another pass through first section

1 files changed, 37 insertions, 28 deletions

diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index b495099..65ce47b 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
+\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
+\renewcommand{\thesubsection}{\arabic{subsection}} 
 
 \fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
 \fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy Proper (Version 3)}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{1. Introduction}}
 
-\subsection{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
+\setcounter{subsection}{0}
+\subsection{Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
 
@@ -13,17 +15,20 @@ All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are normally hel
 
 It is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
 
-To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as \enquote{\emph{Icould not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so,}} or \enquote{\emph{Even if so-and-so is true I don't want to know it.}} These remarks manifest the needs with which we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. 
+To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as \enquote{\emph{I could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so,}} or \enquote{\emph{Even if so-and-so is true I don't want to know it.}} These remarks manifest the needs with which we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. 
 
-A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for non-cognitive reasons follows. \vskip 0.5em\begin{enumerate}[nosep, itemsep=0.5em]\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. \enquote{\emph{I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God.}} \enquote{\emph{If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it.}}
+A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for non-cognitive reasons follows. 
+\vskip 0.5em
+\begin{enumerate}[nosep, itemsep=0.5em]\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. \enquote{\emph{I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God.}} \enquote{\emph{If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it.}}
 
 \item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
 
-\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Ca\-tho\-li\-cism for esthetic reasons. 
+\slop{\item The American philosopher Santayana said that he believed in Catholicism for esthetic reasons.}
 
 \item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
 
 \item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called \term{theologizing,} in recognition of the archetypal activity in this category. \end{enumerate}
+\vskip 0.5em
 
 When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he believed in the \enquote{\emph{real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who discovers it bit by bit.}} The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows that science is an instance of \term{theologizing.} If scientists cannot welcome a demonstration that their \enquote{metaphysical} presuppositions are invalid, then their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
 
@@ -33,15 +38,15 @@ The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitiv
 
 \item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is provided by the person who holds a fearful belief which is widely considered to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. \end{enumerate}
 
-\vskip 0.5emThis examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this monograph. 
-
-\vfill
-
+\slop{\vskip 0.5em This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this monograph.}
+\nopagebreak\vfill
 \signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without change.)}
+\vfill
 
-\clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-\subsection{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{2. Preliminary Concepts}}
+\clearpage
+\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
+\subsection{Preliminary Concepts}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{1. Preliminary Concepts}}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or false). 
 
@@ -55,7 +60,7 @@ Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an express
 
 As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical problems. 
 
-Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the explications for \enquote{thing having a mind} mentioned above. 
+\slop{Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the explications for \enquote{thing having a mind} mentioned above.}
 
 The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be discussing the \enquote{truth} of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for \enquote{true statement}. (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
 
@@ -65,9 +70,11 @@ In explicating \enquote{\term{true statement}} I will use the most elegant appro
 
 The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind; thus an explication for \enquote{\term{true statement}} can be found. To do so, first let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \enquote{main verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the sentence. For example, the associated name of \enquote{Boston is in Massachusetts} is \enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. 
 
-\vskip 0.5em
+\vskip 1em
 
+\begin{leftbar}
 Example:  \\\textbf{sentence:} \enquote{The table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one man while the other man talked}; \\\textbf{main verb:} \enquote{will have been} or \enquote{had been pushed}. 
+\end{leftbar}
 
 \vskip 0.5em
 
@@ -75,13 +82,13 @@ Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, but this is
 
 Now this approach may seem \enquote{unnatural} or incomplete to the reader for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is replaced by a statement \enquote{about} it (or to be precise its associated name). Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of interpreting \enquote{simple names} (Fries' \term{Class 1 words}), but not so natural to speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such words as \enquote{the}; in making statements, these names have to be in the context of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything about what the \enquote{meaning} (intension), as opposed to the referents (and non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous word \enquote{determinate}, because I haven't said anything about how names get referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in some form must have the central role in it.) 
 
-\term{Statements}, then, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have described. I could thus explicate \enquote{\emph{true statement}} as referring to those true \enquote{simple} assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of \enquote{true statement} having to do with the method of applying the first member to the second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more elegant to explicate \enquote{true statement} as referring to all true assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of the two explications the reader prefers. 
+\slop{\term{Statements}, then, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have described. I could thus explicate \enquote{\emph{true statement}} as referring to those true \enquote{simple} assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of \enquote{true statement} having to do with the method of applying the first member to the second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more elegant to explicate \enquote{true statement} as referring to all true assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of the two explications the reader prefers.}
 
 So much for the preliminaries. 
 
-\subsection[Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}][\enquote{Experience}]{Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}}
+\subsection{\enquote{Experience}}
 
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{3. \enquote{Experience}}}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{2. \enquote{Experience}}}
 
 I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
 
@@ -99,10 +106,9 @@ I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \enquote{experience}. A
 
 As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my \term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything about \term{non-experiences}, since in English there is always the implication that there could be \term{non-experiences}. The term is a radical innovation; one of the most important in this book. The fact that although it is the \enquote{simplest} and least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my \term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences.\footnote{It's good that this isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this realm would have to be a non-experience.} If he is lucky he will just find the book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may already realize what I'm going to say. 
 
+\subsection{The Linguistic Solution}
 
-\subsection[Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution][The Linguistic Solution]{Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution}
-
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{4. The Linguistic Solution}}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{3. The Linguistic Solution}}
 
 Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to explore all its implications; that will come later. 
 
@@ -120,9 +126,11 @@ Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about belief langua
 
 The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes, but\ldots} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if embarrassing) curiosity.\footnote{Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how well the reader understands that.} And there does remain a lot to be said about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose rejection as wrong would conflict with \term{experience}, or which it would be impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these matters. 
 
-\clearpage\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}\subsection[Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts][Beliefs as Mental Acts]{Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts}
+\clearpage
+\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}
+\subsection{Beliefs as Mental Acts}
 
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{B. Completion of Treatment}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{5. Beliefs as Mental Acts}}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{B. Completion of Treatment}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{4. Beliefs as Mental Acts}}
 
 In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be talking about mental acts and \term{experience}, it must be clear that this part of the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify \enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
 
@@ -136,7 +144,9 @@ I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one is at
 
 lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the expression has a referent}}. With respect to the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}}, one's attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \enquote{\stress{There is a table behind me}}, pretty much regarded as \enquote{\stress{There being a table behind me}}, and one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{\stress{that this name has a referent}}. Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of beliefs. 
 
-\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an imagined-\x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an \x-experience, whereas in the version involving language, the attention is on something which is \enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{\stress{that the reality is at one remove}}, and correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs doesn't desire to have as \term{experiences}, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-\x-experience in the version of the belief not involving language, has something which functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one has the attitude that the imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience in the version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the thing believed in is a mere \term{imagined-experience}, so in the version involving \enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a referent could only be a (mere) \term{experience}. One who expects an expression, which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for awareness of the referent to be part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving language consists of being attentive to an \term{imagined-experience} and having the attitude that it is not an \term{imagined-experience}, discredits that belief. 
+\vskip 0.3em
+\slop{\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an imagined-\x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an \x-experience, whereas in the version involving language, the attention is on something which is \enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{\stress{that the reality is at one remove}}, and correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs doesn't desire to have as \term{experiences}, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-\x-experience in the version of the belief not involving language, has something which functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one has the attitude that the imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience in the version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the thing believed in is a mere \term{imagined-experience}, so in the version involving \enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a referent could only be a (mere) \term{experience}. One who expects an expression, which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for awareness of the referent to be part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving language consists of being attentive to an \term{imagined-experience} and having the attitude that it is not an \term{imagined-experience}, discredits that belief.}
+\vskip 0.3em
 
 Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of \enquote{attitudes}, then let him consider the following summary: there must be something more to a mental act than just taking note of an \term{experience} for it to be a \enquote{belief}; this something is \enquote{peripheral and elusive}, so that I am calling the something an \enquote{attitude}, the most appropriate way in English to speak of it; the attitude, an \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} which \stress{is} the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}, is a \enquote{(conscious) self-deception experience}, because when aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just about has to be a (\enquote{conscious}) self-deception experience to transform mere taking note of an \term{experience} into something remotely deserving to be said to be a \enquote{belief}. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be \enquote{self-deceiving} is to be made without trying to think \enquote{about the relation of the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience}, to do which would be to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more than to say that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
 
@@ -148,9 +158,8 @@ I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions my pos
 
 What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions dependent on "\term{non-experience}", and pointed out that those who expect them to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
 
-
-\subsection[Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs][Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs]{Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{B. Completion of Treatment}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{6. Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}}
+\subsection{Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{B. Completion of Treatment}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{5. Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}}
 
 In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the entire \enquote{history of world thought}, the fantastic proliferation of activities at least partly \enquote{systems of knowledge} which constitute it, Platonism, psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how \enquote{non-experiential language}, and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are incomplete and confused. 
 
@@ -172,8 +181,8 @@ The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}is f
 
 It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!) to learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
-\subsection[Chapter 7: Summary][Summary]{Chapter 7: Summary}
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy Proper (Version 3)}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{7. Summary}}
+\subsection{Summary}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy Proper (Version 3)}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{6. Summary}}
 
 The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to \enquote{remain unconvinced} of the rightness of my position, or to \enquote{doubt, question} it, or to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can \enquote{question} (not believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief to be \enquote{skeptical} of my position in the sense of believing \enquote{that although the position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is objectively wrong}.) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less credulous. If one \enquote{questions my position} then one is misconstruing it as a belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right.