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| author | phoebe jenkins <pjenkins@tula-health.com> | 2024-08-23 01:06:26 -0400 |
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| committer | phoebe jenkins <pjenkins@tula-health.com> | 2024-08-23 01:06:26 -0400 |
| commit | e19cd38239a9c0cf5c58ef1b7c6e5ced4d3e3b34 (patch) | |
| tree | 856721b8a9bc721b817a1eaf4eb531cf57492bb6 /essays/walking_through_walls.tex | |
| parent | 32d9167dcbb7613cfe521441142e05cd43c09a21 (diff) | |
| download | blueprint-e19cd38239a9c0cf5c58ef1b7c6e5ced4d3e3b34.tar.gz | |
this is the gameplan
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| -rw-r--r-- | essays/walking_through_walls.tex | 3 |
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diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex index ea04bf1..17c6ce5 100644 --- a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex +++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ \chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} +\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage} +\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{Walking Through Walls}} + We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation whatever? |