this is the gameplan

5 files changed, 49 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex
index 6672122..ac7851a 100644
--- a/blueprint.tex
+++ b/blueprint.tex
@@ -2,7 +2,15 @@
 
 \usepackage{salitter}
 
-\usepackage[papersize={5.5in,8.5in},includeheadfoot=true,width=4.75in,height=7.8in
+\usepackage[
+	papersize={5.5in,8.5in},
+	includeheadfoot=true,
+	total={4.75in,7.7in},
+	headheight=0.25in,
+	headsep=0.15in,
+	footskip=0.3in,
+	outer=0.5in,
+	inner=0.75in
 ]{geometry}
 
 
@@ -21,7 +29,9 @@
 \usepackage{fancyhdr}
 
 % fonts
-\newpxfont
+\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
+\usepackage{ETbb}
+\let\oldstylenums\textosf
 
 \newcommand\speech[1]{
 	\textquote{\emph{#1}}}
@@ -78,6 +88,8 @@
   \end{figure}}
 
 \begin{document}
+
+% --- Initial header configuration for front matter, introduction
 \pagestyle{fancy}
 \fancyhead{} % clear all header fields
 %\fancyhead[RO,LE]{\thepart}
@@ -86,8 +98,10 @@
 %\fancyfoot[LO,CE]{\thechapter}
 %\fancyfoot[CO,RE]{\thesection}
 
-\titleformat{\chapter}[block]{\scshape\Large}{\thechapter \hskip 0.25cm \textbullet}{0.25cm}{\filleft}[\titlerule]
-\titlespacing*{\chapter}{1in}{1cm}{2cm}[1cm]
+\titleformat{\part}[display]{\centering\scshape\Huge}{\thepart}{1.5cm}{}
+
+\titleformat{\chapter}[block]{\scshape\Large}{\itshape\thechapter \hskip 0.25cm ---}{0.25cm}{\filcenter}[]
+\titlespacing*{\chapter}{0in}{1cm}{2cm}[0.5cm]
 
 \frontmatter
 \graphicspath{{img/}}
@@ -128,10 +142,15 @@ colophon goes here
 \photopage{img/creep02}{5/15/1962}{Henry Flynt presents "Creep" lecture in Adam Hovre upper common room, Harvard University, May 15, 1962}{Tony Conrad}
 \clearpage
 
+\fancyhead{} % clear all header fields
+\fancyhead[RO,LE]{\textsc{Introduction}}
 \input{essays/introduction.tex}
 
 \clearpage
 
+% --- Stripped headers for ToC, list of figures, etc
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+
 \tableofcontents*
 
 \clearpage
@@ -141,7 +160,15 @@ colophon goes here
 \clearpage
 
 \mainmatter
+
+% --- Baseline header that individual essays may modify but should restore
+%\fancyfoot[CO,RE]{\thesection}
+
 \part{Philosophy}
+
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+\fancyhead[LO]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RE]{\chaptername}
+
 \input{essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex}
 \input{essays/walking_through_walls.tex}
 \input{essays/philosophical_reflections.tex}
diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
index d02e6de..f0a1dd3 100644
--- a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
+++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
@@ -1,16 +1,19 @@
 \chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
 
-We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion. 
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}}
+
+We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion. 
 
 The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. The only possible approach for this paper is an internal critique of common sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to aspects of themselves. 
 
-As an example of the application of our initial result to specific questions of belief, consider the question of whether the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced \textsc{Empire State Building} does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it depends on the very assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a definitional trick. 
+As an example of the application of our initial result to specific questions of belief, consider the question of whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced Empire State Building does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it depends on the very assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the Empire State Building continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a definitional trick. 
 
 We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing about nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that belief-assertions are not substantive. 
 
-Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts.\footnote{We understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal formulation.} Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of \enquote{reality,} two different types of experiences can be distinguished, non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a non-mental experience. The \enquote{attitude} which is involved is not a proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief-assertion. 
+Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts.\footnote{We understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal formulation.} Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of \enquote{reality,} two different types of experiences can be distinguished, non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a non-mental experience. The \enquote{attitude} which is involved is not a proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief-assertion. 
 
-The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that although the problem originally seems to center on \enquote{nonexperience,} it turns out to center on \enquote{language.} Philosophical problems exist only if there is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word \enquote{table} is supposed to denote an object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? In other words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more immediately than in the case of \enquote{nonexperience,} that this question is caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and nonexperiences? Is there an expression, \enquote{\textsc{Empire State Building,}} which is related to an object outside one's experience, the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the \textsc{Empire State Building} or not?) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There is no way to \enquote{go back before the natural language.} As we mentioned before, the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so} is an example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
+The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that although the problem originally seems to center on \enquote{nonexperience,} it turns out to center on \enquote{language.} Philosophical problems exist only if there is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word \enquote{table} is supposed to denote an object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? In other words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more immediately than in the case of \enquote{nonexperience,} that this question is caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and nonexperiences? Is there an expression, \enquote{Empire State Building,} which is related to an object outside one's experience, the Empire State Building, and which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the Empire State Building or not?) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There is no way to \enquote{go back before the natural language.} As we mentioned before, the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so} is an example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
 
 In summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fall on the question of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question simply collapses. 
 
diff --git a/essays/introduction.tex b/essays/introduction.tex
index 27d4616..0dfb610 100644
--- a/essays/introduction.tex
+++ b/essays/introduction.tex
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It summarizes
 
 The second essay, \essaytitle{Creep}, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality problems. 
 
-I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still consider it \enquote{necessary} to believe in God; but the Soviet government has managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled \essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. The question of whe\-ther a given belief is valid depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it, I imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. 
+I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still consider it \enquote{necessary} to believe in God; but the Soviet government has managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled \essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. The question of whether a given belief is valid depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that the Empire State Building exists even though I am not looking at it, I imagine the Empire State Building, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. 
 
 The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that an activity may perfectly well employ false statements and still have objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to pre-scientific irrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material for rational purposes. 
 
@@ -28,16 +28,16 @@ A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. Until n
 
 But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. 
 
-We can now consider the following principle---\enquote{spontaneously and without any prompting: to sweep human culture aside and to carry out elaborate, completely self-justifying activities.} Relative to the social context of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. In the light of \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} and the \term{brend} theory, however, the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be standardized. 
+\slop{We can now consider the following principle---\enquote{spontaneously and without any prompting: to sweep human culture aside and to carry out elaborate, completely self-justifying activities.} Relative to the social context of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. In the light of \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} and the \term{brend} theory, however, the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be standardized.}
 
 The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism}, \essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. \essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena with the thinking of contradictions. It led to \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed Memories}, which in turn led to \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}. With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications outside itself. 
 
-\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963} uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Mem\-or\-ies}, and this led in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}.
+\slop{\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in \booktitle{An Anthology} ed. LaMonte Young, 1963} uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories}, and this led in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}.}
 
 The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} was intended to exploit the realization that humans are the most advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs to produce its effects. 
 
-\slop{\essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies} (1966). In this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its potential applications in conjunction with science. \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses. \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences of the logically impossible which we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are \enquote{admissible.} The theory investigates the implications of admitting some contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of many-valued numbers is also presented.}
+\slop{\essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies (1966)}. In this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its potential applications in conjunction with science. \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses. \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences of the logically impossible which we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are \enquote{admissible.} The theory investigates the implications of admitting some contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of many-valued numbers is also presented.}
 
-The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to \essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it impossible for physicists to \enquote{construct the object from experience.} Finally, \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not generated a series of applications as the other activities have. 
+\slop{The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to \essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it impossible for physicists to \enquote{construct the object from experience.} Finally, \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not generated a series of applications as the other activities have.}
 
 To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities having objective value, together with each individual's brend. Consider the individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded the wrong things, as I argued in \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}. But in addition, the institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is presumably not inherent in my intellectual modality; but under present social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
index 091cd7a..987c51c 100644
--- a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
 
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{Philosophical Reflections I}}
+
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the mindless animals? 
 
diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
index ea04bf1..17c6ce5 100644
--- a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
+++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
 
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{Walking Through Walls}}
+
 We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. 
 
 Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation whatever?