truly unsure what im doing anymore

15 files changed, 404 insertions, 2595 deletions

diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex
index 9f792b9..8b7f477 100644
--- a/blueprint.tex
+++ b/blueprint.tex
@@ -18,22 +18,11 @@
 \usetikzlibrary{calc}
 \usepackage[pagestyles]{titlesec}
 \usepackage{hanging}
+\usepackage{screed}
 
 % fonts
 \newpxfont
 
-
-% \newcommand{\tocline}{
-% 	\addtocontents{toc}{\protect\mbox{}\protect\hrulefill\par}}
-% \setlength\cftbeforepartskip{1.1em}
-% \setlength\cftbeforechapterskip{0.5em}
-
-% \renewcommand{\printpartname}{}
-% \renewcommand{\parttitlefont}{\normalfont\Huge\scshape}
-
-% \usepackage{cabin}
-% \newfontfamily{\specialheadersfont}{Cabin}
-
 \newcommand\speech[1]{
 	\textquote{\emph{#1}}}
 
@@ -82,55 +71,15 @@
     { \raggedleft \itshape (photo by #4) \par }
   \end{figure}}
 
-\begin{document}
+\LETSGOOOO
+
 \frontmatter
 \graphicspath{{img/}}
 
-% for portions with section/chapter defined
-\newpagestyle{salpc}[]{
-	\sethead[\chaptertitle][][]{}{}{\sectiontitle}
-	\setfoot[\thepage][][]{}{}{\thepage}}
-
-\newcommand\partstyle[2]{
-	\newpagestyle{#1}[]{
-		\sethead[\textsc{#2}][][]{}{}{\chaptertitle}
-		\setfoot[\thepage][][]{}{}{\thepage}}}
-
-\partstyle{salpre}{Preface}
-\partstyle{salphil}{Philosophy}
-\partstyle{salest}{Esthetics}
-\partstyle{salps}{Para-Science}
-\partstyle{salnm}{The New Modality}
-\partstyle{salsp}{Social Philosophy}
-\partstyle{salsci}{Science (Logic)}
-\partstyle{salapp}{Appendix}
-\pagestyle{salpre}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
-
-% \chapterstyle{tandh}
-
-
-% \openany
-% \sloppybottom
 \raggedbottom
 
 \renewcommand*{\thesection}{\Alph{section}}
 
-% \renewcommand*{\cftpartfont}{\bfseries\scshape}
-% \renewcommand*{\cftchapterfont}{\normalfont}
-% \renewcommand*{\cftsectionfont}{\itshape}
-% \setlength\beforechapskip{10pt}
-% \renewcommand*{\chapterheadstart}{\vskip 1pt}
-\titleformat{\part}[block]{\scshape\Huge}{\centering\thepart\vskip 1em}{1em}{\centering}
-
-\titleformat{\chapter}[block]{\scshape\Large}{\itshape\thechapter}{1em}{}[\titlerule]
-\titlespacing*{\chapter}{2em}{2em}{3em}
-
-\titleformat{\subsection}[block]{\bfseries}{\itshape}{1em}{}
-
-\newcommand\CHAP[2]{
-	% construct toc, header, and page titles
-	\chapter{#1 #2}}
 
 \setlist{itemsep=3pt}
 \setlist{parsep=0pt}
@@ -173,10 +122,7 @@
 \clearpage
 
 \mainmatter
-\part{Philosophy}
-\pagestyle{salphil}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
-%\tocline
+\Prt{Philosophy}
 \input{essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex}
 \input{essays/walking_through_walls.tex}
 \input{essays/philosophical_reflections.tex}
@@ -185,10 +131,7 @@
 \input{essays/philosophy_proper.tex}
 % primary study?
 
-\part{Esthetics}
-\pagestyle{salest}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
-%\tocline
+\Prt{Esthetics}
 \input{essays/down_with_art.tex}
 \input{essays/art_or_brend.tex}
 \input{essays/letters.tex}
@@ -196,18 +139,15 @@
 % \input{extra/poem_1.tex}
 % \input{extra/poem_4.tex}
 
-\part{Para-science}
-\pagestyle{salps}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
-%\tocline
+\Prt{Para-science}
 \input{essays/dissociation_physics.tex}
 \input{essays/mathematical_studies.tex}
 % \input{essays/post_formalism_memories.tex}
 \input{essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex}
 
-\part{The New Modality}
-\pagestyle{salnm}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
+\end{document}
+
+\Prt{The New Modality}
 %\tocline
 \input{essays/energy_cube1966.tex}
 \input{essays/energy_cube1961.tex}
@@ -217,28 +157,20 @@
 \input{essays/mock_risk_games.tex}
 \input{essays/dream_reality.tex}
 
-\part{Social Philosophy}
-%\tocline
-\pagestyle{salsp}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
+\Prt{Social Philosophy}
 \input{essays/social_recognition.tex}
 \input{essays/creep.tex}
 \input{essays/three_levels_of_politics.tex}
 
-\part{Science (Logic)}
-\pagestyle{salsci}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
-%\tocline
+\Prt{Science (Logic)}
 \input{essays/admissible_contradictions.tex}
 \input{essays/propositional_vibration.tex}
 % \input{extra/repressed_content.tex}
 % \input{extra/apprehension_of_plurality.tex}
 
 \backmatter
-\part{Appendix}
+\Prt{Appendix}
 %\tocline
-\pagestyle{salapp}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
 \input{extra/structure_art_pure_mathematics.tex}
 \input{extra/misleading_newness.tex}
 \input{extra/anthology_non_philosophical.tex}
diff --git a/essays/art_or_brend.tex b/essays/art_or_brend.tex
index e5914a4..99209fc 100644
--- a/essays/art_or_brend.tex
+++ b/essays/art_or_brend.tex
@@ -1,142 +1,41 @@
 \chapter{\textsc{Art} or \textsc{Brend}?}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\arabic*.}, wide, itemsep=1em]
-\item Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession 
-is to say that it is somehow scientific. LaMonte Young, Milton Babbitt, and 
-Stockhausen are exponents of this sort of justification. 
-
-The law which relates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value 
-and is an outstanding scientific law. Is the work of art such a law? The 
-experiment which shows that the speed of light is independent of the motion 
-of its source is a measurement of a phenomenon crucial to the confirmation of 
-a scientific hypothesis; it is an outstanding scientific experiment. Is the work 
-of art such a measurement? The invention of the vacuum tube was an 
-outstanding technological advance. Is the work of art such a technological 
-advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations 
-and an outstanding mathematical theory. ts the work of art such an 
-analysis? 
-
-The motives behind the \enquote{scientific} justification of art are utterly sinister. 
-Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an 
-academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a pedantic 
-pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his \enquote{scientific music}, intends 
-nothing less than the suppression of the culture of \enquote{lower classes} and 
-\enquote{ower races.} 
-
-It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to 
-the \enquote{scientific} justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in 
-artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters 
-all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the 
-audience than all the works that \enquote{obey} the laws. 
-
-\item The artist or entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other 
-people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to 
-win public acceptance for it, to advertise and promote it, to sell it, to force it 
-on people. If the public doesn't accept it at first, he is disappointed. He 
-doesn't drop it, but repeatedly urges the product on them. 
-
-People have every reason, then, to ask the artist: Is your product good for 
-me even if I don't like or enjoy it? This question really lays art open. One of 
-the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to 
-defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of 
-art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but 
-they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one 
-artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is \enquote{Do 
-you like it?} Once the \enquote{scientific} justification of art is discredited, the 
-artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no 
-reason why you should \enquote{consume} it. 
-
-There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political 
-dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be 
-transcended. Even so, subjectivity of value remains a feature which 
-distinguishes art and entertainment from other activities. Thus art is 
-historically a leisure activity. 
-
-\item But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which 
-one person produces for the liking, the enjoyment of another. The value of 
-the object is supposed to be that you just like it. It supposedly has a value 
-which is entirely subjective and entirely within you, is a part of you. Yet---the 
-object can exist without you, is completely outside you, is not you or your 
-valuing, and has no inherent connection with you or your valuing. The 
-product is not personal to you. 
-
-Such is the contradiction in much art and entertainment. it is unfortunate 
-that it has to be stated so abstractly, but the discussion is about something 
-so personal that there can be no interpersonal examples of it. Perhaps it will 
-help to say that in appreciating or consuming art, you are always aware that 
-it is not you, your valuing---yet your liking it, your valuing it is usually the 
-only thing that can justify it. 
-
-In art and entertainment, objects are produced having no inherent 
-connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find 
-their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would 
-have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as 
-your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's 
-product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to \enquote{be oneself} for 
-other people, to \enquote{express oneself} for them. 
-
-\item There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and 
-entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of 
-these experiences, by comparing and contrasting them with art. I have 
-coined the term \term{brend} for these experiences. 
-
-Consider all of your doings, what you already do. Exclude the gratifying of 
-physiological needs, physically harmful activities, and competitive activites. 
-Concentrate on spontaneous self-amusement or play. That is, concentrate on 
-everything you do just because you like it, because you just like it as you do 
-it. 
-
-Actually, these doings should be referred to as your just-likings. In saying 
-that somebody likes an art exhibit, it is appropriate to distinguish the art 
-exhibit from his liking of it. But in the case of your just-likings, it is not 
-appropriate to distinguish the objects valued from your valuings, and the 
-single term that covers both should be used. When you write with a pencil, 
-you are rarely attentive to the fact that the pencil was produced by 
-somebody other than yourself. You can use something produced by 
-somebody else without thinking about it. In your just-likings, you never 
-notice that things are not produced by you. The essence of a just-liking is 
-that in it, you are not aware that the object you value is less personal to you 
-than your very valuing. 
-
-These just-likings are your \term{brend.} Some of your dreams are brend; and 
-some children's play is brend (but formal children's games aren't). In a sense, 
-though, the attempt to give interpersonal examples of brend is futile, 
-because the end result is neutral things or actions, cut off from the valuing 
-which gives them their only significance; and because the end result suggests 
-that brend is a deliberate activity like carrying out orders. The only examples 
-for you are your just-likings, and you have to guess them by directly 
-applying the abstract definition. 
-
-Even though brend is defined exclusively in terms of what you like, it is not 
-necessarily solitary. The definition simply recognizes that valuing is an act of 
-individuals; that to counterpose the likes of the community to the likes of 
-the individuals who make it up is an ideological deception. 
-
-\item It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are 
-pseudo-brend; that your brend is the total originality beyond art; that your 
-brend is the absolute self-expression and the absolute enjoyment beyond art. 
-Can brend, then, replace art, can it expand to fill the space now occupied by 
-art and entertainment? To ask this question is to ask when utopia will 
-arrive, when the barrier between work and leisure will be broken down, 
-when work will be abolished. Rather than holding out utopian promises, it is 
-better to give whoever can grasp it the realization that the experience 
-beyond art already occurs in his life---but is totally suppressed by the general 
-repressiveness of society. 
-\end{enumerate}
+\item Perhaps the most diseased justification the artist can give of his profession is to say that it is somehow scientific. LaMonte Young, Milton Babbitt, and Stockhausen are exponents of this sort of justification. 
+
+The law which relates the mass of a body to its velocity has predictive value and is an outstanding scientific law. Is the work of art such a law? The experiment which shows that the speed of light is independent of the motion of its source is a measurement of a phenomenon crucial to the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis; it is an outstanding scientific experiment. Is the work of art such a measurement? The invention of the vacuum tube was an outstanding technological advance. Is the work of art such a technological advance? Differential geometry is a deductive analysis of abstract relations and an outstanding mathematical theory. ts the work of art such an analysis? 
+
+The motives behind the \enquote{scientific} justification of art are utterly sinister. Perhaps LaMonte Young is merely rationalizing because he wants an academic job. But Babbitt is out to reduce music to a pedantic pseudo-science. And Stockhausen, with his \enquote{scientific music}, intends nothing less than the suppression of the culture of \enquote{lower classes} and \enquote{ower races.} 
+
+It is the creative personality himself who has the most reason to object to the \enquote{scientific} justification of art. Again and again, the decisive step in artistic development has come when an artist produces a work that shatters all existing 'scientific' laws of art, and yet is more important to the audience than all the works that \enquote{obey} the laws. 
+
+\item The artist or entertainer cannot exist without urging his product on other people. In fact, after developing his product, the artist goes out and tries to win public acceptance for it, to advertise and promote it, to sell it, to force it on people. If the public doesn't accept it at first, he is disappointed. He doesn't drop it, but repeatedly urges the product on them. 
+
+People have every reason, then, to ask the artist: Is your product good for me even if I don't like or enjoy it? This question really lays art open. One of the distinguishing features of art has always been that it is very difficult to defend art without referring to people's liking or enjoying it. (Functions of art such as making money or glorifying the social order are real enough, but they are rarely cited in defense of art. Let us put them aside.) When one artist shows his latest production to another, all he can usually ask is \enquote{Do you like it?} Once the \enquote{scientific} justification of art is discredited, the artist usually has to admit: If you don't like or enjoy my product, there's no reason why you should \enquote{consume} it. 
+
+There are exceptions. Art sometimes becomes the sole channel for political dissent, the sole arena in which oppressive social relations can be transcended. Even so, subjectivity of value remains a feature which distinguishes art and entertainment from other activities. Thus art is historically a leisure activity. 
+
+\item But there is a fundamental contradiction here. Consider the object which one person produces for the liking, the enjoyment of another. The value of the object is supposed to be that you just like it. It supposedly has a value which is entirely subjective and entirely within you, is a part of you. Yet---the object can exist without you, is completely outside you, is not you or your valuing, and has no inherent connection with you or your valuing. The product is not personal to you. 
+
+Such is the contradiction in much art and entertainment. it is unfortunate that it has to be stated so abstractly, but the discussion is about something so personal that there can be no interpersonal examples of it. Perhaps it will help to say that in appreciating or consuming art, you are always aware that it is not you, your valuing---yet your liking it, your valuing it is usually the only thing that can justify it. 
+
+In art and entertainment, objects are produced having no inherent connection with people's liking, yet the artist expects the objects to find their value in people's liking them. To be totally successful, the object would have to give you an experience in which the object is as personal to you as your valuing of it. Yet you remain aware that the object is another's product, separable from your liking of it. The artist tries to \enquote{be oneself} for other people, to \enquote{express oneself} for them. 
+
+\item There are experiences for each person which accomplish what art and entertainment fail to. The purpose of this essay is to make you aware of these experiences, by comparing and contrasting them with art. I have coined the term \term{brend} for these experiences. 
+
+Consider all of your doings, what you already do. Exclude the gratifying of physiological needs, physically harmful activities, and competitive activites. Concentrate on spontaneous self-amusement or play. That is, concentrate on everything you do just because you like it, because you just like it as you do it. 
+
+Actually, these doings should be referred to as your just-likings. In saying that somebody likes an art exhibit, it is appropriate to distinguish the art exhibit from his liking of it. But in the case of your just-likings, it is not appropriate to distinguish the objects valued from your valuings, and the single term that covers both should be used. When you write with a pencil, you are rarely attentive to the fact that the pencil was produced by somebody other than yourself. You can use something produced by somebody else without thinking about it. In your just-likings, you never notice that things are not produced by you. The essence of a just-liking is that in it, you are not aware that the object you value is less personal to you than your very valuing. 
+
+These just-likings are your \term{brend.} Some of your dreams are brend; and some children's play is brend (but formal children's games aren't). In a sense, though, the attempt to give interpersonal examples of brend is futile, because the end result is neutral things or actions, cut off from the valuing which gives them their only significance; and because the end result suggests that brend is a deliberate activity like carrying out orders. The only examples for you are your just-likings, and you have to guess them by directly applying the abstract definition. 
+
+Even though brend is defined exclusively in terms of what you like, it is not necessarily solitary. The definition simply recognizes that valuing is an act of individuals; that to counterpose the likes of the community to the likes of the individuals who make it up is an ideological deception. 
+
+\item It is now possible to say that much art and entertainment are pseudo-brend; that your brend is the total originality beyond art; that your brend is the absolute self-expression and the absolute enjoyment beyond art. Can brend, then, replace art, can it expand to fill the space now occupied by art and entertainment? To ask this question is to ask when utopia will arrive, when the barrier between work and leisure will be broken down, when work will be abolished. Rather than holding out utopian promises, it is better to give whoever can grasp it the realization that the experience beyond art already occurs in his life---but is totally suppressed by the general repressiveness of society. \end{enumerate}
 
 \vfill
 
-\textsc{Note:} The avant-garde artist may raise a final question. Can't art or 
-entertainment compensate for its impersonality by having sheer newness as a 
-value? Can't the very foreignness of the impersonal object be entertaining? 
-Doesn't this happen with \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games}, for example? The answer is 
-that entertainmental newness is also subjective. What is entertainingly 
-strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, or irrelevant to 
-another. The only difference between foreignness and other entertainment 
-values is that brend does not have more foreignness than conventional 
-entertainment does. 
-
-As for objective newness, or the objective value of \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games}, these 
-issues are so difficult that I have been unable to reach final conclusions 
-about them. 
+\textsc{Note:} The avant-garde artist may raise a final question. Can't art or entertainment compensate for its impersonality by having sheer newness as a value? Can't the very foreignness of the impersonal object be entertaining? Doesn't this happen with \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games}, for example? The answer is that entertainmental newness is also subjective. What is entertainingly strange to one person is incomprehensible, annoying, or irrelevant to another. The only difference between foreignness and other entertainment values is that brend does not have more foreignness than conventional entertainment does. 
+
+As for objective newness, or the objective value of \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games}, these issues are so difficult that I have been unable to reach final conclusions about them. 
 
diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index 9635163..d56ab55 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -1,332 +1,57 @@
-\chapter{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}
+\Chp{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}
 
+From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of moderate temperatures. 
 
+Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along the humen sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light retlection and emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the discussion. 
 
+Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics. 
 
+Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified with closing one's eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights which do not occur when one can feel that one's eyes are closed. 
 
+Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of open eyes be $T_1$, and of closed eyes be $T_2$. Now anything that can be seen with closed eyes---from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct sunlight---can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be $V_1$, and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be $V_2$: If there are sights seen only with closed eyes, they will be $V_3$; we want disjoint classes. We are interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the $i$th row and $j$th column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of regularities in our present world. 
 
+\begin{equation}\begin{pmatrix}	p & p\\	f & p \end{pmatrix}\end{equation}
 
-From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and 
-touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the 
-objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the 
-touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too 
-limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of 
-moderate temperatures. 
 
-Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would 
-cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along 
-the humen sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch 
-dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our 
-discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light retlection and 
-emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and 
-inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch 
-registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and 
-so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our 
-discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations 
-or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an 
-experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical 
-subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the 
-discussion. 
+So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the present world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is excluded, meaning that at the moment, a $V_1$, is defined as lasting from the time the eyes open until the time they next close. 
 
-Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and 
-even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with 
-experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved 
-is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to 
-experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with 
-experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics. 
+We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a $2\times2$ array, there are 16 ways it can be filled with $p$'s and $f$'s. That is, there are 16 imaginable states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the present state (\ref{physpresent}) to another state such as \ref{physafter}.
 
-Throughout much of the discussion, we have to assume that the human 
-physicist exists before the sight-touch split occurs, that he continues to exist 
-after it occurs, and that he functions as a physicist after it occurs. Therefore, 
-we begin as follows. A healthy human has a realm of sights, and a realm of 
-touches: and there is a correlation between the two which receives its highest 
-expression in the concept of the object. (In psychological jargon, intermodal 
-organization contributes to the object Gestalt. Incidentally, for us \enquote{touch} 
-includes just about every sense except sight, hearing, smell.) Suppose there is 
-a change in which the tactile realm remains coherent, if not exactly the same 
-as before, and the visual realm also remains coherent; but the correlation 
-between the two becomes completely chaotic. A totally blind person does 
-not directly experience any incomprehensible dislocation, nor does a person 
-with psychogenic tactile anesthesia (actually observed in hysteria patients). 
-Let us define such a change. Consider the sight-touch correlation identified 
-with closing one's eyes. The point is that there is a whole realm of sights 
-which do not occur when one can feel that one's eyes are closed. 
+\vskip 1em{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering	\parbox{1.5in}{		\begin{equation}\label{physpresent}\begin{pmatrix}	p & p \\	f & p\end{pmatrix}		\end{equation}}\parbox{1.5in}{\begin{equation}\label{physafter}\begin{pmatrix}	p & f \\	p & p\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}\par}\par}\vskip 1em
 
-Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of 
-open eyes be $T_1$, and of closed eyes be $T_2$. Now anything that can be seen 
-with closed eyes---from total blackness, to the multicolored patterns produced 
-by waving the spread fingers of both hands between closed eyes and direct 
-sunlight---can no doubt be duplicated for open eyes. Closed-eye sights are a 
-subset of open-eye sights. Thus, let sights seen only with open eyes be $V_1$, 
-and sights seen with either open or closed eyes be $V_2$: If there are sights seen 
-only with closed eyes, they will be $V_3$; we want disjoint classes. We are 
-interested in the temporal concurrence of sensations. Combining our 
-definitions with information about our present world, we find there are no 
-intrasensory concurrences (eyes open and closed at the same time). Further, 
-our change will not produce intrasensory concurrences, because each realm 
-will remain coherent. Thus, we will drop them from our discussion. There 
-remain the intersensory concurrences, and four can be imagined; let us 
-denote them by the ordered pairs $(T_1, V_1)$, $(T_1, V_2)$, $(T_2, V_1)$, $(T_2, V_2)$. In 
-reality, some concurrences are permitted and others are forbidden, Let us 
-designate each ordered pair as permitted or forbidden, using the following 
-notation. Consider a rectangular array of \enquote{places} such that the place in the 
-$i$th row and $j$th column corresponds to $(T_i, V_j)$, and assign a $p$ or $f$ (as 
-appropriate) to each place. Then the following state array is a description of 
-regularities in our present world. 
+However, we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only $f$'s, which amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of $f$'s leaves one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are changes in the place of the one $f$; the change to the state having only $p$'s; and finally 
 
-\begin{equation}
-\begin{pmatrix}
-	p & p\\
-	f & p 
-\end{pmatrix}
-\end{equation}
+\vskip 1em{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering	\parbox{0.75in}{\raggedleft $\begin{pmatrix} p & p \\ f & p \end{pmatrix}$}		\parbox{0.5in}{\centering \huge $\rightarrow$ }		\parbox{0.75in}{$\begin{pmatrix} f & p \\ p & f \end{pmatrix}$}}}\vskip 1em
 
+In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are $[T_j]$ and $[V_j]$. The number of classes in a partition, m for touch and n for sight, is its detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition $[T_j]\times [V_j]$ is written $m\times n$. This detailedness virtually determines the $(mn)^2$ imaginable states, although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a conposition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a general rule for rewriting states. A $2\times2$ rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from \ref{physegcwa} to \ref{physegcwb}.
 
-So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the present 
-world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other 
-permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is 
-excluded, meaning that at the moment, a $V_1$, is defined as lasting from the 
-time the eyes open until the time they next close. 
+\vskip 1em			{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering\parbox{1.25in}{\raggedleft\begin{equation}\label{physegcwa}\begin{pmatrix}a & b \\ c & d\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}\parbox{1.25in}{\begin{equation}\label{physegcwb}\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}}}	\vskip 1em
 
-We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate 
-more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a $2\times2$ array, there are 
-16 ways it can be filled with $p$'s and $f$'s. That is, there are 16 imaginable 
-states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the 
-present state (\ref{physpresent}) to another state such as \ref{physafter}.
+But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change changes, and states having only $f$'s. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}changes, changes to states with rows or columns of $f$'s. Of the remaining changes, some merely forbid, replacing $p$'s with $f$'s. The rest of the changes are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
 
-\vskip 1em
-{\centering
-\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering
-	\parbox{1.5in}{
-		\begin{equation}\label{physpresent}
-\begin{pmatrix}
-	p & p \\
-	f & p
-\end{pmatrix}
-		\end{equation}}\parbox{1.5in}{\begin{equation}\label{physafter}
-\begin{pmatrix}
-	p & f \\
-	p & p
-\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}\par}\par}
-\vskip 1em
+As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave the forbidden concurrence permitted; or else they merely leave permitted successions forbidden---for example, in order to open your eyes in the dark you might have to open them in the light and then turn the light off. These secondary changes are of secondary interest. 
 
-However, 
-we want to exclude some changes. The change that changes nothing is 
-excluded. We aren't interested in changing to a state having only $f$'s, which 
-amounts to blindness. A change to a state with a row or column of $f$'s leaves 
-one sight or touch completely forbidden (a person becomes blind to 
-open-eye sights); such an \enquote{impairment} is of little interest. Of the remaining 
-changes, one merely leaves a formerly permitted concurrence forbidden: 
-closed-eye sights can no longer be seen with open eyes. The rest of the 
-changes are the ones most relevant to perception-dissociation. They are 
-changes in the place of the one $f$; the change to the state having only $p$'s; 
-and finally 
+If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will (observable as electrochemical impulses along efferent neurons). If a change occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a formerly forbidden concurrence, is it $T$ or $V$ that conflicts with the command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes close anyway? 
 
-\vskip 1em
-{\centering
-\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering
-	\parbox{0.75in}{\raggedleft $\begin{pmatrix} p & p \\ f & p \end{pmatrix}$}
-		\parbox{0.5in}{\centering \huge $\rightarrow$ }
-		\parbox{0.75in}{$\begin{pmatrix} f & p \\ p & f \end{pmatrix}$}}}
-\vskip 1em
-
-In general, we speak of a partition of a sensory realm into disjoint 
-classes of perceptions, so that the two partitions are $[T_j]$ and $[V_j]$. The 
-number of classes in a partition, m for touch and n for sight, is its 
-detailedness. The detailedness of the product partition $[T_j]\times [V_j]$ is written 
-$m\times n$. This detailedness virtually determines the $(mn)^2$ imaginable states, 
-although it doesn't determine their qualitative content. Now suppose one 
-change is followed by another, so that we can speak of a change series. It is 
-important to realize that by our definitions so far, a change series is not a 
-conposition of functions; it is a temporal phenomenon in which each state 
-lasts for a finite time. (A function would be a general rule for rewriting 
-states. A $2\times2$ rule might say, rotate the state clockwise one place, from \ref{physegcwa} to \ref{physegcwb}.
-
-\vskip 1em
-			{\centering\parbox{0.9\textwidth}{\centering
-\parbox{1.25in}{\raggedleft\begin{equation}\label{physegcwa}\begin{pmatrix}a & b \\ c & d\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}
-\parbox{1.25in}{\begin{equation}\label{physegcwb}\begin{pmatrix}c & a \\ d & b\end{pmatrix}\end{equation}}}}
-	\vskip 1em
-
-But a composition of rules would not be a temporal series; it would be a new 
-rule.) Returning to the sorting of changes, we always exclude the no-change 
-changes, and states having only $f$'s. We are unenthusiastic about \enquote{impairing}
-changes, changes to states with rows or columns of $f$'s. Of the remaining 
-changes, some merely forbid, replacing $p$'s with $f$'s. The rest of the changes 
-are the most perception-dissociating ones. 
-
-As for changes in the succession state in the eye case, either they leave 
-the forbidden concurrence permitted; or else they merely leave permitted 
-successions forbidden---for example, in order to open your eyes in the dark 
-you might have to open them in the light and then turn the light off. These 
-secondary changes are of secondary interest. 
-
-If we simply continue with the material we already have, two lines of 
-investigation are possible. The first investigation is mathematical, and 
-apparently amounts to combinatorial algebra. The second investigation 
-concerns the relation between concurrences and commands of the will 
-(observable as electrochemical impulses along efferent neurons). If a change 
-occurs, and the perceptual feedback from a willed command consists of a 
-formerly forbidden concurrence, is it $T$ or $V$ that conflicts with the 
-command? Is it that you tried to close your eyes but couldn't get the sight 
-to go away, or that you were trying to look at something but felt your eyes 
-close anyway? 
-
-Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to 
-our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he 
-may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that 
-the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an 
-extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole 
-change series occurs. Let $p$'s be black dots and $f$'s be white dots, and imagine 
-a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from 
-time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the 
-extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary 
-English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between 
-scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the 
-same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the 
-anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect 
-everything---everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each 
-sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference 
-point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomalies are really 
-outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. 
-If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as 
-a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have 
-had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be 
-either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if the
-asserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the 
-states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of 
-observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the 
-changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things 
-shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our 
-interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the 
-investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and 
-what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what 
-has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the 
-same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even 
-harder part is making it happen. 
+Before we carry out these investigations, however, we must return to our qualitative theory. If one of our eye changes happens to a physicist, he may immediately conclude that the cause of the anomaly is in himself, that the anomaly is psychological. But suppose that starting with a state for an extremely detailed product partition describing the present world, a whole change series occurs. Let $p$'s be black dots and $f$'s be white dots, and imagine a continuously shaded gray rectangle whose shading suddenly changes from time to time. We evoke this image to impress on the reader the extraordinary qualities of our concept, which can't be conveyed in ordinary English. Suppose also that to the extent that communication between scientists is still possible, perhaps in Braille, everybody is subjected to the same changes. If the physicist turns to his instruments, he finds that the anomalies have spread to his attempts to use them. The changes affect everything---everything, that is, except the intrasensory coherence of each sensory realm. Intrasensory coherence becomes the only stable reference point in the \enquote{world.} The question of \enquote{whether the anomalies are really outside or only in the mind} comes to have less and less scientific meaning. If physics survived, it would have to recognize the touch-sight dichotomy as a physical one! This scenario helps answer a question the reader may have had: what is the methodological status of our states? They don't seem to be either physics or psychology, yet it is quite clear how we would know if theasserted regularities had changed; in fact, that is the whole point of the states. The answer is that the states are perfectly good assertions (of observed regularities) which would acquire primary importance if the changes actually occurred. In fact, the changes would among other things shift the boundaries of physics and psychology; but we insist that our interest is in the physicist's side of the boundary. To complete the investigation we have outlined, the relation between what the states say and what existing physics says should be established, so that we will know what has to be done to the photons and electrons to produce the changes. It is the same as with time travel: the hard part is deciding what it is and the even harder part is making it happen. 
 
 \visbreak
 
-However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet 
-satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the 
-subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his 
-perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely 
-chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book 
-in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be 
-justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even 
-know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know 
-whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is 
-visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books 
-never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the 
-changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are 
-defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that 
-everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may 
-literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this 
-compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the 
-physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a 
-temporary psychological malfunction. 
+However, the foundations of our qualitative theory are not yet satisfactory, We have assumed that the physicist will be able to identify the subjective concurrences of perceptions, and will be able to identify his perceptions themselves, even if sense correlation becomes completely chaotic. We have assumed that the physicist will be able to say \enquote{I see a book in my hand but I concurrently feel a pencil.} These assumptions may not be justified at all. It is quite likely that the physicist will say, \enquote{I don't even know whether the sight and the touch seem concurrent; I don't even know whether I think I see a book; I don't even know whether this sensation is visual.} In fact, the anomalies may cause the physicist to decide that books never looked like books in the first place. In this case, the occurrence of the changes would render meaningless the terms in which the changes are defined. Alternately, if the changes produce a localized chaos, so that everything fits together except the book seen in the hand, the physicist may literally force himself to re-see that-book as a pencil, and in time this compensation may become habitual and \enquote{pre-conscious.} In this case, if the physicist remembers the changes, he will be convinced that they were a temporary psychological malfunction. 
 
-These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are 
-actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by 
-themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast 
-number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the 
-subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is 
-confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old 
-familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an 
-effort to see the table which he knows is there. 
+These criticisms are based on the fact that our simple perceptions are actually learned, \enquote{unconscious} interpretations of raw data which by themselves don't look like anything. This fact is demonstrated by a vast number of standard experiments in which the raw data are distorted, the subject perceptually adapts to the distorted data, and then the subject is confronted with normal sensations again. The subject finds that the old familiar sensation of a table looks quite wrong, and that he has to make an effort to see the table which he knows is there. 
 
-Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The 
-subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in 
-some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give hima 
-quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which 
-photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is 
-tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We 
-expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; 
-but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Tell the subject that 
-he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be 
-given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the 
-experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of 
-subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of 
-modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem 
-simultaneous. 
+Consider a modification of the clock-bell simultaneity experiment. The subject sits facing a large clock with a second-hand. His hearing is blocked in some way. Behind him, completely unseen, is a device which can give hima quick tap, a tactile sensation. There is also an unseen movie camera which photographs both the tactile contact and the clock face. The subject is tapped, and must call out the second-hand reading at the time of the tap. We expect a discrepancy between what the subject says and what the film says; but even if there is none, the experiment can proceed. Tell the subject that he always placed the tap earlier than it actually occurred, and that he will be given a reward if he learns to perceive more accurately. The purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate to the subject that even his perception of subjective simultaneity can be consciously modified. In the course of modification, he may not even know whether two perceptions seem simultaneous. 
 
-This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may 
-not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick 
-eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to 
-our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier 
-scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is 
-possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch 
-correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might 
-become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle 
-resonance is today. 
+This criticism of the changes defined earlier is important, but it may not be insurmountable. Although Stratton became used to his trick eyeglasses, the image continued to seem distorted. There is some stability to our identification of our perceptions. Also, the physicist in our earlier scenario might ultimately adapt to the changes. He might realize that it is possible separately to identify sights and touches. Only the sight-touch correlation is unidentifiable; and the concept of such a correlation might become an abstract concept of physics just as the concept of particle resonance is today. 
 
-Time is inescapably involved in our discussion; so we must decide what 
-happens to time as a distinct physical category, and as a sense, in 
-perception-dissociation. Here, we will simply distinguish three sorts of time. 
-First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to 
-discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time. 
-There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge 
-are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't 
-automatically introduced in the other. If the ratio of the repetitions of the 
-two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into 
-equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real 
-line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman). 
-One effect of perception-dissociation relating to this sort of time would be 
-to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile 
-clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished 
-manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, 
-our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. 
-\enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional 
-futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The 
-empirical importance of Alten's idea is that it raises the question of what the 
-perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of 
-futurity. 
+Time is inescapably involved in our discussion; so we must decide what happens to time as a distinct physical category, and as a sense, in perception-dissociation. Here, we will simply distinguish three sorts of time. First, there is subjective concurrence, which we have already begun to discuss. Secondly, there is the physicist's operational definition of time. There must be two repeating processes, which to the best of our knowledge are causally independent, so that irregularities in one process aren't automatically introduced in the other. If the ratio of the repetitions of the two processes is constant, we assume that the repetitions divide time into equal intervals. Eventually the physicist arrives at a concept of time as a real line along which movement can be both forward and backward (Feynman). One effect of perception-dissociation relating to this sort of time would be to disrupt the ratios of visual clocks (such as electric wall clocks) to tactile clocks (such as the pulse). The third idea of time comes from an unpublished manuscript by John Alten, a Harvard classmate of mine. According to Alten, our most intimate sensation of futurity is associated with our acts of will. \enquote{The future} is simply the time of willing. In comparison with volitional futurity, the physicist's linear, reversible time is a mere spatial concept. The empirical importance of Alten's idea is that it raises the question of what the perceptual frustration of the will (as we defined it) would do to the sense of futurity. 
 
 \visbreak
 
-We now come to some considerations which will help us develop the 
-state descriptions, and which also show that from one point of view, the 
-states are actually necessary for the operational definition of physical 
-language. Let parallel but separated sheets of clear plastic and colored plastic 
-be mounted in lighting conditions so that the subject can't see the clear 
-plastic. He touches the clear plastic, but from what he sees, he believes he is 
-touching the colored plastic. The lighting is then changed and his error is 
-exposed. In some sense, the sight-touch concurrence identifying an object 
-was a mere coincidence. Next, we produce another colored sheet for the 
-subject to touch, and we are able to convince him that this time the 
-object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence. 
+We now come to some considerations which will help us develop the state descriptions, and which also show that from one point of view, the states are actually necessary for the operational definition of physical language. Let parallel but separated sheets of clear plastic and colored plastic be mounted in lighting conditions so that the subject can't see the clear plastic. He touches the clear plastic, but from what he sees, he believes he is touching the colored plastic. The lighting is then changed and his error is exposed. In some sense, the sight-touch concurrence identifying an object was a mere coincidence. Next, we produce another colored sheet for the subject to touch, and we are able to convince him that this time the object-identifying concurrence is more than a coincidence. 
 
-The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which 
-resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. 
-To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the 
-concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. 
-The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight 
-and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the 
-physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its 
-immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot 
-be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. 
-Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of 
-the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our 
-experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying 
-concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to tell us how to avoid being 
-fooled. 
+The physicist interprets this latter case by saying that the matter which resists the pressure of the subject's finger also reflects the light into his eyes. To the extent that the physicist's interpretation is causal, it employs the concept of \enquote{matter,} a concept which is not really either visual or tactile. The physicist explains a sight and a touch with a reference beyond both sight and touch. It is important, then, to know the operational definition of the physicist's statement, the testing procedures which give the statement its immediate meaning. What is significant is that the testing procedures cannot be reduced to purely visual procedures or purely tactile procedures. Affecting the world requires tactile operations; and the visual \enquote{reading} of the world is so woven into physics that it can't be given up. Yet our experiment showed that the subject can be fooled by object-identifying concurrences, and the physicist is supposed to tell us how to avoid being fooled. 
 
-We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in 
-testing object-identifying concurrences, that doesn't immediately rely on 
-other object-identifying concurrences, the very concurrences which are 
-suspect. It is as if the physicist proposed to prove that clicks come from a 
-certain metronome by manipulating a detecting device that outputs its data 
-as sounds. But suppose the physicist proves that the clicks come from the 
-metronome by showing (1) that the metronome has to be stopped or 
-removed to stop the clicks, and (2) that the clicks stop if the metronome is 
-stopped or removed. The physicist proves that the object-identifying 
-concurrence is not a coincidence by demonstrating that certain related 
-concurrences are forbidden. We suggest that the physicist ultimately handles 
-touch-sight concurrences in just this way. The operational basis of the 
-physicist's activity comes down to our states. (But note that the physicist 
-has tests, which do not rely directly on his hearing, to determine whether the 
-clicks come from the metronome!) One way to develop our states, then, 
-may be to develop substates which express the differences between those 
-object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that 
-aren't---the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment. 
+We find, then, that there is nothing the physicist can appeal to, in testing object-identifying concurrences, that doesn't immediately rely on other object-identifying concurrences, the very concurrences which are suspect. It is as if the physicist proposed to prove that clicks come from a certain metronome by manipulating a detecting device that outputs its data as sounds. But suppose the physicist proves that the clicks come from the metronome by showing (1) that the metronome has to be stopped or removed to stop the clicks, and (2) that the clicks stop if the metronome is stopped or removed. The physicist proves that the object-identifying concurrence is not a coincidence by demonstrating that certain related concurrences are forbidden. We suggest that the physicist ultimately handles touch-sight concurrences in just this way. The operational basis of the physicist's activity comes down to our states. (But note that the physicist has tests, which do not rely directly on his hearing, to determine whether the clicks come from the metronome!) One way to develop our states, then, may be to develop substates which express the differences between those object-identifying concurrences that are coincidental and those that aren't---the differences illustrated by the plastic sheet experiment. 
 
diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
index 857efe1..6b7dfcd 100644
--- a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
+++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
@@ -1,125 +1,16 @@
-\chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
+\Chp{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
 
-We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my 
-\enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist 
-even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, 
-then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask 
-whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be 
-yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in 
-order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. 
-Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap 
-between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion 
-\speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that 
-is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural 
-language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a 
-statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the 
-natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. 
-Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, 
-and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses 
-about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. 
-An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so 
-doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics 
-of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a 
-substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a 
-statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must 
-be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is 
-our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my 
-experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a 
-substantive assertion. 
+We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion. 
 
-The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we 
-are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our 
-argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, 
-and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. 
-The only possible approach for this paper is an internal critique of common 
-sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to 
-aspects of themselves. 
+The methodology of this paper requires special comment. Because we are considering ultimate questions, it is pointless to try to support our argument on some more basic, generally accepted account of logic, language, and cognition. After all, such accounts are being called into question here. The only possible approach for this paper is an internal critique of common sense and the natural language, one which judges them by reference to aspects of themselves. 
 
-As an example of the application of our initial result to specific 
-questions of belief, consider the question of whether the \textsc{Empire State 
-Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is 
-even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced 
-\textsc{Empire State Building} does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the 
-realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the \textsc{Empire State 
-Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it depends on the very 
-assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we 
-found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the \textsc{Empire State 
-Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be 
-considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a 
-definitional trick. 
+As an example of the application of our initial result to specific questions of belief, consider the question of whether the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. If this question is even meaningful, then there has to be a realm in which the nonexperienced \textsc{Empire State Building} does or does not exist. This realm is precisely the realm beyond my experience. The question of whether the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it depends on the very assertion, about the existence of a realm beyond my experience, which we found to be nonsubstantive. Thus, the assertion that the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it must also be considered as nonsubstantive or meaningless, as a special case of a definitional trick. 
 
-We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, 
-which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in 
-the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has 
-traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian 
-atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing 
-about nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the 
-natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that 
-belief-assertions are not substantive. 
+We start by taking questions of belief seriously as substantive questions, which is the way they should be taken according to the semantics implicit in the natural language. The assertion that God exists, for example, has traditionally been taken as substantive; when American theists and Russian atheists disagree about its truth, they are not supposed to be disagreeing about nothing. We find, however, that by using the rules implicit in the natural language to criticize the natural language itself, we can show that belief-assertions are not substantive. 
 
-Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my 
-experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts.\footnote{We 
-understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my 
-experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal 
-formulation.} Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire 
-State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the 
-\textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture 
-that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a 
-distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called 
-perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may 
-close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of 
-\enquote{reality,} two different types of experiences can be distinguished, 
-non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act 
-consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a 
-non-mental experience. The \enquote{attitude} which is involved is not a 
-proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only 
-introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving 
-psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the 
-belief-assertion. 
+Parallel to our analysis of belief-assertions or the realm beyond my experience, we can make an analysis of beliefs as mental acts.\footnote{We understand a belief to be an assertion referring to the realm beyond my experience, or to be the mental act of which the assertion is the verbal formulation.} Introspectively, what do I do when I believe that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it? I imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. Let us bring out a distinction we are making here. Suppose I see a table. I have a so-called perception of a table, a visual table-experience. On the other hand, I may close my eyes and imagine a table. Independently of any consideration of \enquote{reality,} two different types of experiences can be distinguished, non-mental experiences and mental experiences. A belief as a mental act consists of having the attitude toward a mental experience that it is a non-mental experience. The \enquote{attitude} which is involved is not a proposition. There are no words to describe it in greater detail; only introspection can provide examples of it. The attitude is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief-assertion. 
 
-The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as 
-the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that 
-although the problem originally seems to center on \enquote{nonexperience,} it 
-turns out to center on \enquote{language.} Philosophical problems exist only if there 
-is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in 
-belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the 
-existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that 
-the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which 
-refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond 
-experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic 
-expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark 
-parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to 
-nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word \enquote{table} is supposed to denote an 
-object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. 
-Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as 
-follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that 
-we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to 
-entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? In other 
-words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of 
-all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is 
-true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is 
-whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more 
-immediately than in the case of \enquote{nonexperience,} that this question is 
-caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is 
-there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and 
-nonexperiences? Is there an expression, \enquote{\textsc{Empire State Building,}} which is 
-related to an object outside one's experience, the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and 
-which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the \textsc{Empire 
-State Building} or not?) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask 
-whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the 
-distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help 
-here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the 
-natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of 
-the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this 
-container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There 
-is no way to \enquote{go back before the natural language.} As we mentioned 
-before, the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so} is an 
-example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
+The entire analysis up until now can be carried a step farther. So far as the formal characteristics of the problem are concerned, we find that although the problem originally seems to center on \enquote{nonexperience,} it turns out to center on \enquote{language.} Philosophical problems exist only if there is language in which to formulate them. The flaw which we have found in belief-assertions has the following structure. A statement asserts the existence of something of a trans-experiential nature, and it turns out that the statement must be true if it is merely meaningful. The language which refers to nonexperience can be meaningful only if there is a realm beyond experience. The entire area of beliefs reduces to one question: are linguistic expressions which refer to nonexperience meaningful? We remark parenthetically that practically all language is supposed to refer to nonexperiences. Even the prosaic word \enquote{table} is supposed to denote an object, a stable entity which continues to exist when I am not looking at it. Taking this into account, we can reformulate our fundamental question as follows. Is language meaningful? Is there a structure in which symbols that we experience (sounds or marks) are systematically connected to objects, to entities which extend beyond our experience, to nonexperiences? In other words, is there language? (To say that there is language is to say that half of all belief-assertions are true. That is, given any belief-assertion, either it is true or its negation is true.) Thus, the only question we need to consider is whether language itself exists. But we see immediately, much more immediately than in the case of \enquote{nonexperience,} that this question is caught in a trap of its own making. The question ought to be substantive. (Is there a systematic relation between marks and objects, between marks and nonexperiences? Is there an expression, \enquote{\textsc{Empire State Building,}} which is related to an object outside one's experience, the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and which therefore has the same meaning whether one is looking at the \textsc{Empire State Building} or not?) However, it is quite obvious that if one can even ask whether there is language, then the answer must be affirmative. Further, the distinction of language levels which is made in formal languages will not help here. Before you can construct formal languages, you have to know the natural language. The natural language is the infinite level, the container of the formal languages. If the container goes, everything goes. And this container, this infinite level language, must include its own semantics. There is no way to \enquote{go back before the natural language.} As we mentioned before, the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so} is an example of the natural language's semantics in the natural language. 
 
-In summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, 
-made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is 
-too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fall on the question 
-of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional 
-trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question 
-simply collapses. 
+In summary, the crucial assertion is the assertion that there is language, made in the natural language. This assertion is true if it is meaningful. It is too true; it must be a definitional trick. Beliefs stand or fall on the question of whether there is language. There is no way to get outside the definitional trick and ask this question in a way that would be substantive. The question simply collapses. 
 
diff --git a/essays/flyntian_modality.tex b/essays/flyntian_modality.tex
index a153ec1..f952897 100644
--- a/essays/flyntian_modality.tex
+++ b/essays/flyntian_modality.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality}
+\Chp{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality}
 
 \begin{enumerate}
 
diff --git a/essays/introduction.tex b/essays/introduction.tex
index 4a4d7ea..86b84de 100644
--- a/essays/introduction.tex
+++ b/essays/introduction.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-\chapter{Introduction}
+
+
+\Chp
+{Introduction}
+{Introduction}
+{Introduction}
 
 This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It 
 summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole 
diff --git a/essays/letters.tex b/essays/letters.tex
index fb7c554..fcb49d8 100644
--- a/essays/letters.tex
+++ b/essays/letters.tex
@@ -1,290 +1,78 @@
-\chapter{Letters}
-
-\section*{{\normalsize Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, Mass., \\ dated 11/8/62}}
-
-One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and 
-decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others 
-were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and 
-\enquote{radical new theory} of \enquote{pure recreation} for their enjoyment but before he 
-let them in for this highly secret and \enquote{revolutionary theory} they should 
-follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclasm. From those 
-that balked he removed the label \enquote{avant-garde} and attached the label 
-\enquote{traditionalist} or if they were already labeled \enquote{traditionalist} he added one 
-more star. If they accepted they got a \enquote{hip} rating with gold cluster and if 
-they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their 
-own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose 
-designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf. 
-
-Now about this hip radical new theory of pure recreation.---Well---alor! its 
-simply what people do anyway but don't realize it but it seems that what 
-people \enquote{do anyway and don't realize it} will not be fully appreciated until 
-\enquote{what people do in the name of art} is eliminated. If art can be relegated to 
-obscurity, if some one can get John Coltrane to stop blowing, if someone 
-can smash up all the old Art tatum records as well as all the existing pianos, 
-if someone can get all that stuff out of those museums, If someone can only 
-burn down all those concert halls, movie houses, small galleries as well as 
-rooms in private houses that contain signs of art, If someone can do in all the 
-cathedrals and monuments bridges etc, If someone can get rid of the sun, 
-moon, stars, ocean, desert trees birds, bushes mountains, rivers, joy, sadness 
-inspiration or any other natural phenomenon that reminds us of the ugly 
-scourge art that has preoccupied and plagued man since he can remember 
-then yes then at last Henry Flynt, sorry! 
+\Chp{Letters}
+
+\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, Mass., \\ dated 11/8/62}}
+
+One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and \enquote{radical new theory} of \enquote{pure recreation} for their enjoyment but before he let them in for this highly secret and \enquote{revolutionary theory} they should follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclasm. From those that balked he removed the label \enquote{avant-garde} and attached the label \enquote{traditionalist} or if they were already labeled \enquote{traditionalist} he added one more star. If they accepted they got a \enquote{hip} rating with gold cluster and if they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf. 
+
+Now about this hip radical new theory of pure recreation.---Well---alor! its simply what people do anyway but don't realize it but it seems that what people \enquote{do anyway and don't realize it} will not be fully appreciated until \enquote{what people do in the name of art} is eliminated. If art can be relegated to obscurity, if some one can get John Coltrane to stop blowing, if someone can smash up all the old Art tatum records as well as all the existing pianos, if someone can get all that stuff out of those museums, If someone can only burn down all those concert halls, movie houses, small galleries as well as rooms in private houses that contain signs of art, If someone can do in all the cathedrals and monuments bridges etc, If someone can get rid of the sun, moon, stars, ocean, desert trees birds, bushes mountains, rivers, joy, sadness inspiration or any other natural phenomenon that reminds us of the ugly scourge art that has preoccupied and plagued man since he can remember then yes then at last Henry Flynt, sorry! 
 
 {\centering \includegraphics[width=3in]{terry_flynt_name} \par}
 
-will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee 
-\vfill
-\signoffnote{[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved]}
+will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee \vfill\signoffnote{[Terry Riley's spelling etc. carefully preserved]}
 
 \clearpage
 
-\section*{{\normalsize Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62}}
+\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62}}
 
-\vfill 
-\noindent
-Dear Henry, \\
-perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not 
-important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most 
-admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage \& 
-Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding \enquote{new} ideas has 
-not shown too much more than that it has become established as a 
-traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be 
-avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to 
-react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of 
-when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can 
-somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty 
-with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have 
-only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't 
-seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand 
-way---but what I mean by \enquote{new ideas} is not only what you might call
-\enquote{Concept Art} but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms 
-more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt 
-these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants 
-\enquote{experience} one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a 
-position difficult if not impossible to accept with large \enquote{idea} ambitions. So 
-one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and 
-duration outside the art---jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a 
-form of art history. 
-
-I don't think entertainment solves the problem presented by avant gard art 
-since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is 
-now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with 
-\enquote{just liked} things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art 
-(some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or 
-memory or however). As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and 
-when avoiding \enquote{given} structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and 
-decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. If I need concentration, 
-which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. 
+\vfill \noindentDear Henry, \\perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage \& Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding \enquote{new} ideas has not shown too much more than that it has become established as a traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand way---but what I mean by \enquote{new ideas} is not only what you might call\enquote{Concept Art} but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants \enquote{experience} one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a position difficult if not impossible to accept with large \enquote{idea} ambitions. So one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and duration outside the art---jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a form of art history. 
+
+I don't think entertainment solves the problem presented by avant gard art since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with \enquote{just liked} things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art (some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or memory or however). As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and when avoiding \enquote{given} structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. If I need concentration, which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. 
 
 One accepts language, one accepts logic. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\signoff{Best regards,}
-\signoff{Bob Morris}
+\signoff{Best regards,}\signoff{Bob Morris}
 
 \clearpage
 
-\section*{}
-
-{\raggedleft 
-\parbox{2.5in}{
-\textsc{From "Culture" to Veramusement} \\
-Boston--New York \\
-\textsc{Press Release:} for March--April, 1963 \par
-}\vskip 1em}
-
-
-Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate 
-against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at 
-the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the 
-slogans 
-\textsc{Demolish serious culture! / Destroy art!} ; 
-\textsc{Demolish art museums! / No more art!} ;
-\textsc{Demolish concert halls! / Demolish Lincoln Center!}
-and handing out announcements of 
-Flynt's lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give 
-encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around 
-and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum 
-official came out and imperiously told the pickets that he was going to 
-straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could 
-not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that 
-the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picket who had obtained police 
-permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the 
-police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. It was found that 
-the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. 
-People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the 
-viciousness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the 
-permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of 
-the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration 
-increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much 
-greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people 
-indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then 
-went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected 
-requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on 
-Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the 
-fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, 
-they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were 
-there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more 
-announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. 
-Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places. 
-
-On Thursday evening, February 28, at Walter DeMaria's loft, Henry Flynt 
-gave a long lecture expositing the doctrine the Wednesday demonstrations 
-were based on. On entering the lecture room, the visitor found himself 
-stepping in the face of a Mona Lisa print placed as the doormat. To one side 
-was an exhibition of demonstration photos and so forth. Behind the lecturer 
-was a large picture of Viadimir Mayakovsky, while on either side were the 
-signs used in the demonstrations, together with one saying 
-\textsc{Veramusement---Not culture}. About 20 people came to the lecture. 
-The lecturer showed first the suffering caused by Serious-Cultural snobbery, 
-by its attempts to force individuals in line with things supposed to have 
-objective validity, but actually representing only alien subjective tastes 
-sanctioned by tradition. He then showed that artistic categories have 
-disintegrated, and that their retention has become obscurantist. (He showed 
-that the purpose of didactic art is better served by documentaries.) Finally, 
-in the most intellectually sophisticated part of the lecture, he showed the 
-superiority of each individual's veramusement (partially defined on the 
-lecture announcement\editornote{The comment on the announcement read:
-\begin{quotation}
-	\enquote{\textsc{Veramusement}} is every doing of an individual which is not naturally physiologically necessary (or harmful), is not for the satisfaction of a social demand, is not a means, does not involve competition; is done entirely because he just likes it as he does it, without any consciousness that anything is not-obligated-by-himself; and is not special exertion. (And is done and \enquote{then} turns out to be in the category of \enquote{veramusement})
-\end{quotation}
-	Additionally, \essaytitle{My New Concept of General Acognitive Culture}, in the Appendix, provides additional explication of what is effectively \term{veramusement} or \term{brend}.
-}) to institutionalized amusement activities (which 
-impose foreign tastes on the individual) and indeed to all \enquote{culture} the 
-lecture was concerned with. After the lecture, Flynt told how his doctrine 
-was anticipated by little known ideas of Mayakovsky, Dziga Vertov, and 
-their group, as related in Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs and elsewhere. He 
-touched on the Wednesday demonstrations. He spoke of George Maciunas' 
-\textsc{Fluxus}, with which all this is connected. Several people at the lecture 
-congratulated Flynt on the clarity of the presentation and logicality of the 
-arguments. Photos were taken. 
+\Sec{}
+
+{\raggedleft \parbox{2.5in}{\textsc{From "Culture" to Veramusement} \\Boston--New York \\\textsc{Press Release:} for March--April, 1963 \par}\vskip 1em}
+
+Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the slogans \textsc{Demolish serious culture! / Destroy art!} ; \textsc{Demolish art museums! / No more art!} ;\textsc{Demolish concert halls! / Demolish Lincoln Center!}and handing out announcements of Flynt's lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum official came out and imperiously told the pickets that he was going to straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picket who had obtained police permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. It was found that the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the viciousness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places. 
+
+On Thursday evening, February 28, at Walter DeMaria's loft, Henry Flynt gave a long lecture expositing the doctrine the Wednesday demonstrations were based on. On entering the lecture room, the visitor found himself stepping in the face of a Mona Lisa print placed as the doormat. To one side was an exhibition of demonstration photos and so forth. Behind the lecturer was a large picture of Viadimir Mayakovsky, while on either side were the signs used in the demonstrations, together with one saying \textsc{Veramusement---Not culture}. About 20 people came to the lecture. The lecturer showed first the suffering caused by Serious-Cultural snobbery, by its attempts to force individuals in line with things supposed to have objective validity, but actually representing only alien subjective tastes sanctioned by tradition. He then showed that artistic categories have disintegrated, and that their retention has become obscurantist. (He showed that the purpose of didactic art is better served by documentaries.) Finally, in the most intellectually sophisticated part of the lecture, he showed the superiority of each individual's veramusement (partially defined on the lecture announcement\editornote{The comment on the announcement read:\begin{quotation}	\enquote{\textsc{Veramusement}} is every doing of an individual which is not naturally physiologically necessary (or harmful), is not for the satisfaction of a social demand, is not a means, does not involve competition; is done entirely because he just likes it as he does it, without any consciousness that anything is not-obligated-by-himself; and is not special exertion. (And is done and \enquote{then} turns out to be in the category of \enquote{veramusement})\end{quotation}	Additionally, \essaytitle{My New Concept of General Acognitive Culture}, in the Appendix, provides additional explication of what is effectively \term{veramusement} or \term{brend}.}) to institutionalized amusement activities (which impose foreign tastes on the individual) and indeed to all \enquote{culture} the lecture was concerned with. After the lecture, Flynt told how his doctrine was anticipated by little known ideas of Mayakovsky, Dziga Vertov, and their group, as related in Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs and elsewhere. He touched on the Wednesday demonstrations. He spoke of George Maciunas' \textsc{Fluxus}, with which all this is connected. Several people at the lecture congratulated Flynt on the clarity of the presentation and logicality of the arguments. Photos were taken. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\section*{\normalsize Statement of November 1963}
+\Sec{\normalsize Statement of November 1963}
 
-Back in March 1963, I sent the first \textsc{FCTB\editornote{From Culture To Brend?} Press Release}, about FCTB's 
-February picketing and lecture, to all the communications media, including 
-the New Yorker. It is so good that the New Yorker wanted to use it, but 
-they didn't want to give FCTB any free publicity; so they finally published 
-an inept parody of it, in the October 12, 1963 issue, pp. 49--51. They 
-changed my last name to Mackie, changed February 27 to September 25, the 
-Museum of Modern Art to a church, changed our slogans to particularly 
-idiotic ones (although they got in '\textsc{No More Art/Culture?}', later on), 
-and added incidents; but the general outlines, and the phrases lifted verbatim 
-from the \textsc{FCTB Release}, make the relationship clear.---Henry Flynt 
+Back in March 1963, I sent the first \textsc{FCTB\editornote{From Culture To Brend?} Press Release}, about FCTB's February picketing and lecture, to all the communications media, including the New Yorker. It is so good that the New Yorker wanted to use it, but they didn't want to give FCTB any free publicity; so they finally published an inept parody of it, in the October 12, 1963 issue, pp. 49--51. They changed my last name to Mackie, changed February 27 to September 25, the Museum of Modern Art to a church, changed our slogans to particularly idiotic ones (although they got in '\textsc{No More Art/Culture?}', later on), and added incidents; but the general outlines, and the phrases lifted verbatim from the \textsc{FCTB Release}, make the relationship clear.---Henry Flynt 
 
 \clearpage
 
-\section*{{\normalsize Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 3/6/63}}
+\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 3/6/63}}
 
 
 \vfill 
 
-\noindent
-Henry, \\
-\\
-Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the 
-lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I 
-didn't send them. Don't know if I can make it any clearer\ldots actually I keep 
-thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have 
-to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating 
-Veramusement, stating clearly what it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, 
-of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which 
-cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external 
-activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or \enquote{intersect} one or 
-another or several activities. You have discredited activities---like art, 
-competitive games---as pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing 
-arguments which are external to \enquote{experiencing} these activities (e.g. chess is 
-bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which 
-doesn't fit you)\ldots well it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace 
-any cultural form because it has no external \enquote{edges} but rather by definition 
-can occur anywhere anytime anyplace (By the way I want to say here that 
-its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable---but I can't at the 
-moment really say why.) It seems that you have these two things going: 
-Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, 
-entertainment, that have to do with society and I don't think that the 
-exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George 
-Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don't shudder at that word, but I can see 
-you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind 
-of double aspect of the personality (which he called the \enquote{me} and the \enquote{I} 
-\ldots can't remember his book, something like \booktitle{Mind, Self, and Society}). 
-
-I thought you presented the lecture very well, but towards the end I was 
-getting too tired to listen very carefully and I am sorry because this was the 
-newest writing. I would like very much to read this part, i.e. that which dealt 
-with the evolution of work, automation and the liberation from 
-drudgery---send me a copy if you can. 
+\noindentHenry, \\\\Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I didn't send them. Don't know if I can make it any clearer\ldots actually I keep thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating Veramusement, stating clearly what it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or \enquote{intersect} one or another or several activities. You have discredited activities---like art, competitive games---as pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing arguments which are external to \enquote{experiencing} these activities (e.g. chess is bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which doesn't fit you)\ldots well it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace any cultural form because it has no external \enquote{edges} but rather by definition can occur anywhere anytime anyplace (By the way I want to say here that its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable---but I can't at the moment really say why.) It seems that you have these two things going: Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, entertainment, that have to do with society and I don't think that the exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don't shudder at that word, but I can see you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind of double aspect of the personality (which he called the \enquote{me} and the \enquote{I} \ldots can't remember his book, something like \booktitle{Mind, Self, and Society}). 
+
+I thought you presented the lecture very well, but towards the end I was getting too tired to listen very carefully and I am sorry because this was the newest writing. I would like very much to read this part, i.e. that which dealt with the evolution of work, automation and the liberation from drudgery---send me a copy if you can. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\signoff{Best regards,}
-\signoff{Bob Morris}
+\signoff{Best regards,}\signoff{Bob Morris}
 
-\clearpage
-\section*{{\normalsize Letter from Walter DeMaria to Henry Flynt, dated 3/12/63}}
+\clearpage\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Walter DeMaria to Henry Flynt, dated 3/12/63}}
 
 \vfill 
 
 \noindent Henry 
 
-\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c }
-	\redact{Jazz} & 
-	\redact{Cage} & 
-	\redact{"Folk Music"} & 
-	\redact{Communism} & 
-		\begin{tabular}{ c }
-			(anti-art?) \\
-			----------------- \\
-			(communism) \\
-		\end{tabular} \\
-\end{tabular}
-\\
-\noindent
-I've been along this road too. \\
-Yes I certainly do see the harmfullness of serious culture. My favorite movies are plain documentaries. 
+\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c }	\redact{Jazz} & 	\redact{Cage} & 	\redact{"Folk Music"} & 	\redact{Communism} & 		\begin{tabular}{ c }			(anti-art?) \\			----------------- \\			(communism) \\		\end{tabular} \\\end{tabular}\\\noindentI've been along this road too. \\Yes I certainly do see the harmfullness of serious culture. My favorite movies are plain documentaries. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\noindent \enquote{Veramusement} \\
-questions: the way you set it up it sound like veramusement is \textsc{it}. Some 
-kind of Absolute good state or activity. ---ie) \textsc{athletics} are out. \\
----now my brother is a healthy athelete---he enjoys nothing so much as 
-swimming or playing tennis all day (he likes to use his body---and he likes the 
-form---competition) 
-
-{ \vskip 1em \raggedleft
-\parbox{3in}{
-Is this \enquote{wrong} \\
-Should he stop.---}\vskip 1em
-}
-
-\noindent or wouldn't your \enquote{creep theory} which lets each person be himself and 
-relish in himself---by extention from this---shouldn't the atheletic person be 
-alowed to be himself? ---too. \\
-I think you were opening up the world to the people at the lecture---
-{
-	\vskip 1em
-	\raggedleft
-	\parbox{3in}{
-	\bgroup
-	\setlength\tabcolsep{0.1em}
-	\begin{tabular}{ c c l }
-		making & them & move free-- \\
-		" & " & ready to be themselves \\
-	\end{tabular}
-	\egroup}\vskip 1em
-}
+\noindent \enquote{Veramusement} \\questions: the way you set it up it sound like veramusement is \textsc{it}. Some kind of Absolute good state or activity. ---ie) \textsc{athletics} are out. \\---now my brother is a healthy athelete---he enjoys nothing so much as swimming or playing tennis all day (he likes to use his body---and he likes the form---competition) 
 
-\vfill
-\noindent I think you were right in not giving examples! \\
-\vfill
-\noindent however \\
-your absolute---statements and "come on"---and blend with the communist 
-ideas---(My mind was pretty tired by then and I didn't follow how the 
-veramusement---was tied to communism)---this \textsc{it} kind of talk.---can only shoo 
-people off---and let them wait for the next revision or explication. 
+{ \vskip 1em \raggedleft\parbox{3in}{Is this \enquote{wrong} \\Should he stop.---}\vskip 1em}
+
+\noindent or wouldn't your \enquote{creep theory} which lets each person be himself and relish in himself---by extention from this---shouldn't the atheletic person be alowed to be himself? ---too. \\I think you were opening up the world to the people at the lecture---{
+	\vskip 1em	\raggedleft	\parbox{3in}{	\bgroup	\setlength\tabcolsep{0.1em}	\begin{tabular}{ c c l }		making & them & move free-- \\		" & " & ready to be themselves \\	\end{tabular}	\egroup}\vskip 1em}
+
+\vfill\noindent I think you were right in not giving examples! \\\vfill\noindent however \\your absolute---statements and "come on"---and blend with the communist ideas---(My mind was pretty tired by then and I didn't follow how the veramusement---was tied to communism)---this \textsc{it} kind of talk.---can only shoo people off---and let them wait for the next revision or explication. 
 
 \vfill
 
@@ -292,48 +80,33 @@ people off---and let them wait for the next revision or explication.
 
 \clearpage
 
-\section*{}
+\Sec{}
 
-\section*{{\normalsize Letter from Diane Wakoski to Henry Flynt, dated 3/18/63}}
+\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Diane Wakoski to Henry Flynt, dated 3/18/63}}
 
-\vfill
-\vfill
+\vfill\vfill
 
 Dear Henry, 
 
 \vfill
 
-As I said before, my main reactions to yr lecture \& ideas is that I'm for 
-Henry Flynt but not for his ideas. I think the spirit you show in carrying on 
-yr crusade is admirable and exciting. However, I am not against art and think 
-that any artist who would say that he is or think that he is would be 
-masochistic enough to need psychiatric care. Since you make no claims to 
-being an artist this does not refer to you. However, I do call myself a poet 
-and do think of myself as one. I like art, culture, etc. and do not yet feel 
-that I am being screwed by it. Until I do, I will not need to turn to anti-art 
-movements. 
+As I said before, my main reactions to yr lecture \& ideas is that I'm for Henry Flynt but not for his ideas. I think the spirit you show in carrying on yr crusade is admirable and exciting. However, I am not against art and think that any artist who would say that he is or think that he is would be masochistic enough to need psychiatric care. Since you make no claims to being an artist this does not refer to you. However, I do call myself a poet and do think of myself as one. I like art, culture, etc. and do not yet feel that I am being screwed by it. Until I do, I will not need to turn to anti-art movements. 
 
 All best wishes. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\signoff{Yours,}
-\signoff{Diane Wakoski}
+\signoff{Yours,}\signoff{Diane Wakoski}
 
-\vfill
-\vfill
+\vfill\vfill
 
 \clearpage
 
-\section*{}
+\Sec{}
 
 \vfill
 
-"Dear Mr. Flynt\ldots Since I may be depending on organized culture for my 
-loot \& livelihood I can wish you only a limited success in your movement\ldots 
-Cornelius Cardew" 
-\vskip 2em
-\signoff{[from a postcard of June 7, 1963]}
+"Dear Mr. Flynt\ldots Since I may be depending on organized culture for my loot \& livelihood I can wish you only a limited success in your movement\ldots Cornelius Cardew" \vskip 2em\signoff{[from a postcard of June 7, 1963]}
 
 \vfill
 
diff --git a/essays/mathematical_studies.tex b/essays/mathematical_studies.tex
index cb50efb..9674c41 100644
--- a/essays/mathematical_studies.tex
+++ b/essays/mathematical_studies.tex
@@ -1,38 +1,12 @@
-\chapter{1966 Mathematical Studies: Introduction}
+\Chp{1966 Mathematical Studies: Introduction}
 
-Pure mathematics is the one activity which is intrinsically formalistic. It 
-is the one activity which brings out the practical value of formal 
-manipulations. Abstract games fit in perfectly with the tradition and 
-rationale of pure mathematics; whereas they would not be appropriate in 
-any other discipline. Pure mathematics is the one activity which can 
-appropriately develop through innovations of a formalistic character. 
+Pure mathematics is the one activity which is intrinsically formalistic. It is the one activity which brings out the practical value of formal manipulations. Abstract games fit in perfectly with the tradition and rationale of pure mathematics; whereas they would not be appropriate in any other discipline. Pure mathematics is the one activity which can appropriately develop through innovations of a formalistic character. 
 
-Precisely because pure mathematics does not have to be immediately 
-practical, there is no intrinsic reason why it should adhere to the normal 
-concept of logical truth. No harm is done if the mathematician chooses to 
-play a game which is indeterminate by normal logical standards. All that 
-matters is that the mathematician clearly specify the rules of his game, and 
-that he not make claims for his results which are inconsistent with his rules. 
+Precisely because pure mathematics does not have to be immediately practical, there is no intrinsic reason why it should adhere to the normal concept of logical truth. No harm is done if the mathematician chooses to play a game which is indeterminate by normal logical standards. All that matters is that the mathematician clearly specify the rules of his game, and that he not make claims for his results which are inconsistent with his rules. 
 
-Actually, my pure philosophical writings discredit the concept of 
-logical truth by showing that there are flaws inherent in all non-trivial 
-language. Thus, no mathematics has the logical validity which was once 
-claimed for mathematics. From the ultimate philosophical standpoint, all 
-mathematics is as \enquote{indeterminate} as the mathematics in this monograph. 
-All the more reason, then, not to limit mathematics to the normal concept 
-of logical truth. 
+Actually, my pure philosophical writings discredit the concept of logical truth by showing that there are flaws inherent in all non-trivial language. Thus, no mathematics has the logical validity which was once claimed for mathematics. From the ultimate philosophical standpoint, all mathematics is as \enquote{indeterminate} as the mathematics in this monograph. All the more reason, then, not to limit mathematics to the normal concept of logical truth. 
 
-Once it is realized that mathematics is intrinsically formalistic, and need 
-not adhere to the normal concept of logical truth, why hold back from 
-exploring the possibilities which are available? There is every reason to 
-search out the possibilities and present them. Such is the purpose of this 
-monograph. 
+Once it is realized that mathematics is intrinsically formalistic, and need not adhere to the normal concept of logical truth, why hold back from exploring the possibilities which are available? There is every reason to search out the possibilities and present them. Such is the purpose of this monograph. 
 
-The ultimate test of the non-triviality of pure mathematics is whether it 
-has practical applications. I believe that the approaches presented on a very 
-abstract level in this monograph will turn out to have such applications. In 
-order to be applied, the principles which are presented here have to be 
-developed intensively on a level which is compatible with applications. The 
-results will be found in my two subsequent essays, \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional 
-Vibration} and \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}.
+The ultimate test of the non-triviality of pure mathematics is whether it has practical applications. I believe that the approaches presented on a very abstract level in this monograph will turn out to have such applications. In order to be applied, the principles which are presented here have to be developed intensively on a level which is compatible with applications. The results will be found in my two subsequent essays, \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} and \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}.
 
diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
index e072d9a..cf136a6 100644
--- a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
@@ -1,188 +1,54 @@
-\chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
+\Chp{Philosophical Reflections I}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
-\item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these 
-intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why 
-are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find 
-in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating 
-concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of 
-this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to 
-concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a 
-transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not 
-these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the 
-mindless animals? 
-
-Such questions tempt one to engage in a sort of philosophical 
-anthropology, using in part the method of introspection. Beliefs could be 
-explained as arising in an attempt to deal with experienced frustrations by 
-denying them in thought. The origin of Christian Science and magic would 
-thereby be explained. Further, we could postulate a primal anxiety-reaction 
-to raw experience. This anxiety would be lessened by mythologies and 
-explanatory beliefs. The frustration and the anxiety-reaction would be 
-primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
-
-Going even farther, we could suppose that a being which could 
-apprehend the whole universe through direct experience would have no need 
-of beliefs. Beliefs would be a rickety method of coping with the limited 
-range of our perception, a method by which our imperfect brains cope with 
-the world. There would be an analogy with the physicist's use of phantom 
-models to make experimental observations easier to comprehend. 
-
-However, there are two overwhelming objections to this philosophical 
-anthropology. First, it purports to study the human mind as a derivative 
-phenomenon, to study it from a God-like perspective. The philosophical 
-anthropology thus consists of beliefs which are subject to the same 
-objections as any other beliefs. It is on a par with any other beliefs; it has no 
-privileged position. Specifically, it is in competition not only with my 
-philosophy but with other accounts of the mind-reality relation, such as 
-behaviorism, Platonism, and Thomism. And my philosophy provides me with 
-no basis to defend my philosophical anthropology against their philosophical 
-anthropologies. My philosophy doesn't even provide me with a basis to 
-defend my philosophical anthropology against its own negation. 
-
-In short, the paradoxes which my philosophy uncovers must remain 
-unexplained and unresolved. 
-
-The other objection to my philosophical anthropology is that its 
-implications are unnecessarily conservative. An explanation of why people 
-do something wrong can become an assertion that it is necessary to do wrong 
-and finally a justification for doing wrong. But just because I tend, for 
-example, to construe my perceptions as confirmations of propositions about 
-phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this 
-way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical 
-anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. 
-
-\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective \enquote{anthropology} 
-of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
-Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I 
-have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between 
-beliefs and non-credulous mental activity. 
-
-Is my fear of jumping out of the window a belief? Strictly speaking, 
-no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require 
-propositional thought. 
-
-Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations 
-(relative to my field of vision) as \enquote{the same object} a belief? Apparently, 
-but this is very ambiguous. 
-
-Is my identification of tactile and visual \enquote{pencil-perceptions} as aspects 
-of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through 
-different senses) a belief? Yes. 
-
-It is possible to subjectively classify bodily movements according to 
-whe\-ther they are intentional, because drunken awkwardness, adolescent 
-awkwardness, and movements under ESB are clearly unintentional. Then 
-does intentional movement of my hand require a belief that I can move my 
-hand? Definitely not, although in rare cases some belief will accompany or 
-precede the movement of my hand. But believing itself will not get the hand 
-moved! 
-
-Is there any belief involved in identifying my leg, but not the leg of the 
-table at which I am sitting, as part of my body? Maybe---another ambiguous 
-case.
-
-Are my emotions of longing and dread beliefs in future time? Is my 
-emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these 
-temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) 
-
-How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if 
-my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily---the 
-object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. 
+\item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the mindless animals? 
+
+Such questions tempt one to engage in a sort of philosophical anthropology, using in part the method of introspection. Beliefs could be explained as arising in an attempt to deal with experienced frustrations by denying them in thought. The origin of Christian Science and magic would thereby be explained. Further, we could postulate a primal anxiety-reaction to raw experience. This anxiety would be lessened by mythologies and explanatory beliefs. The frustration and the anxiety-reaction would be primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. 
+
+Going even farther, we could suppose that a being which could apprehend the whole universe through direct experience would have no need of beliefs. Beliefs would be a rickety method of coping with the limited range of our perception, a method by which our imperfect brains cope with the world. There would be an analogy with the physicist's use of phantom models to make experimental observations easier to comprehend. 
+
+However, there are two overwhelming objections to this philosophical anthropology. First, it purports to study the human mind as a derivative phenomenon, to study it from a God-like perspective. The philosophical anthropology thus consists of beliefs which are subject to the same objections as any other beliefs. It is on a par with any other beliefs; it has no privileged position. Specifically, it is in competition not only with my philosophy but with other accounts of the mind-reality relation, such as behaviorism, Platonism, and Thomism. And my philosophy provides me with no basis to defend my philosophical anthropology against their philosophical anthropologies. My philosophy doesn't even provide me with a basis to defend my philosophical anthropology against its own negation. 
+
+In short, the paradoxes which my philosophy uncovers must remain unexplained and unresolved. 
+
+The other objection to my philosophical anthropology is that its implications are unnecessarily conservative. An explanation of why people do something wrong can become an assertion that it is necessary to do wrong and finally a justification for doing wrong. But just because I tend, for example, to construe my perceptions as confirmations of propositions about phenomena beyond my experience does not mean that I must think in this way. To explain the modern cognitive orientation by philosophical anthropology tends to absolutize it and to conceal its dispensability. 
+
+\item There are more legitimate tasks for the introspective \enquote{anthropology} of beliefs than trying to find primal non-cognitive needs for beliefs. Presupposing the analysis of beliefs as mental acts and self-deception which I have made elsewhere, we need to examine closely the boundary line between beliefs and non-credulous mental activity. 
+
+Is my fear of jumping out of the window a belief? Strictly speaking, no. In psychological terms, a conditioned reflex does not require propositional thought. 
+
+Is my identification of an object in different spatial orientations (relative to my field of vision) as \enquote{the same object} a belief? Apparently, but this is very ambiguous. 
+
+Is my identification of tactile and visual \enquote{pencil-perceptions} as aspects of a single object (identity of the object as it is experienced through different senses) a belief? Yes. 
+
+It is possible to subjectively classify bodily movements according to whe\-ther they are intentional, because drunken awkwardness, adolescent awkwardness, and movements under ESB are clearly unintentional. Then does intentional movement of my hand require a belief that I can move my hand? Definitely not, although in rare cases some belief will accompany or precede the movement of my hand. But believing itself will not get the hand moved! 
+
+Is there any belief involved in identifying my leg, but not the leg of the table at which I am sitting, as part of my body? Maybe---another ambiguous case.
+
+Are my emotions of longing and dread beliefs in future time? Is my emotion of regret belief in past time? Philosophical anthropology: these temporal feelings precede and give rise to temporal beliefs. (?) 
+
+How can I introspectively analyze my dread as dread of future injury if my belief in the existence of the future is invalid to begin with? Easily---the object of the fear is a belief or has a belief associated with it. 
 
 \gap
 
-\item At one point Alten\editornote{A classmate of Flynt's at Harvard.} claimed that his dialectical approach does not 
-take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other 
-evidence. Our \enquote{immediate experience} is mediated; it is a derived 
-phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our 
-subjective standpoint. 
+\item At one point Alten\editornote{A classmate of Flynt's at Harvard.} claimed that his dialectical approach does not take any evidence as being more immediate, more primary, than any other evidence. Our \enquote{immediate experience} is mediated; it is a derived phenomenon which only subsists in an objective reality that is outside our subjective standpoint. 
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\arabic*.}, leftmargin=2em]
 
-\item But Alten does not seriously defend the claim that he does not 
-distinguish between immediate and non-immediate. The claim that there is 
-no distinction would be regarded as demented in every human culture. Every 
-culture supposes that I may be tricked or cheated: there is a realm, the 
-non-immediate or non-experienced, which provides an arena for surreptitious 
-hostility to me. Every culture supposes that it is easier for me to tell what I 
-am thinking than what you are thinking. Every culture supposes that I will 
-hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is 
-simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he 
-apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction 
-between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only 
-way of confirming a model, but to construct a model of the relation between 
-the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. 
-
-\item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative 
-phe\-no\-me\-non, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the 
-pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness 
-and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it is
-the archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy 
-exposes. \enquote{\emph{I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I 
-cannot now perceive it.}} 
-\end{enumerate}
-
-\item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain 
-self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} il the logic of common sense. These nodes include the 
-concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often 
-find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from 
-cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they 
-are self-vitiating nodes in the logic of common sense. As a result, I have 
-concluded that it is probably futile to debate the abstract validity of my 
-analysis of these nodes. It does indeed appear as if I am debating over an 
-abstract joke, and it is not apparent why I would attribute such great 
-importance to a joke. 
-
-\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} represents my 
-present approach. The advantage of this approach is that it makes 
-unmistakable the reason why I attribute so much importance to these 
-philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few 
-isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only 
-significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation 
-of why the life-world is subject to being undermined. 
-
-When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of 
-trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day 
-scientific common sense. Walking through walls is understood as it would be 
-pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside 
-the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go 
-directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive 
-orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or 
-have \enquote{object perceptions,} and thus wouldn't know whether one was 
-walking through a wall or not. 
-
-At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my 
-genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of 
-non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a 
-hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental 
-incompetence or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify 
-this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. 
-
-\item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are 
-now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing 
-over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does 
-not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two 
-circumstances in conflict. The \enquote{fact} that we are talking is one of the two 
-circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other 
-circumstance being the self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} I have mentioned. To repeat 
-over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. 
-
-Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking 
-suggests, we do not \enquote{see} language. (That is, we do not experience an 
-objective relation between words and things.) The language we \enquote{see} is a 
-shell whose \enquote{transcendental reference} is provided by self-deception. 
-
-\item Does the theory of amcons\editornote{"Admissable contradictions", defined in \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissable Contradictions} in this volume.} show that the contradiction exposed in 
-\essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical 
-force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary 
-motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of 
-contradictory qualities. (But \enquote{\emph{He left an hour ago}} begins to be a borderline 
-case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which 
-violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to 
-classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first 
-with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to 
-do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as 
-if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter 
-sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. 
-\end{enumerate}
+\item But Alten does not seriously defend the claim that he does not distinguish between immediate and non-immediate. The claim that there is no distinction would be regarded as demented in every human culture. Every culture supposes that I may be tricked or cheated: there is a realm, the non-immediate or non-experienced, which provides an arena for surreptitious hostility to me. Every culture supposes that it is easier for me to tell what I am thinking than what you are thinking. Every culture supposes that I will hear things which I should not accept before I go and see for myself. Alten is simply not iconoclastic enough to reject these commonplaces. What he apparently does is, like the perceptual psychologist, to accept the distinction between immediate and non-immediate, and to accept the former as the only way of confirming a model, but to construct a model of the relation between the two in which the former is analyzed as a derivative phenomenon. 
+
+\item Alten proposes to analyze his own awareness as a derivative phe\-no\-me\-non, to take a stance outside all human awareness. But this is the pretense of the God-like perspective. He postulates both his own limitedness and his ability to step outside it! This is an overt contradiction. Indeed, it isthe archetype of the overt self-deception in beliefs which my philosophy exposes. \enquote{\emph{I can tell the Empire State Building exists now even though I cannot now perceive it.}} \end{enumerate}
+
+\item In my technical philosophical writings, I call attention to certain self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} il the logic of common sense. These nodes include the concept of non-experience and the assertion that there is language. I often find that others dismiss these examples as jokes that can be isolated from cognition or the logic of common sense, rather than acknowledging that they are self-vitiating nodes in the logic of common sense. As a result, I have concluded that it is probably futile to debate the abstract validity of my analysis of these nodes. It does indeed appear as if I am debating over an abstract joke, and it is not apparent why I would attribute such great importance to a joke. 
+
+\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls} represents my present approach. The advantage of this approach is that it makes unmistakable the reason why I attribute so much importance to these philosophical studies. I am not merely debating the abstract validity of a few isolated linguistic jokes; I seek to overthrow the life-world. The only significance of my technical philosophical writings is to offer an explanation of why the life-world is subject to being undermined. 
+
+When I speak of walking through walls, the mistake is often made of trying to understand this reference within the framework of present-day scientific common sense. Walking through walls is understood as it would be pictured in a comic-book episode. But such an understanding is quite beside the point. What I am advocating---to skip over the intermediate details and go directly to the end result---is a restructuring of the whole modern cognitive orientation such that one doesn't even engage in scientific hypothesizing or have \enquote{object perceptions,} and thus wouldn't know whether one was walking through a wall or not. 
+
+At first this suggestion may seem like another joke, a triviality. But my genius consists in recognizing that it is not, that there is a residue of non-vacuity and non-triviality in this proposal. There may be only a hair's-breadth of difference between the state I propose and mental incompetence or death---but still, there is all of a hair's-breadth. I magnify this hair's-breadth many times, and use it as a lever to overturn civilization. 
+
+\item I am often asked in philosophical discussion how it is that we are now talking if language is vitiated. Let me comment that merely pointing over and over to one of the two circumstances which create a paradox does not resolve the paradox. Indeed, a paradox arises when there are two circumstances in conflict. The \enquote{fact} that we are talking is one of the two circumstances which conjoin in the paradox of language; the other circumstance being the self-vitiating \enquote{nodes} I have mentioned. To repeat over and over that we are now talking does not resolve any paradoxes. 
+
+Contrary to what the question of how it is that we are now talking suggests, we do not \enquote{see} language. (That is, we do not experience an objective relation between words and things.) The language we \enquote{see} is a shell whose \enquote{transcendental reference} is provided by self-deception. 
+
+\item Does the theory of amcons\editornote{"Admissable contradictions", defined in \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissable Contradictions} in this volume.} show that the contradiction exposed in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} is admissible and thus loses its philosophical force? No. An amcon is between two things that you see, e.g. stationary motion. It is between two sensed qualities, the simultaneous experiencing of contradictory qualities. (But \enquote{\emph{He left an hour ago}} begins to be a borderline case. Here the point is the ease with which we swallow an expression which violates logical rules. Also expansion of an arc: a case even more difficult to classify.) The contradiction in \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} has to do first with the logic of common sense, with the logical rules of language. It has to do, secondly, with the circumstance that you don't see something, yet act as if you do. Amcons should not be used to justify self-deception in the latter sense, to rescue every cheap superstition. \end{enumerate}
diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index ac392ea..dc037c5 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -8,69 +8,22 @@
 
 
 
-\newcommand{\stress}[1]{\textbf{#1}}
-% \settocdepth{subsection}
-
-% \chapter[Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)][Philosophy Proper]{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
-\CHAP{Philosophy Proper}{(\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}
-\pagestyle{salpc}
-\setheadrule{.4pt}
-%\subsection[Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)][Introduction]{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}
-\SUBSEC{Chapter 1: Introduction}{(Revised, 1973)}
-
-This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be 
-an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are 
-tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}
-Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by 
-their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as 
-corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
-
-Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or 
-supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is 
-also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the 
-notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the 
-natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in 
-philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is 
-continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which 
-philosophers have dealt with it. 
-
-All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are 
-normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be helpful to 
-examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here 
-beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this 
-monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain 
-approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold 
-beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
-
-It is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that 
-they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on 
-their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, 
-quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some 
-non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has 
-to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. 
-Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy 
-non-cognitive needs. 
-
-To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as \enquote{\emph{I
-could not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so,}} or \enquote{\emph{Even if so-and-so is 
-true I don't want to know it.}} These remarks manifest the needs with which 
-we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level 
-of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit 
-and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing 
-subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to 
-recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of 
-beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical 
-validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in 
-the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are 
-alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have 
-not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions 
-being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. 
-
-A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for 
-non-cognitive reasons follows. 
-\vskip 0.5em
-\begin{enumerate}[nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
-\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. \enquote{\emph{I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God.}} \enquote{\emph{If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it.}}
+
+\Chp{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
+
+\Ssc{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
+
+This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
+
+Philosophy proper is an ultimate activity in the sense that no belief or supposed knowledge is conceded to be above philosophical examination. It is also an unavoidable activity in the sense that the notion of a belief, and the notion of judging the truth of a belief, are intrinsic to common sense and the natural language. Philosophers may not have achieved convincing results in philosophy proper; but the question of which beliefs are right is continuously posed for us even if we do not respect the way in which philosophers have dealt with it. 
+
+All of the obstacles to philosophy proper arise because beliefs are normally held in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. It will be helpful to examine this situation at some length. However, nothing can be done here beyond examining the situation. It is already clear that the interest of this monograph in beliefs is cognitive. It would be inappropriate to try to gain approval for philosophy proper by appealing to the values of those who hold beliefs in order to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
+
+It is implicit in beliefs that they correspond to cognitive claims, that they are subject to being judged true or false, and that their value rests on their truth. Nevertheless, beliefs can and do satisfy non-cognitive needs, quite apart from whether they are true. In order for a belief to satisfy some non-cognitive need, it is not necessary for the belief to be true; it merely has to be held. Concern with the ultimate philosophical validity of beliefs is rare. Concern with beliefs is normally concern with their ability to satisfy non-cognitive needs. 
+
+To be specific, the literature of credulity contains remarks such as \enquote{\emph{Icould not stand to live if I did not believe so-and-so,}} or \enquote{\emph{Even if so-and-so is true I don't want to know it.}} These remarks manifest the needs with which we are concerned. To take note of these remarks is already to uncover a level of self-deception. It is important to realize that this self-deception is explicit and self-admitted. To recognize it has nothing to do with imputing subconscious motives to behavior, as is done in psychoanalysis. Further, to recognize it is by no means to advance a theory of the ultimate origin of beliefs, a theory which would presuppose a judgment as to the philosophical validity of the beliefs. To theorize that the ultimate origin of beliefs lies in the denial of frustrating experiences, or in primal anxieties which are alleviated by mythological inventions, would be inappropriate when we have not even begun our properly philosophical inquiry. The only self-deceptions being considered here are admitted self-deceptions. 
+
+A partial classification of the circumstances in which beliefs are held for non-cognitive reasons follows. \vskip 0.5em\begin{enumerate}[nosep, itemsep=0.5em]\item Beliefs may be directly tied to one's morale. \enquote{\emph{I couldn't stand to live if I didn't believe in God.}} \enquote{\emph{If President Nixon is guilty I don't want to know it.}}
 
 \item One may believe for reasons of conformity. The conversion of Jews to Catholicism in late medieval Spain was an extreme example. 
 
@@ -78,1153 +31,153 @@ non-cognitive reasons follows.
 
 \item Moral doctrines are sometimes justified on the grounds of their efficacy in maintaining public order, rather than their philosophical validity. 
 
-\item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one 
-who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the 
-inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. 
-Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called \term{theologizing,} in recognition of 
-the archetypal activity in this category. 
-\end{enumerate}
-
-When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are 
-instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive 
-motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific 
-method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he 
-believed in the \enquote{\emph{real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a 
-common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who 
-discovers it bit by bit.}} The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a 
-commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he 
-must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. 
-The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry 
-begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows 
-that science is an instance of \term{theologizing.} If scientists cannot welcome a 
-demonstration that their \enquote{metaphysical} presuppositions are invalid, then 
-their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
-
-The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the 
-non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the 
-non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not 
-be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed 
-area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two 
-contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be 
-satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test 
-or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other 
-hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a 
-single alternative is welcome. 
+\item A more complicated and more interesting situation arises when one who claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry somehow circumscribes the inquiry so as to ensure in advance that it will yield certain preferred results. Such a circumscribed inquiry will be called \term{theologizing,} in recognition of the archetypal activity in this category. \end{enumerate}
 
-\vskip 0.5em
-\begin{enumerate}[resume, nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
-\item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested 
-in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To 
-academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had 
-made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians 
-circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as 
-scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. 
-
-\item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is 
-provided by the person who holds a fearful belief which is widely considered 
-to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the 
-motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would 
-welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect 
-that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a 
-demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no 
-comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it 
-seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. 
-\end{enumerate}
+When we raise the question of whether the natural sciences are instances of theologizing, it becomes apparent that the issue of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is no light matter. According to writers on the scientific method such as A. d'Abro, the scientist is compelled to operate as if he believed in the \enquote{\emph{real existence of a real absolute objective universe---a common objective world, one existing independently of the observer who discovers it bit by bit.}} The scientist holds this belief, even though it is a commonplace of college philosophy courses that it is unprovable, because he must do so in order to get on to the sort of results he considers desirable. The scientist claims to be engaged in a cognitive inquiry; yet the inquiry begins with an act of faith which it is impermissible to scrutinize. It follows that science is an instance of \term{theologizing.} If scientists cannot welcome a demonstration that their \enquote{metaphysical} presuppositions are invalid, then their interest in science cannot be cognitive. 
 
-\vskip 0.5em
-This examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, 
-limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or 
-self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The 
-examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge 
-whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to 
-our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this 
-monograph. 
+The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitive motives described earlier in one notable respect. Each of the non-cognitive needs described earlier required a given belief, and could not be satisfied by that belief's negation. But inside a science's circumscribed area of inquiry, the scientist can welcome the establishment of either of two contradictory propositions; in other words, his non-cognitive need can be satisfied by either proposition. It is in this sense that he can impartially test or decide between two propositions, or make new discoveries. On the other hand, with regard to the metaphysical presuppositions of science, only a single alternative is welcome. 
+
+\vskip 0.5em\begin{enumerate}[resume, nosep, itemsep=0.5em]\item Academicians will readily acknowledge that they are not interested in scholarly work by unknown persons with no academic credentials. To academic mathematicians and biologists, whether Galois and Mendel had made valid discoveries was irrelevant. Thus, academicians as academicians circumscribe their purported interest in the cognitive in two ways---once as scientists; and once for reasons of personal gain and prestige. 
+
+\item The strangest instance of a non-cognitive need for a belief is provided by the person who holds a fearful belief which is widely considered to be superstitious, such as belief in Hell. As always, the test of whether the motive for the belief is cognitive is the question of whether the person would welcome a demonstration that the belief is invalid. There is reason to suspect that persons who cling to fearful beliefs would not welcome such a demonstration, perverse as their attitude may seem. After all, they take no comfort in the widespread rejection of the belief as superstitious. Thus, it seems that a masochistic need for fearful beliefs must be recognized. \end{enumerate}
+
+\vskip 0.5emThis examination of non-cognitive motives for beliefs is, to repeat, limited to circumstances in which there is explicit self-deception, or self-deception that can be demonstrated directly from internal evidence. The examination cannot be carried further unless we become able to judge whether the beliefs referred to are, after all, valid. Thus, we will now turn to our properly philosophical inquiry, which will occupy the remainder of this monograph. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used 
-unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without 
-change.)}
-
-\clearpage
-\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-\subsection[Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts][Preliminary Concepts]{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}
-
-In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of 
-philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing 
-language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might 
-tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, 
-formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as 
-representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem 
-will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be 
-driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or 
-false). 
-
-To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right 
-into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next 
-chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and 
-simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain 
-concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution 
-they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has 
-to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly 
-philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which 
-doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the 
-truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the 
-others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. 
-
-The first concept is a new one, that of \emph{explication}. Explication of a 
-familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding 
-a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is 
-wanted that the expression \enquote{mean}. To explain: I will be discussing 
-philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their 
-\enquote{meaning} needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to 
-use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which 
-the \enquote{meanings}, uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as 
-replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, 
-which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses 
-are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be 
-replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to 
-the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be 
-concerned with the suggestion of clear \stress{uses}, of the expressions of which the 
-uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the 
-expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of 
-acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of 
-which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents 
-(and non-referents), then the new expressions must clearly have referents. 
-Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents 
-in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, 
-especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. 
-(I will not say here just how I use \enquote{connotation}. What the connotations of 
-an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a 
-supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are 
-supposed to be like.) \enquote{Finding}, or constructing, an expression (with its use) 
-supposed to be acceptable to oneself as a replacement, of the kind described, 
-for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be \term{explicating} the 
-expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to 
-be the \term{explicandum}, and the suggested replacement, the \term{explication}. 
-Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is 
-inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the 
-same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. 
-
-I should mention that my use of \term{explication} is different from that of 
-Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very 
-problematic \term{definition}. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher 
-of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, 
-suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of 
-\enquote{work}); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, 
-clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. 
-
-Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an 
-expression is suggested, as an explication for \enquote{thing having a mind} (if 
-supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the 
-things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other 
-\enquote{overt} behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this 
-expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for \enquote{thing 
-having a mind}, since \enquote{thing having a mind} presumably has the connotations 
-for the reader \enquote{\stress{that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, 
-higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt 
-behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by 
-the thing having it}}, and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: 
-the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the 
-proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causal 
-connection between having a mind and the other things, because the 
-expression \enquote{thing having a mind} itself, and not the supposed effects of 
-having a mind, is what is under discussion. 
-
-As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating 
-expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are 
-for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be 
-slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be 
-otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of 
-finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical 
-problems. 
-
-Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed 
-name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the 
-connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases 
-when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with 
-philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly 
-be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the 
-explications for \enquote{thing having a mind} mentioned above. 
-
-The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be 
-discussing the \enquote{truth} of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two 
-chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a 
-good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify 
-the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for \enquote{true statement}. 
-(Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the 
-explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
-
-Well, what is a \term{statement}? How do what are usually said to be 
-\term{statements} state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language 
-you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What 
-does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just 
-about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their 
-arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that 
-when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy 
-ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important 
-connotations of \term{true statement}, and, more generally, of \emph{statement}, as 
-traditionally and commonly used, is that a \term{statement} is an \enquote{assertion 
-which has truth value} (is true or false) (or \enquote{has content}, as it is sometimes 
-said, rather misleadingly). That is, the \enquote{verbal} part of a statement is 
-supposed to be related in a certain way to something \enquote{non-verbal}, or at 
-least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a 
-statement is supposed to be \enquote{true} or not because of something having to do 
-with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is 
-related. (The exceptions are the \enquote{statements} of formalist logic and 
-mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus 
-irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are 
-interested in.) Thus, if \enquote{\term{true statement}} is to be explicated, \enquote{assertion having 
-truth value} and \enquote{is true} (and \enquote{has content} in a misleading use) have to be 
-explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication 
-for \enquote{\term{true statement}} deserves the connotations which were suggested with 
-\enquote{assertion having truth value} and \enquote{is true}. One important conclusion from 
-these observations is that although \enquote{sentences} (the bodies of sound or 
-bodes of marks such as \enquote{The man talks}) are often said to be \enquote{statements}, 
-would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate \enquote{\term{statement}} by simply 
-identifying it with \enquote{sentence} (in my sense); something must be said about 
-such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same 
-reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify \enquote{\term{statement}}
-with \enquote{sentence}, the latter being explicated in terms of the (\enquote{formal}) rules 
-for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no 
-reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. 
-
-In explicating \enquote{\term{true statement}} I will use the most elegant approach, one 
-relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having 
-truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way 
-to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to 
-make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to \enquote{apply} \uline{table} to 
-the thing. It is supposed that \uline{table} has been \enquote{interpreted}, that is, that it is 
-\enquote{\emph{determinate}} to which, of all things, applications of \uline{table} are (to be said 
-to be) \enquote{true}. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is 
-\enquote{determinate} which, of all things (events), are \enquote{occurrences of the word 
-\enquote{table}}, are expressions \enquote{equivalent to} \uline{table}.) 
-The word \enquote{\emph{determinate}} is 
-the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit 
-myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for \enquote{apply}, one 
-can \enquote{apply} the word to the thing by pointing out \enquote{first} the word and 
-\enquote{then} the thing. \enquote{point out} is restricted to refer to \term{ostension}, pointing 
-out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to \enquote{directing 
-attention to things not in one's presence} as well. The assertion is \enquote{true}, of 
-course, if and only if the thing to which \uline{table} is applied is one of the things 
-to which it is determinate that the application of \uline{table} is (to be said to be) 
-\enquote{true}, otherwise \enquote{false}. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a 
-\enquote{first} thing and a \enquote{second}, the first being an interpreted expression, is an 
-assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further 
-suggest \enquote{\term{interpreted expression}} as an explication for \enquote{name}; with respect to 
-this explication, the things to which equivalent names (\enquote{occurrences of a 
-name}) may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, 
-other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the 
-concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple 
-assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is 
-\emph{how a name has referents}; I have not said, for example, whether the relation 
-between name and referents is an \enquote{objective, metaphysical entity}, which 
-would be getting into philosophy proper. 
-
-The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that 
-what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the 
-context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} 
-kind; thus an explication for \enquote{\term{true statement}} can be found. To do so, first 
-let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \enquote{main 
-verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the 
-sentence. For example, the associated name of \enquote{Boston is in Massachusetts} is 
-\enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate 
-clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main 
-verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. 
+\signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without change.)}
+
+\clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}\SUBSEC{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
+
+In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or false). 
+
+To make this book as engaging as possible, I would like to start right into the solution of the problem, to begin with the material in the next chapter. However, it effects, I think, a considerable clarification and simplification of the presentation of the solution if I first introduce certain concepts in an extended discussion. Then, when they enter into the solution they won't have to be just suggested in a condensed explanation which has to be repeated over and over. Thus, this chapter will be a properly philosophically neutral introduction of the concepts, an introduction which doesn't in itself say anything about the rightness of given beliefs (or the truth of given statements). The chapter is as a result not so interesting as the others, but I hope the reader will bear with me through it. 
+
+The first concept is a new one, that of \emph{explication}. Explication of a familiar linguistic expression is what might traditionally be said to be finding a definition of the expression; it amounts partly to determining what it is wanted that the expression \enquote{mean}. To explain: I will be discussing philosophically important expressions, familiar to the reader, such that their \enquote{meaning} needs clarifying, such that it is not clear to him how he wants to use them. I will be concerned with the suggestion of expressions, of which the \enquote{meanings}, uses, are clear, which will be acceptable to the reader as replacements for the expressions of which the uses are obscure; that is, which have the uses that, it will turn out, the expressions of which the uses are obscure are supposed to have. Since the expressions which are to be replacements can be equivalent as expressions (sounds, bodies of marks) to the expressions they are to replace, it can also be said that I will be concerned with the suggestion of clear \stress{uses}, of the expressions of which the uses are obscure, which are, it will turn out, the uses the reader wants the expressions to have. To be more specific about the conditions of acceptability of such replacements, if the familiar expressions (expressions of which the uses were obscure) were supposed to be names, have referents (and non-referents), then the new expressions must clearly have referents. Further, the new expressions must deserve (by having appropriate referents in the case of names) the principal connotations of the familiar expressions, especially the distinctive, honorific connotations of the familiar expressions. (I will not say here just how I use \enquote{connotation}. What the connotations of an expression are will be suggested by giving sentences about, in the case of a supposed name for example, what the referents of the expression are supposed to be like.) \enquote{Finding}, or constructing, an expression (with its use) supposed to be acceptable to oneself as a replacement, of the kind described, for an expression familiar to oneself, will be said to be \term{explicating} the expression familiar to oneself. The expression to be replaced will be said to be the \term{explicandum}, and the suggested replacement, the \term{explication}. Incidentally, if clarification shows that the desired use of the explicandum is inconsistent, then it can't have an explication at all acceptable, or what is the same thing, any explication will be as good as any other. 
+
+I should mention that my use of \term{explication} is different from that of Rudolph Carnap, from whom I have taken the word rather than use the very problematic \term{definition}. For him, explication is a scientist's, or philosopher of science's, devising a new precise concept, useful in natural science, suggested by a vague, unclear common concept (for example, that of \enquote{work}); whereas for me it is in effect constructing (if possible) that precise, clear concept which is the nearest equivalent to an unclear common concept. 
+
+Here is an example in the acceptability of explications. Suppose that an expression is suggested, as an explication for \enquote{thing having a mind} (if supposed to be a name, have referents), which has as referents precisely the things which have certain facial expressions, or talk, or have certain other \enquote{overt} behavior, or even certain brain electricity. Then I expect that this expression will not be acceptable to the reader as an explication for \enquote{thing having a mind}, since \enquote{thing having a mind} presumably has the connotations for the reader \enquote{\stress{that having a mind is not the same as, is very different from, higher than, having certain facial expressions, talking, certain other overt behaving, or having certain brain electricity---the mind is observable only by the thing having it}}, and the explication doesn't deserve these connotations: the connotations of the explicandum are exclusive of the referents of the proposed explication. It doesn't make any difference if there's a causal connection between having a mind and the other things, because the expression \enquote{thing having a mind} itself, and not the supposed effects of having a mind, is what is under discussion. 
+
+As the reader can tell from the example, I will, in evaluating expressions, have to speak of what I assume the connotations of words are for the reader. If any of my assumptions are incorrect, the book will be slightly less relevant to the reader's philosophical problems than it would be otherwise. Even so, the reader should get from this part the method of finding good explications, and its use in solving properly philosophical problems. 
+
+Especially important in deciding whether an explication for a supposed name is good is the check of the referents of the explication against the connotations of the explicandum. Traditional philosophers, in the rare cases when they have suggested explications for expressions in dealing with philosophical problems, have suggested absurdly bad ones, which can quickly be shown up by such a check. Examples which are typically horrible are the explications for \enquote{thing having a mind} mentioned above. 
+
+The second concept I will discuss is that of true statement. As I will be discussing the \enquote{truth} of formulations of beliefs, statements, in the next two chapters, and as the concept of true statement is quite obscure (making it a good example of one needing explication), it will be helpful for me to clarify the concept beforehand, to give a partial explication for \enquote{true statement}. (Partial because the explication, although much clearer than the explicandum, will itself have an unclear word in it.) 
+
+Well, what is a \term{statement}? How do what are usually said to be \term{statements} state? Take a book and look through it, a book in a language you don't read, so you won't assume that it's obvious what it means. What does the book, the object, do? How does it work? Note that talking just about the marks in the book, or what seem (!) to be the rules of their arrangement, or the like, won't answer these questions. In fact, I expect that when the reader really thinks about them, the questions won't seem easy ones to answer. Now to begin answering them, one of the most important connotations of \term{true statement}, and, more generally, of \emph{statement}, as traditionally and commonly used, is that a \term{statement} is an \enquote{assertion which has truth value} (is true or false) (or \enquote{has content}, as it is sometimes said, rather misleadingly). That is, the \enquote{verbal} part of a statement is supposed to be related in a certain way to something \enquote{non-verbal}, or at least not in the language the verbal part of the statement is in. Further, a statement is supposed to be \enquote{true} or not because of something having to do with the non-verbal thing to which the verbal part of the statement is related. (The exceptions are the \enquote{statements} of formalist logic and mathematics, which are not supposed to be assertions; they are thus irrelevant to statements of the kind ordinary persons and philosophers are interested in.) Thus, if \enquote{\term{true statement}} is to be explicated, \enquote{assertion having truth value} and \enquote{is true} (and \enquote{has content} in a misleading use) have to be explicated, as they are obscure, and as it must be clear that the explication for \enquote{\term{true statement}} deserves the connotations which were suggested with \enquote{assertion having truth value} and \enquote{is true}. One important conclusion from these observations is that although \enquote{sentences} (the bodies of sound or bodes of marks such as \enquote{The man talks}) are often said to be \enquote{statements}, would not be sufficient (to say the least) to explicate \enquote{\term{statement}} by simply identifying it with \enquote{sentence} (in my sense); something must be said about such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. For the same reason, it is not sufficient (to say the least) to simply identify \enquote{\term{statement}}with \enquote{sentence}, the latter being explicated in terms of the (\enquote{formal}) rules for the formation of (grammatical) sentences, as these rules have no reference to such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. 
+
+In explicating \enquote{\term{true statement}} I will use the most elegant approach, one relevant to the interest in such matters as that of being an assertion having truth value. This is to begin by describing a simple, if not the simplest, way to make an assertion. As an example, I will describe the simplest way to make the assertion that a thing is a table. The way is to \enquote{apply} \uline{table} to the thing. It is supposed that \uline{table} has been \enquote{interpreted}, that is, that it is \enquote{\emph{determinate}} to which, of all things, applications of \uline{table} are (to be said to be) \enquote{true}. (It is good to realize that it is also supposed that it is \enquote{determinate} which, of all things (events), are \enquote{occurrences of the word \enquote{table}}, are expressions \enquote{equivalent to} \uline{table}.) The word \enquote{\emph{determinate}} is the intentionally ambiguous one in this explication; I don't want to commit myself yet on how an expression becomes interpreted. As for \enquote{apply}, one can \enquote{apply} the word to the thing by pointing out \enquote{first} the word and \enquote{then} the thing. \enquote{point out} is restricted to refer to \term{ostension}, pointing out things in one's presence, things one is perceiving, and not to \enquote{directing attention to things not in one's presence} as well. The assertion is \enquote{true}, of course, if and only if the thing to which \uline{table} is applied is one of the things to which it is determinate that the application of \uline{table} is (to be said to be) \enquote{true}, otherwise \enquote{false}. It should be clear that such a pointing out of a \enquote{first} thing and a \enquote{second}, the first being an interpreted expression, is an assertion of a simple kind, does have truth value and so forth. Let me further suggest \enquote{\term{interpreted expression}} as an explication for \enquote{name}; with respect to this explication, the things to which equivalent names (\enquote{occurrences of a name}) may be truthfully applied are the referents of the equivalent names, other things being non-referents. (Incidentally, I could have started with the concept of a name and its referents, and then said how to make a simple assertion using a name.) Then what I have intentionally left ambiguous is \emph{how a name has referents}; I have not said, for example, whether the relation between name and referents is an \enquote{objective, metaphysical entity}, which would be getting into philosophy proper. 
+
+The point of describing this simple way of making an assertion is that what one wants to say are \term{statements}, namely sentences used in the context of certain conventions, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind; thus an explication for \enquote{\term{true statement}} can be found. To do so, first let us say that the \term{complex name} gotten by replacing a sentence's \enquote{main verb} with the corresponding participle is the \term{associated name} of the sentence. For example, the associated name of \enquote{Boston is in Massachusetts} is \enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. In the case of a sentence with coordinate clauses there may be a choice with respect to what is to be taken as the main verb, but this presents no significant difficulty. 
 
 \vskip 0.5em
 
-Example:  \\
-\textbf{sentence:} \enquote{The 
-table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one 
-man while the other man talked}; \\
-\textbf{main verb:} \enquote{will have been} or \enquote{had been 
-pushed}. 
+Example:  \\\textbf{sentence:} \enquote{The table in the room will have been black only if it had been pushed by one man while the other man talked}; \\\textbf{main verb:} \enquote{will have been} or \enquote{had been pushed}. 
 
 \vskip 0.5em
 
-Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, 
-but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be 
-invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to 
-make a statement, is to so to speak \enquote{assert} its associated name; this 
-\enquote{asserted name} being \enquote{true} if and only if it has a referent. However, one 
-doesn't \emph{assert} names; names just have referents---it is statements that one 
-makes, \enquote{asserts}, and that are \enquote{true} or \enquote{false}. How, then, do we explicate 
-this \enquote{\term{asserting}} of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple 
-kind, which is the application of \uline{having a referent} to the name. In other 
-words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a 
-statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and 
-puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying 
-\uline{having a referent} to it. For example, the sentence \enquote{Boston is in 
-Massachusetts} should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the 
-application of \uline{having a referent} to \enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. 
-
-Now this approach may seem \enquote{unnatural} or incomplete to the reader 
-for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is 
-replaced by a statement \enquote{about} it (or to be precise its associated name). 
-Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to 
-describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a 
-statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even 
-more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of 
-interpreting \enquote{simple names} (Fries' \term{Class 1 words}), but not so natural to 
-speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of 
-course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from 
-simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus 
-referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which 
-they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex 
-names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex 
-names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such 
-words as \enquote{the}; in making statements, these names have to be in the context 
-of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be 
-clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these 
-relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything 
-about what the \enquote{meaning} (intension), as opposed to the referents (and 
-non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension 
-unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for 
-my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells 
-the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is 
-true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly 
-philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous 
-word \enquote{determinate}, because I haven't said anything about how names get 
-referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how 
-one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards 
-explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with 
-formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if 
-language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in 
-some form must have the central role in it.) 
-
-\term{Statements}, then, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind 
-which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have 
-described. I could thus explicate \enquote{\emph{true statement}} as referring to those true 
-\enquote{simple} assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this 
-would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of \enquote{true 
-statement} having to do with the method of applying the first member to the 
-second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to 
-do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more 
-elegant to explicate \enquote{true statement} as referring to all true assertions of the 
-\enquote{simple} kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of 
-the two explications the reader prefers. 
+Also, English may not have a participle to correspond to every verb, but this is in theory no difficulty; the lacking participle could obviously be invented. Now what we would like to say one does, in using a sentence to make a statement, is to so to speak \enquote{assert} its associated name; this \enquote{asserted name} being \enquote{true} if and only if it has a referent. However, one doesn't \emph{assert} names; names just have referents---it is statements that one makes, \enquote{asserts}, and that are \enquote{true} or \enquote{false}. How, then, do we explicate this \enquote{\term{asserting}} of a name? By construing it as that assertion, of the simple kind, which is the application of \uline{having a referent} to the name. In other words, from our theoretical point of view, to use a sentence to make a statement, one begins with a name (the sentence's associated name), and puts it into the sentence form, an act equivalent by convention to applying \uline{having a referent} to it. For example, the sentence \enquote{Boston is in Massachusetts} should be regarded as the simple assertion which is the application of \uline{having a referent} to \enquote{Boston being in Massachusetts}. 
+
+Now this approach may seem \enquote{unnatural} or incomplete to the reader for several reasons. First there is the syntactical oddity: the sentence is replaced by a statement \enquote{about} it (or to be precise its associated name). Well, all I can say is that this oddity is the inevitable result of trying to describe explicitly all that happens when one uses a sentence to make a statement; I can assure the reader that the alternate approaches are even more unnatural. Secondly, it may seem natural enough to speak of interpreting \enquote{simple names} (Fries' \term{Class 1 words}), but not so natural to speak of interpreting complex names (what could their referents be?). Of course, this is because complex names are to be regarded as formed from simpler names by specified methods; that is, their interpretations (and thus referents) are in specified relations to those of the simple names from which they are formed. The relations are indicated by the words, in the complex names, which are not names, and by the order of the words in the complex names. An example worth a comment is associated names containing such words as \enquote{the}; in making statements, these names have to be in the context of additional conventions, understandings, to have significance. It will be clear that what these relations (and referents) are, the explication of these relations, is not important for my purposes. Thirdly, I have not said anything about what the \enquote{meaning} (intension), as opposed to the referents (and non-referents), of a name is. (I might say that a thing can't have an intension unless it has referents or non-referents.) This matter is also not important for my purposes (and gets into philosophy proper). Finally, my approach tells the reader no more than he already knew about whether a given statement is true. Quite so, and I said that the discussion would be properly philosophically neutral. In fact, it is so precisely because of the ambiguous word \enquote{determinate}, because I haven't said anything about how names get referents. Even so, we have come a long way from blank wonder about how one (sounds, marks) could ever state anything, a long way towards explicating how asserting works. (And to the philosopher of language with formalist prejudices, the discussion has been a needed reminder that if language is to be assertional, say something, then names and referring in some form must have the central role in it.) 
+
+\term{Statements}, then, can be regarded as assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind which are made in the special, conventional way, involving sentences, I have described. I could thus explicate \enquote{\emph{true statement}} as referring to those true \enquote{simple} assertions made in the special way, and it should be clear that this would be a good explication. However, as the connotations of \enquote{true statement} having to do with the method of applying the first member to the second are, I expect, of secondary importance compared to those having to do with such matters as being an assertion having truth value, it ts more elegant to explicate \enquote{true statement} as referring to all true assertions of the \enquote{simple} kind. For the purposes of this book it is not important which of the two explications the reader prefers. 
 
 So much for the preliminaries. 
 
 \subsection[Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}][\enquote{Experience}]{Chapter 3: \enquote{Experience}}
 
-I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step 
-in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical 
-language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This 
-terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing 
-my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on 
-precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I 
-think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern 
-philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are 
-relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
-
-First, consider the term \enquote{\term{non-experience}}. Although the concept of a 
-non-experience is intrinsically far more \enquote{difficult} than the concept of 
-\enquote{\term{experience}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, 
-presupposed in all \enquote{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so 
-taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should 
-have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are 
-perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of 
-it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the 
-future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects 
-from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily 
-understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and 
-their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the 
-second chapter); unperceivable \enquote{things} (microscopic objects (of course, 
-viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), 
-essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, 
-normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\footnote{To 
-simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am 
-speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing 
-the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}
-Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that 
-there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one 
-can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex 
-belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the 
-mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is 
-presumably a connotation of \enquote{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the 
-second chapter. 
-
-In the history of philosophy, the concept of \term{non-experience} comes first. 
-Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about 
-non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a \term{perception}, or 
-\term{experience} of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that 
-one knows about \term{non-experiences} by perceiving, having experiences of, some 
-of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes 
-(assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by 
-having a \enquote{visual-table-experience}. The theory goes on to say that these 
-perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in 
-one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now 
-there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, 
-saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they 
-are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a 
-table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem \enquote{mental}. 
-The theory that they are in the mind is a \textbf{belief}. This point leads directly to 
-the second source of confusion. Does the English word \enquote{table}, as ordinarily 
-used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity 
-external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's 
-perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between 
-the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to 
-the reader, then he probably uses \enquote{table}, \enquote{perceived table}, and 
-\enquote{table-experience} as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, 
-is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not 
-perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this 
-confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being 
-used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the 
-perceptions. 
-
-Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are 
-experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term 
-\enquote{\term{experience}} is important here because with it philosophers finally made a 
-start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably 
-knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are 
-experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional 
-philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not 
-know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective 
-table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, 
-has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences 
-not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one 
-unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that \stress{there 
-is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like.}
-One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would 
-be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, \enquote{thinking} that one doesn't have 
-one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be 
-shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest 
-idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the 
-reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably 
-known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some 
-philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say 
-cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity.\footnote{For example, some 
-philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds.} In 
-speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a 
-lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by 
-appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy 
-which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One 
-does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective 
-tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other 
-persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's 
-table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as 
-will be shown). 
-
-I have explained the current use of the term \enquote{\term{experience}}. Now I want 
-to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, 
-will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing 
-\enquote{\term{non-experience}} I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of 
-the term, in the case of \enquote{\term{experience}} I am going to suggest a new use for the 
-term.) As I explained, the concept of \term{non-experience} preceded that of 
-\term{experience}, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the 
-former. What I am interested in, however, is not \enquote{experience} as it implies. 
-\enquote{perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind}, but as it refers to \stress{that 
-which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not 
-something one believes exists}. I am going to use \enquote{\term{experience}} to refer, as it 
-already does, to that immediate \enquote{world}, but \stress{without the implication that 
-\term{experience} is perception of \term{non-experience}, and in the mind: the same 
-referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use 
-\enquote{\term{experience}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to 
-non-experiences, is not an antonym for \enquote{\term{non-experience}} as conventionally 
-used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a 
-leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy 
-between \enquote{experience} as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences 
-or in particular the realm where they could be, and \enquote{\term{experience}} without 
-these connotations. 
-
-Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be 
-obvious that although my term \enquote{\term{experience}} was introduced last, it is 
-intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the 
-terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I 
-discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I 
-have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my 
-term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, 
-especially, the theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences}. Even if the reader's 
-conceptual background does not involve the concept of \term{non-experience,} and 
-especially the modern Western theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences,} he 
-ought to be able to understand, and realize the \enquote{primacy} of, my term 
-\enquote{\term{experience}}. The term should be supra-cultural. 
-
-I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \enquote{experience}. 
-As I have said, it is \enquote{intrinsically} the simplest term, but I can not define it 
-by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including 
-the traditional term \enquote{experience}, the antonym of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, is based 
-on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, 
-in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for 
-different philosophers according as their metaphysics\footnote{Or, as is sometimes 
-(incorrectly) said, \enquote{ontologies}.} differ. Even such a sentence as \enquote{The table is 
-black} implies the formulation \enquote{\uline{Material objects are real}} (to the materialist), 
-or \enquote{\uline{So-called objects are ideas in the mind}} (to the idealist), or 
-\enquote{\uline{Substances 
-and attributes are real}}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to 
-explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, 
-ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I 
-use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of 
-\term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example 
-when I say that the connotation of relatedness to \term{non-experience} is to be 
-dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is 
-not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied 
-philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, 
-to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or 
-other natural language, but by having referents. 
-
-As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my 
-\term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything 
-about \term{non-experiences}, since in English there is always the implication that 
-there could be \term{non-experiences}. The term is a radical innovation; one of the 
-most important in this book. The fact that although it is the \enquote{simplest} and 
-least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain 
-using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the 
-philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my 
-\term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as 
-an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences.\footnote{It's good that this 
-isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be 
-no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this 
-realm would have to be a non-experience.} If he is lucky he will just find the 
-book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from 
-the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is 
-past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may 
-already realize what I'm going to say. 
+I will introduce in this chapter some basic terminology, as the main step in taking the reader from ordinary English and traditional philosophical language to a language with which my philosophy can be exposited. This terminology is important because one of the main difficulties in expositing my philosophy (or any new philosophy) is that current language is based on precisely some of the assumptions, beliefs, I intend to question. It will, I think, be immediately clear to the reader at all familiar with modern philosophy that the problems of terminology I am going to discuss are relevant to the problem of which beliefs are right. 
+
+First, consider the term \enquote{\term{non-experience}}. Although the concept of a non-experience is intrinsically far more \enquote{difficult} than the concept of \enquote{\term{experience}} which I will be discussing presently, it is, I suppose, presupposed in all \enquote{natural languages} and throughout philosophy, is so taken for granted that it is rarely discussed in itself. Thus, the reader should have no difficulty understanding it. Examples of \term{non-experiences} are perceivable objects---for example, a table (as opposed to one's perceptions of it), existing external to oneself, persisting when one is not perceiving it; the future (future events); the past; space (or better, the distantness of objects from oneself); minds other than one's own; causal relationships as ordinarily understood; referential relationships (the relationships between names and their referents as ordinarily understood; what I avoided discussing in the second chapter); unperceivable \enquote{things} (microscopic objects (of course, viewing them through microscopes does not count as perceiving them), essences, Being); in short, most of the things one is normally concerned with, normally thinks about, as well as the objects of uncommon knowledge.\footnote{To simplify the explanation of the concept, make it easier on the reader, I am speaking as if I believed that there are non-experiences, that is, introducing the concept in the context of the beliefs usually associated with it.}Non-experiences are precisely what one has beliefs about. One believes that there are microscopic living organisms, or that there are none (or that one can not know whether there are any---this is \stress{not} a \term{non-belief} but a complex belief about the relation of the realm where non-experiences could be to the mind). Incidentally, that other minds, for example, are non-experiences is presumably a connotation of \enquote{other minds} for the reader, as explained in the second chapter. 
+
+In the history of philosophy, the concept of \term{non-experience} comes first. Then philosophers begin to develop theories of how one knows about non-experiences (epistemological theories). The concept of a \term{perception}, or \term{experience} of something, is introduced into philosophy. The theory is that one knows about \term{non-experiences} by perceiving, having experiences of, some of them. For example, one knows that there is a table before one's eyes (assuming that there is) by having a visual perception or experience of it, by having a \enquote{visual-table-experience}. The theory goes on to say that these perceptions are in the mind. Then, if one has a visual-table-experience in one's mind when there is no table, one is hallucinated. And so forth. Now there are two sources of confusion in all this for the naive reader. First, saying that perceptions of objects are in one's mind is not saying that they are, for example, visualizations, imaginings, such as one's visualization of a table with one's eyes closed. Perceptions of objects do not seem \enquote{mental}. The theory that they are in the mind is a \textbf{belief}. This point leads directly to the second source of confusion. Does the English word \enquote{table}, as ordinarily used to refer to a table when one is looking at it, refer to the table, an entity external to one's perceptions which persists when not perceived, or to one's perception of it, to the visual-table-experience? If distinguishing between the two, and the notion that the table-experience is in his mind, seem silly to the reader, then he probably uses \enquote{table}, \enquote{perceived table}, and \enquote{table-experience} as equivalent some of the time. The distinction, however, is not just silly; anyone who believes that there are tables when he is not perceiving them must accept it to be consistent. At any rate there is this confusion, that it is not always clear whether English object-names are being used to refer to perceived non-experiences or to experiences, the perceptions. 
+
+Now let us ignore for a moment the connotations that experiences are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences, and are in the mind. The term \enquote{\term{experience}} is important here because with it philosophers finally made a start at inventing a term for the things one knows directly, unquestionably knows, or, better, which one just has, or are just there (whether they are experiences, perceptions, of non-experiences or not). A traditional philosopher would say that if one is having a table-experience, one may not know whether it's a true perception of a table, whether there's an objective table there; or whether it's an hallucination; but one unquestionably knows, has, the table-experience. And of course, with respect to one's experiences not supposed to be perceptions of anything, such as visualizations, one unquestionably knows, has them too. A better way of putting it is that \stress{there is no question as to whether one has one's experiences or what they are like.}One doesn't believe (that one has) one's experiences; to try to do so would be rather like trying to polish air. In fact, \enquote{thinking} that one doesn't have one's experiences, if this is possible, is a belief, a wrong one (as will be shown, although it should already be obvious if the reader has the slightest idea of what I am talking about), and in fact a perfectly insane one. Now the reader must not think that because I say experiences are unquestionably known I am talking about tautologies, or about beliefs which some philosophers say can be known by intuition even though unprovable, or say cannot really be doubted without losing one's sanity.\footnote{For example, some philosophers say this about the belief that other persons have minds.} In speaking of experiences I am not trying to trick the reader into accepting a lot of beliefs I am not prepared to justify, as many philosophers do by appealing to intuition or sanity or what not, a reprehensible hypocrisy which shows that they are not the least interested in philosophy proper. One does not have other-persons'-having-minds-experiences (nor are the objective tables one supposedly perceives table-experiences); one believes that other persons have minds (or that there is an objective table corresponding to one's table-experience), and this belief could very well be wrong (in fact, it is, as will be shown). 
+
+I have explained the current use of the term \enquote{\term{experience}}. Now I want to propose a new use for the term, which, except where otherwise noted, will be that of the rest of this book. (Thus whereas in discussing \enquote{\term{non-experience}} I was merely explaining and accepting the current use of the term, in the case of \enquote{\term{experience}} I am going to suggest a new use for the term.) As I explained, the concept of \term{non-experience} preceded that of \term{experience}, and the latter was developed to explain how one knows the former. What I am interested in, however, is not \enquote{experience} as it implies. \enquote{perceptions, of non-experiences, and in the mind}, but as it refers to \stress{that which one unquestionably knows, is immediate, is just there, is not something one believes exists}. I am going to use \enquote{\term{experience}} to refer, as it already does, to that immediate \enquote{world}, but \stress{without the implication that \term{experience} is perception of \term{non-experience}, and in the mind: the same referents but without the old connotations}. In other words, in my use \enquote{\term{experience}} is completely neutral with respect to relationships to non-experiences, is not an antonym for \enquote{\term{non-experience}} as conventionally used, does not presuppose a metaphysic. The reader is being asked to take a leap of understanding here, because there is all the difference in philosophy between \enquote{experience} as implying, connoting, relatedness to non-experiences or in particular the realm where they could be, and \enquote{\term{experience}} without these connotations. 
+
+Viewing this discussion of terminology in retrospect, it should be obvious that although my term \enquote{\term{experience}} was introduced last, it is intrinsically, logically, the simplest, most immediate, most inevitable of the terms, and should be the easiest to understand. In contrast, the notions I discussed in reaching it may seem a little arbitrary. As a matter of fact, I have used the perspective of the Western philosophical tradition to explain my term, but this doesn't mean that it is relevant only to that tradition or, especially, the theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences}. Even if the reader's conceptual background does not involve the concept of \term{non-experience,} and especially the modern Western theory of knowing about \term{non-experiences,} he ought to be able to understand, and realize the \enquote{primacy} of, my term \enquote{\term{experience}}. The term should be supra-cultural. 
+
+I have gone to some length to explain my use of the term \enquote{experience}. As I have said, it is \enquote{intrinsically} the simplest term, but I can not define it by just equating it to some English expression because all English, including the traditional term \enquote{experience}, the antonym of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, is based on metaphysical assumptions, does have implications about non-experience, in short, is formulations of beliefs. These implications are different for different philosophers according as their metaphysics\footnote{Or, as is sometimes (incorrectly) said, \enquote{ontologies}.} differ. Even such a sentence as \enquote{The table is black} implies the formulation \enquote{\uline{Material objects are real}} (to the materialist), or \enquote{\uline{So-called objects are ideas in the mind}} (to the idealist), or \enquote{\uline{Substances and attributes are real}}, and so forth, traditionally. As a result, in order to explain the new term I have had to use English in a very special way, ultimately turning it against itself, so as to enable the reader to guess how I use the term. That is, although there is nothing problematic about my use of \term{experience}, about its referents, there is about my English, for example when I say that the connotation of relatedness to \term{non-experience} is to be dropped from \term{experience}. There can be this new term, the philosopher is not irrevocably tied to English or other natural language and its implied philosophy, as some philosophers claim; because a term is able to be a name, to be used to make assertions, not by being a part of conventional English or other natural language, but by having referents. 
+
+As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I need to introduce my \term{experience} because without it I cannot question all beliefs, everything about \term{non-experiences}, since in English there is always the implication that there could be \term{non-experiences}. The term is a radical innovation; one of the most important in this book. The fact that although it is the \enquote{simplest} and least questionable term, it is a radical innovation and is difficult to explain using English, shows how philosophically inadequate English and the philosophies it implies are. Now if the reader has not understood my \term{experience} he is likely to precisely mis-understand the rest of the book as an attempt to show that there are no non-experiences.\footnote{It's good that this isn't what I'm trying to show, because it is self-contradictory: for there to be no non-experiences there would have to be a realm empty of them, and this realm would have to be a non-experience.} If he is lucky he will just find the book incomprehensible, or possibly even come to understand the term from the rest of what I say, using it. But if he does understand the term, then he is past the greatest difficulty in understanding the book; in fact, he may already realize what I'm going to say. 
 
 
 \subsection[Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution][The Linguistic Solution]{Chapter 4: The Linguistic Solution}
 
-Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the 
-book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the 
-problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the 
-language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present 
-the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my 
-work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, 
-and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a 
-philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will 
-not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to 
-explore all its implications; that will come later. 
-
-However, in the hope that it will make the main \enquote{argument} of this 
-chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous 
-version of it, which should give the \enquote{intuitive insight} behind the main 
-argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is 
-true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified 
-from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without 
-appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot 
-know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a 
-contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be 
-right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if 
-they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The \enquote{necessity}, but 
-inconsistency, of skepticism \enquote{shows} my conclusion in an intuitively 
-understandable way. 
-
-To get on to the definitive version of my \enquote{argument}. I will say that 
-one name \enquote{\term{depends}} on another if and only if it has the logical relation to 
-that other that \uline{black table} has to \uline{table}: a referent of the former is 
-necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names 
-mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any 
-statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity \term{depends} on 
-\term{non-experience}, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For 
-example, \enquote{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the 
-formulation \enquote{Other persons have minds}, certainly \term{depends} on 
-\term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-ex\-per\-ience} will be true of the 
-associated name of any formulation of a belief. 
-
-In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of 
-non-ex\-per\-ience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of 
-\term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions 
-\term{non-experience} and experience (traditional). What I did not go on to 
-show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, 
-one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What 
-follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the 
-reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's 
-\term{experience} (used in my, \enquote{neutral}, sense unless I say otherwise). Could there 
-be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was 
-awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to 
-non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of 
-non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in 
-the last chapter.\footnote{Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) 
-justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it 
-without appealing to other beliefs.} If there could be, if such awareness were 
-just an experience, the distinctness of \term{experience} from experience 
-(traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience 
-(traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have 
-them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into 
-\term{experience}. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience 
-which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there 
-is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience 
-(traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in 
-one's \term{experience}---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness 
-which is \enquote{understanding the concepts} of non-experience and the rest as 
-they are supposed to be understood. And for \enquote{understanding}
-\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its 
-referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an 
-experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and 
-non-referents) of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, which to name an experience 
-(traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands 
-\term{non-experience}---and \enquote{\term{non-experience}}---and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}}; but here 
-one is, using \enquote{\term{non-experience}} and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}} to say so (which 
-certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible 
-for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the 
-concept of \term{non-experience}, it collapses. 
-
-(A final point for the expert. This 
-tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does 
-not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot 
-name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences 
-about names, which show contradictions---that one must not assume that 
-one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say 
-so (does assume it)---with explicit stratification.) 
-
-My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now 
-what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about 
-experience (traditional), \term{non-experience}, and the rest, because I have spoken 
-as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \enquote{experience} 
-(traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have 
-said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is 
-a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \enquote{experience} 
-(traditional), \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, and the rest, it shows that one who \enquote{accepts} 
-the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent 
-desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no 
-explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the 
-expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, 
-remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are 
-completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to 
-\term{experiences} (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a 
-formulation of a belief does have a good \term{explication} for the reader, then it is 
-not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to \term{experiences}.) Now there is 
-an important point about method which should be brought out. If all 
-\enquote{non-experiential language}, \enquote{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I 
-show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer 
-is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into 
-contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I 
-want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we 
-have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as \enquote{all formulations of 
-beliefs are false}. 
-
-Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about 
-belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is 
-right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since 
-the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a 
-belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable 
-\term{explication} which was true; in short, the belief would have a true 
-formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a 
-formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point 
-answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of 
-belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not 
-to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one 
-who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that 
-it could have an acceptable \term{explication} for him, could not turn out to be an 
-expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some 
-way. Now there is another important point about \enquote{method} to be made. 
-The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one 
-can \enquote{know}, be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. 
-The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of 
-the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. 
-(Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the 
-way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like 
-being aware with respect to a table, \enquote{that in my language, this is to be said to 
-be a \enquote{table}}.) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how 
-a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its 
-referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this 
-belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be 
-discussed here. 
-
-The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes, 
-but\ldots} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their 
-formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of 
-linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if 
-embarrassing) curiosity.\footnote{Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how 
-well the reader understands that.} And there does remain a lot to be said 
-about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in 
-them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its 
-formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose 
-rejection as wrong would conflict with \term{experience}, or which it would be 
-impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these 
-matters. 
-
-\clearpage
-\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}
-\subsection[Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts][Beliefs as Mental Acts]{Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts}
-
-In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by 
-discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be 
-talking about mental acts and \term{experience}, it must be clear that this part of 
-the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will 
-not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify 
-\enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally 
-relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I 
-discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
-
-I should say immediately that \enquote{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed 
-to refer to \enquote{\term{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of 
-non-experience}}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. 
-This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one 
-does or does not \enquote{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having 
-beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \enquote{belief} in the 
-use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of 
-the last part. Now when I speak of a \enquote{belief} I will be speaking of an 
-\term{experience}, what might be said to be \enquote{\emph{an act of consciously believing, of 
-consciously having a belief}}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that 
-one \enquote{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in 
-distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \enquote{that others have minds}, for example, 
-or in general of belief \enquote{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation 
-marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be 
-\enquote{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely 
-about \term{experiences}; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of 
-non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already 
-fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has 
-any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his 
-\enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{\emph{act of consciously 
-believing}}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. 
-What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, 
-use of a word (\enquote{\term{belief}}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, 
-rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
-
-There is a further point about terminology. The reader should 
-remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \enquote{that 
-perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental 
-and non-mental \term{experiences}, between, for example, visualizing a table with 
-one's eyes closed, and a \enquote{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am 
-going to say that visualizations and the like are \enquote{\term{imagined-experiences}}. For 
-example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an 
-\enquote{\term{imagined-visual-table-experience}}. The reader should not suppose that by 
-\enquote{imagined} I mean that the experiences are 
-\enquote{hallucinations}, are \enquote{unreal}. I 
-use \enquote{imagined} because saying \enquote{mental-table-experience} is too much like 
-saying \enquote{table in the mind} and because just using \enquote{visualization} leaves no way 
-of speaking of mental \term{experiences} which are not visualizations. Speaking of 
-an \enquote{\term{imagined-table-experience}} seems to be the best way of saying that it is 
-a mental \term{experience}, and then distinguishing it from other mental 
-\term{experiences} by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \enquote{of 
-a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining 
-like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). In other words, an 
-\term{imagined-\x-experience} (to generalize) is a \enquote{valid} experience, all right, but it 
-is not a non-mental \x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a 
-(non-mental) \x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \enquote{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an 
-imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this 
-terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the 
-conventional method of distinguishing different mental \term{experiences} by 
-saying that they are imaginings \enquote{of one or another non-mental \term{experiences}}. 
-
-I can at last ask what one does when one believes \enquote{\emph{that there is a table, 
-not perceived by oneself, behind one now}}, or anything else. Well, in the 
-first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an 
-imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization 
-of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed 
-statement, such as \enquote{\emph{There is a table behind me}}. This is not all one does, 
-however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said 
-to be a \enquote{belief} (a point about the explication of my \enquote{\term{belief}}). The 
-additional, \enquote{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \enquote{attitude} 
-toward the \term{experience}. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe 
-that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief 
-about the \term{experience} because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in 
-other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental 
-action. Now the claim that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving} is not, could not 
-be, at all like the claim \enquote{\emph{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to 
-correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}}. The 
-question of \enquote{\emph{what is going on in the realm of non-experience}} does not arise 
-here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an \term{experience}; it is that the attitude, 
-the \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} of believing, is 
-\enquote{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \enquote{self-deception \term{experience}}. I 
-don't have to \enquote{\emph{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what 
-is going on in the realm of non-experience}}; when I have described the 
-attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good 
-explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
-
-I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one 
-is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as 
-mentioned above. The attitude is \enquote{peripheral}, is a matter of the way one is 
-attentive. Saying that the attitude is \enquote{conscious, deliberate}, is a little 
-strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am 
-trying to say is that it is not an \enquote{objective} or \enquote{subconscious} self-deception 
-such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This 
-is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the 
-inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental \term{experiences}; 
-with respect to English the attitude is a \enquote{vague, elusive} thing, very difficult 
-to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by 
-saying that it is the attitude \enquote{that such and such} (the reader must not think 
-I mean the belief \enquote{that such and such}). If the \term{experience} to which the 
-attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-\x-experience, then the 
-self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the imagined-\x-experience is a 
-(non-mental) \x-experience}}. As an example, consider the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is 
-a table behind one}}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic 
-expression, it will be on an \term{imagined-experience} such as an 
-imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself 
-(to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving 
-attitude \enquote{\stress{that the \term{imagined-experience} is a table or oneself with one's back 
-to a table}}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-\x-experience is 
-a (non-mental) \x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly 
-an \term{imagined-experience} but \enquote{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not 
-inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \enquote{\stress{that 
-one's imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience}}; secondly, when one is asked 
-the question, one stops believing \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}} and starts 
-believing \enquote{\stress{that one's \term{imagined-experience} corresponds in a certain way to a 
-non-experience}}, a different matter (different belief). 
-
-lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression 
-(which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), 
-the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the expression has a 
-referent}}. With respect to the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}}, one's 
-attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \enquote{\stress{There is a table 
-behind me}}, pretty much regarded as \enquote{\stress{There being a table behind me}}, and 
-one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{\stress{that this name has a referent}}. 
-Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of 
-beliefs. 
-
-\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse 
-the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the 
-version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving 
-language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an 
-imagined-\x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an \x-experience, whereas in 
-the version involving language, the attention is on something which is 
-\enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). 
-For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{\stress{that the reality is at one remove}}, and 
-correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs 
-doesn't desire to have as \term{experiences}, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, 
-referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make 
-believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-\x-experience in 
-the version of the belief not involving language, has something which 
-functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language 
-one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one 
-has the attitude that the imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience in the 
-version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the 
-thing believed in is a mere \term{imagined-experience}, so in the version involving 
-\enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a 
-referent could only be a (mere) \term{experience}. One who expects an expression, 
-which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does 
-so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the 
-belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires 
-with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the 
-way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for 
-awareness of the referent to be part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the 
-attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it 
-not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's 
-\term{experience} corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. 
-Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which 
-it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving 
-language consists of being attentive to an \term{imagined-experience} and having the 
-attitude that it is not an \term{imagined-experience}, discredits that belief. 
-
-Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather 
-unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of 
-\enquote{attitudes}, then let him consider the following summary: there must be 
-something more to a mental act than just taking note of an \term{experience} for it 
-to be a \enquote{belief}; this something is \enquote{peripheral and elusive}, so that I am 
-calling the something an \enquote{attitude}, the most appropriate way in English to 
-speak of it; the attitude, an \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the 
-\term{experience} which \stress{is} the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is 
-\enquote{self-deceiving}, is a \enquote{(conscious) self-deception experience}, because when 
-aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just 
-about has to be a (\enquote{conscious}) self-deception experience to transform mere 
-taking note of an \term{experience} into something remotely deserving to be said to 
-be a \enquote{belief}. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be 
-\enquote{self-deceiving} is to be made without trying to think \enquote{about the relation of 
-the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience}, to do which would be 
-to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which 
-would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is 
-to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more 
-than to say that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
-
-In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention 
-some things often associated with believing but not \enquote{essential} to it. First, 
-one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the 
-one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and 
-believes \enquote{that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing 
-table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so 
-believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in 
-believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be "evidence 
-for, confirmation of, one's belief} (more will be said about confirmation 
-shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic 
-expression \enquote{\x}, one may give attention to a referent of 
-\enquote{imagined-\x(-experience)}, an \enquote{imagined-referent} of \enquote{\x}; or to 
-imagined-\y-experiences such that \y-experiences are supposed, said, to be 
-\enquote{analogous to the referent of \enquote{\x}}. In the latter case the \y-experiences will be 
-mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be 
-to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is 
-visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of 
-\enquote{There being a table behind one}. An example of imagined-\y-experiences 
-(such that \y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be 
-\enquote{analogous to referents}, in believing, is the visualizations associated with 
-beliefs \enquote{\stress{about entities wholly other than, transcending, \term{experience}, such as 
-Being}}. 
-
-Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical \enquote{justifications}, 
-\enquote{arguments}, for them, \enquote{defenses} of them. I will not bother to explicate 
-the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong 
-with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would 
-show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language 
-and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested 
-before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the 
-justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive 
-justification, the kind involving the citing of \term{experience} supposed to be 
-evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical 
-assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them 
-inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has 
-four legs; therefore (\enquote{it is more probable that}) any other table has four 
-legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it 
-superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, 
-argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can 
-show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a lesser, 
-weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to 
-believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, 
-then one already had the belief \enquote{implicitly} (it was a conjunct of a belief 
-one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. 
-
-I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions 
-my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, 
-I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my 
-position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, 
-and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it 
-is ironic that "disbeliever", without qualification, has been used by believers 
-as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some 
-belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny \enquote{the 
-existence of non-experience}, to \enquote{cause non-experiences to vanish}, so to 
-speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental 
-\term{experiences}, \enquote{perceived objects}. My position is not skepticism of any kind, 
-is not, for example, the belief \enquote{that there is a realm where there could either 
-be or not be certain entities not \term{experiences}, but our means of knowing are 
-inadequate for finding which is the case.} My position is not a mere 
-\enquote{decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}. The philosopher who denies 
-\enquote{the existence of non-experiences}, or denies any belief, or who is skeptical 
-of any belief, or who merely \enquote{decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}, 
-has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. 
-
-What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of 
-beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In 
-the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions 
-dependent on "\term{non-experience}", and pointed out that those who expect them 
-to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting 
-the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have 
-described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the 
-self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. 
-To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right 
-philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief 
-one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
+Now that I have explained the key terminology for this part of the book, I can give the solution to properly philosophical problems, the problems of which beliefs are right, in the form of conclusions about the language in which the beliefs are formulated. My concern here is to present the solution as soon as possible, so as to make it clear to the reader that my work contains important results, is an important contribution to philosophy, and not just admirable sentiments or the formulation of an attitude or a philosophically neutral analysis of concepts or the like. For this reason I will not be too concerned to make the solution seem natural, or intuitive, or to explore all its implications; that will come later. 
+
+However, in the hope that it will make the main \enquote{argument} of this chapter easier to understand, I will precede it with a short, non-rigorous version of it, which should give the \enquote{intuitive insight} behind the main argument. Consider the question of whether one can know if a given belief is true. Now a given belief is cognitively arbitrary in that it cannot be justified from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot be justified without appealing to other beliefs. Thus the answer must be skepticism: one cannot know if a given belief is true. However, this skepticism is a belief---a contradiction. The ultimate conclusion is that to escape inconsistency, to be right, one must, at the linguistic level, reject all talk of beliefs, of knowing if they are true, reject all formulations of beliefs. The \enquote{necessity}, but inconsistency, of skepticism \enquote{shows} my conclusion in an intuitively understandable way. 
+
+To get on to the definitive version of my \enquote{argument}. I will say that one name \enquote{\term{depends}} on another if and only if it has the logical relation to that other that \uline{black table} has to \uline{table}: a referent of the former is necessarily a referent of the latter (one of the relations between names mentioned in the second chapter). Now the associated name of any statement, or formulation, of a belief of necessity \term{depends} on \term{non-experience}, since non-experiences are what beliefs are about. For example, \enquote{Other persons having minds}, the associated name of the formulation \enquote{Other persons have minds}, certainly \term{depends} on \term{non-experience}. Thus, anything true of \term{non-ex\-per\-ience} will be true of the associated name of any formulation of a belief. 
+
+In the last chapter I introduced, explained the concepts of non-ex\-per\-ience and experience (in the traditional sense, as the antonym of \term{non-experience}), showed the connotations of the expressions \term{non-experience} and experience (traditional). What I did not go on to show, left for this chapter, is that if one continues to analyze these concepts, one comes on crucial implications which result in contradictions. What follows is perhaps the most concentrated passage in this book, so that the reader must be willing to read it slowly and thoughtfully. Consider one's \term{experience} (used in my, \enquote{neutral}, sense unless I say otherwise). Could there be something in one's experience, a part of one's experience, which was awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether it's related to non-experience, of whether there is non-experience, awareness of non-experience? No, as should be obvious from the connotations shown in the last chapter.\footnote{Compare this with the point that one cannot (cognitively) justify a belief from the standpoint of having no beliefs, cannot justify it without appealing to other beliefs.} If there could be, if such awareness were just an experience, the distinctness of \term{experience} from experience (traditional) and so forth would disappear. The concepts of experience (traditional) and so forth would be superfluous, in fact, one couldn't have them: experience (traditional) and so forth would just be absorbed into \term{experience}. One concludes that there cannot be anything in one's experience which is awareness of whether it's experience (traditional), of whether there is non-experience. But then this awareness, which is in part about experience (traditional) and non-experience and thus involves awareness of them, is in one's \term{experience}---a contradiction. In fact, the same holds for the awareness which is \enquote{understanding the concepts} of non-experience and the rest as they are supposed to be understood. And for \enquote{understanding}\term{non-experience} (and the rest) as it is supposed to be, being aware of its referents (and non-referents); since to name non-experience, it must be an experience (traditional). And even for being aware of the referents (and non-referents) of \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, which to name an experience (traditional) must be one. One mustn't assume that one understands \term{non-experience}---and \enquote{\term{non-experience}}---and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}}; but here one is, using \enquote{\term{non-experience}} and \enquote{\enquote{\term{non-experience}}} to say so (which certainly implies that one assumes one understands them). It is impossible for there to be non-experiences. When one begins to examine closely the concept of \term{non-experience}, it collapses. 
+
+(A final point for the expert. This tangle of contradictions is intrinsic in the concept of non-experience; it does not result because I have introduced a violation of the law that names cannot name themselves. This should be absolutely clear from the two sentences about names, which show contradictions---that one must not assume that one understands certain expressions, but that one uses the expressions to say so (does assume it)---with explicit stratification.) 
+
+My exposition has broken down in a tangle of contradictions. Now what is important is that it has done so precisely because I have talked about experience (traditional), \term{non-experience}, and the rest, because I have spoken as if there could be non-experiences, because I have used \enquote{experience} (traditional), \enquote{non-experience}, and the rest. Thus, even though what I have said is a tangle of contradictions, it is not by any means valueless. Since it is a tangle of contradictions precisely because it involves \enquote{experience} (traditional), \enquote{\term{non-experience}}, and the rest, it shows that one who \enquote{accepts} the expressions, supposes that they are valid language, has inconsistent desires with respect to how they are to be used. The expressions can have no explications at all acceptable to him. He cannot consistently use the expressions (the way they're supposed to be). The expressions, and, remembering the paragraph before last, any formulation of a belief, are completely discredited. (What is not discredited is language referring to \term{experiences} (my use). If it happens that an expression I have said is a formulation of a belief does have a good \term{explication} for the reader, then it is not a formulation of a belief for him but refers to \term{experiences}.) Now there is an important point about method which should be brought out. If all \enquote{non-experiential language}, \enquote{belief language}, is inconsistent, how can I show this and yet avoid falling into contradiction when I say it? The answer is that I don't have to avoid falling into contradiction; that I fall into contradiction precisely because I use formulations of beliefs shows what I want to show. This, then, is the linguistic solution; as I said we would, we have been driven far beyond any such conclusion as \enquote{all formulations of beliefs are false}. 
+
+Now what do these conclusions about formulations of beliefs, about belief language, say about beliefs themselves, about whether a given belief is right? Well, to the extent that a belief is tied up with its formulation, since the formulation is discredited, the belief is, must be wrong. After all, if a belief were right, its formulation would necessarily have an acceptable \term{explication} which was true; in short, the belief would have a true formulation (to see this, note that the contrary assertion is itself a formulation of a belief---leading to a contradiction). Incidentally, this point answers those who would say, that the inconsistency of their statements of belief taken literally does not discredit their beliefs, as the statements are not to be taken literally, are metaphorical or symbolic truths. To continue, one who because of having a belief took its formulation seriously, expected that it could have an acceptable \term{explication} for him, could not turn out to be an expression he could not properly use, must be deceiving himself in some way. Now there is another important point about \enquote{method} to be made. The question will probably continually recur to the critical reader how one can \enquote{know}, be aware that any given belief is wrong, without having beliefs. The answer is that one way one can be aware of it is simply to be aware of the inconsistency of belief language, which awareness is not a belief. (Whether belief language is inconsistent is not a matter of belief but of the way one wants expressions used; being aware of the inconsistency is like being aware with respect to a table, \enquote{that in my language, this is to be said to be a \enquote{table}}.) Incidentally, to wrap things up, the common belief as to how a name has referents is that there is a relation between the name and its referents which is an objective, metaphysical entity, a non-experience; this belief is wrong. How, in what sense a name can have referents will not be discussed here. 
+
+The unsophisticated reader may react to all of this with a lot of \enquote{Yes, but\ldots} thoughts. If he doesn't more or less identify beliefs with their formulations, and doesn't have an intuitive appreciation of the force of linguistic arguments, he my tend to regard my result as a mere (if embarrassing) curiosity.\footnote{Of course, it isn't, but I am concerned with how well the reader understands that.} And there does remain a lot to be said about beliefs themselves (as mental acts), and where the self-deception is in them; it is not even clear yet just what the relation of a belief to its formulation is. Then the reader might ask whether there aren't beliefs whose rejection as wrong would conflict with \term{experience}, or which it would be impossible or dangerous not to have. I now turn to the discussion of these matters. 
+
+\clearpage\section{Completion of the Treatment of Properly Philosophical Problems}\subsection[Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts][Beliefs as Mental Acts]{Chapter 5: Beliefs as Mental Acts}
+
+In this chapter I will solve the problems of philosophy proper by discussing believing itself, as a (\enquote{conscious}) mental act. Although I will be talking about mental acts and \term{experience}, it must be clear that this part of the book, like the fast part, is not epistemology or phenomenology. I will not try to talk about \enquote{perception} or the like, in a mere attempt to justify \enquote{common-sense} beliefs or what not. Of course, both parts are incidentally relevant to epistemology and phenomenology, since in discussing beliefs I discuss the beliefs which constitute those subjects. 
+
+I should say immediately that \enquote{belief}, in its traditional use as supposed to refer to \enquote{\term{mental acts, often unconscious, connected with the realm of non-experience}}, has no explication at all satisfactory, has been discredited. This point is important, as it means that one does not want to say that one does or does not \enquote{have beliefs}, in the sense important to those having beliefs, that beliefs (in my sense) will not do as referents for \enquote{belief} in the use important to those having beliefs; helping to fill out the conclusion of the last part. Now when I speak of a \enquote{belief} I will be speaking of an \term{experience}, what might be said to be \enquote{\emph{an act of consciously believing, of consciously having a belief}}, of what is \enquote{in one's head} when one says that one \enquote{believes a certain thing}. Further, I will, for convenience in distinguishing beliefs, speak of belief \enquote{that others have minds}, for example, or in general of belief \enquote{that there are non-experiences} (with quotation marks), but I must not be taken as implying that beliefs manage to be \enquote{about non-experiences}. (Thus, what I say about beliefs will be entirely about \term{experiences}; I will not be trying to talk \enquote{about the realm of non-experience, or the relation of beliefs to it}.) I expect that it is already fairly clear to the reader what his acts of consciously believing are (if he has any); I will be more concerned with pointing out to him some features of his \enquote{beliefs} (believing) than with the explication of \enquote{\emph{act of consciously believing}}, although I will need to make a few comments about that too. What I am trying to do is to get the reader to accept a useful, possibly new, use of a word (\enquote{\term{belief}}) salvaged from the unexplicatible use of the word, rather than rejecting the word altogether. 
+
+There is a further point about terminology. The reader should remember from the third chapter that quite apart from the theory \enquote{that perceptions are in the mind}, one can make a distinction between mental and non-mental \term{experiences}, between, for example, visualizing a table with one's eyes closed, and a \enquote{seen} table, a visual-table-experience. Now I am going to say that visualizations and the like are \enquote{\term{imagined-experiences}}. For example, a visualization of a table will be said to be an \enquote{\term{imagined-visual-table-experience}}. The reader should not suppose that by \enquote{imagined} I mean that the experiences are \enquote{hallucinations}, are \enquote{unreal}. I use \enquote{imagined} because saying \enquote{mental-table-experience} is too much like saying \enquote{table in the mind} and because just using \enquote{visualization} leaves no way of speaking of mental \term{experiences} which are not visualizations. Speaking of an \enquote{\term{imagined-table-experience}} seems to be the best way of saying that it is a mental \term{experience}, and then distinguishing it from other mental \term{experiences} by the conventional method of saying that it is an imagining \enquote{of a (non-mental) table-experience} (better thought of as meaning an imagining like a  (non-mental)  table-experience). In other words, an \term{imagined-\x-experience} (to generalize) is a \enquote{valid} experience, all right, but it is not a non-mental \x-experience; it is a mental experience which is like a (non-mental) \x-experience in a certain way. Incidentally, an \enquote{imagined-imagined-experience} is impossible by definition; or is no different from an imagined-experience, whichever way you want to look at it. If this terminology is a little confusing, it is not my fault but that of the conventional method of distinguishing different mental \term{experiences} by saying that they are imaginings \enquote{of one or another non-mental \term{experiences}}. 
+
+I can at last ask what one does when one believes \enquote{\emph{that there is a table, not perceived by oneself, behind one now}}, or anything else. Well, in the first place, one takes note of, gives one's attention to, an imagined-experience, such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of oneself with one's back to a table; or to a linguistic expression, a supposed statement, such as \enquote{\emph{There is a table behind me}}. This is not all one does, however; if it were, what one does would not in the least deserve to be said to be a \enquote{belief} (a point about the explication of my \enquote{\term{belief}}). The additional, \enquote{essential} component of a belief is a self-deceiving \enquote{attitude} toward the \term{experience}. What this attitude is will be described below. Observe that one does not want to say that the additional component is a belief about the \term{experience} because of the logical absurdity of doing so, or, in other words, because it suggests that there is an infinite regress of mental action. Now the claim that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving} is not, could not be, at all like the claim \enquote{\emph{that a belief as a whole, or its formulation, fails to correspond in a certain way to non-experience, to reality, or is false}}. The question of \enquote{\emph{what is going on in the realm of non-experience}} does not arise here. Rather, my claim is entirely about an \term{experience}; it is that the attitude, the \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} of believing, is \enquote{consciously, deliberately} self-deceiving, is a \enquote{self-deception \term{experience}}. I don't have to \enquote{\emph{prove that the attitude is self-deceiving by reference to what is going on in the realm of non-experience}}; when I have described the attitude and the reader is aware of it, he will presumably find it a good explication, unhesitatingly want, to say that it is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
+
+I will now say, as well as can be, what the attitude is. In believing, one is attentive primarily to the imagined-experience or linguistic expression as mentioned above. The attitude is \enquote{peripheral}, is a matter of the way one is attentive. Saying that the attitude is \enquote{conscious, deliberate}, is a little strong if it seems to imply that it is cynical self-brainwashing; what I am trying to say is that it is not an \enquote{objective} or \enquote{subconscious} self-deception such as traditional philosophers speak of, one impossible to be aware of. This is about as much as I can say about the attitude directly, because of the inadequacy of the English descriptive vocabulary for mental \term{experiences}; with respect to English the attitude is a \enquote{vague, elusive} thing, very difficult to describe. I will be able to say more about what it is only by suggestion, by saying that it is the attitude \enquote{that such and such} (the reader must not think I mean the belief \enquote{that such and such}). If the \term{experience} to which the attention is primarily given in believing is an imagined-\x-experience, then the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the imagined-\x-experience is a (non-mental) \x-experience}}. As an example, consider the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}}. If one's attention in believing is not on a linguistic expression, it will be on an \term{imagined-experience} such as an imagined-table-experience or a visualization of a person representing oneself (to be accurate) with his back to a table, and one will have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{\stress{that the \term{imagined-experience} is a table or oneself with one's back to a table}}. Of course, if one is asked whether one's imagined-\x-experience is a (non-mental) \x-experience, one will say that it is not, that it is admittedly an \term{imagined-experience} but \enquote{corresponds to a non-experience}. This is not inconsistent with what I have said: first, I don't say that one believes \enquote{\stress{that one's imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience}}; secondly, when one is asked the question, one stops believing \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}} and starts believing \enquote{\stress{that one's \term{imagined-experience} corresponds in a certain way to a non-experience}}, a different matter (different belief). 
+
+lf one's attention in believing is primarily on a linguistic expression (which if a sentence, will be pretty much regarded as its associated name), the self-deceiving attitude is the attitude \enquote{\stress{that the expression has a referent}}. With respect to the belief \enquote{\stress{that there is a table behind one}}, one's attention in believing would be primarily on the expression \enquote{\stress{There is a table behind me}}, pretty much regarded as \enquote{\stress{There being a table behind me}}, and one would have the self-deceiving attitude \enquote{\stress{that this name has a referent}}. Unexplicatible expressions, then, function as principal components of beliefs. 
+
+\inlineaside{This paragraph is complicated and inessential; if it begins to confuse the reader it can be skipped.} I will now describe the relation between the version, of a belief, involving language and the version not involving language. In the version not involving language, the attention is on an imagined-\x-experience which is \enquote{regarded} as an \x-experience, whereas in the version involving language, the attention is on something which is \enquote{regarded} as having as referent \enquote{something} (the attitude is vague here). For the latter version, the idea is \enquote{\stress{that the reality is at one remove}}, and correspondingly, one whose \enquote{language} consists of formulations of beliefs doesn't desire to have as \term{experiences}, or perceive, or even be able to imagine, referents of expressions---which, for the more critical person, may make believing easier. Thus, just as one takes note of the imagined-\x-experience in the version of the belief not involving language, has something which functions as the thing the belief is about, so in the version involving language one has the attitude that the expression has a referent. Further, just as one has the attitude that the imagined-\x-experience is an \x-experience in the version not involving language, does not recognize that what functions as the thing believed in is a mere \term{imagined-experience}, so in the version involving \enquote{language} one takes note of an \enquote{expression} not having a referent, since a referent could only be a (mere) \term{experience}. One who expects an expression, which is the principal component of a belief, to have a good explication does so on the basis of the self-deceiving attitude one has towards it in having the belief. In trying to explicate the expression, one finds inconsistent desires with respect to what its referents must be. These desires correspond to the way the expression functions in the belief: the desire that it be possible for awareness of the referent to be part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the attitude, in believing, that the expression has a referent; and the desire that it not be possible for awareness of the referent to be (merely) part of one's \term{experience} corresponds to the expression's not having a referent in believing. Pointing out that the expression is unexplicable discredits the belief of which it is the principal component, just as pointing out that a belief not involving language consists of being attentive to an \term{imagined-experience} and having the attitude that it is not an \term{imagined-experience}, discredits that belief. 
+
+Such, then, is what one does when one believes. If the reader is rather unconvinced by my description, especially because of my speaking of \enquote{attitudes}, then let him consider the following summary: there must be something more to a mental act than just taking note of an \term{experience} for it to be a \enquote{belief}; this something is \enquote{peripheral and elusive}, so that I am calling the something an \enquote{attitude}, the most appropriate way in English to speak of it; the attitude, an \term{experience} not itself a belief but part of the \term{experience} which \stress{is} the belief, is thus isolated; the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}, is a \enquote{(conscious) self-deception experience}, because when aware of it the reader will presumably want to say that it is. The attitude just about has to be a (\enquote{conscious}) self-deception experience to transform mere taking note of an \term{experience} into something remotely deserving to be said to be a \enquote{belief}. The decision as to whether the attitude is to be said to be \enquote{self-deceiving} is to be made without trying to think \enquote{about the relation of the belief as a whole to the realm of non-experience}, to do which would be to slip into having beliefs, other than the one under consideration, which would be irrelevant to our concern here. Ultimately, the important thing is to observe what one does in believing, and particularly the attitude, more than to say that the attitude is \enquote{self-deceiving}. 
+
+In order for my description of believing to be complete, I must mention some things often associated with believing but not \enquote{essential} to it. First, one may take note of non-mental and imagined-experiences other than the one to which attention is primarily given. If one has a table-experience and believes \enquote{that it is a table-perception corresponding to an objectively existing table', one may give much of his attention to the table-experience in so believing, associate the table-experience strongly with the belief. One may in believing give attention to non-mental experiences supposed to be "evidence for, confirmation of, one's belief} (more will be said about confirmation shortly). If one's attention in believing is primarily on the linguistic expression \enquote{\x}, one may give attention to a referent of \enquote{imagined-\x(-experience)}, an \enquote{imagined-referent} of \enquote{\x}; or to imagined-\y-experiences such that \y-experiences are supposed, said, to be \enquote{analogous to the referent of \enquote{\x}}. In the latter case the \y-experiences will be mutually exclusive, and less importance will be given to them than would be to imagined-referents. An example of imagined-referents in believing is visualizing oneself with one's back to a table, as the imagined-referent of \enquote{There being a table behind one}. An example of imagined-\y-experiences (such that \y-experiences are mutually exclusive) which are said to be \enquote{analogous to referents}, in believing, is the visualizations associated with beliefs \enquote{\stress{about entities wholly other than, transcending, \term{experience}, such as Being}}. 
+
+Secondly, there are associated with beliefs logical \enquote{justifications}, \enquote{arguments}, for them, \enquote{defenses} of them. I will not bother to explicate the different kinds of justifications because it is so easy to say what is wrong with all of them. There are two points to be made. First, explication would show that the matter of justifications for beliefs is just a matter of language and beliefs of the kind already discussed. Secondly, as I have suggested before, whether a statement or belief is right is not dependent on what the justifications, arguments for it are. (If this seems to fail for inductive justification, the kind involving the citing of \term{experience} supposed to be evidence for, confirmation of, the belief, it is because the metaphysical assumptions on which induction is based are rarely stated. Without them inductive justifications are just non sequiturs. An example: this table has four legs; therefore (\enquote{it is more probable that}) any other table has four legs.) Justification of a statement or belief does nothing but conjoin to it superfluous statements or beliefs, if anything. The claim that a justification, argument can show that a belief is not arbitrary, gratuitous, in that it can show that to be consistent, one must have the belief if one has a lesser, weaker belief, is simply self-contradictory. If a justification induces one to believe what one apparently did not believe before hearing the justification, then one already had the belief \enquote{implicitly} (it was a conjunct of a belief one already had), or one has accepted superfluous beliefs conjoined with it. 
+
+I will conclude this chapter first with a list of philosophical positions my position is not. Although I have already suggested some of this material, I repeat it because it is so important that the reader not misconstrue my position as some position which is no more like mine than its negation is, and which I show to be wrong. My position is not disbelief. (Incidentally, it is ironic that "disbeliever", without qualification, has been used by believers as a term of abuse, since, as disbelief is belief which is the negation of some belief, any belief is disbelief.) In particular, I am not concerned to deny \enquote{the existence of non-experience}, to \enquote{cause non-experiences to vanish}, so to speak, to change or cause to vanish some of the reader's non-mental \term{experiences}, \enquote{perceived objects}. My position is not skepticism of any kind, is not, for example, the belief \enquote{that there is a realm where there could either be or not be certain entities not \term{experiences}, but our means of knowing are inadequate for finding which is the case.} My position is not a mere \enquote{decision to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}. The philosopher who denies \enquote{the existence of non-experiences}, or denies any belief, or who is skeptical of any belief, or who merely \enquote{decides to ignore non-experiences, or beliefs}, has some of the very beliefs I am concerned to discredit. 
+
+What I have been concerned to do is to discredit formulations of beliefs, and beliefs as mental acts, by pointing out some features of them. In the first part of the book I showed the inconsistency of linguistic expressions dependent on "\term{non-experience}", and pointed out that those who expect them to have explications at all acceptable are deceiving themselves; discrediting the beliefs of which the expressions are formulations. In this chapter, I have described the mental act of believing, calling the reader's attention to the self-deception experience involved in it, and thus showing that it is wrong. To conclude, in discrediting beliefs I have shown what the right philosophical position is: it is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve having beliefs)). 
 
 
 \subsection[Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs][Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs]{Chapter 6: Discussion of Some Basic Beliefs}
 
-In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any 
-given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter 
-I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just 
-what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the 
-entire \enquote{history of world thought}, the fantastic proliferation of activities at 
-least partly \enquote{systems of knowledge} which constitute it, Platonism, 
-psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, 
-phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, 
-comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each 
-with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, 
-associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not 
-hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how \enquote{non-experiential 
-language}, and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not 
-always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and 
-belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter 
-of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an 
-anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are 
-difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has 
-to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind 
-what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are 
-incomplete and confused. 
-
-What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a 
-few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of \enquote{knowledge}; 
-have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are 
-thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so 
-\enquote{basic} (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as 
-too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if 
-they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. 
-The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have 
-these beliefs, that not having them is not \enquote{inconsistent} with one's 
-\term{experience}; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea 
-of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and 
-of not having it. 
-
-Consider beliefs to the effect \enquote{that the world is ordered}, beliefs 
-formulated in \enquote{natural laws}, beliefs \enquote{about substance}, and the like. 
-Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's \enquote{perceived 
-world} is not \enquote{chaotic}, is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting 
-beliefs \enquote{that the world is ordered} I do not say that his \enquote{perceived world} is 
-(\enquote{subjectively}) chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The 
-non-strange character of one's \enquote{perceived world} is associated with beliefs 
-\enquote{about substance} and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not \enquote{the 
-world being ordered}; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's 
-\enquote{perceived world} is not part of what is \enquote{essential} in these beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of \enquote{spatio-temporal} beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. 
-After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from 
-oneself? Of course one can \enquote{watch oneself wave one's hand} (in a non-strict 
-sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a 
-formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can \enquote{watch oneself wave 
-one's hand} (in the non-strict sense) does not imply \enquote{that there are spatially 
-distant, and past and future events}; and although \term{experiences} such as a 
-visual---\enquote{moving}---hand \term{experience} are associated with spatio-temporal 
-beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of beliefs \enquote{about the objectivity of linguistic referring} may 
-seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a \enquote{table}, 
-doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that 
-things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the 
-slightest intention of saying that it is a \enquote{non-table}? The reader should 
-observe that I do not deny this. These \term{experiences} are associated with beliefs 
-\enquote{about the objectivity of referring}, but they are not \enquote{objective referring}; 
-and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
-
-Rejection of the belief \enquote{that other humans (better, things) than oneself 
-have minds} my seem to lead to a problem. After all, \enquote{perceived other 
-humans} talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in 
-rejecting the belief \enquote{that others have minds} I do not deny that \enquote{perceived 
-other humans} talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is 
-associated with the belief \enquote{that others have minds}, but it is not \enquote{other 
-humans having minds}; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not 
-part of what is essential in believing \enquote{that others have minds}, points I 
-anticipated in the second chapter. 
-
-Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of 
-temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form \enquote{If \x, then \y\ 
-will follow in the future}, especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is 
-something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the 
-switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear 
-\enquote{that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge}. They say, 
-for example, \enquote{that one had better know that one must drink water to live, 
-and drink water, or one won't live}. Now \enquote{one's throwing the switch and the 
-light's coming on} (in a non-strict sense) is like the \term{experiences} associated 
-with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does 
-not imply \enquote{that there are past or future events}, and taking note of it is not 
-part of what is essential in the belief \enquote{that if one throws the switch, then the 
-light will come on}. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe \enquote{about 
-the necessity of such knowledge for survival}, it is just more beliefs of the 
-same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt 
-dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows 
-how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. 
-Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to \enquote{save} 
-beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
-
-By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their 
-formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most 
-suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with 
-non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the 
-beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in 
-defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he 
-continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the 
-\term{experiences} associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do 
-so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to 
-deny that he has the \term{experiences}. Now I am not denying that he has the 
-\term{experiences}. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the 
-reader that he doesn't have \term{experiences} he has, but to point out to him the 
-self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary 
-of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs 
-after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to \term{experiences}. It 
-sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief 
-language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language 
-to refer to \term{experiences}, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's 
-usually because one has beliefs. 
-
-The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}
-is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all 
-English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a 
-result, those who want to talk about \term{experiences} (my use) and still use 
-English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly 
-associated \term{experiences}, and this seems to be happening more and more; often 
-among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have 
-always been used that way, except by a few \enquote{metaphysicians}. I have had to 
-so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being 
-the introduction of my use of \enquote{\term{experience}} in the third chapter. Thus, some 
-of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't 
-for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the 
-book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third 
-chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to 
-\term{experiences}, language with which they are very strongly associated and 
-which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by 
-announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
-
-It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I 
-was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be 
-understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented 
-my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This 
-does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They 
-are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, 
-which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think 
-of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not 
-be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually 
-get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by 
-suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than 
-beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English 
-in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!) to 
-learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having 
-unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
+In the preceding chapters I have been concerned, in discrediting any given belief, to show what the right philosophical position is. In this chapter I will turn to particular beliefs, supposed knowledge, to make it clear just what, specifically, have been discredited. Now if the reader will consider the entire \enquote{history of world thought}, the fantastic proliferation of activities at least partly \enquote{systems of knowledge} which constitute it, Platonism, psychoanalysis, Tibetian mysticism, physics, Bantu witchcraft, phenomenology, mathematical logic, Konko Kyo, Marxism, alchemy, comparative linguistics, Orgonomy, Thomism, and so on indefinitely, each with its own kind of conclusions, method of justifying them, applications, associated valuations, and the like, he will quickly realize that I could not hope to analyze even a fraction of them to show just how \enquote{non-experiential language}, and beliefs, are involved in them. And I should say that it is not always obvious whether the concepts of non-experiential language, and belief, are relevant to them. Zen is an obvious example (although as a matter of fact is unquestionably does involve beliefs, is not for example an anticipation of my position). Further, many quasi-systems-of-knowledge are difficult to discuss because the expositions of them which are what one has to work with, are badly written, in particular, fail to state the insights behind what is presented, the real reasons why it can be taken seriously, and are incomplete and confused. 
+
+What I will do, then, to specifically illustrate my results, is to discuss a few particular beliefs which are found in almost all systems of \enquote{knowledge}; have been given especial attention in modern Western philosophy and are thus especially relevant to the immediate audience for this book; and are so \enquote{basic} (accounting for their ubiquity) that they are either just assumed, as too trivially factual to be worthy the attention of a profound thinker, or if they are explicit are said to be so basic that persons cannot do without them. The discussion will make it specifically clear that it is not necessary to have these beliefs, that not having them is not \enquote{inconsistent} with one's \term{experience}; and is thus important for the reader who is astonished at the idea of rejecting any given belief, the idea of any given belief's being wrong and of not having it. 
+
+Consider beliefs to the effect \enquote{that the world is ordered}, beliefs formulated in \enquote{natural laws}, beliefs \enquote{about substance}, and the like. Rejection of them may seem to lead to a problem. After all, one's \enquote{perceived world} is not \enquote{chaotic}, is it? The reader should observe that in rejecting beliefs \enquote{that the world is ordered} I do not say that his \enquote{perceived world} is (\enquote{subjectively}) chaotic (that is, extremely unfamiliar, strange). The non-strange character of one's \enquote{perceived world} is associated with beliefs \enquote{about substance} and beliefs formulated in natural laws, but it is not \enquote{the world being ordered}; and taking note of the non-strange character of one's \enquote{perceived world} is not part of what is \enquote{essential} in these beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of \enquote{spatio-temporal} beliefs may seem to lead to a problem. After all, cannot one watch oneself wave one's hand towards and away from oneself? Of course one can \enquote{watch oneself wave one's hand} (in a non-strict sense---and if the reader uses the expression in this sense it will not be a formulation of a belief for him). However, that one can \enquote{watch oneself wave one's hand} (in the non-strict sense) does not imply \enquote{that there are spatially distant, and past and future events}; and although \term{experiences} such as a visual---\enquote{moving}---hand \term{experience} are associated with spatio-temporal beliefs, taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of beliefs \enquote{about the objectivity of linguistic referring} may seem to lead to a problem. After all, when one says that a table is a \enquote{table}, doesn't one do so unhesitatingly, with a feeling of satisfaction, a feeling that things are less mysterious, strange, when one has done so, and without the slightest intention of saying that it is a \enquote{non-table}? The reader should observe that I do not deny this. These \term{experiences} are associated with beliefs \enquote{about the objectivity of referring}, but they are not \enquote{objective referring}; and taking note of them is not part of what is essential in those beliefs. 
+
+Rejection of the belief \enquote{that other humans (better, things) than oneself have minds} my seem to lead to a problem. After all, \enquote{perceived other humans} talk and so forth, do they not? The reader should observe that in rejecting the belief \enquote{that others have minds} I do not deny that \enquote{perceived other humans} talk and so forth. Other humans' talking and so forth is associated with the belief \enquote{that others have minds}, but it is not \enquote{other humans having minds}; and taking note of others talking and so forth is not part of what is essential in believing \enquote{that others have minds}, points I anticipated in the second chapter. 
+
+Finally, many philosophers will violently object to rejection of temporal beliefs of a certain kind, namely beliefs of the form \enquote{If \x, then \y\ will follow in the future}, especially if \y\ is something one wants, and \x\ is something one can do. (After all, doesn't it happen that one throws the switch, and the light goes on?) They object so strongly because they fear \enquote{that one cannot live unless one has and uses such knowledge}. They say, for example, \enquote{that one had better know that one must drink water to live, and drink water, or one won't live}. Now \enquote{one's throwing the switch and the light's coming on} (in a non-strict sense) is like the \term{experiences} associated with other temporal beliefs; that one can do it (in the non-strict sense) does not imply \enquote{that there are past or future events}, and taking note of it is not part of what is essential in the belief \enquote{that if one throws the switch, then the light will come on}. As for what the philosophers say, fear, believe \enquote{about the necessity of such knowledge for survival}, it is just more beliefs of the same kind, so that rejection of it is similarly unproblematic. If this abrupt dismissal of the fears as wrong is terrifying to the reader, then it just shows how badly he is in need of being straightened out philosophically. Incidentally, all this should make it clear that it is futile to try to \enquote{save} beliefs (render them justifiable) by construing them as predictions. 
+
+By now the reader has probably observed that the beliefs, and their formulations, which I have been discussing, the ones he is presumably most suspicious of rejecting, are all strongly (but not essentially) associated with non-mental experiences of his. The reader may no longer seriously have the beliefs, but have problems in connection with them, get involved in defending them, and be suspicious of rejecting them, merely because he continues to use the formulations of the beliefs, but to refer to the \term{experiences} associated with them (as there's no other way in English to do so), and confusedly supposes that to reject the beliefs and formulations is to deny that he has the \term{experiences}. Now I am not denying that he has the \term{experiences}. As I said in the last chapter, I am not trying to convince the reader that he doesn't have \term{experiences} he has, but to point out to him the self-deception experiences involved in his beliefs. The reader should be wary of thinking, however, on reading this, that maybe he doesn't have any beliefs after all, just uses the belief language he does to refer to \term{experiences}. It sometimes happens that people who have beliefs and as a result use belief language excuse themselves on the basis that they are just using the language to refer to \term{experiences}, an hypocrisy. If one uses belief formulations, it's usually because one has beliefs. 
+
+The point that the language which one may use to describe \term{experiences}is formulations of beliefs, is true generally. As I said in the third chapter, all English sentences are, traditionally anyway, formulations of beliefs. As a result, those who want to talk about \term{experiences} (my use) and still use English are forced to use formulations of beliefs to refer to strongly associated \term{experiences}, and this seems to be happening more and more; often among quasi-empiricists who naively suppose that the formulations have always been used that way, except by a few \enquote{metaphysicians}. I have had to so use belief language throughout this book, the most notable example being the introduction of my use of \enquote{\term{experience}} in the third chapter. Thus, some of what I say may imply belief formulations for the reader when it doesn't for me, and be philosophically problematic for him; he must understand the book to some extent in spite of the language, as I suggested in the third chapter. I have tried to make this relatively easy by choosing, to refer to \term{experiences}, language with which they are very strongly associated and which is only weakly associated with beliefs, and, the important thing, by announcing when the language is used for that purpose. 
+
+It is time, though, that I admit, so as not to be guilty of the hypocrisy I was exposing earlier, that most of the sentences in this book will be understood as formulations of beliefs, that, in other words, I have presented my philosophy to the reader by getting him to have a series of beliefs. This does not invalidate my position, because the beliefs are not part of it. They are for the heuristic purpose of getting the reader to appreciate my position, which is not having beliefs (and realizing, for any belief one happens to think of, that it is wrong (which doesn't involve believing)); and they may well not be held when they have accomplished that purpose. I hope I will eventually get around to writing a version of this book which presents my position by suggesting to the reader a series of imaginings (and no more), rather than beliefs; developing a new language to do so. The reason I stick with English in this book is of course (!) that readers are too \enquote{unmotivated} (lazy!) to learn a language of an entirely new kind to read a book, having unconventional conclusions, in philosophy proper. 
 
 \subsection[Chapter 7: Summary][Summary]{Chapter 7: Summary}
 
-The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I 
-am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore 
-beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he 
-will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to 
-construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a 
-formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or 
-the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of 
-them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is 
-supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This 
-statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in 
-connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that 
-my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible 
-argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to \enquote{remain 
-unconvinced} of the rightness of my position, or to \enquote{doubt, question} it, or 
-to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can \enquote{question} (not 
-believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief 
-to be \enquote{skeptical} of my position in the sense of believing \enquote{that although the 
-position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is 
-objectively wrong}.) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to 
-reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less 
-credulous. If one \enquote{questions my position} then one is misconstruing it as a 
-belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to 
-decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or 
-the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to 
-understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it 
-is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be 
-wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the 
-matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my 
-position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. 
-
-Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without 
-beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for 
-example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. 
-Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to 
-be \enquote{true or false}, to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you 
-to believe something, for example, to believe \enquote{that there is a table behind 
-you}. Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to 
-continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, \enquote{visualizing 
-yourself with your back to a table}), you are going to have to have the 
-attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, 
-deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going 
-to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
-
-As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, 
-intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to 
-realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The 
-important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true 
-statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the 
-expressions in them being construed as referring to the \term{experiences}
-associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when 
-you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my 
-language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to 
-do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the 
-complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to 
-be flawless to unquestionably discredit \enquote{non-experiential language}); if you 
-don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just 
-ignore the book, and \enquote{justify} your doing so on the basis of what I have said 
-about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not 
-therefore valueless. 
-
-So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having 
-beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete 
-transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter 
-position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, 
-\enquote{obvious}? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic 
-proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the \enquote{profound} philosophical 
-problems (for example, \enquote{Could an omnipotent god do the literally 
-impossible?}, \enquote{Are statements about what I did in the past while alone 
-capable of intersubjective verification?}) arising from them? And again, one 
-begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is 
-wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be \enquote{Why 
-bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving 
-myself}. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. 
-And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one 
-\enquote{naturally} tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so 
-(that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, 
-since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts 
-which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. 
+The most important step in understanding my work is to realize that I am trying neither to get one to adopt a system of beliefs, nor to just ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Once the reader does so, he will find that my position is quite simple. The reader has probably tended to construe the body of the book, the second through the sixth chapters, as a formulation of a system of beliefs; or as a proposal that he ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Even if he has, a careful reading of them will, I hope, have prepared him for a statement of my position which is supposed to make it clear that the position is simple and right. This statement is a summary, and thus cannot be understood except in connection with the second through the sixth chapters. First, I reiterate that my position is not a system of beliefs, supported by a long, plausible argument. This means, incidentally, that it is absurd to \enquote{remain unconvinced} of the rightness of my position, or to \enquote{doubt, question} it, or to take a long time to decide whether it is right: one can \enquote{question} (not believe) disbelief, but not unbelief. (Not to mention that it is a wrong belief to be \enquote{skeptical} of my position in the sense of believing \enquote{that although the position may subjectively seem right, there is always the possibility that it is objectively wrong}.) I am trying, not to get one to adopt new beliefs but to reject those one already has, not to make one more credulous but less credulous. If one \enquote{questions my position} then one is misconstruing it as a belief for which I try to give a long, plausible argument, and is trying to decide which is more plausible, my argument that all beliefs are false, say, or the arguments that beliefs are true. It may well take one a long time to understand my position, but if one is taking a long time to decide whether it is right then one is wasting one's time thinking about a position I show to be wrong. Secondly, my position is not a proposal that one ignore beliefs or the matter of whether they are right. Thus, it is absurd to conclude that my position is irrefutable but trivial, that one who has beliefs can also be right. 
+
+Now for the statement of the position. Imagine yourself without beliefs. One certainly is without beliefs when one is not thinking, for example (although not only then). This being without beliefs is my position. Now this position can't be wrong inasmuch as you aren't doing anything to be \enquote{true or false}, to be self-deceiving. Now imagine that someone asks you to believe something, for example, to believe \enquote{that there is a table behind you}. Then if you are going to do what he asks, and believe (as opposed to continuing not to think; or only imagining---for example, \enquote{visualizing yourself with your back to a table}), you are going to have to have the attitude that you are in effect perceiving what you don't perceive, that is, deceive yourself. (What else could he be asking you to do?) You are going to have to be wrong. That's all there is to it. 
+
+As for my language here, it is primarily intended to be suggestive, intended, at best, to suggest imaginings to you which will enable you to realize what the right philosophical position is (as in the last paragraph). The important thing is not whether the sentences in this book correspond to true statements in your language (although I expect the key ones will, the expressions in them being construed as referring to the \term{experiences}associated with them); it is for you to realize, observe what you do when you don't have beliefs and when you do. You are not so much to study my language as to begin to ask what one who asks you to believe wants you to do, anyway. The language isn't sufficiently flawless to absolutely force the complete realization of what the right position is on you (it doesn't have to be flawless to unquestionably discredit \enquote{non-experiential language}); if you don't want to realize where the self-deception is in believing you can just ignore the book, and \enquote{justify} your doing so on the basis of what I have said about language such as I have used. The point is that the book is not therefore valueless. 
+
+So much for what the right philosophical position is. From having beliefs to not having them is not a trivial step; it is a complete transformation of one's cognitive orientation. Yet astonishing as the latter position is when first encountered, does it not become, in retrospect, \enquote{obvious}? What other position could be the resolution of the fantastic proliferation of conflicting beliefs, and of the \enquote{profound} philosophical problems (for example, \enquote{Could an omnipotent god do the literally impossible?}, \enquote{Are statements about what I did in the past while alone capable of intersubjective verification?}) arising from them? And again, one begins to ask, when one is asked to believe something, what it is that one is wanted to do, anyway; and one's reaction to the request comes to be \enquote{Why bother? Cognitively, what is the value of doing so? I'd just be deceiving myself}. Also, how much simpler my position is than that of the believer. And although in a way the believer's position is the more natural, since one \enquote{naturally} tends to deceive oneself if there's any advantage in doing so (that is, being right tends not to be valued), in another way my position is, since it is simple, and since the non-believer isn't worried by the doubts which arise for one who tries to keep himself deceived. 
 
diff --git a/essays/photos.tex b/essays/photos.tex
index 2b5e6a9..1824537 100644
--- a/essays/photos.tex
+++ b/essays/photos.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\chapter{Protest Photographs}
+\Chp{Protest Photographs}
 
 \photopage{img/nomoreart01}{2/22/1963}{Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstrate against Lincoln Center, February 22, 1963}{Tony Conrad}
 
diff --git a/essays/some_objections.tex b/essays/some_objections.tex
index 6da14fd..4d49830 100644
--- a/essays/some_objections.tex
+++ b/essays/some_objections.tex
@@ -1,158 +1,28 @@
-\chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
-
+\Chp{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
-\item The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in 
-educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the 
-philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The 
-Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply 
-that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that 
-other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a 
-philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language.\footnote{See 
-\booktitle{Philosophical Investigations}, \S 420.} Statements which imply that other 
-people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were 
-intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because 
-they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are 
-irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage.\footnote{\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.}
+\item The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language.\footnote{See \booktitle{Philosophical Investigations}, \S 420.} Statements which imply that other people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage.\footnote{\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.}
 
-For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, 
-and the \textsc{Empire State Building} (when I am not looking at it) are all things 
-which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt \enquote{in a real 
-case.}\footnote{\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's 
-memoir.} The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in 
-God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. 
+For Wittgenstein, the existence of God, immortal souls, other minds, and the \textsc{Empire State Building} (when I am not looking at it) are all things which everybody knows; things which it is impossible to doubt \enquote{in a real case.}\footnote{\S 303, Iliv. For Wittgenstein's theism, see Norman Malcolm's memoir.} The proper use of language admits of no alternative to belief in God; atheism is just a mistake in the use of language. 
 
-In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason 
-why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read 
-that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they 
-would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as 
-Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt \enquote{in a real case.} 
-Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet 
-Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the 
-latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as 
-inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have 
-today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay \essaytitle{The 
-Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that 
-the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief 
-that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no 
-different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It is 
-perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is 
-totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also 
-possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be 
-absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per 
-cent certainty that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists; the point is that we 
-need not believe in the \textsc{Empire State Building} at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying 
-Beliefs} shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural 
-sciences, involve outright self-deception. 
+In arguing against Wittgenstein, I will concentrate on the real reason why I oppose him, rather than on less fundamental technical issues. We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy; just as Wittgenstein finds the existence of God impossible to doubt \enquote{in a real case.} Yet even Wittgenstein does not defend the former belief; while the Soviet Union has shown that a government can function which has repudiated the latter belief. There is a tremendous discovery here: that beliefs which were as inescapable---as impossible to doubt in a real case---as any belief we may have today, were subsequently discarded. How was this possible? My essay \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows how. Further, it shows that the belief that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists when I am not looking at it, or the belief that I would be killed if I jumped out of a tenth story window, are no different in principle from beliefs which we have already discarded. It is perfectly possible to project a metaphysical outlook on experience which is totally different from the beliefs Wittgenstein inherited, and it is also possible not to project a metaphysical outlook on experience at all. Let us be absolutely clear: the point is not that we do not know with one hundred per cent certainty that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists; the point is that we need not believe in the \textsc{Empire State Building} at all. \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} shows that factual propositions, and the propositions of the natural sciences, involve outright self-deception. 
 
-These discoveries have consequences far more important than the 
-technical issues involved. It is by no means trivial that I do not have to pray, 
-or to fast, or to accept the moral dictates of the clergy, or to give money to 
-the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human 
-cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In 
-analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring 
-the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to 
-doubt in a real case, as in my essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking 
-Through Walls.} I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of 
-intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these 
-consequences. 
+These discoveries have consequences far more important than the technical issues involved. It is by no means trivial that I do not have to pray, or to fast, or to accept the moral dictates of the clergy, or to give money to the Church. Because the Church prohibited the dissection of human cadavers, it took an atheist to originate the modern subject of anatomy. In analogy with this example, the rest of my writings are devoted to exploring the consequences of rejecting beliefs that Wittgenstein says are impossible to doubt in a real case, as in my essay \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls.} I oppose Wittgenstein because he descended to extremes of intellectual dishonesty in order to prevent us from discovering these consequences. 
 
-A reply to the Wittgensteinian attitude which is technically adequate 
-can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical 
-maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not 
-necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical 
-connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in 
-the aphorism that \enquote{the meaning is the use} (as an explication of the natural 
-language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive 
-linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic 
-than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted. 
+A reply to the Wittgensteinian attitude which is technically adequate can be provided in short order, for when Wittgenstein's central philosophical maneuver is identified, its dishonesty becomes transparent. It is not necessary to enumerate the fallacies in the Wittgensteinian claim that logical connections and logical standards are extrinsic to the natural language, or in the aphorism that \enquote{the meaning is the use} (as an explication of the natural language). In other words, there is no reason why I should bandy descriptive linguistics with Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was wrong at a level more basic than the level on which his philosophical discussions were conducted. 
 
-Wittgenstein held that philosophical or metaphysical controversies 
-literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not 
-arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing 
-Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver 
-is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the 
-paradoxes uncovered by \enquote{bad} philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary 
-language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary 
-language because they uncover paradoxes in ordinary language propositions. 
-Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in 
-ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then 
-Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to 
-see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as 
-inadmissible. 
+Wittgenstein held that philosophical or metaphysical controversies literally would not arise if it were not for bad philosophers. They would not arise because there is nothing problematic about sentences, expressing Wittgenstein's inherited beliefs, in ordinary usage. This rhetorical maneuver is the inverse of what it seems to be. Wittgenstein doesn't prove that the paradoxes uncovered by \enquote{bad} philosophers result from a misuse of ordinary language; he defines the philosophers' discussions as a misuse of ordinary language because they uncover paradoxes in ordinary language propositions. Wittgenstein waits to see whether a philosopher uncovers problems in ordinary language propositions; and if the philosopher does so, then Wittgenstein defines his discussion as improper usage. Wittgenstein waits to see whether evidence is against his side, and if it is, he defines it as inadmissible. 
 
-Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the \textsc{Empire 
-State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The 
-Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic 
-because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no 
-behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to 
-this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use 
-ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The 
-philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as 
-improper because it leads to problems. The reason why \enquote{the proper use of 
-ordinary language never leads to paradoxes} is that Wittgenstein has defined 
-proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not 
-resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. 
-Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and 
-language, a gratuitous definition to the effect that certain portions of the 
-natural language which embarrass him are inadmissible, a gratuitous ban on 
-certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him. His purpose is 
-to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious 
-inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish 
-intellectual dishonesty. 
+Consider the philosopher's question of how I know whether the \textsc{Empire State Building} continues to exist when I am not looking at it. The Wittgensteinian position on this question would be that it is problematic because it is a misuse of ordinary language; and because there is no behavioral context which constitutes a use for the question. According to this position, we would not encounter such problems if we would use ordinary language properly. But what does this position amount to? The philosopher's question has not been proved improper; it has been defined as improper because it leads to problems. The reason why \enquote{the proper use of ordinary language never leads to paradoxes} is that Wittgenstein has defined proper use as use in which no paradoxes are visible. Wittgenstein has not resolved or eliminated any problems; he has just refused to notice them. Wittgenstein attempts to pass off, as a discovery about philosophy and language, a gratuitous definition to the effect that certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him are inadmissible, a gratuitous ban on certain portions of the natural language which embarrass him. His purpose is to make criticism of his inherited beliefs impossible, to give them a spurious inescapability. Wittgenstein's maneuver is the last word in modish intellectual dishonesty. 
 
-\item In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which 
-cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality 
-are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if 
-there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there 
-are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus 
-there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which 
-leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the 
-middle of the argument by a play on the words \enquote{subject} and \enquote{object.} 
+\item In philosophy, arguments which start from an immediate which cannot be doubted and attempt to prove the existence of an objective reality are called transcendental arguments. Typically, such an argument says that if there is experience, there must be subject and object in experience; if there are subject and object, subject and object must be objectively real; and thus there must be objectively real mind and matter. Clearly, the belief which leaps the gap from the immediate to the objectively real is smuggled into the middle of the argument by a play on the words \enquote{subject} and \enquote{object.} 
 
-When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the 
-attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within 
-experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it 
-would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be 
-\enquote{proved} that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, 
-etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be 
-trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be 
-my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its 
-otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it 
-would be trivial. We ask how I know that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists 
-when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate 
-experience, then objective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The 
-dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the 
-gap between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself, yet they do not 
-want to conclude that appearances exhaust reality. 
+When the sophistry is cleared away, it becomes apparent that the attempt to attain the trans-experiential or extra-experiential within experience faces a dilemma of overkill. If the attempt could succeed, it would have only collapsed objective reality to my subjectivity. If it could be \enquote{proved} that I know the distant past, other minds, God, angels, archangels, etc. from immediate experience, then all these phenomena would be trivialized. If other minds were given in my experience, they would only be my mind. The interest of the notion of objective reality is precisely its otherness and unreachability. If it could be reached from the immediate, it would be trivial. We ask how I know that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists when I am not looking at it. If the answer is that I know through immediate experience, then objective reality has been collapsed to my subjectivity. The dilemma for transcendental arguments is that they propose to overcome the gap between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself, yet they do not want to conclude that appearances exhaust reality. 
 
-There are two special assumptions which are smuggled into supposedly 
-assumptionless transcendental arguments. First, there is the belief that there 
-is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they 
-describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, 
-there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective 
-basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is 
-controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with 
-crossed fingers.) 
+There are two special assumptions which are smuggled into supposedly assumptionless transcendental arguments. First, there is the belief that there is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they describe, an objective criterion of the use of descriptive words. Secondly, there is the belief that correlations between the senses have an objective basis. (It is claimed that this belief cannot be doubted, but the claim is controverted by intersensory illusions such as the touching of a pencil with crossed fingers.) 
 
-Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are 
-addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have 
-conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step 
-such as the following, for example. We can have \enquote{real knowledge} of 
-particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive 
-words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. 
-This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the 
-alternative that we don't have this \enquote{real knowledge.} 
+Transcendental arguments are secular theology, because they are addressed to a reader who wants only philosophical analyses that have conventional conclusions. A transcendental argument will contain a step such as the following, for example. We can have \enquote{real knowledge} of particular things only if there is an objective relationship between descriptive words and the things they describe; thus there must be such a relationship. This argument is plausible only if the reader can be trusted to overlook the alternative that we don't have this \enquote{real knowledge.} 
 
-In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that 
-transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring 
-the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, 
-transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the 
-empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing 
-fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many 
-transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific 
-psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes 
-as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental 
-arguments are supposed to prove. 
+In the way of supplementary remarks, we may mention that transcendental arguments typically commit the ontological fallacy: inferring the existence of a thing from the idea or name of the thing. Finally, transcendental arguments share a confusion which originates in the empiricism they are directed against: the confusion between doing fundamental philosophy and doing the psychology of perception. Many transcendental arguments are similar to current doctrines in scientific psychology. But they fail as philosophy, because scientific psychology takes as presuppositions, and cannot prove, the very beliefs which transcendental arguments are supposed to prove. 
 
-\end{enumerate}
\ No newline at end of file
+\end{enumerate}
diff --git a/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex b/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex
index 67a3f2b..2bc7484 100644
--- a/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex
+++ b/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
-\chapter{Studies in Constructed Memories}
-\pagestyle{salpc}
-\setheadrule{0.4pt}
+\Chp{Studies in Constructed Memories}
 
-\section{Introduction}
+\Sec{Introduction}
 
 The memory of a conscious organism is a phenomenon in which 
 interrelations of mind, language, and the rest of reality are especially evident. 
@@ -89,7 +87,7 @@ while $A_{a_3}$, remained only a possibility.
 
 Enough concepts are now at hand for the studies to begin in earnest. 
 
-\section{M-Memories}
+\Sec{M-Memories}
 
 \newcommand{\definition}{\textbf{Definition.}}
 \newcommand{\assumption}[1]{\textit{Assumption #1.}}
@@ -252,7 +250,7 @@ loose, but not arbitrary. And the investigation will become increasingly
 mathematical. 
 
 
-\section{D-Memories}
+\Sec{D-Memories}
 
 \begin{hangers}
 \definition\ A \term{D-Memory} is a memory such that measured past time 
@@ -409,7 +407,7 @@ accept than the other features of the D-Memory. And the thinking of $S_j$ has
 to be one of the events for the organism to be aware of the infall. 
 \end{hangers}
 
-\section{$\Phi$-Memories}
+\Sec{$\Phi$-Memories}
 I will conclude these studies with two complex constructions. 
 
 \begin{hangers}
diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
index 6c76551..3e5a6e1 100644
--- a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
+++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
@@ -1,155 +1,29 @@
-\chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
+\Chp{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
 
-We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to 
-believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. 
-Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a 
-blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. 
-Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also 
-observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so 
-that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will 
-not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question 
-then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that 
-people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as 
-soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract 
-and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. 
-Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot 
-afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs 
-which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. 
+We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs. 
 
-Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs 
-as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and 
-decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be 
-punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional 
-preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between 
-fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be 
-self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional 
-formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation 
-whatever? 
+Fearful beliefs raise some subtle questions about the character of beliefs as mental acts. If I contemplate blasphemy, experience a strong fear, and decide not to blaspheme, do I stand convicted of believing that I will be punished if I blaspheme, or may I claim that I was following an emotional preference which did not involve any belief? Is there a distinction between fearful avoidance and fearful belief? Can the emotion of fear be self-deceiving in and of itself? Must a belief have a verbal, propositional formulation, or is it possible to have a belief with no linguistic representation whatever? 
 
-It is apparent that fearful beliefs suggest many topics for speculation. 
-This essay, however, will concentrate exclusively on one topic, which is by 
-far the most important. Given that people once held the belief about 
-blasphemy, and that I do not, then I have succeeded in dispensing with a 
-fearful belief. Two beliefs which are exactly analogous to the one about 
-blasphemy are the belief that if I jump out of a tenth story window I will be 
-hurt, and the belief that if I attempt to walk through a wall I will bruise 
-myself. Given that I am able to dispense with the belief about blasphemy, it 
-follows that, in effect, I am able to walk through walls relative to medieval 
-people. That is, my ability to blaspheme without being struck by lightning 
-would be as unimaginable to them as the ability to walk through walls is 
-today. The topic of this essay is whether it is possible to transfer my 
-achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs. 
+It is apparent that fearful beliefs suggest many topics for speculation. This essay, however, will concentrate exclusively on one topic, which is by far the most important. Given that people once held the belief about blasphemy, and that I do not, then I have succeeded in dispensing with a fearful belief. Two beliefs which are exactly analogous to the one about blasphemy are the belief that if I jump out of a tenth story window I will be hurt, and the belief that if I attempt to walk through a wall I will bruise myself. Given that I am able to dispense with the belief about blasphemy, it follows that, in effect, I am able to walk through walls relative to medieval people. That is, my ability to blaspheme without being struck by lightning would be as unimaginable to them as the ability to walk through walls is today. The topic of this essay is whether it is possible to transfer my achievement concerning blasphemy to other fearful beliefs. 
 
 \visbreak
 
-I am told that \enquote{if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will 
-be hurt.} Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not 
-convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the 
-\enquote{evidence} implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to 
-see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both 
-blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the 
-action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in 
-order to prove that I can get away with it? Actually, I do not blaspheme; I 
-simply do not perform the action at all. Yet I do not have any belief 
-whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose 
-that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, 
-shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? 
-Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of 
-having to accept the dare that \enquote{you have to do it to prove you don't believe 
-it's dangerous}? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? 
-The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief 
-should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. 
+I am told that \enquote{if you jump out of a tenth story window you really will be hurt.} Yet the analogous exhortation concerning blasphemy is not convincing or compelling at all. Why not? I suggest that the nature of the \enquote{evidence} implied in the exhortation should be examined very closely to see if it does not represent an epistemological swindle. In the cases of both blasphemy and jumping out of the window, I am told that if I perform the action I will suffer injury. But do I concede that I have to blaspheme, in order to prove that I can get away with it? Actually, I do not blaspheme; I simply do not perform the action at all. Yet I do not have any belief whatever that it would be dangerous to do so. Why should anyone suppose that because I do not believe something, I have to run out in the street, shake my fist at the sky, and curse God in order to validate may disbelief? Why should the credulous person be able to put me in in the position of having to accept the dare that \enquote{you have to do it to prove you don't believe it's dangerous}? Could it not be that this dare is some sort of a swindle? The structure of the evidence for the supposedly unrelinquishable belief should be examined very closely to see if it is not so much legerdemain. 
 
-The exhortation continues to the effect that if I did utter blasphemy I 
-really would be struck by lightning. I still do not find this compelling. But 
-suppose that I do see someone utter a blasphemy and get struck by lightning. 
-Surely this must convert me. But with due apologies to the faithful, I must 
-report that it does not. There is no reason why it should make me believe. I 
-do not believe that blaspheming will cause me to be struck by lightning, and 
-the evocation of frightful images---or for that matter, something that I 
-see---would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an 
-immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by 
-lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by 
-lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold 
-the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I live is so 
-profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one 
-\enquote{sighting.}}
+The exhortation continues to the effect that if I did utter blasphemy I really would be struck by lightning. I still do not find this compelling. But suppose that I do see someone utter a blasphemy and get struck by lightning. Surely this must convert me. But with due apologies to the faithful, I must report that it does not. There is no reason why it should make me believe. I do not believe that blaspheming will cause me to be struck by lightning, and the evocation of frightful images---or for that matter, something that I see---would provide no reason whatever for sudden credulity. There is an immense difference between seeing a person blaspheme and get struck by lightning, and believing that if one blasphemes, one will get struck by lightning. This difference should be quite apparent to one who does not hold the belief.\footnote{In more conventional terms, the civilization in which I live is so profoundly secular that its secularism cannot be demolished by one \enquote{sighting.}}
 
-In general, the so-called evidence doesn't work. There is a swindle 
-somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful 
-belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the 
-whole conglomeration of \enquote{evidence} somehow overwhelmed medieval 
-people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away 
-with something that they could not get away with. 
+In general, the so-called evidence doesn't work. There is a swindle somewhere in the evidence that is supposed to make me accept the fearful belief. Upon close scrutiny, each bit of evidence misses the target. Yet the whole conglomeration of \enquote{evidence} somehow overwhelmed medieval people. They had to believe something that I do not believe. I can get away with something that they could not get away with. 
 
-It is not that I stand up in a society of the faithful and suddenly 
-blaspheme. It is rather that the whole medieval cognitive orientation had 
-been completely reoriented by the time it was transmitted to me. Or in other 
-words, the medieval cognitive orientation was restructured throughout 
-during the modern era. In the process, the compelling conglomeration of 
-evidence was disintegrated. Isolated from their niches in the old orientation, 
-the bits of evidence no longer worked. Each bit missed the target. I do not 
-have a head-on confrontation with the medieval impossibility of 
-blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I 
-structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. 
+It is not that I stand up in a society of the faithful and suddenly blaspheme. It is rather that the whole medieval cognitive orientation had been completely reoriented by the time it was transmitted to me. Or in other words, the medieval cognitive orientation was restructured throughout during the modern era. In the process, the compelling conglomeration of evidence was disintegrated. Isolated from their niches in the old orientation, the bits of evidence no longer worked. Each bit missed the target. I do not have a head-on confrontation with the medieval impossibility of blaspheming. I slip by the impossibility, where they could not, because I structure the entire situation, and the evidence, differently. 
 
-The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I 
-have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that \enquote{if I try to walk 
-through the wall I will fail and will bruise myself} is also discardable. I am 
-sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. 
-But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a 
-fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring 
-the entire situation, of restructuring evidence, so that the conglomeration of 
-evidence is disintegrated into isolated bits which are separately powerless. 
-Only then can one slip by the impossibility. I cannot exercise my freedom to 
-walk through walls until the whole cognitive orientation of the modern era is 
-restructured throughout. 
+The analysis just presented, combined with analyses of beliefs which I have made elsewhere, assures me that the belief that \enquote{if I try to walk through the wall I will fail and will bruise myself} is also discardable. I am sure that I can walk through walls just as successfully as I can blaspheme. But to do so will not be trivial. As I have shown, escaping the power of a fearful belief is not a matter of head-on confrontation, but of restructuring the entire situation, of restructuring evidence, so that the conglomeration of evidence is disintegrated into isolated bits which are separately powerless. Only then can one slip by the impossibility. I cannot exercise my freedom to walk through walls until the whole cognitive orientation of the modern era is restructured throughout. 
 
-The project of restructuring the modern cognitive orientation is a vast 
-one. The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. In this connection it 
-is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic of science as Carnap 
-rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition meaningful if it had any 
-empirically verifiable proposition as an implication. But consider an 
-appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions in good standing, and 
-conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite number of propositions about 
-single events (what Carnap called protocol-sentences). Only a very small 
-number of the latter propositions are indeed subject to verification. If we 
-sever them from the entire conjunction, what remains is as effectively 
-blocked from verification as the propositions which Carnap rejected as 
-meaningless. This criticism of science is not a mere technical exercise. A 
-scientific proposition is a fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially 
-testable meanings with an infinite number of untestable meanings and 
-inveigles us to accept the whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the 
-very beginning of \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this 
-quite clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it. For us, 
-however, it is essential to be assured that science can be dismantled just as 
-the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme. 
+The project of restructuring the modern cognitive orientation is a vast one. The natural sciences must certainly be dismantled. In this connection it is appropriate to make a criticism about the logic of science as Carnap rationalized it. Carnap considered a proposition meaningful if it had any empirically verifiable proposition as an implication. But consider an appropriate ensemble of scientific propositions in good standing, and conceive of it as a conjunction of an infinite number of propositions about single events (what Carnap called protocol-sentences). Only a very small number of the latter propositions are indeed subject to verification. If we sever them from the entire conjunction, what remains is as effectively blocked from verification as the propositions which Carnap rejected as meaningless. This criticism of science is not a mere technical exercise. A scientific proposition is a fabrication which amalgamates a few trivially testable meanings with an infinite number of untestable meanings and inveigles us to accept the whole conglomeration at once. It is apparent at the very beginning of \booktitle{Philosophy and Logical Syntax} that Carnap recognized this quite clearly; but it did not occur to him to do anything about it. For us, however, it is essential to be assured that science can be dismantled just as the proof can be dismantled that I will be struck by lightning if I blaspheme. 
 
-We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to 
-overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of 
-the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive 
-\enquote{objects} is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for 
-this correlation is \enquote{the contribution of intermodal organization to the 
-object Gestalt.}}
+We can suggest some other approaches which may contribute to overcoming the modern cognitive orientation. The habitual correlation of the realm of sight and the realm of touch which occurs when we perceive \enquote{objects} is a likely candidate for dismantling.\footnote{The psychological jargon for this correlation is \enquote{the contribution of intermodal organization to the object Gestalt.}}
 
-From a different tradition, the critique of scientific fact and of 
-measurable time which is suggested in Luk\'{a}cs' \booktitle{Reification and the 
-Consciousness of the Proletariat} might be of value if it were developed.\footnote{Luk\'{a}cs also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist 
-society---that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to 
-subsistence was unconditional. He implied that scientific quantification and 
-facticity are closely connected with the work discipline required by the 
-capitalist mode of production; and that like the price system, they constitute 
-a false objectivity which we accept because the social economic institutions 
-deprive us of subsistence if we fail to submit to them. Quite aside from the 
-historical unlikelihood of a communist society, this suggestion might be 
-pursued as a thought experiment to obtain a more detailed characterization 
-of the hypothetical post-scientific outlook.}
+From a different tradition, the critique of scientific fact and of measurable time which is suggested in Luk\'{a}cs' \booktitle{Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat} might be of value if it were developed.\footnote{Luk\'{a}cs also implied that scientific truth would disappear in a communist society---that is, a society without necessary labor, in which the right to subsistence was unconditional. He implied that scientific quantification and facticity are closely connected with the work discipline required by the capitalist mode of production; and that like the price system, they constitute a false objectivity which we accept because the social economic institutions deprive us of subsistence if we fail to submit to them. Quite aside from the historical unlikelihood of a communist society, this suggestion might be pursued as a thought experiment to obtain a more detailed characterization of the hypothetical post-scientific outlook.}
 
-Finally, I may mention that most of my own writings are offered as 
-fragmentary beginnings in the project of dismantling the modern cognitive 
-orientation. 
-
-Someday we will realize that we were always free to walk through 
-walls. But we could not exercise this freedom because we structured the 
-whole situation, and the evidence, in an enslaving way. 
+Finally, I may mention that most of my own writings are offered as fragmentary beginnings in the project of dismantling the modern cognitive orientation. 
 
+Someday we will realize that we were always free to walk through walls. But we could not exercise this freedom because we structured the whole situation, and the evidence, in an enslaving way. 
diff --git a/screed.sty b/screed.sty
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6b7bfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/screed.sty
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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