clean up some probably misguided ideas about document splitting

13 files changed, 75 insertions, 293 deletions

diff --git a/blueprint.tex b/blueprint.tex
index 8b7f477..c88f76d 100644
--- a/blueprint.tex
+++ b/blueprint.tex
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 \usetikzlibrary{calc}
 \usepackage[pagestyles]{titlesec}
 \usepackage{hanging}
-\usepackage{screed}
 
 % fonts
 \newpxfont
@@ -43,6 +42,9 @@
 \newcommand\greater{>}
 \newcommand\less{<}
 
+\newcommand\slop[1]{{\sloppy #1 \par}}
+\newcommand\stress[1]{\textbf{#1}}
+
 % TODO these should be considered placeholders basically
 \newcommand{\name}[1]{\textbf{#1}}
 
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@
     { \raggedleft \itshape (photo by #4) \par }
   \end{figure}}
 
-\LETSGOOOO
+\begin{document}
 
 \frontmatter
 \graphicspath{{img/}}
@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@
 \clearpage
 
 \mainmatter
-\Prt{Philosophy}
+\part{Philosophy}
 \input{essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex}
 \input{essays/walking_through_walls.tex}
 \input{essays/philosophical_reflections.tex}
@@ -131,7 +133,7 @@
 \input{essays/philosophy_proper.tex}
 % primary study?
 
-\Prt{Esthetics}
+\part{Esthetics}
 \input{essays/down_with_art.tex}
 \input{essays/art_or_brend.tex}
 \input{essays/letters.tex}
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@
 % \input{extra/poem_1.tex}
 % \input{extra/poem_4.tex}
 
-\Prt{Para-science}
+\part{Para-science}
 \input{essays/dissociation_physics.tex}
 \input{essays/mathematical_studies.tex}
 % \input{essays/post_formalism_memories.tex}
@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@
 
 \end{document}
 
-\Prt{The New Modality}
+\part{The New Modality}
 %\tocline
 \input{essays/energy_cube1966.tex}
 \input{essays/energy_cube1961.tex}
@@ -157,19 +159,19 @@
 \input{essays/mock_risk_games.tex}
 \input{essays/dream_reality.tex}
 
-\Prt{Social Philosophy}
+\part{Social Philosophy}
 \input{essays/social_recognition.tex}
 \input{essays/creep.tex}
 \input{essays/three_levels_of_politics.tex}
 
-\Prt{Science (Logic)}
+\part{Science (Logic)}
 \input{essays/admissible_contradictions.tex}
 \input{essays/propositional_vibration.tex}
 % \input{extra/repressed_content.tex}
 % \input{extra/apprehension_of_plurality.tex}
 
 \backmatter
-\Prt{Appendix}
+\part{Appendix}
 %\tocline
 \input{extra/structure_art_pure_mathematics.tex}
 \input{extra/misleading_newness.tex}
diff --git a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
index d56ab55..5255df0 100644
--- a/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
+++ b/essays/dissociation_physics.tex
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-\Chp{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}
+\chapter{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics}
 
 From the physicist's point of view, the human dichotomy of sight and touch is a coincidence. It does not correspond to any dichotomy in the objective physical world. Light exerts pressure, and substances hot to the touch emit infrared light. It is just that the range of human receptors is too limited for them to register the tactile effect of light or the visual effect of moderate temperatures. 
 
-Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along the humen sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light retlection and emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the discussion. 
+Our problem is to determine what observations or experiences would cause the physicist to say that the objective physical world had split along the human sight-touch boundary, to say that the human sight-touch dichotomy was an unavoidable model of objective physical reality. Our discussion is not about perfectly transparent matter, or light reflection and emission in the absence of matter, or the dissociation of electromagnetic and inertial phenomena, or the fact that human sight registers light, while touch registers inertia, bulk modulus, thermal conduction, friction, adhesion, and so on. (However, these concepts may have to be introduced to complete our discussion.) Our discussion is about a change in the physicist's observations or experiences, such that the anomalous state of affairs would be an experimental analogue to the sight-touch dichotomy of philosophical subjectivism. Of course, philosophical subjectivism itself will not enter the discussion. 
 
 Because of the topic, our discussion will often seem psychological and even philosophical. However, the psychology involved always has to do with experimentally demonstrable aspects of perception. The philosophy involved is always scientific concept formation, the relating of concepts to experiments. Sooner or later it will be clear that our only concern is with experiences that would cause a physicist to modify physics. 
 
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ Let $T$ indicate tactile and $V$ indicate visual. Let the tactile sensation of o
 
 \begin{equation}\begin{pmatrix}	p & p\\	f & p \end{pmatrix}\end{equation}
 
-
 So far as temporal successions of concurrences (within the present world) are concerned, any permitted concurrence may succeed any other permitted concurrence. The succession of a concurrence by itself is excluded, meaning that at the moment, a $V_1$, is defined as lasting from the time the eyes open until the time they next close. 
 
 We have said that our topic is a certain change; we can now indicate more precisely what this change is. As long as we have a $2\times2$ array, there are 16 ways it can be filled with $p$'s and $f$'s. That is, there are 16 imaginable states. The changes we are interested in, then, are specific changes from the present state (\ref{physpresent}) to another state such as \ref{physafter}.
diff --git a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
index 6b7dfcd..d02e6de 100644
--- a/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
+++ b/essays/flaws_underlying_beliefs.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\Chp{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
+\chapter{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}
 
 We begin with the question of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If either of these questions can be asked, then there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience. If I can ask whether there is a realm beyond my experience, then the answer must be yes. The reason is that there has to be a realm beyond my experience in order for the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} to have any meaning. Russell's theory of descriptions will not work here; it cannot jump the gap between my experience and the realm beyond my experience. The assertion \speech{There is a realm beyond my experience} is true if it is meaningful, and that is precisely what is wrong with it. There are rules implicit in the natural language as to what is semantically legitimate. Without a rule that a statement and its negation cannot simultaneously be true, for example, the natural language would be in such chaos that nothing could be done with it. Aristotle's \booktitle{Organon} was the first attempt to explicate this structure formally, and Supplement D of Carnap's \booktitle{Meaning and Necessity} shows that hypotheses about the implicit rules of a natural language are well-defined and testable. An example of implicit semantics is the aphorism that \enquote{saying a thing is so doesn't make it so.} This aphorism has been carried over into the semantics of the physical sciences: its import is that there is no such thing as a substantive assertion which is true merely because it is meaningful. If a statement is true merely because it is meaningful, then it is too true. It must be some kind of definitional trick which doesn't say anything. And this is our conclusion about the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience. Since it would be true if it were meaningful, it cannot be a substantive assertion. 
 
diff --git a/essays/flyntian_modality.tex b/essays/flyntian_modality.tex
index f952897..340ac48 100644
--- a/essays/flyntian_modality.tex
+++ b/essays/flyntian_modality.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-\Chp{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality}
+\chapter{Instructions for the Flyntian Modality}
 
-\begin{enumerate}
+\begin{enumerate}[label=\arabic*., nosep, itemsep=0.5em]
 
 \item \textsc{ Stop all \enquote{gross believing,} such as belief in other minds, causality, and the phantom entities of science (atoms, electrons, \etc).}
 
diff --git a/essays/introduction.tex b/essays/introduction.tex
index 86b84de..27d4616 100644
--- a/essays/introduction.tex
+++ b/essays/introduction.tex
@@ -1,259 +1,43 @@
+\chapter{Introduction}
 
+This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole range of questions which I have developed. The first essay, \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}, noted that the official social philosophy of practically every regime in the world says that the individual has a duty to serve society to the best of his abilities. Social recognition is supposed to be the reward which indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution (Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the individual has a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond this, he will undertake the most important tasks posed by society for his own private gratification. He will not attempt to benefit society, or to gain the recognition which would necessarily result if society were to utilize his achievements. 
 
-\Chp
-{Introduction}
-{Introduction}
-{Introduction}
+The second essay, \essaytitle{Creep}, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality problems. 
 
-This essay is the third in a series on the rationale of my career. It 
-summarizes the results of my activities, the consistent outlook on a whole 
-range of questions which I have developed. The first essay, 
-\essaytitle{On Social Recognition}, noted that the official social philosophy of practically every 
-regime in the world says that the individual has a duty to serve society to the 
-best of his abilities. Social recognition is supposed to be the reward which 
-indicates that the individual is indeed serving society. Now it happens that 
-the most important tasks the individual can undertake are tasks (intellectual, 
-political, and otherwise) posed by society. However, when the individual 
-undertakes such tasks, society's actual response is almost always persecution 
-(Galileo) or indifference (Mendel). Thus, the doctrine that the individual has 
-a duty to serve society is a hypocritical fraud. I reject every social 
-philosophy which contains this doctrine. The rational individual will obtain 
-the means of subsistence by the most efficient swindle he can find. Beyond 
-this, he will undertake the most important tasks posed by society for his 
-own private gratification. He will not attempt to benefit society, or to gain 
-the recognition which would necessarily result if society were to utilize his 
-achievements. 
+I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still consider it \enquote{necessary} to believe in God; but the Soviet government has managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled \essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and \essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. The question of whe\-ther a given belief is valid depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase \enquote{a realm beyond my experience} could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it, I imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. 
 
-The second essay, \essaytitle{Creep}, discussed the practices of isolating oneself; 
-carefully controlling one's intake of ideas and influences from outside; and 
-playing as a child does. I originally saw these practices as the effects of 
-certain personality problems. However, it now seems that they are actually 
-needed for the intellectual approach which I have developed. They may be 
-desirable in themselves, rather than being mere effects of personality 
-problems. 
+The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that an activity may perfectly well employ false statements and still have objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to pre-scientific irrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material for rational purposes. 
 
-I chose fundamental philosophy as my primary subject of investigation. 
-Society presses me to accept all sorts of beliefs. At one time it would have 
-pressed me to believe that the earth was flat; then it reversed itself and 
-demanded that I believe the earth is round. The majority of Americans still 
-consider it \enquote{necessary} to believe in God; but the Soviet government has 
-managed to function for decades with an atheistic philosophy. Thus, which 
-beliefs should I accept? My analysis is presented in writings entitled 
-\essaytitle{Philosophy Proper}, \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs}, and 
-\essaytitle{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}. 
-The question of whe\-ther a given belief is valid 
-depends on the issue of whether there is a realm beyond my \enquote{immediate 
-experience.} Does the \textsc{Empire State Building} continue to exist even when I 
-am not looking at it? If such a question can be asked, there must indeed be 
-a realm beyond my experience, because otherwise the phrase \enquote{a realm 
-beyond my experience} could not have any meaning. (Russell's theory of 
-descriptions does not apply in this case.) But if the assertion that there is a 
-realm beyond my experience is true merely because it is meaningful, it 
-cannot be substantive; it must be a definitional trick. In general, beliefs 
-depend on the assertion of the existence of a realm beyond my experience, 
-an assertion which is nonsubstantive. Thus, beliefs are nonsubstantive or 
-meaningless; they are definitional tricks. Psychologically, when I believe that 
-the \textsc{Empire State Building} exists even though I am not looking at it, I 
-imagine the \textsc{Empire State Building}, and I have the attitude toward this 
-mental picture that it is a perception rather than a mental picture. The 
-attitude involved is a self-deceiving psychological trick which corresponds to 
-the definitional trick in the belief assertion. The conclusion is that all beliefs 
-are inconsistent or self-deceiving. It would be beside the point to doubt 
-beliefs, because whatever their connotations may be, logically beliefs are 
-nonsense, and their negations are nonsense also. 
+The other initial subject of investigation I chose was art. The art which claims to have cognitive value is already demolished by my philosophical results. However, art at its most distinctive does not need to claim cognitive value; its value is claimed to be entertainmental or amusemental. What about art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely subjective. (Call these experiences \term{brend.}) The difference between brend and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to overlook their brend, and they do so because of the same factors which perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning which causes one to venerate \enquote{great art} is also a conditioning to dismiss one's own brend. If one can become aware of one's brend without the distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's brend is superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality which completely transcends art. 
 
-The important consequence of my philosophy is the rejection of truth 
-as an intellectual modality. I conclude that an intellectual activity's claim to 
-have objective value should not depend on whether it is true; and also that 
-an activity may perfectly well employ false statements and still have 
-objective value. I have developed activities which use mental capabilities that 
-are excluded by a truth-oriented approach: descriptions of imaginary 
-phenomena, the deliberate adoption of false expectations, the thinking of 
-contradictions, and meanings which are reversed by the reader's mental 
-reactions; as well as illusions, the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs, and 
-phrases whose meaning is stipulated to be the associations they evoke. It 
-must be clear that these activities are not in any way whatever a return to 
-pre-scientific irrationalism. My philosophy demolishes astrology even more 
-than it does astronomy. The irrationalist is out to deceive you; he wants you 
-to believe that his superstitions are truths. My activities, on the other hand, 
-explicitly state that they are using non-true material. My intent is not to get 
-you to believe that superstitions are truths, but to exploit non-true material 
-for rational purposes. 
+Thus, I reject art as an intellectual or cultural modality. In rejecting truth, I advocated in its place intellectual activities which have an objective value independent of truth. In rejecting art, I do not propose that it be replaced with any objective activity at all. Rather, I advocate that the individual become aware of his just-likings for what they are, and allow them to come out. If I succeed in getting the individual to recognize his own just-likings, then I will have given him infinitely more than any artist ever can. 
 
-The other initial subject of investigation I chose was art. The art which 
-claims to have cognitive value is already demolished by my philosophical 
-results. However, art at its most distinctive does not need to claim cognitive 
-value; its value is claimed to be entertainmental or amusemental. What about 
-art whose justification is simply that people like it? Consider things which 
-are just liked, or whose value is purely subjective. I point out that each 
-individual already has experiences, prior to art, whose value is purely 
-subjective. (Call these experiences \term{brend.}) The difference between brend 
-and art is that in art, the thing valued is separated from the valuing of it and 
-turned into an object which is urged on other people. Individuals tend to 
-overlook their brend, and they do so because of the same factors which 
-perpetuate art. These factors include the relation between the socialization 
-of the individual and the need for an escape from work. The conditioning 
-which causes one to venerate \enquote{great art} is also a conditioning to dismiss 
-one's own brend. If one can become aware of one's brend without the 
-distortion produced by this conditioning, one finds that one's brend is 
-superior to any art, because it has a level of personalization and originality 
-which completely transcends art. 
+We are not finished with art, however. Ever since art began to disintegrate as an institution, modern art has become more and more of a repository for activities which represent pure waste, but which counterfeit innovation and objective value. A two-way process is involved here. On the one hand, the modern artist, faced with the increasing gratuitousness of his profession, desperately incorporates superficial references to science in his products in the hope of intimidating his audience. On the other hand, art itself has become an institution which invests waste with legitimacy and even prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game. What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call the result a \enquote{modern poem,} people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets. 
 
-Thus, I reject art as an intellectual or cultural modality. In rejecting 
-truth, I advocated in its place intellectual activities which have an objective 
-value independent of truth. In rejecting art, I do not propose that it be 
-replaced with any objective activity at all. Rather, I advocate that the 
-individual become aware of his just-likings for what they are, and allow them 
-to come out. If I succeed in getting the individual to recognize his own 
-just-likings, then I will have given him infinitely more than any artist ever 
-can. 
-
-We are not finished with art, however. Ever since art began to 
-disintegrate as an institution, modern art has become more and more of a 
-repository for activities which represent pure waste, but which counterfeit 
-innovation and objective value. A two-way process is involved here. On the 
-one hand, the modern artist, faced with the increasing gratuitousness of his 
-profession, desperately incorporates superficial references to science in his 
-products in the hope of intimidating his audience. On the other hand, art 
-itself has become an institution which invests waste with legitimacy and even 
-prestige; and it offers instant rewards to people who wish to play the game. 
-What is innovation in modern art? You take a poem by Shelly, cut it up into 
-little pieces, shake the pieces up in a box, then draw them out and write 
-down whatever is on them in the order in which they are drawn. If you call 
-the result a \enquote{modern poem,} people will suddenly be awed by it, whereas 
-they would not have been awed otherwise. This sort of innovation is utterly 
-mechanical and superficial. When artists incorporate scientific references in 
-their products, the process is similarly a mechanical, superficial 
-amalgamation of routine artistic material with current gadgets. 
-
-Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between 
-the products which result from this attempt to \enquote{save} art, and activities in 
-the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse 
-activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art 
-products which are claimed to be \enquote{scientific} and therefore objectively 
-valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked 
-about art products. 
+Now there may be some confusion as to what the difference is between the products which result from this attempt to \enquote{save} art, and activities in the intellectual modality which I favor. There may be a tendency to confuse activities which are neither science nor art, but have objective value, with art products which are claimed to be \enquote{scientific} and therefore objectively valuable. To dispel this confusion, the following questions may be asked about art products. 
 \begin{enumerate}[itemsep=3pt, parsep=0pt, topsep=3pt, leftmargin=1cm]
-\item If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be 
-worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to \enquote{carry} it? 
+\item If the product were not called art, would it immediately be seen to be worthless? Does the product rely on artistic institutions to \enquote{carry} it? 
 
-\item Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific 
-discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the 
-field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, 
-why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it 
-only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to 
-perform \enquote{Swan Lake} in order to do antigravity experiments? 
+\item Suppose that the artist claims that his product embodies major scientific discoveries, as in the case of a ballet dancer who claims to be working in the field of antigravity ballet. If the dancer really has an antigravity device, why can it only work in a ballet theater? Why can it only be used to make dancers jump higher? Why do you have to be able to perform \enquote{Swan Lake} in order to do antigravity experiments? 
 \end{enumerate}
-To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to 
-isolate the active principle---not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo. 
-
-Both of these sets of questions make the same point, from somewhat 
-different perspectives. Given an individual with a product to offer, does he 
-actively seek out the lady art reporters, the public relations contracts, the 
-museum officials, or does he actively dissociate himself from them? Does he 
-seek artistic legitimation of his product, or does he reject it? The objective 
-activities which I have developed stand on their own feet. They are not art, 
-and to construe them as art would make it impossible to comprehend them. 
+To use a phrase from medical research, I contend that a real scientist would seek to isolate the active principle---not to obscure it with non-functional mumbo-jumbo. 
 
-A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. 
-Until now, this modality has involved the construction of ideas such that the 
-very possibility of thinking these ideas is a significant phenomenon. In other 
-words, the modality has consisted of the invention of mental abilities. The 
-ideas involve physical language, that is, language which occurs in beliefs 
-about the physical world. Such language is philosophically meaningless, but 
-it has connotations provided by the psychological trick involved in believing. 
-The connotations are what are utilized; factual truth is irrelevant. Then, the 
-ideas cannot be reduced to the mechanical manipulation of marks or 
-counters---unlike ordinary mathematics. Also, logical truth, which happens to 
-be discredited by my philosophical results, is irrelevant to the ideas. 
+Both of these sets of questions make the same point, from somewhat different perspectives. Given an individual with a product to offer, does he actively seek out the lady art reporters, the public relations contracts, the museum officials, or does he actively dissociate himself from them? Does he seek artistic legitimation of his product, or does he reject it? The objective activities which I have developed stand on their own feet. They are not art, and to construe them as art would make it impossible to comprehend them. 
 
-But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it 
-must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something 
-which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful 
-independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. 
+A definition of the intellectual modality which I favor is now in order. Until now, this modality has involved the construction of ideas such that the very possibility of thinking these ideas is a significant phenomenon. In other words, the modality has consisted of the invention of mental abilities. The ideas involve physical language, that is, language which occurs in beliefs about the physical world. Such language is philosophically meaningless, but it has connotations provided by the psychological trick involved in believing. The connotations are what are utilized; factual truth is irrelevant. Then, the ideas cannot be reduced to the mechanical manipulation of marks or counters---unlike ordinary mathematics. Also, logical truth, which happens to be discredited by my philosophical results, is irrelevant to the ideas. 
 
-We can now consider the following principle. \enquote{spontaneously and 
-without any prompting: to sweep human culture aside and to carry out 
-elaborate, completely self-justifying activities.} Relative to the social context 
-of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to 
-respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary 
-antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, 
-it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. 
-In the light of \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} and the \term{brend} theory, however, 
-the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted 
-correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The 
-activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be 
-standardized. 
+But the defining requirement of the modality is that each activity in it must have objective value. The activity must provide one with something which is useful irrespective of whether one likes it; that is, which is useful independently of whether it produces emotional gratification. 
 
-The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism},
-\essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. 
-\essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very 
-possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an 
-activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional 
-gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena 
-with the thinking of contradictions. It led to \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed 
-Memories}, which in turn led to \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}.
-With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications 
-outside itself. 
+We can now consider the following principle---\enquote{spontaneously and without any prompting: to sweep human culture aside and to carry out elaborate, completely self-justifying activities.} Relative to the social context of the individual's activities, this principle is absurd. We have no reason to respect the eccentric hobbyist, or the person who engages in arbitrary antisocial acts. If an action is to have more than merely personal significance, it must have a social justification, as is explained in On Social Recognition. In the light of \essaytitle{The Flaws Underlying Beliefs} and the \term{brend} theory, however, the principle mentioned above does become valid when it is interpreted correctly, because it becomes necessary to invent ends as well as means. The activity must provide an objective value, but this value will no longer be standardized. 
 
-\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963}
-uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental 
-reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Mem\-or\-ies}, and this led 
-in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}.
+The modality I favor is best exemplified by \essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism}, \essaytitle{Concept Art}, and the \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}. \essaytitle{Energy Cube Org\-an\-ism} is a perfect example of ideas such that the very possibility of thinking them is a significant phenomenon. It is also a perfect example of an activity which is useful irrespective of whether it provides emotional gratification. It combines the description of imaginary physical phenomena with the thinking of contradictions. It led to \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed Memories}, which in turn led to \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions}. With this last writing, it becomes obvious that the activity has applications outside itself. 
 
-The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} 
-was intended to exploit the realization that humans are the most 
-advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model 
-of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, 
-the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically 
-impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I 
-have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely 
-accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension 
-of normal beliefs to produce its effects. 
+\essaytitle{Concept Art}\footnote{published in An Anthology ed. LaMonte Young, 1963} uses linguistic expressions which are changed by the reader's mental reactions. It led to \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Mem\-or\-ies}, and this led in turn to \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration}.
 
-{\sloppy \essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in 
-Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies} (1966). In 
-this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as 
-formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two 
-subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its 
-potential applications in conjunction with science. 
-\essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical 
-possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses.
-\essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences 
-of the logically impossible which 
-we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us 
-to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the 
-logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to 
-obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are 
-\enquote{admissible.} The theory investigates the implications of admitting some 
-contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of 
-many-valued numbers is also presented. \par}
+The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model}\footnote{published in I-KON, Vol. 1, No. 5} was intended to exploit the realization that humans are the most advanced machines (or technology) that we have. I wanted to build a model of a machine out of humans, using a minimum of non-human props. Further, the machine modelled was to have capabilities which are physically impossible according to present-day science. I still think that the task as I have defined it is an excellent one; but the model does not yet completely accomplish the objective. The present model uses the deliberate suspension of normal beliefs to produce its effects. 
 
-The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to 
-\essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose 
-significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay 
-defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it 
-impossible for physicists to \enquote{construct the object from experience.} Finally, 
-\essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of 
-false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I 
-favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not 
-generated a series of applications as the other activities have. 
+\slop{\essaytitle{Post-Formalism in Constructed Memories} and \essaytitle{Studies in Constructed Memories} together make up \booktitle{Mathematical Studies} (1966). In this monograph, the emphasis was on extending the idea of mathematics as formalistic games to games involving subjectivity and contradiction. In two subsequent monographs, the material was developed so as to bring out its potential applications in conjunction with science. \essaytitle{Subjective Propositional Vibration} investigates the logical possibilities of expressions which are changed by the reader's mental responses. \essaytitle{The Logic of Admissible Contradictions} starts with the experiences of the logically impossible which we have when we suffer certain perceptual illusions. These illusions enable us to imagine certain logical impossibilities just as clearly as we imagine the logically possible. The monograph models the content of these illusions to obtain a system of logic in which some (but not all) contradictions are \enquote{admissible.} The theory investigates the implications of admitting some contradictions for the admissibility of other contradictions. A theory of many-valued numbers is also presented.}
 
-To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They 
-are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities 
-having objective value, together with each individual's brend. Consider the 
-individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the 
-significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the 
-business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of 
-the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded 
-the wrong things, as I argued in \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}. But in addition, the 
-institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual 
-modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to 
-prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which 
-I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official
-intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot 
-be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the 
-beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is 
-presumably not inherent in my intellectual modality; but under present 
-social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. 
+The \essaytitle{Perception-Dissociator Model} led to \essaytitle{The Perception-Dissociation of Physics.} Again, here is an essay whose significance lies in the very possibility of thinking the ideas at all. The essay defines a change in the pattern of experience which would make it impossible for physicists to \enquote{construct the object from experience.} Finally, \essaytitle{Mock Risk Games} is the activity which involves the deliberate adoption of false expectations. It is on the borderline of the intellectual modality which I favor, because it seems to me to have objective value, and yet has not generated a series of applications as the other activities have. 
 
+To summarize my general outlook, truth and art are discredited. They are replaced by an intellectual modality consisting of non-true activities having objective value, together with each individual's brend. Consider the individual who wishes to go into my intellectual modality. What is the significance to him of the academic world, professional occupations, and the business of scholarships, fellowships, and grants? From the perspective of the most socially important tasks, these institutions have always rewarded the wrong things, as I argued in \essaytitle{On Social Recognition}. But in addition, the institutions as now organized are obstacles specifically to my intellectual modality. In fact, society in general has the effect of a vast conspiracy to prevent one from achieving the kind of consequential intellectual play which I advocate. The categories of thought which are obligatory in the official intellectual world and the media are categories in which my outlook cannot be conceived. And here is where the creep practices mentioned at the beginning of this essay become important. Isolation from society is presumably not inherent in my intellectual modality; but under present social conditions isolation is a prerequisite for its existence. 
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/essays/letters.tex b/essays/letters.tex
index fcb49d8..7cc781e 100644
--- a/essays/letters.tex
+++ b/essays/letters.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-\Chp{Letters}
+\chapter{Letters}
 
-\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, Mass., \\ dated 11/8/62}}
+\section{Letter from Terry Riley, Paris, to Henry Flynt, Cambridge, Mass., \\ dated 11/8/62}
 
 One day a little boy got up and looked at his toys, appraised them and decided they were of no value to him so he did them in. Seeing that others were blindly and blissfully enjoying theirs he offered them a long and \enquote{radical new theory} of \enquote{pure recreation} for their enjoyment but before he let them in for this highly secret and \enquote{revolutionary theory} they should follow his example and partake of a little 20th C. iconoclasm. From those that balked he removed the label \enquote{avant-garde} and attached the label \enquote{traditionalist} or if they were already labeled \enquote{traditionalist} he added one more star. If they accepted they got a \enquote{hip} rating with gold cluster and if they comprehended the worth of his theory well enough to destroy their own art they would be awarded assignments to destroy those works whose designers were no longer around to speak out in their behalf. 
 
@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ will show us how to really enjoy ourselves. Whooopeeee \vfill\signoffnote{[Terry
 
 \clearpage
 
-\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62}}
+\section{Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 8/13/62}
 
-\vfill \noindentDear Henry, \\perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage \& Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding \enquote{new} ideas has not shown too much more than that it has become established as a traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand way---but what I mean by \enquote{new ideas} is not only what you might call\enquote{Concept Art} but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants \enquote{experience} one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a position difficult if not impossible to accept with large \enquote{idea} ambitions. So one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and duration outside the art---jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a form of art history. 
+\vfill \noindent Dear Henry, \\
+perhaps the desirability of certain kinds of experience in art is not important. The problem has been for some time one of ideas---those most admired are the ones with the biggest, most incisive ideas (e.g. Cage \& Duchamp). The mere exertion in the direction of finding \enquote{new} ideas has not shown too much more than that it has become established as a traditional method; not much fruit has appeared on this vine. Also it can't be avoided that this is an academic approach which presupposes a history to react against---what I mean here is the kind of continuity one is aware of when involved in this activity: it just seems academic (if the term can somehow be used without so much emotion attached to it). The difficulty with new ideas is that they are too hard to manufacture. Even the best have only had a few good ones. (I suppose none of this is very clear and I can't seem to get in the mood to do any more than put it down in an off-hand way---but what I mean by \enquote{new ideas} is not only what you might call\enquote{Concept Art} but rather effecting changes in the structures of art forms more than any specific content or forms) Once one is committed to attempt these efforts---and tries it for a while---one becomes aware that if one wants \enquote{experience} one must repeat himself until other new things occur: a position difficult if not impossible to accept with large \enquote{idea} ambitions. So one remains idle, repeats things, or finds some form of concentration and duration outside the art---jazz, chess, whatever. I think that today art is a form of art history. 
 
 I don't think entertainment solves the problem presented by avant gard art since entertainment has mostly to do with replacing that part of art which is now hard to get---i.e. experience. It seems to me that to be concerned with \enquote{just liked} things as you present it is to avoid such things as tradition in art (some body of stuff to react against---to be thought of as opponent or memory or however). As I said before, I for one am not so self-sufficient and when avoiding \enquote{given} structures, e.g. art, or even the most tedious and decorous forms of social intercourse, I am bored. If I need concentration, which I do, I can't think of anything on my own as good as chess. 
 
@@ -26,28 +27,27 @@ One accepts language, one accepts logic.
 
 \clearpage
 
-\Sec{}
+\section{}
 
 {\raggedleft \parbox{2.5in}{\textsc{From "Culture" to Veramusement} \\Boston--New York \\\textsc{Press Release:} for March--April, 1963 \par}\vskip 1em}
 
-Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the slogans \textsc{Demolish serious culture! / Destroy art!} ; \textsc{Demolish art museums! / No more art!} ;\textsc{Demolish concert halls! / Demolish Lincoln Center!}and handing out announcements of Flynt's lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum official came out and imperiously told the pickets that he was going to straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picket who had obtained police permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. It was found that the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the viciousness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places. 
+Henry Flynt, Tony Conrad, and Jack Smith braved the cold to demonstrate against Serious Culture (and art) on Wednesday, February 27. They began at the Museum of Modern Art at 1:30 p.m., picketing with signs bearing the slogans \textsc{Demolish serious culture! / Destroy art!} ; \textsc{Demolish art museums! / No more art!} ; \textsc{Demolish concert halls! / Demolish Lincoln Center!}and handing out announcements of Flynt's lecture the next evening. Benjamin Patterson came up to give encouragement. There was much spontaneous interest among people around and in the Museum. At about 1:50, a corpulent, richly dressed Museum official came out and imperiously told the pickets that he was going to straighten them out, that the Museum had never been picketed, that it could not be picketed without its permission, that it owned the sidewalk, and that the pickets would have to go elsewhere. The picket who had obtained police permission for the demonstration was immediately dispatched to call the police about the matter, while the other two stood aside. It was found that the Museum official had not told the truth; and the picketing was resumed. People who care about the rights of pickets generally should recognize the viciousness of, and oppose, the notion that picketing can only be at the permission of the establishment being picketed. (As for previous picketing of the Museum, it is a matter of record.) Interest in the demonstration increased; people stopped to ask questions and talk. There was a much greater demand for announcements than could be supplied. Some people indicated their sympathy with the demonstrators. The demonstrators then went on to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Because of the unexpected requirement of a permit to picket on a park street, they had to picket on Lexington Avenue, crossing 82nd Street. As a result they were far from the fools lined up to worship the Mona Lisa, but there was still interest. Finally, they went to Philharmonic Hall. Because of the time, not many people were there, but still there was interest; people stopped to talk and wanted more announcements than were available. The demonstrations ended at 3:45 p.m. Photos of the pickets were taken at all three places. 
 
 On Thursday evening, February 28, at Walter DeMaria's loft, Henry Flynt gave a long lecture expositing the doctrine the Wednesday demonstrations were based on. On entering the lecture room, the visitor found himself stepping in the face of a Mona Lisa print placed as the doormat. To one side was an exhibition of demonstration photos and so forth. Behind the lecturer was a large picture of Viadimir Mayakovsky, while on either side were the signs used in the demonstrations, together with one saying \textsc{Veramusement---Not culture}. About 20 people came to the lecture. The lecturer showed first the suffering caused by Serious-Cultural snobbery, by its attempts to force individuals in line with things supposed to have objective validity, but actually representing only alien subjective tastes sanctioned by tradition. He then showed that artistic categories have disintegrated, and that their retention has become obscurantist. (He showed that the purpose of didactic art is better served by documentaries.) Finally, in the most intellectually sophisticated part of the lecture, he showed the superiority of each individual's veramusement (partially defined on the lecture announcement\editornote{The comment on the announcement read:\begin{quotation}	\enquote{\textsc{Veramusement}} is every doing of an individual which is not naturally physiologically necessary (or harmful), is not for the satisfaction of a social demand, is not a means, does not involve competition; is done entirely because he just likes it as he does it, without any consciousness that anything is not-obligated-by-himself; and is not special exertion. (And is done and \enquote{then} turns out to be in the category of \enquote{veramusement})\end{quotation}	Additionally, \essaytitle{My New Concept of General Acognitive Culture}, in the Appendix, provides additional explication of what is effectively \term{veramusement} or \term{brend}.}) to institutionalized amusement activities (which impose foreign tastes on the individual) and indeed to all \enquote{culture} the lecture was concerned with. After the lecture, Flynt told how his doctrine was anticipated by little known ideas of Mayakovsky, Dziga Vertov, and their group, as related in Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs and elsewhere. He touched on the Wednesday demonstrations. He spoke of George Maciunas' \textsc{Fluxus}, with which all this is connected. Several people at the lecture congratulated Flynt on the clarity of the presentation and logicality of the arguments. Photos were taken. 
 
 \vfill
 
-\Sec{\normalsize Statement of November 1963}
+\section{Statement of November 1963}
 
 Back in March 1963, I sent the first \textsc{FCTB\editornote{From Culture To Brend?} Press Release}, about FCTB's February picketing and lecture, to all the communications media, including the New Yorker. It is so good that the New Yorker wanted to use it, but they didn't want to give FCTB any free publicity; so they finally published an inept parody of it, in the October 12, 1963 issue, pp. 49--51. They changed my last name to Mackie, changed February 27 to September 25, the Museum of Modern Art to a church, changed our slogans to particularly idiotic ones (although they got in '\textsc{No More Art/Culture?}', later on), and added incidents; but the general outlines, and the phrases lifted verbatim from the \textsc{FCTB Release}, make the relationship clear.---Henry Flynt 
 
 \clearpage
 
-\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 3/6/63}}
-
+\section{Letter from Bob Morris to Henry Flynt, dated 3/6/63}
 
 \vfill 
 
-\noindentHenry, \\\\Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I didn't send them. Don't know if I can make it any clearer\ldots actually I keep thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating Veramusement, stating clearly what it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or \enquote{intersect} one or another or several activities. You have discredited activities---like art, competitive games---as pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing arguments which are external to \enquote{experiencing} these activities (e.g. chess is bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which doesn't fit you)\ldots well it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace any cultural form because it has no external \enquote{edges} but rather by definition can occur anywhere anytime anyplace (By the way I want to say here that its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable---but I can't at the moment really say why.) It seems that you have these two things going: Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, entertainment, that have to do with society and I don't think that the exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don't shudder at that word, but I can see you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind of double aspect of the personality (which he called the \enquote{me} and the \enquote{I} \ldots can't remember his book, something like \booktitle{Mind, Self, and Society}). 
+\noindent Henry, \\\\Received your note this morning. I had written down a few things about the lecture the very night I got home but decided they were not very clear so I didn't send them. Don't know if I can make it any clearer\ldots actually I keep thinking that I must have overlooked something because the objection I have to make seems too obvious. You spend much time and effort locating Veramusement, stating clearly what it is not, and stating that it is, if I get it, of the essence of an awareness, rather memory, of an experience which cannot be predicted and therefore cannot be located or focused by external activities. And, in fact, as you said, may cut across, or \enquote{intersect} one or another or several activities. You have discredited activities---like art, competitive games---as pseudo work or unsatisfactory recreation by employing arguments which are external to \enquote{experiencing} these activities (e.g. chess is bad because why agree to some arbitrary standard of performance which doesn't fit you)\ldots well it seems to me that Veramusement could never replace any cultural form because it has no external \enquote{edges} but rather by definition can occur anywhere anytime anyplace (By the way I want to say here that its existence as a past tense or memory I find objectionable---but I can't at the moment really say why.) It seems that you have these two things going: Veramusement, that has to do with experience, and art, work, entertainment, that have to do with society and I don't think that the exposition of how the two things are related has been very clear. George Herbert Mead, an early Pragmatist (don't shudder at that word, but I can see you throwing up your hands in despair) talked about this relation as a kind of double aspect of the personality (which he called the \enquote{me} and the \enquote{I} \ldots can't remember his book, something like \booktitle{Mind, Self, and Society}). 
 
 I thought you presented the lecture very well, but towards the end I was getting too tired to listen very carefully and I am sorry because this was the newest writing. I would like very much to read this part, i.e. that which dealt with the evolution of work, automation and the liberation from drudgery---send me a copy if you can. 
 
@@ -55,13 +55,22 @@ I thought you presented the lecture very well, but towards the end I was getting
 
 \signoff{Best regards,}\signoff{Bob Morris}
 
-\clearpage\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Walter DeMaria to Henry Flynt, dated 3/12/63}}
+\clearpage
+\section{Letter from Walter DeMaria to Henry Flynt, dated 3/12/63}
 
 \vfill 
 
 \noindent Henry 
 
-\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c }	\redact{Jazz} & 	\redact{Cage} & 	\redact{"Folk Music"} & 	\redact{Communism} & 		\begin{tabular}{ c }			(anti-art?) \\			----------------- \\			(communism) \\		\end{tabular} \\\end{tabular}\\\noindentI've been along this road too. \\Yes I certainly do see the harmfullness of serious culture. My favorite movies are plain documentaries. 
+\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c }
+\redact{Jazz} & \redact{Cage} & \redact{"Folk Music"} & \redact{Communism} & 
+	\begin{tabular}{ c } (anti-art?) \\	
+		----------------- \\	
+		(communism) \\	
+	\end{tabular} \\
+\end{tabular} \\
+\noindent I've been along this road too. \\
+Yes I certainly do see the harmfullness of serious culture. My favorite movies are plain documentaries. 
 
 \vfill
 
@@ -80,9 +89,8 @@ I thought you presented the lecture very well, but towards the end I was getting
 
 \clearpage
 
-\Sec{}
 
-\Sec{{\normalsize Letter from Diane Wakoski to Henry Flynt, dated 3/18/63}}
+\section{\normalsize Letter from Diane Wakoski to Henry Flynt, dated 3/18/63}
 
 \vfill\vfill
 
@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ All best wishes.
 
 \clearpage
 
-\Sec{}
+\section*{}
 
 \vfill
 
diff --git a/essays/mathematical_studies.tex b/essays/mathematical_studies.tex
index 9674c41..bfae1b5 100644
--- a/essays/mathematical_studies.tex
+++ b/essays/mathematical_studies.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\Chp{1966 Mathematical Studies: Introduction}
+\chapter{1966 Mathematical Studies: Introduction}
 
 Pure mathematics is the one activity which is intrinsically formalistic. It is the one activity which brings out the practical value of formal manipulations. Abstract games fit in perfectly with the tradition and rationale of pure mathematics; whereas they would not be appropriate in any other discipline. Pure mathematics is the one activity which can appropriately develop through innovations of a formalistic character. 
 
diff --git a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
index cf136a6..091cd7a 100644
--- a/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophical_reflections.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\Chp{Philosophical Reflections I}
+\chapter{Philosophical Reflections I}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item If language is nonsense, why do we seem to have it? How do these intricate pseudo-significant structures arise? If beliefs are self-deceiving, why are they there? Why are we so skilled in the self-deceptive reflex that I find in language and belief? Why are we so fluent in thinking in self-vitiating concepts? Granting that language and belief are mistakes, are mistakes of this degree of complexity made for nothing? Is not the very ability to concoct an apparently significant, self-vitiating and self-deceiving structure a transcendent ability, one that points to something non-immediate? Do not these conceptual gymnastics, even if self-vitiating, make us superior to the mindless animals? 
diff --git a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
index dc037c5..e122d29 100644
--- a/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
+++ b/essays/philosophy_proper.tex
@@ -1,17 +1,6 @@
+\chapter{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-\Chp{Philosophy Proper (\enquote{Version 3,} 1961)}{Philosophy Proper}
-
-\Ssc{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
+\subsection{Chapter 1: Introduction (Revised, 1973)}{1: Introduction}
 
 This monograph defines philosophy as such---philosophy proper---to be an inquiry as to which beliefs are \enquote{true,} or right. The right beliefs are tentatively defined to be \stress{the beliefs one does not deceive oneself by holding.}Although beliefs will be regarded as mental acts, they will be identified by their propositional formulations. Provisionally, beliefs may be taken as corresponding to \stress{non-tautologous propositions.}
 
@@ -47,7 +36,8 @@ The scientist's non-cognitive motive for believing differs from the non-cognitiv
 
 \signoffnote{(Note: Chapters 2--7 were written in 1961, at a time when I used unconventional syntax and punctuation. They are printed here without change.)}
 
-\clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}\SUBSEC{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
+\clearpage\section{The Linguistic Solution of Properly Philosophical Problems}
+\subsection{Chapter 2: Preliminary Concepts}{2. Preliminary Concepts}
 
 In this part of the book I will be concerned to solve the problem of philosophy proper, the problem of which beliefs are right, by discussing language, certain linguistic expressions. To motivate what follows I might tentatively say that I will consider beliefs as represented by statements, formulations of them (for example, \enquote{Other persons have minds} as representing the belief that other persons have minds), so that the problem will be which statements are true. Actually, to solve this problem we will be driven far beyond answers to the effect that given statements are true (or false). 
 
diff --git a/essays/photos.tex b/essays/photos.tex
index 1824537..2b5e6a9 100644
--- a/essays/photos.tex
+++ b/essays/photos.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\Chp{Protest Photographs}
+\chapter{Protest Photographs}
 
 \photopage{img/nomoreart01}{2/22/1963}{Henry Flynt and Jack Smith demonstrate against Lincoln Center, February 22, 1963}{Tony Conrad}
 
diff --git a/essays/some_objections.tex b/essays/some_objections.tex
index 4d49830..ff4b8f0 100644
--- a/essays/some_objections.tex
+++ b/essays/some_objections.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\Chp{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
+\chapter{Some Objections to My Philosophy}
 
 \begin{enumerate}[label=\textbf{\Alph*.}, wide, nosep, itemsep=1em]
 \item The predominant attitude toward philosophical questions in educated circles today derives from the later Wittgenstein. Consider the philosopher's question of whether other people have minds. The Wittgensteinian attitude is that in ordinary usage, statements which imply that other people have minds are not problematic. Everybody knows that other people have minds. To doubt that other people have minds, as a philosopher might do, is simply to misuse ordinary language.\footnote{See \booktitle{Philosophical Investigations}, \S 420.} Statements which imply that other people have minds works perfectly well in the context for which they were intended. When philosophers find these statements problematic, it is because they subject the statements to criticism by logical standards which are irrelevant and extraneous to ordinary usage.\footnote{\S \S 402, 412, 119, 116.}
diff --git a/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex b/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex
index 2bc7484..d782123 100644
--- a/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex
+++ b/essays/studies_in_constructed_memories.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-\Chp{Studies in Constructed Memories}
+\chapter{Studies in Constructed Memories}
 
-\Sec{Introduction}
+\section{Introduction}
 
 The memory of a conscious organism is a phenomenon in which 
 interrelations of mind, language, and the rest of reality are especially evident. 
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ while $A_{a_3}$, remained only a possibility.
 
 Enough concepts are now at hand for the studies to begin in earnest. 
 
-\Sec{M-Memories}
+\section{M-Memories}
 
 \newcommand{\definition}{\textbf{Definition.}}
 \newcommand{\assumption}[1]{\textit{Assumption #1.}}
@@ -249,8 +249,7 @@ thrust is rather toward the modern axiomatic systems. The reasoning is
 loose, but not arbitrary. And the investigation will become increasingly 
 mathematical. 
 
-
-\Sec{D-Memories}
+\section{D-Memories}
 
 \begin{hangers}
 \definition\ A \term{D-Memory} is a memory such that measured past time 
@@ -407,7 +406,7 @@ accept than the other features of the D-Memory. And the thinking of $S_j$ has
 to be one of the events for the organism to be aware of the infall. 
 \end{hangers}
 
-\Sec{$\Phi$-Memories}
+\section{$\Phi$-Memories}
 I will conclude these studies with two complex constructions. 
 
 \begin{hangers}
diff --git a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
index 3e5a6e1..ea04bf1 100644
--- a/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
+++ b/essays/walking_through_walls.tex
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-\Chp{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
+\chapter{Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls}
 
 We read that in the Middle Ages, people found it impossible not to believe that they would be struck by lightning if they uttered a blasphemy. Yet I utterly disbelieve that I will be struck by lightning if I utter a blasphemy. Beliefs such as the one at issue here will be called fearful beliefs. Elsewhere, I have argued that all beliefs are self-deceiving. I have also observed that there are often non-cognitive motives for holding beliefs, so that a technical, analytical demonstration that a belief is self-deceiving will not necessarily provide a sufficient motive for renouncing it. The question then arises as to why people would hold fearful beliefs. It would seem that people would readily repudiate beliefs such as the one about blasphemy as soon as there was any reason to doubt them, even if the reason was abstract and technical. Yet fearful beliefs are held more tenaciously than any others. Further, when philosophers seek examples of beliefs which one cannot afford to give up, beliefs which are not mere social conventions, beliefs which are truly objective, they invariably choose fearful beliefs.