fix some quotes

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index d78631a..9c93395 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore
 we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of 
 touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest 
 expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal 
-organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us "touch" 
+organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} 
 includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is 
 a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same 
 as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation 
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us
 denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1), (T_1, V_2), (T_2, V_1), (T_2, V_2)$. In 
 reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us 
 designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following 
-notation. Consider a rectangular array of "places" such that the place in the 
+notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the 
 ith row and jth column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as 
 appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of 
 regularities in our present world. 
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is
 excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only f's, which 
 amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of f's leaves 
 one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to 
-open-eye sights); such an "impairment" is of little interest. Of the remaining 
+open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining 
 changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: 
 closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the 
 changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ $\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}$.
 
 But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new 
 rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change 
-changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about "impairing"
+changes, and states having only f's. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}
 changes, changes to states with rows or columns of f's. Of the remaining 
 changes, some merely forbid, repiacing p's with f's. The rest of the changes 
 are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ same changes. !f the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the
 anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect 
 everything-- everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
 sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference 
-point in the "world." The question of "whether the anomaties are really 
-outside or only in the mind" comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
+point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomaties are really 
+outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
 If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as 
 a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have 
 had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be 
@@ -198,23 +198,23 @@ However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet
 satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the 
 subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his 
 perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely 
-chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say "I see a book 
-in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil." These assumptions may not be 
-justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, "I don't even 
+chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book 
+in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be 
+justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even 
 know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know 
 whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is 
-visual." In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
+visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
 never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the 
 changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are 
 defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that 
 everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may 
 literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this 
-compensation may become habitual and "pre-conscious." In this case, if the 
+compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the 
 physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a 
 temporary psychological malfunction. 
 
 These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are 
-actually learned, "unconscious" interpretations of raw data which by 
+actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by 
 themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast 
 number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the 
 subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is 
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile
 clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished 
 manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, 
 our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. 
-"The future" is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
+\enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
 futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The 
 empirical importance of Alten's idea is thet it raises the question of what the 
 perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of 
@@ -286,13 +286,13 @@ object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence.
 The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which 
 resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. 
 To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the 
-concept of "matter," a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
+concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
 The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight 
 and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the 
 physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its 
 immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot 
 be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. 
-Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual "reading" of 
+Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of 
 the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our 
 experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying 
 concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to te!l us how to avoid being