin that down? A little bit, only. 
+\spk{Hennix} On what basis? Can you pin that down? A little bit, only. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} This is something I want to compress---it says a little bit about 
+\spk{Flynt} This is something I want to compress---it says a little bit about 
 this in \booktitle{Blueprint for a Higher Civilization}\footnote{H. Flynt, Blueprint for a Higher Civilization (Milan, 1975). Recently reissued and an expanded and corrected edition by \textsc{Salitter Workings}}---like 
-the proposition, "this key is made of iron" or something like that, I comment on that in the 
+the proposition, \enquote{this key is made of iron} or something like that, I comment on that in the 
 essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}.
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} I didn't recall the example actually. 
+\spk{Hennix} I didn't recall the example actually. 
 
-\speakermod{FLYNT}{reading} "The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. 
+\spkmod{Flynt}{reading} \textquote{The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. 
 In this connection it is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic 
 of science as Carnap rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition 
 meaningful if it had any empirically verifiable proposition as an 
@@ -441,7 +433,7 @@ fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially-testable meanings with
 an infinite number of untestable meanings and inveigles us to accept the 
 whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the very beginning of 
 \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this quite 
-clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it." 
+clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it.}
 
 The only point that I'm trying to make here is that I began to move 
 very quickly when I was still very young towards a position of extreme 
@@ -450,7 +442,7 @@ was not a slow process. I just immediately took Carnap's critique of
 metaphysics, decided that it applied directly to natural science---you 
 dismiss natural science as meaningless. The problem: is there an object 
 that is beyond my experience, is there a glass which is beyond what they 
-would call the "scopic" glass, the "tactile" glass \action{gestures toward the 
+would call the \enquote{scopic} glass, the \enquote{tactile} glass \action{gestures toward the 
 glass from which he has been drinking}---is there a glass other than 
 those glasses---when you first think about it, that question seems to 
 have exactly the status of the propositions about God, freedom, and 
@@ -478,16 +470,16 @@ Kant makes the same point. In order to ask the question whether
 there is a glass beyond my sense impression of it---I cannot ask that 
 question\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Oh you mean the \term{ding an sich} question. 
+\spk{Hennix} Oh you mean the \term{ding an sich} question. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Well that's what Kant would have been talking about but I 
+\spk{Flynt} Well that's what Kant would have been talking about but I 
 don't want to fit that narrowly into Kant's controlling the terms of the 
 discussion. I'm trying to ask it as someone who has embraced 
 Logical Positivism and is now turning around to question Logical 
 Positivism---you see the point that I was just making there---when 
 you say that this key is made of iron, which is Carnap's favorite 
 example---and then a protocol sentence, for example 
-"if I hold a magnet near this key, the key will be attracted to the magnet"---it 
+\enquote{if I hold a magnet near this key, the key will be attracted to the magnet}---it 
 is not clear where Carnap stands on 
 the question whether only my sense impressions are real---just talking 
 about this situation---only my sense impressions are real---or is there 
@@ -540,26 +532,26 @@ forces a yes answer. This does not mean that a proof of the existence of
 the external world has been given. It meant that the proposition of the 
 existence of the external world would verify itself even if it were false! 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} I find this extremely interesting and rewarding, what you are 
+\spk{Hennix} I find this extremely interesting and rewarding, what you are 
 saying now, because I never heard you say it this way before. I just want 
 to ask you one question before you go on: namely, I see something for 
 the first time which I hadn't seen before---but before you go on I just 
 want to ask you one leading question: the simple existential statement, 
-"there is a glass on the table." You include that also in what will be 
-doubtable here. In other words not just "there is a glass on the table" 
-but "there exists a glass," the existential statement. I guess I wasn't very 
+\enquote{there is a glass on the table.} You include that also in what will be 
+doubtable here. In other words not just \enquote{there is a glass on the table} 
+but \enquote{there exists a glass,} the existential statement. I guess I wasn't very 
 clear now. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, the thing is, the approach that I'm taking doesn't break it 
+\spk{Flynt} No, the thing is, the approach that I'm taking doesn't break it 
 down the way that you're talking about. Let me tell you. You may not 
 be \emph{sympatico} with empiricism. When you are trying to deal with 
 philosophy at all---you have to make some allowance for the 
 fact---you have to understand that the philosopher may be carving up 
 problems in a way that is temperamentally alien to you. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Yeah\ldots
+\spk{Hennix} Yeah\ldots
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} You have to understand that. This is why somebody like 
+\spk{Flynt} You have to understand that. This is why somebody like 
 Carnap would read Hegel and say it's not saying anything. Actually, 
 Hegel is saying something. In fact, you might go so far as to make a case 
 that Hegel is actually rebutting Carnap, becaue if you understand what 
@@ -574,17 +566,17 @@ solved problem. I'm trying to give you a sense of misunderstandings
 between philosophers that are the results of temperamental incompatibilities. 
 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} What you are giving me is a two-step way to skepticism. You 
+\spk{Hennix} What you are giving me is a two-step way to skepticism. You 
 ask a certain question---is there something beyond this perception of 
-the glass? And you say the answer "yes" is forced on me, but then you 
+the glass? And you say the answer \enquote{yes} is forced on me, but then you 
 realize this was a meaningless question. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, it's the other way around. 
+\spk{Flynt} No, it's the other way around. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Oh, okay, but here's where you have to explain in detail 
+\spk{Hennix} Oh, okay, but here's where you have to explain in detail 
 because here's where I miss you. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Let me go through the series of steps again. The series of steps 
+\spk{Flynt} Let me go through the series of steps again. The series of steps 
 was\ldots\  I'll have to doit all at the same time. You have to understand---I 
 don't think that you even understand what an empiricist is. It's a 
 peculiar attitude. And one of the reasons why you have very little 
@@ -598,9 +590,9 @@ because in addition to having the doctrine of the construction of the
 world from sense impressions, they also want to have things like 
 science--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Ethics\ldots
+\spk{Hennix} Ethics\ldots
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, not ethics---one of the characteristics of the twentieth- 
+\spk{Flynt} No, not ethics---one of the characteristics of the twentieth- 
 century philosopher was the appearance of the tough-guy philosopher 
 who rejects all of ethics as meaningless, which Carnap certainly did and 
 people who are close to him like A.J. Ayer---no, they did not want 
@@ -625,9 +617,9 @@ stupidity, because the man did not realize that his answers were not
 adequate, did not realize how preposterous his constructions of the 
 world were--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} I would say vulgar. 
+\spk{Hennix} I would say vulgar. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, yes. And\ldots\ what is even worse about empiricism is, in the 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes, yes. And\ldots\ what is even worse about empiricism is, in the 
 case of somebody like Mach, not only does he want to have his sense 
 impressions and does he want to have his science, but he wants to have 
 science explain sense impressions! And nevertheless it was supposed to 
@@ -646,12 +638,12 @@ authentic empiricist. You ask does a glass exist; an authentic empiricist
 would have to say that he already has a problem with that---that he has 
 to regard that as an undefined question or statement. It's undefined, 
 because if you are asking me if at this moment I quote unquote 
-have---interesting word there, "have"---that is what our ordinary 
+have---interesting word there, \enquote{have}---that is what our ordinary 
 language gives us as the idiom for this. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Or "suffer!" 
+\spk{Hennix} Or \enquote{suffer!} 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, "have" or "suffer," that's right. I have or I suffer a scopic 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes, \enquote{have} or \enquote{suffer,} that's right. I have or I suffer a scopic 
 glass or visual glass apparition---then that is identically true. That is 
 identically true. If you express any surprise at that, we have a problem 
 here. I have a scopic glass. If I say I have an apparitional glass, would 
@@ -671,77 +663,77 @@ an objectivity to compare it to. And a bona fide empiricist would not
 agree that my sense impression is subjective---subjective in comparison 
 to \emph{what}? 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} So an empiricist would be a person who would not doubt 
+\spk{Hennix} So an empiricist would be a person who would not doubt 
 whether he had a toothache or not. In other words, if he had a 
 toothache\ldots
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} You would regard it as being a mistake to do what? I'm not 
-sure about the word "toothache"---if you mean that he would not 
+\spk{Flynt} You would regard it as being a mistake to do what? I'm not 
+sure about the word \enquote{toothache}---if you mean that he would not 
 doubt whether he had a toothache sensation. Whether there is an 
 organic---in the language of medicine---whether there is an organic 
 substrate for the toothache impression---this in a medical sense is a 
 question of what is called hysteria or something like that\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Suppose I have a toothache. But now I'm an empiricist so I 
+\spk{Hennix} Suppose I have a toothache. But now I'm an empiricist so I 
 say I'm doubting this impression. I probably don't have a toothache. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, no\ldots
+\spk{Flynt} No, no\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} I have to accept the toothache? 
+\spk{Hennix} I have to accept the toothache? 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, you don't have--- 
+\spk{Flynt} No, you don't have--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} The glass you said was---I couldn't doubt the perception of 
+\spk{Hennix} The glass you said was---I couldn't doubt the perception of 
 the glass. You said that was beyond doubt, in some sense, for the 
 empiricist. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} It would be some kind of logical mistake to think that there 
+\spk{Flynt} It would be some kind of logical mistake to think that there 
 was anything there to be doubted. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Okay. And the same with the toothache. 
+\spk{Hennix} Okay. And the same with the toothache. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes, yes. I mean the point is not so much that we have come 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes, yes. I mean the point is not so much that we have come 
 into an area in which the empiricist is prepared to have faith---that 
 would be completely missing the point. No faith is required---that's the 
 point. The point is that it would be some kind of logical error. Once you 
 understand what a sense impression is, the terminology of doubt does 
 not apply to that level. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} I see. Just that was my question. 
+\spk{Hennix} I see. Just that was my question. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} The terminology of doubt does not apply to apparitions. It 
+\spk{Flynt} The terminology of doubt does not apply to apparitions. It 
 doesn't make sense to doubt subjective apparitions. The empiricist is 
 already nervous when you ask does a glass exist. If you are asking 
-whether I have a "scopic" glass, it's identically true. Wait, wait. There 
+whether I have a \enquote{scopic} glass, it's identically true. Wait, wait. There 
 are already problems there. I'll come back to them. But when you 
 say---it sounds like what you're asking me is whether the fact that I see a 
 glass is sufficient to prove an objective glass---that sounds like \ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} No, no, that's not what---
+\spk{Hennix} No, no, that's not what---
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Well, ok. Most people when they say: 
-"do you concede that there is a glass on the table---I'm sitting here looking at it," what they 
-mean is: "do you concede that from your visual glass apparition you should conclude an objective glass, a substantial glass?" I'm taking it for 
+\spk{Flynt} Well, ok. Most people when they say: 
+\enquote{do you concede that there is a glass on the table---I'm sitting here looking at it,} what they 
+mean is: \enquote{do you concede that from your visual glass apparition you should conclude an objective glass, a substantial glass?} I'm taking it for 
 granted that you know enough about philosophy to have a sense of the 
-full weight those two words "substantial" and "objective" have in 
+full weight those two words \enquote{substantial} and \enquote{objective} have in 
 philosophy. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Yes. 
+\spk{Hennix} Yes. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} That at great length is my reaction to your question about 
-doubting "there is a glass on the table" versus doubting "there exists a glass." 
-A bona fide empiricist would say, "Why are you asking me this?" 
+\spk{Flynt} That at great length is my reaction to your question about 
+doubting \enquote{there is a glass on the table} versus doubting \enquote{there exists a glass.} 
+A bona fide empiricist would say, \enquote{Why are you asking me this?} 
 The scopic glass is simply here for me. As far as concluding that an 
 objective glass exists from the existence of that apparition---the traditional 
 problem of concluding whether the apparition is a symptom of 
-some transcendent world---I think the word "transcendent" is sometimes 
+some transcendent world---I think the word \enquote{transcendent} is sometimes 
 used in that sense in philosophy---the world beyond any sense 
 impression--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} This is why I used the example of the pain---because it 
+\spk{Hennix} This is why I used the example of the pain---because it 
 would be senseless for me to claim that \emph{I} can have \emph{your} toothache! 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Now just a minute. An empiricist---what you're really getting 
+\spk{Flynt} Now just a minute. An empiricist---what you're really getting 
 at what you're sort of squeezing out of me here---I'm glad to have it 
 squeezed out of me---I have no embarrassment about this---is that with 
 empiricism either you must be prepared immediately to depart 
@@ -758,7 +750,7 @@ For the empiricist, nothing remotely like that question has arisen yet,
 because I haven't got outside of my own quote unquote head yet. 
 
 Maybe you're just squeezing more and more. Either the empiricist 
-must be a "madman" or else he must be insincere. I took the alternative 
+must be a \enquote{madman} or else he must be insincere. I took the alternative 
 of the madman. This is important not for me but for the general public 
 to be told---something which the general public has never been 
 told---and I know why they have never been told---maybe it is necessary to 
@@ -776,14 +768,14 @@ the scientist needed. And, at the same time, empiricism was supposed to
 be---in the case of Neurath---he wanted to make some kind of unification 
 of empiricism with Marxism and make it like a complete demythified view of society. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} There was even an attempt to bring ethics into it. 
+\spk{Hennix} There was even an attempt to bring ethics into it. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Well, in Neurath's case, yes. 
+\spk{Flynt} Well, in Neurath's case, yes. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Schlick too, I think---Schlick, I recall, did something in 
-ethics.\bootnote{\booktitle{Fragen der Ethik}, Vienna, 1930.}
+\spk{Hennix} Schlick too, I think---Schlick, I recall, did something in 
+ethics.\footnote{\booktitle{Fragen der Ethik}, Vienna, 1930.}
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} I was talking about why empiricism is not portrayed honestly 
+\spk{Flynt} I was talking about why empiricism is not portrayed honestly 
 in the general picture that exists of philosophy---the public picture of 
 philosophy---it was brought in to solve the problem of what is a base 
 for science---namely, sense impressions are going to be taken as 
@@ -791,20 +783,20 @@ elemental. Science is going to arise from sense impressions by construction.
 Nevertheless it is required that both scientific knowledge and the 
 common-sense social world be produced by this approach--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Neurath, you mean. 
+\spk{Hennix} Neurath, you mean. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, no. Well, Carnap did not deny the existence of other 
+\spk{Flynt} No, no. Well, Carnap did not deny the existence of other 
 people. All of the positivists\ldots
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Rather, he had nothing to say about it. 
+\spk{Hennix} Rather, he had nothing to say about it. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} I didn't say ethics---I said the common-sense social world. I 
+\spk{Flynt} I didn't say ethics---I said the common-sense social world. I 
 wasn't talking about anything ethical\ldots
 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} The existence of tables and cars and--- 
+\spk{Hennix} The existence of tables and cars and--- 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Well, what I'm saying is that the existence of other people is on 
+\spk{Flynt} Well, what I'm saying is that the existence of other people is on 
 the same level as the existence of tables and automobiles. And what is 
 even worse than that is that the ones who were scientists in fact wanted 
 to see perception itself as the product of the abstract and quantified 
@@ -827,14 +819,14 @@ take that \emph{seriously} anymore.
 As a matter of fact Hume wrote two philosophical works and in 
 the first work\footnote{\booktitle{Treatise on Human Nature}}
 there is the notorious passage in which he himself 
-understands what it means to be a genuine empiricist.\footnote{Book I, Part IV, VII "Conclusion"}
+understands what it means to be a genuine empiricist.\footnote{Book I, Part IV, VII \enquote{Conclusion}}
 He says, \textquote{I feel that I am an outcast from the human race,} and so forth in this famous 
 passage---he says, 
-"I do not know if the glass continues to exist after I've looked away from it." 
+\enquote{I do not know if the glass continues to exist after I've looked away from it.} 
 That line in Hume should have told you 
 whatever you wanted to know about the existence of the glass. You 
 should be able to ascertain the appropriate answer to your question. 
-Hume says: "I do not know if the glass exists when I look away from it." 
+Hume says: \enquote{I do not know if the glass exists when I look away from it.} 
 
 Hume's second book\footnote{\booktitle{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}}, 
 when he was trying to vindicate himself, 
@@ -867,7 +859,7 @@ how dreams would affect the validity of the proof. He touches on all of
 those in a way which is just awful. It's a disgraceful performance. But he 
 had the issue there, actually. 
 
-Well, your first reaction is, "I have no way of answering this." Your 
+Well, your first reaction is, \enquote{I have no way of answering this.} Your 
 second reaction is, that \emph{if I understand the question}, then there must be 
 an external world. So it would seem that I have actually proved the 
 external world---that's what Kant actually said. Or he came very near 
@@ -875,11 +867,11 @@ to saying something like that. The third step is the realization that the
 statement would validate itself not only if it's true---but if it's false it 
 validates itself equally well! 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Given this method of understanding the question. And the 
+\spk{Hennix} Given this method of understanding the question. And the 
 method remained unspecified so far---as far as I know nobody has been 
 able to do very well at specifying it. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} What? Do you mean if somebody asks whether there is an 
+\spk{Flynt} What? Do you mean if somebody asks whether there is an 
 external world---my last remark is a comment about semantics---the 
 genuine semantic issue, as I said, and it's very different from the sort of 
 thing that Tarski is going on about which I think is just ridiculous. 
@@ -899,8 +891,8 @@ then there is no guarantee of the continuity of the position of the pieces
 in the absence of moves. What happens is that people treat those basic 
 questions as if they are so basic that it's sort of preposterous to make an 
 issue of them. Kripke said very clearly in his book on Wittgenstein that 
-once the question, "Does language exist?" has been asked, not to give 
-an affirmative answer is "insane and intolerable."\footnote{S. Kripke, 
+once the question, \enquote{Does language exist?} has been asked, not to give 
+an affirmative answer is \enquote{insane and intolerable.}\footnote{S. Kripke, 
 \booktitle{Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language}, p.60} 
 It's the same reaction as there is to solipsism---that solipsism is the philosophy of the 
 man in the lunatic asylum. 
@@ -909,23 +901,23 @@ The thing that may come before all the discussion so far is the
 question of \emph{what is my position on being classified as insane} is the 
 beginning This of philosophy for me. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Well, this is the classical beginning of philosophy. 
+\spk{Hennix} Well, this is the classical beginning of philosophy. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Because if you're not willing to face up to being classified as 
+\spk{Flynt} Because if you're not willing to face up to being classified as 
 insane---if you want to avoid that confrontation---you can't be a 
 philosopher. That confrontation is at the center of bona fide philosophy. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} Or was\ldots
+\spk{Hennix} Or was\ldots
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. At any rate, I had reached this point in something like 
-1961. I had not yet done \essaytitlte{The "Is There Language?" Trap}. But I had reached 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes. At any rate, I had reached this point in something like 
+1961. I had not yet done \essaytitle{The \enquote{Is There Language?} Trap}. But I had reached 
 the point of saying that to claim the existence of a world beyond 
 experience is untenable. However I understood very well that it begins 
 to create problems for me to say, \textquote{I have a visual glass apparition,}
 because there is a lot of structure in that sentence. And it's not clear 
 what is supporting that structure after the world has been cut away. 
-Even the use of the idioms like "have" and "suffer." The use of the word 
-"I"---after the objective world has been cut away it's unclear what is the 
+Even the use of the idioms like \enquote{have} and \enquote{suffer.} The use of the word 
+\enquote{I}---after the objective world has been cut away it's unclear what is the 
 basis for all of that. And this is the point I had reached in 1961 and this is 
 the point when I did \essaytitle{Concept Art}.
 
@@ -981,7 +973,7 @@ rule---but in each case they wish to express the violation, the failure of
 some traditional organizing principle of these uninterpreted calculi, 
 For instance there is one where, among other things, the very notation 
 itself has an undisplaced active interaction with the subjectivity of the 
-quote unquote reader.\footnote{dated 6/19/61---later titled "Illusions."} 
+quote unquote reader.\footnote{dated 6/19/61---later titled \enquote{Illusions.}} 
 And that determines the structure of the derivation, the proof. 
 It was pointed out to me many years later that it's not 
 just that you don't get this in schoolbook mathematics---this is what 
@@ -994,15 +986,15 @@ In other words, for each step you are told, for that step only and for this
 moment only, what the transformation rule is. And by the time you are 
 ready to take the next step, that rule is forgotten and inoperative. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} This is the \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism}? 
+\spk{Hennix} This is the \essaytitle{Energy Cube Organism}? 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No, no. \essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} was not Concept Art at 
+\spk{Flynt} No, no. \essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} was not Concept Art at 
 all. No, no. It was a different genre. That one was the piece called 
 \essaytitle{Transformations}.
 
 \essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator} in my 
 own classification are not Concept Art. Only the pieces labeled 
-"Concept Art" are Concept Art. And I only did four of them until 1987. 
+\enquote{Concept Art} are Concept Art. And I only did four of them until 1987. 
 Three of them are in \booktitle{An Anthology}, and the fourth was published in 
 \journaltitle{dimension 14} (1963). \essaytitle{The Energy Cube Organism} and the 
 \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator} were in other genres. I drew these distinctions of genre 
@@ -1024,18 +1016,18 @@ general rule written in Heaven. But in fact there isn't any general rule,
 and when you move the pawn to Bishop 3, you're just making up what 
 you are doing right at that moment, and there isn't any general rule. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} You would label this ad hoc? 
+\spk{Hennix} You would label this ad hoc? 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} That's right. That would be perhaps a better word for it. All 
+\spk{Flynt} That's right. That would be perhaps a better word for it. All 
 transformation rules and probably even all formation rules are ad hoc, 
 yes, yes. 
 
-I said "nominalistic" because they are only there individually. 
+I said \enquote{nominalistic} because they are only there individually. 
 They do not add up to any general--- 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} System of rules? 
+\spk{Hennix} System of rules? 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} No---not that---they do not add up to any generality, to a 
+\spk{Flynt} No---not that---they do not add up to any generality, to a 
 general rule that covers all cases of a certain class. 
 
 What is inadequate about this---and I realized very quickly that 
@@ -1109,20 +1101,20 @@ third thing is that this does not claim to have objective truth. It is a
 construction for the world-hallucination or the world-apparition or 
 even a construction for the private world-apparition. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} You are actually extending the world by new constructions. 
+\spk{Hennix} You are actually extending the world by new constructions. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} But it's the world-apparition. In a sense if I believed that these 
+\spk{Flynt} But it's the world-apparition. In a sense if I believed that these 
 rules were objectively established, then it would almost indicate that I 
 had not learned the lesson of the very piece which sits beside it on the 
-page!\footnote{\essaytitle{Innperseqs} versus \essaytitle{{Transformations,} second edition.} 
+page!\footnote{\essaytitle{Innperseqs} versus \essaytitle{Transformations,} second edition.}
 And what am I doing talking about a page and a text? So the 
 answer is that I have abandoned the provision of truth as the purpose of 
 this activity and I have moved to the provision of experiences where the 
 possibility of these experiences is a surprise. 
 
-\speaker{HENNIX} And you don't have to be an empiricist to be surprised. 
+\spk{Hennix} And you don't have to be an empiricist to be surprised. 
 
-\speaker{FLYNT} Yes. Yes. But the truth claim that you would have from a 
+\spk{Flynt} Yes. Yes. But the truth claim that you would have from a 
 Kripke or a Goodman has been dropped. The meaning of the text is the 
 meaning that the reader associates to it. And the thing is, that in 
 conventional intellectual work that's an unacceptable answer, because