philosophy segment styling

5 files changed, 19 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
index f0a1dd3..5fc90c7 100644
--- a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
+++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 \chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
 
 \fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}}
 
 We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the Empire State Building continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion. 
 
diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
index 987c51c..0915be0 100644
--- a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
 
 \fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{Philosophical Reflections I}}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{Philosophical Reflections I}}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the mindless animals? 
diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index e122d29..b495099 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 \chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
 
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy Proper (Version 3)}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{1. Introduction}}
+
 \subsection{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
@@ -38,6 +41,7 @@ The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitiv
 
 \clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
 \subsection{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{2. Preliminary Concepts}}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or false). 
 
@@ -77,6 +81,8 @@ So much for the preliminaries.
 
 \subsection[Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}][\enquote{Experience}]{Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}}
 
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{3. \enquote{Experience}}}
+
 I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
 
 First, consider the term \enquote{\term{non-experience}}. Although the concept of a non-experience is intrinsically far more \enquote{difficult} than the concept of \enquote{\term{experience}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, presupposed in all \enquote{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the second chapter); unperceivable \enquote{things} (microscopic objects (of course, viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\footnote{To simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is presumably a connotation of \enquote{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the second chapter. 
@@ -96,6 +102,8 @@ As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my \term{ex
 
 \subsection[Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution][The Linguistic Solution]{Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution}
 
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{A. The Linguistic Solution}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{4. The Linguistic Solution}}
+
 Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to explore all its implications; that will come later. 
 
 However, in the hope that it will make the main \enquote{argument} of this chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous version of it, which should give the \enquote{intuitive insight} behind the main argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The \enquote{necessity}, but inconsistency, of skepticism \enquote{shows} my conclusion in an intuitively understandable way. 
@@ -114,6 +122,8 @@ The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes,
 
 \clearpage\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}\subsection[Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts][Beliefs as Mental Acts]{Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts}
 
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{B. Completion of Treatment}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{5. Beliefs as Mental Acts}}
+
 In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be talking about mental acts and \term{experience}, it must be clear that this part of the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify \enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
 
 I should say immediately that \enquote{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed to refer to \enquote{\term{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of non-experience}}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one does or does not \enquote{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \enquote{belief} in the use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of the last part. Now when I speak of a \enquote{belief} I will be speaking of an \term{experience}, what might be said to be \enquote{\emph{an act of consciously believing, of consciously having a belief}}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that one \enquote{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \enquote{that others have minds}, for example, or in general of belief \enquote{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be \enquote{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely about \term{experiences}; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his \enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{\emph{act of consciously believing}}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, use of a word (\enquote{\term{belief}}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
@@ -140,6 +150,7 @@ What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of beliefs, and be
 
 
 \subsection[Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs][Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs]{Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{B. Completion of Treatment}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{6. Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}}
 
 In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the entire \enquote{history of world thought}, the fantastic proliferation of activities at least partly \enquote{systems of knowledge} which constitute it, Platonism, psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how \enquote{non-experiential language}, and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are incomplete and confused. 
 
@@ -162,6 +173,7 @@ The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}is f
 It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!) to learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
 \subsection[Chapter 7: Summary][Summary]{Chapter 7: Summary}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy Proper (Version 3)}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{7. Summary}}
 
 The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to \enquote{remain unconvinced} of the rightness of my position, or to \enquote{doubt, question} it, or to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can \enquote{question} (not believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief to be \enquote{skeptical} of my position in the sense of believing \enquote{that although the position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is objectively wrong}.) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less credulous. If one \enquote{questions my position} then one is misconstruing it as a belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. 
 
diff --git a/essays/some_objections.tex b/essays/some_objections.tex
index ff4b8f0..d320f7c 100644
--- a/essays/some_objections.tex
+++ b/essays/some_objections.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
-\chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
+\chapter{Some Objections to my Philosophy}
+
+\fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{Some Objections to my Philosophy}}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language.\footnote{See \booktitle{Philosophical Investigations}, \S 420.} Statements which imply that other people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage.\footnote{\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.}
diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
index 17c6ce5..701d5c3 100644
--- a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
+++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 \chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
 
 \fancyhead{} \fancyfoot{} \fancyfoot[LE,RO]{\thepage}
-\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textsc{Walking Through Walls}}
+\fancyhead[LE]{\textsc{Philosophy}} \fancyhead[RO]{\textit{Walking Through Walls}}
 
 We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs.